The Reactor Oversight The Reactor Oversight Process:Process:

Development and ResultsDevelopment and Results

Tom HoughtonTom Houghton

Nuclear Energy InstituteNuclear Energy Institute

September 20, 2005September 20, 2005

2

What is NEI?What is NEI? The Nuclear Energy Institute is the industry’s The Nuclear Energy Institute is the industry’s

policy organization, whose mission is to foster policy organization, whose mission is to foster the beneficial uses of nuclear technology in its the beneficial uses of nuclear technology in its myriad formsmyriad forms

NEI’s membership includes 250 corporate NEI’s membership includes 250 corporate members in 14 nationsmembers in 14 nations

NEI and its predecessor organizations have NEI and its predecessor organizations have served the nuclear industry since 1953served the nuclear industry since 1953

NEI’s key organizations areNEI’s key organizations are Governmental AffairsGovernmental Affairs CommunicationsCommunications Nuclear GenerationNuclear Generation

3

NEI 2006 Business PlanNEI 2006 Business PlanCORE ESSENTIAL

ACTIVITY

Enhancing the Business

Environment for Operating Plants

CORE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY

Creating the Business

Environment for New Plants

Managing Used Nuclear

Fuel

Advancing a National

Energy Policy

Sustaining the Nuclear

Infrastructure

Branding, Building

Public Support

Enhancing The Regulatory Environment

Security

Emergency Planning

Materials

Risk-Informed Regulation

New Plant Regs.

NRC Effectiveness

New Plant Incentives

Price-Anderson Renewal

Appropriations for R&D, Nuclear Power 2010

Environmental Policy

Fuel Supply

Workforce

Manufacturing Base

Financial Community Outreach

Adequate Funding

Funding Reform

Licensing

EPA Standard

Nevada

Project Support

Advertising

Media Relations

State Govt., Labor Outreach

Environmental Programs

5 ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES

4

In April 2000 NRC implemented the In April 2000 NRC implemented the new Reactor Oversight Processnew Reactor Oversight Process

The new process revised, and for the first time, The new process revised, and for the first time, integrated NRC’s inspection, assessment and integrated NRC’s inspection, assessment and enforcement programsenforcement programs

This presentation will describeThis presentation will describe Reasons for the changeReasons for the change Results to dateResults to date

5

Industry Performance improved Industry Performance improved dramatically in the 1980sdramatically in the 1980s

SafetySafety Production (capacity factor)Production (capacity factor) Cost ($/kw)Cost ($/kw)

6

US Capacity Factor 1981-2001

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

1981 1986 1991 1996 2001

Top Quartile

Median

Bottom Quartile

Std Dev

U.S. Capacity Factor 1981-2001U.S. Capacity Factor 1981-2001

7

US Electricity Production Cost US Electricity Production Cost Estimates Estimates (1981-2000)(1981-2000)

(in constant 2000 cents/kWh)(in constant 2000 cents/kWh)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00

Nuclear1.76

Coal 1.79

Gas 5.69

Source: Pre 1995: UDI, Post 1995: RDI Modeled Production Cost

8

US Production Cost ($ per Installed KW -- Constant yr 2000 $)

0

50

100

150

200

250

1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Bottom Quartile

Median

Top Quartile

Std Deviation

U.S. Production Costs 1988-2000U.S. Production Costs 1988-2000

9

Automatic Scrams Per Unit

012345678

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Scra

ms

per

year

Industry’s safety performance, as measured by Industry’s safety performance, as measured by NRC and WANO indicators, continued to improveNRC and WANO indicators, continued to improve

10

Significant Events: Industry Average Significant Events: Industry Average (1985-2000)(1985-2000)

2.37

1.61

0.81 0.86 0.8

0.440.27 0.29 0.25 0.2

0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.030

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000

Source: NUS

11

Safety System PerformanceSafety System Performance

70

8492 91 94 94 94 98 95 96 94

0

20

40

60

80

100

89 91 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001

% o

f sy

stem

s ac

hie

vin

g 20

05 g

oals

Source: WANO 2001 Performance Indicators

12

Collective Radiation Exposure - BWRs

859988

846

475

403446

368 363

265

184

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Ma

n-R

em

pe

r U

nit

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997

13

US Manufacturing IASR US Finance, Insurance, Real Estate IASR US Nuclear IASR*

Industrial Accident Safety Rate

3.954.004.204.204.30

4.704.70

1.10 0.900.620.80 0.80

0.60 0.70

0.260.77 0.64 0.46 0.45 0.29 0.340.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Indu

stri

al A

ccid

ent Sa

fety

Rat

e (IA

SR):

Acc

iden

ts# P

er 2

00,0

00 W

orke

r H

ours

#Number of accidents resulting in lost work, restricted work, or fatalities per 200,000 worker hours *Full- time, on- site employees

Sources: WANO and BLS

Despite objective evidence of improving safety, NRC Violations continued to

increase

Total Industry Violations

793 801

904 925

989

620

1,001

1,519

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Increase was driven by a 100% jump in Level IV Violations (minor process and procedure

errors)

Industry Violations - Severity Level 4

710 715

795820

927

567

905

1427

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

4

The consequences of the old approach were significant, both economically…

Civil Penalties

0

10

20

30

40

50

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

# of Violations

$0$1,000,000$2,000,000$3,000,000$4,000,000$5,000,000$6,000,000$7,000,000$8,000,000

Civil Penalty Amount

Number Civil Penalty Amount $

…AND in diverting NRC and industry resources from focusing on more risk significant areas

17

NRC agreed a new approach was appropriate

NRC’s internal reviews found the previous NRC’s internal reviews found the previous approach inefficient, untimely, very subjective approach inefficient, untimely, very subjective and inscrutable to licensees and the publicand inscrutable to licensees and the public

Advances in risk assessment provided Advances in risk assessment provided confidence that risk-informed performance confidence that risk-informed performance indicators and simplified risk analyses could indicators and simplified risk analyses could be used as effective assessment toolsbe used as effective assessment tools

18

RADIATIONSAFETY

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY ASA RESULT OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR

REACTOR OPERATION

REACTOR SAFETY

SAFEGUARDS

INITIATINGEVENTS

MITIGATING SYSTEMS

BARRIERINTEGRITY

EMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

PUBLIC OCCUPATIONALPHYSICAL

PROTECTION

Cornerstones

HUMANPERFORMANCE

SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT

PROBLEMIDENTIFICATION

ANDRESOLUTION

Cross-Cutting Areas

NRCs OverallSafety Mission

Strategic Performance

Areas

Cornerstone Chart

19

DevelopInspection

Plan

AssessResults

DetermineRegulatory

Action

ConductInspections

Regulatory Oversight ModelLicensee ProvidesSelf Assessments& Audit Results*

Licensee ProvidesSafety PerformanceIndicators

Licensee Assesses& CorrectsDeficiencies

Licensee ProvidesSelf Assessment &Audit Plans*

Regulatory Oversight ProcessRisk-Informed, Performance-Based Assessment,

Inspection and Enforcement

* Future

20

What are appropriate roles for Licensees and Regulators?

Performance Model for Successful Plant Operations

Inputs Management Actions Outputs

People

Plant

Processes

Procedures

Safety Performance

Cost Effective

Production

Human Performance

Self Assessment

Corrective Action

21

Reactor Oversight Process

Enforcement

Public Meetings

•Press Releases•NRC WebSite•PDR/ADAMS

Assessment ReportsInspection Plans

Inspection FindingsPerformance Indicators

Communications

Assessment Process

(Action Matrix)

Agency Response

Management ConferenceMonitor Licensee Actions

NRC InspectionsAdditional Regulatory Actions

Event Response(SI/AIT/IIT)

Performance IndicatorsRisk Informed

Baseline InspectionsGeneric Safety

InspectionsSupplemental

Inspections

Significance Determination Process Performance Indicator Thresholds

Performance IndicatorsInspections

Significance Evaluations Significance Evaluations

Cornerstones of Safety

22

Performance BandsSAMPLE INDICATOR

Licensee Response

Increased Regulator Response

Required Regulator Response

Unacceptable Performance

23

ACTION MATRIXR

ES

ULT

S

INCREASING SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

All AssessmentInputs (PIs andInspection Areas)Green; Cornerstone objectives fully met

One or Two inputs White (in different cornerstones) in a Strategic Performance Area; Cornerstone objectives fully met

One DegradedCornerstone (2 W or 1 Y input) or any 3 W inputs in strategic performance area; Cornerstones met-minimal reduction in safety margin

Repetitive/multipledegraded cornerstones, Multiple Y or 1R input; Cornerstone met-longstanding issues or signif safety margin reduction

Overall Unacceptable Performance; Operation not permitted. Unacceptable safety margin.

RE

SP

ON

SE

Routine ResidentInspector Interaction

SRI/BC Meet with Licensee

DD/RA Meet withLicensee Management

EDO (or Commission) Meet with SeniorLicense Management

Management Meeting

Commission Meeting with Senior LicenseeManagement

Licensee Action

Licensee Corrective Action Licensee Corrective Action with NRCOversight

Licensee SelfAssessment with NRCOversight

Licensee Performance Improvement Plan withNRC Oversight

NRCInspection

Risk-Informed BaselineInspection Program

Inspection Followup Baseline and Inspection Focused on Cause of Degradation

Baseline and Team Insp. Focused on Cause of Overall Degradation

RegulatoryActions

None -Document Response to Degrading Area in Inspection Report

Docket Response toDegrading Condition

-10 CFR 2.204 DFI-10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter-CAL/Order

Order to Modify, Suspend or RevokeLicensed Activities

AssessmentReport

DD review/signAssessment Report(w/ inspection plan)

DD review/signAssessment Report(w/ inspection plan)

RA review/signAssessment Report(w/ inspection plan)

RA review/signAssessment Report(w/ inspection plan)

CO

MM

UN

ICA

TIO

N

PublicAssessment Meeting

SRI or Branch ChiefMeet with Licensee

SRI or Branch ChiefMeet with Licensee

RA Discuss Performancewith Licensee

EDO (or Commission) Discuss Performance with Senior Licensee Management

Commission Meetingwith Senior LicenseeManagement

Regional Review Only Headquarters Review

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

1Q

99

2Q

99

3Q

99

4Q

99

1Q

00

2Q

00

3Q

00

4Q

00

1Q

01

2Q

01

3Q

01

4Q

01

1Q

02

2Q

02

3Q

02

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours

Pe

rce

nt

of

Gre

en

-Wh

ite

Th

res

ho

ld

Unit Average

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

1Q99 2Q99 3Q99 4Q99 1Q00 2Q00 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 3Q02

Safety System Functional FailuresP

erc

en

t o

f G

ree

n-W

hit

e T

hre

sh

old

PWR Average BWR Average

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1Q99 2Q99 3Q99 4Q99 1Q00 2Q00 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 3Q02

ERO Drill Participation

Pe

rce

nt

of

Gre

en

-Wh

ite

Th

res

ho

ld

Average ERO Drill Participation

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

1Q99 2Q99 3Q99 4Q99 1Q00 2Q00 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 3Q02

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

Pe

rce

nt

of

Gre

en

-Wh

ite

Th

res

ho

ld

Site Average Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

0%

20%

40%

60%

1Q99 2Q99 3Q99 4Q99 1Q00 2Q00 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 3Q02

Protected Area Security Equipment Performance Index

Pe

rce

nt

of

Gre

en

-Wh

ite

Th

res

ho

ld

Site Average

29

Performance Indicator TrendPerformance Indicator Trend

New PIs > Green by Quarter

0

5

10

15

20

25

1Q002Q

003Q

004Q

001Q

012Q

013Q

014Q

011Q

022Q

023Q

024Q

021Q

032Q

033Q

034Q

031Q

042Q

043Q

044Q

041Q

05

SEC

PRAD

ORAD

EP

BA

MS

IE

30

Greater than GreenPerformance Indicators

Greater than Green PIsTotal = 91 (ROP Inception through 1Q05)

0

5

10

15

20

25

IE1 IE2 IE3 MS1 MS2 MS3 MS4 MS5 BA1 BA2 EP1 EP2 EP3 OR1 PR1 PP1 PP2 PP3

Yellow

White

31

Inspection Finding Trend

New Findings > Green by Quarter

0

5

10

15

20

Find

ings

SEC

PRAD

ORAD

EP

BAR

MS

IE

32

Greater than GreenGreater than GreenInspection FindingsInspection Findings

Greater than Green Findings by CornerstoneTotal = 133 (ROP inception through 1Q05)

0

1020

3040

50

6070

80

IE MS BAR EP ORAD PRAD SEC

Red

Yellow

White

33

Inspection FindingsInspection FindingsFY 2002 - 2004FY 2002 - 2004

20022002 20032003 20042004

GreenGreen 696696 716716 881881

White White 2626 1414 1212

YellowYellow 22 22 00

RedRed 33 11 00

TOTALTOTAL 727727 733733 893893

34

““Greater than Green” TrendGreater than Green” Trend

New FINs and PIs > Green

010203040506070

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

New PI > G New FIN > G

35

Crosscutting IssuesCrosscutting Issues

Number of Crosscutting Issues

50 59 67

177

392

050

100150200250300350400450

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

36

Industry ActionsIndustry Actions

Developing crosscutting criteriaDeveloping crosscutting criteria Performance indicatorsPerformance indicators

MSPIMSPI Replacement for Scrams w/ loss of normal heat Replacement for Scrams w/ loss of normal heat

removal PIremoval PI Alternate RCS leakage PIAlternate RCS leakage PI

Significance Determination Process (SDP) Significance Determination Process (SDP) improvementsimprovements

37

ROP continues to evolve Availability of data has enhanced public confidenceAvailability of data has enhanced public confidence Continue to modify performance indicators and Continue to modify performance indicators and

significance determination process for inspectionssignificance determination process for inspections Focuses industry &regulator on risk significant issuesFocuses industry &regulator on risk significant issues Degrading performance can be identified before Degrading performance can be identified before

serious increase in risk to publicserious increase in risk to public Has resulted in performance improvements by Has resulted in performance improvements by

focusing on problem areas focusing on problem areas Has demonstrated need to reassess deterministic Has demonstrated need to reassess deterministic

regulationsregulations HOWEVER, ROP is not a substitute for vigilance, HOWEVER, ROP is not a substitute for vigilance,

and a willingness to aggressively pursue off normal and a willingness to aggressively pursue off normal conditionsconditions