The Power of a Few: Bureaucratic Decision-Making in the Okavango Delta

The Power of a Few: Bureaucratic Decision-Making in the Okavango DeltaAuthor(s): Laurel Abrams NemeSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 37-51Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162053 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35, I(1997), pp. 37-5I

Copyright C I997 Cambridge University Press

The Power of a Few: Bureaucratic Decision-1Making

in the Okavango Delta

by LAUREL ABRAMS NEME*

WATER is scarce yet vital in Botswana's desert climate. As one of only two perennial surface sources, the Okavango Delta has often been seen by the Government and international donors as under-utilised and ripe for development. Hence the major project proposed in the early i980s by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), albeit suspended, nearly a decade later, after both local and global protests. This article examines how a small group of state bureaucrats was able to control the decision-making process, and discusses the implications of this hegemony. It is based on research undertaken in Botswana during I99I-3 that included over I50 interviews with the members of a wide range of organisations in the public, parastatal, and private sectors.

THE OKAVANGO DELTA AND THE PROJECT

The Okavango Delta is an important and unique natural resource. It is located in the northwest corner of the country, where a single river fans out to create the largest freshwater delta in the world, covering between i 6,ooo and 22,000 square kilometres.1 An ever-changing mosaic of perennial and seasonal swamps, grasslands, intermittently flooded areas, and dry land, this oasis within the Kalahari desert serves as a magnet for many kinds of wildlife, especially when the rest of Botswana is dry. The waters here are paradoxically at their highest level during the dry season June-September) and their lowest during the wet season (November-March) because the flow from Angola to Botswana takes about six months. The Delta has been proposed as a

* International Economist at the US Treasury Department's Office of Multilateral Development Banks, Washington, DC. The author was affiliated with the University of Botswana's National Institute for Development Research and Documentation, I 99 I-3, during the fieldwork for her doctorate which she received from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in January I995. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the US Treasury Department.

1 Karen Ross, Jewel of the Kalahari: Okavango (London, I 987), p. I I 5.



38 LAUREL ABRAMS NEME

major world heritage site, and several international environmental organisations are interested in preserving its distinct ecosystem, as well as its unique and endangered residents, such as the red lechwe and sitatunga, two types of aquatic antelopes. It also provides vital sustenance and income for the inhabitants, many of whom are from minority ethnic groups.2 Villagers harvest its fish and vegetation for nourishment, crafts, construction, and medicinal purposes. In addition, flood-recession agriculture, known as melapo farming, is practised throughout the area, providing much needed food for nearby communities.

The Delta has long been viewed by some politicians and engineers as wasted, and because only about three per cent of its inflow exits the system - the remainder either evapo-transpires or percolates down into underground aquifers - several hydrologists believed the amount available for use could be increased by reducing evaporation losses. However, its unstable drainage presents many physical challenges because the location and volumes of outflow are subject to change. For example, the Thaoge River carried the bulk of the watershed's outflow to Ngami until the i 88os, when the strength of that flow shifted, leading to the drying up of that Lake until recently, when it started to refill. Currently, the main outlet is the Boro River, which runs southeast through the centre of the Delta. However, modifications in the faults or the blockage of channels with sand, debris, or papyrus could interrupt this pattern and move it to a different course.3

Figure i shows that the primary components of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project (hereinafter referred to as the SOWP) involved dredging the Boro and storing the increased flow in three reservoirs, with each benefiting a different interest. The first, near Maun, was to serve the growing population of that sizeable village. Originally, it was also supposed to supply large-scale commercial irrigation, but this was abandoned in i989 after detailed engineering studies had showed that it would not be economically feasible due to the poor quality of the soils and other factors. The second, at Matlapaneng, was to help flood-recession agriculture and to ensure that the water ultimately reaching the Maun reservoir was clean. Just before implementation in late i 990, however, this

2 Most of Botswana's citizens are members of the Tswana tribe, which has many different sub- groups, some of whom are regarded more highly than others. In Ngamiland, the district where the Okavango Delta is located, the Batawana (a Tswana sub-group) and the Bayeyi and Basarwa (non-Setswana-speaking) comprise the majority of the populace.

3 Ross, op. cit. pp. I I4-I5.



BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING IN BOTSWANA 39

FIGURE I

The Southern Okavango Planning Regiona

ANGOLA S 'W'. ZAMBIA | >-,-.--- g BlA' ~~S CNPT \/Sobe

* K~~~~~~achekabwe Shakawe

Sepupa Seronga 4... pan;;r\ten

Nokaneng

Ghanzi . ._ . .. _ ,Rn

Sehitw teng pi __;

rake Ngama 20M~~~AKGADIKGAD.!........,,-*

NGAMILA~~~~~t/DISTRICT I /REERV MAKGADtIKGADI

Veterinary C onFnce Sukwane

,fGhanzi\

\ \ ~~~~~~~~~~CENTRAL DISTRICT GHANZI DISTRICT

CENTRAL KALAHARI GAME RESERVE

0 50 100 km

a Source: World Conservation Union, The IUCN Review of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project. Final Report (Geneva, October I992).

It should be noted that the Namibian Government is currently planning to divert water from the Kavango, which directly feeds into the Okavango Delta, through a 25o km pipeline from Rundu to Grootfontein, and thence to the central area water system, which includes Windhoek.




component was dropped from the project in order to reduce costs. The third, at Sukwane, was to benefit the Orapa diamond mine.

Initially, the goals of the SOWP were viewed positively. They were supported by district officials, who favoured anything to alleviate the severe drought affecting the area during the early I 98os. Local residents also approved of the project to enhance their dwindling water supplies despite fears that the dredging would have a negative impact on the few rivers and threaten their livelihoods. Their concerns were based, in part, on the demonstrated failure and adverse effects of similar efforts undertaken from the I 930S to the I 970S.' Various environmentalists, including members of the Kalahari Conservation Society - a domestic non-governmental organisation (NGO) originally comprised primarily of white expatriates - also opposed dredging because of worries about the potential harmful consequences for the surrounding ecosystem.

The initiation of construction in the region sparked broad protests in late I990. Villagers requested that the dredging be stopped while Greenpeace International, an advocacy-oriented NGO which had been brought in by some local groups, threatened to call for a world- wide boycott of diamonds, the mainstay of Botswana's economy. This campaign, called 'diamonds are for death', was to emphasise Orapa's role, as a project beneficiary, in the destruction of the river. In response, the Government formed a high-level inter-ministerial committee, which suspended the SOWP while simultaneously commissioning an independent analysis. It believed an unbiased evaluation would help convince others, internationally and locally, of the project's soundness.

A highly critical review by Greenpeace, written following a two- week visit by non-technical personnel, was rejected by the DWA on the grounds that it failed either to substantiate criticisms with scientific evidence or to offer suggestions for design improvement. Consequently, in October i99i a second study was commissioned, to be undertaken by qualified staff from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), better known as the World Conservation Union, over a period of one year. This team recommended that the Southern

4 From I93I to I942, for example, although the colonial authorities cleared channel blockages and constructed engineering works to improve the Okavango waterways, rural people claimed that the dredging had been responsible for drying up the Gomoti, Santantadibe, and Thaoge Rivers. During I97I-3, the Anglo-American Corporation tried to redirect more water to its diamond mine at Orapa via the Mopipi reservoir, but the dredging of the Boro River and diversionary works along the Boteti River significantly altered the environment. Indeed, whenever the Boteti does have water, this is diverted to Mopipi and away from the fields of the villagers.



BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING IN BOTSWANA 4I

Okavango project should be cancelled because of deficiencies in the hydrological modelling, negative impacts on nearby residents, and community opposition. It also claimed that a more effective and less expensive alternative was available that could meet the same development goals.5 In May I992, one hour prior to the public release of the IUCN's draft report, the Government - without acknowledging the validity of the report's analysis or conclusions - announced in a carefully worded statement that 'in view of the time required to provide any solution to the urgent water supply problems in the affected areas' it would not proceed 'with the project as currently conceived'.6

IMPETUS FOR THE WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Southern Okavango project was advanced in the early I 980s by civil servants in the DWA in response to a perceived expansion in water demand, a need heightened by the severe drought crippling the country. At the same time, this proposal helped satisfy their own vested interests of extending their jurisdiction and influence over other sectors of the economy.

The DWA felt under constant pressure to develop new water supplies in response to Botswana's rapidly increasing population. Nationally, the growth rate was 3-5 per cent per annum from i98i to I 99I, and was even higher in some areas close to the Okavango Delta. For instance, in Maun, the region's largest village, it averaged about 6 per cent annually over the same period.7 The Government recognised the necessity of a reliable base for irrigation, and during the early I 980s

became determined to reduce dependence on South Africa and achieve self-sufficiency in food production. Preliminary surveys identified IO,ooo hectares of irrigable soil in the region, with the potential to produce iooOOO metric tons of food crops (about half of the country's consumption).8 The DWA foresaw that the planned expansion of the diamond mine at Orapa and the ensuing depletion of the underground aquifers would reduce or even eliminate the access of many villagers to

5 World Conservation Union, The IUCN Review of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project. Draft Final Report (Geneva, May I992), Executive Summary.

6 'Draft Report on Review of Okavango Dev. Programme Out', in Botswana Daily News (Gaborone), 22 May I992.

7 Botswana Government, Central Statistics Office, ' i99i Population Census - Preliminary Results', in Stats Brief (Gaborone), 9 I /4, I 5 October I 99 I, p. I 2.

8 World Conservation Union, The IUCN Review of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project. Final Report (Geneva, October I992), pp. 4-I 6 and 4-I 7.




reliable reserves. Because of limited surface supplies, groundwater reportedly provided only about 6o per cent of Botswana's total demand in I 990, of which less than one per cent was estimated to be rechargeable.'

It could be argued that the Southern Okavango project served an additional purpose: increasing the DWA's prestige within the state's bureaucracy. Its responsibility for the nation's water gave it a measure of control over all sectors of the economy. By working to ensure universal availability, it justified its own raison d'e'tre and improved its status within the public service. For example, it was not the inhabitants of Maun who lobbied for increased access, but rather the Department of Water Affairs that anticipated possible scarcities and decided to include them as beneficiaries. Similarly, the impetus to include large- scale irrigation probably came from the DWA. While admitting their interest, officials in the Ministry of Agriculture assert they did not initiate this component of the project.10 Further, according to the deputy managing director of Debswana, although that national diamond mining company owned by the Government of Botswana and DeBeers had proposed meeting the needs of additional operations at Orapa by extending its network of deep boreholes, the DWA preferred that the mine's supply be supplemented through the SOWP instead of using scarce groundwater.11 In an economy based on diamonds, the fact that this Department was able to dictate terms to Debswana illustrates its strong position within the Government.

The involvement of many diverse consumers reveals different motivations for the Southern Okavango project. The first was an objectively defined need for the resources it would provide. It was logical that its development be coordinated and planned by the responsible line agency. At the same time, the strategy of including most potential beneficiaries could be seen either as a clever way of building support for the project itself and/or as a means of acquiring greater jurisdiction, influence, and control within the bureaucratic hierarchy.

9 Republic of Botswana, National Development Plan 7: 1991-1997 (Gaborone, December i 99 i),

p. 275- 10 Interview with A. A. Mokgare, Principal Agricultural Economist (Planning), Ministry of

Agriculture, Gaborone, I4 December I992.

11 Interview with Ken J. Trueman, Deputy Managing Director, Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd., Gaborone, 3 November I992.




THE DWA S DOMINANCE OVER DECISION-MAKING

The civil servants in the DWA dominated the entire formulation of the SOWP. The Government's confidence in their technical expertise gave them the authority to propose actions that would seldom, if ever, be challenged. There were few either within the bureaucracy or without that had the scientific knowledge to dispute their recommendations.

Nevertheless, the DWA sought participation by others as a way to legitimise its decisions. At the beginning of the process, it established the Okavango Water Development Committee, which first met in I 982

and regularly brought together representatives of different agencies with an interest in the region. Participants varied over time, although they generally included officials from the Ministries of Finance and Development Planning, Health, Local Government and Lands, Agriculture, Works, Transport and Communications, and Commerce and Industry's Department of Wildlife and National Parks. It also included the District Officer (Lands), the DWA consultants from the Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation, the engineering firm responsible for the design and construction of the project, and a representative from the Kalahari Conservation Society. The committee held more than 20 meetings (approximately two each year) from I982

until the end of i990, when it disbanded. In addition, the DWA consulted the public through a series of kgotlas

during March I988. These village meetings were held in I I different locations in the affected region, at which time officials explained the reasons for the project, described its major components, and gave people a chance to comment. As with any major public investment in Botswana, these exchanges were considered to be a necessary part of the process of approval.

However, neither the inputs from committee members nor the opinions of villagers had much impact on the decisions taken by the Department of Water Affairs, even though doubts were raised throughout the rather lengthy formulation of the Southern Okavango project as to whether or not it was really needed. One DWA official, not directly responsible for the SOWP and without the relevant academic and scientific credentials (yet with years of hands-on experience), argued that the current water outflow from the Delta was under- estimated 'by, at the minimum, an amount equal to the supplement it is claimed can be provided by Boro dredging. In others words, there




would appear on the face of it to be no case for Boro dredging'.12 A consultant from the German assistance agency added: 'Given the quality of the database and, more particularly, the way sudden changes of regime can occur, it is optimistic to assume that the dynamics of the system will remain stable even for the lifetime of the project.'13

However, after many deliberations and meetings with some of the concerned parties - including the technical committee of the Kalahari Conservation Society - these arguments were largely rejected. Ad- ditional work undertaken by the DWA gave it further confidence in the appropriateness of its analytical methods. Even though its officers respected the views of many of their critics - a number of whom were very familiar with the Okavango - they believed their discussions illustrated a lack of understanding of hydrological and river engineering concepts and models. Because they ultimately would be held responsible for any technical decisions or recommendations, they backed their own judgements, relying on their own assessments over those who still had serious reservations.

Similarly, the DWA dismissed anxiety over the planned dredging. The Kalahari Conservation Society expressed concern because members felt its necessity was unproved.14 Villagers, too, were troubled as they believed that this would have the same adverse impact as previous schemes. In addition, some objected on religious grounds, since 'rivers are part of the Creation and that there is good reason for them to be like they are: Any fiddling with this natural course will make the river stop flowing '.15 DWA officials disregarded these apprehensions as they were convinced that the SOWP would be different from previous dredging efforts and not have the same negative effects. 16 Because of their own superior knowledge, they could reasonably disavow the scepticism of others when this conflicted with their own expert opinions.

12 P. A. Smith,' The Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development (SOIDWP) Project', Maun, June-July I 989, p. I 8.

13 Jamie Skinner, Review of Environmental Impact Studies Concerning the Southern Okavango Development Project, Botswana. Final Report (Eschborn, July I 989), Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Zusammenarbeit

(GTZ), p. 20.

14 Letter from L. G. Nchindo, Chairman, Kalahari Conservation Society, to Director, Department of Water Affairs, I 4 May I990.

15 Lejo van der Heiden, 'Report of the Village Consultation Tour in the Framework of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project', Maun, 20 May i988, p. 2.

16 Rather than describe the proposed deepening of the Boro River as 'dredging', DWA officials referred to 'channel improvements', which had more positive implications. The terminology expressed DWA's expectation that the SOWP's dredging, because it was limited in scale, was unlike previous attempts and would have only minimal impact.




A final example of the hegemony of the Department of Water Affairs was the elimination of the Matlapaneng reservoirjust before the project's scheduled implementation. After receiving bids for construction which were considered to be too high, it unilaterally decided to drop this component. Although this reduced the overall cost for the SOWP, it also erased the benefits to flood-regression agriculture and improved water quality in Maun. When the members of the advisory committee heard about this decision they suggested in November I 990

that the project be re-evaluated because its form had changed so significantly."7 But this proposal was virtually ignored, and by the time the change in design was announced, tenders had already been issued and a contractor had been selected. Shortly thereafter, mobilisation for construction began. After expending so much time and energy, the staff of the DWA were reluctant to consider any ideas that could significantly reshape their Southern Okavango project. To do so would have delayed it indefinitely and called into question their own capability, two things they were loathe to do.

Competing demands on the time of committee members gave the Department the latitude to make unilateral decisions. While the SOWP was the primary responsibility of the DWA officers, for others it was merely an additional chore. Given their various duties, there were rarely sufficient opportunities to carefully analyse and evaluate the many documents, let alone enough time to present persuasive arguments against the recommendations. The reviewers had usually only two to four weeks to submit their comments on the voluminous amount of material routinely sent out for examination. During i987, for example, more than I5 reports were circulated, sometimes two or more in the same month. In addition, inconsistent attendance made it rather difficult for outside opinions to be expressed in a timely manner. For instance, the erratic participation by the representative of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks was worrisome because it 'was one of the most affected by [these] development projects'. 18

The DWA used the involvement of others to add credibility to its decisions. Knowing that the project would be criticised for reducing seasonal flooding (which would affect plant ecology and wildlife habitat), for improving access to an ecologically sensitive area, and for permanently inundating some existing melapo land, the Department incorporated mitigating measures by planning the revegetation of

17 Department of Water Affairs, Minutes of Okavango Water Development Committee Meeting, Gaborone, I November I990, p. 4* " Ibid. 26 May i988, p. io.




affected areas and the extension of flood-recession agriculture to alternate sites. It also ordered an environmental impact assessment in i986 to dispel any doubts about ecological soundness."9 With these elements in place, it tried to get everybody 'on board' through the inter-ministerial committee, which served as a mechanism to avert future conflicts. This approach meant that once an aspect of the project had been agreed upon, members would be forced 'to go along with it', even if they still objected, because they had been part of the decision- making process.

In view of the continuing anxiety about the need for dredging, and the possibility of 'opening the door' for new incursions into the area and allowing 'extension of engineering works up the Boro axis',20 the Cabinet's approval of the feasibility studies specified that the project would not go any further into the watershed.21 However, the DWA retained the option for development, saying it did not 'rule out the possibility of undertaking works elsewhere in the Delta in the future if it can be demonstrated their environmental impact would be relatively small and the cost benefits for the good of the nation can be justified .22 Despite this failure to address its concerns, the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS) outwardly accepted this decision, stating 'that it operates in a democratic society in which Government has a duty to plan in the interests of everybody in Botswana, not only conservationists. In a democracy it is inevitable that there will be residual disagreements after decisions are made'.23 The Department's strategy paid off when the KCS forbade its Okavango branch in late i990 to criticise the dredging under its official banner.24 As a part of the process, the KCS did not want a section of its organisation to publicly reject something it had already implicity endorsed. In reaction to this prohibition, branch members opted to protest as individuals and help motivate other residents.

19 The validity of this i986 environmental impact assessment was queried by those who felt it ought not to have been undertaken by the Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation, which had such a vested interest in the project.

20 Letter from L. G. Nchindo, Chairman, Kalahari Conservation Society, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, Gaborone, 23 March i988.

21 Interview with Blackie Marole, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, Gaborone, 2i December I992.

22 Attachment to letter of i9 August i988 from M. C. Tibone, Permanent Secretary, MMRWA, to Chairman, KCS, entitled 'Comments on the Findings of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project', p. 3.

23 Kalahari Conservation Society, 'Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project', press release, Gaborone, January I 99 I.

24 Letter from Dr Karen Greer and Paul Sheller, KCS Okavango Branch, to Lieutenant- General Ian Khama, Botswana Defence Force, Maun, io December i99o.




Thus, encouraging inter-agency and public involvement meant that, when points of contention arose later in the process, participants had little leverage for dispute. Further, the inclusion of many different viewpoints added credibility to the decisions as they were taken. In Botswana's democracy, community involvement through the institution of kgotlas serves an important function in validating the decisions taken by bureaucrats. Although their technocratic bias prevented these structures from providing adequate opportunities for real feedback and debate on the project's design, they still gave the necessary political legitimacy for its implementation.

THE EROSION OF THE DWA S HEGEMONY

Local and international protests arrested the DWA's absolute control over the policy process. The Government's obligation to its democracy, along with the threat against its diamond industry, forced the Southern Okavango project to be shelved, despite its advanced stage.

Several factors initially prevented mobilisation against the SOWP. First, the crisis of the ongoing drought made any opposition seem unreasonable. In addition, there was uncertainty whether the project would actually be implemented because of the long time it took to finalist the design and begin construction. Furthermore, villagers felt powerless: in all of the i988 kgotlas 'it was more than once said that there was no need to discuss projects like this because everything was already discussed, finalized and decided upon in [the capital] Gaborone'.25 Consequently, they chose to 'exit' the system rather than expend effort on what they perceived as a worthless cause. Few attended the meetings because, at least in their eyes, the potential benefits of engaging in the debate seemed negligible.26 However, by the end of I990, the arrival of equipment openly indicated that engineers would soon make alterations to the Boro River, while the lessening of the drought removed the sense of urgency. As a result, citizens were more willing to speak out against the project.

The presence and activity of skilled organisers in Maun helped villagers express their criticisms. In particular, a number of long-term white expatriate members of the KCS's Okavango branch played a

25 Van der Heiden, op. cit. pp. I and 7. 26 Attendance at most of the kgotlas was low, except at Samedupe and Shorobe. The gatherings

at Boro and Matlapaneng failed altogether, even after rescheduling and special announcements by a government driver.




catalytic role. They pursued a two-pronged strategy of stimulating local protests while instigating international opposition. They helped arrange a public meeting on 30 November i990 to generate interest and formulate a reaction by the community. The attendance of traditional leaders at this event set an example and galvanised the rest of the populace.

It was decided that a kgotla was the appropriate mechanism for villagers to air their grievances and seek redress.27 Two were held. At the first, in December I 990, several officials from the DWA, headed by their Director, obviously felt that they had only to address minor fears coming from just a few, expatriate conservationists, not from the entire region. However, those present were furious at the absence of the appropriate highest-level authority and refused to continue without the presence of either the President or the Minister of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. The Chief terminated this meeting after less than I 5 minutes, the shortest kgotla ever. Another was called in January i99i,

this time attended by the Minister and over 700 residents, one of the largest in Botswana's history. Sitting in the hot summer sun, unprotected by shade for more than seven hours, the community demonstrated its aversion to the dredging. They rejected assurances that it would have only minimal impact, instead noting the sanctity of natural systems and their previous negative experiences.28 The consistent show of concerted opposition obliged the country's democratic leadership to listen seriously.

Simultaneously, the Okavango branch of the KCS tried to delay the project by contacting the global press to publicise the controversy.29 The media attention aroused interest abroad and stimulated the involvement of Greenpeace, whose threat to organise a diamond boycott prompted reconsideration of the proposal. It also caused the mining authorities at Orapa to distance themselves and take the role of innocent bystanders, thus removing one of the DWA's justifications. The Government of Botswana has been always anxious to protect its world-wide image, and consequently created a high-level inter- ministerial committee to formulate a response to this international attention. Two independent evaluations were commissioned in the expectation that these would validate the project's socio-economic and

27 Minutes of public meeting at Duck Inn, Maun, 30 November i990.

28 Augustine Matumo, 'Boro Dredging Suspended', in Midweek Sun (Gaborone), i6 January I99I.

29 Interview with Paul Sheller, Chairman, Kalahari Conservation Society, Okavango Branch, Maun, I2 August I992.




environmental soundness, and thus satisfy both local and global anxieties. In its invitation to Greenpeace, for instance, the Government noted it was 'confident that this project as designed represents an efficient management of water resources and its environmental impact on the delta [will be] negligible'.30

But both assessments proved to be highly critical and recommended the SOWP's cancellation. For example, the World Conservation Union estimated that without the project the outflow would be '6o MCM [million cubic metres] higher than was estimated to result from the channel dredging'.31 While the Government was able to reject Greenpeace's analysis easily because of its lack of proof, the World Conservation Union's 'international reputation for independence and scientific rigor', as well as its 'expertise relating to wetland habitats', made its advice difficult to ignore.32 This inability was particularly problematic for the DWA, whose own legitimacy had been based on its superior technical proficiency.

The suspension of the SOWP in May I 992 confirmed the Government's desire to respond to public opinion. The decision also restrained challenges to the DWA's capability and authority, and deflected doubts about its technocratic approach when considering matters of national importance. Indeed, by October 1993 the Department appeared to be admitting the validity of the World Conservation Union's analysis by starting to explore alternative strategies for Maun's water supply.33

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Southern Okavango project reveals how two factors- the importance of a Government Department's jurisdiction and its specialised capacity - can facilitate the co-optation of decision-making by a small group of public servants. In Botswana, as in many other countries, water is vital for both survival and economic development. As the responsible agency, the DWA had the political clout for virtual carte blanche over related programmes. Its position as the only public

30 Press release by C. M. Lekaukau, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, I3 December i990.

31 World Conservation Union, Final Report, pp. 4-25.

32 Blackie Marole, Acting Permanent Secretary, 'Review of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project by IUCN', Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs press release, i6 October i99i.

3 ' Long Term Water Plans Include the Delta', in Okavango Observer (Maun), 22 October I993.




institution possessing hydrological expertise justified and encouraged this control. However, its independence limited the effectiveness of consultations and reduced the influence of non-technical factors.

In Botswana, a scarcity of skills exists nationally, as evidenced by the continuing activities of expatriates in the public, parastatal, and private sectors. The fact that the Government is the main employer in the country, means that much of the know-how that does exist rests within the state's bureaucracy. By grounding their programmes in generally accepted, scientific principles, a number of key civil servants have a significant advantage in policy debates over their colleagues in other ministries, as well as NGOs, local communities, and even elected officials.34 The asymmetry tilts the balance of power and gives considerable autonomy over the entire process to the line agency. Such a technocratic bias handicaps outsiders who do not possess the same level of training. The lack of comparable credentials outside the responsible department means that, to a large extent, alternate analyses are easily dismissed as invalid. While DWA officials went through the inter-agency review and the kgotla system, their distrust of non- technical opinions limited the influence of such inputs.

Despite these deficiencies, consultations still play an important role in legitimising decisions. Botswana has strong democratic traditions, with a history of using village meetings to give local people a voice. In more recent years, however, kgotlas have become less of an avenue for feedback and more of a place to simply disseminate information about government programmes. For current arrangements to have real influence, participants in the decision-making process must be able to assert opinions which are based on their knowledgeable understanding of what is at stake. The spread of information and expertise to those outside the responsible agencies can, therefore, open up domestic structures to real external influence. The World Conservation Union's ability to bridge this gap, for example, strengthened the power of the community by making objections from the grass-roots more plausible.

The Southern Okavango project demonstrates how public involvement can be positive for decision-making by keeping the system accountable to its citizenry. External protests provided enough of a check on bureaucratic hegemony to stop the implementation of

34 The expertise possessed by civil servants puts them in a powerful position with respect to elected officials, who tend to be less educated. A survey conducted by the University of Botswana's Democracy Project in I987-8 showed that district councillors and members of parliament had an average of 84 and II -3 years of formal education, respectively, while the Government's permanent secretaries typically held a degree.



BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING IN BOTSWANA 5 I

engineering works that were ill-designed for their stated goals. Here is an illustration of how strengthening the capacity of other actors can provide an incentive for the incorporation of outside views. By so doing, these changes can enhance the prospects for environmental and social concerns to be integrated earlier in the process, and help to shift governmental decisions towards a more sustainable agenda.



Documents

The Power of a Few: Bureaucratic Decision-Making in the Okavango Delta