The processes, principles and goals of  constitutional design

Class #11 – DPI403

14 Mon 25 Oct Constitution‐building in peace‐building processes: International IDEA #1

15 Wed 27 Oct Elections: ACE/International IDEA

16 Mon 1 Nov CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATION A: (MENA) : Jinnyn, Suhail, Tim, Muhamed, Charles

17 Wed 3 Nov Elections: ACE/International IDEA

18 Mon 8 Nov CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATIONS Group D (South Asia) : Syed, Sonam, Abdul, Victoria; Group F (Central, Eastern Europe):  Elspeth, Katya, Maxim, Inna

19 Wed 10 Nov Parliaments, parties, and women’s empowerment: the Inter‐parliamentaryUnion

20 Mon 15 Nov Public administration reform, local governance, and anti‐corruption:Transparency International

21 Wed 17 Nov CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATIONS: Group E (East and South East Asia) : Mila, Lansong, Chaminda, Kevin, Kim; Group G (Latin America and Caribbean) : Michael, Lucilla, Kelsi

22 Mon 22 Nov Civil society, social capital and the news media: Committee to ProtectJournalists and the Open Society Institute

23 Wed 24 Nov Human rights, justice, and rule of law: Amnesty International

24 Mon 29 Nov CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATIONS: Group B (Sub‐Saharan Africa) : Alexandra, Matthias, Musa, Emily, Sophia; Group C (Sub‐Saharan Africa) : Daniel, Brandon, Caroline, Assefa, Sahr, Hideko

25 Wed 1 Dec Conclusion & wrap up #2

Lijphart 3

Class Structure

I. Why are constitutions important?II. Processes of constitutional design

Inclusive or elite‐driven (Ginsburg, Samuels)

III. Principles of constitutional design Power‐concentrating or power‐sharing? (Lijphart) Nine choices

IV. Contrasting case‐studies Majoritarian democracy: Case study of the UK May 2005 and 2010 elections Consensus democracy: Case study of the Swiss 2003 election  

V. Discussion   What would be the arguments for adopting either type of constitutions in 

Iraq,  Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?

Lijphart 4

Required readings

PROCESSES: 

Elkins, Zach. 2010. ‘Diffusion and the Constitutionalization of Europe.’ Comparative Political Studies 43(8‐9): 969‐999. DOI: 10.1177/0010414010370433

PRINCIPLES: 

Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 pp22‐31.  

CASE STUDIES: 

Kirsti Samuels. 2007 Constitution building processes and democratization: A discussion of twelve case studies. International IDEA

Lijphart 5

Additional useful resources

Comparative Constitutions Project http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions

International Constitutional Law Documents http://www.uni‐wuerzburg.de/law/index.html

International IDEA  www.IDEA.int

Lijphart 6

Lijphart 7

Lijphart 8

1. Why are constitutions important?

Lijphart 9

I: Why are constitutions important?

1. Constitutions structure patterns of legitimate authority within nation‐states e.g.

Electoral rules determine the number of parties in parliament and in government

Executive‐legislative relations influence capacity for effective governance Federalism determines vertical power‐sharing

2. Constitutions embody symbolic national goals and aspirations

3. Negotiated constitutional settlements integral to peace‐building and reconciliation process

In  Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan

4. Potential for practical policy reforms e.g.  Electoral reforms in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitutional change in Bolivia, UK, Turkey

Lijphart 10

What are constitutions?

The body of highest‐order legal rules and principles that specify how other laws are to be produced, applied, enforced and interpreted

What counts? A single Constitutional document  Supplementary charters of human rights Or a series of basic laws and unwritten conventions

Major contrasts can exist between de jure Constitutions and de facto constitutions

Lijphart 11

“In any given year…some 4 or 5 constitutions will be replaced, 10‐15 will be amended, and another 20 or so proposals for revision will be under consideration.”

Worldwide, the average lifespan of a constitution is 17 years

Ginsberg, Elkins and Blount 2009 p202

Constitutional Change

Lijphart 12

Lifespan Duration of Constitutions0

24

68

10Pe

rcen

t

0 50 100 150 200Lifespan

Source: Comparative Constitutions Project

Lijphart 13

Types of Constitutional Change

State building Post‐conflict peace settlements 

E.g. Afghanistan constitution

State reform Transition from autocracy 

Eg Choice of electoral system in post‐Communist states 

Common in established democracies Revision or amendment of existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options 

eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)

Lijphart 14

Stages of constitution‐making

Drafting

Consultation

Deliberation

Adoption

Ratification

Implementation

Feedback

Lijphart 15

Who decides?

Executive

Expert commissions and international 

advisors

Legislative bodies and committees

Special constituent assemblies

Inclusive constitutional referendums

Lijphart 16

Trend is growing use of public participation in constitution making (Ginsburg et al Fig 1 p207)

Processes involving a referendum produce constitutions that are more likely to have virtually every category of right..more likely to ensure universal suffrage, secret ballot, use of referenda.

More inclusive processes may produce more democratic outcomes Source: Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009) p218

Does inclusion matter?

Lijphart 17

2. Principles of constitutional design

Lijphart 18

II: Principles of constitutional design 

Arend Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968) Democracy in Plural Society (1979) Democracies (1984) Electoral systems and party systems (1994) Institutional design in new democracies (1996) Patterns of Democracy (1999) “Constitutional design for divided societies” (2004) Thinking about Democracy (2008)

Lijphart 19

1. Legislative electoral system Proportional representation eg party list Mixed eg mixed member proportional Majoritarian – eg Single member plurality Pros and cons?

2. Within PR Open or closed lists Size of multimember districts Degree of proportionality Pros and cons?

Choices for divided societies

Lijphart 20

3. Parliamentary or presidential government? Parliamentary executives have collegial executive Avoid zero‐sum majoritarian elections Avoid executive‐legislative stalemate Avoid rigidity Pros and cons?

Choices

Lijphart 21

4. Power‐sharing executive Collegial cabinets Mandates specific group representation

Eg Belgium

Party ministers on proportional basis for those with 5%+ seats E.g. South Africa

Choices

Lijphart 22

5. Cabinet stability No‐confidence vote Fixed term parliaments Constructive vote of no‐confidence

6. Head of state Ceremonial role eg monarchy If selected

Limited powers Appointed by multiple actors 

Choices

Lijphart 23

7. Federalism and decentralization Second federal chamber over‐represents less populous units

Federal boundaries? Size of federal states?

8. Non‐territorial autonomy Eg minority rights over education 

9. Power‐sharing in appointed positions Civil service, judiciary, police

Choices

Lijphart 24

Types of democratic constitutions

Source: Lijphart Democracies (1999)

egUK?

New Zealand?Barbados

Majoritarian(Westminster)

egUSA

Costa RicaFrance

Mixed

egEU

BelgiumSwitzerland

Consensus(Consociational)

Democracies

Lijphart 25

Consociational democracy

Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensus Why? Constitutional arrangements

Executive power‐sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in elected/appointed 

office Cultural autonomy for groups

Model for other divided (plural) societies? E.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus 

Lijphart 26

Normative values

Majoritarian democracy Goals…

government accountability and transparency of decision‐making  

single‐party executives, effective opposition parties, vigorous parliamentary debate, and decisive elections.

Yet dangers of  elective dictatorship, permanent majorities,  lack of checks and balances.

Consociationaldemocracy

Goals… consensual decision‐making, 

bargaining and compromise  multiple parliamentary parties, 

each with a stake in coalition government, and

dispersed decision‐making processes.

Yet dangers of  ineffective governance, extreme multiparty 

fragmentation,  lack of accountability.

Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

‘Majoritarian’ ModelPower-concentrating

Effective and accountable

‘Consensus’ ModelPower-sharing

Inclusive &representativeExec-Parties One-party cabinet Coalition government

Executive Executive dominant Balanced exec-legislature

Party system Two-party Multi-party

Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional Representation

Interest groups Pluralist Corporatist

Federal-Unitary

Government Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federal

Parliament Unicameral Balanced Bicameral

Constitution Flexible More Rigid

Judiciary Parlt. sovereign Judicial review

Central Bank Dependent Independent

Lijphart 30Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

Executive-Parties

2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0

Uni

tary

-Fed

eral

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

VEN

US

UK

TRI

SWI

SWE

SPA

POR

PNG

NOR

NZ

NET

MAU

MAL

JPN

JAM ITA

ISR

IRE

ICE

GRE

GER

FRA

FIN

DENCR

CAN

BOT

BEL

BARBAH

AUT

AUL

Majoritarian

Consensual

Lijphart 31

Consensus democracy matters

For the inclusion of minority parties For the protection of minority interests For women’s representation For public policy, economic outcomes, and welfare states

Lijphart 32

The logical sequence of consociational theory

PR electoral systems or

reserved seats

Federalism & decentralization

Election ofethnic minority

partiesPeaceful

democratic consolidation

Election ofethnic minority

parties

Greater support within minority communities

Does the logic make sense? Criticisms?

Plural societies

Lijphart 33

Potential criticisms?

For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings shaped by political structures and elites. Power‐sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages  (Donald Horowitz)

Eg Bosnia‐Herzegovina

By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote‐pooling across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)

Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victory

Majoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)

III: Majoritarian institutions

Case study: UK May 2005 and 2010 general elections

Lijphart 35

Institutions: UK 1945‐1997 

Unwritten constitution – Magna Carta etc. One‐party cabinet government since 1945

Collective responsibility, primus inter pares

Two‐party parliamentary competition Labour and Conservative in govnt and opposition

Programmatic & disciplined parties Mass‐branch party organizations, few independents, few backbench rebellions, manifesto program

Parliamentary sovereignty (no Supreme Court) Unitary state (local government administration) Bicameral parliament but Commons predominant Plurality FPTP elections – exaggerates votes: seats for 

winner

Lijphart 36

UK Ballot paper

Lijphart 37

2005 UK election resultJune 2005 % of Votes % of seats Ratio Number of

seatsLabour 35.2 54.9 1.56 355

Conservative 32.3 30.4 0.94 197

Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62

SNP 1.5 0.9 0.60 6

PC 0.6 0.5 0.83 3

Other 8.4 3.4 0.40 23

Labour Maj. 2.9 24.5 66

Total 100 100 659

Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

Lijphart 38

2010 UK election resultParty Seats Gain Loss Net Votes % +/‐%

Conservative 306 100 3 +97 10,706,647 36.1 +3.8

Labour 258 3 94 ‐91 8,604,358 29.0 ‐6.2

Liberal Democrat 57 8 13 ‐5 6,827,938 23.0 +1.0

Democratic Unionist Party 8 0 1 ‐1 168,216 0.6 ‐0.3

Scottish National Party 6 0 0 0 491,386 1.7 +0.1

Sinn Fein 5 0 0 0 171,942 0.6 ‐0.1

Plaid Cymru 3 1 0 +1 165,394 0.6 ‐0.1

Social Democratic & Labour Party 3 0 0 0 110,970 0.4 ‐0.1

Green 1 1 0 +1 285,616 1.0 ‐0.1

Alliance Party 1 1 0 +1 42,762 0.1 +0.0

UK Independence Party 0 0 0 0 917,832 3.1 +0.9

British National Party 0 0 0 0 563,743 1.9 +1.2

Ulster Conservatives and Unionists ‐ New Force 0 0 1 ‐1 102,361 0.3 ‐0.1

English Democrats 0 0 0 0 64,826 0.2 +0.2

Respect‐Unity Coalition 0 0 1 ‐1 33,251 0.1 ‐0.1

Traditional Unionist Voice 0 0 0 0 26,300 0.1

Christian Party 0 0 0 0 18,623 0.1

Independent Community and Health Concern 0 0 1 ‐1 16,150 0.1 +0.0

Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition 0 0 0 0 12,275 0.0

Scottish Socialist Party 0 0 0 0 3,157 0.0 ‐0.1

Others 1 1 1 0 319,891 1.1 0.0

Turnout 29,653,638 65.1 4.0

Lijphart 39

UK House of Commons 1900‐2010Overall Maj Govnt

1900 135 Con Salisbury/Balfour1906 129 Lib Campbell Bannerman1910 None Asquith1910 None Asquith1918 283 Coalition Lloyd George1922 74 Con Bonar Law1923 None Baldwin1924 210 Con MacDonald1929 None MacDonald1931 492 Nat MacDonald1935 242 Nat Baldwin/Chamberlain/Churchill1945 147 Lab Attlee1950 6 Lab Attlee1951 16 Con Churchill1955 59 Con Eden/Macmillan1959 99 Con Macmillan/Douglas‐Home1964 5 Lab Wilson1966 97 Lab Wilson1970 31 Con Heath1974 0 Lab Wilson 1974 4 Lab Wilson/Callaghan1979 44 Con Thatcher1983 144 Con Thatcher1987 101 Con Thatcher1992 21 Con Major1997 178 Lab Blair2001 167 Lab Blair2005 66 Lab Blair/Brown2010 None Cameron?

Lijphart 40

‘Winner’s bonus’ UK

Note: The votes-seats ratio is calculated as the percentage of UK seats divided into the percentage of UK votes for the governing party. A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no electoral bias for the government. Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

1.28

1.091.07

1.10

1.171.14

1.20

1.13

1.27 1.28

1.22

1.44

1.37

1.23

1.46

1.541.56

1.30

1.00

1.10

1.20

1.30

1.40

1.50

1.60

1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010

Vote

s: s

eats

ratio

Lijphart 41

UK % Vote 1900‐2010

Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

19001906191019101918192219231924192919311935194519501951195519591964196619701974197419791983198719921997200120052010

% o

f UK

vot

e Con

Lab

LD

Other

Lijphart 42

UK % Seats 1900‐2010

Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

19001906191019101918192219231924192919311935194519501951195519591964196619701974197419791983198719921997200120052010

Num

ber o

f MPs Con

Lab

LD

Other

Lijphart 43

Why exaggerative bias for winner?

1. Malapportionment Unequal size of electorates in each seat Decline of urban pop/Labour constituency Delayed effect of boundary changes

2. Differential turnout Lowest in safe Labour seats

Lijphart 44

Geography also matters:UK 2005 Election Seats

Source: Pippa Norris Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

Lijphart 45

Simulated seats GB 2010

306

246

281

234

258

207

262

188

57

162

79

150

2835

28

78

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

FPTP STV AV PR List

Con

Lab

LD

Other

Lijphart 46

Moderate party competition

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project/ Judith Bara EPOP 2005

Lijphart 47

Breakdown of classic ideal type since 1997

Federalism: Devolution for Scotland and Wales Northern Ireland assembly Elected Mayor/Assembly for London

Electoral reform: Party list PR for Europe AMS for Scotland/Wales STV for Scottish local elections May 2011 referendum on AV for Commons

House of Lords reform Written Bill of Rights‐ Euro. Convention Use of referendums

Advantages and disadvantages?

IV: Consensus democracy

Switzerland  

Lijphart 50

Swiss democracy

Pop 7.4m Plural cleavages

Religion (46% Catholic, 40% Protestant)  Language 

(65%German, 10% Italian, 18% French), 

Region/canton  Class ($32,800 per capita PPP 2003)

Social divisions, yet elite consensus?   Stable power‐sharing coalition but lack of accountability?

Lijphart 51

Swiss democracy 

Since 1848, Switzerland has been a confederation, currently with 26 cantons and 2873 communes. 

The Government (Federal Council) has 7 members elected by parliament for 4 years

From 1959‐2003, ‘magic formula’ 2 seats each for the FDP, CVP, and SPS,  and 1 seat for the SVP.

October 2003, 2 seats given to SVP, 1 CVP Annual president rotates as primus inter pares

Lijphart 52

Swiss parliament

Bicameral Federal Assembly:  Direct elections PR List elections w. high proportionality votes : seats The National Council (popular representation, 200 seats, based on population size per canton) and 

The Council of States (cantonal representation, 46 seats, 2 per canton)

Eight party factions in Federal Assembly and 13 parties in total.

Federal Supreme Court Many popular initiatives and referendums.

Lijphart 53

October 2003 Election resultsNationalrat and Ständerat: 19 october 2003 (%) %Vote 200 %Seats 46

Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 26.6 55 27.5% 8

Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz SPS 23.4 52 26.0% 9

Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz FDP 17.3 36 18.0% 14

Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz CVP 14.4 28 14.0% 15

Grüne Partei der Schweiz GPS 7.4 13 6.5% -

Liberale Partei der Schweiz LPS 2.2 4 2.0% -

Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz EVP 2.3 3 1.5% -

Eidgenössische Demokratische Union EDU 1.3 2 1.0% -

Schweizer Demokraten SD 1.0 1 0.5% -

Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz PdA 0.7 2 1.0% -

Lega dei Ticinese LdT 0.4 1 0.5% -

Solidarités Sol 0.5 1 0.5% -

Christlich-Soziale Partei CSP 0.4 1 0.5% -

Alternative Liste AL 0.5 1 0.5% -

- Sozialistisch Grüne Alternative Zug SGAZ 1

Freiheitspartei der Schweiz FPS 0.2 - -

Lijphart 54

Swiss party competition

European Liberal

Conservative

RightLeft

SVP Radical right

SP Social Democratic

Green Party

Free Democrats

CVP Christian Democrats

Note: Legislative voting patterns 1999-2003

Advantages and disadvantages?

Lijphart 56

V: Discussion 

In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?

What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?

Lijphart 57

Conclusions

Useful classification of democratic institutions From ideal types to continuous measures Clarifies values and normative debates Systematic comparisons Consequences of institutional design?

Next class:  Electoral Systems

Lijphart 58