The Recovery of Practical Philosophy

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1/17

The Recovery of Practical PhilosophyAuthor(s): STEPHEN TOULMINSource: The American Scholar, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 337-352Published by: The Phi Beta Kappa SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41211544.

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2/17

The Recovery f Practical

Philosophy

STEPHEN

TOULMIN

a letter written in

1932,

AlbertEinstein

spoke

of

the "na-

kedness

and

poverty"

of

philosophy

with

regret,

but

also

some

affection.

eople

working

n

serious

cientific

ields

ike

physics,

e

said,

should treat

philosophy

kindly,

because all of

their

subjects

are

its

offspring,

ven

though, y

now,

the Mother f Science seems

to be not

just

aged,

but barren oo.

Einstein's letterdraws

attention o an odd feature

f

philosophy,

which s no

better

now than

when he wrote.

People

who work

n

the

natural ciences share

n more

r

ess

agreedupon

tasks.

But

the

agenda

of

philosophy

s

always

contested:

ts

scope

and credentials

ave never

been

agreed upon,

even

by

its classic

authors. hose

self-doubts ave

never been more

striking

r

severe

than

n our

century.

n his 1929

Giffordectures, or xample,JohnDewey argued hat, ince the1630s

the

philosophical

ebate

has rested

n too

passive

a

view ofthe

human

mind and

on

inappropriate

emands

for

geometrical

ertainty.

n

the

1940s,

gain,Wittgenstein

ried

o show how endemic

confusions ver

the

"grammar"

f

anguage

mislead

us into vacuous

speculations.

Far

from

eing profound, hilosophical

uestions

only

distract

s from he

important

ssues

in life. recall

Wittgenstein

aying,

f

a

colleague

in

English

iterature

t

Cambridge,

What

makes

him hink e understands

WilliamBlake?

Why,

he doesn't

even understand

hilosophy "

Edmund Husserland

Martin

Heidegger

lso

wrote

austically

bout

the nheritedhilosophical nterprise;nd RichardRorty,urveyinghe

whole

debate,

concludes that

philosophers

ave

nothing

eft

o do

but

engage

n

a

personal

onversationbout

theworld s

they

have

found

t,

each as a

separate

ndividual.

utting

own

Rorty's

ssays,

cany away

STEPHEN TOULMIN

is Avalon

rofessorn the

Humanities t Northwestern

niver-

sity.

A

physicist y

nitial

raining,

e studied

with

udwigWittgenstein

t

Cambridge

nd

has written

xtensively

n

ethics,

he

philosophy

f

cience,

nd the

history

f deas.

He is

co-author,

ith

Albert

Jonsen,

f the new book The Abuse

of

Causistry

University

f

California

ress).

337

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3/17

THE

AMERICAN SCHOLAR

the

mage

of

group

f

x-soldiers

isabled

n

the ntellectual

ars,

who

are

sharing

memories ver a

glass

of wine of

"old,

forgotten,

aroff

things,

nd battles

ong ago."

So philosophy's genda is as problematics ever.What an we do?

Mustwe

agree

to

regard

ll

philosophicalwritings

s

"autobiography"?

Or,

f

not,

an we

piece

together

n alternative

genda

from he

wreckage

left

y

our

parents'

nd

grandparents'

emolition ork? shall

try,

n this

essay,

to

give

at least a

partial

nswer o that

uestion.

This

problem

does not

respond

well to

head-on

attack,

o let me

sneak

up

on it

from

ehind,

y

ooking

t the

historical

ontext.

ere the

current

ritique

ives

us

a lot

of lues. For a

start,

he

philosophy

whose

legitimacy

he critics

hallenge

s

always

he

seventeenth-century

radi-

tion

founded

primarily

but

not

entirely) pon

Ren Descartes:

what

English nd American hilosophy epartments,ith nconsciousrony,

usually

all

"modern"

hilosophy.

hough

Wittgenstein's

hilosophical

Investigations

tarts rom

passage

n

Augustine

nd criticizes

ositions

from lato's

Theaetetus

nd

Cratylus,

is

arguments

like

Dewey's

and

Heidegger's)

are

directed

t one

particular

tyle

of

philosophizing

a

"theory-centered"

tyle,

which

poses philosophical

problems,

and

frames olutions o

them,

n

timeless

nd

universal

erms.

rom

1650,

this

particular

tyle

whose

charmswere

linked

to

those of

Dewey's

"quest

for

ertainty")

as taken s

defining

he

very genda

of

philoso-

phy.

Yet,

ust

because of his

fact,

we need to

ookback

further

n

time nd

ask,"How fardid,orcould,

any

one

style

xhaust he whole

scope

of

philosophy?"

To the

contrary,

will

argue

that

this

definition

f

the

subject

sets on

the sidelines

a

good

half of

the

topics

that

had been

discussed,

as

philosophy,

hroughoutntiquity

nd the

Middle

Ages:

from

ristotle's

icomachean

thics,

by way

of

Cicero's

De

Officiis,

nd

right p

to

th

Renaissance. The

current

ritiques

have leftthis

ne-

glected

halfof

the

philosophical

ield what shall

here call

"practical

philosophy" quite

untouched.

nd,

ndeed,

t s

those

neglected

opics

that re

showing

resh

igns

of ife

oday,

t the

very

ime

whenthe

more

familiar,

theory-centered"

alf

f

the

subject

s

languishing.

I

What

ssues,

then,

did

seventeenth-century

hilosophers

et

aside?

In

four

sets of

topics

and

spheres

of

thought, hey

were

especially

uninterested:

he

"oral,"

the

"particular,"

he

"local,"

and

the

"timely."

These

topics

re

connected,

ut

we can

usefully

ook at them n turn.

To

begin

with

he "oral": Ever

since

Descartes,

ll

questions

bout

the

soundness

or

validity

f

arguments

re understood

s

referring

o

338



4/17

THE RECOVERY

OF

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

"arguments"

n the enseof chains fwritten

ropositions,"

nd

their

soundness

s

seen o

depend

nformal

elations

mong

he

propositions.

The

question,

Who

ddressed

his

rgument

o

whom,

n

what

orum,

andusingwhat xamples?"s nolonger philosophical atter.s for

Plato,

hemerits f

rguments

o more

est n

uch

uman acts

han

those f a

geometricalroof

est n the

accompanying

iagram,

ven

whendrawn

y

a

master

raftsman.

o "modern"

hilosophy

gnores

argumentationamong articular

eople,

n

specific

ituations,

ealing

with oncrete

ases,

with ifferent

hings

t stake

in favor f

proofs"

captured

n

writing,

nd

udged

s written

As

history,

his

evelopment

xplains

hat

appened

ext.

latonists

opposed

hetorics

"making

heworse

rgument

eem

he

better";

ut

Aristotlead

rejected

his

ibel,

eeing

the onditions

n,

nd

he

ways

inwhichrgumentsarryonviction"san ssue hat hilosophersould

address

with

lear

onsciences.

p

to

the ate sixteenth

entury,

hey

discussed hat ssue

without

ny

sense

that

t was irrational.

he

seventeenth

entury

ndid that

good

work,

einstating

lato's

ibel

against

hetoric

o

successfully

hat he

colloquial

use

of the

word

rhetoric

as been

deprecatory

ver

ince,

gnoring

hemerits

f onsci-

entious

rofessional

rgumentation,

nd

hinting

t

persuasive

ricks

or

use

ndishonestral ebate.

o

this

ay,

erious

tudents

f hetoric

till

feel

ound o

xplain

hat

he erm

s

not

necessarily

nsulting.

rom

he

1630s

n,

n

short,

ormal

ogic

was

n,

Rhetoric

as

Out.

As to the second ssue,the"particular,"

shall cite

the

French

mathematicianascal. Medievaland Renaissance cholarshandled

moral

ssues

by

case

methods

ike

those

n

Anglo-American

ommon

law.

Once

again,

hey

were

following

ristotle's

thics.

The

Good,"

Aristotle

aid,

has no universal

orm,

egardless

f

subject

matter

r

situation:ound

moral

udgment

espects

he

detailed

ircumstances

f

specific

inds

f ases."

That

nsight

ourished

he

practice

fCatholic

and

Anglican

asuists

p

to the

eventeenth

entury;

ut,

n the

1640s,

Pascal

published

series

f

nonymousamphlets

ndefense

fAntoine

Arnaud,

ho

was

accused

by

the

Jesuits

f

heresy

n the cclesiastical

court t

Paris. ascal's

arget

as

themethods

f

moral

nalysis

sed

by

theJesuits,ased onconcretecasesofconscience"casusconscien-

tiae),

and

his

Provincial

etters

idiculed

hem

with uch

ferocious

sarcasm

hathe

brought

he

whole

enterprise

f

"case

ethics"

or

"casuistry")

nto

asting

iscredit.

Starting

ith he

Cambridge

latonists,

hilosophers

urned

thics

into bstract

heory,gnoring

heconcrete

roblems

fmoral

ractice.

The modern

hilosophers

ssumed

hat

God and

Freedom,

Mind

nd

Matter,

ood

and

Justice,

re

governed

y

timeless,

niversal

prin-

ciples,"

nd

regarded

riters

ho

ocused

n

particular

ases,

r

ypes

f

339



5/17

THE AMERICAN

SCHOLAR

cases

limited

y

specific

onditions,

s either

nphilosophical

rdishon-

est.

So,

seventeenth-century

hilosophy gain

limited ts

own

scope,

excluding

he

examination

f

"particular ractical

ases"

by

definition.

In a phrase,GeneralPrincipleswereIn,Particular ases were Out.

Likewise for he

third

ssue,

the "local."

I

use this

word

local

as

Clifford eertz

does

in

his

book Local

Knowledge.Early

in

the Dis-

course

on

Method,

Descartes

reports

vercoming

is

early

fascination

with

history

nd

ethnography,

here

geometrical

methods re of

ittle

power:

"History

s

like

foreign

ravel,"

e

says,

it

broadens

he

mind,

but t

does not

deepen

it."

Ethnographers

ollectfacts

bout ll

the ocal

jurisdictions

hatGeertz

xamines,

utthetask

f

philosophy

s

to

bring

to the

surface

he

general

principles

holding

n

any

and all

fields.For

Descartes,

uriosity

s

a human

rait,

ut

understanding

oes not

come

fromccumulatingheexperience fparticularndividuals nd specific

cases.

Reason

always

seeks for

bstract,

eneral

deas and

principles

o

connect

particulars

ogether.

Plato

saw

malfunctioning

ities as

having

pecific

athologies,

ike

Tolstoy's

unhappy

amilies,"

nd

historians

ere

free o

study

hem,

f

that

was

their

nclination.

he

philosopher's

ask

was,

rather,

o

study

"happy"

families

nd

"healthy"

ities and to

find

eneral

principles

f

political

health

behind all

local

idiosyncrasies.

or

Aristotle,

uman

affairs

ere

open

to no

such

generalization,

o the

diversity

f

political

affairs

as

legitimate

rist

or

he

philosophical

mill,

s it

remained

ight

up

to the

sixteenth entury. y dismissinghistorynd ethnography,

modern

philosophy

hus

excluded

a

whole realm

of

previously

ecog-

nized

issues. From

then

on,

Abstract xioms

were

In,

Concrete

Diver-

sity

was Out.

Finally,

he

fourth

ssue,

the

"timely."

Descartes

and his

successors

do

not

discuss

ssues

that

nvolve

given

momentsn

time:

now,

not

ater,

yesterday,

ot

today.

Earlier

on,

concrete ssues

of

legal

and

medical

practice

in

which

"time

s

of

the

essence")

had an

equal

billing

with

abstract,

heoretical

ssues;

practical

ssues

were all

decided as

the

occasion

required

pros

to

kairon,

n

Aristotle's

hrase).

A

navigator's

decision

to

change

courseten

degrees

to

starboard,

ay,

s

as

"rational"

as anythingnmathematics;et tsrationalityests nwhen t sput nto

effect

s

much s it

does on

any

formal

omputations

nvolved.

For

sixteenth-century

cholars,

aw was

the

model

"rational

nter-

prise,"

and

the

possibility

f a

universal

natural

philosophy

eemed

problematic.

century

ater,

he

shoe is

on

the other

oot.

hilosophy

focuses n

the

permanent

nderlying

tructure

f

Nature:

he

transient

affairs

f

human

beings

take

econd

place.

As

a

result,

ssues

of

practical

relevanceand

timeliness

re

sidelined

as not

being

properly philo-

sophical"

at

all.

After

he

1630s,

aw and

medicine

play

only

marginal

340



6/17

THE

RECOVERY F PRACTICAL

HILOSOPHY

parts

n

the

debate;

philosophers

ocus heir

ttention, ather,

n

time-

less

principles

oldinggood,

not t

one

timerather han

nother,

ut

at

all times.From his ime

on,

then,

he Permanent

s

In,

the

Transitory

s

Out.

These four

changes

of mind

from ral

to

written,

articular

o

universal,

ocal

to

general,

imely

o timeless

were distinct.

ut when

seen

in

context,

hey

have several

things

n common:

pecifically,

hey

choose

to

ignore

he

whole

of

practical

philosophy

that

s,

the

ssues

arising

out of the

clinical

aspects

of

medicine,

the

procedures

and

practices

f

aw,

the

rhetorical

orce

f

personal

rgumentation,

nd

the

moralmethods f

hecasuists.

o it was

no accident hat

iagnostics

nd

due

process,

ase ethics

nd

rhetoric,

opics

nd

poetics,

were

sidelined

and discredited

at

the same

time.

Rational

udgments

of

practical

adequacyare timelynottimeless, oncretenotabstract, articular ot

universal,

ocal

not

general.

They

concern

eople

who

have roots

n the

practical

nd

pastoral

rts,

nd the

seventeenth-century

new

philoso-

phers"

were

theory-centered,

ot

practical-minded.

hey

were

not

interested

n

procedures

or

andling

imited

lasses of

cases or

specific

types

of

problems;

they

concentrated

nstead

on

abstract,

imeless

methods

f

deriving

eneral

olutions

o

universal

roblems.

II

Whydidphilosophy'sgendachangeso drasticallyt ust

this ime?

How can

we

explain

this

turning

way,

fter

630,

from he

oral,

ocal,

transient,

articular

spects

of

anguage

nd

life,

nd

this

preoccupation

with

written

rguments,

eneral

deas,

and

abstract

rinciples?

Evidently,

his

change

followed

he

rise of a

lay

culture

n

Europe.

The

main vehicle

of

medieval

religious

eaching

had

been oral

preach-

ing,

which

supported

n

interest

n rhetoric.

eformation

cholars

ead

the

Scriptures

nd

commentaries

or hemselves

nd became

interested

in

criticizing

ritten

rguments.

s

aymen,

oo,

hey

were

ess

involved

in

pastoral

are

than

heir cclesiastical

orerunners.

hough

discussing

ethical

heory,hey

were

not

ctively esponsible

or he

ureof

ouls.

n

these respects, he new philosopherswere the firstntelligentsian

Western

istory.

But

something

more

s needed

to

explain

why,

after

enturies

of

Aristotelian

ractical

hilosophy,

he

years

1620

to 1660

saw

not

ust

a

renewed

nterest

n

universal,

bstract

heory

ut

outright

ejection

f

traditional

ractical

oncerns.

Where

houldwe

look

for

his

omething

more? believe

it s time

for

ntellectual

istorians o

take

a

page

from

the economic

nd social

historians' ook.

All

historians

f

early

modern

Europe

(high

Tories

such

as

Hugh

Trevor-Roper,

s

much

as

liberal

341



7/17

THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

Marxists

uch

s

Eric

Hobsbawm)

gree

by

now that

he

years

610-1650

were a time of social

disorder

nd

economicretreat

cross

Europe,

so

much o that

hey

ometimes all the

early

eventeenth

entury period

ofgeneral risis.

The

origin

fmodern cience and

philosophy,

s

I

myself

as

taught

to

think,

reated hem s

by-products

fmercantile

rosperity;

his

gave

scholarsnew comfortnd

leisure

to

pursue

bstract

peculations

ree f

worldly

distractions. he

picture

f

general

crisis

makes that ccount

implausible,

nd the truth s

nearer

the

reverse.

Early

seventeenth-

century

urope

was far rom

eing

eisurely

nd

comfortable;

rom 620

on,

people

were

ready

o

cut

your

hroat r burn

your

house down

ust

because

they

disliked

your

pinions,

s

in

the Lebanon of

today.

o the

real

question

is,

Why, given

such

an uncomfortable

ituation,

id

philosophers

ind

"theory-centered"tyle

f

philosophizing

o

power-

fully

ppealing?

To answer

hat

uestion,

ermit

me to takeas

my

ext

John

Donne's

long

poem,

An

Anatomy

f heWorld."

Donne wrote

his

poem

n

1611,

just

after he

ssassination f

KingHenry

V

of

France,

who had

been the

main

agent

of

religious

olerance n

Western

Europe.

(We

know that

Donne understood

he

significance

f

this

ventfrom

hings

e

said

in

1611 n

another

oem,

gnatius

His

Conclave.)

With

he

sensitivity

f

writerwho

picks

up

the

feel of his

time,

Donne

voices a

conservative

regret

hat heworld s

getting

ut

ofhand

n

a

dozen different

ays.

His

concern s

not

merely

the warfare

etween

Protestant nd Catholic

zealots, specially fterhe CouncilofTrent, hough his s threatening

to become

unmanageable.

t is

not

merely

he

decay

of old

political

loyalties

nd

allegiances,

with

he

growth

f

rade nd

cities,

nd therise

of a class of

people

outside he

traditionalocial

network

the

so-called

"masterless

men"),

though

his,too,

s

aggravating

he current

lien-

ation.Nor s it

ust

the

general

narcissism

fhis

time,

hough

onne

can

deplore

"extreme

ndividualism" s

vocally

s

Robert ellah

today.

Nor

is

it,

even,

the radical

doubts that

Copernicus

nd

the "new

philoso-

phers"

are

spreading

bout

traditional

deas

in

astronomy

nd

physics,

though

heir

kepticism

s

corroding

he

general

confidence

n

provi-

dence andhuman eason.What hines hrough ohn onne'spoem s his

response

o

the fact

hat ll

these

things

re

happening

t

once.

Donne moves

from ivil

war to

physics,

rom

olitics

o

psychology,

within

ust

a few

ines,

n

ways

that lmost

defy

unctuation:

And

new

Philosophy

alls

ll

in

doubt,

The Element

ffire

s

quiteput

ut;

The Sun s

lost,

nd

th'earth,

nd

no man'swit

Can well

direct

im

where o

ooke

or t. ..

'Tis all in

peeces,

ll cohaerance

one;

342



8/17

THE

RECOVERY OF

PRACTICAL

PHILOSOPHY

All

ust upply,

nd ll

Relation:

Prince,

ubject,

ather,

onne,

re

hingsorgot,

For

very

an

lone hinkesehath

ot

To be a

Phoenix,nd hathenanbeeNone fthatinde,fwhich e s,but ee.

Evidently,

he

general

risis f

the

early

eventeenth

entury

as not

only

a social and

economic

ne,

but

quite

as

much

religious

nd

cosmological;

nd this

makes

he

change

n

the

genda

f

philosophy-

more

ntelligible.

To

people caught

p

in

a

far-reaching,horoughgoing

ntellectual

crisis,

he

modest nd

undogmaticuggestions

f

practicalhilosophy"

looked,

ot

untrue,

utbesidethe

point: iddling

hileRomeburned.

The more

rgent

askwastofind newfoundationor ll that

ad,

fter

all,been soundnearlierdeas, ndevenmore orevitalizeosmology,

by developing

new,

more ational

heory

f nature. othof these

theoretical

rograms

the "foundationalist"

heory

f

knowledge

hat

collapsed

n

our

own

imes,

nd the

ystem

f

physical osmology

hat

Isaac

Newtonnherited

rom en

Descartes,

hich

made he

tarting

point

for modern"

hysics

were

formulated

n

universal,imeless,

mathematicalerms

uiteforeign

o theconcerns

f

practical hiloso-

phers.

ut,

or

ll that

he rchitects

f

he

new

philosophy

ared,

iven

their wn

exciting

ew

program,

he

wholeof

"practical hilosophy"

could ake back

eat.

Ill

It s now

ime o

put

orthhemore onstructive

uestions.

ow

does

practical hilosophy

nter nto

our lives

today?

And

how

does

it

contribute

o an

agenda

or he

futuref he

ubject

hat an

blunt

he

force

f

urrent

ritiques?

ne

good uestion

eserves

nother,

o etme

ask

n

return:ince

1945,

what

roblems

avecalled

for

hilosophical

reflectionn the

deepest

evel,

with

ny

of the same

urgency

hat

cosmological

heory

ad

for

eople

n

the seventeenth

entury?

he

answers, urely, attersfpractice: ot ooverstatehepoint,matters

of ife

nd death. ince

WorldWar

I,

three ets f ssueshave

mposed

themselves

n all reflectivehinkers

nuclear

war,

medical

echnology,

and the environmentand

none

of

these

three ssues can be

fully

addressed

without

ringing

ack to the surface

uestions

bout

the

significance

f human ifeand about

our

responsibilities

ot

ust

to

humanity

ut lso to Nature.

Yet

how fardo these

practical roblems

ive

rise

to

authentically

philosophical

uestions?

he

people

whodiscuss

hemmost

ffectively

343



9/17

THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

today

ediscover

rguments

hat

re-Cartesian

hinkers

sedfour rfive

centuries

go.

n

analyzing

he

morality

fnuclear

arfare,

or

xample,

Michael

Walzerrevives medieval

rgument

boutthe criteria or

telling just" romunjust" ars. heJustWar ebate s,of ourse,ne

central

lement

n

the ase-ethicsraditionhat ascal

disowned;

ndwe

can

scarcely ope

otalk

ense

bout he

ubject

f

we

totallyeject

hat

tradition.

In

discussing

he

role f

echnology

n

prolonging

he

biological

ife

of

dying atients,gain,

we confrontssues

bout herelationsetween

the

personality

ndthe

body

hat evive

he

argely

moribund

roblems

of Mind

nd

Body.

Far from

eingpurely

heoretical

uestions

bout

how

we can

distinguish

sychologicalxplanations

rom

hysiological

ones,

he ssuesnowbecome

ntenselyractical

nes,

bout owwe are

to treat

eople

t

the rucial

moments

f

heirives.Even before

hese

new issuesbecame so urgent,t was arguable hat heMind/Body

problem

ut

right

own hemiddle fmost

niversity

epartments

f

psychiatry:

ith he

ddition f

this

new,

moral

omponent,

he ssue

becomes

bove ll a

practical

ne.

As

for

cology

nd he

nvironment,

he ssential

hing

o

note

s

that

the

ssueraises ot

ust

utilitarian

uestions,

ut

osmological

nes oo.

This

may

ot

be

obvious,

ecausewe tend o

overlookhe

riginal

oal

of

osmology

nd

quate

t

with

part

f

heoretical

hysics.

et,

nboth

Greek

ntiquity

nd

eventeenth-century

urope,

he

rder

f

Nature

or

kosmos)

as

naturally

dentified

ith

he ixed

tructuref he

heavens,

whichwas a stable ackground,r tage etting,or he hangingrama

of

ife.

Leibniz's

fiercest

bjection

o Newton's

ccount f the

solar

system

s

thatt

gives

no

mathematical

uarantee

hat he

lanets

annot

get

ff

rack,

nd o

disrupt

he

whole

ystem )

ow,

n

the ate

wentieth

century,

ur

deas bout he

rder

f

Nature

re

quite

different.

or

us,

Nature

s

not

undamentally

table,

s itwas

for heGreeks

ndNewton.

Farfrom

eing

n

unchanging

ausal

backdrop

o

rational uman

ction,

Nature ow

has ts

wn

volutionaryistory;

ndhuman

istory

s

fully

intelligible

nly

when ead n this

arger

ontext.

On

one

evel,

ur

ntimate

ractical

ives re now

ouched

y

what

happened

o

green

monkeys

n

Central

frica

wenty

r

hirtyears go.Ona morentellectualevel, urbasic deasabout ocialrelationsnd

political

nstitutions

re also in

need of

rethinking;

nstead f

seeing

society

s a

fixed

order"modeled n

the

solar

ystem,

ith

lasses,

genders,

nd

occupations

eeping

o heir

roper

rbits,

e

are

earning

to

see those

hanging

elations

nd

nstitutionss so

many

more r ess

"adaptive"ways

f

meeting

hanging

uman

roblems.

n this

ense,

too,

our

ives

and

thoughts

re no

longer

onfined ithin

he

fixed

Newtonian

orld;

nd,

n

more

espects

han re s

yet ecognized,

ur

cosmology

oday

s

a

historically

hanging

ne.

344



10/17

THE

RECOVERY F

PRACTICAL

HILOSOPHY

IV

Nowadays,

hen,

hilosophers

re

increasingly

rawn nto

public

debates bout nvironmentalolicy,medical thics,udicial ractice,r

nuclear

olitics.

omeof

hem ontributeo

these iscussions

appily;

others

ear hat

ngaging

n

applied

hilosophyrostitutes

heir

alents

and

distractshem rom

heir

roper

oncern ith

uantificationheory,

illocutionary

orce,

ossible

worlds,

r henature f

Erlebnis. or hese

purists,

have

specialmessage.

hese

practical

ebates reno

onger

"applied

philosophy":hey

re

philosophy

tself. o

speak

more

re-

cisely,

hey

re

legitimate

eirs

to

quote

Wittgensteingain)

of the

theoretical

nterprise

hat

ormerly

alled tself

philosophy."y pur-

suing

these

ssues,

we as

philosophers

oth

demolish he barriers

between racticalndtheoreticalhilosophynd reenterhevery ore

of echnical

hilosophy

rom

productive

ew

direction.

To

illustrate

his

oint,

etmetake linicalmedicine

s the

ype

ase

of

practicalnterprise

nduse

tto

do

two

hings.

irst,

etme

briefly

connect

he heoretical

roblem

f

general

imeless niversaishatwas

the

tarting

oint

f

eventeenth-century

hilosophy

ack

o

the

ocal,

timely,

oncretessues

hat

t setaside. will

argue

hat othkinds

f

issues re

ruly

hilosophical.

econdly,

will

use this

xample

o

make

some

pecific hilosophicaloints

bout

articularity,

bout

xperience,

and about

ationality.

To beginwith heparticular,e may ontrastheaimsof clinical

medicinendbiomedicaicience.

eople

ften

hinkf

medical

ractice

as

"applied

cience,"

hus

oncealing

he

particularity

f

patients

nd

theirmedical onditions.

patientmay

e studied ither

y

clinician

or

by

a scientist ho

s

researching

is or

her current isease.

The

scientist'snterests

in

anygeneral

eatureshe

patientmay

hare

with

others

uffering

rom he same

disease.

The

clinician's

nterest

s in

whateveranthrow

ight

n

this

atient,

n

that

ed,

here nd

now.

The

clinician's

nowledge

f

he

patient

illbe

"informed

y"

biomedicai

science;

ut t

s

not,

n ts

details,

entailed

y" ny

iomedicai

heory

and

typicallyoesbeyond verything

hat cientistsan

yet

ccount

or.

Thepatients notmerelyn "individual" hohappenso "instantiate"

a "universalaw." His clinical tate

s

local,

imely,

nd

particular,

nd

universalheoriest best hrow

nly artialight

n

t.

l

Clinical

nowledge

hus

iffers

rucially

rom

nyunderstanding

f

scientific

heory.

n

the

world f

practical

xperience,

e have

greater

confidence

n

our

knowledge

f

pecific

oncrete acts

han

we have

n

the

general

xplanations

hat

eople

offer

or

hose acts.

We know hat

chicken

s

good

to eat better hanwe understand

hy

t s

(Aristotle's

own

xample);

ndwe know hat

spirin elps

headaches etterhan

we

345



11/17

THE

AMERICAN SCHOLAR

understand

hy

t does.

Knowledge

f

linical

articulars

oes not est

only

ntheir

eing

ndividual

instances"f stablished

laws,"

ince t

always

utruns

he

scope

of

those aws.

Only

n

strictly

athematical

fields avewe moreonfidencen theoreticalnderstandingfgeneral

principles

han n a

practical

nowledge

f

particular

ases. n

medicine

(to

be

sure)

heoretical

nd

practical

nowledge

renot

asily

eparated.

Still,

ny

belief

hat

etailed linical

nowledge

s

a

simple

pplication

of

cience

misses he entral

oints

that

nowledge

f

particular

ases

is

prior

o,

nd

more ertain

han,

ny

nderstanding

f

general

cientific

concepts

nd

theories.

To turn

next o

experience,

he terms clinical

xperience"

nd

"practical

xperience"

se this

word

xperience

n

an

everyday

ollo-

quial

sense.For

nstance,

ontaigne'sssay

Of

Experience"

ellsus

about he hingshat appenedo him nd what ind fperson ehas

become:how

he tends

otalkwith is

mouth

ull,

ell

ff is

horse nd

suffered

concussion,

nd

finds

is

aging odyhelping

o make

him

depressed.

Such

ways

of

discussing xperience

may

appear

philosophically

trivial,

ut

they

re

central o

the

working

f

practical

nterprises:

clinical

bservation

n

medicine,

irect

estimony

n

law,

ven

reports

about

experimental

rocedures

n

science.

By

contrast,

sk

modern

philosophers

o

ccount or

sense

xperience"

s

a basisof

knowledge,

and

therich

nd

concrete

hroniclef

everyday

xperience

s

at

once

replacedy thin,

bstract

ortegef deas,mpressions,nd ensations.What rewe tomake f his act?

hilosophy

nstructorsftenindthard

to

get

students

ven to

see the

"sense

data"that

re

supposedly

he

primary

tuff

f

he

visual

world: t

was

equally

ard or .

B.

Tichener,

fresh

rom

Wilhelm

Wunds

aboratory,

o

get

his

students

o

perceive

the

yellow

atches

hat

were,

n

his

theory,

resent

n

anyone's

mind

who

heard

nd

understood

he

word

yellow.

et

everyday

ractical

experience

eside

the "sense

experiences"

f

perceptual

heory,

n

short,

nd

sense

data"

urely

ppear

obe

fictions,

reamed

p

afterhe

event,

o

make

good

he

missing

inks

etween

pistemological

heory

and

practical

ife.

After

isiting

friend

ecovering

rom

urgery,

saiah

Berlinwasheard odeclare,He's a mere ense-datumf hisformer

self "

The willful

ncongruity

fhis

remarkhowsus

how far

expe-

rience,"

n

the

practicalense,

iffersrom

ll

these heoretical

ictions.

Finally,

s for

ogic

and

rationality,

linical

diagnosis

helps

us

dismantlehe

barriers

etween

logic"

nd

"rhetoric,"

argument"

nd

"argumentation."

arlier

contrasted

he

ormal

alidity

f

heoretical

arguments

ith

he

ubstantive

oundness f

practicalrgumentation.

Evidently,

linical

iagnoses

an

never

ave he

necessity

f

geometri-

cal

proof;

hey

est n

the

doctor's

ccumulated

xperience,

long

with

346



12/17

THE

RECOVERY

F

PRACTICAL HILOSOPHY

any igns

nd

ymptoms

hat re

vailable t

the ime f he

iagnosis.

o

they

re

always pen

to revision r

rebuttal,

s

the llness

nfolds,

nd

they

upport

t

best

strongresumption:

rom

what

ne has to

go

on,

thebestdiagnosisnd treatmentre,presumably,o and so. ..

That s all

that

we ask of venthebest

diagnosticians;

nd

t s the

same

n

other ields f

practicalrgument

oo. n

a

legal rgument,

ven

thebest

vidence oesnot

ntail

ny

onclusion:

t

upports udgment

that,

n

the

ircumstances,

annot

n fact

e

rebutted.nferences

ithin

a

theory ursue

hedetailed

mplications

f

deas;

practical

nferences

use those deas to

suggest

owto handle

articular

ases.

So

practical

judgments

re

not

weaker

han heoretical

nferences;

hey

iffer

nly

n

being

ubstantivend

n

reaching

ut

beyond

bstract

onceptual

ssues

to

novel,

oncreteituations.

imely,

ubstantive

rguments

epend

not

on entailmentsut on

generalizations

hat re

trustworthy

n the

whole kaholou even houghebuttablenexceptionalases.

This

point

olds ven

n

physics,

here heories

reusedto

explain

particular

henomena.

ewton

went o

great engths

n

Principia

o

show

hat,

n

his

definitions,

satellite

moving reely

ear massive

body,

nder he nfluence

f n nverse

quare

ttractive

orce irected

toward hat

ody,

must ave

n

elliptical

r

parabolic

rack;

nd several

such atellites

oing

ound he ame

massive

ody

must

o

so at

ust

he

relative

peeds

hat

epler

ad

found

n

thevisible

lanets

for xam-

ple,

Mercury,

enus,

nd Mars.

Does

this

mean

hatNewton

roved

mathematically

hat he

planets

ecessarily

ove s

Kepler

ad

shown

theynfactmove?Newton'sdmirersssumedhat ehad;but twas n

illusion.

is

proof

ives

s reason

o

presume

hat he

isible

lanets

re

satellites

oving

nder

nverse

quare

orces;

et, ractically

peaking,

that

resumption

as

open

o

challenge

or t east he

next

iftyears,

while he

heory

as

accumulating

ther

upport.

Scientific

nterpretations

factual

physical

henomena

re

thus s

open

to revision r rebuttal

as

local,

timely,

nd

particular

as are

clinical

eadings

f

patients

nd their llnesses.

he moment e

leave

the realm

of

theory

or

hat f

practical xperience,

he rebuttable

presumptions

f

practical

rgumenteplace

the formal

ecessity

f

theoreticalnference.

onsider,

or

xample,

he

problem

f

onceptual

change,owhichmuchhoughtasbeengiven ver he ast hirtyears.

What easons o we

need to

ustify

iving p

one

scientific

heory

or

another?

nductive

ogicians

ave offered

uasi-mathematical

confir-

mation heories"

o answer

his

question;finding

hese

algorithms

unsatisfactory,

homas uhn

ave

us his

heory

f

paradigm

hifts."

et

surely theory

f

conceptual

hange

misses he

point.

he

practical

decisionwhethero

modify

n old

theory

r abandon

t

in

favor f

a

radically

ew one

is itself

local and

timely

hoice

bout

particular

situationnd

callsfor he ame

ppraisal

s

any

ther

ractical

ecision.

347



13/17

THE

AMERICAN SCHOLAR

Given hewhole

ituation

n

whichwe

currently

ind

urselves,

s it

best to

hang

on to

the older

heory,

r

give

t

up?

Some

conceptual

change

may

presumably

e

ustified,

n

practice, y

all thatwe know

about he cientificituationnquestion; ut he heoreticalream hat

one and

only

ne

change

s

"necessarily

orrect"emainshe

dream

t

always

was.

To

this

day,

hen,

he

patterns

f

practical easoning

re

rhetorical,

not

geometrical.

ormal

emonstrativenferences

possible

nly

f

he

concepts

n

the

premises

nd the

conclusion f an

argument

re the

same;

nd

n

clinical

iagnoses,

or

xample,

his

an

never e the ase.

In

such

fields s medicine

nd

aw,

we

bring xperience

f

previous

casesto

bear n novel

ituations,

ndour

onclusionsold

good nly

o

the xtent

hatwhatwas true f

arlier ases s also

applicable

o

future

situations.iven his oint, e have basisfor econcilinghetoric ith

logic.

The

arguments

ithin

theory

r

conceptual ystem

may

be

"demonstrative";

ut

the

arguments

hat

pply

theoretical

deas to

practical

ituations,

rwhich

eek o

riticizehose

heories,

ook

utside

the heories

nd so

become

practical,"

r

"rhetorical,"

rguments.

V

When

was child n

England,

e

earned

W. S.

Gilbert's

ouplet

o

the

ffecthat

Every

ittle

oy

r

girl

hat's

ornnto heworld

live

Is

either

littleiberal

r lse little

onservative.

We

were lso

taught

o

divide uman

eings

nto

wo lasses:

hosewho

prefer

lue to

green,

weets o

savories,

ats o

dogs,

ndthe

ther

ay

around. he

blue, weet,

at

overs we

were old also

prefer

lato;

the

green,

avory,

og

fanciers

refer

ristotle.ow amno

onger

lear

what o make f

hese

upposed

orrelations,

hough

don't ule hem

wholly

ut.A

few

years

ack,

you

may

recall,

William

Gass wrote

perceptivessay,On BeingBlue;andcertainly yownAristotelian

tastes

mbracehelties

nd

green

heese.Whats

clear,

owever,

s

that

philosophy

isplays

series f

historical

endulum

wings

etween

wo

broad

gendas.

n

one

agenda,

he ask

f

philosophy

s

to

ay

whatever

can

be said

n

any

field

f

nquiry

hat s

entirely

eneral;

n the

other

agenda,

he ask s

to

say

whatever

an be said

that

s

as

general

s the

field

ermits.

eingpractical-minded,

ristoteliansill

not laimuni-

versality

or

heir iews n

advance f

practical

xperience;

eing

more

348



14/17

THE

RECOVERY

OF

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

theoretically

nclined,

latonistsre

willing

o

peculate

more

reely

nd

to hazard roader

eneralizations.

Understood

n

these

terms,

he

seventeenth-century

ransition

y

whichmodernhilosophyndmodernciencewere aunchednvolved

a

pendulumwing

way

rom

imited,

ractical,

ristotelianoncerns

o

a Platonist

rogram

or

developing eneral

heories

nd

solutions.

Conversely,

hen

Wittgenstein

nd

Rorty

laim hat he

resent osition

of

philosophy

s

"the

End of heRoad"for he

ubject,hey

verdrama-

tize

he ituation.

ather,

e are

n

the

middle f

yet

nother

endulum

swing

ack,

rom

Platonically

riented,

heory-centered

tyle

f

phi-

losophy

oward he

re-acceptance

f more

practical,

ristotelianon-

cerns.

Sometime

go,

wrote or

erspectives

n

Biology

nd Medicine

paper

alled How

Medicine aved

heLife fEthics."

n

that

aper,

setoutto showhow andwhy evenfor hilosophicalurposes,he

primary

ocus ofethical

iscussion as

lately

een

moving

ut of

the

study

ndtothebedside.

imilarly,

he

primary

ocus f he

mind/body

problem

oday

ies

n

the ealm f

sychiatric

ractice;

he

rimary

ocus

of

problems

bout

ausality,ationality,

nd

responsibility

n

the

rimi-

nal courts.

To

say

his

s

not

o

uggest

hat hese

roblems

ave

become he ole

business

f

psychiatrists,

awyers,

nd

udges,

o that

hilosophers

ust

hand

them ver o the

specialists

ho alone

really

nderstand

hem.

Quite

he

contrary.

sychiatrists,

awyers,

nd

udges

whoaddress

he

general hilosophicalroblemsrisingutof heir espectiveractices

often

o so

ncompetently,

ndthere

s

important

ork or

hilosophers

to do

in

conjunction

ith uch

pecialists.

Wittgenstein

ay

laim

hat,

f

aken

n

isolation,

he

general

heo-

retical

ssues of

traditional

hilosophy

uickly

ecome

vacuous.

But,

where

omethingractical

s

truly

t

stake,

ll

is

changed.

o

quote

n

example

romnother

f

myCambridge

eachers,

ohn

Wisdom,

hilo-

sophical roblems

re

ike the

question,

s

a

flying

oat

ship

or an

airplane?

aken

ut f ll

practical

ontexts,

t

does

notmatter

hat

ou

reply.

"Have

it

your

wn

way "Wittgenstein

ays.)

But

f

something

serious

s

really

t stake

if

the force

f the

questions, Ought

he

captain fa flyingoatto have an airlinepilot's icense, master

mariner's

ertificate,

r both?

the ssue comes

ntofocus.

Most aw

students,ikewise,

now

he trick

uestion

bout

the

phone

call

in

which

ne

udge

sks

nother,

s

a

glove

ompartmentprivate

ouse

r

a

pleasure

oat? he

trick

s to

pot

he onstitutional

oint

bout

earch

and seizure

t issue

the

police

need

a warrant

efore

earching

private

ouse

for

llegal

narcotics,

ay,

but not before

earching

pleasure

oat.

o what bout

he

glove ompartment

f car?

349



15/17


16/17

THE

RECOVERY OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

anyone

o

experience

hem,

nd

t

almost ooks s

though,

n

the deal

case,

people

would o

onger xperiencenythingrivately

t

ll,

nd he

omforting

weight

f

personal esponsibility

ould issolve

nto

system

fformulaeor

potential eanings.

. .

And ll atonce, nthemiddle f hese eflections,lrichthe rotagonistf

Musil's

ook]

had

smilingly

o confesso himself

hat,

espite

ll

this,

e

was

afterll a

"character,"

ven

without

aving

ne.

There s

nothing pecifically

utobiographical

r

ndividual

boutthe

methods nd demands

of our collective ctivities.

On the

contrary,

e

can

discuss

them

s

present-day

ounterparts

f

what

Aristotle new as

"special topics,"

ecognizing

hat he

rts fMolecular

Biochemistry

nd

Criminal Law and

Drypoint

Engraving

re

larger

than the

personal

contributionsf ll

those ndividual

iochemists,

udges,

and

artists ho

putthose arts owork.The significancefpragmatismwhichRichard

Rorty

ouches

his forelock

o,

butthen

urns

is

back

on)

is

then

wofold:

first,

he

encouragement

t

gives

us to

study

he

practical

methods the

"topics,"

dialectics,"

nd "rhetorics"-

f ll these ollective

rts,

n

the

context fthe

Lebensformen

hat

mbody

hem; nd,

second

which

s

what

crucially

istinguishes

ur

position

from ristotle's the

fact hat

these

Lebensformen,

nd

the

forms f

thought

hat re "at

home" in

them,

re not

static,

ermanent

essences"

that re

capable

of

being

known

priori

nd

for

ood,

but

changing

onstellations

r

populations,

whose

historically

volving

orms

ave to be

discovered,

y ooking

nd

seeing, fter he event.

Only

when we have

finished

xploring

he collective

artsof these

enterprises

nd seek to

go beyond

themdo we

reach

a

point

t

which,

perhaps,

he

move into

autobiography

an

no

longer

be

further

ost-

poned.

As with

Musil's

protagonist

lrich,

ur

personalities

nd

"char-

acters"

re shownnot

by

our

participation

n these

enterprises

ut

rather

in

the

ways

in which

we

fashion

private

ives

out of

multiplepublic

roles.

Whatwas

it ike to

nherit seat

n the

parliament

t

Bordeaux,

nly

to have

your

closest

friend

nd

colleague

die

in his

(and

your)

mid-

thirties?

ow can

you

reasonably

eal

with he

conflicting

emands

of

private ndpublic ifethat uch an eventprovokes?Again,what s it to

be

a

talented

rganist

nd

musical heorist

ho

s

also

called

to

work s

a medical

missionary

n Africa?

How

do

you piece

together

life

that

reasonably

alances

off he

proper

xercise

of

your

musical alents

with

respect

for

your

Beruf?

These

autobiographical

ssues raise

questions

about

which a

Michel de

Montaigne

in

one

case)

or

an Albert

Schweitzer

in

the

other)

an

write as we

say

"philosophically."

o

that

xtent,

hilosophy

may

well include

at

one extreme

utobiograph-

ical reflections

f the

kindthat

Rorty

alks bout.

351



17/17

THE

AMERICAN

SCHOLAR

But

none of

this

rules out or

discredits he more

public,

collective

agenda

that

he

current

ecovery

f

practical hilosophy

makes

vailable

to

us:

all the

way

across

a

spectrum

f

activities,

rom he

problems

f

nuclearwar discussedbya "newcasuist,"bywayofthegeriatric ard

and

neonatal ntensive

are

unit,

o

the

urisprudence

f

capitalpunish-

ment,

nd the

philosophy

f

quantum

mechanics.

aking

philosophy"

in

this

practical

sense,

as a

contributiono the reflective esolution

f

quandaries

thatface us in

enterprises

ith

high

stakes even

life and

death

Albert instein

would

surely

hink

gain

about the

"nakedness

and

poverty"

fthe

subject

nd concede

that

t s

timefor

hilosophers

to

come out

of their

elf-imposed

solation

nd

reenter he collective

worldof

practical

ife

nd sharedhuman

problems.

352

Documents

The Recovery of Practical Philosophy