The Price We Pay: Environmental and Health Impacts of Nuclear Weapons

Production and Testing

M. V. Ramana and Surendra Gadekar

Published in Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream ed. M. V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar

Reddy (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003).

If one were to look at the official announcements of the May 1998 tests and the

bulk of the discussion in the media, one would be left with the impression that the only

consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons are strategic. A few commentators also

analyzed the economic repercussions. One of the missing elements in the discussion was

any appreciation of the enormous impact on the environment, and occupational and

public health arising from the manufacture of nuclear weapons. These effects occur well

before the deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Like some of the other deleterious

consequences of making nuclear weapons, it is the weaker and disempowered sections of

society that bear the bulk of the burden.

As a result of such activities around the world, millions of people have been

affected. Thousands of square kilometres have been highly contaminated, including entire

river systems, lakes, and farmland. Millions of tonnes of nuclear waste have been

produced, but no satisfactory solutions to the problem of their disposal have been found.

Radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests has likely led to thousands of deaths

due to cancer already; even if no more nuclear tests are conducted, the incidence of

cancer and other diseases resulting from exposure to long-lived radionuclides will

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continue to kill for several centuries, taking a total toll of millions in all. The immense

quantities of radioactive material remaining in the ground from underground testing

around the globe are likely to lead to the contamination of water and the food chain in the

long-term.

In this paper we shall try to estimate the costs paid by the people of India in terms

of their health and the environment from the activities of the Department of Atomic

Energy that, in the words of Abdul Kalam, is said to have conferred the country with a

capability to vacate nuclear threats.1 We will first enumerate the reasons why estimating

these costs is a difficult task. Then we describe the different stages of the nuclear fuel

cycle and the various processes involved in making nuclear weapons and detail the

environmental and the health impact of each activity. Due to the vastness of the subject,

we will not deal with the effects of making all the other non-nuclear components that go

into making nuclear weapons.

A Difficult Task

The task of estimating the impacts on public health and the environment from

nuclear weapons production and testing is difficult for four reasons.

First, the subject is intrinsically difficult and controversial. Despite decades of

research, experts are still divided on the effects of radiation on health, especially at low

doses. In part this is because the onset of cancer, one of the chief health outcomes of

exposure to radiation, occurs only many years after the exposure and cannot be easily

correlated with it. An added complication is that cancers can have a great variety of

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causal agents. Further, the question of adverse health and environmental consequences of

nuclear weapons production goes beyond just radiation effects. Nuclear weapons

production involves the use of large quantities of organic and inorganic toxic materials,

which have their own health and environmental effects.2 For example, chronic exposure

to beryllium could lead to berylliosis, a potentially fatal lung disease. The US Department

of Energy recently admitted, after decades of knowing but not disclosing, the hazards to

workers exposed to beryllium.3

Second, because academic research on the subject the world over is largely

supported by government funds, often through the nuclear or defence agencies,

researchers do not easily receive funding to work on the health and environmental impact

of nuclear and defence projects. In India, the nuclear establishment has for years been

granted a large share of research funds to the exclusion of other subjects.4 As a

consequence they have tremendous financial influence over the universities, which are

starved of research funds. The universities therefore are loath to come into conflict with

the nuclear establishment and shy away from researching subjects that may bring them

1 Sukumar Muralidharan and John Cherian, The BJPs Bombs, Frontline (23 May 1998); available on the internet at http://www.indiaserver.com/frontline/1998/05/23/15110040.htm2 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and its Health and Environmental Effects (Cambridge, USA: The MIT Press, 1995). Also see Arjun Makhijani, Making the Bomb: Without Consent, With Injury, The Hindu Survey of the Environment (May 1999), pp. 21-27. 3 Secretary Richardson Announces Proposal to Compensate Thousands of Sick Workers, U.S. Department of Energy Press Release, 12 April 2000; available on the internet at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/portal/feature/pr00103.htm 4 In the late 1950s, over a quarter of all resources devoted to Science and Technology Development in the country went to the Atomic Energy department. Though it was subsequently overtaken by the Department of Space, the total amount spent on the Department of Atomic Energy, the Defence Research and Development Organisation, and the Department of Space has been increasing as a fraction of all government Research and Development budgets. In the late 1980s, for example, the proportion was over 60 per cent of the total. See Itty Abraham, Security, Technology and Ideology: Strategic Enclaves in Brazil and India, 1945-1989, (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 1993), p. 177.

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into the bad books of the nuclear establishment.

Knowledge about the impact on health and the environment from nuclear

weapons production is also not desirable to governments. All nuclear weapons states

have been so enamoured of the idea of possessing bombs that they are willing to pay any

price required in terms of the health of their own voiceless poor and harm to the

environment of remote regions. As a consequence they are careless when it comes to

quantifying these costs. What little accounting is done is entrusted to the bomb makers

themselves; the proverbial foxes are called upon to guard the environmental hen house.

Besides the fact that these people often lack the expertise, what impedes this task

significantly is their lack of motivation. Faced with contradictory expectations, nuclear

establishments know very well that their primary purpose is to produce bombs. There are

no perks or privileges for keeping meticulous records of the ill effects of the production

process.

Third, whatever little knowledge is available is treated with such secrecy that

getting even the basic facts from the nuclear establishment is a Herculean task. In the

Indian case this is illustrated by an example. The exact site of the first Pokhran test was

not published in the various accounts of the explosion. Although the spot was well known

to hundreds of villagers living in the vicinity, as well as to all foreign information

agencies with access to satellite photography, getting its location from the Indian

Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) or other government agencies was impossible. It

was only when two researchers from the United States, Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian,

pinpointed the spot using commercially available satellite imagery and old photographs

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of the time that the location became known to a larger audience.5

Such independent checks are difficult in India given the paucity of people with

technical expertise outside the establishment.6 Unlike many other countries, knowledge

regarding reactor engineering or other related nuclear subjects is available essentially at

one centre, namely the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Subsequent

employment to trainees is also available with only one employer, the DAE.

Making the task more difficult are the draconian Atomic Energy and the Official

Secrets Acts with provisions for rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years, to be

held aloft as a suitably impressive stick.7 Passed on 15 September 1962, the Atomic

Energy Act empowers the government to restrict the disclosure of information, whether

contained in a document, drawing, photograph, plan, model, or in any other form

whatsoever, which relates to, represents or illustrates:

a) an existing or proposed plant used or proposed to be used for the purpose of

producing, developing or using atomic energy, or

b) the purpose or method of operation of any such existing or proposed plant, or

c) any process operated or proposed to be operated in any such existing or proposed

plant.8

5 Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the Rajasthan Desert: A CTBT Verification Exercise Using Commercial Satellite Imagery, Science and Global Security 6 (1996), pp. 101-89. 6 Paucity, however, does not mean absence. There is a small but growing trend of outsiders challenging the nuclear and defence establishments on technical grounds, which needs to be further encouraged. See the paper by M. V. Ramana in this book. 7 M. Rama Jois, Hazards Arising from Nuclear Plants: The Right to Information, in Nuclear Energy and Public Safety, ed. Vinod Gaur (Delhi: INTACH, 1996), pp. 102-113. 8 Available on the internet at http://www.dae.gov.in/rules/aeact.htm.

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The DAE has used the acts in Indian courts to, for example, refuse to divulge

information about issues related to the safety of nuclear reactors.9 However, the

application of this act has been limited to a small extent by the tradition of free discourse

that exists in India.

Finally, it is impossible to separate the so-called peaceful nuclear activities from

the making of bombs. Again this is especially true in India, where the very raison dtre

of keeping a large non-performing nuclear establishment seems to be the making of

bombs. After 50 years of relatively large investments in atomic energy, the share of

nuclear power is less than 3 per cent of the countrys electricity output.

There are two reasons for the overlap between nuclear energy and weapons

activities. The first is that all nuclear reactors produce plutonium, the fissile material

commonly used in nuclear bombs. J. Carson Mark, the former director of the theoretical

division of Las Alamos National Laboratory, USA, has shown that even reactor grade

plutonium can be used to make a nuclear explosive.10 In 1994, the US Department of

Energy announced that a US nuclear test in 1962 used reactor grade plutonium.11

Provided a country has a reprocessing facility to separate the plutonium from the other

9 Buddhi Kota Subbarao, Indias Nuclear Prowess: False Claims and Tragic Truths, Manushi 109 (November December 1998); available on the internet at http://www.freespeech.org/manushi/109/nuke.html; For an application of these provisions to an individual critical of the nuclear establishment see M. S. Siddhu, Victimised by the Official Secrets Act: the story of Dr. B. K. Subbarao, Manushi 108 (September October 1998); available on the internet at http://www.freespeech.org/manushi/108/subbprof.html10 J. Carson Mark, Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium, Science and Global Security 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 111-124; US National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 32; Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (Washington, DC: US Department of Energy, 1997), p. 37. 11 U.S. Department of Energy, Additional Information Concerning Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium, Openness Press Conference, 27 June 1994; available on the internet at http://www.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/press/pc29.html.

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elements in spent fuel, it could make nuclear weapons if it has nuclear reactors that are

not safeguarded or monitored. Making nuclear weapons, then, become a matter of choice

and not one of capability. As though illustrating this point, it has been reported that one

of the tests conducted by India in May 1998 used reactor grade plutonium from its

peaceful programme.12

Second, many of the physical steps involved in the two pursuits are the same and

the infrastructure for and personnel involved in one can contribute substantially to the

other. For example, the uranium mines in Jaduguda serve both the weapons and energy

programmes. Methodologically, therefore, it is impossible to clearly separate the impacts

from nuclear weapons production and nuclear energy production. This is especially true

in India, where until recently, there was no officially admitted nuclear weapons

programme.

Official Limits

As a way of dealing with the risks to human health from radiation exposure,

international and national bodies have tried to come up with recommendations for

limiting the exposure to workers. In 1991, following revised estimates of the risks of

cancer from radiation exposure, the International Commission on Radiological Protection

(ICRP) recommended that radiation doses to occupational workers be limited to 20

milliSievert (mSv) per year on average (1 mSv = 0.1 rem). To members of the general

public, the radiation dose limit from all anthropogenic activities has been set at 1 mSv per

year. For comparison, the average dose from background natural sources is about 2-3

12 R. Ramachandran, Pokharan II: The Scientific Dimensions, in Indias Nuclear Deterrent: Pokharan II

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mSv per year. According to the ICRP a dose of 20 mSv leads to, on average, a 1 in a

1000 chance of dying from radiation-induced cancer.13 A dose that is twice as large

would lead to twice the probability of getting cancer.

The Indian DAE claims to follow these guidelines. 14 Leaving aside the ethics of

trying to compensate, or not compensate, those exposed to such risks, it is worth

examining the record of how well these recommendations have been followed. The

Indian experience, as we shall detail has been patchy at best. To do this, we rely largely

on official sources, which are incomplete and often contradictory.15 But for the most part

they are all that are available.

Given the secrecy mentioned earlier, there is also no practical way of

independently verifying stated exposure data. According to independent analysts and

investigative journalists, the record is even worse. For example, an early report on the

Indian nuclear energy programme observes that at the Tarapur atomic power station, the

radiation dose limit for radiation workers exposure means very little in practice: it has

been breached so frequently as to make one wonder why it exists at all.16

and Beyond ed. Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1999), pp. 34-61. 13 ICRP, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991), p. 22. 14 See for example Radiation Exposure Limits, Nuclear India (March 2000); available on the internet at http://www.dae.gov.in/ni/mar2000/mar2000.htm. 15 For example, the stated figures for Argon-41 releases from the Madras Atomic Power Station in 1990 vary by 37.5 per cent. See E. Chandrasekharan, V. Rajagopal, M. A. R. Iyengar and S. Venkatraman, Dose Estimates due to Argon-41 in the Kalpakkam Environment, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 15, no. 1 (January March 1992), pp. 18 19, and I. S. Bhat, M. A. R. Iyengar, R. P. Gurg, S. Krishnamony, and K. C. Pillai, Environmental impact of PHWR type power stations India experience, Conference Proceedings on Small and Medium Scale Nuclear Reactors, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 532-539. Since there is one author (M. A. R. Iyengar) who is a co-author in both papers, this is even more inexplicable. 16 Nuclear Power in India: A White Elephant? Business India (4 September 1978), pp. 20-35.

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The Materials Involved

There are different processes involved in the production of different kinds of

nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are basically of three types:

Pure fission weapons: The energy produced is due to fission, i.e., a heavy nucleus splitting into two lighter nuclei, also releasing some extra neutrons in the process.

Under suitable circumstances, these neutrons could be absorbed by other heavy

nuclei, in turn causing these nuclei to split and so on, thus leading to a chain reaction.

Very few materials can undergo a chain reaction; among these are the isotopes,

uranium-233, uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission weapons use either

plutonium, usually with a large fraction of plutonium-239, or uranium that has been

highly enriched in the uranium-235 isotope; some weapons use both.17 Uranium-233

is not often used since its production process is more involved.

Boosted fission weapons: These are similar to fission weapons, but in addition to the fissile material there is also some tritium gas that provides a large supply of neutrons.

These are produced through a reaction with deuterium that can occur only at the high

temperatures produced by the fission explosion. This neutron flux increases the

efficiency of fission, i.e., increases the fraction of fissile material that undergoes

fission before the weapon is blown apart. Though the fusion of tritium does produce a

small amount of energy, the energy released is overwhelmingly due to fission.

Thermonuclear weapons: The energy released is due to fusion, wherein two light nuclei combine to form a heavier nucleus. Fusion can happen only at very high

17 Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (Arlington: Aerofax, 1988), p. 32.

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temperatures; for this reason, all fusion weapons designed so far start with a primary

fission trigger. The elements used in fusion weapons are isotopes of hydrogen

deuterium and tritium. Besides energy, the fusion reaction between deuterium and

tritium that also releases high-energy neutrons; these neutrons then go on to fission

uranium-235 and uranium-238 found in the secondary in such weapons, releasing

more energy. The yield is typically much larger than from pure fission weapons.

India has developed implosion type plutonium fission bombs and claims to have

detonated a thermonuclear device on May 11, 1998. Doubts have been expressed about

the success of the thermonuclear explosion.18 However, it is fairly certain that India has

manufactured all the raw materials needed to make such a weapon; hence the

environmental damage caused by their production has already occurred.

We shall not enumerate the various processes involved in the highly enriched

uranium route although Pakistan has chosen that route.19

Plutonium is not ordinarily found in nature. It is a man-made element. To produce

plutonium, one first needs to mine uranium, convert it into a form suitable for use as

reactor fuel and burn it in a reactor. The resulting spent fuel is then reprocessed to

recover the plutonium. In India, tritium is produced as a by-product in heavy water

reactors when the deuterium in the heavy water absorbs a neutron. This is separated using

a catalytic exchange process.20

18 Brian Barker et al, Monitoring Nuclear Tests, Science (25 September 1998), pp. 1967-8. 19 India does claim to done some amount of uranium enrichment at the Rare Materials Plant at Rattehalli near Mysore. However, since uranium enrichment is not the focus of the Indian bomb making efforts, we shall not consider it. 20 T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, Tritium Breakthrough brings India closer to an H-bomb Arsenal, Janes Intelligence Review (January 1998), pp. 29-31.

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and its Impacts

Starting Point: Uranium Mining and Milling

The common starting point for the production of nuclear weapons, through either

the uranium or plutonium routes, as well as the production of nuclear energy is the

mining of uranium. Uranium mining and milling or refining has often severely impacted

the health of workers around the world. The radioactive hazards of uranium mines and

concentrating plants arise less from uranium than from the radionuclides in the

radioactive decay chain of uranium, especially radium-226, radon-222 (a gas) and its

decay products (daughters), and polonium-210, all alpha emitters.21

Under the poorly ventilated conditions that are characteristic of many uranium

mines, miners inhale radon and ore dust (including uranium), resulting in radiation doses.

Averaging exposure data from around the world, the United Nations Scientific

Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) estimates that about 70 per

cent of the total radiation exposure to the miners comes from radon and radon daughters,

3 per cent from ore dust and the remaining 27 per cent from external radiation.22

Inhalation of alpha emitting radionuclides increases the risk of lung cancer. The

US National Research Councils Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR)

committee estimates that the extra relative risk of death from lung cancer from exposure

to 1 Working Level Month (WLM, a unit used to measure radon exposure) when

21 There are three chief forms of ionizing radiation from radioactive substances alpha, beta and gamma radiation. For details see the paper in this book by Dr. Thomas George. 22 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation: UNSCEAR 1993 Report to the General Assembly (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 390.

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compared to an unexposed individual is 0.5 per cent/WLM.23 Average exposures to

uranium miners in Czechoslovakia, US, Canada and France ranged from 21.2 WLM in

one Canadian mine to 578.6 WLM in US mines in Colorado.24 Thus, the Colorado miners

had a (fatal) lung cancer risk of nearly four times that of an unexposed individual. Miners

are also apt to suffer from silicosis as a result of exposure to high levels of dust.

India has uranium mines at Jaduguda in Bihar; significant exploration for uranium

has been conducted near Domiasiat in Meghalaya and near the Andhra Pradesh -

Karnataka border. The uranium thus obtained is then milled at the mill-complex at

Jaduguda. The ore is first crushed, ground and leached into solution using sulphuric

acid.25 The solution is then filtered, purified by an ion-exchange process and uranium

precipitated in the form of magnesium diuranate. The remaining solution contains

contaminants including sulphuric acid, heavy metals, nitrates, sulphates, amines and

chlorides. This barren liquor is treated with lime and barium salts to reduce the

radioactivity and acidity; however, the effluent, which is discharged into a tailing pond,

does contain some radioactivity. The tailing pond in Jaduguda is close to villages and till

recently was not fenced off to prevent access by people or cattle.26

Mill tailings, i.e., the solid material left behind after uranium has been extracted

from the ore, are produced in large quantities in uranium milling because the typical

amount of uranium in the ore is about 0.1 per cent or less. Indian uranium ores on

23 Committee on Health Risks of Exposure to Radon (BEIR VI), Health Effects of Exposure to Radon (Washington: National Academy Press, 1999), p. 110. 24 Committee on Health Risks of Exposure to Radon (BEIR VI), Health Effects of Exposure to Radon, p. 270. 25 T. Subramaniam and Suhrid Sankar Chattopadhyay, From Ore to Yellow Cake, Frontline (10 September 1999), pp. 65-69. 26 Aziz ur Rahman and Jayanta Basu, Living in death shadow, Sunday (4 April 1999).

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average contain about 0.067 per cent of uranium oxide (U3O8).27 Thus, for each kilogram

of uranium metal produced, over 1750 kilograms of mill tailings are left behind. These

are contaminated with toxic heavy metals, such as molybdenum, arsenic and vanadium,

and with radioactive materials, principally thorium-230 and radium-226. The radium-226

decays into radon gas; in the case of exposed mill tailings, radon emissions can be

detected up to about one mile.28

Due to its fine sandy texture, mill tailings have been used to construct homes and

public buildings. Residents of these buildings are then exposed to gamma radiation and

radon. The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates the lifetime excess lung

cancer risk of residents of such homes at 4 cases per 100. In Jaduguda, tailings have been

used for road and home construction but the health impacts of these practices have not

been computed. Neither have the authorities informed the residents of the risks involved.

Mill tailings have contaminated water supplies at many locations. This becomes

particularly important in the Indian case because of heavy rainfall in the Jaduguda area.

The contamination of ground and surface water by seepage introduces radium-226 and

other hazardous substances like arsenic into drinking water supplies and in fish from the

area. The seepage problem is very important with acidic tailings, as the radionuclides

involved are more mobile under acidic conditions.29

Tailing dams are often not of stable construction. In most cases, they were made

27 This is at the Jaduguda mines, the richest uranium deposit; see Sanjib Chandra Sarkar, Geology and ore mineralisation of the Singhbhum copper-uranium belt, Eastern India, (Calcutta: Jadavpur University, 1984), p. 193. 28 Merril Eisenbud and Thomas Gesell, Environmental Radioactivity (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997), p. 206.

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from sedimentation of the coarse fraction of the tailing sludge. They are subject to the

risk of dam failures due to earthquakes or strong rains. It is of no surprise that dam

failures have repeatedly occurred all over the world. For example, there was a spill

involving 1000 tonnes of contaminated sediment and 370 million litres of contaminated

water in Church Rock, New Mexico, USA, in July 1979.30

What makes the concern about health effects due to radiation even more

worrisome in the Indian case is because ores in subsurface mines like Jaduguda and

Mosabani have high rates of radon exhalation.31 The relatively scant official data

available in the public domain on the state of health of workers exposed to this material

only heightens this concern. In 1986, for example, 42 per cent of all workers at the

Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) received a radiation dose greater than the

ICRP recommended value of 20 mSv/year; 6 per cent received doses in excess of 35

mSv/year.32 Table 1 shows exposures for India as well as world averages from a United

Nations survey.

Table 1: Radiation Exposures from Uranium Mining and Milling

Annual Collective Effective Dose Average Dose Region Total

(man Sv) Average per unit

extracted (man-Sv/kt) Per Monitored Worker (mSv)

Uranium Mining India (1981-84) 13.8 108 11.9 India (1985-89) 15.2 101 11.3 World (1980-84) 1580 29 5.15

29 Peter Diehl, Uranium Mining and Milling Wastes: An Introduction, World Information Service on Energy website http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/uwai.html 30 World Information Service on Energy website http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/mdaf.html 31 A. K. Singh, D. Sengupta and Rajendra Prasad, Radon Exhalation Rate and Uranium Estimation in Rock Samples from Bihar Uranium and Copper Mines using the SSNTD Technique, Applied Radiation and Isotopes 51 (1999), pp. 107-113. 32 A. U. Sonawane et al, New ICRP Dose Limit and Prospects for its Implementation in Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 15, no. 1 (January March 1992), pp. 10-12.

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World (1985-89) 1140 25.9 4.45 Uranium Milling and Extraction

India (1981-84) 3.58 27.9 7.35 India (1985-89) 3.40 22.6 5.86 World (1980-84) 117 1.84 5.1 World (1985-89) 116 2.01 6.3 Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation (New York: United Nations, 1993), pp. 447 51.

UCIL, which is responsible for uranium mining, seems to have taken the policy of

stoutly denying all health effects. A. N. Mullick, who served as UCILs chief medical

officer for 25 years is reported to have said: I have not come across any radiation-related

ailments during my entire career.33 However, this statement is not based on any concrete

data. The DAE did not conduct any baseline studies at Jaduguda to evaluate the health

status of the people of the area before commencing mining and milling operations.

Neither have there been careful health studies later to establish if there have been any

deleterious consequences. However, a number of newspaper and magazine reports and

recently a documentary film Buddha Weeps In Jaduguda do report a very high incidence

of congenital anomalies and cancer.34

A recent health survey conducted by Anumukti in selected villages both near and

far from Jaduguda observed a statistically significant increase in congenital deformities in

the villages close to Jaduguda. It also appears that a number of people suffer from various

lung diseases; however, these are all routinely classified as tuberculosis by the medical

authorities. Members of the survey team also noted several practices that unnecessarily

increased the radiation exposure to the workers and the inhabitants of the area. Some of

33 A Deformed Existence, Down to Earth (15 June 1999); available on the internet at http://www.oneworld.org/cse/html/dte/dte990615/dte_srep.htm34 Shriprakash Buddha Weeps in Jaduguda, Krittika Films (1999).

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the problems are improper ventilation in the mines, use of material leftover from mining

to build roads and houses, and drying up of tailing ponds during the summer.

NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION

Since the bulk of Indias nuclear reactors use natural uranium, the uranium goes

directly to fuel fabrication facilities after mining and milling. This is done at the Nuclear

Fuel Complex (NFC) at Hyderabad.

Some studies of workers in uranium processing facilities have observed high rates

of cancer, especially lung cancer and radiosensitive solid cancers.35 These result from

inhalation of fine particles of uranium and other materials by workers. If the uranium is in

a state that is relatively insoluble in bodily fluids and the particles are small enough to be

absorbed into the lung, inhalation leads to increased risk of lung cancer. If not, the

uranium accumulates in the kidney and there is a risk of renal damage and possibly

kidney failure due to heavy metal toxicity effects.

In addition, it has been shown that genomic instabilities can also result from

exposure to uranium. For example, a study of nuclear fuel workers by researchers from

Osmania University demonstrated a significant increase in sister-chromatid exchanges.36

Among a set of 24 workers monitored for the amount of uranium inhaled (technically, the

uranium thorax burden), at least two had exceeded the annual limit.37

35 See for example Beate Ritz, Radiation Exposure and Cancer Mortality in Uranium Processing Workers, Epidemiology 10, no. 5 (September 1999), pp. 531 - 538. 36 P. Aruna Prabhavati et al, Sister-chromatid Exchanges in Nuclear Fuel Workers, Mutation Research 347 (1995), pp. 31-35. Sister chromatid exchanges are reciprocal interchanges of the two chromatid arms within a single chromosome. 37 R. C. Sharma et al, Inferences from Thorax Counting on Selected Occupational Workers of Nuclear Fuel Complex, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 10, no. 1&2 (January June 1987), pp. 121-124. Though not specified, it appears that this limit is based on the radiation dose delivered rather than the chemical

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Apart from exposure to toxic chemicals and (mostly) internal and external doses

of radiation, workers are also at risk from a variety of accidents. In the 1990s alone, the

NFC has had at least four accidents that have been publicly acknowledged. Though these

were all relatively small, there is also the risk of more serious criticality accidents, i.e., an

accidental chain reaction, especially in facilities like the NFC that make different kinds of

fuel for different reactors. An example of such an accident was the one that occurred in

1999 at the Tokaimura fuel fabrication facility in Japan.38 The accident occurred because

workers put fuel enriched to 16 per cent uranium-235 in a container meant to hold fuel

for light water reactors, which is usually only enriched to 3-5 per cent. Unlike Tokaimura

which is in a somewhat remote location, the NFC is near the densely populated city of

Hyderabad and such an accident would have more serious consequences.

Nuclear Reactors

Two steps are involved in producing plutonium from nuclear fuel. First, a nuclear

reactor, either one whose main purpose is to produce electricity or one whose sole aim is

the production of plutonium, transmutes uranium-238 in the nuclear fuel into plutonium-

239 and heavier plutonium isotopes. The plutonium as it comes out from the reactor is

mixed with fission products and the remaining uranium. The process of separating the

plutonium from the other materials is called reprocessing and is the second step in

producing plutonium. Reprocessing will be considered in the next section.

As with many other things, information about the primary reactors used for

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, namely CIRUS and Dhruva, is hard to

toxicity. See for example Shiv Datta et al, Computations of Uranium Burden Buildups in the Bodu Organs

17

come by. Therefore, to get a sense of the radiation exposures to workers there, we look at

practices at power reactors, about which more information is publicly available.

Even routine operations in nuclear plants lead to some amount of radiation

exposure to workers; in some Indian reactors such exposure has sometimes led to

significant radiation doses. A 1992 Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) study of

workers in various units of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) showed that

between 1986 and 1990 nearly 3-5 per cent of all workers employed by the DAE received

over 20 mSv/year.39 Considering that the DAE employed over 17,000 workers during that

period, the sheer number of people with significant radiation exposures is clearly quite

large. However, expressing the number of workers receiving high doses of radiation as a

percentage of the total workforce is somewhat misleading because it is averaged over

different plants and workers in various situations with different levels of routine

exposure. Specific plants had much higher doses. For example, in 1987 over 18 per cent

of all workers at the Madras Atomic Power Station received a dose greater than 20

mSv/year; 5.5 per cent received doses in excess of 35 mSv/year.40 The average dose to

MAPS workers was 11 mSv/year.41

Another indicator of the high radiation dose to workers in Indian nuclear reactors

is to compare the total radiation exposure to the amount of power they produce. For

of Occupational Workers, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 10, no. 1&2 (January June 1987), pp. 37-40. 38 Nuclear Horror, Hindu (14 October 1999). 39 A. U. Sonawane et al, New ICRP Dose Limit and Prospects for its Implementation in Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 40 A. U. Sonawane et al, New ICRP Dose Limit and Prospects for its Implementation in Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 41 U. C. Mishra and S. Krishnamony, Radiation Protection and Environmental Impact from Nuclear Power Plants, Indian Journal of Power and River Valley Development: Development in Nuclear Power Generation Number, (October November 1994), pp. 332-346.

18

example, in the year 1980, the collective dose (i.e., the sum of all individual worker

doses) at the two boiling water reactors at Tarapur Atomic Power Station was 43.06 man-

Sv, sufficient to cause 2 cancer deaths.42 During that year, the reactors produced 0.2

GigaWatt-years (GWy) of electricity.43 This works out to a per-unit exposure of 215.3

man-Sv per GWy. The corresponding figure at the pressurized heavy water reactors at the

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station was 91.2 man-Sv per GWy in 1980, corresponding to

nearly 5 cancer deaths. Such high exposures in the case of Indian reactors are not

exceptional; average exposures have been high as well, as illustrated in Table 2, which

also gives world averages for exposures.

Table 2: Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Reactors

Region Total (man Sv)

Average per unit energy generated (man-Sv/GWy)

Per Monitored Worker (mSv)

Boiling Water Reactors India (1980-84) 38 189 11.4 India (1985-89) 23.2 113 8.63 World (1980-84) 454 18 4.47 World (1985-89) 331 7.94 2.38

Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors India (1981-84) 15.7 103 5.08 India (1985-89) 3.40 76 6.51 World (1980-84) 46 8.0 3.2 World (1985-89) 60 6.2 3.4 Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation (New York: United Nations, 1993), pp. 457 461.

If radiation exposures even during regular operations are so high, one can imagine

42 M. R. Srinivasan, Thirty Reactor Years of Maintenance Experience An Introspection, in Selected Lectures of Dr. M. R. Srinivasan, (Bombay: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1990), pp. 78-85. 43 Data from International Atomic Energy Agency, Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in Member States in 1997 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998).

19

how much higher they would be due to accidents, even small ones. The heavy water spill

of March 26, 1999 at the Madras Atomic Power Station provides an example. During this

accident, somewhere between four and fourteen tonnes of heavy water leaked out.

Mopping up the spill required 42 workers. Using standard methods of radiation

exposure calculation, it can be shown that each worker who was involved in cleaning up

the spill would have received a radiation dose of at least 6 8 mSv for every hour of the

job.44 Therefore, even working for 4 hours in such an environment would have led to a

dose in excess of ICRP recommendations. One must remember that this dose is in

addition to those that they would have received over the course of routine reactor

operations during the rest of the year. Such heavy water leaks are relatively frequent.

Over the years the MAPS reactors have experienced at least 3 such leaks. Just in 1997,

the Kakrapar I, MAPS II and Narora II reactors had heavy water leaks.45

Apart from heavy water leaks, there have also been numerous other kinds of

accidents in Indian nuclear facilities.46 An AERB report released in May 1993 revealed

that there had been 147 accidents of varying magnitudes in the previous year. Some of

them could have potentially led to major catastrophes. The best known, but by no means

the only, example of a catastrophic nuclear reactor accident is the Chernobyl explosion in

1986.47

The only power station in India around which there has been a scientific study of

44 See M. V. Ramana, Disturbing Questions, Frontline (4 June 1999), pp. 119-120. 45 International Atomic Energy Agency, Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in Member States in 1997, pp. 301 320. 46 See Nayan Chanda, The Perils of Power, Far Eastern Economic Review (4 February 1999) and T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, In the Comfort of Secrecy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 52-57.

20

health consequences on the local population, i.e., not just workers in the plants, is the

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) located at Rawatbhata near Kota in central

India.48 This study, conducted in 1991, surveyed five villages (total population: 2860)

within ten kilometres of the plant and compared them with four other villages (total

population: 2544) more than fifty kilometres away; the results were published in 1993.

The study observed:

An increase in the rate of congenital deformities

A significantly higher rate of spontaneous abortions, still births and one day deaths of new born babies

A significant increase in chronic diseases especially amongst the young, but no differences in acute infections

A significantly higher rate of solid tumours

More cancer patients and cancer deaths in villages near the plant

It is worth noting that the survey also observed that there were significantly fewer

number of electrified household and pumping set connections near the plant. Thus it is

clear that with the exception of generating employment for the workers, the benefits from

running the plant do not flow to the inhabitants of the region.

In addition to these health consequences from routine operations and accidents,

47 For a list of nuclear related accidents see the list put out by Greenpeace on the internet at: http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/nukes/chernob/rep02.html48 This study has been published in detail in a special issue on Rawatbhata in Anumukti 6, no. 5 (April/May 1993). Extracts from the study have been published in International Perspectives in Public Health 10 (1994). See also Sanghamitra Gadekar and Surendra N. Gadekar, Rawatbhata, in Nuclear Energy and

21

there is also a long-term threat to the environment and human health from a variety of

wastes that are produced during the operation of nuclear reactors. Additional wastes will

be produced when reactors are decommissioned. Though it has been claimed that these

are safely stored and handled in waste management facilities, such facilities at BARC and

at Tarapur have had leaks leading to radiation exposure to workers involved in cleaning

up the resulting mess.49

Gaseous wastes produced during routine operations are released through stacks

(75-100 m tall) into the environment. This mainly consists of tritium, Argon-41 and

Iodine-131, fission product noble gases and a small amount of particulate matter. More

recent nuclear plants are designed to trap the short-lived (half-life = 1.83 hours) Argon-

41.50 Low level liquid wastes, consisting mostly of tritium but also small quantities of

Cesium-137 and Strontium-90, are released into nearby water bodies, such as the sea in

the case of coastal reactors. Data on such releases are scarce and often conflicting but

the available data suggests that releases at Indian reactors are much higher on a per unit

electricity output basis when compared to similar reactors elsewhere.

Reactors also produce a number of solid and liquid wastes during operation and

maintenance that are not directly discharged into the environment. Solid wastes include

materials, such as protective clothing, paper and cloth wipers and discarded equipment,

that are contaminated by contact with the reactor system; and materials, such as ion-

Public Safety, ed. Vinod Gaur (New Delhi: Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, 1996), pp. 57-87. 49 Rupa Chinai, The Sunday Observer (6 September 1992); available on the internet at http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/other.html; Villagers at Risk from Atom Leak, Experts Claim, The Daily Telegraph (6 July 1995), p. 12. 50 I. S. Bhat et al, Environmental impact of PHWR type power stations India experience, Conference Proceedings on Small and Medium Scale Nuclear Reactors, New Delhi, 1991.

22

exchange resins and filters, that are contaminated by their use in cleaning and

conditioning the reactor coolant and moderator and the fuel storage bay water. The bulk

of the radioactivity, however, is contained in the spent fuel coming out of the reactors,

which is reprocessed.

Reprocessing

The next step in the process of making nuclear weapons is to reprocess the spent

fuel that comes out of nuclear reactors to obtain plutonium. The irradiated spent fuel

contains the largest quantities of radioactivity produced in the fuel cycle. Spent fuel is

first stored in water filled pools for cooling. After cooling, the fuel rods are chopped up,

dissolved in acid and other solvents and different chemicals added to precipitate out

different elements. Reprocessing, in many ways, is the dirtiest part of the nuclear fuel

cycle producing large amounts of solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive waste. The largest

component (by volume) is low level waste that comprises 84% by volume of the waste

stream; however, this only contains about 0.1% of the total activity from the spent fuel.

Intermediate level waste accounts for 14% (vol.) and contains about 1% of the

radioactivity. High level waste constitutes the remaining 2% but contains nearly 99% of

the total radioactivity. For each tonne of spent fuel reprocessed, Indian reprocessing

facilities generate 2.2 cubic metres of high level waste, 15.4 cubic metres of intermediate

level waste and 92.4 cubic metres of low level waste.

Since there is no way of removing the radioactive nature of these wastes,

exposure to these wastes will continue to be harmful to humans and other forms of life

for thousands of years. They have to be isolated from human contact and possibly

monitored if they are not to cause radiation doses. This need for stewardship is

23

unprecedented in human history.

Table 3: Total Nuclear Waste Generation in India

Step in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Waste Estimate (2 significant digits) Uranium Mining and Milling 4.1 million tonnes

Fuel Fabrication 2000 cubic metres Reactor Operations (low level waste) 22000 cubic metres

Reactor Operations (intermediate level waste) 280 cubic metres Spent Fuel Storage (not reprocessed so far) 400 tonnes

Reprocessing (high level waste) 5000 cubic metres Reprocessing (intermediate level waste) 35000 cubic metres

Reprocessing (low level waste) 210000 cubic metres Source: M. V. Ramana, Dennis Thomas and Susy Varughese, Estimating Nuclear Waste Production in India, (Current Science 81, no. 11 (10 December 2001), pp. 1458-1462).

Apart from radiation exposure and waste generation during regular operations,

these facilities also become extremely contaminated and have to be decontaminated. In

the case of Indias smallest full-scale reprocessing facility at Trombay, decontamination

generated about 300 tonnes of solid wastes, about 60,000 litres of medium-level liquid

wastes and about 13 million litres of low-level liquid effluents.51 The official collective

dose to workers was about 30 person-Sv. There are also reports that many of these

operations use temporary workers whose radiation exposure is not monitored. This would

only increase the total radiation exposure and adverse health impact.

Because of the radioactivity which releases heat, the wastes coming from

reprocessing must be stored in cooled tanks. Loss of cooling could cause explosions. For

example, on 29 September 1957, a large explosion (estimated to be between 70 and 100

tons of TNT equivalent) occurred at the Mayak nuclear weapons facility in the then

Soviet Union; it contained 70-80 tons of highly radioactive waste with a total

24

radioactivity of 20 million curies.52 The chief long-lived components and their

contributions to total activity are listed in Table 4; it has been estimated that the

collective radiation dose was nearly 6000 person-Sv, which would result in about 300

cancer deaths. The fallout settled along a 400 km long swath of land, covering an area of

over 20,000 square kilometers.53

Table 4: Characteristics of Radioactivity Released in the 1957 Accident

Radionuclide Contribution to Total Activity of Mixture, %

Half Life Radiation Emitted

Sr-90 + Y-90 5.4 28.6 y Beta Zr-95 + Nb-95 24.9 65 d Beta, Gamma

Ru-106 + Rh-106 3.7 1 y Beta, Gamma Cs-137 0.036 30 y Beta, Gamma

Ce-144 + Pr-144 66 284 d Beta, Gamma Source: B. V. Nikipelov et al, Accident in the Southern Urals on 29 September 1957, International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular, 28 May 1989; cited in Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 111.

Fabrication

The making of the cores of nuclear weapons, known as pits, from plutonium

requires extensive chemical and metallurgical operations. These involve not only

plutonium but also other toxic materials such as beryllium and hydrofluoric acid.

Plutonium dust if inhaled in large quantities (about 100 mg of plutonium for adult

humans) would cause death from acute respiratory failure within a week. At lower doses

that are likely to result from working in pit manufacturing facilities, inhalation of

plutonium increases the risk of lung, bone and liver cancers. It has been estimated that

51 Ann MacLachlan, Indias Kalpakkam Plant can reprocess mixed-carbide fuel from FBTR, Nuclear Fuel (3 June 1985), p. 11. 52 Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 109-113. 53 Richard Stone, Retracing Mayaks Radioactive Cloud, Science (8 January 1999), p. 164.

25

somewhere between 3 and 12 cancer deaths would be caused for each milligram of

plutonium inhaled.54 This estimate assumes that the plutonium is relatively insoluble. If it

were to be in a chemical form that dissolves rapidly, then this would increase by a factor

of up to 6.

Plutonium metal is also very susceptible to fires. In the US, for example, there

were many fires in the nuclear weapons complex, especially at the Rocky Flats Plant.55

Fortunately, the amount of plutonium converted to respirable aerosol in such fires is only

about 0.05 0.07 per cent.56 But since the total amount of plutonium at facilities could be

quite large, even this small fraction could lead to releases of sizeable quantities. The

release of 1 kg of plutonium aerosol near one of South Asias large and crowded cities

and its dispersal by wind could lead to 5,000 20,000 cancer deaths.57

Plutonium fabrication operations also carry the risk of accidental criticality. At

least eight accidental criticality events are known to have occurred in the U.S. nuclear

weapons complex; some have had fatal consequences due to very high radiation

exposure.58

There is also the danger of an accidental detonation during the process of

54 Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, The Hazard from Plutonium Dispersal by Nuclear-warhead Accidents, Science and Global Security 2, no. 1 (1990), pp. 21-41. 55 Len Ackland, The Day we Almost Lost Denver, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 58-65. 56 D. R. Stephens, Source Terms for Plutonium Aerosolization from Nuclear Weapons Accidents Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report UCRL-ID-119303 (undated); John M. Haschke, Evaluation of Source-Term for Plutonium Aerosolization Los Alamos National Laboratory Report LA-1231 (1992). 57 Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana and R. Rajaraman,Risks and Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Accidents in South Asia, Princeton University/Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report No. 326, September 2000; available on the internet at http://www.princeton.edu:80/~cees/arms/index.shtml 58 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, USA: International Physicians Press, 1992), p 50.

26

assembling the chemical high explosive components around the plutonium pit. This has

occurred at least once in the U.S. in March 1977.59

Nuclear Testing

The last step before manufacturing and deploying nuclear weapons is conducting

explosive tests. Since 1945, 2051 nuclear tests have been conducted all over the world.

Of these, 528 have been in the atmosphere, under water, or in space. The rest have been

underground.60 The effects of atmospheric testing are both local and global. Local effects

in regions near testing sites and, in some cases, due to winds, even hundreds of

kilometres away, led to relatively large doses to the inhabitants of these areas. Dissident

Soviet scientist Andrei Sakharov was one of the first to calculate that atmospheric tests

cause about 10,000 deaths and other health injuries globally per megatonne of the

explosion.61 These deaths would occur over thousands of years, largely due to inhalation

of Carbon-14 (which has a half-life of 5730 years) resulting from the explosion. Since the

estimated cumulative yield of atmospheric tests by the U.S., Russia, U.K, France and

China is about 545 megatonnes, this implies that over the next few thousands of years,

over 5 million people will die from cancers induced by atmospheric testing.

There are two kinds of environmental dangers associated with radioactivity from

underground tests. Both of these stem from the radioactive remnants left behind by the

59 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and its Health and Environmental Effects, p. 62. 60 Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945-98, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 65-67. 61 Andrei D. Sakharov, Radioactive Carbon from Nuclear Explosions and Nonthreshold Biological Effects, Atomic Energy (USSR) 4, no. 6 (June 1958); reproduced in Science and Global Security 1 (1990), pp. 175-187.

27

nuclear reactions that are responsible for the energy produced in a nuclear explosion. The

first is that radioactive contamination may escape into the atmosphere. The second is that

the radioactivity left underground makes its way into ground water or to the surface.

Table 5: Key Radioactive Remnants, Half-lives, Production Rates

Fission Product Half-life Principal Decay Mode

Yield per kiloton (Ci/kt)

Strontium-90 28 years beta radiation 0.1 Iodine-131 8 days beta and gamma

radiation 125.0

Cesium-137 30 years beta and gamma radiation

0.16

Plutonium-239 (un-fissioned material)

24,100 years

alpha radiation approx. 2.5 kg/explosion

Source: Merrill Eisenbud and Thomas Gesell, Environmental Radioactivity (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997), p. 279.

Releases to Atmosphere: Several underground tests have vented i.e., failed to

contain the radioactivity due to faulty design, and released fission products into the

atmosphere. Others have late-time seeps, whereby radioactive gases were released into

the atmosphere gradually over a period of several weeks or months. And finally

radioactivity is sometimes released during routine post-test activities. In the US, more

than half of all the underground tests conducted at the Nevada Test site after 1963 have

led to radioactivity being released to the atmosphere. 62 Similarly in the Soviet Union,

nearly 60 per cent of the underground nuclear tests conducted at the Novaya Zemlya test

site released radioactivity into the atmosphere.63 While these releases are typically small

compared to releases from atmospheric tests, they demonstrate that underground testing

does lead to radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. The following table lists some

62 C. R. Schoengold, M. E. DeMarre, and E. M. Kirkwood, Radiological Effluents Released from U.S. Continental Tests 1961 through 1992 DOE/NV-317 (Las Vegas, NV: Bechtel Nevada, 1996).

28

of the significant venting incidents in the U.S.

Table 6: Significant Incidents of Venting

Year Test name Amount of Radioactivity vented (12 hours after explosion)

1962 Platte 1.9 million curies 1962 Eel 1.9 million curies 1962 Des Moines 11 million curies 1970 Baneberry 6.7 million curies

Source: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions (Washington, DC: OTA, 1989).

According to public statements by the DAE, none of the tests conducted at

Pokharan released any radioactivity. However, residents of the villages near the test site

have complained, both in 1974 and in 1998, of different kinds of physical illnesses. In

particular, reported cases of nose bleeding and burning eyes may have resulted from

exposure to beta radiation.64 Without a thorough independent examination, it is not

possible to decide on the veracity of the complaints or their causes.

It is worth mentioning that it is difficult to predict, a priori, whether a test is likely

to vent. On the basis of several hundred tests, the US uses a formula that relates the depth

of burial to the cube root of the yield, with a minimum depth of burial of about 185

metres. A 10 kiloton explosion is buried at a depth of about 260 metres or more.65 Based

on this estimate, the Indian explosions of 11 May 1998, which are said to have been

conducted at a depth of 200-300 metres with the largest explosion having a yield of 45

kilotons, could well have resulted in venting of radioactivity. The 1970 Baneberry test,

63 Donald J. Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet Union (Columbus, U.S.A.: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory/Batelle Press, 1997), p. 506. 64 Amar De, In Pokhran, their Eyes are Burning, Noses Bleeding, The Economic Times (21 May 1998). 65 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions (Washington, DC: OTA, 1989).

29

which resulted in a massive vent, had a yield of only 10 kilotonnes and was conducted at

a depth of about 275 metres.66 Thus, even if the Pokharan tests did not actually result in

venting, there was considerable risk of that occurring.

Releases to Groundwater: The major effects of atmospheric releases of radioactivity

from underground tests are relatively short-lived, and in most countries have been

dominated by such releases from aboveground testing. The long term effects of

underground testing are more likely to arise from the immense quantities of radioactive

material, much of it very long-lived, left below the ground and which may lead to

contamination of water and the food chain. The extent of the problem can be seen from

Table 7, which estimates the amounts of various radioactive isotopes that have been left

underground in different countries.

Table 7: Approximate Underground Radioactivity Estimates, as of 1999 (in Curies)

Country Strontium-90 Cesium-137 Plutonium-239 Main Locations USA 2.2 million 3.5 million 122250 Nevada Test Site USSR 1.8 million 2.9 million 74400 Kazakh Test Site & Novaya

Zemlya UK UK carried out all of its underground testing in Nevada and these

estimates have been included in the U.S. totals France 150,000 240,000 24000 In Ecker, Moruroa, Fangataufa China 94,000 117,000 3300 Lop Nor India67 6300 10,000 900 Pokharan

Pakistan68 3400 5500 900 Chagai Total 4.3 million 6.9 million 226,000 (Totals rounded off )

Source: M. V. Ramana, Underground Tests: Ravaging Nature, The Hindu Survey of the Environment (June 1999).

For long, officials in charge of nuclear testing have claimed that because all the

66 Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing 1947 1974, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 248. 67 Assuming the official yields of the Indian tests in 1974 and 1998 of 12 kt and 58 kt (5 explosions). 68 Assuming that the total yield of the Pakistani tests is 35 kilotonnes (6 explosions).

30

radioactive material is trapped within the cavity left behind by the explosion, this vast

accumulation of radioactive material under the ground did not lead to any hazards. In

particular, though it stayed radioactive for thousands of years, plutonium was considered

not to pose a threat because it is largely insoluble in water.69

However, as recent studies have shown, plutonium has indeed escaped from

underground test cavities and migrated a significant distance, by attaching itself to

colloids, i.e, small particles suspended in water.70 Through this process, plutonium is

transported at a rate approximately that of the motion of groundwater (about a hundred

metres per year). While the transportation rate is small, the long half-life of plutonium

allows the possibility of migrating significant distances in groundwater.

Besides plutonium, it is known that tritium has contaminated subsurface

groundwater.71 Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen with a half-life of 12.3 years;

it decays by emitting a beta particle. Since its chemical properties are identical to

hydrogen, it can combine with oxygen and isotopes of hydrogen to produce tritiated

heavy water, which is easily absorbed by plants, animals and humans. Any tritiated water

vapour that is breathed in, absorbed through the skin, or ingested, would result in

complete absorption of the entire radioactivity. The absorbed tritiated water is rapidly

distributed throughout the body via the blood, which in turn equilibriates with

extracellular fluid in about 12 minutes. Since tritiated water can pass through the

69 More precisely, the Pu ion-exchange factor = ratio of velocity of ions to velocity of water = 10-4; see Bernard L. Cohen, High Level Radioactive Waste, Reviews of Modern Physics 49, no. 1 (January 1977), pp. 1-20. 70 A. Kersting et al, Migration of Plutonium in Ground Water at the Nevada Test Site, Nature 397, no. 6714 (7 January 1999), pp. 56-59. 71 United States Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Final Impact Statement for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada, August 1996, Summary, p. S-21.

31

placenta, it also could lead to mental retardation and other developmental effects when

ingested by pregnant women.

Even if the extent of contamination and its rate of spreading are slow, it must be

remembered that test sites such as Pokharan are usually located in desert environments.

Water is a precious commodity in such places. Even polluting a few wells could cause

incredible hardships and make it impossible for a local community to live there.

CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Rosalie Bertell has put it most succinctly: If we kept accounts of our health,

as well as we do of our money, nuclear activities whether for war or peace would be

banned immediately. Unfortunately keeping good and reliable accounts of public health

is not a priority since those with hefty bank balances do not mind sacrificing those

without any in the name of development, progress, national security and prestige.

Nuclear weapons do not have to be used in war to affect peoples health and the

environment; the process of manufacturing and testing them does precisely that along

every step of the way. Many of these harmful effects arise from producing nuclear energy

as well. The people who bear the brunt of these are often disempowered in the first place.

Thus, for them and for others, nuclear weapons are a constant threat to their well-being.

Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the Anumukti team for their help. MVR

would like to thank Ahnde Lin for procuring several useful references and Arjun

Makhijani and Frank von Hippel for useful comments. MVRs research was supported in

part by a Research and Writing grant from the MacArthur foundation and in part by a

32

grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

33

The Price We Pay: Environmental and Health Impacts of NucleaA Difficult TaskOfficial LimitsThe Materials InvolvedThe Nuclear Fuel Cycle and its ImpactsStarting Point: Uranium Mining and MillingNUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATIONNuclear ReactorsReprocessingFabrication

Nuclear TestingCONCLUSIONS