THE PRINCE

by Nicolo Machiavelli

STYLED BY LIMPIDSOFT

2

Contents

INTRODUCTION 5

DEDICATION 24

CHAPTER I 27

CHAPTER II 29

CHAPTER III 31

CHAPTER IV 45

CHAPTER V 50

CHAPTER VI 53

3

CONTENTS

CHAPTER VII 59

CHAPTER VIII 71

CHAPTER IX 79

CHAPTER X 85

CHAPTER XI 89

CHAPTER XII 94

CHAPTER XIII 103

CHAPTER XIV 110

CHAPTER XV 114

CHAPTER XVI 117

CHAPTER XVII 121

CHAPTER XVIII 126

CHAPTER XIX 132

4

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XX 148

CHAPTER XXI 155

CHAPTER XXII 162

CHAPTER XXIII 165

CHAPTER XXIV 169

CHAPTER XXV 172

CHAPTER XXVI 178

APPENDIX 185

5

The present document was derived fromtext provided by Project Gutenberg (docu-ment 1232), which was made available free ofcharge. This document is also free of charge.

INTRODUCTION

Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May1469. He was the second son of Bernardo di NicoloMachiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of Bar-tolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parentswere members of the old Florentine nobility.

His life falls naturally into three periods, each ofwhich singularly enough constitutes a distinct andimportant era in the history of Florence. His youthwas concurrent with the greatness of Florence as anItalian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’Medici, Il Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici inFlorence occurred in 1494, in which year Machiavellientered the public service. During his official careerFlorence was free under the government of a Repub-lic, which lasted until 1512, when the Medici returnedto power, and Machiavelli lost his office. The Mediciagain ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they

7

INTRODUCTION

were once more driven out. This was the periodof Machiavelli’s literary activity and increasing influ-ence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsionof the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighthyear, without having regained office.

YOUTH=Aet. 1-25–1469-94

Although there is little recorded of the youth ofMachiavelli, the Florence of those days is so wellknown that the early environment of this represen-tative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence hasbeen described as a city with two opposite cur-rents of life, one directed by the fervent and aus-tere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-lovingLorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the youngMachiavelli must have been slight, for although atone time he wielded immense power over the for-tunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli witha subject of a gibe in “The Prince,” where he is citedas an example of an unarmed prophet who came to abad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Mediceanrule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have im-pressed Machiavelli strongly, for he frequently recursto it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo’s grandsonthat he dedicates “The Prince.”

Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a

8

INTRODUCTION

picture of the young men among whom his youth waspassed. He writes: “They were freer than their fore-fathers in dress and living, and spent more in otherkinds of excesses, consuming their time and money inidleness, gaming, and women; their chief aim was toappear well dressed and to speak with wit and acute-ness, whilst he who could wound others the mostcleverly was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his sonGuido, Machiavelli shows why youth should avail it-self of its opportunities for study, and leads us to inferthat his own youth had been so occupied. He writes:“I have received your letter, which has given me thegreatest pleasure, especially because you tell me youare quite restored in health, than which I could haveno better news; for if God grant life to you, and to me,I hope to make a good man of you if you are willingto do your share.” Then, writing of a new patron, hecontinues: “This will turn out well for you, but it isnecessary for you to study; since, then, you have nolonger the excuse of illness, take pains to study lettersand music, for you see what honour is done to me forthe little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish toplease me, and to bring success and honour to your-self, do right and study, because others will help youif you help yourself.”

9

INTRODUCTION

OFFICE–Aet. 25-43–1494-1512

The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spentin the service of the free Republic of Florence, whichflourished, as stated above, from the expulsion ofthe Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. Af-ter serving four years in one of the public offices hewas appointed Chancellor and Secretary to the Sec-ond Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here weare on firm ground when dealing with the events ofMachiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a lead-ing part in the affairs of the Republic, and we have itsdecrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as wellas his own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few ofhis transactions with the statesmen and soldiers of histime gives a fair indication of his activities, and sup-plies the sources from which he drew the experiencesand characters which illustrate “The Prince.”

His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza,“my lady of Forli” of “The Prince,” from whose con-duct and fate he drew the moral that it is far bet-ter to earn the confidence of the people than to relyon fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle inMachiavelli, and is urged by him in many ways as amatter of vital importance to princes.

In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from

10

INTRODUCTION

Louis XII for continuing the war against Pisa: thisking it was who, in his conduct of affairs in Italy, com-mitted the five capital errors in statecraft summarizedin “The Prince,” and was consequently driven out.He, also, it was who made the dissolution of his mar-riage a condition of support to Pope Alexander VI;which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge thatsuch promises should be kept to what he has writtenconcerning the faith of princes.

Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied withevents arising out of the ambitions of Pope Alexan-der VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke Valentino,and these characters fill a large space of “The Prince.”Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of theduke for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep thestates they have seized; he can, indeed, find no pre-cepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare Bor-gia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed bysome critics as the “hero” of “The Prince.” Yet in “ThePrince” the duke is in point of fact cited as a type ofthe man who rises on the fortune of others, and fallswith them; who takes every course that might be ex-pected from a prudent man but the course which willsave him; who is prepared for all eventualities but theone which happens; and who, when all his abilitiesfail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his

11

INTRODUCTION

fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen fatality.

On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli wassent to Rome to watch the election of his successor,and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into allow-ing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delleRovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals thathad most reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, whencommenting on this election, says that he who thinksnew favours will cause great personages to forget oldinjuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until hehad ruined Cesare.

It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506,when that pontiff was commencing his enterpriseagainst Bologna; which he brought to a successful is-sue, as he did many of his other adventures, owingchiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference toPope Julius that Machiavelli moralizes on the resem-blance between Fortune and women, and concludesthat it is the bold rather than the cautious man thatwill win and hold them both.

It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunesof the Italian states, which in 1507 were controlled byFrance, Spain, and Germany, with results that havelasted to our day; we are concerned with those events,and with the three great actors in them, so far only

12

INTRODUCTION

as they impinge on the personality of Machiavelli.He had several meetings with Louis XII of France,and his estimate of that monarch’s character has al-ready been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdi-nand of Aragon as the man who accomplished greatthings under the cloak of religion, but who in realityhad no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who,had he allowed himself to be influenced by such mo-tives, would have been ruined. The Emperor Maxim-ilian was one of the most interesting men of the age,and his character has been drawn by many hands;but Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures whenhe describes him as a secretive man, without force ofcharacter–ignoring the human agencies necessary tocarry his schemes into effect, and never insisting onthe fulfilment of his wishes.

The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official careerwere filled with events arising out of the League ofCambrai, made in 1508 between the three great Euro-pean powers already mentioned and the pope, withthe object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This re-sult was attained in the battle of Vaila, when Venicelost in one day all that she had won in eight hundredyears. Florence had a difficult part to play duringthese events, complicated as they were by the feud

13

INTRODUCTION

which broke out between the pope and the French,because friendship with France had dictated the en-tire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius IIfinally formed the Holy League against France, andwith the assistance of the Swiss drove the French outof Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, andhad to submit to his terms, one of which was that theMedici should be restored. The return of the Medici toFlorence on 1st September 1512, and the consequentfall of the Republic, was the signal for the dismissalof Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end tohis public career, for, as we have seen, he died withoutregaining office.

LITERATURE AND DEATH–Aet. 43-58–1512-27

On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for afew weeks had vainly hoped to retain his office un-der the new masters of Florence, was dismissed bydecree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after thishe was accused of complicity in an abortive conspir-acy against the Medici, imprisoned, and put to thequestion by torture. The new Medicean pope, Leo X,procured his release, and he retired to his small prop-erty at San Casciano, near Florence, where he devotedhimself to literature. In a letter to Francesco Vettori,dated 13th December 1513, he has left a very inter-

14

INTRODUCTION

esting description of his life at this period, which elu-cidates his methods and his motives in writing “ThePrince.” After describing his daily occupations withhis family and neighbours, he writes: “The eveningbeing come, I return home and go to my study; atthe entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, coveredwith dust and dirt, and put on my noble court dress,and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancientcourts of the men of old, where, being lovingly re-ceived by them, I am fed with that food which is minealone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them,and to ask for the reason of their actions, and theyin their benignity answer me; and for four hours I feelno weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does notdismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessed en-tirely by those great men. And because Dante says:

Knowledge doth come of learning well re-tained,Unfruitful else,

I have noted down what I have gained from theirconversation, and have composed a small work on‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as fully as Ican in meditation on the subject, discussing what aprincipality is, what kinds there are, how they can beacquired, how they can be kept, why they are lost:

15

INTRODUCTION

and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, this oughtnot to displease you: and to a prince, especially to anew one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicateit to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchiohas seen it; he will be able to tell you what is in it, andof the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, Iam still enriching and polishing it.”

The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes beforeattaining the form in which it has reached us. Vari-ous mental influences were at work during its com-position; its title and patron were changed; and forsome unknown reason it was finally dedicated toLorenzo de’ Medici. Although Machiavelli discussedwith Casavecchio whether it should be sent or pre-sented in person to the patron, there is no evidencethat Lorenzo ever received or even read it: he cer-tainly never gave Machiavelli any employment. Al-though it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s life-time, “The Prince” was never published by him, andits text is still disputable.

Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus:“And as to this little thing [his book], when it has beenread it will be seen that during the fifteen years I havegiven to the study of statecraft I have neither slept noridled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by

16

INTRODUCTION

one who has reaped experience at the expense of oth-ers. And of my loyalty none could doubt, becausehaving always kept faith I could not now learn howto break it; for he who has been faithful and honest,as I have, cannot change his nature; and my povertyis a witness to my honesty.”

Before Machiavelli had got “The Prince” off hishands he commenced his “Discourse on the FirstDecade of Titus Livius,” which should be read con-currently with “The Prince.” These and several mi-nor works occupied him until the year 1518, whenhe accepted a small commission to look after the af-fairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519the Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few politi-cal concessions to her citizens, and Machiavelli withothers was consulted upon a new constitution underwhich the Great Council was to be restored; but onone pretext or another it was not promulgated.

In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourseto Machiavelli to settle their difficulties with Lucca,but this year was chiefly remarkable for his re-entryinto Florentine literary society, where he was muchsought after, and also for the production of his “Art ofWar.” It was in the same year that he received a com-mission at the instance of Cardinal de’ Medici to write

17

INTRODUCTION

the “History of Florence,” a task which occupied himuntil 1525. His return to popular favour may have de-termined the Medici to give him this employment, foran old writer observes that “an able statesman out ofwork, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturnthe ship unless he has an empty cask to play with.”

When the “History of Florence” was finished,Machiavelli took it to Rome for presentation to hispatron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in the mean-while become pope under the title of Clement VII. Itis somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavellihad written “The Prince” for the instruction of theMedici after they had just regained power in Florence,so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” tothe head of the family when its ruin was now at hand.In that year the battle of Pavia destroyed the Frenchrule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in the handsof his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by thesack of Rome, upon the news of which the popularparty at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici,who were once more banished.

Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time,but hastened his return, hoping to secure his formeroffice of secretary to the “Ten of Liberty and Peace.”Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached Flo-

18

INTRODUCTION

rence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.

HE MAN AND HIS WORKS

NO one can say where the bones of Machiavellirest, but modern Florence has decreed him a

stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of hermost famous sons; recognizing that, whatever othernations may have found in his works, Italy found inthem the idea of her unity and the germs of her renais-sance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle toprotest against the world-wide and evil significationof his name, it may be pointed out that the harsh con-struction of his doctrine which this sinister reputationimplies was unknown to his own day, and that the re-searches of recent times have enabled us to interprethim more reasonably. It is due to these inquiries thatthe shape of an “unholy necromancer,” which so longhaunted men’s vision, has begun to fade.

Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great obser-vation, acuteness, and industry; noting with appre-ciative eye whatever passed before him, and with hissupreme literary gift turning it to account in his en-forced retirement from affairs. He does not presenthimself, nor is he depicted by his contemporaries, asa type of that rare combination, the successful states-man and author, for he appears to have been only

19

INTRODUCTION

moderately prosperous in his several embassies andpolitical employments. He was misled by CatherinaSforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by CesareBorgia; several of his embassies were quite barrenof results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, andthe soldiery that he raised astonished everybody bytheir cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs hewas timid and time-serving; he dared not appear bythe side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, forfear of compromising himself; his connection with theMedici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appearsto have recognized his real forte when he set him towrite the “History of Florence,” rather than employhim in the state. And it is on the literary side of hischaracter, and there alone, that we find no weaknessand no failure.

Although the light of almost four centuries has beenfocused on “The Prince,” its problems are still de-batable and interesting, because they are the eternalproblems between the ruled and their rulers. Such asthey are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contem-poraries; yet they cannot be said to be out of date solong as the governments of Europe rely on materialrather than on moral forces. Its historical incidentsand personages become interesting by reason of theuses which Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his

20

INTRODUCTION

theories of government and conduct.

Leaving out of consideration those maxims of statewhich still furnish some European and eastern states-men with principles of action, “The Prince” is be-strewn with truths that can be proved at every turn.Men are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed,as they were in the days of Alexander VI. The cloakof religion still conceals the vices which Machiavellilaid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.Men will not look at things as they really are, butas they wish them to be–and are ruined. In politicsthere are no perfectly safe courses; prudence consistsin choosing the least dangerous ones. Then–to pass toa higher plane–Machiavelli reiterates that, althoughcrimes may win an empire, they do not win glory.Necessary wars are just wars, and the arms of a na-tion are hallowed when it has no other resource butto fight.

It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s thatgovernment should be elevated into a living moralforce, capable of inspiring the people with a justrecognition of the fundamental principles of society;to this “high argument” “The Prince” contributes butlittle. Machiavelli always refused to write either ofmen or of governments otherwise than as he found

21

INTRODUCTION

them, and he writes with such skill and insight thathis work is of abiding value. But what invests “ThePrince” with more than a merely artistic or histori-cal interest is the incontrovertible truth that it dealswith the great principles which still guide nations andrulers in their relationship with each other and theirneighbours.

In translating “The Prince” my aim has been toachieve at all costs an exact literal rendering of theoriginal, rather than a fluent paraphrase adapted tothe modern notions of style and expression. Machi-avelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions un-der which he wrote obliged him to weigh every word;his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his man-ner nobly plain and serious. “Quis eo fuit unquam inpartiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pres-sior?” In “The Prince,” it may be truly said, there isreason assignable, not only for every word, but for theposition of every word. To an Englishman of Shake-speare’s time the translation of such a treatise was insome ways a comparatively easy task, for in thosetimes the genius of the English more nearly resem-bled that of the Italian language; to the Englishmanof to-day it is not so simple. To take a single ex-ample: the word “intrattenere,” employed by Machi-avelli to indicate the policy adopted by the Roman

22

INTRODUCTION

Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would byan Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” andevery contemporary reader would understand whatwas meant by saying that “Rome entertained the Ae-tolians and the Achaeans without augmenting theirpower.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obso-lete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are com-pelled to say that “Rome maintained friendly rela-tions with the Aetolians,” etc., using four words todo the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithybrevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with anabsolute fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occa-sional asperity I can only hope that the reader, in hiseagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may over-look the roughness of the road that leads him to it.

The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:

Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose diPisa, 1499; Del modo di trattare i popoli dellaValdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenutodal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitel-lozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, etc., 1502;Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506;Ritratti delle cose dell’ Alemagna, 1508-12;Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose

23

INTRODUCTION

di Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima decadi T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513;Andria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513(?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts,with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (di-alogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515(?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asinod’oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell’ artedella guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il rifor-mare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario dellecose della citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruc-cio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie fioren-tine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.

Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ot-tave, and Canti carnascialeschi.

Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina,1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 vols., 1782-5; deiClassici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. onlypublished, 1873-7.

Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Let-tere familiari, ed. E. Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions,one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed.G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, seeA. Ridolfi, Pensieri intorno allo scopo di N.

24

INTRODUCTION

Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Fer-rara, The Private Correspondence of NicoloMachiavelli, 1929.

25

DEDICATION

TO THE MAGNIFICENT LORENZO DI PIERO DE’MEDICI:

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of aprince are accustomed to come before him with suchthings as they hold most precious, or in which theysee him take most delight; whence one often seeshorses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and sim-ilar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of theirgreatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnif-icence with some testimony of my devotion towardsyou, I have not found among my possessions any-thing which I hold more dear than, or value so muchas, the knowledge of the actions of great men, ac-quired by long experience in contemporary affairs,and a continual study of antiquity; which, having re-flected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I

DEDICATION

now send, digested into a little volume, to your Mag-nificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy ofyour countenance, nevertheless I trust much to yourbenignity that it may be acceptable, seeing that it isnot possible for me to make a better gift than to offeryou the opportunity of understanding in the shortesttime all that I have learnt in so many years, and withso many troubles and dangers; which work I have notembellished with swelling or magnificent words, norstuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsicallurements or adornments whatever, with which somany are accustomed to embellish their works; for Ihave wished either that no honour should be given it,or else that the truth of the matter and the weightinessof the theme shall make it acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a pre-sumption if a man of low and humble condition dareto discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because,just as those who draw landscapes place themselvesbelow in the plain to contemplate the nature of themountains and of lofty places, and in order to contem-plate the plains place themselves upon high moun-tains, even so to understand the nature of the people itneeds to be a prince, and to understand that of princes

27

DEDICATION

it needs to be of the people.Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the

spirit in which I send it; wherein, if it be diligentlyread and considered by you, you will learn my ex-treme desire that you should attain that greatnesswhich fortune and your other attributes promise.And if your Magnificence from the summit of yourgreatness will sometimes turn your eyes to theselower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffera great and continued malignity of fortune.

THE PRINCE

28

CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIESTHERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY

ARE ACQUIRED

ALL states, all powers, that have held and hold ruleover men have been and are either republics or

principalities.Principalities are either hereditary, in which the fam-

ily has been long established; or they are new.The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to

Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members an-nexed to the hereditary state of the prince who hasacquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to thatof the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accus-tomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom;and are acquired either by the arms of the prince him-

CHAPTER I

self, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

30

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuchas in another place I have written of them at length,

and will address myself only to principalities. In do-ing so I will keep to the order indicated above, anddiscuss how such principalities are to be ruled andpreserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holdinghereditary states, and those long accustomed to thefamily of their prince, than new ones; for it is suffi-cient only not to transgress the customs of his ances-tors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as theyarise, for a prince of average powers to maintain him-self in his state, unless he be deprived of it by someextraordinary and excessive force; and if he should beso deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happensto the usurper, he will regain it.

CHAPTER II

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara,who could not have withstood the attacks of the Vene-tians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius in ’10, unless hehad been long established in his dominions. For thehereditary prince has less cause and less necessity tooffend; hence it happens that he will be more loved;and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated,it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be natu-rally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquityand duration of his rule the memories and motivesthat make for change are lost, for one change alwaysleaves the toothing for another.

32

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality. Andfirstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a

member of a state which, taken collectively, may becalled composite, the changes arise chiefly from aninherent difficulty which there is in all new princi-palities; for men change their rulers willingly, hopingto better themselves, and this hope induces them totake up arms against him who rules: wherein they aredeceived, because they afterwards find by experiencethey have gone from bad to worse. This follows alsoon another natural and common necessity, which al-ways causes a new prince to burden those who havesubmitted to him with his soldiery and with infiniteother hardships which he must put upon his new ac-quisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you

CHAPTER III

have injured in seizing that principality, and you arenot able to keep those friends who put you there be-cause of your not being able to satisfy them in the waythey expected, and you cannot take strong measuresagainst them, feeling bound to them. For, althoughone may be very strong in armed forces, yet in enter-ing a province one has always need of the goodwill ofthe natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France,quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and toturn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico’sown forces; because those who had opened the gatesto him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes offuture benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment ofthe new prince. It is very true that, after acquiringrebellious provinces a second time, they are not solightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with littlereluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion topunish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, andto strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus tocause France to lose Milan the first time it was enoughfor the Duke Lodovico1 to raise insurrections on theborders; but to cause him to lose it a second time itwas necessary to bring the whole world against him,

1Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who married Beatrice d’Este.He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.

34

CHAPTER III

and that his armies should be defeated and driven outof Italy; which followed from the causes above men-tioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both thefirst and the second time. The general reasons for thefirst have been discussed; it remains to name thosefor the second, and to see what resources he had, andwhat any one in his situation would have had formaintaining himself more securely in his acquisitionthan did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when ac-quired, are added to an ancient state by him who ac-quires them, are either of the same country and lan-guage, or they are not. When they are, it is easier tohold them, especially when they have not been accus-tomed to self-government; and to hold them securelyit is enough to have destroyed the family of the princewho was ruling them; because the two peoples, pre-serving in other things the old conditions, and notbeing unlike in customs, will live quietly together,as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, andNormandy, which have been bound to France for solong a time: and, although there may be some differ-ence in language, nevertheless the customs are alike,and the people will easily be able to get on amongst

35

CHAPTER III

themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishesto hold them, has only to bear in mind two consid-erations: the one, that the family of their former lordis extinguished; the other, that neither their laws northeir taxes are altered, so that in a very short time theywill become entirely one body with the old principal-ity.

But when states are acquired in a country differingin language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties,and good fortune and great energy are needed to holdthem, and one of the greatest and most real helpswould be that he who has acquired them should goand reside there. This would make his position moresecure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk inGreece, who, notwithstanding all the other measurestaken by him for holding that state, if he had not set-tled there, would not have been able to keep it. Be-cause, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as theyspring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but ifone is not at hand, they are heard of only when theyare great, and then one can no longer remedy them.Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your offi-cials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse tothe prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have morecause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fearhim. He who would attack that state from the outside

36

CHAPTER III

must have the utmost caution; as long as the princeresides there it can only be wrested from him with thegreatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to oneor two places, which may be as keys to that state, forit is necessary either to do this or else to keep there agreat number of cavalry and infantry. A prince doesnot spend much on colonies, for with little or no ex-pense he can send them out and keep them there,and he offends a minority only of the citizens fromwhom he takes lands and houses to give them tothe new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, re-maining poor and scattered, are never able to injurehim; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily keptquiet, and at the same time are anxious not to errfor fear it should happen to them as it has to thosewho have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say thatthese colonies are not costly, they are more faithful,they injure less, and the injured, as has been said,being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this,one has to remark that men ought either to be welltreated or crushed, because they can avenge them-selves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones theycannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a manought to be of such a kind that one does not stand infear of revenge.

37

CHAPTER III

But in maintaining armed men there in place ofcolonies one spends much more, having to consumeon the garrison all the income from the state, so thatthe acquisition turns into a loss, and many moreare exasperated, because the whole state is injured;through the shifting of the garrison up and down allbecome acquainted with hardship, and all becomehostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten ontheir own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For ev-ery reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as acolony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing inthe above respects ought to make himself the headand defender of his less powerful neighbours, andto weaken the more powerful amongst them, takingcare that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, byany accident, get a footing there; for it will alwayshappen that such a one will be introduced by thosewho are discontented, either through excess of ambi-tion or through fear, as one has seen already. The Ro-mans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; andin every other country where they obtained a foot-ing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And theusual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerfulforeigner enters a country, all the subject states aredrawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel

38

CHAPTER III

against the ruling power. So that in respect to thosesubject states he has not to take any trouble to gainthem over to himself, for the whole of them quicklyrally to the state which he has acquired there. He hasonly to take care that they do not get hold of too muchpower and too much authority, and then with his ownforces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keepdown the more powerful of them, so as to remain en-tirely master in the country. And he who does notproperly manage this business will soon lose what hehas acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will haveendless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed,observed closely these measures; they sent coloniesand maintained friendly relations with2 the minorpowers, without increasing their strength; they keptdown the greater, and did not allow any strong for-eign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to mesufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Aeto-lians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom ofMacedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out;yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians neversecured for them permission to increase their power,nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Ro-mans to be his friends without first humbling him,

2See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”

39

CHAPTER III

nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agreethat he should retain any lordship over the country.Because the Romans did in these instances what allprudent princes ought to do, who have to regard notonly present troubles, but also future ones, for whichthey must prepare with every energy, because, whenforeseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you waituntil they approach, the medicine is no longer in timebecause the malady has become incurable; for it hap-pens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hecticfever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy tocure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time,not having been either detected or treated in the be-ginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure.This it happens in affairs of state, for when the evilsthat arise have been foreseen (which it is only given toa wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, butwhen, through not having been foreseen, they havebeen permitted to grow in a way that every one cansee them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, theRomans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once,and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come toa head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided,but is only to be put off to the advantage of others;moreover they wished to fight with Philip and An-tiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy;

40

CHAPTER III

they could have avoided both, but this they did notwish; nor did that ever please them which is for everin the mouths of the wise ones of our time:–Let us en-joy the benefits of the time–but rather the benefits oftheir own valour and prudence, for time drives ev-erything before it, and is able to bring with it good aswell as evil, and evil as well as good.

But let us turn to France a...nd inquire whether shehas done any of the things mentioned. I will speak ofLouis3(and not of Charles)4 as the one whose conductis the better to be observed, he having held possessionof Italy for the longest period; and you will see that hehas done the opposite to those things which ought tobe done to retain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambitionof the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the stateof Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blamethe course taken by the king, because, wishing toget a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there–seeing rather that every door was shut to him ow-ing to the conduct of Charles–he was forced to ac-cept those friendships which he could get, and hewould have succeeded very quickly in his design ifin other matters he had not made some mistakes. The

3Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, died 1515.4Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

41

CHAPTER III

king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regainedat once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoayielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Mar-quess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli,my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, ofRimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, thePisans, the Sienese–everybody made advances to himto become his friend. Then could the Venetians real-ize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, inorder that they might secure two towns in Lombardy,had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficultythe king could have maintained his position in Italyhad he observed the rules above laid down, and keptall his friends secure and protected; for although theywere numerous they were both weak and timid, someafraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thusthey would always have been forced to stand in withhim, and by their means he could easily have madehimself secure against those who remained powerful.But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the con-trary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Ro-magna. It never occurred to him that by this action hewas weakening himself, depriving himself of friendsand of those who had thrown themselves into his lap,whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much

42

CHAPTER III

temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greaterauthority. And having committed this prime error, hewas obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to putan end to the ambition of Alexander, and to preventhis becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himselfforced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandizedthe Church, and deprived himself of friends, he, wish-ing to have the kingdom of Naples, divides it withthe King of Spain, and where he was the prime ar-biter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambi-tious of that country and the malcontents of his ownshould have somewhere to shelter; and whereas hecould have left in the kingdom his own pensioner asking, he drove him out, to put one there who was ableto drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and com-mon, and men always do so when they can, and forthis they will be praised not blamed; but when theycannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, thenthere is folly and blame. Therefore, if France couldhave attacked Naples with her own forces she oughtto have done so; if she could not, then she ought not tohave divided it. And if the partition which she madewith the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the

43

CHAPTER III

excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this otherpartition merited blame, for it had not the excuse ofthat necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he de-stroyed the minor powers, he increased the strengthof one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought ina foreign power, he did not settle in the country, hedid not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived,were not enough to injure him had he not made asixth by taking away their dominions from the Vene-tians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church,nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been veryreasonable and necessary to humble them; but havingfirst taken these steps, he ought never to have con-sented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, wouldalways have kept off others from designs on Lom-bardy, to which the Venetians would never have con-sented except to become masters themselves there;also because the others would not wish to take Lom-bardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians,and to run counter to both they would not have hadthe courage.

And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded theRomagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain toavoid war,” I answer for the reasons given above that

44

CHAPTER III

a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferredto your disadvantage. And if another should allegethe pledge which the king had given to the Pope thathe would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange forthe dissolution of his marriage5. and for the cap toRouen,6 to that I reply what I shall write later on con-cerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to bekept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having fol-lowed any of the conditions observed by those whohave taken possession of countries and wished toretain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, butmuch that is reasonable and quite natural. And onthese matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, whenValentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexan-der, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, andon Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italiansdid not understand war, I replied to him that theFrench did not understand statecraft, meaning thatotherwise they would not have allowed the Churchto reach such greatness. And in fact is has been seenthat the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy

5Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499 Anne ofBrittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown

6The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a cardinal by AlexanderVI. Born 1460, died 1510.

45

CHAPTER III

has been caused by France, and her ruin may be at-tributed to them. From this a general rule is drawnwhich never or rarely fails: that he who is the causeof another becoming powerful is ruined; because thatpredominancy has been brought about either by as-tuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted byhim who has been raised to power.

46

CHAPTER IV

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS,CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT

REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OFALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have hadto hold to a newly acquired state, some might

wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great becamethe master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst itwas scarcely settled (whence it might appear reason-able that the whole empire would have rebelled), nev-ertheless his successors maintained themselves, andhad to meet no other difficulty than that which aroseamong themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one hasrecord are found to be governed in two differentways; either by a prince, with a body of servants, whoassist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his

CHAPTER IV

favour and permission; or by a prince and barons,who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and notby the grace of the prince. Such barons have statesand their own subjects, who recognize them as lordsand hold them in natural affection. Those states thatare governed by a prince and his servants hold theirprince in more consideration, because in all the coun-try there is no one who is recognized as superior tohim, and if they yield obedience to another they do itas to a minister and official, and they do not bear himany particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our timeare the Turk and the King of France. The entiremonarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, theothers are his servants; and, dividing his kingdominto sanjaks, he sends there different administrators,and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But theKing of France is placed in the midst of an ancientbody of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,and beloved by them; they have their own preroga-tives, nor can the king take these away except at hisperil. Therefore, he who considers both of these stateswill recognize great difficulties in seizing the state ofthe Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in hold-ing it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the king-dom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called

48

CHAPTER IV

in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope tobe assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whomthe lord has around him. This arises from the reasonsgiven above; for his ministers, being all slaves andbondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty,and one can expect little advantage from them whenthey have been corrupted, as they cannot carry thepeople with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence,he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that hewill find him united, and he will have to rely more onhis own strength than on the revolt of others; but, ifonce the Turk has been conquered, and routed in thefield in such a way that he cannot replace his armies,there is nothing to fear but the family of this prince,and, this being exterminated, there remains no one tofear, the others having no credit with the people; andas the conqueror did not rely on them before his vic-tory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed likethat of France, because one can easily enter there bygaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one al-ways finds malcontents and such as desire a change.Such men, for the reasons given, can open the wayinto the state and render the victory easy; but if youwish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite dif-ficulties, both from those who have assisted you and

49

CHAPTER IV

from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough foryou to have exterminated the family of the prince,because the lords that remain make themselves theheads of fresh movements against you, and as youare unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, thatstate is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of thegovernment of Darius, you will find it similar to thekingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was only nec-essary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in thefield, and then to take the country from him. Afterwhich victory, Darius being killed, the state remainedsecure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And ifhis successors had been united they would have en-joyed it securely and at their ease, for there were notumults raised in the kingdom except those they pro-voked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquil-lity states constituted like that of France. Hencearose those frequent rebellions against the Romans inSpain, France, and Greece, owing to the many prin-cipalities there were in these states, of which, as longas the memory of them endured, the Romans alwaysheld an insecure possession; but with the power andlong continuance of the empire the memory of them

50

CHAPTER IV

passed away, and the Romans then became securepossessors. And when fighting afterwards amongstthemselves, each one was able to attach to himself hisown parts of the country, according to the authorityhe had assumed there; and the family of the formerlord being exterminated, none other than the Romanswere acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will mar-vel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empireof Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had tokeep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;this is not occasioned by the little or abundance ofability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformityin the subject state.

51

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIESOR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER

THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WEREANNEXED

WHENEVER those states which have been acquiredas stated have been accustomed to live under

their own laws and in freedom, there are three coursesfor those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruinthem, the next is to reside there in person, the thirdis to permit them to live under their own laws, draw-ing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchywhich will keep it friendly to you. Because such agovernment, being created by the prince, knows thatit cannot stand without his friendship and interest,and does it utmost to support him; and therefore hewho would keep a city accustomed to freedom willhold it more easily by the means of its own citizens

CHAPTER V

than in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Ro-mans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, estab-lishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they lost them.The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, andNumantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them.They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it,making it free and permitting its laws, and did notsucceed. So to hold it they were compelled to dis-mantle many cities in the country, for in truth there isno safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruiningthem. And he who becomes master of a city accus-tomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expectto be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has alwaysthe watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges asa rallying point, which neither time nor benefits willever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do orprovide against, they never forget that name or theirprivileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, butat every chance they immediately rally to them, asPisa after the hundred years she had been held inbondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to liveunder a prince, and his family is exterminated, they,being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the

53

CHAPTER V

other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree inmaking one from amongst themselves, and they donot know how to govern themselves. For this reasonthey are very slow to take up arms, and a prince cangain them to himself and secure them much more eas-ily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater ha-tred, and more desire for vengeance, which will neverpermit them to allow the memory of their former lib-erty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy themor to reside there.

54

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICHARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND

ABILITY

LET no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirelynew principalities as I shall do, I adduce the high-

est examples both of prince and of state; because men,walking almost always in paths beaten by others, andfollowing by imitation their deeds, are yet unable tokeep entirely to the ways of others or attain to thepower of those they imitate. A wise man ought al-ways to follow the paths beaten by great men, and toimitate those who have been supreme, so that if hisability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour ofit. Let him act like the clever archers who, designingto hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, andknowing the limits to which the strength of their bowattains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to

CHAPTER VI

reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height,but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit themark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities,where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty isfound in keeping them, accordingly as there is moreor less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now,as the fact of becoming a prince from a private stationpresupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear thatone or other of these things will mitigate in some de-gree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has re-lied least on fortune is established the strongest. Fur-ther, it facilitates matters when the prince, having noother state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability andnot through fortune, have risen to be princes, I saythat Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such likeare the most excellent examples. And although onemay not discuss Moses, he having been a mere execu-tor of the will of God, yet he ought to be admired, ifonly for that favour which made him worthy to speakwith God. But in considering Cyrus and others whohave acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be foundadmirable; and if their particular deeds and conductshall be considered, they will not be found inferior to

56

CHAPTER VI

those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.And in examining their actions and lives one cannotsee that they owed anything to fortune beyond op-portunity, which brought them the material to mouldinto the form which seemed best to them. Withoutthat opportunity their powers of mind would havebeen extinguished, and without those powers the op-portunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he shouldfind the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and op-pressed by the Egyptians, in order that they shouldbe disposed to follow him so as to be delivered outof bondage. It was necessary that Romulus shouldnot remain in Alba, and that he should be abandonedat his birth, in order that he should become King ofRome and founder of the fatherland. It was neces-sary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontentedwith the government of the Medes, and the Medessoft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseuscould not have shown his ability had he not foundthe Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, there-fore, made those men fortunate, and their high abilityenabled them to recognize the opportunity wherebytheir country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like

57

CHAPTER VI

these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, butthey keep it with ease. The difficulties they have in ac-quiring it rise in part from the new rules and methodswhich they are forced to introduce to establish theirgovernment and its security. And it ought to be re-membered that there is nothing more difficult to takein hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertainin its success, than to take the lead in the introduc-tion of a new order of things, because the innovatorhas for enemies all those who have done well underthe old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in thosewho may do well under the new. This coolness arisespartly from fear of the opponents, who have the lawson their side, and partly from the incredulity of men,who do not readily believe in new things until theyhave had a long experience of them. Thus it hap-pens that whenever those who are hostile have theopportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilstthe others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that theprince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss thismatter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innova-tors can rely on themselves or have to depend on oth-ers: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enter-prise, have they to use prayers or can they use force?In the first instance they always succeed badly, and

58

CHAPTER VI

never compass anything; but when they can rely onthemselves and use force, then they are rarely endan-gered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have con-quered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed.Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the peo-ple is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them,it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thusit is necessary to take such measures that, when theybelieve no longer, it may be possible to make thembelieve by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had beenunarmed they could not have enforced their constitu-tions for long–as happened in our time to Fra Giro-lamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new orderof things immediately the multitude believed in himno longer, and he had no means of keeping steadfastthose who believed or of making the unbelievers tobelieve. Therefore such as these have great difficultiesin consummating their enterprise, for all their dan-gers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will over-come them; but when these are overcome, and thosewho envied them their success are exterminated, theywill begin to be respected, and they will continue af-terwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one;

59

CHAPTER VI

still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wishit to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is Hiero theSyracusan.7 This man rose from a private station tobe Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe any-thing to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans,being oppressed, chose him for their captain, after-wards he was rewarded by being made their prince.He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen,that one who writes of him says he wanted nothingbut a kingdom to be a king. This man abolished theold soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances,made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers andallies, on such foundations he was able to build anyedifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble inacquiring, he had but little in keeping.

7Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

60

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICHARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF

OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

THOSE who solely by good fortune become princesfrom being private citizens have little trouble in

rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not anydifficulties on the way up, because they fly, but theyhave many when they reach the summit. Such arethose to whom some state is given either for moneyor by the favour of him who bestows it; as happenedto many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of theHellespont, where princes were made by Darius, inorder that they might hold the cities both for his secu-rity and his glory; as also were those emperors who,by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizenscame to empire. Such stand simply elevated uponthe goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated

CHAPTER VII

them–two most inconstant and unstable things. Nei-ther have they the knowledge requisite for the posi-tion; because, unless they are men of great worth andability, it is not reasonable to expect that they shouldknow how to command, having always lived in a pri-vate condition; besides, they cannot hold it becausethey have not forces which they can keep friendly andfaithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all otherthings in nature which are born and grow rapidly,cannot leave their foundations and correspondenciesfixed in such a way that the first storm will not over-throw them; unless, as is said, those who unexpect-edly become princes are men of so much ability thatthey know they have to be prepared at once to holdthat which fortune has thrown into their laps, and thatthose foundations, which others have laid BEFOREthey became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be aprince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce twoexamples within our own recollection, and these areFrancesco Sforza8 and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by

8Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a naturaldaughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevationto the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia(1478- 1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelliat Sinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten

62

CHAPTER VII

proper means and with great ability, from being a pri-vate person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that whichhe had acquired with a thousand anxieties he keptwith little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Bor-gia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired hisstate during the ascendancy of his father, and on itsdecline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had takenevery measure and done all that ought to be done bya wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the stateswhich the arms and fortunes of others had bestowedon him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laidhis foundations may be able with great ability to laythem afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble tothe architect and danger to the building. If, therefore,all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it willbe seen that he laid solid foundations for his futurepower, and I do not consider it superfluous to discussthem, because I do not know what better precepts togive a new prince than the example of his actions; andif his dispositions were of no avail, that was not hisfault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity offortune.

years before “The Prince,” of the proceedings of the duke in his “Descritione del modo tenutodal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appendedto the present work.

63

CHAPTER VII

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize theduke, his son, had many immediate and prospectivedifficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to makehim master of any state that was not a state of theChurch; and if he was willing to rob the Church heknew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians wouldnot consent, because Faenza and Rimini were alreadyunder the protection of the Venetians. Besides this,he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which hemight have been assisted, in hands that would fearthe aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsiniand the Colonnesi and their following. It behovedhim, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and em-broil the powers, so as to make himself securely mas-ter of part of their states. This was easy for him todo, because he found the Venetians, moved by otherreasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy;he would not only not oppose this, but he would ren-der it more easy by dissolving the former marriageof King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italywith the assistance of the Venetians and the consentof Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than thePope had soldiers from him for the attempt on theRomagna, which yielded to him on the reputation ofthe king. The duke, therefore, having acquired theRomagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing

64

CHAPTER VII

to hold that and to advance further, was hindered bytwo things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal tohim, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say,he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he wasusing, would not stand to him, that not only mightthey hinder him from winning more, but might them-selves seize what he had won, and that the king mightalso do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warningwhen, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, hesaw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And asto the king, he learned his mind when he himself,after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany,and the king made him desist from that undertaking;hence the duke decided to depend no more upon thearms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini andColonnesi parties in Rome, by gaining to himself alltheir adherents who were gentlemen, making themhis gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, accordingto their rank, honouring them with office and com-mand in such a way that in a few months all attach-ment to the factions was destroyed and turned en-tirely to the duke. After this he awaited an oppor-tunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adher-ents of the Colonna house. This came to him soon andhe used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length

65

CHAPTER VII

that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Churchwas ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magionein Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbinoand the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dan-gers to the duke, all of which he overcame with thehelp of the French. Having restored his authority, notto leave it at risk by trusting either to the French orother outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, andhe knew so well how to conceal his mind that, bythe mediation of Signor Pagolo–whom the duke didnot fail to secure with all kinds of attention, givinghim money, apparel, and horses–the Orsini were rec-onciled, so that their simplicity brought them into hispower at Sinigalia.9 Having exterminated the leaders,and turned their partisans into his friends, the dukelaid sufficiently good foundations to his power, hav-ing all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and thepeople now beginning to appreciate their prosperity,he gained them all over to himself. And as this pointis worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I amnot willing to leave it out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he foundit under the rule of weak masters, who rather plun-dered their subjects than ruled them, and gave themmore cause for disunion than for union, so that the

9Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

66

CHAPTER VII

country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kindof violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace andobedience to authority, he considered it necessary togive it a good governor. Thereupon he promotedMesser Ramiro d’Orco,10 a swift and cruel man, towhom he gave the fullest power. This man in a shorttime restored peace and unity with the greatest suc-cess. Afterwards the duke considered that it was notadvisable to confer such excessive authority, for hehad no doubt but that he would become odious, sohe set up a court of judgment in the country, under amost excellent president, wherein all cities had theiradvocates. And because he knew that the past sever-ity had caused some hatred against himself, so, toclear himself in the minds of the people, and gainthem entirely to himself, he desired to show that, ifany cruelty had been practised, it had not originatedwith him, but in the natural sternness of the minister.Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morningcaused him to be executed and left on the piazza atCesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side.The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to beat once satisfied and dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say that theduke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and

10Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

67

CHAPTER VII

partly secured from immediate dangers by havingarmed himself in his own way, and having in a greatmeasure crushed those forces in his vicinity that couldinjure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest,had next to consider France, for he knew that the king,who too late was aware of his mistake, would not sup-port him. And from this time he began to seek newalliances and to temporize with France in the expe-dition which she was making towards the kingdomof Naples against the Spaniards who were besiegingGaeta. It was his intention to secure himself againstthem, and this he would have quickly accomplishedhad Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. Butas to the future he had to fear, in the first place, thata new successor to the Church might not be friendlyto him and might seek to take from him that whichAlexander had given him, so he decided to act in fourways. Firstly, by exterminating the families of thoselords whom he had despoiled, so as to take away thatpretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to him-self all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curbthe Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly,by converting the college more to himself. Fourthly,by acquiring so much power before the Pope shoulddie that he could by his own measures resist the first

68

CHAPTER VII

shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexan-der, he had accomplished three. For he had killedas many of the dispossessed lords as he could layhands on, and few had escaped; he had won overthe Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numer-ous party in the college. And as to any fresh acqui-sition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, forhe already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisawas under his protection. And as he had no longerto study France (for the French were already drivenout of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, andin this way both were compelled to buy his good-will), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Luccaand Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred andpartly through fear of the Florentines; and the Floren-tines would have had no remedy had he continued toprosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexanderdied, for he had acquired so much power and repu-tation that he would have stood by himself, and nolonger have depended on the luck and the forces ofothers, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had firstdrawn the sword. He left the duke with the state ofRomagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air,between two most powerful hostile armies, and sickunto death. Yet there were in the duke such bold-

69

CHAPTER VII

ness and ability, and he knew so well how men areto be won or lost, and so firm were the foundationswhich in so short a time he had laid, that if he hadnot had those armies on his back, or if he had beenin good health, he would have overcome all difficul-ties. And it is seen that his foundations were good,for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month.In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure;and whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsinimight come to Rome, they could not effect anythingagainst him. If he could not have made Pope himwhom he wished, at least the one whom he did notwish would not have been elected. But if he had beenin sound health at the death of Alexander,11 every-thing would have been different to him. On the daythat Julius the Second12 was elected, he told me thathe had thought of everything that might occur at thedeath of his father, and had provided a remedy for all,except that he had never anticipated that, when thedeath did happen, he himself would be on the pointto die.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I donot know how to blame him, but rather it appears tobe, as I have said, that I ought to offer him for imi-

11Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.12Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula, born 1443, died

1513.

70

CHAPTER VII

tation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms ofothers, are raised to government. Because he, havinga lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not haveregulated his conduct otherwise, and only the short-ness of the life of Alexander and his own sicknessfrustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considersit necessary to secure himself in his new principality,to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud,to make himself beloved and feared by the people, tobe followed and revered by the soldiers, to extermi-nate those who have power or reason to hurt him,to change the old order of things for new, to be se-vere and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to de-stroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to main-tain friendship with kings and princes in such a waythat they must help him with zeal and offend withcaution, cannot find a more lively example than theactions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius theSecond, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as issaid, not being able to elect a Pope to his own mind,he could have hindered any other from being electedPope; and he ought never to have consented to theelection of any cardinal whom he had injured or whohad cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. Formen injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he

71

CHAPTER VII

had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vin-cula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.13 The rest,in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and theSpaniards excepted; the latter from their relationshipand obligations, the former from his influence, thekingdom of France having relations with him. There-fore, above everything, the duke ought to have cre-ated a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought tohave consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vin-cula. He who believes that new benefits will causegreat personages to forget old injuries is deceived.Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was thecause of his ultimate ruin.

13San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.

72

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVEOBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY

WICKEDNESS

ALTHOUGH a prince may rise from a private sta-tion in two ways, neither of which can be en-

tirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is mani-fest to me that I must not be silent on them, althoughone could be more copiously treated when I discussrepublics. These methods are when, either by somewicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the prin-cipality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizensa private person becomes the prince of his country.And speaking of the first method, it will be illustratedby two examples–one ancient, the other modern–andwithout entering further into the subject, I considerthese two examples will suffice those who may becompelled to follow them.

CHAPTER VIII

Agathocles, the Sicilian,14 became King of Syracusenot only from a private but from a low and abject po-sition. This man, the son of a potter, through all thechanges in his fortunes always led an infamous life.Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with somuch ability of mind and body that, having devotedhimself to the military profession, he rose through itsranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being establishedin that position, and having deliberately resolved tomake himself prince and to seize by violence, with-out obligation to others, that which had been con-ceded to him by assent, he came to an understandingfor this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who,with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morninghe assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse,as if he had to discuss with them things relating tothe Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killedall the senators and the richest of the people; thesedead, he seized and held the princedom of that citywithout any civil commotion. And although he wastwice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately be-sieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city,but leaving part of his men for its defence, with theothers he attacked Africa, and in a short time raisedthe siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to

14Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

74

CHAPTER VIII

extreme necessity, were compelled to come to termswith Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to becontent with the possession of Africa.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the ge-nius of this man will see nothing, or little, which canbe attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour ofany one, but step by step in the military profession,which steps were gained with a thousand troublesand perils, and were afterwards boldly held by himwith many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be calledtalent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to bewithout faith, without mercy, without religion; suchmethods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if thecourage of Agathocles in entering into and extricatinghimself from dangers be considered, together withhis greatness of mind in enduring and overcominghardships, it cannot be seen why he should be es-teemed less than the most notable captain. Neverthe-less, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infi-nite wickedness do not permit him to be celebratedamong the most excellent men. What he achievedcannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth,Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left an orphan

75

CHAPTER VIII

many years before, was brought up by his maternaluncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days ofhis youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, be-ing trained under his discipline, he might attain somehigh position in the military profession. After Pagolodied, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in avery short time, being endowed with wit and a vig-orous body and mind, he became the first man in hisprofession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serveunder others, he resolved, with the aid of some citi-zens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their countrywas dearer than its liberty, and with the help of theVitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to GiovanniFogliani that, having been away from home for manyyears, he wished to visit him and his city, and in somemeasure to look upon his patrimony; and although hehad not laboured to acquire anything except honour,yet, in order that the citizens should see he had notspent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably,so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen,his friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovannito arrange that he should be received honourably bythe Fermians, all of which would be not only to hishonour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who hadbrought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions

76

CHAPTER VIII

due to his nephew, and he caused him to be hon-ourably received by the Fermians, and he lodgedhim in his own house, where, having passed somedays, and having arranged what was necessary forhis wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a solemn ban-quet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and thechiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the otherentertainments that are usual in such banquets werefinished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave dis-courses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexan-der and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, towhich discourse Giovanni and others answered; buthe rose at once, saying that such matters ought tobe discussed in a more private place, and he betookhimself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the restof the citizens went in after him. No sooner werethey seated than soldiers issued from secret placesand slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After thesemurders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode upand down the town and besieged the chief magistratein the palace, so that in fear the people were forcedto obey him, and to form a government, of which hemade himself the prince. He killed all the malcontentswho were able to injure him, and strengthened him-self with new civil and military ordinances, in such away that, in the year during which he held the prin-

77

CHAPTER VIII

cipality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo,but he had become formidable to all his neighbours.And his destruction would have been as difficult asthat of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself tobe overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him withthe Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above.Thus one year after he had committed this parricide,he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom hehad made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agath-ocles, and his like, after infinite treacheries and cru-elties, should live for long secure in his country, anddefend himself from external enemies, and never beconspired against by his own citizens; seeing thatmany others, by means of cruelty, have never beenable even in peaceful times to hold the state, still lessin the doubtful times of war. I believe that this followsfrom severities15 being badly or properly used. Thosemay be called properly used, if of evil it is possibleto speak well, that are applied at one blow and arenecessary to one’s security, and that are not persistedin afterwards unless they can be turned to the advan-tage of the subjects. The badly employed are thosewhich, notwithstanding they may be few in the com-

15Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent of Machi-avelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than the more obvious “cruelties.”

78

CHAPTER VIII

mencement, multiply with time rather than decrease.Those who practise the first system are able, by aid ofGod or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, asAgathocles did. It is impossible for those who followthe other to maintain themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state,the usurper ought to examine closely into all those in-juries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to dothem all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat themdaily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be ableto reassure them, and win them to himself by bene-fits. He who does otherwise, either from timidity orevil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife inhis hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor canthey attach themselves to him, owing to their contin-ued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to bedone all at one time, so that, being tasted less, theyoffend less; benefits ought to be given little by little,so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongsthis people in such a way that no unexpected cir-cumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make himchange; because if the necessity for this comes in trou-bled times, you are too late for harsh measures; andmild ones will not help you, for they will be consid-

79

CHAPTER VIII

ered as forced from you, and no one will be under anyobligation to you for them.

80

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

BUT coming to the other point–where a leading cit-izen becomes the prince of his country, not by

wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by thefavour of his fellow citizens–this may be called a civilprincipality: nor is genius or fortune altogether nec-essary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness.I say then that such a principality is obtained eitherby the favour of the people or by the favour of the no-bles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties arefound, and from this it arises that the people do notwish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and thenobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and fromthese two opposite desires there arises in cities one ofthree results, either a principality, self-government, oranarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by

CHAPTER IX

the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them hasthe opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannotwithstand the people, begin to cry up the reputationof one of themselves, and they make him a prince,so that under his shadow they can give vent to theirambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist thenobles, also cry up the reputation of one of them-selves, and make him a prince so as to be defendedby his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by theassistance of the nobles maintains himself with moredifficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of thepeople, because the former finds himself with manyaround him who consider themselves his equals, andbecause of this he can neither rule nor manage themto his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by pop-ular favour finds himself alone, and has none aroundhim, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and with-out injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you cansatisfy the people, for their object is more righteousthan that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It isto be added also that a prince can never secure him-self against a hostile people, because of their being toomany, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, asthey are few in number. The worst that a prince may

82

CHAPTER IX

expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned bythem; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fearabandonment, but also that they will rise against him;for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and as-tute, always come forward in time to save themselves,and to obtain favours from him whom they expect toprevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live al-ways with the same people, but he can do well with-out the same nobles, being able to make and unmakethem daily, and to give or take away authority whenit pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that thenobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: thatis to say, they either shape their course in such a wayas binds them entirely to your fortune, or they donot. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapa-cious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who donot bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways;they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and anatural want of courage, in which case you ought tomake use of them, especially of those who are of goodcounsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honourthem, in adversity you do not have to fear them. Butwhen for their own ambitious ends they shun bind-ing themselves, it is a token that they are giving morethought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought

83

CHAPTER IX

to guard against such, and to fear them as if they wereopen enemies, because in adversity they always helpto ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through thefavour of the people ought to keep them friendly, andthis he can easily do seeing they only ask not to beoppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to thepeople, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles,ought, above everything, to seek to win the peopleover to himself, and this he may easily do if he takesthem under his protection. Because men, when theyreceive good from him of whom they were expect-ing evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor;thus the people quickly become more devoted to himthan if he had been raised to the principality by theirfavours; and the prince can win their affections inmany ways, but as these vary according to the circum-stances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them;but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have thepeople friendly, otherwise he has no security in ad-versity.

Nabis,16 Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attackof all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, andagainst them he defended his country and his gov-

16Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed192 B.C.

84

CHAPTER IX

ernment; and for the overcoming of this peril it wasonly necessary for him to make himself secure againsta few, but this would not have been sufficient hadthe people been hostile. And do not let any one im-pugn this statement with the trite proverb that “Hewho builds on the people, builds on the mud,” forthis is true when a private citizen makes a founda-tion there, and persuades himself that the people willfree him when he is oppressed by his enemies or bythe magistrates; wherein he would find himself veryoften deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Romeand to Messer Giorgio Scali17 in Florence. But granteda prince who has established himself as above, whocan command, and is a man of courage, undismayedin adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications,and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps thewhole people encouraged–such a one will never findhimself deceived in them, and it will be shown thathe has laid his foundations well.

These principalities are liable to danger when theyare passing from the civil to the absolute order of gov-ernment, for such princes either rule personally orthrough magistrates. In the latter case their govern-ment is weaker and more insecure, because it rests en-

17Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s “Florentine History,” BookIII.

85

CHAPTER IX

tirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raisedto the magistracy, and who, especially in troubledtimes, can destroy the government with great ease, ei-ther by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince hasnot the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute au-thority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomedto receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mindto obey him amid these confusions, and there will al-ways be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom hecan trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon whathe observes in quiet times, when citizens have needof the state, because then every one agrees with him;they all promise, and when death is far distant theyall wish to die for him; but in troubled times, whenthe state has need of its citizens, then he finds butfew. And so much the more is this experiment dan-gerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. There-fore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course thathis citizens will always in every sort and kind of cir-cumstance have need of the state and of him, and thenhe will always find them faithful.

86

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THESTRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT

TO BE MEASURED

IT is necessary to consider another point in exam-ining the character of these principalities: that is,

whether a prince has such power that, in case of need,he can support himself with his own resources, orwhether he has always need of the assistance of oth-ers. And to make this quite clear I say that I con-sider those who are able to support themselves bytheir own resources who can, either by abundance ofmen or money, raise a sufficient army to join battleagainst any one who comes to attack them; and I con-sider those always to have need of others who cannotshow themselves against the enemy in the field, butare forced to defend themselves by sheltering behindwalls. The first case has been discussed, but we will

CHAPTER X

speak of it again should it recur. In the second caseone can say nothing except to encourage such princesto provision and fortify their towns, and not on anyaccount to defend the country. And whoever shallfortify his town well, and shall have managed theother concerns of his subjects in the way stated above,and to be often repeated, will never be attacked with-out great caution, for men are always adverse to en-terprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will beseen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has histown well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they ownbut little country around them, and they yield obedi-ence to the emperor when it suits them, nor do theyfear this or any other power they may have near them,because they are fortified in such a way that everyone thinks the taking of them by assault would be te-dious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditchesand walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they al-ways keep in public depots enough for one year’s eat-ing, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keepthe people quiet and without loss to the state, theyalways have the means of giving work to the com-munity in those labours that are the life and strengthof the city, and on the pursuit of which the people aresupported; they also hold military exercises in repute,

88

CHAPTER X

and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and hadnot made himself odious, will not be attacked, or ifany one should attack he will only be driven off withdisgrace; again, because that the affairs of this worldare so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep anarmy a whole year in the field without being inter-fered with. And whoever should reply: If the peoplehave property outside the city, and see it burnt, theywill not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this Ianswer that a powerful and courageous prince willovercome all such difficulties by giving at one timehope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long,at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, thenpreserving himself adroitly from those subjects whoseem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrivalat once burn and ruin the country at the time whenthe spirits of the people are still hot and ready for thedefence; and, therefore, so much the less ought theprince to hesitate; because after a time, when spir-its have cooled, the damage is already done, the illsare incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; andtherefore they are so much the more ready to unite

89

CHAPTER X

with their prince, he appearing to be under obliga-tions to them now that their houses have been burntand their possessions ruined in his defence. For it isthe nature of men to be bound by the benefits theyconfer as much as by those they receive. Therefore,if everything is well considered, it will not be diffi-cult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizenssteadfast from first to last, when he does not fail tosupport and defend them.

90

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICALPRINCIPALITIES

IT only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical princi-palities, touching which all difficulties are prior to

getting possession, because they are acquired eitherby capacity or good fortune, and they can be heldwithout either; for they are sustained by the ancientordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, andof such a character that the principalities may be heldno matter how their princes behave and live. Theseprinces alone have states and do not defend them;and they have subjects and do not rule them; and thestates, although unguarded, are not taken from them,and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, andthey have neither the desire nor the ability to alienatethemselves. Such principalities only are secure andhappy. But being upheld by powers, to which the

CHAPTER XI

human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more ofthem, because, being exalted and maintained by God,it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash manto discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me howcomes it that the Church has attained such great-ness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexanderbackwards the Italian potentates (not only those whohave been called potentates, but every baron and lord,though the smallest) have valued the temporal powervery slightly–yet now a king of France trembles be-fore it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy,and to ruin the Venetians–although this may be verymanifest, it does not appear to me superfluous to re-call it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,18this country was under the dominion of the Pope, theVenetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, andthe Florentines. These potentates had two principalanxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italyunder arms; the other, that none of themselves shouldseize more territory. Those about whom there was themost anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To re-strain the Venetians the union of all the others was

18Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

92

CHAPTER XI

necessary, as it was for the defence of Ferrara; andto keep down the Pope they made use of the baronsof Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsiniand Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and,standing with arms in their hands under the eyes ofthe Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless.And although there might arise sometimes a coura-geous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune norwisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And theshort life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; forin the ten years, which is the average life of a pope,he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; andif, so to speak, one people should almost destroy theColonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini,who would support their opponents, and yet wouldnot have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the rea-son why the temporal powers of the pope were littleesteemed in Italy.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of allthe pontiffs that have ever been showed how a popewith both money and arms was able to prevail; andthrough the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino,and by reason of the entry of the French, he broughtabout all those things which I have discussed abovein the actions of the duke. And although his intentionwas not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nev-

93

CHAPTER XI

ertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness ofthe Church, which, after his death and the ruin of theduke, became the heir to all his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Churchstrong, possessing all the Romagna, the barons ofRome reduced to impotence, and, through the chas-tisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; healso found the way open to accumulate money ina manner such as had never been practised beforeAlexander’s time. Such things Julius not only fol-lowed, but improved upon, and he intended to gainBologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive theFrench out of Italy. All of these enterprises prosperedwith him, and so much the more to his credit, inas-much as he did everything to strengthen the Churchand not any private person. He kept also the Orsiniand Colonnesi factions within the bounds in whichhe found them; and although there was among themsome mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he heldtwo things firm: the one, the greatness of the Church,with which he terrified them; and the other, not allow-ing them to have their own cardinals, who caused thedisorders among them. For whenever these factionshave their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long,because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and outof it, and the barons are compelled to support them,

94

CHAPTER XI

and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disor-ders and tumults among the barons. For these reasonshis Holiness Pope Leo19 found the pontificate mostpowerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made itgreat in arms, he will make it still greater and morevenerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

19Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.

95

CHAPTER XII

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THEREARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

HAVING discoursed particularly on the character-istics of such principalities as in the beginning I

proposed to discuss, and having considered in somedegree the causes of their being good or bad, and hav-ing shown the methods by which many have soughtto acquire them and to hold them, it now remains forme to discuss generally the means of offence and de-fence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a princeto have his foundations well laid, otherwise it followsof necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundationsof all states, new as well as old or composite, are goodlaws and good arms; and as there cannot be goodlaws where the state is not well armed, it follows thatwhere they are well armed they have good laws. I

CHAPTER XII

shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shallspeak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a princedefends his state are either his own, or they are mer-cenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and aux-iliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holdshis state based on these arms, he will stand neitherfirm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, andwithout discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends,cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fearof God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is de-ferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace oneis robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The factis, they have no other attraction or reason for keepingthe field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficientto make them willing to die for you. They are readyenough to be your soldiers whilst you do not makewar, but if war comes they take themselves off or runfrom the foe; which I should have little trouble toprove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothingelse than by resting all her hopes for many years onmercenaries, and although they formerly made somedisplay and appeared valiant amongst themselves,yet when the foreigners came they showed what theywere. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was

97

CHAPTER XII

allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand;20 and hewho told us that our sins were the cause of it toldthe truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, butthose which I have related. And as they were the sinsof princes, it is the princes who have also suffered thepenalty.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of thesearms. The mercenary captains are either capable menor they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, be-cause they always aspire to their own greatness, ei-ther by oppressing you, who are their master, or oth-ers contrary to your intentions; but if the captain isnot skilful, you are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act inthe same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply thatwhen arms have to be resorted to, either by a princeor a republic, then the prince ought to go in personand perform the duty of a captain; the republic hasto send its citizens, and when one is sent who doesnot turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and

20“With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the bons mots of Alexander VI, and refersto the ease with which Charles VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him tosend his quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. Cf. “TheHistory of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, andlost it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy withoutresistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmencame into Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swordsto fight.”

98

CHAPTER XII

when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so thathe does not leave the command. And experience hasshown princes and republics, single-handed, makingthe greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothingexcept damage; and it is more difficult to bring a re-public, armed with its own arms, under the sway ofone of its citizens than it is to bring one armed withforeign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many agesarmed and free. The Switzers are completely armedand quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are theCarthaginians, who were oppressed by their merce-nary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, al-though the Carthaginians had their own citizens forcaptains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip ofMacedon was made captain of their soldiers by theThebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlistedFrancesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he, hav-ing overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,21 allied him-self with them to crush the Milanese, his masters.His father, Sforza, having been engaged by QueenJohanna22 of Naples, left her unprotected, so thatshe was forced to throw herself into the arms of the

21Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.22Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.

99

CHAPTER XII

King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. Andif the Venetians and Florentines formerly extendedtheir dominions by these arms, and yet their captainsdid not make themselves princes, but have defendedthem, I reply that the Florentines in this case havebeen favoured by chance, for of the able captains, ofwhom they might have stood in fear, some have notconquered, some have been opposed, and others haveturned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did notconquer was Giovanni Acuto, 23 and since he did notconquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every onewill acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Floren-tines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza hadthe Bracceschi always against him, so they watchedeach other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lom-bardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdomof Naples. But let us come to that which happeneda short while ago. The Florentines appointed as theircaptain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who froma private position had risen to the greatest renown.If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that itwould have been proper for the Florentines to keep inwith him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies

23Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought inthe English wars in France, and was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body oftroops and went into Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in manywars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village inEssex. He married Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.

100

CHAPTER XII

they had no means of resisting, and if they held to himthey must obey him. The Venetians, if their achieve-ments are considered, will be seen to have acted safelyand gloriously so long as they sent to war their ownmen, when with armed gentlemen and plebians theydid valiantly. This was before they turned to enter-prises on land, but when they began to fight on landthey forsook this virtue and followed the custom ofItaly. And in the beginning of their expansion onland, through not having much territory, and becauseof their great reputation, they had not much to fearfrom their captains; but when they expanded, as un-der Carmignuola,24 they had a taste of this mistake;for, having found him a most valiant man (they beatthe Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on theother hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in thewar, they feared they would no longer conquer un-der him, and for this reason they were not willing,nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to loseagain that which they had acquired, they were com-pelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him.They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo daBergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pit-igliano,25 and the like, under whom they had to dread

24Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, executed at Venice, 5thMay 1432.

25Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San Severino; died fighting for

101

CHAPTER XII

loss and not gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,26where in one battle they lost that which in eight hun-dred years they had acquired with so much trouble.Because from such arms conquests come but slowly,long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sud-den and portentous.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy,which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries,I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order that,having seen their rise and progress, one may be betterprepared to counteract them. You must understandthat the empire has recently come to be repudiatedin Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporalpower, and that Italy has been divided up into morestates, for the reason that many of the great cities tookup arms against their nobles, who, formerly favouredby the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst theChurch was favouring them so as to gain authorityin temporal power: in many others their citizens be-came princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fellpartly into the hands of the Church and of republics,and, the Church consisting of priests and the republicof citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced

Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”– Machiavelli.Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.

26Battle of Vaila in 1509.

102

CHAPTER XII

to enlist foreigners.The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Al-

berigo da Conio,27 the Romagnian. From the school ofthis man sprang, among others, Braccio and Sforza,who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. Afterthese came all the other captains who till now havedirected the arms of Italy; and the end of all their val-our has been, that she has been overrun by Charles,robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insultedby the Switzers. The principle that has guided themhas been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so thatthey might increase their own. They did this be-cause, subsisting on their pay and without territory,they were unable to support many soldiers, and afew infantry did not give them any authority; so theywere led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force ofwhich they were maintained and honoured; and af-fairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army oftwenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be foundtwo thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this,used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to them-selves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, buttaking prisoners and liberating without ransom. Theydid not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons

27Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He was the leaderof the famous “Company of St George,” composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.

103

CHAPTER XII

of the towns attack encampments at night; they didnot surround the camp either with stockade or ditch,nor did they campaign in the winter. All these thingswere permitted by their military rules, and devisedby them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue anddangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery andcontempt.

104

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXEDSOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN

AUXILIARIES, which are the other useless arm, areemployed when a prince is called in with his

forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Juliusin the most recent times; for he, having, in the enter-prise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenar-ies, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdi-nand, King of Spain,28 for his assistance with men andarms. These arms may be useful and good in them-selves, but for him who calls them in they are alwaysdisadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and win-ning, one is their captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of exam-ples, I do not wish to leave this recent one of Pope

28Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), surnamed “The Catholic,” born1542, died 1516.

CHAPTER XIII

Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot fail tobe perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threwhimself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. Buthis good fortune brought about a third event, so thathe did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because,having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and theSwitzers having risen and driven out the conquerors(against all expectation, both his and others), it socame to pass that he did not become prisoner to hisenemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, hehaving conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sentten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby theyran more danger than at any other time of their trou-bles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,29 to oppose hisneighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece,who, on the war being finished, were not willing toquit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greeceto the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquermake use of these arms, for they are much more haz-ardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruinis ready made; they are all united, all yield obedi-

29Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

106

CHAPTER XIII

ence to others; but with mercenaries, when they haveconquered, more time and better opportunities areneeded to injure you; they are not all of one com-munity, they are found and paid by you, and a thirdparty, which you have made their head, is not able allat once to assume enough authority to injure you. Inconclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most danger-ous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore,has always avoided these arms and turned to his own;and has been willing rather to lose with them than toconquer with the others, not deeming that a real vic-tory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and hisactions. This duke entered the Romagna with aux-iliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and withthem he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turnedto mercenaries, discerning less danger in them, andenlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, onhandling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, anddangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men.And the difference between one and the other of theseforces can easily be seen when one considers the dif-ference there was in the reputation of the duke, whenhe had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli,and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose

107

CHAPTER XIII

fidelity he could always count and found it ever in-creasing; he was never esteemed more highly thanwhen every one saw that he was complete master ofhis own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recentexamples, but I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, theSyracusan, he being one of those I have named above.This man, as I have said, made head of the army bythe Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary sol-diery, constituted like our Italian condottieri, was ofno use; and it appearing to him that he could nei-ther keep them not let them go, he had them all cut topieces, and afterwards made war with his own forcesand not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from theOld Testament applicable to this subject. David of-fered himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philis-tine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armedhim with his own weapons; which David rejected assoon as he had them on his back, saying he couldmake no use of them, and that he wished to meetthe enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion,the arms of others either fall from your back, or theyweigh you down, or they bind you fast.

108

CHAPTER XIII

Charles the Seventh,30 the father of King Louis theEleventh,31x having by good fortune and valour lib-erated France from the English, recognized the ne-cessity of being armed with forces of his own, andhe established in his kingdom ordinances concerningmen-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son, KingLouis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist theSwitzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as isnow seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because,having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he hasentirely diminished the value of his own arms, for hehas destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being asthey are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers,it does not appear that they can now conquer withoutthem. Hence it arises that the French cannot standagainst the Switzers, and without the Switzers theydo not come off well against others. The armies ofthe French have thus become mixed, partly merce-nary and partly national, both of which arms togetherare much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliariesalone, but much inferior to one’s own forces. Andthis example proves it, for the kingdom of Francewould be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles

30Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died 1461.31Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

109

CHAPTER XIII

had been enlarged or maintained.But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an

affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poi-son that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hecticfevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality can-not recognize evils until they are upon him, he is nottruly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if thefirst disaster to the Roman Empire32 should be exam-ined, it will be found to have commenced only withthe enlisting of the Goths; because from that time thevigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and allthat valour which had raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is securewithout having its own forces; on the contrary, it isentirely dependent on good fortune, not having thevalour which in adversity would defend it. And ithas always been the opinion and judgment of wisemen that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable asfame or power not founded on its own strength. Andone’s own forces are those which are composed ei-ther of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others

32“Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the reduction of armamentsseemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the British Empiremaintains its existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empiresank under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was ‘wholly unhistorical.’ Hemight well have added that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledgedhis liability to fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was nolonger recognized.”–Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.

110

CHAPTER XIII

are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to makeready one’s own forces will be easily found if the rulessuggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if onewill consider how Philip, the father of Alexander theGreat, and many republics and princes have armedand organized themselves, to which rules I entirelycommit myself.

111

CHAPTER XIV

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THESUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A prince ought to have no other aim or thought,nor select anything else for his study, than war

and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art thatbelongs to him who rules, and it is of such force thatit not only upholds those who are born princes, butit often enables men to rise from a private station tothat rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that whenprinces have thought more of ease than of arms theyhave lost their states. And the first cause of your los-ing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you toacquire a state is to be master of the art. FrancescoSforza, through being martial, from a private personbecame Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoid-ing the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukesbecame private persons. For among other evils which

CHAPTER XIV

being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be de-spised, and this is one of those ignominies againstwhich a prince ought to guard himself, as is shownlater on. Because there is nothing proportionate be-tween the armed and the unarmed; and it is not rea-sonable that he who is armed should yield obediencewillingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmedman should be secure among armed servants. Be-cause, there being in the one disdain and in the othersuspicion, it is not possible for them to work well to-gether. And therefore a prince who does not under-stand the art of war, over and above the other misfor-tunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by hissoldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never,therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject ofwar, and in peace he should addict himself more toits exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways,the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keephis men well organized and drilled, to follow inces-santly the chase, by which he accustoms his body tohardships, and learns something of the nature of lo-calities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise,how the valleys open out, how the plains lie, and tounderstand the nature of rivers and marshes, and inall this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge

113

CHAPTER XIV

is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know hiscountry, and is better able to undertake its defence;afterwards, by means of the knowledge and obser-vation of that locality, he understands with ease anyother which it may be necessary for him to study here-after; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and riversand marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have acertain resemblance to those of other countries, so thatwith a knowledge of the aspect of one country one caneasily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the princethat lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is de-sirable that a captain should possess, for it teacheshim to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to leadarmies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advan-tage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among otherpraises which writers have bestowed on him, is com-mended because in time of peace he never had any-thing in his mind but the rules of war; and when hewas in the country with friends, he often stopped andreasoned with them: “If the enemy should be uponthat hill, and we should find ourselves here with ourarmy, with whom would be the advantage? Howshould one best advance to meet him, keeping theranks? If we should wish to retreat, how ought we topursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went,

114

CHAPTER XIV

all the chances that could befall an army; he would lis-ten to their opinion and state his, confirming it withreasons, so that by these continual discussions therecould never arise, in time of war, any unexpected cir-cumstances that he could not deal with.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should readhistories, and study there the actions of illustriousmen, to see how they have borne themselves in war,to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; andabove all do as an illustrious man did, who tookas an exemplar one who had been praised and fa-mous before him, and whose achievements and deedshe always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexanderthe Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, ScipioCyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, writ-ten by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the lifeof Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and howin chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipioconformed to those things which have been written ofCyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observesome such rules, and never in peaceful times standidle, but increase his resources with industry in sucha way that they may be available to him in adversity,so that if fortune chances it may find him prepared toresist her blows.

115

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN,AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED

OR BLAMED

IT remains now to see what ought to be the rules ofconduct for a prince towards subject and friends.

And as I know that many have written on this point,I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in men-tioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shalldepart from the methods of other people. But, it be-ing my intention to write a thing which shall be use-ful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me moreappropriate to follow up the real truth of the matterthan the imagination of it; for many have picturedrepublics and principalities which in fact have neverbeen known or seen, because how one lives is so fardistant from how one ought to live, that he who ne-glects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner

CHAPTER XV

effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man whowishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtuesoon meets with what destroys him among so muchthat is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold hisown to know how to do wrong, and to make use of itor not according to necessity. Therefore, putting onone side imaginary things concerning a prince, anddiscussing those which are real, I say that all menwhen they are spoken of, and chiefly princes for beingmore highly placed, are remarkable for some of thosequalities which bring them either blame or praise; andthus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly,using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person inour language is still he who desires to possess by rob-bery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himselftoo much of the use of his own); one is reputed gener-ous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; onefaithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cow-ardly, another bold and brave; one affable, anotherhaughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere,another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave,another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving,and the like. And I know that every one will con-fess that it would be most praiseworthy in a princeto exhibit all the above qualities that are considered

117

CHAPTER XV

good; but because they can neither be entirely pos-sessed nor observed, for human conditions do notpermit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently pru-dent that he may know how to avoid the reproach ofthose vices which would lose him his state; and alsoto keep himself, if it be possible, from those whichwould not lose him it; but this not being possible,he may with less hesitation abandon himself to them.And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incur-ring a reproach for those vices without which the statecan only be saved with difficulty, for if everything isconsidered carefully, it will be found that somethingwhich looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin;whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet fol-lowed brings him security and prosperity.

118

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

COMMENCING then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say that it would be well

to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality exer-cised in a way that does not bring you the reputa-tion for it, injures you; for if one exercises it hon-estly and as it should be exercised, it may not be-come known, and you will not avoid the reproach ofits opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintainamong men the name of liberal is obliged to avoidno attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus in-clined will consume in such acts all his property, andwill be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintainthe name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people,and tax them, and do everything he can to get money.This will soon make him odious to his subjects, andbecoming poor he will be little valued by any one;

CHAPTER XVI

thus, with his liberality, having offended many andrewarded few, he is affected by the very first troubleand imperilled by whatever may be the first danger;recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw backfrom it, he runs at once into the reproach of beingmiserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise thisvirtue of liberality in such a way that it is recognized,except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fearthe reputation of being mean, for in time he will cometo be more considered than if liberal, seeing that withhis economy his revenues are enough, that he can de-fend himself against all attacks, and is able to engagein enterprises without burdening his people; thus itcomes to pass that he exercises liberality towards allfrom whom he does not take, who are numberless,and meanness towards those to whom he does notgive, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time ex-cept by those who have been considered mean; therest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was assistedin reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality,yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when hemade war on the King of France; and he made manywars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his

120

CHAPTER XVI

subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses outof his long thriftiness. The present King of Spainwould not have undertaken or conquered in so manyenterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince,therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects,that he can defend himself, that he does not becomepoor and abject, that he is not forced to become ra-pacious, ought to hold of little account a reputationfor being mean, for it is one of those vices which willenable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empireby liberality, and many others have reached the high-est positions by having been liberal, and by being con-sidered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, orin a way to become one. In the first case this liberalityis dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to beconsidered liberal; and Caesar was one of those whowished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he hadsurvived after becoming so, and had not moderatedhis expenses, he would have destroyed his govern-ment. And if any one should reply: Many have beenprinces, and have done great things with armies, whohave been considered very liberal, I reply: Either aprince spends that which is his own or his subjects’or else that of others. In the first case he ought to besparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any op-

121

CHAPTER XVI

portunity for liberality. And to the prince who goesforth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack,and extortion, handling that which belongs to others,this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not befollowed by soldiers. And of that which is neitheryours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, aswere Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it doesnot take away your reputation if you squander that ofothers, but adds to it; it is only squandering your ownthat injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberal-ity, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the powerto do so, and so become either poor or despised, orelse, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And aprince should guard himself, above all things, againstbeing despised and hated; and liberality leads youto both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputationfor meanness which brings reproach without hatred,than to be compelled through seeking a reputation forliberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets re-proach with hatred.

122

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY,AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED

THAN FEARED

COMING now to the other qualities mentionedabove, I say that every prince ought to desire to

be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless heought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Ce-sare Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding,his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and re-stored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightlyconsidered, he will be seen to have been much moremerciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoida reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be de-stroyed.33 Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps hissubjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the re-proach of cruelty; because with a few examples he

33During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions in 1502 and 1503.

CHAPTER XVII

will be more merciful than those who, through toomuch mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which fol-low murders or robberies; for these are wont to injurethe whole people, whilst those executions which orig-inate with a prince offend the individual only.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new princeto avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing to newstates being full of dangers. Hence Virgil, through themouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reignowing to its being new, saying:

“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, etlate fines custode tueri.”34

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and toact, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed ina temperate manner with prudence and humanity, sothat too much confidence may not make him incau-tious and too much distrust render him intolerable.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better tobe loved than feared or feared than loved? It maybe answered that one should wish to be both, but,because it is difficult to unite them in one person, itis much safer to be feared than loved, when, of thetwo, either must be dispensed with. Because this is tobe asserted in general of men, that they are ungrate-

34...against my will, my fate A throne unsettled, and an infant state, Bid me defend myrealms with all my pow’rs, And guard with these severities my shores. Christopher Pitt.

124

CHAPTER XVII

ful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long asyou succeed they are yours entirely; they will offeryou their blood, property, life, and children, as is saidabove, when the need is far distant; but when it ap-proaches they turn against you. And that prince who,relying entirely on their promises, has neglected otherprecautions, is ruined; because friendships that areobtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobil-ity of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are notsecured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon;and men have less scruple in offending one who isbeloved than one who is feared, for love is preservedby the link of obligation which, owing to the base-ness of men, is broken at every opportunity for theiradvantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of pun-ishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in sucha way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred;because he can endure very well being feared whilsthe is not hated, which will always be as long as heabstains from the property of his citizens and subjectsand from their women. But when it is necessary forhim to proceed against the life of someone, he mustdo it on proper justification and for manifest cause,but above all things he must keep his hands off theproperty of others, because men more quickly forget

125

CHAPTER XVII

the death of their father than the loss of their patri-mony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the propertyare never wanting; for he who has once begun to liveby robbery will always find pretexts for seizing whatbelongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on thecontrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse.But when a prince is with his army, and has undercontrol a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite neces-sary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, forwithout it he would never hold his army united ordisposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one isenumerated: that having led an enormous army, com-posed of many various races of men, to fight in for-eign lands, no dissensions arose either among them oragainst the prince, whether in his bad or in his goodfortune. This arose from nothing else than his inhu-man cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, madehim revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers,but without that cruelty, his other virtues were notsufficient to produce this effect. And short-sightedwriters admire his deeds from one point of view andfrom another condemn the principal cause of them.That it is true his other virtues would not have beensufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio,that most excellent man, not only of his own times

126

CHAPTER XVII

but within the memory of man, against whom, nev-ertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose fromnothing but his too great forbearance, which gave hissoldiers more license than is consistent with militarydiscipline. For this he was upbraided in the Senateby Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of theRoman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by alegate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him,nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owingentirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someonein the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there weremany men who knew much better how not to err thanto correct the errors of others. This disposition, ifhe had been continued in the command, would havedestroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but,he being under the control of the Senate, this injuri-ous characteristic not only concealed itself, but con-tributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved,I come to the conclusion that, men loving accordingto their own will and fearing according to that of theprince, a wise prince should establish himself on thatwhich is in his own control and not in that of others;he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

127

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCESSHOULD KEEP FAITH35

EVERY one admits how praiseworthy it is in aprince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and

not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has beenthat those princes who have done great things haveheld good faith of little account, and have known howto circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in theend have overcome those who have relied on theirword. You must know there are two ways of con-testing,36 the one by the law, the other by force; thefirst method is proper to men, the second to beasts;but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it

35“The present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion of Machiavelli’swritings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297.

36“Contesting,” i.e. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out that this passage is imitateddirectly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”: “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per discepta-tionem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum estad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.”

CHAPTER XVIII

is necessary to have recourse to the second. There-fore it is necessary for a prince to understand howto avail himself of the beast and the man. This hasbeen figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers,who describe how Achilles and many other princes ofold were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, whobrought them up in his discipline; which means solelythat, as they had for a teacher one who was half beastand half man, so it is necessary for a prince to knowhow to make use of both natures, and that one with-out the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, be-ing compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, oughtto choose the fox and the lion; because the lion can-not defend himself against snares and the fox cannotdefend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is neces-sary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to ter-rify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion donot understand what they are about. Therefore a wiselord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when suchobservance may be turned against him, and when thereasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. Ifmen were entirely good this precept would not hold,but because they are bad, and will not keep faith withyou, you too are not bound to observe it with them.Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimatereasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this end-

129

CHAPTER XVIII

less modern examples could be given, showing howmany treaties and engagements have been made voidand of no effect through the faithlessness of princes;and he who has known best how to employ the foxhas succeeded best.

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise thischaracteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissem-bler; and men are so simple, and so subject to presentnecessities, that he who seeks to deceive will alwaysfind someone who will allow himself to be deceived.One recent example I cannot pass over in silence.Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men,nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he alwaysfound victims; for there never was a man who hadgreater power in asserting, or who with greater oathswould affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nev-ertheless his deceits always succeeded according tohis wishes,@@“Nondimanco sempre gli succederonogli inganni (ad votum).” The words “ad votum” areomitted in the Testina addition, 1550.

Alexander never did what he said, Cesare never saidwhat he did.

Italian Proverb.@@ because he well understood thisside of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all

130

CHAPTER XVIII

the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is verynecessary to appear to have them. And I shall dareto say this also, that to have them and always to ob-serve them is injurious, and that to appear to havethem is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane,religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind soframed that should you require not to be so, you maybe able and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, es-pecially a new one, cannot observe all those things forwhich men are esteemed, being often forced, in or-der to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,37friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it isnecessary for him to have a mind ready to turn it-self accordingly as the winds and variations of for-tune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to divergefrom the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if com-pelled, then to know how to set about it.

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he37“Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto fede,” “altogether faithful,”

in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tuttofede,” were omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction of the papalauthorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the word “fede” was “the faith,” i.e.the Catholic creed, and not as rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word“religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being used to signify indifferentlyevery shade of belief, as witness “the religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate theHuguenot heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows:“That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a masterrule in his political scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but thereality of it hurtful and pernicious.”’

131

CHAPTER XVIII

never lets anything slip from his lips that is not repletewith the above-named five qualities, that he may ap-pear to him who sees and hears him altogether mer-ciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. Thereis nothing more necessary to appear to have than thislast quality, inasmuch as men judge generally moreby the eye than by the hand, because it belongs toeverybody to see you, to few to come in touch withyou. Every one sees what you appear to be, few re-ally know what you are, and those few dare not op-pose themselves to the opinion of the many, who havethe majesty of the state to defend them; and in the ac-tions of all men, and especially of princes, which it isnot prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of con-quering and holding his state, the means will alwaysbe considered honest, and he will be praised by every-body; because the vulgar are always taken by what athing seems to be and by what comes of it; and inthe world there are only the vulgar, for the few finda place there only when the many have no ground torest on.

One prince38 of the present time, whom it is not well

38Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing ‘The Prince’ it would have beenclearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here without giving offence.” Burd’s “IlPrincipe,” p. 308.

132

CHAPTER XVIII

to name, never preaches anything else but peace andgood faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either,if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputa-tion and kingdom many a time.

133

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISEDAND HATED

NOW, concerning the characteristics of which men-tion is made above, I have spoken of the more

important ones, the others I wish to discuss brieflyunder this generality, that the prince must consider,as has been in part said before, how to avoid thosethings which will make him hated or contemptible;and as often as he shall have succeeded he will havefulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger inother reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said,to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the propertyand women of his subjects, from both of which hemust abstain. And when neither their property northeir honor is touched, the majority of men live con-tent, and he has only to contend with the ambition of

CHAPTER XIX

a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle,frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, fromall of which a prince should guard himself as from arock; and he should endeavour to show in his actionsgreatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in hisprivate dealings with his subjects let him show thathis judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himselfin such reputation that no one can hope either to de-ceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this im-pression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed isnot easily conspired against; for, provided it is wellknown that he is an excellent man and revered byhis people, he can only be attacked with difficulty.For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, onefrom within, on account of his subjects, the otherfrom without, on account of external powers. Fromthe latter he is defended by being well armed andhaving good allies, and if he is well armed he willhave good friends, and affairs will always remainquiet within when they are quiet without, unless theyshould have been already disturbed by conspiracy;and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he hascarried out his preparations and has lived as I have

135

CHAPTER XIX

said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist ev-ery attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside aredisturbed he has only to fear that they will conspiresecretly, from which a prince can easily secure himselfby avoiding being hated and despised, and by keep-ing the people satisfied with him, which it is mostnecessary for him to accomplish, as I said above atlength. And one of the most efficacious remedies thata prince can have against conspiracies is not to behated and despised by the people, for he who con-spires against a prince always expects to please themby his removal; but when the conspirator can onlylook forward to offending them, he will not have thecourage to take such a course, for the difficulties thatconfront a conspirator are infinite. And as experi-ence shows, many have been the conspiracies, butfew have been successful; because he who conspirescannot act alone, nor can he take a companion exceptfrom those whom he believes to be malcontents, andas soon as you have opened your mind to a malcon-tent you have given him the material with which tocontent himself, for by denouncing you he can lookfor every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from thiscourse to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubt-ful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend,

136

CHAPTER XIX

or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keepfaith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, Isay that, on the side of the conspirator, there is noth-ing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to ter-rify him; but on the side of the prince there is themajesty of the principality, the laws, the protection offriends and the state to defend him; so that, addingto all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossi-ble that any one should be so rash as to conspire. Forwhereas in general the conspirator has to fear beforethe execution of his plot, in this case he has also tofear the sequel to the crime; because on account of ithe has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hopefor any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, butI will be content with one, brought to pass withinthe memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Ben-tivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather ofthe present Annibale), having been murdered by theCanneschi, who had conspired against him, not oneof his family survived but Messer Giovanni,39 whowas in childhood: immediately after his assassination

39Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He ruled Bologna from1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from his ownvery recent experience (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his allegedcomplicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.

137

CHAPTER XIX

the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. Thissprung from the popular goodwill which the houseof Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; whichwas so great that, although none remained there afterthe death of Annibale who was able to rule the state,the Bolognese, having information that there was oneof the Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to thattime had been considered the son of a blacksmith,sent to Florence for him and gave him the governmentof their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Gio-vanni came in due course to the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought toreckon conspiracies of little account when his peoplehold him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, andbears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everythingand everybody. And well-ordered states and wiseprinces have taken every care not to drive the noblesto desperation, and to keep the people satisfied andcontented, for this is one of the most important ob-jects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms ofour times is France, and in it are found many good in-stitutions on which depend the liberty and security ofthe king; of these the first is the parliament and its au-thority, because he who founded the kingdom, know-

138

CHAPTER XIX

ing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness,considered that a bit to their mouths would be neces-sary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowingthe hatred of the people, founded in fear, against thenobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anx-ious for this to be the particular care of the king; there-fore, to take away the reproach which he would be li-able to from the nobles for favouring the people, andfrom the people for favouring the nobles, he set upan arbiter, who should be one who could beat downthe great and favour the lesser without reproach tothe king. Neither could you have a better or a moreprudent arrangement, or a greater source of securityto the king and kingdom. From this one can drawanother important conclusion, that princes ought toleave affairs of reproach to the management of oth-ers, and keep those of grace in their own hands. Andfurther, I consider that a prince ought to cherish thenobles, but not so as to make himself hated by thepeople.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have exam-ined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors thatmany of them would be an example contrary to myopinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly andshowed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they havelost their empire or have been killed by subjects who

139

CHAPTER XIX

have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, toanswer these objections, I will recall the characters ofsome of the emperors, and will show that the causesof their ruin were not different to those alleged by me;at the same time I will only submit for considerationthose things that are noteworthy to him who studiesthe affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emper-ors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus thephilosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcusand his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus andhis son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus,Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other princi-palities the ambition of the nobles and the insolenceof the people only have to be contended with, the Ro-man emperors had a third difficulty in having to putup with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, amatter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruinof many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfactionboth to soldiers and people; because the people lovedpeace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiringprince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike princewho was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualitiesthey were quite willing he should exercise upon the

140

CHAPTER XIX

people, so that they could get double pay and givevent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arosethat those emperors were always overthrown who, ei-ther by birth or training, had no great authority, andmost of them, especially those who came new to theprincipality, recognizing the difficulty of these twoopposing humours, were inclined to give satisfactionto the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people.Which course was necessary, because, as princes can-not help being hated by someone, they ought, in thefirst place, to avoid being hated by every one, andwhen they cannot compass this, they ought to en-deavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatredof the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors whothrough inexperience had need of special favour ad-hered more readily to the soldiers than to the people;a course which turned out advantageous to them ornot, accordingly as the prince knew how to maintainauthority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax,and Alexander, being all men of modest life, loversof justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benig-nant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone livedand died honoured, because he had succeeded to thethrone by hereditary title, and owed nothing either tothe soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being pos-

141

CHAPTER XIX

sessed of many virtues which made him respected,he always kept both orders in their places whilst helived, and was neither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against thewishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to livelicentiously under Commodus, could not endure thehonest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them;thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatredthere was added contempt for his old age, he wasoverthrown at the very beginning of his administra-tion. And here it should be noted that hatred is ac-quired as much by good works as by bad ones, there-fore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his stateis very often forced to do evil; for when that body iscorrupt whom you think you have need of to main-tain yourself–it may be either the people or the sol-diers or the nobles–you have to submit to its humoursand to gratify them, and then good works will do youharm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man ofsuch great goodness, that among the other praiseswhich are accorded him is this, that in the fourteenyears he held the empire no one was ever put to deathby him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered ef-feminate and a man who allowed himself to be gov-

142

CHAPTER XIX

erned by his mother, he became despised, the armyconspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Com-modus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximi-nus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-menwho, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to com-mit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all,except Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severusthere was so much valour that, keeping the soldiersfriendly, although the people were oppressed by him,he reigned successfully; for his valour made him somuch admired in the sight of the soldiers and peo-ple that the latter were kept in a way astonished andawed and the former respectful and satisfied. Andbecause the actions of this man, as a new prince, weregreat, I wish to show briefly that he knew well howto counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as Isaid above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he per-suaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he was cap-tain, that it would be right to go to Rome and avengethe death of Pertinax, who had been killed by thepraetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, withoutappearing to aspire to the throne, he moved the armyon Rome, and reached Italy before it was known that

143

CHAPTER XIX

he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate,through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian.After this there remained for Severus, who wished tomake himself master of the whole empire, two diffi-culties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiaticarmy, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor;the other in the west where Albinus was, who alsoaspired to the throne. And as he considered it dan-gerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decidedto attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the lat-ter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Sen-ate, he was willing to share that dignity with him andsent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that theSenate had made Albinus his colleague; which thingswere accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severushad conquered and killed Niger, and settled orien-tal affairs, he returned to Rome and complained tothe Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the bene-fits that he had received from him, had by treacherysought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he wascompelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought himout in France, and took from him his government andlife. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the ac-tions of this man will find him a most valiant lion anda most cunning fox; he will find him feared and re-spected by every one, and not hated by the army; and

144

CHAPTER XIX

it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, wasable to hold the empire so well, because his supremerenown always protected him from that hatred whichthe people might have conceived against him for hisviolence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man,and had very excellent qualities, which made himadmirable in the sight of the people and acceptableto the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most en-during of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food andother luxuries, which caused him to be beloved bythe armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and crueltieswere so great and so unheard of that, after endlesssingle murders, he killed a large number of the peo-ple of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He becamehated by the whole world, and also feared by those hehad around him, to such an extent that he was mur-dered in the midst of his army by a centurion. Andhere it must be noted that such-like deaths, which aredeliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperatecourage, cannot be avoided by princes, because anyone who does not fear to die can inflict them; but aprince may fear them the less because they are veryrare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave in-jury to those whom he employs or has around himin the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken

145

CHAPTER XIX

this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother ofthat centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet re-tained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, wasa rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it shouldhave been very easy to hold the empire, for, being theson of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only tofollow in the footsteps of his father to please his peo-ple and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal,he gave himself up to amusing the soldiers and cor-rupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacityupon the people; on the other hand, not maintaininghis dignity, often descending to the theatre to com-pete with gladiators, and doing other vile things, littleworthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into contemptwith the soldiers, and being hated by one party anddespised by the other, he was conspired against andwas killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. Hewas a very warlike man, and the armies, being dis-gusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom Ihave already spoken, killed him and elected Maximi-nus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, fortwo things made him hated and despised; the one, hishaving kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into

146

CHAPTER XIX

contempt (it being well known to all, and considereda great indignity by every one), and the other, his hav-ing at the accession to his dominions deferred goingto Rome and taking possession of the imperial seat;he had also gained a reputation for the utmost feroc-ity by having, through his prefects in Rome and else-where in the empire, practised many cruelties, so thatthe whole world was moved to anger at the meannessof his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa re-belled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome,and all Italy conspired against him, to which may beadded his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileiaand meeting with difficulties in taking it, were dis-gusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less whenthey found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus,or Julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible, werequickly wiped out; but I will bring this discourse toa conclusion by saying that princes in our times havethis difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to theirsoldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstand-ing one has to give them some indulgence, that issoon done; none of these princes have armies thatare veterans in the governance and administration ofprovinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire;and whereas it was then more necessary to give sat-

147

CHAPTER XIX

isfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is nowmore necessary to all princes, except the Turk and theSoldan, to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, be-cause the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who al-ways keeps round him twelve thousand infantry andfifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the secu-rity and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessarythat, putting aside every consideration for the people,he should keep them his friends. The kingdom of theSoldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of sol-diers, it follows again that, without regard to the peo-ple, he must keep them his friends. But you must notethat the state of the Soldan is unlike all other princi-palities, for the reason that it is like the Christian pon-tificate, which cannot be called either an hereditaryor a newly formed principality; because the sons ofthe old prince are not the heirs, but he who is electedto that position by those who have authority, and thesons remain only noblemen. And this being an an-cient custom, it cannot be called a new principality,because there are none of those difficulties in it thatare met with in new ones; for although the princeis new, the constitution of the state is old, and it isframed so as to receive him as if he were its heredi-tary lord.

148

CHAPTER XIX

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I saythat whoever will consider it will acknowledge thateither hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also howit happened that, a number of them acting in one wayand a number in another, only one in each way cameto a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Be-cause it would have been useless and dangerous forPertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitateMarcus, who was heir to the principality; and like-wise it would have been utterly destructive to Cara-calla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitatedSeverus, they not having sufficient valour to enablethem to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince,new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions ofMarcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow thoseof Severus, but he ought to take from Severus thoseparts which are necessary to found his state, and fromMarcus those which are proper and glorious to keepa state that may already be stable and firm.

149

CHAPTER XX

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHERTHINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,

ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state,have disarmed their subjects; others have kept theirsubject towns distracted by factions; others have fos-tered enmities against themselves; others have laidthemselves out to gain over those whom they dis-trusted in the beginning of their governments; somehave built fortresses; some have overthrown and de-stroyed them. And although one cannot give a finaljudgment on all of these things unless one possessesthe particulars of those states in which a decision hasto be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehen-sively as the matter of itself will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmedhis subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed

CHAPTER XX

he has always armed them, because, by arming them,those arms become yours, those men who were dis-trusted become faithful, and those who were faithfulare kept so, and your subjects become your adher-ents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yetwhen those whom you do arm are benefited, the oth-ers can be handled more freely, and this difference intheir treatment, which they quite understand, makesthe former your dependents, and the latter, consider-ing it to be necessary that those who have the mostdanger and service should have the most reward, ex-cuse you. But when you disarm them, you at onceoffend them by showing that you distrust them, ei-ther for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and eitherof these opinions breeds hatred against you. Andbecause you cannot remain unarmed, it follows thatyou turn to mercenaries, which are of the character al-ready shown; even if they should be good they wouldnot be sufficient to defend you against powerful en-emies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I havesaid, a new prince in a new principality has alwaysdistributed arms. Histories are full of examples. Butwhen a prince acquires a new state, which he adds asa province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarmthe men of that state, except those who have been hisadherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time

151

CHAPTER XX

and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effem-inate; and matters should be managed in such a waythat all the armed men in the state shall be your ownsoldiers who in your old state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckonedwise, were accustomed to say that it was necessaryto hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses; andwith this idea they fostered quarrels in some of theirtributary towns so as to keep possession of them themore easily. This may have been well enough inthose times when Italy was in a way balanced, butI do not believe that it can be accepted as a preceptfor to-day, because I do not believe that factions canever be of use; rather it is certain that when the en-emy comes upon you in divided cities you are quicklylost, because the weakest party will always assist theoutside forces and the other will not be able to re-sist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the abovereasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factionsin their tributary cities; and although they never al-lowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursedthese disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, dis-tracted by their differences, should not unite againstthem. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn outas expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one partyat once took courage and seized the state. Such meth-

152

CHAPTER XX

ods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, becausethese factions will never be permitted in a vigorousprincipality; such methods for enabling one the moreeasily to manage subjects are only useful in times ofpeace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when theyovercome the difficulties and obstacles by whichthey are confronted, and therefore fortune, especiallywhen she desires to make a new prince great, who hasa greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditaryone, causes enemies to arise and form designs againsthim, in order that he may have the opportunity ofovercoming them, and by them to mount higher, asby a ladder which his enemies have raised. For thisreason many consider that a wise prince, when he hasthe opportunity, ought with craft to foster some ani-mosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, hisrenown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found morefidelity and assistance in those men who in the be-ginning of their rule were distrusted than amongthose who in the beginning were trusted. PandolfoPetrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by thosewho had been distrusted than by others. But on thisquestion one cannot speak generally, for it varies so

153

CHAPTER XX

much with the individual; I will only say this, thatthose men who at the commencement of a prince-dom have been hostile, if they are of a description toneed assistance to support themselves, can always begained over with the greatest ease, and they will betightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuchas they know it to be very necessary for them to cancelby deeds the bad impression which he had formed ofthem; and thus the prince always extracts more profitfrom them than from those who, serving him in toomuch security, may neglect his affairs. And since thematter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince,who by means of secret favours has acquired a newstate, that he must well consider the reasons which in-duced those to favour him who did so; and if it be nota natural affection towards him, but only discontentwith their government, then he will only keep themfriendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it willbe impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well thereasons for this in those examples which can be takenfrom ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that itis easier for the prince to make friends of those menwho were contented under the former government,and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, be-ing discontented with it, were favourable to him andencouraged him to seize it.

154

CHAPTER XX

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to holdtheir states more securely, to build fortresses that mayserve as a bridle and bit to those who might designto work against them, and as a place of refuge froma first attack. I praise this system because it has beenmade use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, MesserNicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to demol-ish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he mightkeep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on re-turning to his dominion, whence he had been drivenby Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all thefortresses in that province, and considered that with-out them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Ben-tivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar deci-sion. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not accordingto circumstances; if they do you good in one way theyinjure you in another. And this question can be rea-soned thus: the prince who has more to fear from thepeople than from foreigners ought to build fortresses,but he who has more to fear from foreigners than fromthe people ought to leave them alone. The castle ofMilan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and willmake, more trouble for the house of Sforza than anyother disorder in the state. For this reason the bestpossible fortress is–not to be hated by the people, be-cause, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they

155

CHAPTER XX

will not save you if the people hate you, for there willnever be wanting foreigners to assist a people whohave taken arms against you. It has not been seenin our times that such fortresses have been of use toany prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,40 whenthe Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for bythat means she was able to withstand the popular at-tack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus re-cover her state; and the posture of affairs was suchat that time that the foreigners could not assist thepeople. But fortresses were of little value to her af-terwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and whenthe people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners.Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both thenand before, not to have been hated by the people thanto have had the fortresses. All these things consid-ered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses aswell as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever,trusting in them, cares little about being hated by thepeople.

40Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499. A letter fromFortunati to the countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,” wroteFortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, alearned young Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.”Cf. “Catherine Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

156

CHAPTER XXI

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCTHIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

NOTHING makes a prince so much esteemed asgreat enterprises and setting a fine example. We

have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the presentKing of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince,because he has risen, by fame and glory, from beingan insignificant king to be the foremost king in Chris-tendom; and if you will consider his deeds you willfind them all great and some of them extraordinary.In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada,and this enterprise was the foundation of his domin-ions. He did this quietly at first and without any fearof hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons ofCastile occupied in thinking of the war and not an-ticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceivethat by these means he was acquiring power and au-

CHAPTER XXI

thority over them. He was able with the money of theChurch and of the people to sustain his armies, andby that long war to lay the foundation for the mili-tary skill which has since distinguished him. Further,always using religion as a plea, so as to undertakegreater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cru-elty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of theMoors; nor could there be a more admirable exam-ple, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he as-sailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally at-tacked France; and thus his achievements and designshave always been great, and have kept the minds ofhis people in suspense and admiration and occupiedwith the issue of them. And his actions have arisen insuch a way, one out of the other, that men have neverbeen given time to work steadily against him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual ex-amples in internal affairs, similar to those which arerelated of Messer Bernabo da Milano, who, when hehad the opportunity, by any one in civil life doingsome extraordinary thing, either good or bad, wouldtake some method of rewarding or punishing him,which would be much spoken about. And a princeought, above all things, always endeavour in everyaction to gain for himself the reputation of being agreat and remarkable man.

158

CHAPTER XXI

A prince is also respected when he is either a truefriend or a downright enemy, that is to say, when,without any reservation, he declares himself in favourof one party against the other; which course will al-ways be more advantageous than standing neutral;because if two of your powerful neighbours come toblows, they are of such a character that, if one of themconquers, you have either to fear him or not. In ei-ther case it will always be more advantageous for youto declare yourself and to make war strenuously; be-cause, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself,you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to thepleasure and satisfaction of him who has been con-quered, and you will have no reasons to offer, noranything to protect or to shelter you. Because he whoconquers does not want doubtful friends who will notaid him in the time of trial; and he who loses will notharbour you because you did not willingly, sword inhand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by theAetolians to drive out the Romans. He sent envoysto the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans,exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the otherhand the Romans urged them to take up arms. Thisquestion came to be discussed in the council of theAchaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them

159

CHAPTER XXI

to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered:“As for that which has been said, that it is better andmore advantageous for your state not to interfere inour war, nothing can be more erroneous; because bynot interfering you will be left, without favour or con-sideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it willalways happen that he who is not your friend will de-mand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friendwill entreat you to declare yourself with arms. Andirresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, gener-ally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined.But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favourof one side, if the party with whom he allies himselfconquers, although the victor may be powerful andmay have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him,and there is established a bond of amity; and men arenever so shameless as to become a monument of in-gratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all arenever so complete that the victor must not show someregard, especially to justice. But if he with whom youally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, andwhilst he is able he may aid you, and you becomecompanions on a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of sucha character that you have no anxiety as to who mayconquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to

160

CHAPTER XXI

be allied, because you assist at the destruction of oneby the aid of another who, if he had been wise, wouldhave saved him; and conquering, as it is impossiblethat he should not do with your assistance, he re-mains at your discretion. And here it is to be notedthat a prince ought to take care never to make an al-liance with one more powerful than himself for thepurposes of attacking others, unless necessity com-pels him, as is said above; because if he conquersyou are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoidas much as possible being at the discretion of anyone. The Venetians joined with France against theDuke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused theirruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannotbe avoided, as happened to the Florentines when thePope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, thenin such a case, for the above reasons, the prince oughtto favour one of the parties.

Never let any Government imagine that it canchoose perfectly safe courses; rather let it expect tohave to take very doubtful ones, because it is foundin ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid onetrouble without running into another; but prudenceconsists in knowing how to distinguish the characterof troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil.

161

CHAPTER XXI

A prince ought also to show himself a patron of abil-ity, and to honour the proficient in every art. At thesame time he should encourage his citizens to prac-tise their callings peaceably, both in commerce andagriculture, and in every other following, so that theone should not be deterred from improving his pos-sessions for fear lest they be taken away from him oranother from opening up trade for fear of taxes; butthe prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishesto do these things and designs in any way to honourhis city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festi-vals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year;and as every city is divided into guilds or into soci-eties,41 he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, andassociate with them sometimes, and show himself anexample of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, al-

41“Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio:“Arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporation town.” The guilds ofFlorence are most admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject(Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called “artel,” exist in Russiato-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during theworking season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are artels of a much morecomplex kind– permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily responsible forthe acts of the individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent similarity, has,Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars” or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb“rotisya,” to bind oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of“rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the underlying idea is thatof a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” were possibly gentile groups, united by commondescent, and included individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or “clans”would be most appropriate.

162

CHAPTER XXI

ways maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this hemust never consent to abate in anything.

163

CHAPTER XXII

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OFPRINCES

THE choice of servants is of no little importance toa prince, and they are good or not according to

the discrimination of the prince. And the first opinionwhich one forms of a prince, and of his understand-ing, is by observing the men he has around him; andwhen they are capable and faithful he may always beconsidered wise, because he has known how to recog-nize the capable and to keep them faithful. But whenthey are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion ofhim, for the prime error which he made was in choos-ing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Ve-nafro as the servant of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince ofSiena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be a veryclever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because

CHAPTER XXII

there are three classes of intellects: one which compre-hends by itself; another which appreciates what oth-ers comprehended; and a third which neither compre-hends by itself nor by the showing of others; the firstis the most excellent, the second is good, the third isuseless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pan-dolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the second,for whenever one has judgment to know good andbad when it is said and done, although he himselfmay not have the initiative, yet he can recognize thegood and the bad in his servant, and the one he canpraise and the other correct; thus the servant cannothope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his ser-vant there is one test which never fails; when you seethe servant thinking more of his own interests thanof yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in ev-erything, such a man will never make a good servant,nor will you ever be able to trust him; because he whohas the state of another in his hands ought never tothink of himself, but always of his prince, and neverpay any attention to matters in which the prince is notconcerned.

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest theprince ought to study him, honouring him, enrich-

165

CHAPTER XXII

ing him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him thehonours and cares; and at the same time let him seethat he cannot stand alone, so that many honoursmay not make him desire more, many riches makehim wish for more, and that many cares may makehim dread chances. When, therefore, servants, andprinces towards servants, are thus disposed, they cantrust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end willalways be disastrous for either one or the other.

166

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I do not wish to leave out an important branch of thissubject, for it is a danger from which princes are

with difficulty preserved, unless they are very carefuland discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whomcourts are full, because men are so self-complacent intheir own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them,that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest,and if they wish to defend themselves they run thedanger of falling into contempt. Because there is noother way of guarding oneself from flatterers exceptletting men understand that to tell you the truth doesnot offend you; but when every one may tell you thetruth, respect for you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third courseby choosing the wise men in his state, and giving tothem only the liberty of speaking the truth to him,

CHAPTER XXIII

and then only of those things of which he inquires,and of none others; but he ought to question themupon everything, and listen to their opinions, and af-terwards form his own conclusions. With these coun-cillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carryhimself in such a way that each of them should knowthat, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shallbe preferred; outside of these, he should listen to noone, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast inhis resolutions. He who does otherwise is either over-thrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varyingopinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern exam-ple. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian,42 thepresent emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: Heconsulted with no one, yet never got his own way inanything. This arose because of his following a prac-tice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is asecretive man–he does not communicate his designsto any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. Butas in carrying them into effect they become revealedand known, they are at once obstructed by those menwhom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is di-verted from them. Hence it follows that those things

42Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. He married,first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus becameinvolved in Italian politics.

168

CHAPTER XXIII

he does one day he undoes the next, and no one everunderstands what he wishes or intends to do, and noone can rely on his resolutions.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel,but only when he wishes and not when others wish;he ought rather to discourage every one from offeringadvice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to bea constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listenerconcerning the things of which he inquired; also, onlearning that any one, on any consideration, has nottold him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that a princewho conveys an impression of his wisdom is not sothrough his own ability, but through the good advis-ers that he has around him, beyond doubt they aredeceived, because this is an axiom which never fails:that a prince who is not wise himself will never takegood advice, unless by chance he has yielded his af-fairs entirely to one person who happens to be a veryprudent man. In this case indeed he may be well gov-erned, but it would not be for long, because such agovernor would in a short time take away his statefrom him.

But if a prince who is not inexperienced should takecounsel from more than one he will never get united

169

CHAPTER XXIII

counsels, nor will he know how to unite them. Eachof the counsellors will think of his own interests, andthe prince will not know how to control them or tosee through them. And they are not to found other-wise, because men will always prove untrue to youunless they are kept honest by constraint. Thereforeit must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoeverthey come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, andnot the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.

170

CHAPTER XXIV

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOSTTHEIR STATES

THE previous suggestions, carefully observed, willenable a new prince to appear well established,

and render him at once more secure and fixed in thestate than if he had been long seated there. For theactions of a new prince are more narrowly observedthan those of an hereditary one, and when they areseen to be able they gain more men and bind fartighter than ancient blood; because men are attractedmore by the present than by the past, and when theyfind the present good they enjoy it and seek no fur-ther; they will also make the utmost defence of aprince if he fails them not in other things. Thus itwill be a double glory for him to have establisheda new principality, and adorned and strengthened itwith good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a

CHAPTER XXIV

good example; so will it be a double disgrace to himwho, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wis-dom.

And if those seigniors are considered who have losttheir states in Italy in our times, such as the King ofNaples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will befound in them, firstly, one common defect in regardto arms from the causes which have been discussedat length; in the next place, some one of them will beseen, either to have had the people hostile, or if hehas had the people friendly, he has not known howto secure the nobles. In the absence of these defectsstates that have power enough to keep an army in thefield cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander theGreat, but he who was conquered by Titus Quintius,had not much territory compared to the greatnessof the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yetbeing a warlike man who knew how to attract thepeople and secure the nobles, he sustained the waragainst his enemies for many years, and if in the endhe lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless heretained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune forthe loss of their principalities after so many years’

172

CHAPTER XXIV

possession, but rather their own sloth, because inquiet times they never thought there could be achange (it is a common defect in man not to make anyprovision in the calm against the tempest), and whenafterwards the bad times came they thought of flightand not of defending themselves, and they hoped thatthe people, disgusted with the insolence of the con-querors, would recall them. This course, when oth-ers fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have ne-glected all other expedients for that, since you wouldnever wish to fall because you trusted to be able tofind someone later on to restore you. This again ei-ther does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be foryour security, because that deliverance is of no availwhich does not depend upon yourself; those only arereliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourselfand your valour.

173

CHAPTER XXV

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMANAFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

IT is not unknown to me how many men have had,and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the

world are in such wise governed by fortune and byGod that men with their wisdom cannot direct themand that no one can even help them; and because ofthis they would have us believe that it is not nec-essary to labour much in affairs, but to let chancegovern them. This opinion has been more creditedin our times because of the great changes in affairswhich have been seen, and may still be seen, everyday, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pon-dering over this, I am in some degree inclined to theiropinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will,I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-

CHAPTER XXV

half of our actions,43 but that she still leaves us to di-rect the other half, or perhaps a little less.

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, whichwhen in flood overflows the plains, sweeping awaytrees and buildings, bearing away the soil from placeto place; everything flies before it, all yield to its vio-lence, without being able in any way to withstand it;and yet, though its nature be such, it does not followtherefore that men, when the weather becomes fair,shall not make provision, both with defences and bar-riers, in such a manner that, rising again, the watersmay pass away by canal, and their force be neither sounrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens withfortune, who shows her power where valour has notprepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forceswhere she knows that barriers and defences have notbeen raised to constrain her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat ofthese changes, and which has given to them their im-pulse, you will see it to be an open country withoutbarriers and without any defence. For if it had beendefended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain,and France, either this invasion would not have made

43Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the more convinced onebecomes that his Majesty King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this miserableuniverse.” Sorel’s “Eastern Question.”

175

CHAPTER XXV

the great changes it has made or it would not havecome at all. And this I consider enough to say con-cerning resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I saythat a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of dispo-sition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly fromcauses that have already been discussed at length,namely, that the prince who relies entirely on fortuneis lost when it changes. I believe also that he willbe successful who directs his actions according to thespirit of the times, and that he whose actions do notaccord with the times will not be successful. Becausemen are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which ev-ery man has before him, namely, glory and riches, toget there by various methods; one with caution, an-other with haste; one by force, another by skill; one bypatience, another by its opposite; and each one suc-ceeds in reaching the goal by a different method. Onecan also see of two cautious men the one attain hisend, the other fail; and similarly, two men by differentobservances are equally successful, the one being cau-tious, the other impetuous; all this arises from noth-ing else than whether or not they conform in theirmethods to the spirit of the times. This follows fromwhat I have said, that two men working differently

176

CHAPTER XXV

bring about the same effect, and of two working sim-ilarly, one attains his object and the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to onewho governs himself with caution and patience, timesand affairs converge in such a way that his adminis-tration is successful, his fortune is made; but if timesand affairs change, he is ruined if he does not changehis course of action. But a man is not often found suf-ficiently circumspect to know how to accommodatehimself to the change, both because he cannot devi-ate from what nature inclines him to do, and also be-cause, having always prospered by acting in one way,he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and,therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turnadventurous, does not know how to do it, hence heis ruined; but had he changed his conduct with thetimes fortune would not have changed.

Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously inall his affairs, and found the times and circumstancesconform so well to that line of action that he alwaysmet with success. Consider his first enterprise againstBologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive.The Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was theKing of Spain, and he had the enterprise still underdiscussion with the King of France; nevertheless he

177

CHAPTER XXV

personally entered upon the expedition with his ac-customed boldness and energy, a move which madeSpain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive,the latter from fear, the former from desire to recoverthe kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drewafter him the King of France, because that king, hav-ing observed the movement, and desiring to make thePope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, foundit impossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with hisimpetuous action accomplished what no other pontiffwith simple human wisdom could have done; for ifhe had waited in Rome until he could get away, withhis plans arranged and everything fixed, as any otherpontiff would have done, he would never have suc-ceeded. Because the King of France would have madea thousand excuses, and the others would have raiseda thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were allalike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of hislife did not let him experience the contrary; but ifcircumstances had arisen which required him to gocautiously, his ruin would have followed, because hewould never have deviated from those ways to whichnature inclined him.

I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful

178

CHAPTER XXV

and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as thetwo are in agreement men are successful, but unsuc-cessful when they fall out. For my part I consider thatit is better to be adventurous than cautious, becausefortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her un-der it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it isseen that she allows herself to be mastered by the ad-venturous rather than by those who go to work morecoldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a loverof young men, because they are less cautious, moreviolent, and with more audacity command her.

179

CHAPTER XXVI

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALYFROM THE BARBARIANS

HAVING carefully considered the subject of theabove discourses, and wondering within myself

whether the present times were propitious to a newprince, and whether there were elements that wouldgive an opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to in-troduce a new order of things which would do hon-our to him and good to the people of this country, itappears to me that so many things concur to favour anew prince that I never knew a time more fit than thepresent.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the peopleof Israel should be captive so as to make manifestthe ability of Moses; that the Persians should be op-pressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatnessof the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should

CHAPTER XXVI

be dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus:then at the present time, in order to discover thevirtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italyshould be reduced to the extremity that she is nowin, that she should be more enslaved than the He-brews, more oppressed than the Persians, more scat-tered than the Athenians; without head, without or-der, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have en-dured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shownby one, which made us think he was ordained by Godfor our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwardsseen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejectedhim; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for himwho shall yet heal her wounds and put an end to theravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the swin-dling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, andcleanse those sores that for long have festered. It isseen how she entreats God to send someone who shalldeliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolen-cies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing tofollow a banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom shecan place more hope than in your illustrious house,44

44Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano waselected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.

181

CHAPTER XXVI

with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and bythe Church of which it is now the chief, and whichcould be made the head of this redemption. This willnot be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actionsand lives of the men I have named. And althoughthey were great and wonderful men, yet they weremen, and each one of them had no more opportunitythan the present offers, for their enterprises were nei-ther more just nor easier than this, nor was God moretheir friend than He is yours.

With us there is great justice, because that war is justwhich is necessary, and arms are hallowed when thereis no other hope but in them. Here there is the great-est willingness, and where the willingness is greatthe difficulties cannot be great if you will only fol-low those men to whom I have directed your atten-tion. Further than this, how extraordinarily the waysof God have been manifested beyond example: thesea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock haspoured forth water, it has rained manna, everythinghas contributed to your greatness; you ought to dothe rest. God is not willing to do everything, and thustake away our free will and that share of glory whichbelongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-

182

CHAPTER XXVI

named Italians have been able to accomplish all thatis expected from your illustrious house; and if in somany revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns,it has always appeared as if military virtue were ex-hausted, this has happened because the old order ofthings was not good, and none of us have known howto find a new one. And nothing honours a man morethan to establish new laws and new ordinances whenhe himself was newly risen. Such things when theyare well founded and dignified will make him reveredand admired, and in Italy there are not wanting op-portunities to bring such into use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst itfails in the head. Look attentively at the duels andthe hand-to-hand combats, how superior the Italiansare in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when itcomes to armies they do not bear comparison, andthis springs entirely from the insufficiency of the lead-ers, since those who are capable are not obedient,and each one seems to himself to know, there havingnever been any one so distinguished above the rest,either by valour or fortune, that others would yieldto him. Hence it is that for so long a time, and dur-ing so much fighting in the past twenty years, when-ever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has al-ways given a poor account of itself; the first witness to

183

CHAPTER XXVI

this is Il Taro, afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa,Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.45

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to fol-low these remarkable men who have redeemed theircountry, it is necessary before all things, as a truefoundation for every enterprise, to be provided withyour own forces, because there can be no more faith-ful, truer, or better soldiers. And although singly theyare good, altogether they will be much better whenthey find themselves commanded by their prince,honoured by him, and maintained at his expense.Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with sucharms, so that you can be defended against foreignersby Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may beconsidered very formidable, nevertheless there is adefect in both, by reason of which a third order wouldnot only be able to oppose them, but might be re-lied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards can-not resist cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of in-fantry whenever they encounter them in close com-bat. Owing to this, as has been and may again beseen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry,and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish infantry.

45The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509;Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.

184

CHAPTER XXVI

And although a complete proof of this latter cannotbe shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of itat the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantrywere confronted by German battalions, who followthe same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, byagility of body and with the aid of their shields, gotin under the pikes of the Germans and stood out ofdanger, able to attack, while the Germans stood help-less, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all wouldhave been over with them. It is possible, therefore,knowing the defects of both these infantries, to inventa new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraidof infantry; this need not create a new order of arms,but a variation upon the old. And these are the kindof improvements which confer reputation and powerupon a new prince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowedto pass for letting Italy at last see her liberator appear.Nor can one express the love with which he would bereceived in all those provinces which have suffered somuch from these foreign scourings, with what thirstfor revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what de-votion, with what tears. What door would be closedto him? Who would refuse obedience to him? Whatenvy would hinder him? What Italian would refusehim homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion

185

CHAPTER XXVI

stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take upthis charge with that courage and hope with which alljust enterprises are undertaken, so that under its stan-dard our native country may be ennobled, and underits auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:

Virtu contro al Furore Prendera l’arme, e fia il com-batter corto: Che l’antico valore Negli italici cuor none ancor morto.

Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, And it i’th’ combat soon shall put to flight: For the old Romanvalour is not dead, Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extin-guished.

Edward Dacre, 1640.

186

APPENDIX

DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTEDBY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN

MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI,OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNORPAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA

ORSINI

BYNICOLO MACHIAVELLI

The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy,where he had been to clear himself with the Kingof France from the calumnies which had been raisedagainst him by the Florentines concerning the rebel-lion of Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana,and had arrived at Imola, whence he intended withhis army to enter upon the campaign against Gio-vanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he in-

APPENDIX

tended to bring that city under his domination, andto make it the head of his Romagnian duchy.

These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelliand Orsini and their following, it appeared to themthat the duke would become too powerful, and itwas feared that, having seized Bologna, he wouldseek to destroy them in order that he might becomesupreme in Italy. Upon this a meeting was calledat Magione in the district of Perugia, to which camethe cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, GianpagoloBaglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonioda Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince ofSiena. Here were discussed the power and courage ofthe duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions,which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of be-ing ruined. And they decided not to abandon theBentivogli, but to strive to win over the Florentines;and they send their men to one place and another,promising to one party assistance and to another en-couragement to unite with them against the commonenemy. This meeting was at once reported through-out all Italy, and those who were discontented underthe duke, among whom were the people of Urbino,took hope of effecting a revolution.

188

APPENDIX

Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unset-tled, it was decided by certain men of Urbino to seizethe fortress of San Leo, which was held for the duke,and which they captured by the following means. Thecastellan was fortifying the rock and causing timberto be taken there; so the conspirators watched, andwhen certain beams which were being carried to therock were upon the bridge, so that it was preventedfrom being drawn up by those inside, they took theopportunity of leaping upon the bridge and thenceinto the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, thewhole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, beingencouraged in this, not so much by the capture of thefort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they ex-pected to get assistance.

Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thoughtthey would not lose the opportunity, and at once as-sembled their men so as to take any town, should anyremain in the hands of the duke in that state; and theysent again to Florence to beg that republic to join withthem in destroying the common firebrand, showingthat the risk was lessened and that they ought not towait for another opportunity.

But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry rea-sons, of the Vitelli and Orsini, not only would not ally

189

APPENDIX

themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli, their secre-tary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke againsthis enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola,because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiershad at once gone over to the enemy and he foundhimself disarmed and war at his door. But recoveringcourage from the offers of the Florentines, he decidedto temporize before fighting with the few soldiers thatremained to him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation,and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained intwo ways, by sending to the King of France for menand by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom heturned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.

Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near tohim, and approached Fossombrone, where they en-countered some men of the duke and, with the aid ofthe Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this hap-pened, the duke resolved at once to see if he couldnot close the trouble with offers of reconciliation, andbeing a most perfect dissembler he did not fail inany practices to make the insurgents understand thathe wished every man who had acquired anything tokeep it, as it was enough for him to have the title ofprince, whilst others might have the principality.

And the duke succeeded so well in this that they

190

APPENDIX

sent Signor Pagolo to him to negotiate for a reconcili-ation, and they brought their army to a standstill. Butthe duke did not stop his preparations, and took ev-ery care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry,and that such preparations might not be apparent tothe others, he sent his troops in separate parties toevery part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile therecame also to him five hundred French lancers, andalthough he found himself sufficiently strong to takevengeance on his enemies in open war, he consideredthat it would be safer and more advantageous to out-wit them, and for this reason he did not stop the workof reconciliation.

And that this might be effected the duke concludeda peace with them in which he confirmed their for-mer covenants; he gave them four thousand ducatsat once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; andhe formed an alliance with Giovanni; and moreoverhe would not force them to come personally into hispresence unless it pleased them to do so. On the otherhand, they promised to restore to him the duchy ofUrbino and other places seized by them, to serve himin all his expeditions, and not to make war against orally themselves with any one without his permission.

This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo,

191

APPENDIX

the Duke of Urbino, again fled to Venice, havingfirst destroyed all the fortresses in his state; because,trusting in the people, he did not wish that thefortresses, which he did not think he could defend,should be held by the enemy, since by these meansa check would be kept upon his friends. But theDuke Valentino, having completed this convention,and dispersed his men throughout the Romagna, setout for Imola at the end of November together withhis French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena,where he stayed some time to negotiate with the en-voys of the Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembledwith their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the en-terprise in which they should now take part; but noth-ing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent topropose that if the duke wished to undertake an ex-pedition against Tuscany they were ready; if he didnot wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To thisthe duke replied that he did not wish to enter into warwith Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Floren-tines, but that he was very willing to proceed againstSinigalia.

It happened that not long afterwards the town sur-rendered, but the fortress would not yield to them be-cause the castellan would not give it up to any onebut the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him

192

APPENDIX

to come there. This appeared a good opportunityto the duke, as, being invited by them, and not go-ing of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions.And the more to reassure them, he allowed all theFrench men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardyto depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons.di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena aboutthe middle of December, and went to Fano, and withthe utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded theVitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, point-ing out to them that any lack of compliance wouldcast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency ofthe reconciliation, and that he was a man who wishedto make use of the arms and councils of his friends.But Vitellozzo remained very stubborn, for the deathof his brother warned him that he should not offenda prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, per-suaded by Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had cor-rupted with gifts and promises, he agreed to wait.

Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano,which was to be on 30th December 1502, communi-cated his designs to eight of his most trusted follow-ers, among whom were Don Michele and the Mon-signor d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and heordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, theDuke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his

193

APPENDIX

followers in pairs should take them one by one, en-trusting certain men to certain pairs, who should en-tertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor shouldthey be permitted to leave until they came to theduke’s quarters, where they should be seized.

The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen andinfantry, of which there were more than two thou-sand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assembleby daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distantfrom Fano, and await him there. He found himself,therefore, on the last day of December at the Metaurowith his men, and having sent a cavalcade of abouttwo hundred horsemen before him, he then movedforward the infantry, whom he accompanied with therest of the men-at-arms.

Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situateon the shore of the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distantfrom each other, so that he who goes towards Sini-galia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases ofwhich are touched by the sea in some places. The cityof Sinigalia is distant from the foot of the mountains alittle more than a bow-shot and from the shore abouta mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a littleriver which bathes that part of the walls looking to-wards Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws

194

APPENDIX

near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by road alongthe mountains, and reaches the river which passes bySinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank ofit, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrivesat a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almostabreast of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by astraight line, but transversely. Before this gate therestands a collection of houses with a square to whichthe bank of the river forms one side.

The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to waitfor the duke, and to honour him in person, sent awaytheir men to several castles distant from Sinigaliaabout six miles, so that room could be made for themen of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliv-erotto and his band, which consisted of one thousandinfantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, whowere quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Mat-ters having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentinoleft for Sinigalia, and when the leaders of the cavalryreached the bridge they did not pass over, but havingopened it, one portion wheeled towards the river andthe other towards the country, and a way was left inthe middle through which the infantry passed, with-out stopping, into the town.

Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on

195

APPENDIX

mules, accompanied by a few horsemen, went to-wards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing acape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as ifconscious of his approaching death–a circumstancewhich, in view of the ability of the man and his for-mer fortune, caused some amazement. And it is saidthat when he parted from his men before setting outfor Sinigalia to meet the duke he acted as if it werehis last parting from them. He recommended hishouse and its fortunes to his captains, and advisedhis nephews that it was not the fortune of their house,but the virtues of their fathers that should be kept inmind. These three, therefore, came before the dukeand saluted him respectfully, and were received byhim with goodwill; they were at once placed betweenthose who were commissioned to look after them.

But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had re-mained with his band in Sinigalia, was missing–forOliverotto was waiting in the square before his quar-ters near the river, keeping his men in order anddrilling them–signalled with his eye to Don Michelle,to whom the care of Oliverotto had been commit-ted, that he should take measures that Oliverottoshould not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode offand joined Oliverotto, telling him that it was not rightto keep his men out of their quarters, because these

196

APPENDIX

might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he ad-vised him to send them at once to their quarters andto come himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto,having taken this advice, came before the duke, who,when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, hav-ing made his obeisance, joined the others.

So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismountedat the duke’s quarters, and went with him into a se-cret chamber, where the duke made them prisoners;he then mounted on horseback, and issued ordersthat the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should bestripped of their arms. Those of Oliverotto, being athand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini andVitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentimentof the destruction of their masters, had time to pre-pare themselves, and bearing in mind the valour anddiscipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses, theystood together against the hostile forces of the coun-try and saved themselves.

But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with hav-ing pillaged the men of Oliverotto, began to sack Sini-galia, and if the duke had not repressed this outrageby killing some of them they would have completelysacked it. Night having come and the tumult being si-lenced, the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliv-

197

APPENDIX

erotto; he led them into a room and caused them tobe strangled. Neither of them used words in keepingwith their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he mightask of the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverottocringed and laid the blame for all injuries against theduke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Grav-ina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard fromRome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino,the Archbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo daSanta Croce. After which news, on 18th January 1502,in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in thesame way.

THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OFLUCCA

WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLIAnd sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI

And LUIGI ALAMANNICASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328

It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderfulthing to those who have considered the matter, thatall men, or the larger number of them, who have per-formed great deeds in the world, and excelled all oth-ers in their day, have had their birth and beginningin baseness and obscurity; or have been aggrievedby Fortune in some outrageous way. They have ei-

198

APPENDIX

ther been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or theyhave had so mean a parentage that in shame theyhave given themselves out to be sons of Jove or ofsome other deity. It would be wearisome to relatewho these persons may have been because they arewell known to everybody, and, as such tales wouldnot be particularly edifying to those who read them,they are omitted. I believe that these lowly begin-nings of great men occur because Fortune is desirousof showing to the world that such men owe much toher and little to wisdom, because she begins to showher hand when wisdom can really take no part in theircareer: thus all success must be attributed to her. Cas-truccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men whodid great deeds, if he is measured by the times inwhich he lived and the city in which he was born; but,like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distin-guished in his birth, as the course of this history willshow. It appeared to be desirable to recall his mem-ory, because I have discerned in him such indicationsof valour and fortune as should make him a great ex-emplar to men. I think also that I ought to call yourattention to his actions, because you of all men I knowdelight most in noble deeds.

The family of Castracani was formerly numberedamong the noble families of Lucca, but in the days

199

APPENDIX

of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in estate, asso often happens in this world. To this family wasborn a son Antonio, who became a priest of the or-der of San Michele of Lucca, and for this reason washonoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He hadan only sister, who had been married to BuonaccorsoCenami, but Buonaccorso dying she became a widow,and not wishing to marry again went to live with herbrother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind thehouse where he resided, and as it was bounded onall sides by gardens, any person could have access toit without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sun-rise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer An-tonio was called, had occasion to go into the vine-yard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the din-ner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves ofa vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heardsomething resembling the cry of an infant. Where-upon she went towards it, and saw the hands andface of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leavesand who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partlywondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion,she lifted it up and carried it to the house, where shewashed it and clothed it with clean linen as is cus-tomary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when hereturned home. When he heard what had happened

200

APPENDIX

and saw the child he was not less surprised or com-passionate than his sister. They discussed betweenthemselves what should be done, and seeing that hewas priest and that she had no children, they finallydetermined to bring it up. They had a nurse for it, andit was reared and loved as if it were their own child.They baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruc-cio after their father. As the years passed Castrucciogrew very handsome, and gave evidence of wit anddiscretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond hisyears those lessons which Messer Antonio impartedto him. Messer Antonio intended to make a priest ofhim, and in time would have inducted him into hiscanonry and other benefices, and all his instructionwas given with this object; but Antonio discoveredthat the character of Castruccio was quite unfitted forthe priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached the ageof fourteen he began to take less notice of the chid-ing of Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and nolonger to fear them; he left off reading ecclesiasticalbooks, and turned to playing with arms, delighting innothing so much as in learning their uses, and in run-ning, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In allexercises he far excelled his companions in courageand bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn tobooks, only those pleased him which told of wars and

201

APPENDIX

the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld allthis with vexation and sorrow.

There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of theGuinigi family, named Messer Francesco, whose pro-fession was arms and who in riches, bodily strength,and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had of-ten fought under the command of the Visconti of Mi-lan, and as a Ghibelline was the valued leader of thatparty in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca andwas accustomed to assemble with others most morn-ings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta,which is at the top of the square of San Michele, thefinest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Cas-truccio taking part with other children of the streetin those games of which I have spoken. Noticing thatCastruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he ap-peared to exercise a royal authority over them, andthat they loved and obeyed him, Messer Francescobecame greatly desirous of learning who he was. Be-ing informed of the circumstances of the bringingup of Castruccio he felt a greater desire to have himnear to him. Therefore he called him one day andasked him whether he would more willingly live inthe house of a gentleman, where he would learn toride horses and use arms, or in the house of a priest,where he would learn nothing but masses and the

202

APPENDIX

services of the Church. Messer Francesco could seethat it pleased Castruccio greatly to hear horses andarms spoken of, even though he stood silent, blushingmodestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francescoto speak, he answered that, if his master were agree-able, nothing would please him more than to give uphis priestly studies and take up those of a soldier. Thisreply delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very shorttime he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, whowas driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature ofthe lad, and the fear that he would not be able to holdhim much longer.

Thus Castruccio passed from the house of MesserAntonio the priest to the house of Messer FrancescoGuinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to find thatin a very short time he manifested all that virtue andbearing which we are accustomed to associate with atrue gentleman. In the first place he became an ac-complished horseman, and could manage with easethe most fiery charger, and in all jousts and tourna-ments, although still a youth, he was observed be-yond all others, and he excelled in all exercises ofstrength and dexterity. But what enhanced so muchthe charm of these accomplishments, was the delight-ful modesty which enabled him to avoid offence ineither act or word to others, for he was deferential to

203

APPENDIX

the great men, modest with his equals, and courte-ous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved,not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca.When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, theGhibellines were driven from Pavia by the Guelphs,and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to as-sist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, incharge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof ofhis prudence and courage in this expedition, acquir-ing greater reputation than any other captain, and hisname and fame were known, not only in Pavia, butthroughout all Lombardy.

Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higherestimation that he left it, did not omit to use all themeans in his power to gain as many friends as hecould, neglecting none of those arts which are nec-essary for that purpose. About this time MesserFrancesco died, leaving a son thirteen years of agenamed Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio tobe his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Be-fore he died Francesco called Castruccio to him, andprayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to renderto the son the gratitude which he had not been ableto repay to the father. Upon the death of Francesco,Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo,

204

APPENDIX

which increased enormously his power and position,and created a certain amount of envy against him inLucca in place of the former universal goodwill, formany men suspected him of harbouring tyrannicalintentions. Among these the leading man was Gior-gio degli Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. Thisman hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to be-come the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to himthat Castruccio, with the great abilities which he al-ready showed, and holding the position of governor,deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he beganto sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of hiseminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn,but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that MesserGiorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace withthe deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have himdriven out of Lucca.

The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione ofthe Faggiuola of Arezzo, who being in the first placeelected their captain afterwards became their lord.There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines fromLucca, with whom Castruccio held communicationswith the object of effecting their restoration by thehelp of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into hisplans friends from Lucca who would not endure theauthority of the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to

205

APPENDIX

be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortified the towerof the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitionsof war, in order that it might stand a siege for a fewdays in case of need. When the night came which hadbeen agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occu-pied the plain between the mountains and Pisa withmany men, the signal was given, and without beingobserved Uguccione approached the gate of San Pieroand set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a greatuproar within the city, calling the people to arms andforcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione en-tered with his men, poured through the town, andkilled Messer Giorgio with all his family and many ofhis friends and supporters. The governor was drivenout, and the government reformed according to thewishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, be-cause it was found that more than one hundred fam-ilies were exiled at that time. Of those who fled, partwent to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city wasthe headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this rea-son it became most hostile to Uguccione and the Luc-chese.

As it now appeared to the Florentines and others ofthe Guelph party that the Ghibellines absorbed toomuch power in Tuscany, they determined to restorethe exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large

206

APPENDIX

army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini;from thence they marched to Montecarlo, in order tosecure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this Uguc-cione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, andwith a number of German cavalry which he drew outof Lombardy, he moved against the quarters of theFlorentines, who upon the appearance of the enemywithdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselvesbetween Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione nowtook up a position near to Montecarlo, and withinabout two miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishesbetween the horse of both parties were of daily occur-rence. Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisansand Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the en-emy. Uguccione, finding himself growing worse,went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the commandof the army in the hands of Castruccio. This changebrought about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinkingthat the hostile army having lost its captain had lostits head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observedthis, and allowed some days to pass in order to en-courage this belief; he also showed signs of fear, anddid not allow any of the munitions of the camp to beused. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more in-solent the more they saw these evidences of fear, andevery day they drew out in the order of battle in front

207

APPENDIX

of the army of Castruccio. Presently, deeming that theenemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mas-tered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them.First he spoke a few words of encouragement to hissoldiers, and pointed out to them the certainty of vic-tory if they would but obey his commands. Castruc-cio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his besttroops in the centre of the line of battle, and his lessreliable men on the wings of the army; whereupon hedid exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant menon the flanks, while those on whom he could not sostrongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing thisorder of battle, he drew out of his lines and quicklycame in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, hadcome in their insolence to defy him. He then com-manded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilsthe moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus,when they came into contact with the enemy, only thewings of the two armies became engaged, whilst thecenter battalions remained out of action, for these twoportions of the line of battle were separated from eachother by a long interval and thus unable to reach eachother. By this expedient the more valiant part of Cas-truccio’s men were opposed to the weaker part of theenemy’s troops, and the most efficient men of the en-emy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were

208

APPENDIX

unable to fight with those who were arrayed oppositeto them, or to give any assistance to their own flanks.So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemyto flight on both flanks, and the centre battalions tookto flight when they found themselves exposed to at-tack, without having a chance of displaying their val-our. The defeat was complete, and the loss in menvery heavy, there being more than ten thousand menkilled with many officers and knights of the Guelphparty in Tuscany, and also many princes who hadcome to help them, among whom were Piero, thebrother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, andFilippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castrucciothe loss did not amount to more than three hundredmen, among whom was Francesco, the son of Uguc-cione, who, being young and rash, was killed in thefirst onset.

This victory so greatly increased the reputation ofCastruccio that Uguccione conceived some jealousyand suspicion of him, because it appeared to Uguc-cione that this victory had given him no increase ofpower, but rather than diminished it. Being of thismind, he only waited for an opportunity to give ef-fect to it. This occurred on the death of Pier AgnoloMicheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca,the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruc-

209

APPENDIX

cio for refuge. On the sergeants of the captain goingto arrest the murderer, they were driven off by Cas-truccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair com-ing to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was thanat Pisa, it appeared to him a proper opportunity topunish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri,who was the governor of Lucca, and commissionedhim to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and puthim to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, went to thegovernor in a friendly way, was entertained at sup-per, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing toput him to death lest the people should be incensed,kept him alive, in order to hear further from his fatherconcerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hes-itation and cowardice of his son, and at once set outfrom Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen tofinish the business in his own way; but he had not yetreached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and puthis deputy to death and created Count Gaddo dellaGherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reachedLucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it didnot appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucch-ese with the example of Pisa before them should closetheir gates against him. But the Lucchese, havingheard of what had happened at Pisa, availed them-selves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of

210

APPENDIX

Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had ar-rived in their city. They first began to speak of it inprivate circles, afterwards openly in the squares andstreets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms intheir hands went to Uguccione and demanded thatCastruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearingthat worse might happen, released him from prison.Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends aroundhim, and with the help of the people attacked Uguc-cione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight,rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the lordsof Scale, where he died in poverty.

But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almosta prince in Lucca, and he carried himself so discreetlywith his friends and the people that they appointedhim captain of their army for one year. Having ob-tained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, heplanned the recovery of the many towns which hadrebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and withthe help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded atreaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this placehe constructed a fort against it, which is called to-dayZerezzanello; in the course of two months Castruc-cio captured the town. With the reputation gainedat that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, andLavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole

211

APPENDIX

of Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which leadsfrom Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoliand wrested it from the hands of Messer AnastagioPalavicini, who was the lord of it. After this vic-tory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed by thewhole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it im-prudent any longer to defer making himself a prince,got himself created the lord of Lucca by the help ofPazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, FrancescoBoccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he hadcorrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and de-liberately elected prince by the people. At this timeFrederick of Bavaria, the King of the Romans, cameinto Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and Castruc-cio, in order that he might make friends with him, methim at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruc-cio had left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi,who was held in high estimation, because of the peo-ple’s love for the memory of his father. Castrucciowas received in great honour by Frederick, and manyprivileges were conferred upon him, and he was ap-pointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At thistime the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo dellaGherardesca, whom they had driven out of Pisa, andthey had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Freder-ick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans,

212

APPENDIX

in dread of the Guelph party, and particularly of theFlorentines, were constrained to accept him as theirlord.

Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome towatch his Italian affairs, returned to Germany. All theTuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines, who followedthe imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for helpand counsel, and all promised him the governorshipof his country, if enabled to recover it with his as-sistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi,Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and PieroBuonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines.Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming themaster of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and ofhis own forces; and in order to gain greater weightin affairs, he entered into a league with Messer Mat-teo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized forhim the forces of his city and the country districts.As Lucca had five gates, he divided his own countrydistricts into five parts, which he supplied with arms,and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, sothat he could quickly bring into the field twenty thou-sand soldiers, without those whom he could summonto his assistance from Pisa. While he surrounded him-self with these forces and allies, it happened at MesserMatteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Pia-

213

APPENDIX

cenza, who had driven out the Ghibellines with theassistance of a Florentine army and the King Ruberto.Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade theFlorentines in their own territories, so that, being at-tacked at home, they should be compelled to drawtheir army out of Lombardy in order to defend them-selves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seizedFucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense dam-age upon the country. Whereupon the Florentinesrecalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tus-cany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessitiesto return to Lucca.

There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio fam-ily, who were so powerful that they could not onlyelevate Castruccio, but even advance him to the dig-nity of prince; and it appearing to them they hadnot received such rewards for their services as theydeserved, they incited other families to rebel and todrive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found their op-portunity one morning, and arming themselves, theyset upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left tomaintain order and killed him. They endeavouredto raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio,a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in therebellion, intervened and compelled them by his au-thority to lay down their arms; and he offered to be

214

APPENDIX

their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from himwhat they desired. Therefore they laid down theirarms with no greater intelligence than they had takenthem up. Castruccio, having heard the news of whathad happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi incommand of the army, and with a troop of cavalry setout for home. Contrary to his expectations, he foundthe rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in themost advantageous places throughout the city. As itappeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be verymuch obliged to him, he sought him out, and withoutsaying anything on his own behalf, for he did not rec-ognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccioto pardon the other members of his family by reasonof their youth, their former friendships, and the obli-gations which Castruccio was under to their house.To this Castruccio graciously responded, and beggedStefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave himmore pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it hadever caused him anxiety to hear of its inception. Heencouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, say-ing that he thanked God for having given him theopportunity of showing his clemency and liberality.Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio they sur-rendered, and with Stefano were immediately throwninto prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Flo-

215

APPENDIX

rentines had recovered San Miniato, whereupon itseemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as itdid not appear to him that he was sufficiently secureat Lucca to leave him. He approached the Florentineswith the proposal of a truce, which they readily enter-tained, for they were weary of the war, and desirousof getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was con-cluded with them for two years, by which both par-ties agreed to keep the conquests they had made. Cas-truccio thus released from this trouble, turned his at-tention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he shouldnot again be subject to the perils from which he hadjust escaped, he, under various pretences and reasons,first wiped out all those who by their ambition mightaspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, butdepriving them of country and property, and thosewhom he had in his hands of life also, stating thathe had found by experience that none of them wereto be trusted. Then for his further security he raised afortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of thosewhom he had killed or hunted out of the state.

Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines,and strengthened his position in Lucca, he neglectedno opportunity, short of open war, of increasing hisimportance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if hecould get possession of Pistoia, he would have one

216

APPENDIX

foot in Florence, which was his great desire. He,therefore, in various ways made friends with themountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia thatboth parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoiawas divided, as it always had been, into the Bianchiand Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bas-tiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia.Each of these men held secret communications withCastruccio, and each desired to drive the other outof the city; and, after many threatenings, they cameto blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the Florentinegate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city;both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Floren-tines, because they believed that Castruccio was farmore ready and willing to fight than the Florentines,and they both sent to him for assistance. He gavepromises to both, saying to Bastiano that he wouldcome in person, and to Jacopo that he would send hispupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the appointed time he sentforward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself di-rect to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outsidethe city, and both were admitted as friends. Thus thetwo leaders entered, and at a signal given by Castruc-cio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastianodi Possente, and both took prisoners or killed thepartisans of either faction. Without further opposi-

217

APPENDIX

tion Pistoia passed into the hands of Castruccio, who,having forced the Signoria to leave the palace, com-pelled the people to yield obedience to him, makingthem many promises and remitting their old debts.The countryside flocked to the city to see the newprince, and all were filled with hope and quickly set-tled down, influenced in a great measure by his greatvalour.

About this time great disturbances arose in Rome,owing to the dearness of living which was causedby the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The Ger-man governor, Enrico, was much blamed for whathappened–murders and tumults following each otherdaily, without his being able to put an end to them.This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romansshould call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, whowould drive the Germans out of the city, and bringback the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whomhe could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent tohim, begging him not only to give him assistance, butalso to come in person to Rome. Castruccio consid-ered that he ought not to hesitate to render the em-peror this service, because he believed that he him-self would not be safe if at any time the emperorceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in com-mand at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six

218

APPENDIX

hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enricowith the greatest distinction. In a short time the pres-ence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the em-peror that, without bloodshed or violence, good orderwas restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio havingsent by sea from the country round Pisa large quanti-ties of corn, and thus removed the source of the trou-ble. When he had chastised some of the Roman lead-ers, and admonished others, voluntary obedience wasrendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many hon-ours, and was made a Roman senator. This dignitywas assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio be-ing clothed in a brocaded toga, which had the follow-ing words embroidered on its front: “I am what Godwills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desiresshall be.”

During this time the Florentines, who were muchenraged that Castruccio should have seized Pistoiaduring the truce, considered how they could temptthe city to rebel, to do which they thought wouldnot be difficult in his absence. Among the exiledPistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi and JacopoBaldini, both men of leading and ready to face dan-ger. These men kept up communications with theirfriends in Pistoia, and with the aid of the Florentinesentered the city by night, and after driving out some

219

APPENDIX

of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and killing oth-ers, they restored the city to its freedom. The news ofthis greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave ofEnrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. Whenthe Florentines heard of his return, knowing that hewould lose no time, they decided to intercept himwith their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the be-lief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pis-toia. Assembling a great army of the supporters of theGuelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian ter-ritories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Mon-tecarlo with his army; and having heard where theFlorentines’ lay, he decided not to encounter it in theplains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pes-cia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldlyin the Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he suc-ceeded in this design, victory was assured, althoughhe was informed that the Florentines had thirty thou-sand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Al-though he had every confidence in his own abilitiesand the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to at-tack his enemy in the open lest he should be over-whelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle betweenPescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks theVal di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a bow-shot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and

220

APPENDIX

steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is stillnarrow, especially at the summit where the waters di-vide, so that twenty men side by side could hold it.The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who,before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been al-lowed to remain in possession of the castle, it beingcommon to the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and un-claimed by either–neither of them wishing to displaceManfred as long as he kept his promise of neutral-ity, and came under obligations to no one. For thesereasons, and also because the castle was well forti-fied, he had always been able to maintain his posi-tion. It was here that Castruccio had determined tofall upon his enemy, for here his few men would havethe advantage, and there was no fear lest, seeing thelarge masses of the hostile force before they becameengaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trou-ble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immenseadvantage which possession of this castle would givehim, and having an intimate friendship with a resi-dent in the castle, he managed matters so with himthat four hundred of his men were to be admitted intothe castle the night before the attack on the Floren-tines, and the castellan put to death.

Castruccio, having prepared everything, had nowto encourage the Florentines to persist in their desire

221

APPENDIX

to carry the seat of war away from Pistoia into theVal di Nievole, therefore he did not move his armyfrom Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on un-til they reached their encampment under Serravalle,intending to cross the hill on the following morning.In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle atnight, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, andmarching from thence at midnight in dead silence,had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and theFlorentines commenced the ascent of the hill at thesame time in the morning. Castruccio sent forwardhis infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hun-dred horsemen by a path on the left towards the cas-tle. The Florentines sent forward four hundred cav-alry ahead of their army which was following, neverexpecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill,nor were they aware of his having seized the cas-tle. Thus it happened that the Florentine horsemenmounting the hill were completely taken by surprisewhen they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, andso close were they upon it they had scarcely time topull down their visors. It was a case of unready sol-diers being attacked by ready, and they were assailedwith such vigour that with difficulty they could holdtheir own, although some few of them got through.When the noise of the fighting reached the Floren-

222

APPENDIX

tine camp below, it was filled with confusion. Thecavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: thecaptains were unable to get their men either back-ward or forward, owing to the narrowness of the pass,and amid all this tumult no one knew what oughtto be done or what could be done. In a short timethe cavalry who were engaged with the enemy’s in-fantry were scattered or killed without having madeany effective defence because of their unfortunate po-sition, although in sheer desperation they had offereda stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, withthe mountains on both flanks, whilst in front weretheir enemies, and in the rear their friends. WhenCastruccio saw that his men were unable to strike adecisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight,he sent one thousand infantrymen round by the cas-tle, with orders to join the four hundred horsemenhe had previously dispatched there, and commandedthe whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy.These orders they carried out with such fury thatthe Florentines could not sustain the attack, but gaveway, and were soon in full retreat–conquered moreby their unfortunate position than by the valour oftheir enemy. Those in the rear turned towards Pis-toia, and spread through the plains, each man seek-ing only his own safety. The defeat was complete and

223

APPENDIX

very sanguinary. Many captains were taken prison-ers, among whom were Bandini dei Rossi, FrancescoBrunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentinenoblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans whofought on the Florentine side, having been sent byKing Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediatelythe Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out thefriends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruc-cio. He was not content with occupying Prato andall the castles on the plains on both sides of the Arno,but marched his army into the plain of Peretola, abouttwo miles from Florence. Here he remained manydays, dividing the spoils, and celebrating his victorywith feasts and games, holding horse races, and footraces for men and women. He also struck medals incommemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. Heendeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of Flo-rence, who were to open the city gates at night; but theconspiracy was discovered, and the participators init taken and beheaded, among whom were TommasoLupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeatcaused the Florentines great anxiety, and despairingof preserving their liberty, they sent envoys to KingRuberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of theircity; and he, knowing of what immense importancethe maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him, ac-

224

APPENDIX

cepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to receivefrom them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousandflorins, and he send his son Carlo to Florence withfour thousand horsemen.

Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved insome degree of the pressure of Castruccio’s army, ow-ing to his being compelled to leave his positions be-fore Florence and march on Pisa, in order to sup-press a conspiracy that had been raised against himby Benedetto Lanfranchi, one of the first men in Pisa,who could not endure that his fatherland should beunder the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formedthis conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill thepartisans of Castruccio, and drive out the garrison.As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers isessential to secrecy, so for its execution a few arenot sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to hisconspiracy Lanfranchi encountered a person who re-vealed the design to Castruccio. This betrayal can-not be passed by without severe reproach to BonifacioCerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles whowere suffering their banishment in Pisa. ThereuponCastruccio seized Benedetto and put him to death,and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drovetheir families into exile. It now appeared to Castruc-cio that both Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaf-

225

APPENDIX

fected; he employed much thought and energy uponsecuring his position there, and this gave the Floren-tines their opportunity to reorganize their army, andto await the coming of Carlo, the son of the King ofNaples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose nomore time, and assembled a great army of more thanthirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry–having called to their aid every Guelph there was inItaly. They consulted whether they should attack Pis-toia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be betterto march on the latter–a course, owing to the recentconspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more ad-vantage to them, because they believed that the sur-render of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.

In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines putin motion this army and quickly occupied Lastra,Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from thenceon to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of theenormous army which the Florentines were sendingagainst him, he was in no degree alarmed, believingthat the time had now arrived when Fortune woulddeliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for hehad no reason to think that his enemy would make abetter fight, or had better prospects of success, thanat Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousandfoot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with

226

APPENDIX

this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent PagoloGuinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucec-chio has a stronger position than any other townin the Pisan district, owing to its situation betweenthe rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevationabove the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemycould not hinder its being victualled unless they di-vided their forces, nor could they approach it eitherfrom the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they getthrough to Pisa, or attack Castruccio’s forces exceptat a disadvantage. In one case they would find them-selves placed between his two armies, the one underhis own command and the other under Pagolo, andin the other case they would have to cross the Arno toget to close quarters with the enemy, an undertakingof great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines totake this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his menfrom the banks of the river and placed them underthe walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of landbetween them and the river.

The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, helda council of war to decide whether they should attackPisa or the army of Castruccio, and, having weighedthe difficulties of both courses, they decided upon thelatter. The river Arno was at that time low enough tobe fordable, yet the water reached to the shoulders of

227

APPENDIX

the infantrymen and to the saddles of the horsemen.On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines com-menced the battle by ordering forward a number ofcavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whoseplan of action was fixed, and who well knew what todo, at once attacked the Florentines with five thou-sand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not al-lowing them to issue from the river before he chargedthem; he also sent one thousand light infantry up theriver bank, and the same number down the Arno. Theinfantry of the Florentines were so much impeded bytheir arms and the water that they were not able tomount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry hadmade the passage of the river more difficult for theothers, by reason of the few who had crossed havingbroken up the bed of the river, and this being deepwith mud, many of the horses rolled over with theirriders and many of them had stuck so fast that theycould not move. When the Florentine captains sawthe difficulties their men were meeting, they with-drew them and moved higher up the river, hopingto find the river bed less treacherous and the banksmore adapted for landing. These men were met atthe bank by the forces which Castruccio had alreadysent forward, who, being light armed with bucklersand javelins in their hands, let fly with tremendous

228

APPENDIX

shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. Thehorses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, wouldnot move forward, and trampled each other in greatconfusion. The fight between the men of Castruccioand those of the enemy who succeeded in crossingwas sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the ut-most desperation and neither would yield. The sol-diers of Castruccio fought to drive the others backinto the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get afooting on land in order to make room for the otherspressing forward, who if they could but get out of thewater would be able to fight, and in this obstinate con-flict they were urged on by their captains. Castruc-cio shouted to his men that these were the same ene-mies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle,whilst the Florentines reproached each other that themany should be overcome by the few. At length Cas-truccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, andthat both his men and the enemy were utterly ex-hausted, and that both sides had many killed andwounded, pushed forward another body of infantryto take up a position at the rear of those who werefighting; he then commanded these latter to opentheir ranks as if they intended to retreat, and one partof them to turn to the right and another to the left.This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once

229

APPENDIX

took advantage, and thus gained possession of a por-tion of the battlefield. But when these tired soldiersfound themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’sreserves they could not stand against them and atonce fell back into the river. The cavalry of either sidehad not as yet gained any decisive advantage over theother, because Castruccio, knowing his inferiority inthis arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand onthe defensive against the attacks of their adversaries,as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantryhe would be able to make short work of the cavalry.This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the Flo-rentine army driven back across the river he orderedthe remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry ofthe enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and,joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the enemy withthe greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Flo-rentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cav-alry had met with in crossing the river, had attemptedto make their infantry cross lower down the river, inorder to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. Buthere, also, the banks were steep and already lined bythe men of Castruccio, and this movement was quiteuseless. Thus the Florentines were so completely de-feated at all points that scarcely a third of them es-caped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory.

230

APPENDIX

Many captains were taken prisoners, and Carlo, theson of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo Falconi andTaddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners,fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughterwas infinitely greater, as might be expected in such abattle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty thousandtwo hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castrucciolost one thousand five hundred and seventy men.

But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Cas-truccio took away his life just at the time when sheshould have preserved it, and thus ruined all thoseplans which for so long a time he had worked to carryinto effect, and in the successful prosecution of whichnothing but death could have stopped him. Castruc-cio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the day;and when the end of it came, although fatigued andoverheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to wel-come his men on their return from victory and per-sonally thank them. He was also on the watch for anyattempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of theday; he being of the opinion that it was the duty ofa good general to be the first man in the saddle andthe last out of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to awind which often rises at midday on the banks of theArno, and which is often very unhealthy; from thishe took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he

231

APPENDIX

was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the causeof his death. On the following night he was attackedwith high fever, which increased so rapidly that thedoctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore,called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him asfollows:

“If I could have believed that Fortune would havecut me off in the midst of the career which was lead-ing to that glory which all my successes promised,I should have laboured less, and I should have leftthee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemiesand perils, because I should have been content withthe governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I should nei-ther have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged theFlorentines with so many injuries. But I would havemade both these peoples my friends, and I shouldhave lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, andhave left you a state without a doubt smaller, but onemore secure and established on a surer foundation.But Fortune, who insists upon having the arbitramentof human affairs, did not endow me with sufficientjudgment to recognize this from the first, nor the timeto surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have toldthee, and I have never concealed it, how I entered thehouse of thy father whilst yet a boy–a stranger to allthose ambitions which every generous soul should

232

APPENDIX

feel–and how I was brought up by him, and lovedas though I had been born of his blood; how underhis governance I learned to be valiant and capable ofavailing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hastbeen witness. When thy good father came to die, hecommitted thee and all his possessions to my care,and I have brought thee up with that love, and in-creased thy estate with that care, which I was boundto show. And in order that thou shouldst not onlypossess the estate which thy father left, but also thatwhich my fortune and abilities have gained, I havenever married, so that the love of children shouldnever deflect my mind from that gratitude which Iowed to the children of thy father. Thus I leave theea vast estate, of which I am well content, but I amdeeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unset-tled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thyhands, which will never rest contented under theygovernment. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men areof nature changeable and unreliable, who, althoughthey may be sometimes held in subjection, yet theywill ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese. Pistoiais also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with fac-tions and deeply incensed against thy family by rea-son of the wrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thouhast for neighbours the offended Florentines, injured

233

APPENDIX

by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed,who will hail the news of my death with more delightthan they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In theEmperor and in the princes of Milan thou canst placeno reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and theirhelp is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast nohope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in thememory of my valour, and in the prestige which thislatest victory has brought thee; which, as thou know-est how to use it with prudence, will assist thee tocome to terms with the Florentines, who, as they aresuffering under this great defeat, should be inclinedto listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to makethem my enemies, because I believed that war withthem would conduce to my power and glory, thouhast every inducement to make friends of them, be-cause their alliance will bring thee advantages and se-curity. It is of the greatest important in this world thata man should know himself, and the measure of hisown strength and means; and he who knows that hehas not a genius for fighting must learn how to governby the arts of peace. And it will be well for thee to rulethey conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this wayto enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained;and in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hastlearnt to believe that what I have told thee is true.

234

APPENDIX

And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that Ihave left thee this realm and have taught thee howto keep it.”

After this there came to Castruccio those citizens ofPisa, Pistoia, and Lucca, who had been fighting at hisside, and whilst recommending Pagolo to them, andmaking them swear obedience to him as his successor,he died. He left a happy memory to those who hadknown him, and no prince of those times was everloved with such devotion as he was. His obsequieswere celebrated with every sign of mourning, and hewas buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune wasnot so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she had been toCastruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long afterthe death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pis-toia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. Thislatter city continued in the family of Guinigi until thetime of the great-grandson of Pagolo.

From what has been related here it will be seen thatCastruccio was a man of exceptional abilities, not onlymeasured by men of his own time, but also by thoseof an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordi-nary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of agracious presence, and he welcomed men with suchurbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left

235

APPENDIX

him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, andhe wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether itrained or snowed, he always went without a hat. Hewas delightful among friends, but terrible to his ene-mies; just to his subjects; ready to play false with theunfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud thosewhom he desired to subdue, because he was wontto say that it was the victory that brought the glory,not the methods of achieving it. No one was bolderin facing danger, none more prudent in extricatinghimself. He was accustomed to say that men oughtto attempt everything and fear nothing; that God isa lover of strong men, because one always sees thatthe weak are chastised by the strong. He was alsowonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in hisanswers; and as he did not look for any indulgencein this way of speaking from others, so he was notangered with others did not show it to him. It has of-ten happened that he has listened quietly when othershave spoken sharply to him, as on the following occa-sions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a par-tridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend,to whom Castruccio had said: “You would not havegiven more than a penny.” “That is true,” answeredthe friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A ducatis much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer

236

APPENDIX

on whom he had spat to show that he scorned him,the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman are willing to letthe waters of the sea saturate them in order that theymake take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to bewetted by spittle that I may catch a whale”; and thiswas not only heard by Castruccio with patience butrewarded. When told by a priest that it was wickedfor him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “Ifthat be a vice than you should not fare so splendidlyat the feasts of our saints.” Passing through a street hesaw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fameblush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him:“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comestout, but when thou goest into such places.” A friendgave him a very curiously tied knot to undo and wastold: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thingwhich gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castrucciosaid to one who professed to be a philosopher: “Youare like the dogs who always run after those who willgive them the best to eat,” and was answered: “Weare rather like the doctors who go to the houses ofthose who have the greatest need of them.” Goingby water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was muchdisturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, andwas reproached for cowardice by one of those withhim, who said that he did not fear anything. Castruc-

237

APPENDIX

cio answered that he did not wonder at that, since ev-ery man valued his soul for what is was worth. Be-ing asked by one what he ought to do to gain esti-mation, he said: “When thou goest to a banquet takecare that thou dost not seat one piece of wood uponanother.” To a person who was boasting that he hadread many things, Castruccio said: “He knows betterthan to boast of remembering many things.” Some-one bragged that he could drink much without be-coming intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox doesthe same.” Castruccio was acquainted with a girl withwhom he had intimate relations, and being blamedby a friend who told him that it was undignified forhim to be taken in by a woman, he said: “She has nottaken me in, I have taken her.” Being also blamed foreating very dainty foods, he answered: “Thou dostnot spend as much as I do?” and being told that itwas true, he continued: “Then thou art more avari-cious than I am gluttonous.” Being invited by TaddeoBernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of Luca, tosupper, he went to the house and was shown by Tad-deo into a chamber hung with silk and paved withfine stones representing flowers and foliage of themost beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered somesaliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, andseeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: “I

238

APPENDIX

knew not where to spit in order to offend thee less.”Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willingI will die as he did.” Being one night in the houseof one of his gentlemen where many ladies were as-sembled, he was reproved by one of his friends fordancing and amusing himself with them more thanwas usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who isconsidered wise by day will not be considered a foolat night.” A person came to demand a favour of Cas-truccio, and thinking he was not listening to his pleathrew himself on his knees to the ground, and beingsharply reproved by Castruccio, said: “Thou art thereason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thyfeet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour hehad asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hellwas an easy one, seeing that it was in a downwarddirection and you travelled blindfolded. Being askeda favour by one who used many superfluous words,he said to him: “When you have another request tomake, send someone else to make it.” Having beenwearied by a similar man with a long oration whowound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you byspeaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, be-cause I have not listened to a word you said.” He usedto say of one who had been a beautiful child and whoafterwards became a fine man, that he was dangerous,

239

APPENDIX

because he first took the husbands from the wives andnow he took the wives from their husbands. To anenvious man who laughed, he said: “Do you laughbecause you are successful or because another is un-fortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of MesserFrancesco Guinigi, one of his companions said to him:“What shall I give you if you will let me give you ablow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A helmet.”Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had beeninstrumental in raising him to power, and being toldthat he had done wrong to kill one of his old friends,he answered that people deceived themselves; he hadonly killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatlythose men who intended to take a wife and then didnot do so, saying that they were like men who saidthey would go to sea, and then refused when the timecame. He said that it always struck him with surprisethat whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vasewould sound it first to learn if it were good, yet inchoosing a wife they were content with only lookingat her. He was once asked in what manner he wouldwish to be buried when he died, and answered: “Withthe face turned downwards, for I know when I amgone this country will be turned upside down.” Onbeing asked if it had ever occurred to him to becomea friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it

240

APPENDIX

had not, because it appeared strange to him that FraLazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione dellaFaggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked whenshould a man eat to preserve his health, and replied:“If the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; ifhe be poor, then when he can.” Seeing on of his gen-tlemen make a member of his family lace him up, hesaid to him: “I pray God that you will let him feedyou also.” Seeing that someone had written upon hishouse in Latin the words: “May God preserve thishouse from the wicked,” he said, “The owner mustnever go in.” Passing through one of the streets hesaw a small house with a very large door, and re-marked: “That house will fly through the door.” Hewas having a discussion with the ambassador of theKing of Naples concerning the property of some ban-ished nobles, when a dispute arose between them,and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear ofthe king. “Is this king of yours a bad man or a goodone?” asked Castruccio, and was told that he was agood one, whereupon he said, “Why should you sug-gest that I should be afraid of a good man?”

I could recount many other stories of his sayingsboth witty and weighty, but I think that the above willbe sufficient testimony to his high qualities. He livedforty-four years, and was in every way a prince. And

241

APPENDIX

as he was surrounded by many evidences of his goodfortune, so he also desired to have near him somememorials of his bad fortune; therefore the manacleswith which he was chained in prison are to be seen tothis day fixed up in the tower of his residence, wherethey were placed by him to testify for ever to his daysof adversity. As in his life he was inferior neither toPhilip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Sci-pio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his age asthey did, and he would doubtless have excelled bothof them had Fortune decreed that he should be born,not in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome.

242