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BACKGROUND GUIDE FOR THE GA - Plenary
___________________________________________________________________________
A g e n d a :
THE PROTECTION OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON
STATES FROM THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
___________________________________________________________________________
“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
- Article II (Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty)
P a r t I
Please note, the following content is provided by the Executive Board of the council and not the
secretariat, hence stays exclusive to the GA-Plenary at Ignite MUN 2016
BEST PRACTICES FOR RESEARCH AND CONDUCT
(You can take these best practices into account, not only for GA-Plenary at Ignite MUN 2016 but for
other MUNs as well. Again, these are informal suggestions that come from an MUN’er to another.)
If you are doing a Model United Nations (MUN) conference for the first time, do not hesitate to
read through this document. Neither the document, nor the Executive Board prejudices about
delegates. Follow the given steps and we see no reason that anyone doing an MUN for the first
time cannot turn out to be the best.
Read the Agenda Guide, least 25 days prior to the conference and make a note of everything that
needs to be understood.
Search (Read: Google) everything and find relating documents (UN, News articles, Scholarly
articles) for whatever was not really understood.
After wholly understanding (subject to how in depth you wish to go for the research), try
understanding your allotted country’s perspective on the agenda.
Make the stance in accordance with the country’s perspective on the agenda which shall also
define your foreign policy.
Understand the cues and hints that are given minutely in the Background Guide that may come
handy while presentation of contentions in committee. Google them, too.
Take a good look at the mandate of council as to what you can discuss and what you can do in
this council. This point is placed here, just because your knowledge base shouldn’t be limited to
the mandate of the council. Know everything, speak whatever the mandate allows.
Follow the links given alongside and understand why they were given.
Predict the kind of discussions and on what subtopics can they take place, thereby analyzing the
subtopic research you have done and prepare yourself accordingly.
Ask the Executive Board your doubts, if you have any, least 10 days before the conference by
means of the given email ID and make sure to not disclose your allotted country, until you want
to understand the policy of your country.
Download the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional protocols
there to and other relative treaties.
Ask questions regarding procedure, if you have any, at the day of the conference.
NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
Dear Delegates,
It is an honor to be serving as a part of the Executive Board at the first committee of the General Assembly, at Ignite Model
United Nations 2016. Please consider that the following guide, as the name suggests, is merely to provide you with the
background of the agenda and cannot serve as the credible source of information. Your real research lies beyond this guide and
we hope to see some strong content and debate come our way.
The agenda at hand is both vast and complex, and a successful discussion on it would entail the collective participation of all of
you. It shall be your prerogative to decide the direction in which you want to take this committee. This agenda demands to be
seen from more than one perspective, one that covers the threat of use of Nuclear weapons in totality, the other could be threat of
use of nuclear weapons on non nuclear weapons states and another could be the proliferation regime to build a nuclear weapon
free world. At the outset, we would like to state that the agenda is to be analyzed from a policy stand point as opposed to a
technological one. However we do understand that the agenda is bound to have a technological aspect, we expect you to keep it
limited, enough to structure your argument/content related to a policy. If you are doing an MUN for the very first time, we
expect you to read the UNA USA rules of procedure. Rest, the same aspect for research applies to you too. Do not feel taken
aback on the research, foreign policy and other details of the allotted country.
Do read the questions that have been mentioned in the latter half of the guide. Those questions might shape the debate. At the
same time, the agenda is open to interpretations and there shall be no direction of debate that shall be provided by the Executive
Board. Delegates are required to direct the council at all stages, unless stagnation occurs. We hope to see a great level of effort
and enthusiasm from you all, so that we all can take back a great experience.
This Background has been created one month prior to the conference and it is in best interest to stick to
Reuters/CNN/BBC/UN News and documents to find more after you have researched. Do research the updated information
on various news agencies but be careful of quoting the credible sources only while presenting arguments/points.
Happy Researching. Angad Singh Madan Siddharth Sriram Chairperson Vice chairperson [email protected]
P a r t I I
OVERVIEW OF THE DISEC
- N a t u r e o f p r o o f a n d e v i d e n c e - Documents from the following sources will be considered as credible proof for any allegations made in
committee or statements that require verification.
A. Reuters: Appropriate Documents and articles from the Reuters News agency will be used to
corroborate or refute controversial statements made in committee. (www.reuters.com)
B. UN Document: Documents by all UN agencies will be considered as sufficient proof. Reports from
all UN bodies including treaty based bodies will also be accepted.
C. Government Reports: Government Reports of a given country used to corroborate an allegation on
the same aforementioned country will be accepted as proof.
- United Nations General Assembly – DISEC -
The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. Chapter IV, Articles 9-22, of
the UN Charter concern the General Assembly. All Member States participate in the General Assembly and
each state has one vote.
The First Committee, one of the six Main Committees of the General Assembly, is allocated agenda items
related to disarmament and international security.
The First Committee submits a separate report to the plenary on every agenda item allocated to it. Each
report:
indicates the meetings at which the item was considered
summarizes the committee's consideration of the item
identifies the sponsors of draft resolutions
reports the vote, if any, of Member States on draft texts
transmits the final version of draft resolutions and/or decisions recommended to the plenary for
adoption
symbol pattern
The plenary considers each report and votes on the draft resolutions or decisions it contains.
For example, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 66/53, 66/54, 66/55, 66/56, 66/57 and 66/58
based on the report of the First Committee (A/66/413).
DISEC covers a variety of different topics ranging from the illegal trade in weapons to conflicts dealing with
non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. Like the other committees of the United Nations
General Assembly, DISEC is unable to impose sanctions, authorize armed intervention or pass binding
resolutions. That being said, DISEC has submitted recommendations to the United Nations Security
Council and to the UN Secretariat on several occasions. DISEC has assisted in the production of several
important treaties and conventions, including the Chemical Weapons Convention (1992), which outlaws the
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), which aims
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote peaceful cooperation in the field of nuclear
energy amongst other things. Although DISEC was not directly responsible for the creation of these two
documents, it certainly played an important role in laying the foundations thereof.
P a r t I I I
OVERVIEW OF THE AGENDA
- I n t r o d u c t i o n -
The discovery of radioactivity by Henri Becquerel bestowed upon human beings an ultimate source of
power. Nuclear energy not only provides a relatively non-polluting source of power but one that is virtually
inexhaustible. With the rapidly increasing energy demand by the world’s growing population, this share is
likely to increase in the upcoming decades. As with any other source of energy there are both benefits and
drawbacks; while nuclear energy provides a relatively non-polluting source of power generation this is at the
cost of producing dangerous radioactive waste and creating opportunities for states to utilize the capabilities
of their nuclear infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons. The dual nature of this technology
and its application for weapons production purposes has been at the very core of international security
agenda. Today a number of countries with nuclear energy programs have the capability, if they choose, to
manufacture nuclear weapons within a matter of months if their security perceptions change, because they
have mastered the critical technology - uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. In the recent past,
many states have been found to or suspected to pursue production of nuclear weapons. In order to maintain
sustainable peace for the future, addressing weapon production threats inherent in nuclear energy infrastructures is of fundamental concern to the international community. It is indeed the task
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard nuclear infrastructures from being misused for military purposes. No solution exists that can cleanly separate a full nuclear energy fuel cycle
and the threat of proliferating nuclear weapons. Instead, the IAEA and the international community must
pursue various approaches that aim to minimize proliferation threats.
- The Link Between The Nuclear Fuel Cycle And Weapon Production -
Figure: Nuclear Fission Reaction.
The processes of producing energy in a nuclear reactor and of exploding a nuclear weapon share the same
underlying laws of nuclear physics, a nuclear fission reaction. It is therefore not surprising that the major
industrial processes required for energy production and for manufacturing nuclear weapons are very similar.
Both rely on the nuclear fuel cycle, a set of complex nuclear facilities that each has a specific role in the
acquisition, processing and usage of nuclear fissile material. In order to highlight the links between the
nuclear fuel cycle and weapon production and to introduce the essential technical jargon, it is worthwhile to
take a closer look at uranium enrichment, reactor fuel reprocessing and at the fundamental ingredients of a
nuclear weapon.
- Nuclear Enrichment -
Naturally occurring uranium only has a 0.7% content of uranium-235 with uranium-238 roughly making up
the rest. Yet nuclear power reactors generally require uranium enriched in up to 4% of uranium-235, also
called low enriched uranium (LEU), as the fissile nuclear material to operate. Raising the uranium-235
content in uranium is a process called “enrichment.” It is a difficult process and requires large and highly
sophisticated enrichment facilities, hence traditionally only technologically advanced states were able to
master it.
As the nuclear enrichment cycle depicts, any facility that can enrich uranium for civilian purposes can be
used to enrich uranium for weapon building activities. Here lies the importance of the Agency safeguards.
The Agency monitors the enrichment activities and reports any irregularities. Before moving to the next
section, it is important to consider a few definitions of uranium of different concentrations.
• Natural Uranium has a 235U concentration of less than 0.7%, as it exists in nature.
• Slightly enriched uranium (SEU) has a 235U concentration of 0.9% to 2%.
• Reprocessed uranium (RpU or RU) is a product of nuclear fuel cycles involving nuclear reprocessing
of spent fuel. RpU recovered from light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel typically contains slightly more U-
235 than natural uranium, and therefore could be used to fuel reactors that customarily use natural uranium
as fuel. However, it also contains the undesirable isotope uranium- 236 which undergoes neutron capture,
wasting neutrons (and requiring higher U-235 enrichment) and creating neptunium-237
which would be one of the more mobile and troublesome radionuclides in deep geological repository
disposal of nuclear waste.
• Low-enriched uranium (LEU) has a lower than 20% concentration of 235U. For use in commercial light water reactors (LWR), the most prevalent power reactors in the world, uranium is
enriched to 3 to 5% 235U. Fresh LEU used in research reactors is usually enriched 12% to 19.75% U- 235,
the latter concentration being used to replace HEU fuels when converting to LEU.
• Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has a greater than 20% concentration of (235) U or (233) U. The fissile
uranium in nuclear weapons usually contains 85% or more of (235)U known as weapon(s)-grade, though for
a crude, inefficient weapon 20% is sufficient (called weapon(s)-usable).
- Nuclear Weapon (Ingredients) -
A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either
fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from
relatively small amounts of matter. The first fission ("atomic") bomb test released the same amount of
energy as approximately 20,000 tons of TNT. The first thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb test released the
same amount of energy as approximately 10,000,000 tons of TNT.
The fundamental ingredient for a nuclear weapon is either one of the following nuclear fissile materials:
uranium with an approximately 90% enrichment in uranium-235, called highly enriched uranium (HEU), or
plutonium-239 with a low plutonium-240 content, called “weapon-grade plutonium”. Both these materials
can be easily obtained from a nuclear enrichment plant or a reprocessing plant. Therefore, even if a country
does not have the design to manufacture e nuclear weapon, they can hoard HEU or weapon(s)-grade
plutonium for future purposes. The process of weaponization – turning the fissile material into a weapon –
is in fact straightforward compared to the difficult processes of enrichment and reprocessing, particularly
when HEU is to be used as the nuclear explosive.
From this technical introduction above, it follows that the two important intersections between operating a
civilian nuclear fuel cycle and the production of nuclear explosives are uranium enrichment and reactor fuel
reprocessing. LEU and HEU can be obtained from the same facility and it is also important to note that
enriching the uranium-235 content from 0.7% to 4% for LEU requires much more time and energy than
enriching it from 4% to 90% for HEU. The production of weapon-grade plutonium only requires a nuclear
power or research reactor reprocessing facilities, because weapon-grade plutonium can easily be extracted
there. Developing and operating enrichment and reprocessing facilities are the highest hurdles a state has to
overcome in order to produce nuclear energy and to produce nuclear weapons indigenously. If states
possess such facilities, they are able to conceal a military nuclear program in their civilian fuel cycle, thereby
avoiding the costs of being punished by the international community.
The reasons why states choose to develop nuclear weapons are manifold. They may wish to obtain a
strategic deterrent to increase their national security, the decision to go nuclear may arise from the internal
politics of the state, or weapons may be acquired because they are seen as prestigious and give the state a
higher status in international politics. In any case and as the following three approaches show, the key in
reducing the proliferation risk inherent in nuclear energy infrastructures is to prevent states from misusing
their facilities or from persuading them not to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the first place.
- IAEA Safeguards System -
The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Article
I sets out the legal obligations for the five nuclear weapon states (NWSs) not to help the non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWSs) to acquire nuclear weapons and Article II prohibits the NNWS from taking steps
to acquire that capability on their own. Article IV of the treaty grants all states the „inalienable right‟ to
develop their own nuclear infrastructures for peaceful purposes. Yet, under Article III, all NNWSs are
required to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Such safeguards are any “measures through
which the IAEA seeks to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses.” Now what do
these safeguards include? They include, for example, taking measurements in enrichment facilities to verify
that states do not produce HEU and surveillance systems in reprocessing facilities to ensure that weapon-
grade plutonium is not diverted. Virtually every state that has nuclear facilities has operational safeguard
agreements with the Agency an d maintaining these safeguards is the IAEA‟s primary way in ensuring that a
state’s nuclear infrastructure is not misused for weapon production. The Information Circular 66 of the
IAEA mentions the Agency’s Safeguards System. The safeguards system clearly outlines: the Agency’s
obligations (Articles 9-14); the principles of implementation (Articles 15-18); nuclear materials subject to
safeguards (Articles 19 & 20); exemptions from safeguards (Articles 21-23); and safeguards procedures
including records, reports and inspections (Articles 29-68). It is generally well accepted that IAEA
safeguards have made a fundamental contribution to sustainable peace, as the award of the 2005 Nobel
Peace Prize to the IAEA for “their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes”
demonstrates.
However, safeguards require constant updating to reflect the nuclear proliferation threat of their time. In the
1970s, the perceived proliferation threat was the misuse of nuclear material in indigenous nuclear fuel cycles.
Hence, with safeguards agreements of type INFCRIC/153(Corrected) (the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements (CSA)) the Agency is limited to nuclear material accountancy and the verification of declared
facilities only. The CSA remains the “standard” safeguards agreement today as this is the type of safeguards
agreement that every state is required to conclude under NPT Article III, as noted above. The major
weakness of the CSA is that they do not allow IAEA inspectors to visit undeclared facilities and to utilize
verification methods that go much further than material accountancy. The international community was
paying the price for limiting the scope of standard safeguards when it became clear that Iraq was able to
establish an advanced clandestine nuclear weapon program – effectively “under the nose of the IAEA” –
despite a CSA safeguards agreement being in force. The program’s discovery after the Gulf War in 1993
showed that CSA agreements have become wholly inadequate.
The Iraqi discovery was also the catalyst in negotiating INFCIRC/540(Corrected) type safeguards (the Additional Protocol, (AP)). The 1997 Additional Protocol (AP) brought a revolution in multilateral nuclear verification by providing a new proactive safeguards methodology and enabling the Agency to employ the latest technologies when conducting inspections.16 They were created as the perceived proliferation threat changed in the 1990s to proliferation through facilities not previously declared to the Agency. Concluding the AP with the Agency is voluntary for states, but many states have taken this step to demonstrate their peaceful intentions in maintaining their nuclear fuel cycle. This is one of the major drawbacks of the AP and hence the ratification process has been slow. It is argued that among the possible causes for slow ratification is that states feel they may be subject to discriminations should international attention shift
towards them for whatever reason, as well as the indifference of governments about the threats of nuclear
proliferation.
The AP comes with the cost of states having to compromise more of their national sovereignty to allow for
more intrusive safeguards. For the IAEA to be able to officially conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear proliferation events occurring in a state, both the CSA and the AP must be in force. Therefore it is
extremely imperative to accelerate the AP ratification process; otherwise the current IAEA safeguards
regime will suffer.
It has become clear in recent years that the IAEA’s tasks are growing much faster than its budget. The use
of nuclear energy in the world increases, but the budget of the Agency’s safeguards department remains
comparable to the cost of running a police department of a medium-sized city, roughly $910 million.
Compliance concerns with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) and Iran’s programs,
shortages in staff and technology could reduce the effectiveness of safeguards. The Safeguards Statement
for 2009 mentions the number of states with both the CSA and AP, only with CSA, without any safeguards
and reports any indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities.
- A Few Pointers On The Safeguards -
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards is a system of inspection and verification of the
peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), supervised by the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
As the verification arm of the IAEA, the Department of Safeguard's primary role is to deter the
proliferation of nuclear weapons by detecting early the misuse of nuclear material or technology, and by
providing credible assurances that States are honoring their safeguards obligations. The Department also
contributes to nuclear arms control and disarmament, by responding to requests for verification and other
technical assistance associated with related agreements and arrangements.
What are Safeguards?
By definition, the safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA
Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States
about their nuclear material and activities including those from the Additional Protocol, in order to achieve
maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources.
Traditional Measures.
One set of measures relates to the nuclear material verification activities performed at facilities or other
locations where States have declared the presence of nuclear material subject to safeguards. These measures
are also referred to as "traditional safeguards".
Strengthening Measures.
Another set relates to the measures endorsed or encouraged by the IAEA Board of Governors since 1992
for strengthening the safeguards system. These measures fall into two categories. The first category
comprises those measures to be implemented under the legal authority conferred by existing safeguards
agreements. The second category comprises measures to be implemented under the complementary legal
authority conferred by Additional Protocols concluded on the basis of the Model Additional Protocol.
Integrated Safeguards.
In 1998, the IAEA's Department of Safeguards embarked upon a program for the development and
implementation of "integrated safeguards". The term refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards
measures available to the Agency, including those from the Additional Protocol, in order to achieve
maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources.
Reference of IAEA Safeguarding System in NPT
ARTICLE III
Each Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view
to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or
special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility
or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction,
or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b)
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article
IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of
nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the
Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic
Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in
accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements
shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their
instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than
eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Measures implemented under the legal authority already existing in comprehensive safeguards
agreements
1) Agency collection of environmental samples at any place where Agency inspectors have access; and
sample analysis at the IAEA Clean Laboratory and/or at qualified laboratories in Member States.
2) Agency use of unattended and remote monitoring of movements of nuclear material in facilities and
the transmission of authenticated and encrypted safeguards-relevant data to the Agency.
3) Agency use, to a greater extent than previously, of unannounced inspections within the routine
inspection regime.
4) Provision of enhanced training for Agency inspectors and safeguards staff and for State personnel
responsible for safeguards implementation.
5) Closer co-operation between the Agency and State and regional systems for accounting for and
control of nuclear material in States
6) Enhanced evaluation by the Agency of information derived from States’ declarations, Agency
verification activities and a wide range of open sources.
7) State provision of information about, and Agency inspector access to, all parts of a State's nuclear
fuel cycle, from uranium mines to nuclear waste and any other location where nuclear material
intended for non-nuclear uses is present.
8) State provision of information on, and Agency short-notice access to, all buildings on a site.
9) State provision of information about, and Agency inspector access to, a State's nuclear fuel cycle
R&D activities not involving nuclear material.
10) State provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related
equipment and material, and Agency inspector access to manufacturing and import locations in the
State.
11) Agency collection of environmental samples at locations beyond those provided for under
safeguards agreements.
12) State acceptance of streamlined procedures for Agency inspector designation and of requirement for
multiple entry visas (valid for at least one year) for inspectors.
13) Agency right to use internationally established communications systems, including satellite systems
and other forms of telecommunication.
14) Wide area environmental sampling, after Board approval of such sampling and consultations with
the State concerned.
15) Revised standardized text and modified eligibility criteria for the Small Quantities Protocol.
- The Threat Of Use Of Nuclear Weapons - U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e N u c l e a r W e a p o n s T h r e a t
While it has been more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War, the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons
continues to pose a serious global threat. The likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia has
decreased, but the continued presence of large stockpiles makes the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons a
persistent risk. Many of the countries with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, are actively engaged in
regional conflicts, making the possibility of regional nuclear war a concern. North Korea illicitly acquired nuclear weapons,
and other countries, including Iran and Syria, have violated their nuclear safeguards commitments and are suspected of
covertly pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. In the post-9/11 world, the potential for catastrophic nuclear terrorism is
also a serious threat. A number of efforts by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations
are underway to attempt to mitigate the nuclear threat—but significantly reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use will
require the sustained long-term commitment of the entire international community.
Who has Nuclear Weapons?
Nine countries are known or widely considered to possess nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is estimated these nine
countries collectively hold over 17,300 nuclear warheads. The United States and Russia possess
approximately 94% of the world’s nuclear weapons. While the possibility of intentional nuclear war has
greatly decreased since the end of the Cold War, ongoing regional tensions between nuclear-armed
countries such as India and Pakistan pose a continued risk in this regard. Furthermore, the continued
existence of large deployed nuclear arsenals in many of the nuclear possessing states poses risks of
accidental or unauthorized use. However, disarmament progress is not historically unprecedented. South
Africa voluntarily disclosed and dismantled its nuclear weapons program, and following the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine voluntarily transferred the Soviet nuclear
weapons on their territories to Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
What is a Nuclear Weapon, and Why is it Different from a Conventional Weapon?
Often referred to as weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from
conventional weapons due to their potential, if used in sufficient numbers, to literally destroy life on
earth. A nuclear weapon is an explosive device which relies on nuclear rather than chemical reactions,
allowing it to harness a far greater amount of energy than a conventional explosive. For example, the
W87, a modern U.S. nuclear warhead, has an explosive yield of 300 kilotons, which is equivalent to
300,000 tons of TNT. The nuclear reactions integral to nuclear weapons can be derived from fission, or
a combination of fission and fusion (called a thermonuclear weapon). A sufficient amount of fissile
material, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is required to construct a nuclear weapon. The
destructive power of a nuclear weapon comes from the blast (pressure shock wave), thermal radiation
(heat), and nuclear radiation (prompt and delayed). Because the production of fissile materials is a
complex process requiring extensive resources, efforts to secure global stocks of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium against theft or diversion are key to reducing the threats of nuclear terrorism
and proliferation.
How is the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technologies Linked with Proliferation?
As more countries invest in civilian nuclear infrastructure, particularly nuclear power, the trade in dual-
use goods (which can be used for peaceful or military purposes), increases. Nuclear power reactors,
while they provide an important source of energy, also produce plutonium in their spent fuel that could
potentially be used for weapons purposes. Some research reactors and medical isotope producers
continue to rely on the use of highly enriched uranium, which is a weapons-usable material. Determining
how to encourage the peaceful use of nuclear technologies while preventing the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons is therefore an ongoing policy challenge.
R e d u c i n g t h e T h r e a t o f N u c l e a r T e r r o r i s m
The possibility that non-state actors might steal or illicitly purchase highly enriched uranium or plutonium and use them to
construct an improvised nuclear device remains an ongoing concern. While the 9/11 terrorist attacks gave policymakers a
renewed sense of urgency, the need for nuclear threat reduction efforts first rose to prominence following the collapse of the
Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991. Concerned that political and economic instability in the former USSR would lead to the
theft or illicit trafficking of nuclear materials or weapons, U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar founded the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program to aid the successor states with nuclear security. The United States
subsequently expanded its threat reduction efforts under programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which is
working to reduce the civil use of HEU globally. In 2003 revelations that the A.Q. Khan network had illicitly sold critical
nuclear technologies to North Korea and other states of proliferation concern highlighted serious gaps in international export
controls. Initiatives such as UNSCR 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state
actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery, aim to fill this gap. In 2009, the U.S.
Obama administration announced efforts to lock down all nuclear weapons-usable materials in four years, convening a
multilateral Nuclear Security Summit attended by 47 countries in 2010 to advance this goal. A follow-on summit occurred
in Seoul, South Korea in 2012, with a third scheduled for 2014 in the Netherlands. While all of these programs have
made significant progress in reducing the nuclear terrorism threat, continued and enhanced international cooperation will be
required to succeed in keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists.
Progress Toward Nuclear Disarmament
Multilateral negotiations on legally-binding nuclear disarmament measures have proven difficult, as
demonstrated by the 15-year stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. However, there has been
some positive progress in the disarmament sphere, with renewed U.S.-Russia bilateral arms reductions
occurring under the New START Treaty, and signs of greater political commitment to the disarmament
goal by the United States and others in the international community. In 2007, four senior U.S. statesmen
– George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn – set forth the vision of a world free of
nuclear weapons in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. The op-ed and subsequent related work lent
renewed momentum to nuclear disarmament debates in the United States and other parts of the world.
While U.S. President Barack Obama remains committed to maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the
interim, he appears to share the “four horsemen’s” long-term disarmament goal, stating in his famous
April 2009 Prague Speech, “today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”
- Legality Of The Threat Of Use Of Nuclear Weapons -
The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996
concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of
fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law,
which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express
ruling on nuclear weapons.
Although the nuclear issue had long been a topic of discussion within United Nations bodies and the
Disarmament Commission in Geneva (later called the Disarmament Conference), it was avoided in
preparatory work for the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law, in particular the
1949 Conference that adopted the four
Geneva Conventions and the 1974-1977 Conference that drafted the Protocols additional thereto. As a
result, the modern world has always had to live with the threat of nuclear weapons, that is, nuclear war. That
threat loomed larger during the long years of the Cold War owing to the strategy adopted by the nuclear
powers and their allies; and even now that the Cold War is over it has still not completely disappeared. In
the present circumstances it was public opinio n and the non-nuclear and non-aligned countries which took
the initiative of asking the Court for an opinion, through such international bodies as the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations General Assembly.
Applicability of humanitarian law to the threat or use of nuclear weapons
One of the main points to be highlighted as far as humanitarian law is concerned is the fact that the Court
gave an affirmative reply to the question of the applicabilityof humanitari an law in the event of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons. Whereas it states in paragraphs 105 (2)A and B of its opinion that " there is in
neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons " or " any comprehensive and universal prohibition " of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such, it confirms in paragraph 105 (2)D that the threat or use of nuclear weapons " should also
be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those
of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law (...) " . This leads to the conclusion (see
para.105 [2 ] E) that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally prohibited under humanitarian law.
The threat of nuclear weapons or the policy of deterrence
The question submitted by the UN General Assembly covered not only the use but also the threat of
nuclear weapons. Indeed, the issue of the nuclear threat is profoundly bound up with the policy of
deterrence, although the Court did not consider it in depth. In response to the argument upheld by certain
States to the effect that the possession of nuclear weapons is in itself an unlawful threat to resort to force,
the Court examined the policy of deterrence. This is the policy whereby States holding nuclear weapons or
under the protection of such States seek to discourage military aggression by demonstrating that it would be
pointless, thus lending credibility to the intention to use nuclear weapons. T he Court declared: " Whether
this is a " threat " contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 [of the UN Charter ] depends on whether the particular
use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,
or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in the event that it were intended as a means of
defence, it would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality. In any of these
circumstances the use of force, and the threat to use it, would be unlawful under the law of the Charter "
(para. 48). This means that the actual threat of nuclear weapons, or the possession of them to discourage
military aggression in accordance with the policy of deterrence, is unlawful only if it constitutes a threat
within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.
"General" illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
In its Advisory Opinion the Court addresses the issue of the legality or illegality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in an ambiguous and highly controversial manner:
" It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and particularly the
principles and rules of humanitarian law;
" However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the
Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or
unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake"
How are these lines to be interpreted in law?
Exception in the case of an extreme circumstance of self-defence
The problem of self-defence and the applicability of humanitarian law, including the legality or illegality of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons, warrants closer attention. It appears prima facie that humanitarian law
should apply to all categories of international armed conflict, and therefore also to those in which self-
defence is invoked by one party to the conflict vis-à-vis the aggressor. To make amore accurate analysis,
however, ever since war itself has been recognized as unlawful under a series of international instruments
(the League of Nations Pact, the 1928 Paris Pact and the UN Charter), the international community has
entertained a thesis based on the discriminatory application of the law of war and the law of neutrality to the
party which is the victim of the aggression on the one hand and the party which is the aggressor on the
other. For instance, there are the International Law Association's " Budapest interpretative articles " of 1934
and t he 1963 resolutions of the Institute of International Law
- The International Nuclear Fuel Bank And Other Multilateral Approaches - An approach that arguably tackles the issue more at its roots than safeguards do is to transfer parts of
national nuclear fuel cycles into multilateral control. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle have
been debated since the 1970s, but without producing any tangible results. The reasoning behind multilateral
approaches is compelling: if guarantees can be given to states that nuclear fuel supply is maintained for their
power reactors even when they are suddenly cut off from supplies due to a change in political or
commercial circumstances, these states would lose any incentive to build their own enrichment or
reprocessing facilities. Such guarantees, like the establishment of a multilateral nuclear fuel bank, would be
able to cope with the continuing expansion of nuclear energy and it would also strengthen the non-
proliferation regime.
Multilateral approaches could come in several phases. The first short term step could be to assure fuel
supply for power reactors, such as by creating a multilateral fuel bank. Further long term phases could
involve putting existing national enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multilateral operation. This
would make nations who do not have indigenous supply of uranium to become completely dependent on the international community for nuclear power generation and hence ensure a greater level
of transparency in terms use o f imported uranium. Twelve such proposals have been brought forward by the international community inrecent years. Yet the proposal that has advanced in negotiations the most is
that of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), an independent think-tank. It envisages the creation of a LEU
stockpile to dissuade states to invest in their own nuclear fuel cycle.22 The funding target of $150 million
has been met in March 2009 and thus this project seems very promising. Among the states that have taken
initiative and submitted proposals for multilateralizing the fuel cycle are Austria, France, Germany, Japan,
the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
Alongside the 2006 IAEA General Conference, a Special Event on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle
was held and it was attended by delegates from 61 Member States. The aim was to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the proposals that were on the floor at that time; it was not the aim to decide on any
particular proposal. The Special Event discussed important issues such as supply conditionality, what kind
of fuel should be assured by the fuel bank and what the possible roles for the Agency could be.
Under the IAEA Statue, the Agency has experience in providing nuclear fuel cycle related services and the
Agency sees itself ready to facilitate and mange multilateral approaches. Problems with such approaches are
that states may come under the impression that they need to surrender some of their national sovereignty to
a multilateral organization, even though care was taken at the 2006 Special Event to communicate that a
multilateral approach is not aimed at undermining the right of a state to make its own decisions regarding its
fuel cycle.
Another important multilateral effort for non-proliferation and disarmament is the International
Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) which is a joint initiative of the
Australian and Japanese governments. The Commission is co-chaired by former Australian foreign minister
Gareth Evans and former Japanese foreign minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. Key goals for the Commission
include undertaking preparatory work for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010,
including shaping a global consensus in the lead-up to the Review Conference. They have come out with a
report titled “Eliminating Nuclear Threats – A Practical Agenda for Global
Policymakers” which provides a good insight on what the main problems are, from where the threats arise
and what can be done both in policy and action.
The conflict between Iran and other countries regarding Iran’s nuclear policy, led to Russia coming in
the spotlight. In November 2005, with an aim to convince Iran to contain their nuclear enrichment
program Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a joint ownership of a uranium enrichment
venture. By this proposal, Iran could have used Russian facilities to enrich its uranium to LEU in order
to power its power plants. This set the ball rolling for the IUEC or the International Uranium Enrichment
Centre in the Russian government circles.
Although initially envisioned as a bilateral relation between Russia and Iran, Moscow’s assured fuel
supply proposal quickly grew to a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle enterprise. As the first pilot project, the
IUEC in Angarsk was established between Russia and Kazakhstan. The project aimed at providing
“access to uranium enrichment to interested parties without transferring the sensitive technology or
restricting development of national nuclear fuel cycle programmes.” The IUEC follows an open joint
stock model with the IAEA as an observer so as to ensure independence from the independent
government budgets.
In order to effectively function, there has to be trust and confidence in the integrity of the assured supply
agreement between "supplier" and "recipient" states. The "recipient" states face the risk of having a
political decision by "supplier" states cutting off supply of nuclear fuel for the "recipient's" power
reactors. Russia however contented that, "the main assurance that the initiative should provide is that a
country complying with its non-proliferation commitments must be sure that, whatever the turn of
events, whatever changes take place in the international situation, it will receive the services guaranteed
to it."The key objective of IUEC is the provision of guaranteed uranium enrichment services to its
shareholders through guaranteed access to enrichment and conversion capacities of all Russian
enterprises.
It is at this juncture that the role of the IAEA as a facilitator between nuclear suppliers and receivers
comes back into focus. In the context of the agreement on setting up the IUEC as well as in response to
the IAEA Director General’s initiative on assurances of supply of nuclear fuel, Russia proposed creating
a guaranteed reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) in June 2007.
This LEU Guaranteed Reserve would be controlled by the IAEA and could be used by its Member
States that find themselves unable to procure LEU from the open market for political reasons.At present,
Ukraine and Armenia have joined the IUEC Agreement.
Following the IAEA’s approval of the LEU Guaranteed Reserve initiative, a guaranteed reserve was
placed under the IUEC storage facility in Angarsk in November 2010 and inaugurated in December
2010 after the first IAEA inspection. After completion of all formal procedures the agreement entered
into force on 3 February 2011. From that date on, the LEU reserve in Angarsk has been available for
IAEA Member States.Russian state nuclear energy company ROSATOM said that it had completed
arrangements for the fuel store in the vault of the International Enrichment Centre at Angarsk. It will be
managed under the auspices of the IAEA.
The establishment of the nuclear bank has elicited responses from the international community. The EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton said in 2010: "Following
the creation of the LEU reserve in the Russian federation in collaboration with the IAEA, today's
resolution constitutes the first decision on an assurance scheme under direct control of the IAEA." In the
same year, World Nuclear Association director general and former US Ambassador to the IAEA John
Ritch said, "Any mechanism that truly fortifies the nuclear non-proliferation system warrants support,
both from the nuclear industry and from governments worldwide," but noted that "no-one has yet
explained a scenario where a country is denied fuel by other governments even though it is meeting its
commitments - and then turns to the same governments to supply the fuel through the IAEA."
The concept of the nuclear bank, works to ensure that indigenous nuclear capabilities are not developed
thereby eliminating the risk of dual-use. Therefore, by removing the need to possess enrichment
technology, a nuclear bank acts as a deterrent to nuclear proliferation.
Since the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Atoms for Speech proposal the need to have a common
international body or agency controlling global nuclear supplies and allocating the same to countries to
pursue peaceful ends has been on the table. However, it is only in the Russian fuel bank under the JSC-
IUEA that such an ideal has seen practical implementation. Although efforts in the past have been made
towards this regard, only Russia seems to have reached such an extent of on-ground success. The
proposal to establish a guaranteed reserve of low enriched uranium in Angarsk as the first step
mechanism of guaranteed fuel supplies was outlined in the Communication of the Permanent Missions
of the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding a Joint Statement on Multilateral
Nuclear Fuel Assurances.
The Russian fuel bank as of November 2010, announced that it had established a 120 tonne stockpile of
LEU. The enrichment levels ranged from 2 per cent to 4.95 per cent and the expenses for creating and
maintaining the reserve were borne by the Russian Federation. This stockpile is available to any IAEA
member country in line with the principles of the NPT and not possessing reactors of its own. The
decision on the release of a material from the LEU Reserve is to be made by the Director General of the
IAEA.
The advantages of being a member of the IUEC and participating in the nuclear bank as proposed by the
Russian Federation includes– guaranteed supply of goods and services thereby increasing energy
security, diversification of supplies and optimum logistics, all rights of a joint stock company
shareholder and most significantly, participation in an international project with a mission to reduce
risks of sensitive technology proliferation.
However, the issue still remains as how to changes in the political environment would impact supplier-
receiver relations. This concern is extremely legitimate especially when seen against the backdrop of the
1979 Iranian Revolution when countries such as Germany, Russia, China, US, France and Ukraine
stalled their various supplies needed to maintain Iran’s nuclear power plants. Apart from this, there a
number of questions that concerns a multilaterialized Nuclear Fuel Cycle and a Nuclear fuel bank
regarding the access of material from such approaches for Non NPT states or Non NPT NSG states.
NSG , here refers to the Nuclear Suppliers Group , which is multinational body concerned with reducing
nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to
nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.
-Dual Use Technology-
Dual use technology as the term suggests is any technology which can serve both peaceful and military
purposes. The European Commission, Trade Topics defines dual use goods as, “products and technologies
normally used for civilian purposes but which may have military applications.” Dual technology has been
prevalent in the international scenario since the Second World War when Germany converted its ability to
make precision wind-up toys to produce shells and bomb fuses. Since then, at various moments in history,
epochal advancements in technology have come burdened with the threat of being used for violent
purposes. This holds true for the nuclear technology as well.
The possibility of using nuclear energy for civilian purposes particularly in the energy and medical sector
makes the prospective of acquiring the capacity of developing nuclear technology a lucrative idea for many
countries. However, as predicted by many realist theorists, the development of such a capacity by one nation
creates a domino effect in the international arena simply because of the latent military potential in civilian
nuclear technology. This is best exemplified as in the case of Brazil and Argentina, Israel and Iran and North
and South Korea.
The latent military possibilities of nuclear technology arise as a result of the enrichment process it undergoes
to serve even civilian needs. There are two pathways for nuclear enrichment—Uranium Pathway and
Plutonium Pathway. Natural Uranium contains 0.72 percent uranium-235 and 99.275 percent uranium-238
as well as a tiny fraction of uranium-234. Enrichment is the process that is undertaken to increase the
percentage of Uranium-235. Weapon grade uranium is a subset of the larger Highly enriched uranium
(HEU) category. It contains more than 90 per cent Uranium-235. Low enriched uranium (LEU) is used for
fueling reactors but not for powering bombs and contains more than 0.72 per cent but less than 20 per cent
uranium-235. The sticky point in the situation is that the same enrichment technology can be used to make
HEU or LEU.
In the case of Plutonium Pathway, plutonium-239 is the isotope required to fuel bombs. Nuclear reactors
produce this isotope when uranium-238 in the fuel mixture absorbs neutrons. The reprocessing process
involves a number of physical and chemical reactions to extract plutonium. Currently, the PUREX
technique is the only commercially available reprocessing mechanism. However, the PUREX reprocessing
technique separates the plutonium from the highly radioactive fission products. The fission products
actually provide a lethal barrier against the theft of unshielded spent fuel containing plutonium. Once
separated, this fuel needs to be guarded as a nuclear weapon itself, as it is directly usable in such a weapon.
The Uranium Pathway poses a risk of dual use of nuclear technology from the governments of countries
which possess such technology. Since the same process can be used to produce both HEU and LEU, the
entire responsibility of ensuring that the LEU technology is not misused to produce HEU relies on a system
of self-monitoring. The uranium enrichment process uses centrifuge technology. A centrifuge enrichment
plant can be designed to allow the operators of the plant to alter the connections so as to intensify the
enrichment process from LEU to HEU. Therefore, a LEU enrichment plant is a sleeping nuclear explosive
material factory. Countries which come under the purview of the IAEA and have signed the NPT thus have
the potential to reveal only the LEU enrichment plants and in the absence of an inspector carry out HEU
enrichment processes. This has been previously been the cause for doubt over South Korea and Iran.
The Plutonium pathway however raises the equally (if not more) important issue of nuclear capabilities
getting into the hands of non-state actors. While states are bound by some extent to certain regulations by
the signing of international agreements and by coming under the scanner of regulatory agencies, non-state
actors face no such qualms thereby intensifying the threat posed by them if they possess nuclear capacity.
Dual Use by Iran
Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and has ever since claimed to develop nuclear
technology for solely peaceful purposes while continuously being under the scanner of the international
community.
Iran’s nuclear activities are primarily concentrated in its commercial reactors—Bushehr reactors. It currently
has nearly 20,000 gas centrifuges at 3 major nuclear facilities. Iran’s failure to report significant parts of its
nuclear program to the IAEA and its effort to build up enrichment capabilities which could be used to
produce HEU for nuclear weaponry has caused an increasing amount of tension in the international front.
While Iran maintains that it reserves the right to develop its nuclear capabilities and is doing so only for
peaceful purposes within the mandate of the NPT, US Secretary of State John Kerry seems to differ. In
April 2014, he said that Iran had the ability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb
within two months.
The Iranian nuclear program is accompanied by both the threats of dual use technology. It has both
uranium enrichment plants and heavy-water reactors. While the enriched fuel can be easily stepped up from
LEU to HEU, the spent fuel from a heavy-water reactor contains plutonium suitable for a bomb. Owing to
international sanctions and resolutions, Iran has been forced to negotiate. US demands that the Iranian
nuclear capacity should be limited such that it would take the government at least a year to make a nuclear
warhead if it so chose. Other P5 nations and Germany, want Iran to limit their research and developmental
activities which could enhance their centrifuge efficiency. While Iran is offering to freeze the current
number of operating centrifuges for three to seven years, it demands that following this there must be
sufficient enrichment capacity to produce fuel for the Bushehr power plant when its fuel supply agreement
with Russia expires in 2021. This would inevitably mean an increase in their nuclear enrichment capacity and
would reduce the amount of time required to produce weapons-grade uranium to a few weeks.
As of November 2014, a yearlong effort to reach an enduring accord with Iran to dismantle large parts of its
nuclear infrastructure has been given a 7 month extension.
- A t t r i b u t i o n A n d D e t e r r e n c e -
A third way of reducing the proliferation threat arising from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle could start at the
other end and would indeed be a quite innovative approach. Rather than physically preventing states from misusing their civilian nuclear infrastructure, the idea is to deter them from doing so. Undoubtedly, there already exists a deterrence effect when safeguards agreements are in place. If a state is
assumed to be in non- compliance with its safeguards agreement, that state will find itself under
investigation by the Board of Governors, which may refer a case to the UN Security Council and thereby
trigger sanctions.
For example, Iran was sanctioned by the Council in 2006 and 2007 after the Board of Governors found
the Member State in non-compliance with its CSA safeguards. Similar was the case with Iraq, where
special powers were conferred upon the IAEA in order to dismantle the nuclear program of Iraq.
The approach introduced here is aimed at countering the threat of terrorists being able to
acquire sufficient nuclear fissile material to build a rudimentary weapon. It is generally agreed
that terrorist would only be able to obtain a weapons essential ingredient with the help of a
state that possesses the necessary enrichment or reprocessing facilities.32 In such a
condition, either a state would knowingly abuse their nuclear energy infrastructure and provide
the terrorists with nuclear materials or nuclear facilities are not adequately secured.
Analysts have identified such state sponsored terrorist activity to be a growing threat to international
security and the IAEA also has a nuclear security program aimed minimizing this threat possibility. 33 If
a weapon has detonated or if one has been intercepted in export/import controls, it could be possible to
attribute the device‟s nuclear fissile material to its origin. The basic technologies required for such
attribution already exist and they have been proven to be successful for unexploded devices. Some
scientists have also predicted for these methods to work by examining the debris in scenarios when a
weapon has detonated. The major remaining problem to establish this deterrent capability is indeed
political: a comprehensive database containing physical, isotopic and chemical properties of the world‟s
nuclear materials is required for attribution. This information, however, is generally kept top secret and
withheld by states as it reveals sensitive information about their nuclear facilities. Therefore, this is
possible only when we have an International Nuclear Fuel Bank that would maintain the records of
origins and transport of nuclear materials emphasizing the importance of the same. It has been
suggested that the IAEA, as a multilateral institution that has demonstrated technical expertise and
impartiality, could be a suitable host such a sensitive database. A similar database is already being
managed by the Agency, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) which records incidents involving
illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.
The unforeseen detonation or interception of a nuclear weapon caused by state-sponsored terrorist
activity is an unlikely yet dramatic event to occur. If it can be proven, using a nuclear materials
database, that a particular state has knowingly diverted nuclear material for a weapon, that state
would face severe sanctions by the UN Security Council. This is demonstrated by the Security
Council Resolution 1540 in which the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obliges
all states not to support non-state actors that attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. The extent to
which this method would be working remains debatable between policy makers and academics
alike. On one hand, the argument goes that effective deterrence using a materials database is
likely to work, because research in attribution is progressing steadily. This would require the IAEA
Committee to hold difficult negotiations with the nuclear powers to establish such a database. On
the other hand, skeptics point out to the political difficulties associated with establishing such a
required database. Key states will be unlikely to surrender sensitive nuclear information to a
multilateral database, even if this database is to be kept secret.
- R e c e n t A d v a n c e m e n t s -
When we talk about safety and legitimacy of nuclear programmes and threat of use of nuclear weapons, the
Asian and Arab sub continent Continent springs to mind.
IRAN Iran has a large-scale nuclear development program under way, stressing a complete nuclear fuel-cycle,
enabling it to make highly enriched uranium (HEU). Ostensibly for civilian power generation, HEU also can
be used for weapons making. Its enrichment facility at Natanz has been the centre of international disputes.
Iran repeatedly stresses that HEU is a substitute for oil to generate electricity, because they feel that their
valuable oil should be used for high-value products, not simple electricity generation.
"Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible,
23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants," the Iranian Shah had previously said.
The Iranians believe that concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation are pretextual, and any suspension
of enrichment is simply intended to ultimately deprive Iran of the right to have an independent nuclear
technology:
“[W]e had a suspension for two years and on and off negotiations for three... Accusing Iran of having "the
intention" of acquiring nuclear weapons has, since the early 1980s, been a tool used to deprive Iran of any
nuclear technology, even a light water reactor or fuel for the American-built research reactor... the United
States and EU never even took the trouble of studying various Iranian proposals: they were –from the very
beginning –bent on abusing this Council and the threat of referral and sanctions as an instrument of
pressure to compel Iran to abandon the exercise of its NPT guaranteed right to peaceful nuclear
technology“.
Iran says that its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology has been the subject of "the most extensive
and intensive campaign of denial, obstruction, intervention and misinformation" and that the international
community has been subject to "bias, politicized and exaggerated information" on the Iranian nuclear
program and activities. Iran believes it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a right which in 2005 the U.S. and the EU-3 began to assert had been
forfeited by a clandestine nuclear program that came to light in 2002.
However, the recent January 2014 conference on the Iran Nuclear deal has begun, as negotiations to
conclude an interim agreement in the Iranian nuclear dispute resumed.
ISRAEL Israelis commonly estimated to have 100- 200 nuclear weapons, deliverable by ballistic missiles and aircraft,
and possibly including thermonuclear weapons.
It’s one source of highly enriched uranium was its nuclear complex at Dimona, which has been reportedly
shut down for several years.
Israel has not signed the NPT, but it did sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.Isolated
in the UN, Israel relies heavily on American support. In the Security Council, the United States vetoes
resolutions aimed specifically against the Israeli nuclear program. In the General Assembly, though, the one-
state one-vote principle makes such protection harder. Criticizing Israel is one of the few issues that most
the Non-Aligned Movement Nations can reliably agree on.
Israeli officials publicly characterize Iran's nuclear program as an "existential threat" to Israel, and Israeli
leaders assert that all options are kept open in dealing with Tehran. The threat has been compared to the
threat the Jews of Europe faced prior to the Holocaust.
Israel, which is not a party to the NPT and is widely believed to possess a huge chunk Middle East's nuclear
arsenal does not believe the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate conclusion that Iran had stopped its
nuclear weapons program in 2003, insisting that it has additional evidence of an active and continued
Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Israel has also rejected the IAEA's November 2007 and February 2008 reports on Iran, and Israeli officials
have called for the resignation of IAEA Director General ElBaradei, accusing him of being "pro-Iranian."
While Israel has never admitted to having nuclear weapons, few international experts question the
Jewish state's presence on the world's list of nuclear powers.
Its nuclear capability is arguably the most secretive weapons of mass destruction programme in the world.
Unlike Iran and North Korea - two countries whose alleged nuclear ambitions have recently come to the
fore - Israel has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to prevent the global spread of
nuclear weapons.
As a result, it is not subject to inspections and the threat of sanctions by the United Nations nuclear
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency
Point Of Conflict Over Non-Proliferation In The Middle East
The most serious attempt to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East
took place within the framework of the “Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)” working group talks
between 1992-1995. With the participation of 14 regional actors, ACRS was one of the five multilateral
working groups established after the post-Gulf War 1991 Madrid Conference hosted by the Spanish
government and co-sponsored by the USA and the USSR.
The primary reason the talks collapsed was a fundamental disagreement between the Egyptian and Israeli
delegations about priorities. The Egyptians said that the creation of Middle East nuclear-free zone was
the first priority, while the Israeli delegation said that comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace was the
precondition for creating a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ME NWFZ).
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) DPRK did originally sign the NPT but withdrew from it. DPRK has actively carried out a nuclear
programme, since, which has involved tests which invited many sanctions. Not a lot required on them as
there is little or no ambiguity in their nuclear ambitions.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN Both nations have not signed the NPT.
D e f i n i n g L e g i t i m a c y
The difference in the policies of countries (falling under Non proliferation regime and other wise) has
sparked a debate with the “have and have-not” of the nuclear weapons ,post NPT. India and Pakistan
debate the idea of NPT to be biased towards those countries which possessed Nuclear Weapons before
the NPT and are still trying to get rid of the stockpiles via various treaties such as the START and the New
START treaties. Meanwhile the idea of NPT is questioned in the Review conferences where India and
Pakistan are negotiated with for inclusion in the NPT. Israel calls NPT flawed which can be withdrawn
from and violated like most Arab Nations. The idea of US nuclear weapons that have been placed in
Germany under the NATO is believed to be conflicting with the NPT principles. Bear in mind, that such
contraventions in the given scenario make it difficult to define legitimacy.
- Q u e s t i o n s T o B e C o n s i d e r e d -
1. What is your country’s stand towards the current non-proliferation regime (NPT, CSA and AP)?
2. Is it necessary for the non NPT Nuclear Weapons States be brought under the non-
proliferation regime so that the Non Nuclear Weapon States can be safeguarded?
3. Is the NPT complete or does it have flaws? What is the policy of each state over the use of
Nuclear weapons?
4. Can non proliferation and the current agenda at hand be interlinked? How or how not?
5. What is the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons? Is it sufficient to hold back any nation from its use?
6. What is the most effective and acceptable way for multi-lateralizing the nuclear fuel
cycle? Does multi-lateralizing the fuel cycle protect the interests of Non Nuclear Weapon
States?
7. Considering international skepticism towards a comprehensive multilateral database of
nuclear materials particularly from the non-weapons states, how feasible is this approach?
8. Is the current threat of Nuclear weapons disturbing or maintaining world peace?
9. Can the Middle East or the Asian Continent be a NWFZ?
10. Can the Dual Use Technology be brought into question while talking of threats?
P o s s i b l e P o i n t s T o A d d r e s s I n T h e R e s o l u t i o n 1. Establishing a new or strengthening the existing non-proliferation regime. 2. Including crucial partners like India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran and DPRK in non-proliferation
measures. 3. Multi-lateralizing the nuclear fuel cycle. 4. Ensuring complete transparency in trading and enrichment of nuclear materials. 5. Further strengthening of the Illicit Trafficking Database by early reporting of incidents. 6. Establishing a possible comprehensive multilateral nuclear materials database and
defining its composition and accessibility.
7. Ensuring strict adherence to UNSC Resolution 1540 to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons.
8. Considering the legality of use of nuclear weapons. 9. Prevention or avoidance of the use nuclear weapons. 10. The threat of nuclear weapons maintaining/disturbing world peace.
S o m e U s e f u l R e s e a r c h L i n k s
Advisory opinion of the ICJ on threat of Use of Nuclear weapons
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Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968 July 1.
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