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The Robustness of Localization Algorithms to Signal Strength Attacks A Comparative Study. Yingying Chen, Konstantinos Kleisouris, Xiaoyan Li, Wade Trappe, and Richard P. Martin Dept. of Computer Science Wireless Information Network Laboratory Rutgers University May 16 th , 2006. Background. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
The Robustness of Localization Algorithms to Signal Strength
AttacksA Comparative Study
Yingying Chen, Konstantinos Kleisouris, Yingying Chen, Konstantinos Kleisouris, Xiaoyan Li, Wade Trappe, and Richard P. Xiaoyan Li, Wade Trappe, and Richard P.
MartinMartin
Dept. of Computer ScienceDept. of Computer Science
Wireless Information Network LaboratoryWireless Information Network Laboratory
Rutgers UniversityRutgers University
May 16May 16thth, 2006, 2006
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Background
Localizing sensor nodes is the building block Localizing sensor nodes is the building block for high-level applications:for high-level applications:
Tracking, monitoring, and geometric-based Tracking, monitoring, and geometric-based routingrouting
Location-based services become more prevalentLocation-based services become more prevalent
Received Signal Strength (RSS)Received Signal Strength (RSS) is an is an attractive basis for indoor localization attractive basis for indoor localization algorithms:algorithms:
Reuse the existing communication infrastructureReuse the existing communication infrastructure
802.11, 802.15.4, Bluetooth support the 802.11, 802.15.4, Bluetooth support the technologytechnology
Tremendous cost savingTremendous cost saving
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Motivation
Localization infrastructure became the target Localization infrastructure became the target of malicious attacks of malicious attacks (non-conventional (non-conventional security threats)security threats)
Important to understand how localization is Important to understand how localization is affected by affected by non-cryptographic attacksnon-cryptographic attacks
Study the Study the susceptibilitysusceptibility of RSS-based of RSS-based localization algorithms to signal strength localization algorithms to signal strength attacks:attacks:
Unanticipated power losses and gainsUnanticipated power losses and gains
Attacks to the transmitting device or Attacks to the transmitting device or individual landmarks.individual landmarks.
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Goal
Study the behavior of RSS-based localization Study the behavior of RSS-based localization algorithms to signal strength attacksalgorithms to signal strength attacks
Generate Generate attack detectionattack detection mechanisms for mechanisms for localization algorithmslocalization algorithms
Improve the current algorithms to Improve the current algorithms to tolerant tolerant attacksattacks
Develop Develop attack resistantattack resistant algorithms algorithms
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
High Level Results
The The average performanceaverage performance of all the of all the algorithms in response to an attack is about algorithms in response to an attack is about the samethe same
General rule of thumbGeneral rule of thumb: easy to conduct : easy to conduct attack by 15 dB and cause the localization attack by 15 dB and cause the localization error of 20-30 feeterror of 20-30 feet
Need to makeNeed to make localization localization more robustmore robust to to signal strength attackssignal strength attacks
Preliminary work shows possibility of Preliminary work shows possibility of attack attack detectiondetection
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Outline
Background and motivationBackground and motivation
RF-based localization algorithmsRF-based localization algorithms
Conducting signal strength attacksConducting signal strength attacks
Measuring attack susceptibilityMeasuring attack susceptibility
Experimental studyExperimental study
Analysis and discussionAnalysis and discussion
ConclusionConclusion
Related workRelated work
Future researchFuture research
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Summary of Algorithms under Study
Area-basedArea-based Point-basedPoint-based
1.Simple Point Matching 1.Simple Point Matching (SPM)(SPM)
2. Area Based 2. Area Based Probability (ABP)Probability (ABP)
3. Bayesian Networks 3. Bayesian Networks (BN)(BN)
4. RADAR (R1)4. RADAR (R1)
5. Averaged RADAR (R2)5. Averaged RADAR (R2)
6. Gridded RADAR (GR)6. Gridded RADAR (GR)
7. Highest Probability (P1)7. Highest Probability (P1)
8. Averaged Highest Probability 8. Averaged Highest Probability (P2)(P2)
9. Gridded Highest Probability 9. Gridded Highest Probability (GP)(GP)
• Offline and online phases (attack during online)• Matching vs. signal to distance
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
A Generalized Localization Model
Physical Space(D)
Signal Space(R)F
G
S1
S2
Sn
: a single point or a region
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Outline
Background and motivationBackground and motivation
RF-based localization algorithmsRF-based localization algorithms
Conducting signal strength attacksConducting signal strength attacks
Measuring attack susceptibilityMeasuring attack susceptibility
Experimental studyExperimental study
Analysis and discussionAnalysis and discussion
ConclusionConclusion
Related workRelated work
Future researchFuture research
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Signal Strength Attacks
Materials – easy to Materials – easy to accessaccessAttacks – simple to Attacks – simple to perform with low costperform with low costLinear relationship -Linear relationship -linear attack modellinear attack modelTwo approaches:Two approaches:
Attack on the Attack on the entire set of entire set of landmarkslandmarksAttack on a single Attack on a single landmarklandmark
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Outline
Background and motivationBackground and motivation
RF-based localization algorithmsRF-based localization algorithms
Conducting signal strength attacksConducting signal strength attacks
Measuring attack susceptibilityMeasuring attack susceptibility
Experimental studyExperimental study
Analysis and discussionAnalysis and discussion
ConclusionConclusion
Related workRelated work
Future researchFuture research
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Attack Susceptibility Metrics
Estimator distance errorEstimator distance error
Estimator precisionEstimator precision
HölderHölder metricsmetricsRelates the magnitude of the perturbation in Relates the magnitude of the perturbation in signal space to its effect on the localization signal space to its effect on the localization results: results:
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Outline
Background and motivationBackground and motivation
RF-based localization algorithmsRF-based localization algorithms
Conducting signal strength attacksConducting signal strength attacks
Measuring attack susceptibilityMeasuring attack susceptibility
Experimental studyExperimental study
Analysis and discussionAnalysis and discussion
ConclusionConclusion
Related workRelated work
Future researchFuture research
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Experimental Setup (CoRE and Industrial Lab)
-- Floor plan: Floor plan: 200ft x 80ft (16000 200ft x 80ft (16000 ftft22))
- Deployment of - Deployment of 4 landmarks4 landmarks
(somewhat co-linear)(somewhat co-linear)
- - 115 training points, 170 testing 115 training points, 170 testing pointspoints
-- Floor plan: Floor plan: 225ft x 144ft (32400 225ft x 144ft (32400 ftft22))
- Deployment of - Deployment of 5 landmarks5 landmarks (more evenly distributed)(more evenly distributed)- - 115 training points, 138 testing points115 training points, 138 testing points
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Error AnalysisCoRE - all landmarks attenuation attack (10/15/25 dB)
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Error AnalysisAll landmarks amplification attack (10 dB)
CoRE Industrial Lab
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Linear ResponseAttenuation Attack - All landmarks; Landmark 1, 2 and 3 All landmarks: ~ 1.55 ft/dB, single landmark: ~ 0.64 ft/dB
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Worst-case ErrorCoRE: attenuation attack
BN, R1, R2: 4ft/dBP1, P2: 3ft/dBABP, GP, GR, SPM: 2ft/dB Exception: SPM ~ 0.61
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Precision Study: Example of Localization Results in CoRE
Normal Attenuation attack (25dB) Landmark 1
SP
MA
BP
BN
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Conclusion
Localization errorLocalization error of all algorithms scales of all algorithms scales similarly under attacksimilarly under attack
With single exception of Bayesian Networks With single exception of Bayesian Networks algorithm to individual landmark attacksalgorithm to individual landmark attacks
The The average susceptibilityaverage susceptibility to an attack is to an attack is essentially identicalessentially identical
In order to In order to lessen the worst-case effectlessen the worst-case effect of a of a potential attack, desirable to employ algorithms potential attack, desirable to employ algorithms that perform averagingthat perform averaging
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Conclusion (cont.)Degraded gracefullyDegraded gracefully: linear scaling in localization : linear scaling in localization error to attackserror to attacks
No algorithm No algorithm “collapses”“collapses” in response to an attack in response to an attack
All landmarks attack: 1.3-1.8 ft/dBAll landmarks attack: 1.3-1.8 ft/dB
Single landmark attack: 0.5-0.8 ft/dBSingle landmark attack: 0.5-0.8 ft/dB
Rule of thumb:Rule of thumb: easy to attack by 15 dB, cause easy to attack by 15 dB, cause localization error of 20-30 ftlocalization error of 20-30 ft
Precision increasedPrecision increased for all three area-based for all three area-based algorithms:algorithms:
A decrease and a spatial-shift in the returned area – A decrease and a spatial-shift in the returned area – biasbias is introduced is introduced ABP ABP significantly shranksignificantly shrank the returned areas in response the returned areas in response to large changes in signal strength – to large changes in signal strength – attack detectionattack detection
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Related WorkCategory of localization algorithms:Category of localization algorithms:
Range-basedRange-based [hightower01design, GPS, nissanka00 ][hightower01design, GPS, nissanka00 ], , range-free range-free [shang03, niculescu01aps],[shang03, niculescu01aps], scene matchingscene matching [youssef03localization,roos02stat, battiti02stat, bahl00][youssef03localization,roos02stat, battiti02stat, bahl00]AggregateAggregate [dohertyl01, shang03][dohertyl01, shang03] or singularor singular (only refer to (only refer to landmarks)landmarks)
Non-cryptographic attacks affect localization:Non-cryptographic attacks affect localization:Wormhole attacksWormhole attacks [hu03packet][hu03packet] – shorten the distance – shorten the distance between two nodesbetween two nodesCompromised nodesCompromised nodes [zang05robust];[zang05robust]; compromised compromised landmarkslandmarks [liu05attack][liu05attack]
Pursue for secure localization algorithmsPursue for secure localization algorithmsDistance bounding protocol Distance bounding protocol [[Capkun05Capkun05]] to upper-bound to upper-bound the distance between two nodesthe distance between two nodesHidden and mobile base stations Hidden and mobile base stations [Capkun06][Capkun06] to verify to verify location estimatelocation estimateUse directional antenna and distance bounding Use directional antenna and distance bounding [lazos05][lazos05] to achieve securityto achieve securityRobust statistical methods Robust statistical methods [zang05robust][zang05robust] to achieve to achieve reliable localizationreliable localization
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
Future Research
Study different Study different attack modelsattack models::Attacks performed by the directional antennaAttacks performed by the directional antenna
Develop Develop attack detectionattack detection mechanisms for mechanisms for RF-based localization algorithmsRF-based localization algorithms
Extend the current algorithms to Extend the current algorithms to tolerant tolerant attacksattacks
Derive Derive attack resistantattack resistant algorithms algorithms
Goal:Goal: adversaries can not affect adversaries can not affect localization !localization !
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06
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