The Reason to Contribute to Cooperative Schemes

Discussion

THE REASON TO CONTRIBUTE TO COOPERATIVESCHEMES

An Examination of Christopher McMahon’sCollective Rationality and Collective Reasoning

Christopher McMahon’s engaging book Collective Rationality andCollective Reasoning is divided into two parts, as the title suggests.1

The first examines cooperation, exploring when and why it isrational for an individual to cooperate with others. The secondexamines collective reasoning, considering how, and to what itextent, it can bring into agreement persons who initially disagree.In the following, I will comment on one aspect or component ofeach part. The centerpiece of the first part is what McMahon callsthe Principle of Collective Rationality (PCR), according to which aperson “has sufficient reason to contribute as provided to a coopera-tive scheme that produces something that one regards as good if thevalue to one of the outcome of the scheme, when one’s contributionis added to the others that will actually be made, exceeds the value toone of the noncooperative outcome” (pp. 21–22). Since McMahonidentifies himself with the contractarian tradition of political philos-ophy according to which the state is most fundamentally a mutuallybeneficial cooperative scheme (p. 63), PCR provides a foundationand framework for peoples’ obligation to the state and its laws. It isPCR and its application to political obligation that will be the focusof my attention. As for the second part, I will focus on McMahon’sbold claim that the fact that other apparently competent reasonersdisagree with one’s own view does not in itself give you any reasonto change your opinion, even if everyone disagrees with you. “Anindividual facing even widespread disagreement,” McMahon main-tains, “should stick to her guns unless she is given good substantivereason to believe that she is wrong” (p. 116). The fact that other

Philosophical Studies 116: 171–181, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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competent reasoners disagree with you, according to McMahon,does not in itself give you a reason to change your mind; instead,it gives you only a reason to reassess the case for your own posi-tion in light of what others say, which might or might not lead youto discover substantive reasons to change your mind. This matterseems especially pressing now when Americans are still debatingthe justification for the war in Iraq and wondering whether a condi-tion upon going to war should be that the world community, via theUnited Nations, agrees that an attack is warranted.

I

McMahon begins the first part of the book by reviewing familiarobstacles to cooperation. One is simple coordination. If two peoplewant to meet, and could just as easily meet at any number ofplaces, they must be sure to coordinate and both go to the sameplace. Coordination problems are usually easily solved, as in thiscase, which can be solved simply by agreeing upon a locationto meet. But things are not so easy in different circumstances,in particular circumstances that have the structure of the famousprisoner’s dilemma. In such cases, each party fares best if he doesnot cooperate when others cooperate; worst when he cooperates andothers do not; second best for him is all parties cooperating; thirdbest for him is all parties not cooperating. Here’s a simple example:If one is a spectator at some event, one does best (in terms of beingable to see the action) if one stands up (does not cooperate) whileeveryone else remains seated (cooperates); worst if one remainsseated while others stand; second best is if everybody sits; thirdif everyone stands.2 The problem for cooperation is that no matterwhat others do, each person is better off standing, because (a) ifeveryone else stands then it is better to stand also because other-wise one’s view will be blocked by the people in front standing,and (b) if everyone sits it is better to stand and gain an especiallygood view. If everyone follows this logic, however, everyone endsup standing and no one has a better view than if all were sitting.This constitutes a failure of cooperation, since an outcome moredesirable to all (everyone sitting) fails to be realized. This is whatit means to say the result is not Pareto optimal. The same analysis

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can be applied to cooperating to keep the environment clean: sinceone’s own polluting will be insignificant if others don’t pollute,and one’s own refraining from polluting will be pointless if otherspollute, even a person who values a clean environment fares bestif he goes ahead and pollutes. If all do this, however, the result iseveryone polluting, which is less desirable from everyone’s point ofview (assuming all want a cleaner environment) than is a situationin which all cooperate and refrain from polluting.

McMahon notes that despite this many people contribute tocooperative schemes that have the structure of the prisoner’sdilemma. Moreover, he claims, people feel confident that suchcooperation is rational (p. 15). Adopting the method of reflectiveequilibrium, he takes this to establish that there must be good reasonto cooperate, and the task is merely to uncover the reason implicit inthe common practice of cooperation. The reason, he claims, is PCR:people have a reason to cooperate so long as the outcome is better,given what others will actually do, than the outcome if there is nocooperation at all.

The first thing to notice is that PCR is not a reason at all, atleast not in the usual sense. A reason, in the usual sense, is thatwhich justifies a course of action. So, for example, the reason forwearing gloves in December is that it is cold out. But PCR does notjustify cooperating, in the way cold weather justifies wearing gloves.Rather, it simply states that cooperation is rational or justified undercertain conditions. As such, it is a principle or guideline for choice.But what we need to know – and what McMahon doesn’t clearly tellus – is why we should accept this principle, rather than some other.In particular, we need to know why we should accept this principleinstead of the principle that lies behind the logic outlined above thatcalls for non-cooperation in circumstances with the structure of theprisoner’s dilemma.

I think there are two answers to the question implicit inMcMahon’s discussion. The first is that we fare better collectively ifwe all adopt PCR, because otherwise we fall victim to the prisoner’sdilemma and end up with outcomes that are not Pareto optimal.Ensuring Pareto optimality, McMahon claims, is “a condition thatmust be satisfied by any purported formulation of the requirement tocontribute to cooperative schemes” (p. 17). I’m willing to grant that

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McMahon is right that PCR is a reasonable principle of collectiverationality or choice, just because it ensures Pareto optimality. Thereis a problem nonetheless: We need to know why individuals shouldopt for a collective principle rather than an individual principle(such as the principle underlying the choice of non-cooperation incircumstances with the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma). Theanswer cannot be that adopting a collective principle will solve theprisoner’s dilemma and ensure Pareto optimality. It can’t becausethe choice between a collective principle and an individual principlehas the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma: each person fares bestif he adopts an individual principle while others adopt a collectiveprinciple; worst if he chooses a collective principle while othersadopt an individual principle; second best is all choosing a collectiveprinciple; third is all choosing an individual principle. It mightbe argued that this complaint is rooted in an individualistic bias,because it depends on assuming that the individual or self-interestedpoint of view is the starting place. But if this is an unfair startingplace, if it is just as reasonable to start from the collective pointof view, then the prisoner’s dilemma is not a problem in need of asolution, which is clearly not McMahon’s view.

The second answer to the question is that PCR better captures ourintuitions about rational cooperation than alternatives such as theprinciple of fairness. Fairness, McMahon notes, is the most popularanswer to the question of why we should each contribute to coopera-tive schemes that have the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma: ifone benefits from a cooperative scheme, it is only fair that onecontributes one’s share (p. 16). Notice that fairness provides a reasonto contribute in what I have called the usual sense: it justifies (ademand of) cooperation. PCR, even if it does better capture ourintuitions about rational cooperation, is still not a reason in the usualsense. To this extent, the second answer, even if granted, may not beadequate on its own; it may have to work in conjunction with some-thing like the first answer.3 Be that as it may, it is worth examiningMcMahon’s argument for PCR over the principle of fairness.

The problem with the principle of fairness, according toMcMahon, is that fairness does not ensure cooperation. It doesn’tbecause fairness is just one value among many, and, as such, canbe outweighed by other values. A person may judge that the moral


good he can do with the resources fairness requires him to contributeto a cooperative scheme such as the state is sufficient to outweighthe moral demands of fairness (p. 17). Were this the case, the personwould not, all things considered, have reason to contribute to thecooperative scheme. And if this were the case with many people,the cooperative scheme would collapse (or depend on an irrationalbasis). This is, intuitively, an unacceptable result, McMahon claims.And, perhaps just for this reason, McMahon claims that we thinkthat even if the moral good a person can do with the resources fair-ness requires him to contribute to a cooperative scheme outweighsthe moral demands of fairness, the person is nonetheless required tomake his contribution (pp. 18–19).

It is crucial to be clear about what McMahon has in mind here.It helps here to remember that if were talking about the state as acollective scheme a person’s contribution consists in obeying thelaw. This includes making a contribution in the familiar sense,because the laws include tax laws. But it is not limited to suchcases. McMahon’s worry is that people may find that, from theirperspective, disobeying the law is morally superior to obeyingbecause the moral good that is realized by disobeying is greater thanthe moral loss when one unfairly does not contribute to a cooperativescheme from which one benefits.

I’m unconvinced, however. Note, first, that one of the advan-tages of large cooperative schemes such as the state is that theycan handle a bit of slack: they will not collapse if some smallpercentage of persons who benefit do not contribute.4 This slackallows the state to allow that if there are good moral reasons amember may be excused from contributing, or allowed to contributeless. Indeed, there are numerous examples of this in the Americansystem. There are some who are morally opposed to participatingin combat, so-called conscientious objectors. Such persons, if theycan establish that their objection is genuine, are excused by thestate from engaging in combat. It is true that they are required tocontribute to the war effort in some other way, serving in a non-combative role either domestically or at the front lines. However,there can be no doubt that such persons are required to sacrifice lessthan those who engage in combat, even though they presumablybenefit just as much from the state as a cooperative scheme. Our

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tax system provides a different example. First, it allows persons todeduct charitable contributions, allowing citizens to contribute toorganizations, e.g., Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, ChristianCharities, one’s church, mosque or synagogue, that they think willbetter promote their moral values than would the state were it toreceive more taxes. Second, the tax structure is such that those whohave an income below some minimum level pay no taxes, and, abovethat level, the tax rate increases as income increases. This reflects aconviction that one’s contribution depends to some extent on one’sability contribute, regardless of the benefits one receives. We see thisin other cooperative schemes. For instance, if I can’t host a rotatingbridge game because my apartment is too small to accommodatefour players, we generally allow that the group can allow me toparticipate and excuse me from hosting. This is especially the caseif my inability to contribute stems from the fact that my resourcesare dedicated to moral causes. If, for instance, I have no room inmy apartment because the space is taken up by things required formy handicapped child, we generally think that I can benefit fromthe bridge club without hosting – without contributing to it. Or,if I support various charities, and for that reason cannot afford adwelling that has room to host guests, we generally allow that I canbe excused from contributing.

These examples can be interpreted in either of two ways. The firsthas it that it is perfectly appropriate for fairness to sometimes beoutweighed by other (moral) considerations. The second has it thatfairness is flexible, such that under certain circumstances it is fairthat some don’t have to contribute, or can be allowed to contributeless. Either way, it seems to me to show that fairness can perfectlywell ground cooperative schemes, especially large and complexschemes such as the state where there are many participants in thescheme. McMahon seems to think that the requirement to contributeto cooperative schemes must be exceptionless, or nearly so, and thisis the problem with fairness serving as a ground for the obliga-tion to contribute to cooperative schemes (p. 18). It seems to me,however, that the requirement need not be exceptionless, and thatour intuitions about the requirements to contribute are in line withthis. Thus it is incorrect to say that our intuitions are incompatiblewith fairness serving as the ground of our obligation to contribute


to cooperative schemes. And McMahon is incorrect to suggest that“there is a theoretical problem concerning the principle of fairness. . . [because it] would fail to underwrite cooperative behavior thatis, intuitively, required” (p. 19).

Of course it would be a problem if the majority of the members ofa cooperative scheme were “special cases” excused from contribut-ing, or allowed to contribute less. However, so long as this is notthe case, there is no real problem.5 Some might worry that this isa policy ripe for abuse – that if exemptions are allowed, everyonewill claim title to such an exemption. But this can be dealt withadministratively, as in the case of conscientious objectors, byplacing significant demands of proof on anyone who claims anexemption. What is necessary, it seems to me, is that the state, orany other cooperative scheme, must require that it takes quite a lot tojustify overriding or relaxing the demands of fairness which requirecontributing to the cooperative scheme.

What goes along with this is that a condition for the stability ofa cooperative scheme is that its members do not have a plethora ofvalues that they take to be more important than fairness. This is true,and might be a cause for concern: if fairness is the basis of obliga-tion to cooperative schemes such as the state, there is no guaranteethat enough people are under the obligation to contribute. This,interestingly, parallels one of Michael Sandel’s central objectionsto John Rawls’ “political liberalism”, which, according to Sandel’sconstrual, requires that all moral and religious convictions must be“bracketed” or set aside in political matters, such that the state isneutral on such matters of conviction. Sandel worries that thereis no guarantee that “no moral or religious doctrine can generateinterests sufficiently compelling to burst the brackets, so to speak,and morally outweigh the practical interest in social cooperation”.6

In his usual inflammatory way, Richard Rorty, in reply, makes twosuggestions. First, he argues that there cannot be a guarantee thatthe “brackets” won’t burst, and that the demand for a guaranteeis a kind of philosophical fetish or illness. Second, he argues thatstability in a diverse society requires of political liberals that they are“as flexible and wishy-washy as possible . . . [and] value democraticconsensus more than they value anything else.”7 This is instructivefor those who think that fairness can serve as a ground for obligation

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to the state. It suggests, first, that the demand for a guarantee maybe misguided. More importantly, it suggests that in a cooperativescheme based on fairness it is important that members place greatvalue on fairness (as Rorty’s political liberal must supremely valuedemocratic consensus), such that it will only be in rare instances thatother values will outweigh fairness’ demand to contribute. A societythat cultivates such an esteem for fairness does not seem to me sobad, even if it does, to some considerable degree, require that, forpolitical purposes, values other than fairness must be demoted, inMcMahon’s language, to the status of mere interests (p. 20).

II

McMahon argues in Chapter 5 that the fact that other competentreasoners disagree with you does not in itself give you a reason tochange your mind; instead, it gives you only a reason to reassess thecase for your own position in light of what others say, which mightor might not lead you to discover substantive reasons to changeyour mind. Note, first, that McMahon’s view does not have it thatone can reasonably simply ignore others’ opinions. On his view,the fact that others disagree with you is of great importance: it“suggests that one’s own view may be susceptible of improvement”(p. 106). So, in the case of war in Iraq for instance, the fact thatmany (nations) disagree with President Bush’s policy towards warshould have a profound effect. It should reduce the Bush adminis-tration’s confidence in its stance, and lead to a serious, thoughtfulre-consideration of the arguments for or against war. I suspect thatmuch of the frustration with Bush and his administration is theresult of a sense that international disagreement seems to havelittle or no effect: the administration’s confidence seems completelyunshaken – sometimes even buoyed – by the strong disagreementof other nations, including many close allies, and their seems littlere-evaluation of the arguments for and against war.8

Nonetheless, there are reasons to be unsatisfied with McMahon’sview and the argument for it that he presents. First, he seems tocompletely ignore time constraints. It is simply impossible in reallife to rely entirely on one’s own judgment. Some things must besimply accepted, on the basis of the widespread agreement, because


an individual cannot possibly rehearse for himself the history ofhuman thinking. We must “stand on the shoulders of giants”. Ideallyperhaps, if time (and one’s own intelligence) were not limited, wewould never rely on the word of others, and instead review forourselves all that is relevant to whatever topic concerns us. But timeis always a constraint; and it is a particularly severe one in the case ofgoing to war with Iraq. For this reason, it seems to me that so muchinternational agreement should weigh more heavily than it seemsto – and more than McMahon would seem to allow. It is also thecase, of course, that there are purely instrumental reasons to thinkinternational agreement is important: the reaction of Iraq, as well asother Arab nations and Arab organizations, will likely be differentif the United States (and a few allies) go to war alone than if thereis widespread, international support that includes at least some Arabnations. The resistance, I suspect, will be greater, and fiercer, if theUnited States (and a few allies) go at it alone.

I am also unsatisfied with the argument McMahon presents todefend his view. The argument is quite simple. It starts with the quitereasonable point that the opinions of others have (epistemic) weightonly if they are independent. If others disagree with you but their“agreement [against you] is simply a result of their imitating a singleperson, it has little weight”. The opinions of others, in other words,have weight only if they have not simply relied on the opinions ofothers. Thus, he claims, there is a kind of paradox: the rationality ofrelying on others’ opinions depends on a general rejection of relyingon other’s opinions. The whole system of reasoning together andtaking seriously what others have to say falls apart unless there is ageneral rejection of relying on others’ opinions. Thus, McMahonclaims, “the rationally appropriate response when faced with theuniversal rejection of one’s opinion . . . is to reconsider the evidence. . . abandoning one’s judgment if and only if one finds persuasivesubstantive reasons for thinking it is wrong” (p. 116).

The conclusion doesn’t follow however, at least not immediately.So long as the contrary opinions of others are indeed independent,they provide (epistemic) reason for me to change my mind. It isanother matter whether I should provide independent opinions forothers to consider. There’s a classic prisoner’s dilemma structurehere. I do best if others contribute by putting forth only independent

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opinions while I do not, as I can “free ride” on the reasoningof others. I do worst if I cooperate by putting forth independentopinions while others do not; second-best is all contributingindependent opinions; third is none contributing independentopinions. McMahon does emphasize that collective reasoning is aninstance of mutually beneficial cooperation (p. 104). Thus, if weaccept that there is reason to contribute to cooperative schemeswhich have the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma, then the rationalthing to do, overall, may well be to contribute by making onlyindependent judgments. However, this doesn’t change the fact thatthe independent opinions of others have genuine (epistemic) weight.The fact that others who judge independently disagree with yougives you genuine reasons to change your mind on that basis alone.Such reasons can be outweighed by your own substantive judgmentson the matter. They can also be outweighed by the (non-epistemic)reasons – either PCR or fairness – to contribute to cooperativeschemes that have the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma, suchthat all-things-considered one should judge independently. But weshould not confuse, as I think McMahon does, what individual orprima facie reasons we have and what we have reason to do all-things-considered. The fact that other competent reasoners disagreewith you provides an individual or prima facie reason to changeyour mind. Whether all things considered you have reason to changeyour mind is another matter. You might not, either because youhave a stronger reason (PCR or fairness) to contribute by puttingforth only independent opinions, or because you have strongersubstantive reasons to stick to your guns. To this extent, McMahondoes not provide good reason to deny, as he does, that “the factthat an apparently competent reasoner has reached a certain conclu-sion concerning what a body of reasons requires constitutes apresumptive reason for believing that this conclusion is correct”(p. 116).

NOTES

1 Christopher McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). In the remainder of this essay,references to the book will be noted in the body of the essay with a parentheticalpage number.


2 I’m assuming that other things equal sitting is preferable to standing, thoughthis might not always be true.3 I say “something like” because, as I explain above, the first answer seems tome problematic.4 McMahon suggests that the problems that concern him will be most apparentin large, diverse groups (p. 18). It seems to me, however, that the problems areless severe when groups are larger, since they can allow for some slack.5 It should be clear that I am not moved by McMahon’s argument that evenif (rationally justified) non-cooperation would most likely not be widespread(p. 18), there would nonetheless be a “theoretical” problem (p. 19), in partbecause the issue here is one of stability, which strikes me as more practical thantheoretical. Moreover, McMahon himself invokes “real world” considerations inhis arguments against alternative arguments for the rationality of contributing incircumstances with the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma, in this case the appealto iteration (p. 14).6 Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a PublicPhilosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 19.7 Richard Rorty, ‘A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism’, in Anita L. Allen andMilton C. Regan, Jr (eds.), Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays on Amer-ican Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1998), p. 120.8 The frustration (and opposition to war), based on most polls I have seen, islimited to a minority in the United States. International opposition seems to begreater.

Department of Philosophy MICHAEL WEBER

108 Connecticut HallYale UniversityNew Haven, CT 06520USAE-mail: [email protected]

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The Reason to Contribute to Cooperative Schemes