The Pratyabhijna and the Logical Epistemological School of Buddhism - Raffaele Torella

8/3/2019 The Pratyabhijna and the Logical Epistemological School of Buddhism - Raffaele Torella

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Andre Padoux


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Ritual and Speculationin Early Tantrism

S tud ie s in H onor o fAndre P adou x

edited byTeun Goudriaan

State University of New York Press


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Published byState University of New York Press, Albany 1992 State University of New YorkAll rights reservedPrinted in the United States of AmericaNo part of this book may be used or reproducedin any manner whatsoever without written permissionexcept in the case of brief quotations embodied incritical articles and reviews.For information, address State University of New YorkPress, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246Production by Leslie Frank-HessMarketing by Theresa A. Swierzowski

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataRitual and speculation in early tantrism: studies in honour of AndrePadoux I edited by Teun Goudriaan.p. cm. - (SUNY series in tantric studies)Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-7914-0897-3 (alk. paper). - ISBN 0-7914-0898-1 (pbk.alk. paper) (1..Tanttism-Doctrines. 2. Tantrism-Rituals. I. Padoux,Andre. II. Goudriaan, Teun. III. Series.

BL1283.845.R48 1991294.5'514-dc20 91-10169ClP

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


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CONTENTSPreface- Te u n Goudriaan- vii

Publications by Andre Padoux xii

Chapter 1-Hilene Brunner-Ji'iana and Kriya: Relation between Theory and

Practice in the Saivagamas

1

Chapter 2-Gudrun Buhnemann -On Purascarana: Kularnavarantra, Chapter 15

61

Chapter 3-Richard H. Davis-Becoming a Siva, and Acting as One in Salva Worship

107

Chapter 4 121- VrajavallabhaDviveda-"Having Become a God, He Should Sacrifice to the Gods"

Chapter 5 139- TeunGoudriaan-The Stages of Awakening in the Svacchanda-tantra

Chapter 6-Sanjukta Gupta-Yoga and Anfaryiiga in Paficaratra

175


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Chapter 7-Minoru Hara-Pasupata Studies (1)

Chapter 8 227-Paul E. Muller-Ortega-Tantric Meditation: Vocalic Beginnings

Chapter 9 247-Navjivan Rastogi-The Yogic Disciplines in the Monistic Salva Tantric

Traditions of Kashmir:Threefold, Fourfold, and Six-Limbed

Chapter 10 281-Alexis Sanderson-The Doctrines of the Malinrvijayottaratantra

Chapter 11 313-Jan A. Schoterman-The Kubjika Upanisad and Its Atharvavedic Character

Chapter 12 327-Raffaele Torella-The Pratyabhijfia and the Logical-Epistemological

School of Buddhism

~~x M7\

209


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PrefaceRitual engagement or abstract speculation about supreme truth?

The title of this book, by juxtaposing ri tual and specu la t ion , isexpressiveof one of the most intriguing characteristics of the Hindu tradition;the conviction that philosophy and ceremonial activity are not twoseparate compartments-as a modern outside observer might beinclined to think-but that, on the contrary, they should be appliedin constant interaction so as to fecundate each other. The studyof Tantric literature, especially of the earlier period of remarkablereligious inspiration is apt to illustrate this point in various ways.

The contributors to this book have dealt with several aspectsof the subject in their own way, in accordance with their distinctivepreferences. They have not been asked to follow a particular lineof argument; it seemed better to allow them full freedom within therange suggested by the general title. The result is a many-sidedorientation from the viewpoint of several Tantric schools; theremay be a certain emphasis on the speculative aspects but the ritualstructure is never entirely lost sight of.

The articles have been arranged in alphabetical order by thenames of the authors. It is a happy coincidence that the first article,by Helene Brunner, offers an encompassing study of the relationbetween "wisdom" and "action" in the Saivagama tradition, wherethese two concepts figure with special prominence. Siva himself hastwo sakUs called jf iana and k r i ya ('wisdom' and 'action').Brunner argues for the originality of this twofold expansion ofpower with respect to later conceptions of three or more Saktis.The main part of her article is devoted to an inquiry after therelationship of doctrine and rituals as described in the Agamas.It appears, surprisingly, that the two often are in clear disagreementwith each other, the ritual usually being older than the transmittedphilosophy.

Richard Davis and Vrajavallabha Dviveda have approached asimilar topic-the relation between God Siva and His worshipperin the ceremonial entourage-from different angles. Davis, whoconcentrates on the Agamic tradition, also departs from the twoaspects of knowledge and ritual, from which context he describesthe ideology behind the worshipping priests' dlvinization. Thelatter's temporary assumption of the powers of a Siva is acted outin the ritual of daily worship that therefore "discloses knowledgethrough action." Dviveda, after retracing the ideal of "becoming agod" to the Brahmanas, gives a description of what actually is done


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326 Ritual and Speculation

duction and translation of the KuUp. (Editor).20. The Harnsa Upanisad is mentioned, for instance, as No. 24in the list of twenty-eight Atharvana UpanisadsIn the CaraQavyilha(Atharvaveda Parisista, no. 49). C E . also M. Bloomfield, The A lhar u a-

v ed a an d the G o pafhab riihm a~ a, (Strassburg, 1899; reprinted New Delhi,1978), p. 18.

21. Bloomfield, ibid.2.2. There is widespread uncertainty about Gaw;lapada's date,cf. Karl H. Potter, Encyclopaedia 0 / In d ian P hilo so phie s, vol. 3: Adva i t a

V edan l.a up to Sa ri kara and H is Pupi ls , (Delhi a..o.: Motilal Banarsidass,1981), pp. 12.f. According to S. N. Dasgupta, A H is to ry o f In d ianPh i lo sophy , vol. 1 (Cam bridge, 1922), p. 423, Ga uda pada "was probablyliving when Sankara was a student ... in order to be able to teachSankara, G. must have been living till at least 800 A.D." JadunathSinha, A H isto ry o f In d ian P hilo so phy,. vol. 2 (Calcutta: Central BookAgency, 1952), p. 444, places Caudapada without comment a't600 A.D. Both Dasgupta and Sinha stick toSankara's traditionaldate of 788-820 A.D.

23. Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 107. Edition of the Gopathabr .. byDieuke Gaastra. (Leiden, 1919).24. P. Deussen, Sechz ig U pan ishads des V eda (Leipzig, 31921),p. 535. The Persian translation was further translated into Latin

and French by Anquetil Duperron,25. U n pu b Ushed U pan i?ad s (A pr.llkas iI iI Up.1l i$lld a~), ed, C. KunhanRaja and the Pandits of the Adyar Library (Adyar, 1933), pp. 30E.


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Chapter TwelveThe Pratyabhijfia and theLogical-Epistemological School of Buddhism

R affae le T ore lla

Perhaps no other doctrines in the history of Indian thoughthave made such a general-overwhelming and subtle-impact oncontemporary philosophical schools as those of Dignaga, Dharma-ktrti, and continuers-at least one of whom, Dharrnotrara, deservesto be mentioned.t And this was not confined only to contemporaryones, as the work of these two masters compelled the opposingschools to carry out a general task of revision and rethinking, thatwas also to bear fruit much later-think for example of the develop-ment of the Navya Nyaya from the Nyaya, through Udayana.

None-vMrmamsakas, Naiyayikas, Vedantins, }ainas-could orwanted to avoid this challenge, for 50 it appears to be from Dharma-ktrti's bitterly haughty tone.s The case of the Pratyabhijfia school,which constituted the highest point of philosophical self-awarenessreached by nondualistic Kashmir Saivism,3 starting from Sornananda(c. 875-925 A.DJ, then especially Utpaladeva (c. 900-950 A.D.), andlater Abhinavagupta (c.950-1020 A.D.), is one of the most typical,though perhaps one of the least investigated.sSornananda definitely knew Dharmaktrti's works-at least oneverse of the PV is clearly recognizable in the Si!mdr?ti5-but it is onlyfrom Utpaladeva onward that the masters of Buddhist logic rise tothe role of principal interlocutors.s They are opponents, of course,but they are evoked so constantly and always with such profoundrespect, particularly Dharmakrrti," that the nature of their relation-ship is not immediately evident. Moreover, it was inevitable thata school that first established itself in tenth-eleventh centuryKashmir sooner or later should accept a confrontation with Bud-dhism, in a country where Saivisrn was deeply rooted, but thatalso was impregnated with Buddhist culture. The Nrlamatapuranaand the Rajatarangint tell of Buddhism in Kashmir from very early


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328 Ritual and SpeculationtimesS and the Chinese pilgrims give us detailed information onthe spread of the different Buddhist schools. In the commentarieson the Sivasutra an echo remains of a certain aggressiveness thatBuddhist proselytism, around the ninth century, must haveassumed." Furthermore, as the Rajatarangint (IV.5.498) informs us,one of the great names of Buddhist logic, Dharrnottara (c. 750~810A.D.), had settled in Kashmir at the invitation of the king, ]ayapi9a(c. 775~806 A.D.);lO Dharmottara's works in effect are well~knownand frequently quoted and criticized by the Pratyabhijfia masters.Arcata (c. 730~790 A.D.l,u the author of the Hetubindutika andAna~davardhana, besides the famous Dhvanyaloka, also th~ authorof a vast commentary, now lost, on Dharmottara's Pramaryavinis-cayat1kalZ were natives of Kashmir. Sankarananda orSankara-nandana (ninth-tenth century)' the Mahabrahrnana of the Tibetans,deserves a special mention. He was an interesting and enigmaticfigure halfway between the logical-eplstemological Buddhisttradition, of which he is both an exponent and critic, and perhapsthe emergingSalva gnossology.The Buddhist logicians and Pratyabhijfia start from presuppo-sitions that appear, and are, absolutely irreconcilable: an impersonalworld of events, on the one hand, and, on the other, a worldpermeated and vivified even in its seemingly most inert cranniesby the dynamism of the I (Siva or Consciousness). Despite this,an undoubted fascination is exerted by the rigor of the Buddhistlogicians' argumen tation and their dauntless critical capacity thatuses its sharp and original instruments on the doctrines of themost diverse opponents. The very air of superiority that sometimesmay be glimpsed in their opposition to all others, though it doesnot fail occasionally to provoke a note of sarcasm in the Saivamasters.t- ends up by further enhancing "their image. This con-tributes to causing them to be adopted by the Pratyabhijfia authors,partly, so to speak, as a touchstone to test the soundness of thelrtheses and partly as a whetstone to sharpen their dialectic arms.

Buddhist logic, in its struggle against realism (particularly ofthe Nyaya) constantly is concerned with showing the fundamentalimportance of the mind in structuring reality, in contrast to thosewho, with the aim of underlining ,he independent nature of theexternal reality confronted by human experience, move in theopposite direction-reducing the creative and formative role o.fknowledge as far as possible and making it into a mere mirror thatrecords ready-made realities outside itself, resulting in an unendingentification even of relations, qualities, and so forth. This referenceto the centrality of the mind must have been felt by the Pratyabhijii~


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Raffaele Torellamasters to be a strong element of affinity, even though it wasdestined to have divergent developments. Bearing this in mind,one may be surprised by statements like that found in [PV, vol. 1,p. 43-naiyayikak ramasyaiva mayapad e p iiramar flz ikafvam iti g ran fhak iir iib lz i-p r iiyab "k r iyi isa/]1 ban d has iim iin ya" ity ad i$u u dd e5e~ u p rakafib hav i$yafilS -which seem to have broader significance and refer not only to themore or less effective articulation of the par i i r th i inumi ina . The Praty-abhijfia seems to reject neither the Buddhist position nor thenaiyi iy ika one, though they are antithetical. It accepts many conceptsthat the Buddhist logicians refute and that the Nyaya upholds,like the previously mentioned k r iya sat/'lb an dha sam iin ya (d ravya d ik k iila;see IPK, 11.2.1) but it does so only after Buddhist criticism hasrendered them untenable, recuperating them in a bound. Thus twoattitudes essentially emerge. In certain cases positions pertainingto the Buddhists are accepted but to show that they become admis-sible in all their implications only if they are placed in a Saiva frameof reference.t- In others, Buddhist criticism is accepted to show thatrealities which on close examination prove to be irremediablycontradictory and yet are demanded by vyavahi ira become acceptablein a Salva context.t? Through this subtle play of a declared basicdisagreement with the doctrines of Buddhist logicians, a limitedacceptance and purely instrumental (or thought to be so) use ofthem, the masters of the Pratyabhijfia end up by being somehowdrawn into their orbit. The architecture of the Pratyabhijfia feelsthe effect of this. That many problems are posed, more or lessunwittingly, in Buddhist terms to a certain extent prefigures theirdevelopment and reduces possible alternative as regard solution.To trace the features of this complex relationship in the filigreeof the terse lines of the IPK and its commentaries, first and foremostone must try to reconstruct the terms of at least some of the variousdisputes to be found in it that deal with the principal t o p o i of logical-epistemological speculation. In doing so, one cannot fail to note,as a preliminary step, how the Pratyabhijfta has appropriated thetypical terminology of Buddhist logic, to a markedly greater extentthan the other schools. I am not referring to expressions such asthe one encountered, parar lh i inumi ina ,18 which, as we know, alreadyhad entered common usage from Prasastapada onward, but, forexample, to 5valak ?alJa, ar thak r iyasamar tha, ti id ii tmya, tad ulpatti , s vab lr i iv a-he iu , k ar yahe tu , the various types of anupalabdh i , and so on. Someof these terms (e.g., 5valak? t i lJa) may designate realities that do notcompletely coincide with those meant by the Buddhist logiciansor that are valued differently (ar thakriya); others, like those con-nected with the inferential process, sometimes are expressly

329


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33U KituaJ and Speculationattributed to the Buddhists but more often are used freely in thecourse of their own argumentation.w But whatever the case, itis the actual use of this terminology that indicates impregnation.

At the beginning of Ahnika 1lI of the Kriyadhikara20 we comeacross this definition of pramat;a:

idam e fad rg ity e vaTfl yad vasad vyavati$ thate /va.s iu p ramilt;a1 1 1 lal so 'p i sTJiib haso 'b hin av o dayab / /so 'nias tafhav imarsatma d d akalad yabhed in i /ekabhidht inav i$aye milir vas fu n y abad hitif / /

The means of knowledge is that thanks to which the objectis situated in its own confines (vyavat i$fhate): "this thing,with these characteristics." This means of knowledge is anever freshly arising light, correlated to a subject. This light,whose essence is the inner reflective awareness of thatwhich is thus manifested, becomes, as regards the objectwithout spatia-temporal limitations etc. and expressedby a single name, knowledge (mif i ) (provided it is] non-invalidated.According to the Pratyabhljfia, therefore, there is no differen-

tiation between the means of knowledge and its result (pramti lJa-prama or pramiii), as also the Buddhists-but not only they21-maintain '(see for example PS 1.8b-ll and vr l f i , PV III.301-3I9, NBTpp. 79-86, TS 1343-60, etc.). The distinction between 'pramti l ; la andp rama , the Buddhists say, is only the outcome of the analytic con-sideration of a reality, which in itself is one. The two terms thusforegrounded cannot in any case represent a relationship of causeand effect, because this would require an actual difference betweenthe two terms, but at the most a relation of vyav"asfhapya-vyavasthapana,with a division of roles within the same reality.22And up to thispoint the Salvas and Buddhists are mainly in agreement. A proofof this is that Abhinavagupta, in concluding his argumentationin the two commentartes.sa which develops Utpaladeva's barelysketched position, quotes part of a verse by Dharmakrrri (PV III.30B:la d va sli l la d vy av as fh an i it . On the contrary, the two positions differ onthe concept of the "function, activity"! (vyi ip i ira) carried out by theelements occurring in cognition. Vyt ipara is completely denied bythe Buddhists, who consider every distinction on this basis purelyimaginary (u lprek~i la) , 50 much so that, for example, an act suchas piercing with an arrow may be analyzed in various ways, allequally legitimate, attributing to the bow the function (vyapi ira)either of karlr , or karat la, or apadana.24 But, above all, the impossibility


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Raffaele Torellaof vyapara is the direct consequence of the doctrine of momentari-ness.25 Cognition, therefore, only "appears" to be endowed with afunction (sav yifp aram iv ifb hati) . Abhinavagupta's reply refers implicitlyto this statement by Dharmakrrti, which in turn depends on PS L8cd:savyaparapratitatv iil p ramalJam eva sat26 (Abhinavagupta, as we haveseen, just before had quoted with approval the third pi ida of thesame verse).27 Vyfipi ira, Abhinavagupta says, not only exists butconstitutes the very essence of pramii and on this, according to theSaivas, hinges the nondifferentiation of pramif1)a and prama: vyaparais not a different reality from the subject that acts and from theinstrument that is set in action.28 All that already had been essentiallycontained in the laconic pramii trvyf iparab, which follows pramif ib inUtpaladeva's vrlti . But, Abhinavagupta continues, that does notmean that pramii1)a and prama are simply two ways of saying thesame thing (paryiiyalvam); the cognitive light, which is the essentialnature of both, in the pramii1)a is turned toward the external ob j e c t ,whereas in the prami; it is turned inward as pure determinate aware-ness, contracted due to the influence of the object assumed in it,having the word as its essence.It is precisely the inseparable connection between knowledgeand the word that forms one of the nerve centers of both schoolsand a vantage point from which, yet again, to view this complexplay of attraction and detachment that characterizes the positionsof the Pratyabhijfia. Both Dignaga and Dharrnaktrti substantiallyagree that vikalpa-kalpana and sabda are very closely related, if notabsolutely identical. The definition in PS I.3d, nfimajafyadiyojanfi,is further elaborated by Dharmaktrti in the subtler and more com-prehensive definition in NB 1.5, ab hilap asalflsarg ayo gyap rafib hiisa p ratflibkalpana, which introduces the element of potentiality.29 Utpaladevadefinitely has this formulation in mind in the verse that opens AhnikaV I of the Jfianadhikara:

aharr!pratyavamarso yab prak iiSafmapi vagvapub Inasa v ikalpab sa hy u k to d vayak?ep f v in iscayab II[v r tfi] prak ifsasyafmany aham iii paravagrupafTJift s ilbhilifpo'p i s vabhiivabhmab prafyavamarso na v ikalpa fly u cyatc , sahi praliyo gin i? ed hapurvo n iscayo n a calra pratiyo gisambhavab .

The reflective awareness "I," which is the very essence oflight, is not a o lka lp , although it is informed by the word.For a o ika lp is an act of determination which implies twoalterna tives.The reflective awareness concerning the self, thereflection awareness "1," which constitutes the own nature

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IoULU"" Ul," UPCl.Ul"'l.JUII

of the light, cannot be called 'pika/pa' even if it is essentiallyassociated with a "discourse" (abhi/lipa), since the wordthat informs it is the supreme word. Indeed, the vikalpais a determination (niscaya) acquired through the negationof the opposite, and, as regards pure light, there is nopossibility of the existence of something that is itsopposite.w

The word, however, is not limited to pervading the sphere ofdiscursive thought. Following the teaching of that other greatfigure who conditioned the Pratyabhijfia, Bhartrhari, it is placedat the very heart of reality as the supremely unifying element, it isthe essence of all knowledge and sentience itself.32 It therefore alsoinforms sensation,33 from which the Buddhist logicians, on thecontrary, strictly excluded it. Direct perception is followed by themoment of determination ( ad hyav as i'iya, n is caya); it is worth dwellingon how this is conceived and valued in the two schools, because itconstitutes the crux of the whole question. For this purpose thefield must be extended to a consideration of the respective positionsregarding the nature of the object of the pramti f}a . Let us returnto the passage of the Kriyadhikara quoted earlier, where one readsamong other things: "as regards the object without spatia-temporallimitations etc. and expressed by a single name" (d dak iiltid yabhed in i /ek i ibhidhi inavi~aye r . . . ] vas funy) . Thus, according to the Pratyabhijfia,the object of the pramalJa is the single i 'ibhiisa, which being disconnectedfrom space and time is a s t imiinya (cf, the v rf li s ti mi in yar u pe ); it is theobject of a single word. A group of i ibhi isas , including those of space,time, and form-endowed with a special individualizing force-is composed in the apparent unity of the individual thing, the5valak?alJa, with which we are confronted in everyday expertence.e'If we then pass on to the respective position of the Buddhistlogicians we find a diametrically opposed picture. The Buddhistsmake a sharp distinction between the objects of the two pramii f}as:the object of knowledge that appears to the senses is the sva/ak?at; la ,What the Saivas conceive as a secondary product they view as thesupremely real and efficient, unitary and unrepeatable being; directperception grasps it in its totality (d. PV 1.43: ekasyi ir thasvabhi ' ivasyapratyak?asya satab svayal]1 / k o 'n yo na 4r~ to bhiigab syad ya~ pramat;laibpar ik? yale / / 'When the unitary specific nature of an object is perceived,what other part that is not perceived can there be that may beinvestigated by [other] means of knowledge?' and the first hemistichof the sal]1grahasloka 1045: lasmad d r~ tasya bhavasya d r~ fa eV iikhilo gU lJab /'Therefore, when an object is perceived, all its qualities are


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Raffaele Torellaautomatically perceived').35 However, it may be the object ofdeterminate knowledge-which alone renders it communicableand places it within the sphere of human activities and conventions.sebut at the price of the decomposition of its unity and the 'covering'( sa7J1.Vr t i ) of the peculiar form of the object with the form of thecognition. The unity of the 5valak~al)a shatters into a myriad ofdharmas, each of which is grasped by a single act of determination(n iscaya, ad hyav a.s aya). This division into many dharmas, like theattribution of diverse multiple and unrepeatable entities to a singleclass or the division into particular and universal, though strictlyspeaking unreal are not arbitrary acts, however, because they stillderive from the perception of a determinate individual reality andin a sense are a property of the thing itself; only a thing that possessessuch a svablzava may be grasped in this way (PVSY, p. 43: faddharmatamevavalaran to v ikalp ii n i in aikad harmavyalire k iin sa 7 !1 darS ayan li I na ca len ir i is rayas tad bhedadarsan as rayafv iif / n iivas fu dharmafii fafs vabhiivasyaivala th ii k hyii te b ).3 7 These constructs do not so much mirror the thingin its reality as communicate the knowing mind's intentions. Theniscaya cannot capture the particular in its totality but only enucleateone feature of it; various factors, such as mental acuteness, previousexperiences, and so forth determine which of the many possiblefeatures (although the thing has in actual fact no parts) is graspedat different times (PYSV, p. 32: yady apy a'!lsarahilab sarn ato bhin na-svabhavo bhavo 'n u bhiU as lafhlip ; na sarvabhed e? u tiiva/li n is cayo bhavati /k iira.l)i in lar iipe k s .alv ii l I an ub havo hi yalhav ikalp iib hyiisaf11 n iscaY llpratyayiif ijanayafi / yathii ru pad arsan iiv ise s .e 'p i kU l)apakamin fb Jzak$yav ika/p iib / fatrab ud dJzip ii favaf11 fad v iisan iibhyiisab p rakaral)am ily tid ayo 'n u bhav iid b heda-n i sr ayo l p at ti 5a Jz ak ii ri ~t a b 38).

The two conceptions differ greatly but have a kind of crosscorrespondence that makes one think that the difference lies inthe approach rather than in the content. For the Buddhist logicians(Dharmakrrti), the starting point is the particular (5 valak ~ al)a, b he d a);perception grasps it in its entirety but it also is inexpressible anduncommunicable, it may not be associated with words (unlikeki l ipani i ) ; different niscayas may stem from this single perceptualcontent; each of them captures a (unreal but not unfounded) partof it and connects it with a word, which therefore denotes a certains t imi inya or rather the negation of what is other than that feature(PY 1.50-51: yiivan to ''!Isas ilmarop iis tan n irs se v in is cayiib / lavan ta e vasabd ii5 ca lena te b hin n ago car iib /1 anyathaik ena sab d en a vyapla e katra uas tu n ! /b ud dJzyii v i i n an yav i$aya iii paryiiyala bhave i / /; PVSV, p. 28: ladv ivekaeva c ifn yiipo hab / fasm iid fad ap i tanmiitrapo hago car llm / n a vas tu svabhiivan is -caylflmakam).39 For the Pratyabhijfia (Utpaladeva), each pramana

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334 Ritual and Speculationgrasps an individual abhasa (which is a samanya), expressed by adeterminate word, depending on a determinate reflective awareness-o(v rU i ad IPK IJ.3.2: v imarsabhedanu saryekaikasabdavacye ; v r fti ad IPK Il.3.5:ekaikas casav ifbhasa ekaikena sabdena vyavahtir iir thal]1 laH ann iyatiir lhakriyii-r thib hir ab hid hfyafe ) or grasps-in the perception itself and not ina later act-a group of abhiisas coordinated by the Lord's power ofnecessity according to s i frn i inadhikaravya (blue lotus); in this case thepramii!}a is oriented to the dominant i ibhflsa and the perception remainsunitary. In various passages of the IPK, Utpaladeva is concernedwith safeguarding the unity of the thing that the division intomultiple abhiisas seems irremediably to break up. IPK II.3.3 andthe relative vrt t i read as follows:

yathiiru ci yafhiir thilvat!1 yafhilvyu tpaU i bhid yale Iiib hilso 'py ar ih ekasmin n an u sal? ldhiin asadhife I Ie kasmin n eva caikaprafyava rna r sas flmiir l hyo papiid ite vas/u n isvecchiivas iid ar fhilv iin u ro dhiid V a naipu tjavas iid vavabhasa-bhedab

In an object, though its unity is established by the unifyingpower of mind, various manifestations (abhiisa) may bedistinguished according to the inclinations, practical re-quirements and specific experience of the subject.

In the object-though it is unitary, having beenassumed as such on the strength of a single reflectiveawareness-there are different manifestations that aredependent on the will, practical requirements andexperience of the subject.Two themes peculiar to Dharmaktrti's thought are here clearly

discernible. I already have dwelt on the first.41 The second, whichappears several times in the PV, is thus formulated in v. 109 ofthe Svarthanum anapariccheda and svavr/ I i: 42

ekaprafyavamarsasya he fu tv tfd d hfr abhed in f /e kadhihe lubhiiv ena vyak ffn iim apy abhinnata II[ . . . ] fad api pratid ravya1 ]l bhid yamiin am ap i p rakr1yaika-p rafyavamarsasyiib hed iivaskand ino the tu r bhavad abhin lla1 ]lkhyiiti I lafhabhataprafyavamarsahe to r abhed iivabhiis in o jflii-n ud e r arfhasya he /u lv iid vyak tayo 'p i SalTlsr? takaral]1 5vabhiiva-b hed aparamar fha1 ]l svabhiivata ekal]1 pratyaya."l jan ayan ti [ ... 1Because it is the cause of a single reflective awareness,

cognition appears as undifferentiated. Because they causea single cognition, individual realities also appear as


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Raffaele Torella 335undifferen hated.

. . . That cognition, although it differs for eachindividual object, appears as undifferentiated, being byits very nature the cause of a single reflective awarenessthat establishes the nondifferentiation. Individual things,because they are the cause of a reality that is manifestedas undifferentiated (cognition etc.) and is the cause ofsuch a reflective awareness, owing to their very naturealso produce a single cognition in which the forms merge,though in the absolute sense there is a differentiationof their own natures. [ ... ]4 3Dharmakrrti uses this argument to account for the formation

of the idea of class and universal that embraces a plurality of discreterealities which, strictly speaking, cannot be reduced to anythingbut themselves. The single particular realities become composedin an apparent unity through the same reflective awareness thatby nature they are able to determine. Dharmakrrti concludes thatit therefore is only the fact that they produce the same effectsthat constitutes the unity of things that are (in fact) differentiated( tasmad e kak aryataiva b havan am ahhe dab ). This theme already had beenexpressed and developed in a clear and rigorous way in PV III.73and svav.ri f i;4 4

e kap rafyav amar sar thajiian ad ye kar thas iid han e /b he d e 'p i n iyatitb k ee it s vab hav en en d riyad iv at II[ . . . ] e val]l ~ il]lsapadayo 'p i bhedaQ paraspar iinanvaye pIp rak rfyaiv aik am e kiik ar aT!I p ralyab hijiian arr t jan ayan ti an ya'!Iv ii yathiip rafyayarr t d ahan ag rhad ik ii71 l k ii? thas iid hyam artha-k r iyiim [ ... J

Some individual entities, despite the fact that they aredifferentiated, are determined by their very nature tobring into being a single reality, such as a single reflectiveawareness or a single object cognition .

. . . Thus, diHerent particular entities, such as Si l !1Sapatrees etc., despite the fact that they are not connectedwith one another, produce by their very nature a single,uniform recognition, or a different efficiency-dependingon the orientation of the cognition-such as burning,building a house etc. carried out by wood.The same effects are, therefore, first, the cognition that the

thing because of its nature is able to give rise to, and, second, thedeterminate purpose that may be achieved thanks to this.45 As


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336 Ritual and SpeculationKamalastla says later in his commentary on TS, everyday experiencegroups together completely heterogeneous and separate data, suchas a certain shape, color, and so forth, Onthe basis of their combiningto perform a single function (e.g., containing water) thus con-structing the unity of a 'thing' (e.g., a jar).46IPK II.3.7 echoes, alsoin its formulation, Dharmakrrti's argumentation; the vrl f i furnishesan indispensable explicitation of it.

p r lh ag d rp ap r ak as an al'fl s ro ta sa l'fl s ii ga n ya /ha Iav ir ud d hav ab has an iim e kak ar yti lalhaik yad hfb IIb hin nii p rad ip ap rab hti av ib hllge nav ab hiisan le n ad fp rav ilhiis cas in dhu bu dd hau p an ak e e a Ie te r as iib lathiis au k/yam ahatv ap afa-tV iid yav ab hiisab p arasp ar iin uprav dak ~amab n a tu n i!ap itad y-a V a b has a b tattad e kak ar ya iad rav yii b h iisa b htiv en a k a [ pan icp ratyak ~a e va I l ad e l at s i im i in i idh ika ral Jyam .

As in the case of the distinct rays of light in a torch andof the currents in the sea, thus in manifestations thatare not in contrast with each other the notion of unityis produced by their appearing as unitary entities.

The individual rays of light in a torch appear asan undifferentiated whole and the same holds for thecurrents of rivers in the notion of the sea and for thevarious flavours in the panalc. Similarly, manifestationssuch as "white," "big," "cloth:' and so on, capable asthey are of interpenetrating, lend themselves in thedirect experience itself to the manifestation of thevarious unitary things having a single, unitary effect.This does not happen with other series such as "blue,""yellow," etc. This is what we call "having the samesubstratum."The context is different from that of Dharmakrrti's argument

and very close to Karnalastla's: here the purpose is to explain howwe may arrive at perceiving the apparent unity of the object froma multiplicity of i ibhi i sas . However, Utpaladeva's conclusion ( tade la t s i imiin i idh ikaral !yam) and Dharmaktrti's ( ta sm ii d e k ak ii ry at ai va bh ii vi in i imabhedab) are strictly homologous. \

In a long fragment of Utpaladeva's lost IPVivrl i - that I haverecently edited and translated-a section is devoted to the self-revealing nature of cognition. It concludes as follows:

s i d dhl !. l'f l l if vat pa rasa l'f lv e dY l !. ti iv y ii pak edan f ii s vabh i iva ja~a fav irud -dhaha l'f lp rak ii savy ii p ia tva 'l 1 s va sal 'f lv i d rupa!vasya I l e na jiian e v yii-p ak av ir u dd ha vyiip tiiya b p ar as aT !lv e d ya lii yii n i~ e d ha b


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Raffaele TorellaIt has therefore been proved that being conscious ofitself [on the part of cognition] is pervaded by the lightof the I, which is opposed to insentience-and insentience,for its part, has the nature of "this," which pervades theproperty of being knowable by others. Thus it is possibleto deny that cognition is knowable by others, because thisproperty is pervaded by another that is in opposition tothe pervading one (vyapakavi ruddhavyi ip tayl ib ) . 47What Iwish to underline here is not the content of this

statement-which would need to be dealt with separately (cognitionas svasaT/ l vedana in fact is a wen-known doctrine of the Buddhistlogicians, although it is not limited strictly to them)-but theprocedure Utpaladeva has used to demonstrate it. In fact, herewe are faced with an argumentation (and a terminology) peculiarto the Buddhist logicians: the anupalabdhi as the hetu of a negativeinference, here in the form of vy i ipakav i ruddhavyl ip topalabdhi .48 More-over, it may be noted that this type is not found in any of theclassifications of the anupalabdhi given by Dharrnaktrri (in the PV,Pramanaviniscaya, Hetubindu, NB), it is not present in Dharmottara,it is not quoted by the Kashmirian authors Jayanta (840-900)and Bhasarvajfia (860-920),49 and until now was thought to havefirst appeared in the relatively late Dharmottarapradtpaev byDurvekarnisra (late tenth-early eleventh centuries), who includesit in a classification comprising fourteen or sixteen forms.51 Thefact that the Pratyabhijfia constitutes a source of information onthe logical-epistemological school of Buddhism contributes anadditional interest to an examination of it from this point of view.

Notes1. On the influence of the founder Dignaga, see Tucci 1971,

pp. 191-192.2. r am referring particularly to the well-known stanzas of the

beginning (1.2) and the end (IV.286, only found in Miyasaka's edition)of the PV: p rayab p rak r tasak fir ap ratib alap rajfio jan ab k evalaT/l n an ar thy e vasu bhii~ itaib par igalo v id v e~ fY ap irW iimalaib / te n ayal!l n a paro pak lira i t i nai(in tlip i ce tas c iram 5uk fiib hyiisav ivard hifavyasanam ily atr lin u b ad dhasp rham / /'Mankind are mostly addicted to platitudes, they don't go in forfinesse. Not enough that they do not care at all for deep sayings,they are fil1ed with hatred and with the filth of envy. Thereforeneither do I care to write for their benefit. However, my heart has

337


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338 Ritual and SpecuJationfound satisfaction in this [my work], because through itmy love forprofound and long meditation over [every] well spoken word hasbeen gratified'; an ad hyav as ifiiv ag iihan am an alp ad his ak fin iip y ad r$ /ap ar a-m iir lhas iiram ad hik iihhiyo gair ap i / mafa'l]! mama jagaly alahd hasad rsaprafi-g rahaka1 !l p rayiis yafi payo n id heb paya iva svad ehe jar i im / / 'My work willfind no one in this world who would be adequate easily to grasp itsdeep sayings. It will be absorbed by, and perish in, my own person,just as a river [which is absorbed and lost] in the ocean. Those whoare endowed with no inconsiderable force of reason, even theycannot fathom its depth! Those who are endowed with exceptionalintrepidity of thought, even they cannot perceive its highest truth'(trans. in Stcherbatsky 1930-32, vol. I, pp. 35-36). Moksakaraguptaaddresses him with the epithet nyi iyaparamesl lara 'Supreme Lord ofLogic' (Kajiyama 1966, p. 125).

.3. Iam aware that the purely speculative aspect, dealt within this chapter, does not exhaust the whole of the Pratyabhijiiateaching. On the doctrines of the Pratyabhijfia, see Pandey 1963,pp. 290-460; on its collocation within the Kaula tradition, see theobservations of Sanderson 1985, pp. 203-204.4. Cf. Masson and Patwardhan 1969, p. 34: "Another questionthat must go unanswered, though it is rich in possibilities, is Abhi-

nava's debt to Buddhism. We simply do not know anything definiteon this problem at all, though it is very tempting to speculate."See also, on the same page, note 1. See Gnoli 1960, pp. xxiii-xxvi.

5. It is PV m.282 k iim as o kab .hayo nmad ae au r as vap n iid yu p ap lu fiib /abhiW in ap i pasyan fi pu raio 'v as lhitan iva /1. The verse of the Sivadr!?tiis lAS d rsyan le 'Ira lad icchato b hiiv a b hftyad iyo gaiab / iair m ilhyasv aru pa'l]!e el s lhap yiig re s alyale d rs iim / / (ef. Gnoli 1957, p. 22); see also Utpaladeva'sv r tti: k am aso kab hayad iyo gac e a ie te b hav iib pu rab sphu ran fo d rsyan fe .

6. On the central role of Utpaladeva in the elaboration ofPratyabhijfia philosophy, see Torella, forthcoming A.7. The privileged relationship with Dharmaktrti might beexplained by the fact that he, unlike Dignaga, had accepted thelegacy of Bharrrhart ( c E . Herzberger 1986, pp.ll-12), who constitutesone .of the Pratyabhijiia's points of reference, from Utpaladevaonward.B. Cf. Pandey 1963, pp. 147-150.9. Ibid., p. 149; see also Sipast l fravimarsini , p. 1.10. Frauwallner 1961, p. 147; Stcherbatsky 1930-32, I 40-41.


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Raffaele Torella11. Prauwallner, ibid., p. 148.12. According to Abhinavagupta's testimony (Stcherbatsky

1930-32, I pp. 41-42). Stcherbatsky identifies a "Cashmere or philo-sophical school of commentators [of Dharmakrrti's works].'

13. On the figure and work of Sankara:nanda, see Gnoli 1960,pp. xxiii ff.; d. also Stcherbatsky, ibid., I p. 42 and Biihnemann 1980.

14. CE . , e.g., vol. 2, p. 174: p ram iilJik atar a'1 1 man yaib [ bau d dhaib lfiid iifm yafad utp aU i n iyam an id iin am u pag afe .

15. Cf. ibid., p. 140: par ii rt hi in um ii n aTJ1 h i s ii st ram I tatra ,It pramiilJiidi-~ o 4as ap lt d ii rf ha taUvamayat vam eVa par am ii rl ha b ; seealso IPVV, vol.3, p. 182.

16. See, for instance, IPV, vol. I, p. 308 (on apoha); IPVV, vol. 2,pp. 276-277 (on sabdakalpana); IPVV, vol. 2, pp. 344-345, vol. 3, p. 205(on kiiryakiiralJasiddhi); IPVV, vol. 2, p. 371 (on bi idhyabi idhakabhiiva) , etc.

17. Cf. e.g., IPV vol. 2, p. 32: e kiin e kar iip as ya k riyiid eb b iihyav iid ev ir u dd ha dh armii dh yii 5a di i~ alJ en a a nu papad yaman as yii py a vas yar rz s amar fha nf yaT flvapub .

18. See note 15.19. See also the description that Abhinavagupta gives of the

anumi ina in IPV, vol. 2, p. 84, which a Buddhist would agree with:an umifn ajii tu pratffib ifb hif5lin tar iit k iiryaru piit sv ab hav aru piif v ii i ib hiisan larepraf ipal t ib . Abhinavagupta accepts the Buddhist conception en bloc,except that he inscribes it in the sphere of the Lord's power ofnecessity (ibid.: v as fv an farasya ca le na sak arrz k aryak aralJab hifv an iyam abs iim an iid hik ar~ lJyan iyam a ca rsv aran iyalisak fyu pajfv an a e va av ad haryo b hav afin a an ya fh ii ). He does the same elsewhere with the Buddhist doctrineof impermanence (IPVV, vol. 3, p. 214: n a b hiiv asya k imci! n ijaTfl n ifyama ni tyaT J1 v ii v ap u b I isvaras fu sv asa1 !Iv in mu ku re v isv am ab hifsayan k ~an ik atiimap i iib hiisayalr ti n ab p ak ~ab ).

20. The quotations from the IPK and v r t l i are drawn from myforthcoming (B) edition and translation.21. Bandyopadhyay 1979, p. 43.22. N B T , p. 82: n a c atr jan yajan ak ab hav an ib an d han ab s iid hyas iid han a-

b hiiv ab , ye naik asmin v as lu n; v iro dhab syiif I ap i tu v yav as thap yavyavas fhapan a-b hifv en a / tad e kasya v as tu nab k i1 !zc id r iip aTfl p mmalJarrz k im ci! p ram alJap halar rzn a v ir ud hyaf e.

23. IPV, vol. 2, pp. 73-75; IPVV, vol. 3, pp. 7l-72.

339


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340 Ritual and Speculation24. Cf. TS 1346: ala u Jp re k$ito b he do v id yate d han ur ad iv at I uJpadylJl-

p ad ak atv en a v yav as fhe yalp tu n e~ yate II and the relative pai icika.25. TSP, vol. 1, p. 488; k ~ an ik at ve n a n ir v ya pa ra tv iit s ar v ad ha rm iil;li im .26. Cf. Hattori 1968, p. 28.27. The whole verse reads as follows: s av yap tf ram i vi ih ht ft i v y ap i ir e l; las vak ar mal;li / lad vasal fad vyav as than iid ak arak am ap i sv ayam II.28. CF. IPV, vol, 2, p. 75: k ilp c a v ytfp ar ar up am e va p hala7 ]'lv yiip iir as e a

v yap riyam iil;liH v yap iir yam al;!i if v ii an an yiik iir a e va s id dha if i ab he da~ p ram iil;la-phalayo~.

29. Cf. Hattori 1968, pp. 83-85. See the discussion in TS 1213 H.and the relative pai icik i i . Cf. also PV III.123: pra lyal e~al p ka lpan i ipo~ha tpp rafyak ~ el;laiv a s id hyati / p rafyafm av ed ya~ 5 ar ve ~ ii lp v ik alp o n amas a7 ]'l5 raya~ II.

30. Abhinavagupta, in commenting on this verse in IPVV, vol, 2,pp. 276-278, refers explicitly (following the !i lei i) to the definitionof the NB and also quotes two passages from Dharmottara, forwhich I have found only a summary correspondence in the editedtext of the NBT. Another element worthy of consideration in thestanza and in the vrf f i is the conception of the determinate cognition( vi ka lp a, n is c aya ) as based on the exclusion of what is other. It remindsone of an important passage of the PV (1.48-49), where the apoha,which at first seemed only to concern the inferential process, also isextended to determinate cognition (niseayajii i ina) that followsperception: b ad d d r~ fe 'p i yaj jn iin ar p s iim iin yiir lhalp v ik alp ak a7 ]'l / as am ar op i-f ii nya rp s e la nm ii tr iip o ha go c ar am /1- [s vav rtfi] yad r ilp iid id ar san an an far amalin galp n is cayajiiiin a7 ]'l b hav ali, tat k atham as ati s am iir op e b hav ad v yav ac che da-v i~ aya7 ]'l hhav ati, s am iir op av i$aye fas yab hiiv iif [ ... 1 ' / / niscayi i ropamanasorb iid hyab iid hak ab hiiv ata~ / sam iiro pav iv ek e 's ya p rav rffir iii gamyafe / / [sva-v rH iJ [ ... 1 lad viv ek a e va e iin yiip oha~ / fas miid lad ap i ft:w .m iifr iip ohag oc ar am Ina vas lu5 vabh. ii van i s cay ii lmakam I tathii hi kasyacin n iseaye 'py an yiis yaprati-p atf id ar san iit / tafs vab hav an is caye c a faS lliiyo giit (d.Mookerjee and Nagasaki1964, pp. 108 H.). CE . IPV, vol. 1, pp. 303-304: v iv id hii k alp an a v iv id ha-Iv en a e a s al1 kilas ya k aip o 'n yav yav ac che dan a1 ]1 v ik aip a~ , v iv id hafv a7 ]'le a v ahn ifvan agn isatpb hiivan iisamiiro pan ir i ise sali b hav1 1, d vayatp vahn yavahn iru patpsamakf ipat i ; see also IPK 1.6.2-3.

31. Up to this point, in fact, the Pratyabhijfia and Buddhist logicagree, and the masters of the Pratyabhijfia are wel1 aware of this(d. IPV, vol. 1, p. 266: b au d dhair ap i ad hyav as ayiip ek ~ a7 ]'l p rak iis as ya p ril-miiv ya1 ]1 v ad ad bhi~ u pag alap riiyab e va ayam arfhab , ab hili ip iitm ak afv iil ad hya-vasiiyasya iii).

32. IrK 1.5.13: ci t ib p r afya vama rs ii lm ii p ar av ak s v ar as o d it ii /s v ilf an tr yam


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Raffaele Torellae lan mukhya11 l lad ais lJarya11 l paramiU manab II.

33. lPK 1.5.19: 5iik~ alkaratle 'py as ii v imarsab kat ham anyafhii Idhiivan iid y u papadyeJa prafisa11 ldhanavarjifa1 1 l II 'Even at the momentof the direct perception there is a determinate reflective awareness.How otherwise could one account for such actions as running andso on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinateawareness?'; cf. lPV, vol. I, p. 293: s iik ~me tla p rafyavamarse na sat[ lvarW a-sabdabhiivan iimayena bhiivyam eva.

34. Abhinavagupta refers explicitly (IPVV, vol. 3, p. 201) totwo different positions as regards the nature of the svalak~alJa. Forthe one (which is also accepted by the Pratyabhijfia) it is formed bya collec tion of iib hils as ( ilb hils an ik ur u m biifm ak a5 valak ~ alJaM d a) , for theother it is part less (n;rat[ l5asvalak~alJavi ida).

35. Cf. Steinkellner 1971, p. 198. This is valid for every pramill}a,therefore also for the anumana (d. PV 1.46 and svavrlt i ) . lPK II. 3.8echoes this conception: talrifvisi~!e vahn yadau k iiryak ilratlafo ~ lJata- Ilallauhabdar lhafiid yafmii pramlifJiid ekato matab II 'Regarding a nonspecificmanifestation of "fire," a single means of knowledge knows whatthe effect or cause of it is, its being hot, its being denoted by thisor that word and so on.' See also IPVV, vol. I, p. 199.

36. Indeed it is precisely determinate knowledge, which is notitself a p raman , that renders the perception for all intents andpurposes a pramli lJa (NBT p. 84: lasmiid adhyavas iiya11 l ku road eva praly-ak ~ at[ l p ram iilJ at[ l b hav ati).

37. Cf. Vetter 1964, p. 56.38. The passage comments on PV 1.58; pratyak$ffJa grhU e 'p i

v ;sc? e 't[ lsav ivarjife I yadv ise? iivas iiye 's t i pralyayab sa praffya/e I I.39. Cf. Vetter 1964, pp. 48-49.40. The vimar:5a plays the role of "systematizer" (vyavasfhi lpaka)

of reality that is strictly analogous to the role the Buddhists assignto niscaya-adhyavasiiya, notwithstanding the different valuation(NBT p. 84: n iscayap rafyaye nlivyavas lhap ifarr l sad api n ilab od har iipat[ l v iji ii in amasafkalpam eva [ ... ] akr te tv adhyavas fiye n r labo dhar iipalven fivyavas lhapitaT]1b hav ati v ijiian am ).

41. Cf. above p. 333 and note 38.42. Cf. Steinkellner 1971, p. 190.43. See also PV 1.68-69: pararilpa1 !l svar ilpe r;a yaya saT]1vr iyate dhiyii Ie k iir thapralibhas inyii hhiiv iin asr itya bhed in ab II layii sa'l11 vr tanan iir fhab sam-

341


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342 Ritual and Speculationv rlya b he din ab svaya7 !l / ab hed in a iV ifbhan fi b hiiva riipe tla kmac i ! II .

44. cr. Vetter 1964, p. 53.45. It is a question of what have been called pral iniyatasakf i and

s i imiinyasakf i (Mikogami 1979, pp. 80 H.; Katsura 1984, p. 218).46. TSP, vol. 1, p. 59: fa e va r up ad ayab s alilad id har alJiir thak riya-k ar i7 ;la b s amud ii yo g ha ta iii vyapadisyanfe.47. Torella 1988, p. 28.48. After Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta also makes frequent useof this type of argumentation.49. The Nyiiyamafijari (vol. 1, p. 53) and the Nyiiyabhu~atla (p, 288)refer to the classification in eleven forms, derived from the NB.5 0. D harmo flar ap rad rp a, p. 140. Cf. Kajiyama 1966, pp. 151 H .51. The vyi ipakaviruddhavyaplopalabdhi later is referred to by

Moksakaragupta (between 1050 and 1202) in the Tarkabhii~i i (Kaji-yama 1966, p. 85) and by Vidyakarasanti (c. 1100) in the Tarkasopi ina(Tucci 1956, p. 291).

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The Pratyabhijna and the Logical Epistemological School of Buddhism - Raffaele Torella