THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE …webopac.ttlawcourts.org/.../2009/cv_09_02474DD04may2016.pdfPage 1 of 42 THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CLAIM NO. CV 2009 - 02474

Between

KATHLEEN BAPTISTE

JASON BAPTISTE

Claimants

And

GERALDINE HYPOLITE

Defendant

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. DES VIGNES

Appearances:

Mr. Gerard Raphael for the Claimants

Mr. Keston Mc Quilkin and Ms. Theresa Hadad instructed by Ms. Nalini Jagnarine for the

Defendant

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. This matter involves a dispute as to ownership of a concrete dwelling house erected on a parcel

of land situate at Light Pole 53, Pundit Street, El Socorro, San Juan which is bounded on the

North by Pundit Street on the East, West and South by lands of heirs of Chanka Maharaj

(hereinafter referred to as “the subject land”). The freehold interest in the subject land was

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initially owned by Chandrahanse Maharaj and Narendra Maharaj (hereinafter referred to as

“the lessors”) who leased it to Virdy King, the father of the First Claimant and the Defendant

(hereinafter referred to as “Virdy”). On 27th March, 2001, the Defendant purchased the

interests of both Virdy and the lessors, thereby becoming the owner in fee simple of the subject

land.

2. The Claimants allege that they are the owners of a concrete dwelling house located to the back

of the subject land (hereinafter referred to as “the disputed house”) as well as the land on which

the disputed house stands (hereinafter referred to as “the disputed land”) by virtue of

purchasing same from Aldwyn King, the brother of the First Claimant and Defendant

(hereinafter referred to as “Aldwyn”). As a consequence, the Claimants seek declaratory relief

to have the disputed house and the disputed land vested in them in fee simple in equity as well

as injunctive relief to prevent the Defendant from evicting or attempting to evict them. The

Claimants also seek an Order that the Defendant convey the disputed house and the disputed

land to them.

3. The Defendant contends that the Claimants do not have any interest in the disputed house and

the disputed land and avers that the disputed house was owned by Virdy and by virtue of her

purchase of Virdy’s leasehold interest and the lessors’ freehold interest in the subject land, she

became the owner thereof. The Defendant further contends that the Claimants obtained a mere

licence to occupy the disputed house from Virdy which said licence was continued by the

Defendant upon acquisition of Virdy’s interest in the subject land, until it was revoked in 2008.

As a consequence, the Defendant has counterclaimed against the Claimants for possession of

the disputed house and the disputed land as well as the repayment of outstanding utility rates,

interest and costs.

THE CLAIM

4. By Claim Form and Statement of Case filed on 9th July, 2009 the Claimants alleged as follows:

a. At all material times, Virdy was the tenant of the lessors in respect of the subject land

and constructed a tapia house to the front of the subject land where he resided with his

wife, Sheryl King and his children, Glen King, Ian King and Aldwyn King as well as

the First Claimant and the Defendant;

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b. In or around 1979, Aldwyn, with the permission and active encouragement of Virdy,

constructed the disputed house for himself and his family to reside, at a cost of

approximately $30,000.00;

c. In or around 1982, Virdy demolished the tapia house and in or about 1984 he erected a

concrete house in its place. During the construction phase, Virdy and the entire family

resided in the disputed house;

d. In or about 1996, Aldwyn decided to migrate with his family to the United States of

America and, with the oral consent of Virdy, he sold the disputed house to the

Claimants at the cost of $43,000.00. Thereafter, in or around 1997, the Claimants

moved into the disputed house with their family and during the period 2000 to 2008

they effected reconstruction and repair works which included, tiling, plumbing,

electrical works and changes to the roof, windows and inner walls at the cost of

approximately $50,000.00;

e. By Deed dated 27th March, 2001 and registered as No.DE200101367464 on 26th June,

2001, Virdy, with the consent of the lessors, assigned and conveyed his share and

interest in the dwelling house to the front and the subject land to the Defendant for the

sum of $30,000.00;

f. By Deed dated 27th March, 2001, and registered as No.DE200101367585 on the 26th

June, 2001, the Defendant purchased the freehold interest in the subject land from the

lessors for the sum of $50,000.00. Further, by Deed dated 26th April, 2001 and

registered as No. DE200101396032 on the 28th June, 2001, the Defendant mortgaged

the subject land together with both dwelling houses thereon to Scotiabank, without the

knowledge and/or consent of the Claimants;

g. The Defendant has requested that they vacate the disputed house and has since

instituted ejectment proceedings against the First Claimant; and

h. By Deed registered as No. BS200900463973, Aldwyn assigned his interest in the

disputed house and the disputed land to the Claimants.

5. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Claimants claim the following relief against the

Defendant:

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a. A declaration that the disputed house and the disputed land are vested in fee simple in

equity in the Claimants;

b. An order that the Defendant convey the disputed house and disputed land to the

Claimants;

c. An injunction restraining the Defendant from evicting or attempting to evict the

Claimants; and

d. Costs.

THE DEFENCE

6. By Defence and Counterclaim filed on 23rd October, 2009, the Defendant alleged as follows:

a. Although Virdy was the tenant of the subject land, the tapia house existed prior to

Virdy’s tenancy and Kelvin King, another child of Virdy, resided therein;

b. In or around 1975, Virdy built a one room wooden structure and gave permission to

Aldwyn, Glen King and two cousins to reside therein. In 1978, Virdy built the disputed

house as temporary accommodation for his family while a proposed 2-storey concrete

structure was being constructed;

c. Aldwyn did not erect the disputed house to accommodate himself and his family nor

did he ever own it as, when it was built, Aldwyn was 18 years old, unmarried and he

had no children or a permanent job;

d. On 7th April, 1982, the Town and Country Planning Division (TCPD) granted the

relevant approvals to Virdy for the construction of the 2-storey concrete dwelling

house, subject to the condition that the disputed house be demolished upon completion

of the approved structure;

e. Virdy did demolish the tapia house in or about 1982 and erected a concrete dwelling

house in its place in or about 1984. The second story of the concrete dwelling house

was not completed due to a lack of funds;

f. When Virdy and his family moved into the concrete dwelling house to the front, he

granted a licence to Aldwyn to reside in the disputed house with his family and in 1994,

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Aldwyn migrated to the United States of America and returned briefly in 1995 and

1997 for his wife and children respectively;

g. Virdy never gave Aldwyn permission to sell the disputed house to the Claimants and,

upon his migration, Virdy gave the First Claimant permission to reside in the disputed

house, rent free with her family. The Claimants have resided there since 1997 to date;

h. Upon the Defendant’s acquisition of Virdy’s interest in the subject land, the Claimants

were given a licence to continue to reside in the disputed house rent free but with the

undertaking to pay the electricity and water rates;

i. The Claimants should not be compensated for the reconstruction and repair works done

on the disputed house as this was initially undertaken without the Defendant’s

permission and subsequently continued, despite the Defendant’s warning to desist;

j. The following correspondence were exchanged between the Claimants and the

Defendant via their respective Attorneys-at-Law:

i. Letter dated 15th January, 2004 - The Defendant’s Attorney-at-law wrote to the

Claimants requesting that they desist from continuing reconstruction and repair

works on the disputed house without the Defendant’s permission;

ii. Letter dated 20th June, 2008 - The Claimants’ Attorney-at-law wrote to the

Defendant indicating that they owned the disputed house;

iii. Letter dated 13th August, 2008 – The Defendant’s Attorney-at-law wrote to the

Claimants indicating that the Defendant was the owner of the subject land as

well as the disputed house and annexed Deeds as proof thereof. The licence

granted to the Claimants to occupy the disputed house was also revoked therein;

iv. Letter dated 26th August, 2008 – The Claimants Attorney-at-law forwarded a

purported declaration by the Second Claimant and signed by Aldwyn indicating

that the Second Claimant had entered into an agreement for the purchase of the

disputed house and disputed land on the immediate payment of $7,000.00 and

monthly payments of $100.00;

v. Letter dated 2nd October, 2008 - The Defendant’s Attorney-at-law wrote to the

Claimants indicating that the purported declaration neither evidenced Aldwyn’s

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ownership or construction of the disputed house nor their purchase of same.

Additionally, the Claimants were given until 30th September, 2008 to vacate the

disputed house; and

vi. Undated Letter - The Claimants Attorney-at-law forwarded an undated letter to

the Defendant contending that Aldwyn owned the disputed house and was given

the disputed land by Virdy to construct same.

k. Virdy assigned all his interest in the whole of the subject land to the Defendant as

evidenced by Deed No.DE200101367464 and this was done with the knowledge and/or

consent of the Claimants as, in or around March 2000, Virdy held a meeting with all

persons who resided on the subject land, including the Claimants and advised them of

same. The Claimants did not raise any objection to this assignment;

l. The lessors sold the freehold interest in the subject land to the Defendant as evidenced

by Deed No.DE200101367585 and the subject land and the buildings thereon have

been mortgaged to Scotiabank as evidenced by Deed No. DE200101396032; and

m. The Defendant denies any knowledge of the purported assignment of interest in the

disputed house and disputed land by Aldwyn to the Claimants and further contends that

there are discrepancies between the signatures of Aldwyn on the purported declaration

and the Deed respectively.

7. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Defendant counterclaims against the Claimants for:

a. Possession of the subject land;

b. Payment of arrears in the sum of $1,725.00 for outstanding electricity bills for the

period spanning September 2008 to January 2009 ($1,405.00) and water rates for the

period spanning May 2008 to May 2009 ($320.00) which the Claimants failed to pay

while in occupation of the disputed house and disputed land pursuant to the licence

granted by the Defendant;

c. Interest; and

d. Costs.

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REPLY AND DEFENCE TO COUNTERCLAIM

8. By Reply and Defence to the Counterclaim filed on 19th January, 2010, the Claimants allege

as follows:

a. Aldwyn built the disputed house and not Virdy;

b. Aldwyn began working at the age of fourteen (14) as a labourer with the Ministry of

Works and Transport and although he was classified as a casual worker, he was

regularly employed;

c. Virdy did not grant a licence to Aldwyn to reside in the disputed house with his family

neither did he grant the First Claimant a licence to reside in the disputed house rent

free. In addition, the Defendant did not grant the Claimants a licence to continue to

reside in the disputed house;

d. It is not admitted that Aldwyn was not given permission by Virdy to sell the disputed

house or that Aldwyn never owned same;

e. Virdy did not assign all his interest in the whole of the subject land to the Defendant

and the assigned interest was subject to the interest of the Claimants in the disputed

house. Further, there was no meeting where Virdy indicated his intention to transfer

his interest to the Defendant without the objection of the Claimants;

f. As the owners of the disputed house, the Claimants were entitled to effect repairs to

same; and

g. The Claimants agreed to pay half of the electricity and water rates and have done so to

date. Therefore, the Claimants deny that the Defendant has suffered any loss and

damage as claimed. Further, in or around September 2008, the Claimants’ electricity

supply was disrupted by the Defendant.

EVIDENCE

9. In support of their case, the Claimants relied on the Witness Statements of:

a. Kathleen Baptiste;

b. Aldwyn King; and

c. Kathleen Holder.

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10. In support of her case, the Defendant relied on the Witness Statements of:

a. Geraldine Hypolite;

b. Virdy King;

c. Kelvin King; and

d. Sheryl King.

ISSUES

11. The following issues arise for determination in this matter:

i. Did Aldwyn, with the permission and active encouragement of his father, Virdy King,

erect the disputed house in or around 1979 for himself and his family at a cost of

approximately $30,000 or did Virdy King erect the disputed house as temporary

accommodation for his family?

ii. Did the Claimants purchase the disputed house from Aldwyn for $43,000 in or around

1997, with the permission of Virdy?

iii. Did the Defendant grant the Claimants a licence to continue to reside in the disputed

house rent free after she acquired Virdy’s leasehold interest and the freehold interest of

the lessors in the subject land? If so, was this licence revoked by the Defendant?

iv. Did the Claimants effect reconstruction and repairs to the disputed house between 2000

and 2008 at a cost of $50,000? If so, were these works done without the permission of

the Defendant and despite protests by her?

v. Did the Claimants give an undertaking to the Defendant to pay the electricity bills and

water rates in respect of the disputed house and are they liable to the Defendant in the

amounts of $1,725.00?

vi. Are the Claimants entitled to the reliefs sought against the Defendant?

vii. Is the Defendant entitled to the reliefs sought against the Claimants?

ISSUE I: DID ALDWYN, WITH THE PERMISSION AND ACTIVE ENCOURAGEMENT

OF HIS FATHER, VIRDY KING, ERECT THE DISPUTED HOUSE IN OR AROUND

1979 FOR HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY $30,000 OR

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DID VIRDY KING ERECT THE DISPUTED HOUSE AS TEMPORARY

ACCOMMODATION FOR HIS FAMILY?

12. The following facts are not in dispute between the parties:

a. Virdy was a statutory lessee of the lessors of the subject land under and by virtue of the

Land Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act 1981;

b. In 1982, Virdy sought and obtained permission from the TCPD to develop the subject

land by erecting a 2-storey concrete dwelling house. This permission expressly

imposed as a condition that the existing building be demolished upon completion of

the proposed new building;

c. By Deed registered as No. DE200101367464, Virdy, with the consent of the lessors,

assigned and conveyed to the Defendant all his right share and interest in the leasehold

premises and the dwelling house standing thereon to the Defendant for the sum of

$30,000.00;

d. By Deed of Conveyance registered as No. DE200101357585D000, the Defendant

purchased the freehold interest in the subject land from the lessors for $50,000.00; and

e. By Deed of Mortgage registered as No. DE200101396032D000, the Defendant

mortgaged the subject land together with the buildings thereon and the appurtenances

thereto belonging to Scotiabank to secure repayment of moneys owing on banking

facilities granted by Scotiabank to the Defendant.

The Evidence

The Claimants’ Evidence

Kathleen Baptiste – First Claimant

13. In her Witness Statement, the First Claimant stated that her father, Virdy, constructed and

owned a two bedroom tapia house which occupied the front of the subject land. This tapia

house was occupied by Virdy and his family including the Defendant and herself.

14. In or around 1979, Virdy gave permission to Aldwyn to erect a concrete house at the back of

the subject land. At that time, Aldwyn was employed as a Labourer in the Ministry of Works

and Transport. With the encouragement and permission of Virdy, Aldwyn erected a three

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bedroom concrete dwelling house on the back portion of the subject land at a cost of

approximately $30,000.

15. In or around 1982, Virdy wanted to erect a concrete upstairs house on the front portion of the

subject land and so he demolished the tapia house and moved his family to the back house

which had been built by Aldwyn until the completion of the dwelling house to the front.

16. Under cross-examination, the First Claimant gave the following evidence:

“….. I was born in 1972. I was 7 years old in 1979… I was not aware that in 1978 my

father constructed small concrete structure…I am aware that father was not owner of land.

I am aware he was a tenant. I don't know how long his tenancy was for… I say father gave

permission to Aldwyn in 1979. I don't mention family meeting or being present for any

conversation between father and Aldwyn. I don't say that father told me about arrangement

in 1979. I don't say I was told about arrangement by Aldwyn. At time of arrangement I was

7. When I spoke at para 5 of permission given to Aldwyn in 1979 I am not saying that based

on my knowledge. I am saying that based on what someone else told me. I did not say in

Witness Statement that my mother said that to me. I say that Aldwyn spent $30,000.00. I

don't say that Aldwyn told me that. I don't say my father told me that. I don't say that mother

told me that. When I say that, it is not based on my own knowledge. It is based on what

someone told me. Aldwyn told me that…

I don't recall going to back when structure was being built. I don't recall going back to

front structure. I was too young to remember.”

Kathleen Holder

17. Kathleen Holder gave evidence that Virdy gave Aldwyn the back portion of the subject land

to build a place for himself as the tapia house in which they lived was too crowded. She went

further to state that Aldwyn built the disputed house while he was working as a Labourer at

the Ministry of Works and Transport and got assistance from Roland Paul and Joseph

Williams.

18. However, under cross-examination, Ms. Holder admitted that her evidence was based on what

Aldwyn told her and she did not speak to Virdy on the issue. She also admitted that she did not

know if what Aldwyn told her was the truth.

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Aldwyn King

19. In his Witness Statement, Aldwyn stated that he was the owner of the disputed house since

1979 up until 1997, when he sold it to the Claimants along with the disputed land. He also

stated that in 1979 he was employed as a labourer in the Ministry of Works and Transport and,

with the encouragement and permission of his father, Virdy, he erected a three bedroom

concrete dwelling house with wooden partitions on the back portion of the subject land at a

cost of approximately $30,000.00. Aldwyn also stated that Roland Paul and Joseph Williams

assisted him in building the disputed house which he moved into in or about 1980, along with

the said Roland Paul.

20. He further stated that in or around 1982 Virdy demolished the tapia house so that he could

replace it with an upstairs concrete house and during the construction phase Virdy and his

family resided in the disputed house.

21. Under cross-examination, Aldwyn stated as follows in relation to his construction and

ownership of the disputed house:

“I was employed by Ministry of Works. I was employed full time by age of 15. That was

1975. I exhibit record of service ‘AK 1’. I see 5 columns. I see column marked substantive

rate. I see numbers for number of days worked. Some of sums I received I expended on

myself personally.

I say father gave me permission to construct house at back. I requested his permission to

construct house at back. I knew it was not owned by father. I did not know if he had

obtained permission to construct house from landlords. I spent about $30,000.00. I moved

in in 1980. I did not take loan to construct house. I did so from my earnings and help from

relatives. It was from my own money. From 1975 to 1980 based on record of service I

would not have earned $30,000.00. I have not said I earned income from other

employment.”

The Defendant’s Evidence

Geraldine Hypolite - Defendant

22. In her Witness Statement, the Defendant gave evidence that she was born in November 1978

and that she has 6 siblings, Aldwyn, Glen, Sheryl, Kelvin, Ian and Kathleen King. Her father,

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Virdy, and her mother, Vera, and all the children lived in a tapia house at the front of the subject

parcel of land until April 1979 when she got married and moved out for one year. Thereafter,

she returned with her husband and her infant son.

23. In or about 1975, Virdy built a small one room wooden structure and gave permission to

Aldwyn, Glen and two cousins from Cedros, Sookram Paul and Carlo Paul, to stay in the

wooden structure. In or about 1978, Virdy built a small three room concrete structure (“the

disputed house”) with a wooden kitchen frame at the back of the subject land to temporarily

accommodate the family while a proposed 2 storey structure was being built. Her father built

the concrete structure with his own resources and with no financial help from anyone and

everyone, except the boys, went to the concrete back structure.

24. At the time when the disputed house was built, Aldwyn was 18 years old, temporarily

employed as a daily paid worker with the Ministry of Works and Transport, unmarried and he

did not have any children. Aldwyn never owned the disputed house or contributed to its

construction. Sometime in or about 1982, the tapia house was demolished and construction of

the two storey house commenced. When the first level of the two storey house was completed

the family, except Aldwyn, moved to that structure and Aldwyn was given permission by Virdy

to live in the concrete house at the back of the subject land. By that time, her two cousins had

moved back to Cedros. Aldwyn moved into the disputed house but at that time he did not have

any family.

25. Under cross-examination the Defendant stated as follows:

“…. My father erected the house to the back. He started around 1978. It was never really

completed before we moved in. It was completed while we were in it. I don't know how

much he spent to complete that house. My father actually built that house… He was also a

builder and he got help from his friends for labour… It took a couple years from when he

started and when we moved in. It took approximately 2 years to build the back house.

There was tapia house to the front which was broken down in 1982… Aldwyn did not

occupy house to the back from 1979. I said we lived in tapia house until 1982 and I said

we moved in 1980. We moved there in 1982. Aldwyn was not there in 1979.

I heard my lawyer ask Aldwyn if my father gave him permission to live there. It is not true

that Aldwyn lived there in 1979. I said house to back began in 1978. I said it was temporary

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to accommodate the family when the 2 storey structure was being built… I don't why my

father put up a concrete structure as a temporary structure… Aldwyn was given permission

to live in house to back when we moved to the front…

I don't agree that Aldwyn constructed house to back in 1979 with the assistance of Roland

Paul and Joseph Williams. I disagree that he and Roland Paul entered into occupation of

house after. When family moved into structure Aldwyn was given permission to move in…I

was not present when father told Aldwyn he could move in there. I know this because that

is what Daddy said to me. I know he allowed Aldwyn alone to move in because there was

no room in the front house.”

Kelvin King

26. In his Witness Statement, Kelvin gave evidence that he was born in July 1966 and that he and

his six siblings and his mother and father lived in a tapia house that was located at the front of

the subject land until around 1979 when the Defendant got married and moved out. In or about

1975, his father, Virdy, built a small one room wooden structure on the subject land and gave

permission to Alwyn, Glen and two cousins from Cedros, Sookram and Carlo Paul, to stay in

the wooden structure.

27. In or about 1978, his father built a small three room concrete structure at the back of the subject

land to temporarily accommodate the family while a proposed 2-storey concrete structure was

being built. At the time of the construction of the three room concrete structure, Aldwyn was

18 years old, unmarried and he did not yet have any children and he was temporarily employed

as a daily paid worker.

28. His father built the concrete structure with a wooden kitchen frame and Aldwyn never spent

any money on the disputed house and did not own it. When the concrete structure at the back

was erected, everyone, except the boys, went there and his father indicated this was for privacy

reasons.

29. He further stated that in or about 1982 the tapia house was demolished and construction of the

2-storey house commenced. When the first level of the 2-storey house was constructed, the

family moved back to the front structure and Virdy then gave Aldwyn permission to reside in

the disputed house.

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30. Under cross-examination, Kelvin stated as follows:

“… The back house was built between 1978 and early 1980's. My father built house. He

started building back house around 1982. I can't recall how long he took to build the house.

It probably took about a year. Father actually built the house. He did so with some help. I

can't remember who but his friends were there sometimes…

There was a tapia house to the front... The family occupied house until my father built the

house behind. Then we demolished the tapia house. When the house was completed at the

back, the tapia house was demolished. We occupied the tapia house until it was demolished.

I know that Aldwyn lived at back. I cannot recall when he started living there. If Aldwyn

said he started living there in 1979, I cannot recall. My father constructed the house at

back but I can't recall when. I was living there at the time. We moved to the back in 1982

when house to front was being built. When that was built I moved to the front. I cannot

recall if Aldwyn remained to the back. I was living there…”

Sheryl King

31. Sheryl King gave evidence that she was born in September 1964. The entire family lived in a

tapia house at the front of the subject land until around 1979 when Geraldine got married and

moved out.

32. In or about 1975, her father, Virdy, built a small one room wooden structure on the subject

land and gave permission to her brothers, Aldwyn and Glen and two cousins, Sookram and

Carlo Paul, to stay in the wooden structure.

33. In or about 1978, Virdy built a small three room concrete structure at the back of the subject

land to temporarily accommodate the family while a proposed 2 storey structure was being

built. At that time, Aldwyn was about 18 years old, unmarried and he had not yet had children.

He was temporarily employed as a daily paid worker.

34. Her father built the concrete structure with a wooden kitchen frame and Aldwyn never spent

any money on that structure. When this was built, everyone except the boys went to the back

structure and her father indicated that this was for privacy reasons.

35. Sometime in 1982, the tapia house was demolished and construction of the 2 storey house

commenced sometime thereafter. When the first level of the 2 storey structure was completed

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the family, except Aldwyn, moved into that structure which comprised 3 bedrooms, living

room, kitchen, toilet and bath.

36. Aldwyn was given permission by Virdy to live in the concrete structure at the back of the

subject land and the wooden structure was then broken down.

37. Aldwyn’s fist son was born in January 1984 and 3 other children were born thereafter. With

Virdy’s permission, Aldwyn resided in the concrete structure at the back because there was

nowhere else for him to go and there was no more room in the first floor of the concrete

structure at the front of the subject land for him and his family.

38. Under cross-examination Sheryl stated as follows:

“… Aldwyn did not build the house around 1979. My father built the house. In 1979 I was

14 or 15. My dad built the house at the back… I can't say exactly how long he took to build

the back house. Probably he took some months.

There was a tapia house to the front. The family occupied the tapia house. The family

stopped occupying the house when the house to the back was finished. We moved into the

back house around 1979… Front house was ready for occupation around 2001. Sorry, it

was around 1981… The house at the front was ready for occupation around 1983-1984…

Aldwyn moved to the back house when we moved into the front structure… He was in

occupation of back house. While we were there he was there too. He remained there when

we moved to front. He alone did not remain to back. Family occupied back and front. It

was not completed. It was done room by room. It was completed after about 2 to 3 years.

That would take us to 1986. Everybody lived at back up to about 1986...

I do not agree that Aldwyn, with help of Roland Paul and Joseph Williams built the back

house. I do not agree that he and Roland Paul lived there. He and girlfriend lived there…

Virdy King

39. In his witness statement, Virdy gave evidence that he started living on the subject land in or

about 1956. There was a tapia house at the front of the subject land which was given to him by

the previous owner. He and his wife, Vera had 7 children, Geraldine (born 1958), Aldwyn

(born 1960), Glen (born 1962) Sheryl (born 1964), Kelvin (born 1966), Ian (born 1971) and

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Kathleen (born 1972). The entire family lived in the tapia house until around 1979 when

Geraldine got married and moved out.

40. In or about 1975, he built a one room wooden structure on the subject land and gave permission

to Aldwyn and Glen and two cousins from Cedros, Sookram Paul and Carlo Paul, who were

living with them at the time, to stay in the wooden structure.

41. In or around 1978, he built the disputed house at the back of the subject land to be used as

temporary accommodation for his family while a proposed 2-storey concrete structure was

being constructed. He stated that he built the disputed house with his earnings from the

Ministry of Works and Transport and upon its completion, the entire family with the exception

of the boys (for privacy reasons related to the girls) resided there. He also stated that Aldwyn

was 18 years old, temporarily employed, unmarried and had no children at the time that the

disputed house was being built. Virdy denied that he gave Aldwyn permission to erect the

disputed house or that Aldwyn contributed to its construction.

42. Under cross-examination, Virdy gave the following evidence:

“… It is not so that Aldwyn built the back house. I built the back house. I can't remember

exactly when I built it. I can't remember exact date when I finished the back house. I can't

remember the date or the year. I can't remember how long I took to build the house. I can't

remember how much I spent to build the house. My daughter was there too. I alone built

that house. I received assistance from my friends and workers where I used to work, friends

and so forth. I built house at back to stay in while I was building the front. It was a

temporary structure. I built it as a temporary concrete structure. I had a little change and

I used it….It is correct what I said in witness statement that I built concrete structure at

back in 1978. It is correct that in 1982 I demolished tapia house. I said in witness statement

that “in or after this I decided to build 2-storey concrete house to replace the tapia house.”

That is correct. Before I decided to build the 2-storey concrete house, I had built the

concrete house at the back. I said that in or after I demolished tapia house I decided in

1982 to build a 2-storey house. I cannot remember the date.

Shown para 8 of Witness Statement

I cannot read that. My eyes giving me trouble. I said I built temporary concrete structure

at back in 1978.

Page 17 of 42

(Witness complains that he is tired sitting down. He prefers to stand.)

The house at the back was a temporary structure. I can’t remember the year you are

speaking about.”

Analysis and Findings

43. In my evaluation of the evidence, I am guided by the decision in Reid v Charles and Bain1

where the Privy Council emphasized that where the Court is confronted with an acute conflict

of evidence between opposing parties, although the impression which the evidence makes upon

the judge is of the greatest importance, a wrong impression can be gained if this is solely relied

upon. Lord Acker stated as follows:

“... In such a situation, where the wrong impression can be gained by the most experienced

of judges if he relies solely on the demeanour of the witnesses, it is important for him to

check that impression against contemporary documents, where they exist, against the

pleaded case and against the inherent probability or improbability of the rival contentions,

in the light in particular of facts and matters which are common ground or unchallenged,

or disputed only as an afterthought or otherwise in a very unsatisfactory manner. Unless

this approach is adopted, there is a real risk that the evidence will not be properly

evaluated and the trial judge will in the result have failed to take proper advantage of

having seen and heard the witnesses."

44. The Claimants’ case is that Virdy gave permission to Aldwyn to erect a concrete structure at

the back of the subject parcel of land to accommodate himself, his wife and his children for

the rest of his life.2

45. As the evidence unfolded at the trial, however, it became clear that neither the Claimant nor

her witness, Kathleen Holder, were able to give any helpful evidence from their personal

knowledge about the erection of the concrete house by either Virdy or Aldwyn. In the case of

the First Claimant, she was only seven years old at the time when she alleged the disputed

house was erected and she was compelled to admit that she had no personal knowledge about

her father giving Aldwyn permission to erect the disputed house or about how much was spent

1 Privy Council Appeal No. 36 of 1987 at page 6. 2 Para. 4 of Statement of Case

Page 18 of 42

by Aldwyn in such construction. She was merely repeating what she had been told by Aldwyn.

In the case of Kathleen Holder, she also admitted that her evidence about Virdy giving Aldwyn

the back portion of land to build a place for himself and about Aldwyn building the house with

the help of Roland Paul and Joseph Williams was based on what she had been told by Aldwyn.

Accordingly, I place no weight on the evidence of either of these witnesses in determining this

issue of fact.

46. Aldwyn King was 19 years old in 1979. The unchallenged evidence is that he was not yet

married and he had no children. He was employed as a labourer in the Ministry of Works.

According to the unchallenged evidence adduced by the Defendant’s witnesses, he was living

in a one room wooden structure which Virdy had built since 1979 together with his brother

and his 2 cousins. Virdy, his wife and their other 5 children were living in a two room tapia

house located to the front of the subject land.

47. According to Aldwyn, Virdy gave him verbal permission to erect a concrete house and told

him he could live there for life. He proceeded to erect a 3 bedroom concrete house with wooden

partitions at a cost of approximately $30,000 with the help of his cousin, Roland Paul and his

uncle, Joseph Williams. Sometime in 1980, he moved into the disputed house with Roland

Paul.

48. The first observation I wish to make is that there is conflict between the pleading that Virdy

gave Aldwyn permission to erect the structure “to accommodate his wife and his children” and

Aldwyn’s evidence. Aldwyn gave no evidence that he was married or had children in 1979 and

there was no challenge in cross examination to the evidence of Sheryl King that Aldwyn’s first

child was born in 1984 and that he had 3 children thereafter. Secondly, Aldwyn’s evidence

about his expenditure of $30,000 was significantly undermined in cross-examination. He

admitted that between 1975 and 1980, he had not earned $30,000 from his employment as a

labourer. He did not say that he earned money from any other employment and he did not take

a loan to construct the house. Therefore, he could not explain how he spent that amount when

out of what he earned he admitted spending some on his personal expenses.

49. The Defendant’s case is that in 1978 Virdy built the disputed house to provide temporary

accommodation for his family. At that time, Virdy, his wife and five of their children lived in

a two room tapia house at the front of the subject land and Aldwyn, Glen, Sookram and Carlo

Page 19 of 42

stayed in the one room wooden structure that Virdy had built in 1975. In 1982, the Town and

Country Planning Division granted permission to Virdy to construct a two storey concrete

dwelling house to the front of the subject land.

50. The Defendant, Kelvin and Sheryl all gave evidence that Virdy had built the one room wooden

structure in 1975 and that thereafter Aldwyn, Glen, Sookram and Carlo stayed there. The rest

of the family lived in the two room tapia house until the Defendant moved out in 1979.

Although Virdy was unable to recall the exact dates when he built the disputed house at the

back, when he finished it or how much he spent, he was not shaken in his testimony that he

had built it, and not Aldwyn, for his family to stay while he was building the front building

that he sought and obtained approval to build. He also produced the Town and Country

Planning Division Permission to develop the lands which shows that an application dated 12th

January 1982 was submitted on the 1st March 1982 and the permission was issued on the 7th

April 1982.

51. Given the passage of at least 35 years between the alleged erection of the disputed house and

the dates when the evidence was being given by the witnesses at the trial, I am not surprised

that the memories of all the witnesses may have dimmed and that they would have struggled

to recall with clarity the events of that period. In my opinion, the determination of this issue

requires me to weigh up the evidence of the witnesses, especially Aldwyn and Virdy, against

the inherent probability or improbability of the rival contentions as well as the contemporary

documents from that period and the unchallenged facts.

52. The unchallenged facts are that by 1975, there were 11 persons living on the subject land:

Virdy and his wife, their 7 children and the two cousins from Cedros, Sookram and Carlo.

They were all living in a two room tapia house until Virdy built a one room wooden structure

for the four boys to live in, namely Aldwyn, Glen, Sookram and Carlo. Aldwyn was 18 years

old, unmarried and he had no children.

53. According to Aldwyn, he completed construction of the disputed house by 1980 and then he

and Roland Paul moved in. It was not until 1982 when Virdy demolished the tapia house and

began construction of the 2 storey dwelling house that the family moved into the disputed

house.

Page 20 of 42

54. According to the Defendant’s witnesses, Virdy built the disputed house in 1978 and moved in

after completion. In 1982, he demolished the tapia house and began construction of the 2 storey

house on the front portion of the subject land.

55. The questions I ask myself, therefore, are as follows:

a. Is it more probable that Virdy would give permission to and actively encourage Aldwyn

to erect a three bedroom concrete house for him to live in for the rest of his life or that

Virdy would erect a three bedroom house to house his expanding family until he could

construct a larger 2-storey dwelling house on the same spot where the tapia house was

built?

b. Is it more probable that Aldwyn erected the disputed house by 1980 on his income as

a labourer at the Ministry of Works or that Virdy erected the disputed house from his

earnings?

c. Is it more probable that after completion of the disputed house, Aldwyn resided therein

with Roland Paul between 1980 and 1982 while the rest of the family continued to

occupy the 2 room tapia house or that Virdy erected the disputed house in or around

1978 and moved into it with his family as soon as it was complete until he had the

necessary permission to construct the 2 storey house in 1982?

56. In my opinion, it is more probable that Virdy would have taken on the responsibility for

providing suitable and more comfortable accommodation for his large family in the same way

that he had built the one room wooden structure in 1975 for the 4 boys. Although the Town

and Country Planning Permission was issued in April 1982, it is consistent with the evidence

of Virdy that he built the disputed house as a temporary structure until he could build the 2

storey structure and that he demolished the tapia house and began the construction of the 2

storey structure on the same front portion of land.

57. Further, based on the records produced by Aldwyn, in 1975, he earned $576.36 for 36 days. In

1976, he earned $792.45 for 45 days. In 1977, he earned $4235.46 for 219 days. In 1978, he

earned $5,013.30 for 255 days. In1979, he earned $8,813.97 for 261 days. In 1980, he earned

$9,236.40 for 258 days. This amounts to $28,667.94 for the period 1975 to 1980. He did not

say that he earned income from other employment and he said he did not take a loan to

Page 21 of 42

construct the disputed house. He also said that he spent some of the money he earned on himself

which would have depleted the money available to construct the disputed house. This makes

the evidence of Aldwyn incredible that he built the three bedroom concrete structure at a cost

of $30,000. I consider it more probable that Virdy would have been in a better financial position

than Aldwyn to erect the disputed house.

58. Further, I am of the opinion that it is more probable that Virdy erected the disputed house and

moved in with his family prior to 1982 and that the family resided there until planning

permission was granted in 1982, the tapia house was demolished and construction of the 2

storey house commenced.

59. In the circumstances, on a balance of probabilities, I accept the evidence of the Defendant’s

witnesses and find that the disputed house was erected by Virdy and not Aldwyn.

ISSUE II: DID THE CLAIMANTS PURCHASE THE DISPUTED HOUSE FROM

ALDWYN FOR $43,000 IN OR AROUND 1997, WITH THE PERMISSION OF VIRDY?

The Statement of Case

60. In her Statement of Case, the Claimants alleged that in or about 1997 Aldwyn, with the oral

permission and consent of Virdy, sold the disputed house to the Claimants for $43,000.


Aldwyn King

61. In his witness statement, Aldwyn stated that sometime in 1997 he returned to Trinidad from

the United States of America and he and the Claimants visited Virdy at his residence at

Cunupia. On that occasion, Virdy gave him oral permission and consent to sell the disputed

house that he had erected to the Claimants. Therefore, he agreed with the Claimants to sell the

disputed house and the disputed land to them for $43,000. The Second Claimant and Aldwyn

signed a memorandum of acknowledgement dated 24th March, 1997. On the same day it was

agreed that the Claimants would pay one half of the electricity and water bill as Aldwyn had

done previously. On the 26th March, 2009, Aldwyn formally assigned his rights to the disputed

house to the Claimants by a Deed of Assignment of Chattel.

Page 22 of 42

62. Under cross-examination, Aldwyn gave evidence that the purpose of the meeting with his

father was to get his father’s permission to sell the disputed house to the First Claimant because

it was a family property and “we wanted the entire family to be satisfied because of the future

well-being of other siblings. I wanted them to be satisfied. It is not the real reason that I was

not the owner of the house.” Further, he admitted that the memorandum of acknowledgement

did not refer to a purchase price of $43,000 or any purchase price and he did not exhibit any

receipts for payments by the Claimants of instalments amounting to $43,000. Further, he

insisted that by 2009, the Claimants had paid the purchase price of $43,000 and so he signed

the Deed of Assignment. However, when confronted about the computation of the amount paid

by the Claimants, he admitted that if the Claimants had paid $100.00 per month from March

1997 to March 2009, the Second Claimant would not have paid $43,000 but only $21,400.

63. Aldwyn was also cross-examined about a letter dated 16th May, 2000 written by him to the

First Claimant. In this letter, Aldwyn stated, inter alia, as follows:

“First the back house belongs to me I put each block there by myself Roland was the only

person to give me a hand I spent over 20,000 dollars in there.”

64. With respect to this letter, Aldwyn said that he referred to the disputed house as his own and

did not mention that he had agreed to sell the disputed house to the Claimants because the

Second Claimant was still paying for it.

Kathleen Baptiste – First Claimant

65. In her witness statement, the First Claimant stated that sometime in 1997 Aldwyn returned to

Trinidad and she, her husband and Aldwyn visited Virdy at Cunupia where he gave oral

permission and consent to Aldwyn to sell the disputed house that he had erected to her and her

husband. Thereafter, Aldwyn sold the disputed house to the Claimants for $43,000 and he and

the Second Claimant signed a memorandum of acknowledgement dated 24th March, 1997. She

also stated that the assignment of Virdy’s interest to the Defendant was subject to her interest

in the disputed house. She denied that Virdy or the Defendant ever granted a licence to the

Claimants to live in the disputed house and insisted that she and the Second Claimants were

the owners of the disputed house. She stated further that on 3rd November, 2008, she was served

with a Notice to quit by the Defendant and on 6th March, 2009, Aldwyn formally assigned his

rights in the house to her and her husband. On 15th March, 2009, the Defendant issued an

Page 23 of 42

ejectment summons against her which was returnable on the 24th March 2009 in the Port of

Spain Magistrates’ Court.

66. Under cross-examination, the First Claimant stated that Aldwyn requested Virdy’s permission

to sell the disputed house to her because “he wanted everybody to be happy with his decision

to sell me the house.” As far as she was aware, the Second Claimant paid the sum of $43,000

to Aldwyn but the Second Claimant was not called as a witness. She also admitted that the

Deed of Assignment from Virdy to the Defendant did not expressly state it was made subject

to her interest in the disputed house. She also accepted that “my interest in the house is based

on Aldwyn’s interest in the house. If he does not have an interest in the house, I don’t have any

interest in the house.” She also gave the following evidence that I consider quite significant

and relevant to this issue:

“The Defendant issued ejectment proceedings and I was forced to bring these proceedings.

I did so to prevent me and my family being put out. My brother had written to me in 2000

to say that he would do anything to assist me to ensure that I was not thrown out. I entered

into an arrangement to purchase the house at back. We signed assignment in March 2009—

26th March 2009. Summons was to appear on 15th March 2009. Husband paid pursuant to

agreement. We had paid off the $43,000. I am aware that husband had only paid $21,400

up to that time. A few days after the hearing I signed assignment”

67. Further, although the First Claimant said she had seen receipts signed by Joseph Williams for

the payments made by the Second Claimant at her home, she did not annex any receipts to her

Witness Statement or include them in her list of documents. Also, she could not explain why

she had not done so or why the Second Claimant did not give evidence at the trial.

The Defence

68. In her Defence, the Defendant denied that Virdy gave permission to Aldwyn to sell the disputed

house to the Claimant and that Aldwyn ever owned the same. She alleged that when Aldwyn

migrated to the United States of America, Virdy granted the First Claimant permission to reside

in the disputed house with her family rent-free. When Virdy transferred his interest in the

disputed property to her in 2001, she then gave the First Claimant a licence to reside in the

disputed property with her family rent-free but she was to pay the electricity and water rates.

In or about March 2000, Virdy had a meeting with all persons residing on the subject land

Page 24 of 42

including the Claimants, Sheryl and Kelvin King. Virdy indicated his intention to transfer the

subject land to the Defendant and the Claimants did not raise any objection.


Geraldine King – Defendant

69. The Defendant gave evidence in her witness statement that Aldwyn had Virdy’s permission

for his family to reside in the disputed property as there was nowhere else for him to go and

there was no more room in the first floor of the concrete structure. In 1994, Aldwyn went to

the United States of America to participate in a karate tournament and stayed on. In 1995,

Aldwyn returned briefly and then went back to the United States of America with his wife,

Indira, leaving his children with the First Claimant. At that time, the First Claimant started

staying in the disputed house off and on. In March 1997, Aldwyn returned and took his children

with him to the United States of America leaving the disputed house empty. The Claimants

and their children then moved into the disputed house with Virdy’s knowledge and permission.

In or about the end of 1997, there was a family meeting attended by Virdy, her mother,

Kathleen, Kelvin, Sheryl, the Defendant and her husband. Virdy indicated his intention to

transfer his interest in the subject land to the Defendant and there was no objection from the

First Claimant and she did not say anything about owning the disputed house.

70. Under cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that she was not present when Virdy gave

permission to Aldwyn to move into the disputed house and her evidence was based on what

Virdy said to her. She also contradicted her pleading when she stated that there were two family

meetings, one in March 1997 and another in March 2000 although she did not refer to a 1997

meeting in her Defence. Further, she stated that she did not attend the meeting in 2000 but was

only saying what Virdy told her about that meeting. She also accepted that by March 2000 her

mother had died and could not have been present for any such meeting. She denied that the

meetings were a complete fabrication on her part. She said that Virdy told her he was the tenant

of the land and the owner of the dwelling house to the front and she stated that Virdy never

transferred the disputed house to her.

Page 25 of 42

Virdy King

71. In his witness statement, Virdy stated that he did not give permission to anybody to sell the

disputed house because Aldwyn never owned that structure. He also gave evidence that when

Aldwyn took the children with him to the United States of America in 1997, the disputed house

was empty and the First Claimant moved into it with his permission and knowledge. In or about

1997, he heard from Sheryl that Aldwyn had sold the disputed house to the First Claimant for

$7,000. He went to the First Claimant and asked her about the sale but she denied that and said

that Aldwyn had only sold her the furniture and he accepted her explanation. About the end of

1997, he held a meeting with his wife, Kathleen, Sheryl, Kelvin, the Defendant and her husband

at which he indicated his intention to transfer his interest to the Defendant. There was no

objection to this and the First Claimant did not say anything about owning the disputed house.

72. Under cross-examination, Virdy stated that the First Claimant used to live in the disputed house

when she was taking care of Aldwyn’s children and when Aldwyn went away, she continued

to live there. He said that he did not know anything about the First Claimant paying Aldwyn

for the disputed house and he asked rhetorically, “How can you pay for something you don’t

own. I heard something like that but how could you sell something you don’t own? He also

denied that he had any conversation with the First Claimant after Aldwyn left Trinidad and

said, “When I heard that Kathleen bought the back house, what do you want me to do? If you

selling what is not yours, I can’t do anything. I can't beat them. ”

73. In answer to the Court, Virdy said that Town and Country told him he was to demolish the

disputed house because he could not have two structures on the subject land but he did not

demolish house because the First Claimant and the children were at the back.


74. The first important point to note on this issue is that, in the light of my earlier finding that

Virdy erected the disputed house and not Aldwyn, Aldwyn had no share or interest in the

disputed house to sell to the Claimants.

75. Further, and in any event, the burden of proof lay upon the Claimants to prove that they

‘purchased’ the disputed house from Aldwyn, with the verbal permission of Virdy, for $43,000.

In my opinion, the Claimants failed to discharge this burden of proof for the following reasons:

Page 26 of 42

a. I find Aldwyn’s explanation for seeking Virdy’s permission to sell the disputed house

to the Claimants to be illogical and incredible because it is inconsistent with his

contention that since 1978 he had been given permission by Virdy to build the disputed

house and that he had been told that he could live there for life;

b. The First Claimant’s evidence about the agreement to purchase the disputed house for

$43,000 is not supported by the memorandum of acknowledgement signed by Aldwyn

and the Second Claimant. There is no mention therein of the purchase price. Further,

the First Claimant failed to produce any receipts to prove that the Claimants paid that

price and she readily admitted that at the rate of $100 per month the total amount that

had been paid is only $21,400;

c. In my opinion, the assignment from Aldwyn to the Claimants in March 2009 is

consistent with Aldwyn’s desire to ensure that the First Claimant was not kicked out of

the disputed house, as expressed in his letter dated 16th May, 2000. The Defendant filed

an ejectment complaint against the First Claimant which had been listed for hearing on

the 24th March 2009. According to the First Claimant, a few days after the hearing,

Aldwyn executed a Deed of Assignment in favour of the Claimants in respect of an

alleged agreement to purchase the disputed house entered into in 1997 and in respect

of which no evidence was produced to this Court by the Claimants that they had in fact

paid $43,000 to Aldwyn. In the circumstances, I do not accept that the Claimants paid

Aldwyn $43,000 for the disputed house and I believe that the 2009 assignment was

intended to assist the Claimants in their efforts to resist the Defendant’s action to

recover possession; and

d. Despite the Defendant’s lack of personal knowledge about Virdy giving permission to

Aldwyn to reside in the disputed house and her contradictory evidence about the family

meetings, this does not alter the fact that the Claimants bore the burden of proof of the

agreement to purchase and the payment of the purchase price. Further, I consider that,

despite his inability to recall dates and the contradiction in his evidence about not

speaking to the First Claimant after he heard that she had agreed to purchase the

disputed house, Virdy’s evidence under cross-examination was consistent with his

Page 27 of 42

testimony that he built the disputed house and as a consequence Aldwyn could not sell

what did not belong to him.

76. In the circumstances, I find that the Claimants have failed to prove that they purchased the

disputed house from Aldwyn for $43,000, with the permission of Virdy.

ISSUE III: DID THE DEFENDANT GRANT THE CLAIMANTS A LICENCE TO

CONTINUE TO RESIDE IN THE DISPUTED HOUSE RENT FREE AFTER SHE

ACQUIRED VIRDY’S LEASEHOLD INTEREST AND THE FREEHOLD INTEREST OF

THE LESSORS IN THE SUBJECT LAND? IF SO, WAS THIS LICENCE REVOKED BY

THE DEFENDANT?

77. It is not in dispute between the parties that by 1995 Aldwyn had migrated to the United States

of America with his wife and that the First Claimant took care of his children until he returned

for them in 1997. It is also not in dispute that after 1997, the Claimants and their children

resided in the disputed house. I have already found that they did not purchase the disputed

house from Aldwyn in 1997. Therefore, the question is, on what basis did they remain in

occupation of the disputed house after that date?

The Defence

78. According to the Defendant’s Defence, when Aldwyn migrated to the United States of

America, Virdy granted the First Claimant a licence by giving her permission to reside in the

disputed house with her family without the payment of rent. Further, when Virdy transferred

his interest in the subject land to her, she also gave the Claimants a licence to continue to reside

in the disputed property without payment of rent but they were to pay for electricity and water

rates.

79. Further, the Defendant alleged that, by letter dated 13th August, 2008, the Defendant’s

Attorneys-at-Law revoked the licence under which the Claimants resided in the disputed

property.

Page 28 of 42


Virdy King

80. In his witness statement, Virdy stated that when Aldwyn took the children in 1997 the disputed

house was empty and the First Claimant moved into the disputed house with his permission

and knowledge. At that time, the First Claimant had two children and she and the Second

Claimant moved into the disputed house.

81. Under cross-examination, Virdy gave the following evidence:

“I know that Kathleen lives in that house to the back. She started living there but I cannot

recall exact date from when. Aldwyn had children. Kathleen used to take care of children

in that house at the back. She lived there with Aldwyn's children in that house at the back.

When Aldwyn went away, Kathleen continued to live there.”

Geraldine King – Defendant

82. In her witness statement, the Defendant stated that when Aldwyn took the children in 1997 the

disputed house was now empty. The Claimants and their two children moved into the disputed

house with Virdy’s permission and knowledge. After she bought her father’s leasehold interest

and the freehold in 2001, she told everyone that she was now the owner of the subject land and

she specifically told the Claimants that no works were to be done to the disputed house because

on completion of the front two storey structure it would need to be demolished.

83. The Defendant also exhibited to her witness statement the letter dated 13th August, 2008 from

her Attorneys-at-Law which expressly stated, inter alia, as follows:

“Our instructions are to inform your client that the licence granted to her is hereby revoked

and to demand that she vacate the premises on or before he 30th September 2008, failing

which an action for possession will be commenced against her in the High Court without

further notice.”

84. Under cross-examination, this evidence was not challenged by Counsel for the Claimants.


85. In my opinion, the focus of the cross-examination of the Defendant’s witnesses was on trying

to establish that Aldwyn erected the disputed house and that he sold it to the Claimants in 1997

Page 29 of 42

and neither Virdy nor the Defendant were shaken in their evidence about the Claimants being

in occupation of the disputed house with their knowledge and permission. Further, the

Defendant was not challenged on her evidence that she specifically told the Claimants that no

works were to be done to the disputed house because on completion of the front two storey

structure it would need to be demolished.

86. I have already found against the Claimants with respect to the erection of the house by Aldwyn

and the sale of the disputed house by Aldwyn to them. In my opinion, the only reasonable

inferences to be drawn from the evidence are that after Virdy and his family moved back into

the lower level of the two storey structure at the front of the subject land, Virdy permitted

Aldwyn to reside in the disputed house and that he continued to reside there with his wife and

children until 1997, with the permission of Virdy. Further, the Claimants’ continued

occupation of the disputed house between 1997, when Aldwyn had migrated with his wife and

children, and March 2001 was initially with the permission of Virdy and after 2001, was with

the knowledge and permission of the Defendant.

87. In the circumstances, I find that the Defendant granted the Claimants a licence to continue to

reside in the disputed house rent free after she acquired Virdy’s leasehold interest and the

freehold in the subject land and that by letter dated 13th August, 2008 from the Defendant’s

Attorneys-at-Law to the Claimant, this licence was revoked.

ISSUE IV: DID THE CLAIMANTS EFFECT RECONSTRUCTION AND REPAIRS TO

THE DISPUTED HOUSE BETWEEN 2000 AND 2008 AT A COST OF $50,000? IF SO,

WERE THESE WORKS DONE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT

AND DESPITE PROTESTS BY HER?

The Statement of Case

88. The Claimants alleged that between 2000 and 2008 they tiled the disputed house, changed the

galvanize roof and windows and inner walls into concrete and effected plumbing and electrical

works at a cost of approximately $50,000.


89. In her witness statement, the First Claimant gave evidence that “as owners of the dwelling

house my husband and I have done considerable work on the house, including tiling the floor,

Page 30 of 42

repaired and changed where necessary the kitchen cupboard, changed the wood and galvanise

of the roof, replaced the louvres with French windows, changed the inner walls from wood to

concrete, ceiled the roof of the entire house and effected plumbing and electrical works at a

cost of approximately $50,000.” However, the First Claimant did not say when the works were

effected or annex any bills, receipts or other documentation to show how much was spent or

the breakdown of expenses between labour and materials.

90. The First Claimant also gave evidence that, by letter dated 15th January, 2004, the Defendant’s

Attorney-at-Law wrote to the Claimants complaining that they had not obtained the

Defendant’s permission to carry out works on the disputed house and called upon the

Claimants to desist from doing any further works and the Defendant revoked the licence she

allegedly gave them to reside in the disputed house.

91. The First Claimant was not challenged in cross-examination by Counsel for the Defendant

about the works effected by the Claimants or the cost thereof. However, she gave the following

evidence when questioned about the letter dated 15th January, 2004 from the Defendant’s

Attorney-at-Law:

“Para 18.

Letter was sent by defendant's attorney at law.

Shown KB 3

Para. 2 This paragraph does not say that licence is revoked.

Letter says that we should desist in carrying out works. We carried out works up to 2008.

Even after we got letter we carried out works. There is no response to this letter saying

that we owned house. 4 years after my Attorneys responded. Even though I was told not to

carry out works I did so because I had not seen any document. My attorneys showed me

document in 2008. My father told me he had transferred interest to Geraldine.”

The Defence

92. In answer to this allegation, the Defendant contended that the Claimants conducted works on

the premises without her permission and despite her protests. By a letter dated 15th January,

2004, her Attorneys-at-Law called upon the Claimants to desist from carrying out any further

work on the disputed house without the Defendant’s permission. Accordingly, the Defendant

Page 31 of 42

contended that the works done by the Claimants at their own risk and are not to be

compensated.


93. The Defendant gave evidence that after she purchased Virdy’s leasehold interest and the

freehold in 2001 she told everyone she was now the owner of the subject land. Further, she

specifically told the Claimants that no works were to be done on the disputed house because

on completion of the front two storey structure it would need to be demolished. However, the

Claimants, without her permission and despite her protest, conducted works on the premises

by building a steel gate adjoining the front structure blocking off access to the back portion of

the property. As a consequence, by letter dated 15th January, 2004, her Attorneys-at-Law,

Alexander, Jeremie & Co. called upon the Claimants to desist from carrying out any further

works. The letter stated as follows:

“Re: Property situate at L.P. 53, Pundit Street, El Socorro, San Juan

We act on behalf of Geraldine Hypolite who purchased the above-mentioned property in

2001.

Our instructions are that upon acquiring the said property she granted you a licence to

occupy same until such time as she revokes the licence.

We are instructed that recently you carried out work on the property without our client’s

permission – you “inter alia” demolished the then existing garage gate and replaced it

with an iron gate.

Our instructions are to call upon you to desist from carrying out further work on our

client’s property and to advise you that you will not be compensated for any work already

completed by you.

Please be guided accordingly.”

94. By letter dated 20th June, 2008, the Claimants’ Attorney-at-Law wrote to the Defendant stating

as follows:

Page 32 of 42

“I represent your sister Ms. Kathleen King who informs me that she is the owner of a

concrete dwelling house situate at 23 Pundit Street, El Socorro road, San Juan and that

you are the owner of the other building and the tenant of the lot of land on which it stands.

I am instructed that recently you requested my client to get rid of her dogs and prevented

her from placing her tank at the side of the house and told her to refrain from doing

anything on the said parcel of land.

I am therefore to request you to refrain forthwith from interfering with my client’s quiet

enjoyment of the said premises.

My client is without prejudice to her right prepared either to purchase your share and

interest in the property or to sell you her share and interest in same.

Kindly therefore let me know within fourteen days of the date hereof what you propose to

do to have the matter resolved and I trust that you would not interfere with my client’s

enjoyment failing which proceedings would be instituted in Court to prevent you from so

doing”

95. By letter dated 13th August, 2008, the Defendant’s said Attorney-at-Law responded as follows:

“Reference is made to yours dated 20th June 2008.

We act for Geraldine Hypolite in this matter.

Kindly be informed that our client is the owner of the subject parcel of land and dwelling

house, hereinafter referred to as “the premises”) situated at Light Pole 53 Pundit Street,

El Socorro, San Juan by virtue of:

1) Deed No. DE 200101367464D000 made on the 27th March 2001 by which our

client’s father transferred his leasehold interest in the said land and the dwelling

house thereon to her, and

2) Deed No. DE 20010136758D000 made on the 27th March 2001 by which

Chandrahanse Maharaj and Narendra Maharaj transferred the freehold interest in

the said land to our client.

Your client resides on this property and was reminded by letter dated 15th January 20014

from attorney at law for our client, that she was granted a licence to occupy the premises

Page 33 of 42

and that the work she carried out on the premises was without our client’s permission. She

was also asked to desist from carrying out any further work and reminded that she would

not be compensated for any work already completed by her.

A copy of the above-mentioned Deeds and letter dated 15th January 2004 are attached for

your attention.

Our instructions are to inform your client that the licence granted to her is hereby revoked

and to demand that she vacate the premises on or before the 30th September 2008, failing

which an action for possession will be commenced against her in the High Court without

further notice.”

96. The Claimants’ Attorney-at-Law responded by letter 26th August 2008 stating as follows:

“I refer to your letter to me dated 13th August 2008.

I write to make it clear that there are two buildings standing on the said parcel of land.

The building to the back is a concrete structure comprising three bedrooms which was

purchased by my clients from Aldwyn King the brother of Kathleen King. Enclosed please

find an acknowledgement of same from Aldwyn King. The other buildings to the front was

owned by your client’s father.

As a consequence it is my client’s contention that your client is not entitled to the building

to the back and is therefore not entitled to enter same for any purpose unless she obtains

the permission of my clients to do so.

My clients are still prepared to either sell their share and interest or purchase your client’s

share and interest in the said property.

Please therefore be guided accordingly and let me know our client’s position in the

matter.”

97. By letter dated 2nd October, 2008, the Defendant’s Attorneys-at-Law responded as follows:

“Reference is made yours dated 26th August 2008.

We note that the acknowledgement attached to the above mentioned matter states that

Jason Baptiste “agree(s) to purchase the building and contents of premises at 53 Pundit

Street, El Socorro, San Juan now occupied by Aldwyn King on the immediate payment of

Page 34 of 42

$7,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and a further payment of $100.00

per month towards the purchase price of the building and lands thereon”.

Please be advised that this does not constitute evidence that:

(a) Aldwyn King built/owned the house; or that

(b) Jason Baptiste purchased the house.

Further the acknowledgement mentioned payment for the building and land thereon. The

land is not owned by Mr. King and he could not therefore have sold it.

We state again that the subject house is owned by Ms. Geraldine Hypolite and we remind

you that your client was given notice to quit the said house on or before the 30th September

2008.”

98. The Claimants’ Attorney-at-Law responded to this letter by an undated letter which stated as

follows:

“I refer to your letter to me dated 2nd October 2008.

It was never my client’s contention that the acknowledgement constituted evidence that

Aldwyn King built/owned the house as such. It is my client’s contention however that he

purchased the house from Aldwyn King who owned the house and who was given the parcel

of land by his father to construct the said house.

It is my opinion therefore that Mr. Aldwyn King was the owner of the house and had an

equitable interest in the parcel of land which he conveyed to my client.

My client intends to stoutly resist any attempt by your client to evict him and his family

from the said property.

Please therefore be guided accordingly.”

99. Under cross-examination, the Defendant was not challenged with respect to her evidence that

after she acquired the subject land, she specifically told the Claimants that no works were to

be done to the disputed house because, on completion of the front 2-storey structure, it would

need to be demolished. Further, she was not challenged with respect to any of the

correspondence and in particular, the letter dated 15th January, 2004 from the Defendant’s

Attorneys-at-Law to the Claimants.

Page 35 of 42


100. In the circumstances, I find that the Claimants carried out the works identified by the First

Claimant between 2000 and 2008. However, since the First Claimant did not particularise the

breakdown of the cost of the works or the dates when these works were carried or annex any

documentary evidence in support of the expenditure, I am unwilling to make a finding that the

Claimants expended approximately $50,000 in carrying out these works.

101. In any event, in the light of the evidence given by the First Claimant under cross-

examination and the unchallenged evidence of the Defendant, I find that the Claimants were

informed, both verbally by the Defendant and in writing by the Defendant’s Attorneys-at-Law,

of the Defendant’s ownership of the subject land. Notwithstanding such knowledge and the

express prohibition by the Defendant against doing any works on the disputed house after she

acquired the subject land, the Claimants persisted in carrying out works on the disputed house

at their own expense, without the permission of the Defendant and despite protests by her.

ISSUE V: DID THE CLAIMANTS GIVE AN UNDERTAKING TO THE DEFENDANT

TO PAY THE ELECTRICITY BILLS AND WATER RATES IN RESPECT OF THE

DISPUTED HOUSE AND ARE THEY LIABLE TO THE DEFENDANT IN THE

AMOUNTS OF $1,725.00?

The Defence and Counterclaim

102. In her Defence and Counterclaim, the Defendant alleged that she gave the Claimants a

licence to continue to reside in the disputed house without payment of rent but they agreed to

pay the electricity and water bills while they occupied the premises. In breach of the agreement,

the Claimants failed to pay the electricity bill for the period September 2008 to 22nd January

2009 in the amount of $1,405.00 and the water rate for the period May 2008 to May 2009 in

the amount of $320.00.


103. In her witness statement, the Defendant stated that as part of the Claimants’ licence to

reside in the disputed house, the Claimants agreed to pay the electricity bill and water bill while

they occupied the premises. In breach of that agreement, the Claimants failed to pay the

electricity bill for the period September 2008 to 22nd January 2009 and the water rate for the

Page 36 of 42

period May 2008 to May 2009. The Defendant also exhibited an electricity bill for $1,405.00

in her name. The Defendant did not give any evidence with respect to unpaid water rates.

104. Under cross-examination, the Defendant gave the following evidence:

“I cut their electricity supply in September 2008. I redirected bills to my address.

The Claimants were no longer getting the bills to pay the electricity. I have paid

some of the bills and they have paid some. They have paid the water rates too. They

owe me for the bills I paid. All who used to live there used to contribute to payment

of bills. They used to pay the bills. I don't agree they don't owe me anything.”


105. The First Claimant gave evidence that the Claimants have always paid the outgoings for

the disputed house and when the front house became unoccupied they paid the electricity and

water rates for the entire subject land. In or about September 2008, the Defendant disrupted

their electricity supply and redirected all electricity bill to the Defendant’s current address.

When they went to pay the electricity bill at T&TEC they discovered that the bill was already

paid. Further, because of the disruption in supply, the bill only reflected the amount due and

owing for the front house and not the back house. She stated that the Claimants have always

paid their one half share of the water rates and when the front house became unoccupied in or

about 2004 they paid both the electricity bill and the water rates in respect of both properties.

106. Under cross-examination, the First Claimant gave the following evidence:

“I consulted Attorney in 2004 and continued living there paying bills. I continued

to pay bills up to 2008 and then I stopped. The meter was removed. I can't remember

when it was removed. I did not enter into arrangement to pay half of water bills

and electricity. I paid the bills between 2004 and 2008 when I found out that

defendant was the owner.”


107. In the light of this evidence, I am of the opinion that the Claimants agreed to pay the

electricity bills and water rates in respect of the disputed house and that they continued to do

so until their electricity supply was disrupted in September 2008. However, since the

Defendant admitted that she disrupted the Claimants’ electricity supply in September 2008, I

Page 37 of 42

am of the opinion that she cannot maintain a claim against them for the payment of the

electricity bill for the period September 2008 to January 2009. Further, the Defendant failed to

give any evidence of outstanding water rates. Accordingly, I find that the Defendant failed to

prove that the Claimants are indebted to her in the amount of $1,725.00 or any amount for

unpaid electricity bills and water rates.

ISSUE VI: ARE THE CLAIMANTS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT AGAINST

THE DEFENDANT?

108. The Claimants sought to rely on proprietary estoppel to support their claim.

109. Counsel for the Defendant submitted3 that the burden of proof lay upon the Claimants to

prove the elements of their claim so as to ground it in proprietary estoppel. She submitted that

the Claimants must prove that a clear and unequivocal promise was made and if a promise is

equivocal the claim of promissory estoppel will fail. The Claimants must also prove reliance

and detriment which are often intertwined. It was further submitted that the Court in using its

equitable jurisdiction must exercise extreme care. The Defendant relied on the following

authorities in this regard: Snell’s Equity at paras 10-09, 10-17; Sorillo v Donawa, CV2010-

04149; Knowles v Knowles, PCA No. 28 of 2007; Baldeo v Baldeo and Others CV2007-

04311; Thorner v Major and Others [2009] UKHL 18; Gillet v Holt [2001] Ch 210; and

Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P&CR 196.

110. In his submissions,4 Counsel for the Claimants accepted that the Claimants were obliged

to prove their case on a balance of probabilities and submitted that the Claimants had

sufficiently pleaded and proved that a representation was made to both Aldwyn and the

Claimants by Virdy and that they both expended money in reliance on the representations made

to them to their detriment. Counsel further submitted that where the owner of land allows

another person to erect a concrete structure on his land that suggests permanence, the Court

permits the person to remain on the land and even in the absence of a promise made, the

Claimants are entitled to an equitable charge or lien for the amount of money expended or the

value of the building: Dillwyn v Llewelyn 31 LJ Ch. 658 and Chalmers v Pardoe PCA No.

4 of 1962.

3 Defendant’s Written Submissions filed on 6th March, 2015. 4 Claimants’ Written Submissions filed on 24th April, 2015.

Page 38 of 42

111. In Reply,5 Counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Claimants’ reliance on Dillwyn

(supra) for the proposition that the Court will permit someone to remain permanently on land

where the owner has allowed them to erect a concrete structure that suggests permanence, is

not congruent with the modern line of authorities on proprietary estoppel such as Knowles

(supra) and as such should be disregarded by the Court. In addition, the learning therein does

not support the Claimants’ proposition and is entirely distinguishable on the facts. Counsel

also submitted that the Claimants’ reliance on Chalmers (supra) for the proposition of the

Claimants’ entitlement to an equitable charge in respect of the disputed house is dependent on

the establishment of the proprietary estoppel between Virdy and Aldwyn. However, on the

facts of this case, this did not arise.

The Law

112. In the recent Court of Appeal decision in Ralph and Another v Bernard,6 Mendonca JA.

considered the law in relation to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. He applied several of the

leading authorities and stated as follows:

“In Thorner v Major and Ors. [2009] UKHL 18 Lord Walker pointed out that while there

is no universal definition of proprietary estoppel, which is both comprehensive and

uncontroversial, that most scholars agree that the principle of proprietary estoppel is

based on “three elements, although they express them in slightly different terms; a

representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant and

detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance…” For a claimant

therefore to properly plead his case in proprietary estoppel, he must set out those three

elements; a representation or assurance, reliance on that representation or assurance and

detriment as a consequence.”

113. In Gillett v. Holt,7 Walker L.J. highlighted the need for the court to examine these elements

in the round as opposed to separate compartments. He put it this way:

“…although the judgment is, for convenience, divided into several sections with headings

which give a rough indication of the subject matter, it is important to note at the outset that

5 Defendant’s Written Submission in Reply filed on 25th May, 2015. 6 Civil Appeal No. 131 of 2011 at para. 38 – Delivered 9th March, 2016. 7 [2001] Ch. 210 at p. 225

Page 39 of 42

the doctrine of proprietary estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four

watertight compartments. Both sides are agreed on that, and in the course of the oral

argument in this court it repeatedly became apparent that the quality of the relevant

assurances may influence the issue of reliance, that reliance and detriment are often

intertwined, and that whether there is a distinct need for a "mutual understanding" may

depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood. Moreover the

fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct

permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in

the round.”


114. In the light of my earlier findings that:

a. the disputed house was erected by Virdy King and not Aldwyn King;

b. the Claimants have failed to prove that they purchased the disputed house from

Aldwyn for $43,000, with the permission of Virdy;

c. the Defendant granted the Claimants a licence to continue to reside in the disputed

house rent free after she acquired Virdy’s leasehold interest and the freehold in the

subject land and by letter dated 13th August, 2008 from the Defendant’s Attorneys-

at-Law to the Claimants, this licence was revoked; and

d. the Claimants carried out works on the disputed house at their own expense, without

the permission of the Defendant and despite protests by her.

I find that the Claimants are not entitled to the reliefs sought in their Statement of Case for

the following reasons:

a. In her evidence, the First Claimant made it clear that she was not relying on any

representation made to her by Virdy or the Defendant but was relying on Aldwyn’s

interest in the disputed house which he had agreed to sell to the Claimants in 1997.

As she put it, “I say that we are the owners of the house because we purchased it

from Aldwyn. My interest in the house is based on Aldwyn’s interest in the house.

If he does not have an interest in the house, I don’t have an interest in the house.”

Further, in respect of the monies expended by the Claimants in effecting repairs on

Page 40 of 42

the disputed house, she did not allege or give evidence that they did so in reliance

on any representation made by Virdy or the Defendant. Instead, she said that the

Claimants effected these repairs because they were the owners of the disputed

house. In the circumstances, having found that Virdy, and not Aldwyn, built the

disputed house and that the Claimants were licensees of Virdy and the Defendant,

I am of the opinion that the Claimants failed to prove the essential elements of

representation, reliance and detriment in order to rely on the doctrine of proprietary

estoppel;

b. The Claimants have sought a declaration that the disputed house and the disputed

land are vested in them in fee simple in equity and an order that the Defendant

execute a conveyance of the disputed house and the disputed land to them. It is not

in dispute that the Defendant is the owner in fee simple of the subject land which

includes the disputed land on which the disputed house was erected. Therefore, in

order to obtain these reliefs, the Claimants need to prove that they are entitled to an

equitable interest in the disputed house and the disputed land which is enforceable

against the Defendant. In my opinion, the Claimants failed to do so. In any event, I

accept the submissions of Counsel for the Defendant that the Claimants are not

entitled to the declaration and order sought against the Defendant since any such

orders would materially affect the interest of Scotiabank Limited as the mortgagee

of the subject land and the Claimants failed to join Scotiabank Limited as a party

to this action: Derrick v Najjar and the Attorney General of Trinidad and

Tobago 1976 28WIR 340; and

c. The Claimants also sought an injunction restraining the Defendants from evicting

or attempting to evict them from the disputed land. Having regard to the failure of

the Claimants to establish any legal or equitable right or interest in the disputed

house or the disputed land and the revocation by the Defendant of their licence

since 2008, the Claimants are not entitled to be in possession of the disputed house

and the disputed land. In fact, since the revocation of the license, they have

remained in possession as trespassers. Accordingly, they are not entitled to the

injunction sought.

Page 41 of 42

115. Accordingly, the Claimants’ claim is hereby dismissed with costs to be paid by the

Claimants to the Defendant in the amount of $14,000.

ISSUE VI: IS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT AGAINST

THE CLAIMANTS?

116. The Defendant, in her Counterclaim, sought an order for possession of the piece of parcel

of land situate at 53 Pundit Street, El Socorro, San Juan, repayment of electricity and water

rates, interest and costs. In the light of my earlier findings, I find that the Defendant is not

entitled to succeed in her claim for the payment of electricity bills and water rates or interest

thereon.

117. However, in respect of the claim for possession, the Defendant gave evidence that on

several occasions in 2008, she called upon the Claimants to vacate the subject land. First, by

letter dated 13th August, 2008, the Defendant’s Attorneys-at-Law demanded that the Claimants

vacate the disputed house on or before 30th September 2008. By letter dated 26th August 2008,

the Claimants’ Attorney responded that the Defendant was not entitled to the disputed house

because it had been purchased from Aldwyn. Secondly, by Notice dated 3rd November 2008,

the Defendant again revoked the licence and called upon the Claimants to vacate the disputed

house on or before the 30th November, 2008. Thirdly, on the 9th March 2009, the Defendant

caused to be issued against the Claimants an ejectment complaint.

118. The First Claimant in her evidence admitted that the Defendant’s Attorneys-at-Law had

written to the Claimants on the 13th August, 2008, that she had been served on the 3rd November

2008 with the notice calling upon her to vacate the premises by 30th November 2008 and that

the Defendant had filed an ejectment complaint against her. She contended, however, that the

Claimants were entitled to remain in possession because they were the owners of the disputed

house. In the light of my earlier findings, therefore, I find that the Defendant is entitled to an

order for possession against the Claimants.

119. With respect to costs on the Counterclaim, I will make no order for costs on the

Counterclaim since to do so would result in a duplication of the costs already awarded for

successfully defending the Claimants’ claim.

Page 42 of 42

ORDER

120. In the circumstances, I hereby order that:

a. The Claimants’ claim against the Defendant is dismissed;

b. There be judgment in favour of the Defendant against the Claimants for possession of

the concrete dwelling house and the land on which it stands, located to the back of the

parcel of land situate at Light Pole 53, Pundit Street, El Socorro, San Juan and bounded

on the North by Pundit Street on the East, West and South by lands of heirs of Chanka

Maharaj;

c. The Claimants do deliver up to the Defendant vacant possession of the said concrete

dwelling house and the land on which it stands, on or before 30th August, 2016;

d. The Defendant’s Counterclaim for the repayment of electricity and water rates is

dismissed;

e. The Claimants do pay the Defendant’s costs of the claim in the amount of $14,000; and

f. There be no order as to costs on the Counterclaim.

Dated the 4th day of May, 2016

……………………………..

André des Vignes

Judge

Documents

THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE …webopac.ttlawcourts.org/.../2009/cv_09_02474DD04may2016.pdfPage 1 of 42 THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE