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THE ROLE OF AGE, SEX, CLASS, ANDCULTURE IN STUDIES OF MORALDEVELOPMENTUrie Bronfenbrenner aa Department of Child Development and FamilyRelationships , Cornell UniversityPublished online: 10 Jul 2006.

To cite this article: Urie Bronfenbrenner (1962) THE ROLE OF AGE, SEX, CLASS, AND CULTUREIN STUDIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, Religious Education: The official journal of the ReligiousEducation Association, 57:S4, 3-17, DOI: 10.1080/003440862057S402

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THE ROLE OF AGE, SEX, CLASS, AND CULTUREIN STUDIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENTUrie BronfenbrennerDepartment of Child Development and Family Relationships, Cornell University

IT is A SOBERING reflection on the state ofour knowledge in the behavioral sciences

that even our most reliable facts and theoriesabout specific phenomena can usually be seri-ously challenged by asking a simple descrip-tive question: how does this phenomenonvary with the age, sex, and social backgroundof the person ? Paradoxically, the response tothe first of these challenges may at first seemreassuring. Until relatively recently, psychol-ogists were much preoccupied with docu-menting observable changes with age inpractically every variable that they had suc-ceeded in measuring. The result was an im-pressive array of apparently highly-consistentvariations as a function of the developmentallevel of the child. But then, with the growthof the interdisciplinary approach in the be-havioral sciences, investigators of develop-mental trends began to look for possible vari-ation as a function of the child's role insociety—his sex, his ordinal position, and thesocial status, ethnicity, and religious back-ground of his parents. With the introductionof these social factors, the seeming general-ity, simplicity, and regularity of develop-mental age trends were challenged first fromone quarter, then another. As a result, thenotion underlying much of American childpsychology as late as the 1940's of a normalmaturational sequence that could be expectedof all children everywhere was cast into seri-ous doubt. In its place there emerged a social-situational conception of development inwhich maturational conditions were accordedonly a vague and somewhat secondary im-portance.

It is precisely this historical course whichis reflected in empirical studies of moral de-velopment over the past twenty-five years.Such studies take their early and initial in-spiration from the classic work of Piaget

(1932). This investigator presented a seriesof brief stories, each centering on a moralissue, to more than 100 Swiss children, andon the basis of their responses to his semi-structured questions, distinguished two majorstages of moral development.

The first stage, which he called "moralrealism," is based on "an ethic of authority."The child views moral rules and restraints aslaid down from above; they must be in-terpreted literally, and cannot be altered. Inaccordance with the principle of "immanentjustice," punishment follows inevitably uponviolation, and its severity varies directly withthe enormity of the consequences of actionregardless of the motive which inspired it.At this immature level, moral rules are notinternalized but are adhered to solely throughfear of external punishment by superordinateauthority.

In contrast, the more mature stage of "rec-iprocity" or "cooperation" is characterizedby the "ethics of mutual respect." Rules areseen as compacts arrived at and maintainedby equals in the common interest. They maybe changed by mutual consent and modifiedin the light of extenuating circumstances.Punishment, instead of being generalizedand "expiatory," is specific to the infraction,aimed at reciprocity in kind or restitution,and is guided by the principle of "equity"involving consideration of the motive under-lying the act and of the particular circum-stances in which the transgression was com-mitted. Moral principles are internalized sothat the child acts morally without the neces-sity of external sanctions. In short, moralbehavior is its own reward.

The several dichotomies implied in thetwo stages were distinguished on the basisof the child's responses to specially-designedstories and questions. For example, to dis-

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tinguish moral rules based on consequencesfrom those based on motives, Piaget cm-ployed the following story among others:

A little boy who is called John is in his room.He is called to dinner. He goes into the diningroom. But behind the door there was a chair,and on the chair there was a tray with fifteencups on it. John couldn't have known thatthere was all this behind the door. He goesin; the door knocks against the tray; bang gothe fifteen cups, and they all get broken!

Once there was a little boy whose name wasHenry. One day when his mother was out,he tried to get some jam out of the cupboard.He climbed up on to a chair and stretched outhis arm. But the jam was too high up, and hecouldn't reach it and have any. But while hewas trying to get it, he knocked over a cup.The cup fell down and broke.

After each story, Piaget would ask ques-tions such as the following: "Are these chil-dren equally guilty?" "Which of the two isnaughtiest and why ?"

To consider another example: as a meansof distinguishing types of punishment, thefollowing story and questions were used:

A boy has broken a toy belonging to his littlebrother. What should be done? 1. Should henot be allowed to play with any of his owntoys for a week? (expiation); 2. Should hegive the little fellow one of his own toys?(reciprocation) ; 3. Should he pay for havingit mended? (restitution).

"Immanent justice" was assessed by thefollowing story:

In a class of very little children the teacherhad forbidden them to sharpen their pencilsthemselves. Once, when the teacher had herback turned, a little boy took the knife andwas going to sharpen his pencil. But he cuthis finger. If the teacher had allowed him tosharpen his pencil, would he have cut him-self just the same?

It was on the basis of age differences inresponses to these stories that Piaget formu-lated his two-stage theory of moral develop-ment. Since his original study was published,a number of investigators in Europe and theUnited States have sought to replicate hisfindings. We shall turn now to an examina-tion of their results.

I INVESTIGATIONS OF PIAGET'STHEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

AT FIRST BLUSH, there appears to be con-siderable empirical support for Piaget's two-stage theory of moral development. An im-pressive number of studies over a quarter ofa century in two continents have reportedage differences consistent with Piaget's postu-lated shift from moral realism toward rec-iprocity and equity. Thus evidence in sup-port of one or another aspect of Piaget'stheory is reported in studies from England(Harrower 1934; Morris 1958; Peel 1959) ;Switzerland (Lerner 1937a); Belgium (Ca-ruso 1943); Italy (Ponzo 1956) ; and theUnited States (Lerner 1937b; Dennis 1943;Liu 1950; MacRae 1954; Havighurst andNeugarten 1955; Medinnus 1957, 1959;Kohlberg 1958,1959; Durkin 1959a, 1959b;and Boehm and Nass 1961). Two of theforegoing researches (Dennis, Havighurstand Neugarten) were carried out with Indianchildren, and one with Chinese-Americans(Liu). On the basis of their recent review ofvirtually all these studies, Boehm and Nassconclude that "age is the only consistentlyoperative factor in development toward ma-turity" (p. 10). At the same time, they callattention to "strong trends toward sociocul-tural differences." Let us examine some ofthese.

First of all, it is a fact that the closest cor-respondence with Piaget's original results isfound in studies of children from continentalEurope (Lerner 1937a; Caruso 1943; Ponzo1956). The farther one moves from theEuropean mainland in distance and culture,the more frequently are departures from oroutright contradictions of Piaget's findings.Indeed, it is noteworthy, although generallyunnoted, that the very first attempt to verifyPiaget's theory turned up highly significantdifferences across both class and culture. TheEnglish psychologist Harrower (1935), ob-serving that Piaget's subjects were Swisschildren mostly from "the poorer parts ofGeneva" (Piaget 1932, p. 208), sought todetermine whether similar results would beobtained with children of the same agerange in another country and from different

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THE ROLE OF AGE, SEX, CLASS, AND CULTURE S-5

social class levels. Accordingly, she selecteda comparable sample from schools in "thepoorer parts of London" and, in addition, asa "control group" youngsters "from dis-tinctly well-to-do homes and the children ofcultured parents" (Harrower 1935, pp.83-84). The results from the lower socio-economic group were consistent with Piaget'stheory in showing a decrease in moral realismwith age. Quite a different pattern, however,emerged at the higher social level, where theyounger children from the very beginninggave high percentages of mature responses;nor was there any evidence of a shift overthe age range. The author concludes as fol-lows:

Either the stages of development which Piagethas been emphasizing are not a universalcharacteristic of development per se, but areto be found only within certain uniformgroups, groups which are subject to certainconstant conditions; or, in certain environ-ments these stages can be so far acceleratedthat children exhibiting characteristics of the. . . most developed [stage] are to be foundat the ages of the first (p. 93).

Harrower argues further that if the secondhypothesis is correct, she should be able tofind substantial evidences of social realismamong still younger children in the culturedenvironment. Since she was unsuccessful inturning up responses of this kind amongyoungsters below six years of age, she isinclined to the first alternative.

Confirmatory evidence for Harrower's find-ings and interpretation comes from a seriesof studies of class differences in moral de-velopment conducted in the United States(Lerner 1937b; MacRae 1943; Kohlberg1959; Durkin 1959a, 1959b; Boehm andNass 1961), and even more forcefully fromcomparisons of cross-cultural data (Dennis1943; Liu 1950; Havighurst and Neugarten1955; Boehm 1957). The most pronouncedclass differences are reported in the firstAmerican study carried out twenty-five yearsago by Lerner, who found that upper classchildren showed an earlier decrease of moralrealism than lower class youngsters. Twodecades later, lower but still reliable rela-tionships in the same direction are cited by

MacRae and Kohlberg. A statistical analysismade by the present writer of comparabledata from different social classes used in twoseparate studies by Durkin yields a similarresult (P = .05, in favor of more authoritar-ian morality in the lower class). Finally, themost recent results, reported in an unpub-lished study by Boehm, show no significantdifferences by class, but a trend in the pre-dicted direction for some of the stories. Thisdecrease in class differences over time is con-sistent with Bronfenbrenner's (1958) con-clusion, from a survey of class differences inchild-rearing over a twenty-five year period,that the gap between the social classes ap-pears to be narrowing.

EVEN SHARPER CONTRASTS in patterns ofmoral standards and development emerge incross-cultural studies. The first comparativeresults of this kind appear in Harrower's re-search. Curiously enough, she makes no ref-erence to them in her analyses and discus-sion, even though she describes as the "firstproblem" of her research "to discoverwhether national characteristics and tradi-tions in any way affect what must be consid-ered as a pattern of mental developmentlargely independent of external influences"(p. 79). An examination of the comparativedata which she cites, first from Piaget's andthen from her own experiments, certainlycalls the last assumption into question, sincethe Swiss children show evidence of greatermoral realism than the English children ateither socio-economic level and the decreasewith age is appreciably greater for the lattergroup. In other words, if Piaget's criteriaare valid, English children achieve a moremature conscience earlier than Swiss childrenof comparable age. To cite but one example,Piaget reports that 28 per cent of his sub-jects in the 6-1 year age-group gave responsesfavoring "punishment by reciprocity" overless mature forms; in the 8-10 year group,this figure rises to 49 per cent (Piaget 1932).The corresponding percentages for the twogroups of English children are as follows:lower socio-economic level, 39 per cent forthe younger age group, 90 per cent for theolder age group; upper socio-economic level,77 per cent for the younger age group, 100

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per cent for the older age group (Harrower1934, p. 85-88).i

In view of the attenuating character ofclass differences over time, it is noteworthythat more than twenty years later, Boehm(1957), in a comparative study of Swissand American children, found that amongthe latter "conscience becomes less egocentricand interiorizes earlier than does that of theSwiss child." In partial explanation of thisdifference, the author cites evidence fromstory responses supporting the inference thatthe American child transfers his parental de-pendence to a peer dependence at an earlierage.

Even more dramatic departures from thetypical pattern of moral development de-scribed by Piaget are found in studies em-ploying his technique with American Indianchildren. Dennis (1943) shows that storiesabout immanent justice decreased with agemuch more slowly in a group of Hopi schoolchildren than in Lerner's American sample.Although this finding is not inconsistent withPiaget's two-stage theory of moral develop-ment, the results obtained by Havighurst andNeugarten (1955) are far more difficult toreconcile. Working with children from sixdifferent Indian tribes, these investigatorsfound that responses reflecting faith in im-manent justice tended to increase rather thandecrease in age, a trend which is consistentwith the prevailing belief system of the adultIndian culture.

Although Liu (1950), working with Chi-nese-American and non-Chinese-Americanchildren, found a decrease in immanent jus-tice with age in the former group, the whitecontrols showed the reverse trend. Similarinconsistencies are reported for white Ameri-can subjects by McRae (1954) and Medin-nus (1959). Along the same line, severalinvestigators working with English andAmerican children (Morris 1958; Kohlberg1958; Durkin 1959a, 1959b, 1959c) havecalled into question Piaget's thesis that ac-

1 Since Piaget does not cite the total number ofchildren examined at each age level, it is impos-sible to test the statistical significance of thesecross-national differences.

ceptance of reciprocity as a justice principleincreases with age. Specifically, in none ofthese studies did the children, to use Piaget'slanguage, "maintain with a conviction thatgrows with their years that it is strictly fairto give back the blows one has received"(Piaget 1932, p. 301). Indeed, both Morris(1958) and Durkin (1959c) found a re-verse trend with older children showing lessadherence to the reciprocity principle.

A SECOND MAJOR UNE of evidence call-ing into question central assumptions in Pia-get's theory of moral development appearsin the work of MacRae (1954), Kohlberg(1958), Durkin (1959c), and Maccoby(1959). Each of these investigators notefrom their data that the presumed compo-nents of morality do not hang together em-pirically. The first and most comprehensivestudy of this phenomenon is by MacRae, whodid a cluster analysis of responses to moraljudgment questions holding age constant,and identified four relatively independentfactors. An examination of the relationshipsof these factors to patterns of parental au-thority led MacRae to postulate "two dis-tinct processes of moral development: 'cog-nitive' moral development involving thelearning of what behavior patterns are ap-proved and disapproved, and 'emotional'moral development, including the associa-tion of anxiety with one's own deviance andmoral indignation with that of others"(p. 17). MacRae suggests further that thetypes of questions used by Piaget are con-cerned primarily with cognitive moral de-velopment. We may add that one featurecontributing to this cognitive emphasis is thepervasive use of "should" and "ought" inthe questions employed in Piaget's method.In other words, the child is asked to statewhat he believes to be the right course ofaction, not to indicate what someone else orhe himself might actually be impelled to do.Interestingly enough, it was not until the1950's that researchers shifted from Piaget'stype of question to one designed to get atwhat the child might wish to do rather thanmerely what he thought was the appropriateanswer. It is of course a matter of consider-

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able interest whether answers to the lattertype of question exhibit variations with age,class, and culture similar to those obtainedwith Piaget's technique. But before turningto this topic, we must consider briefly oneother category, typically neglected in anal-yses of Piaget-type data, but assuming con-siderable importance in contemporary studiesof conscience development. This is the cate-gory of sex.

It is somewhat surprising that althoughPiaget conducted dozens of experiments onmoral standards presumably with children ofboth sexes, in only one instance does he paysystematic attention to differences in the re-sponses of boys and girls. In answer to thequestion of what a smaller boy should dowhen struck by a bigger boy, the "tendencyto consider it legitimate to give back theblows received" (i.e., reciprocity) tended toincrease more rapidly with age for boys thanfor girls (Piaget 1932, pp. 301-302). In thetwenty-five year period that followed, onlythree studies, and these relatively recent ones,have dealt with possible sex differences inmoral response. According to a secondarysource (Boehm 1961, p. 10; the originalreports were not available to the presentauthor), Medinnus (1957) "found girls tobe less advanced than boys in respect to theconcept of immanent justice and punish-ment," and Morris (1958) "found no sig-nificant differences between boys and girlsin age of decreasing moral realism but founda tendency for the values of girls to changeearlier than those of boys." The two sets offindings do not seem to be consistent; in-deed, the last statement appears self-con-tradictory. Nevertheless, Boehm and Nass(1961) describe the absence of sex differ-ences in their own research as a contradictionto a trend "heretofore evident in previousstudies, that girls show a more advanceddevelopment than do boys on an overallbasis" (p. 10). In our own view, the ques-tion of sex differences in Piaget-type re-sponses is as yet a completely open one.

STUDIES UTILIZING Piaget's technique rep-resent the first major effort to investigate theprocess of moral development. In the light

of our survey of this initial body of research,the following tentative conclusions are in-dicated :

1. It is clear, first of all, that, as Durkinsuggests (1959c, p. 294), Piaget unjustifi-ably "minimizes the influence of the environ-ment on a child's understanding of what isjust." Furthermore, as between the two al-ternative hypotheses proposed by Harrower(see p. S-5 above), the weight of the evidencethrows doubt on the possibility that twostages are present but follow each other sorapidly in some cultures that they are difficultto distinguish. Rather, the cultural and sub-cultural departures from Piaget's norms sup-port Harrower's preference for the alterna-tive hypothesis that the two-stage sequence isto be found only in certain uniform groupssubject to certain constant conditions.

2. The range of variation in moral devel-opment by age, class, and culture is so greatas to call into question the dominant role ofmaturational factors, at least beyond the ageof five.2 It would appear that under ap-propriate environmental conditions, childrenas young as six year* of age can learn equallywell responses characteristic of Piaget's moralrealism or the patterns of reciprocation,equality, and equity presumably indicative of

2Aronfreed (1961), after reviewing many ofthe same studies, arrives at an almost identicalconclusion. He states:

". . . The recent work of Kohlberg (1958)and Peel (1959) tends to confirm, in a verygeneral way, that the child's moral concep-tions are age-related. But it is noteworthythat these studies, when taken together withothers in which age differences were notfound (Boehm 1957; Durkin 1959a; Lerner1937b; MacRae 1954), suggest, as a group,that the child's cognitive resources for moraljudgment are more closely associated withsocial status and other indicators of culturalexpectations. These findings are interestingbecause they imply that the availability ofhighly differentiated cognitive-evaluative stand-ards is not a necessary accompaniment of ad-vancing age or experience. Apparently, therole of cognitive equipment in the child'smoral behavior is dependent on the kinds ofexperience provided by its environment" (pp.7-8).

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moral maturity.3 In a word, the primaryfactors determining the nature of moralstandards appear to be social and situationalrather than genetic.

3. The preceding conclusion is not in-compatible with the manifestation of orderlysequences of moral development in certaincultural contexts since such genetic sequencesmay only mirror the changing character ofthe child's relation to his social environmentas he grows older. Thus the classic two-stagesequence observed by Piaget could be a re-flection of the fact that European children,especially a quarter of a century ago, tendedto be dealt with in rather authoritarian andarbitrary fashion through the early years andexposed to rationalistic, equalitarian treat-ment only at later ages. A similar but lessextreme transition was found in America buthas been steadily decreasing, especially atupper middle class levels (Bronfenbrenner1958); hence the frequent departures fromthe stipulated pattern of moral developmentin recent American data.

4. The various manifestations of moraldevelopment posited by Piaget, while theymay be correlated in a particular culturalcontext, are most appropriately regarded asseparate variables representing responses tospecific social-situational influences.

5. The aspects of moral developmentstudied by Piaget are primarily cognitive,evaluative, and conscious. In particular, theyreflect the child's knowledge of the idealnorms held up to him by his culture. Assuch, they shed little light on the emotional,covert, and behavioral aspects of moralstandards and development.

Perhaps in partial reaction to Piaget's in-tellectual and moralistic approach, Americansocial scientists, especially since World WarII, have focused their attention primarily onovert expressions of moral behavior, under-lying emotional impulses and moral conflicts,and their social-psychological antecedents.

* Consistent with this conclusion is Carmichael'searly finding (1930) that six-year-old children arefully capable of recognizing misdeeds, forecastingthe future, and learning a wide variety of adap-tive responses, including avoidance, prevarication,confession, and restitution.

We turn next to a consideration of the re-sults of this contrasting approach.

II CURRENT TRENDS IN RESEARCHON THE DEVELOPMENT OF

MORAL STANDARDSCURRENT STUDIES of moral development

show strong influence from three theoreticaltraditions: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, andthe cognitive theories of Piaget. Of these,behaviorism was the first to make a majorimpact through inspiring the monumentalCharacter Education Inquiry of Hartshorne,May, and their colleagues (Hartshorne andMay, 1928; Hartshorne, May, and Mailer1929; Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth,1930). The major conclusion of these re-searchers, in part pre-ordained by the highlyspecific nature of their theoretical conceptsand of the tasks and tests they employed, isthat moral qualities, such as honesty and de-ceit, "represent not general ideals but specifichabits learned in relation to specific situa-tions which have made one or the other re-sponse successful" (Vol. 3, p. 372). It isquite possible that a second look at Hart-shorne and May's data in the light of pres-ent-day theories and concepts may revealmore generality than the original authorsdetected. MacRae (1954, p. 17), for ex-ample, demonstrates that his distinction be-tween "cognitive" and "emotional" aspectsof moral development is supported by thepattern of reported correlations among vari-ous measures of moral judgment used thirtyyears ago in the Character Education Inquiry.

The chief importance of this pioneeringresearch was the precedent it set for studyingmoral character not merely through verbalresponse but through observation of con-crete behaviors, such as cheating, sacrifice,sharing, and the like. This precedent wasfollowed only a few years later by MacKin-non (1933, 1938), who compared the per-sonality characteristics of college studentsyielding or not yielding to the temptation ofcheating. As the conceptual framework forhis research, however, MacKinnon explicitlyrejected Hartshorne and May's theory ofspecificity and turned instead to structuraland developmental hypotheses from psy-

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choanalysis. With these as a guide, MacKin-non observed a number of reliable relation-ships reflecting dynamic processes. Thus"violators" were much more likely than"non-violators" to vent their anger out-wardly rather than engage in self-depreca-tion. A similar differential was observed inthe realm of motor behavior with violatorsbeing more likely to take out their aggressionon the environment through pounding thetable, stamping, and kicking objects, whilenon-violators concentrated motor activity ontheir own bodies through "oral, nasal, andhirsutal activities." At the level of consciouscognitive processes, non-violators were muchmore likely than violators to answer affirma-tively to the question: "Do you in everydaylife often feel guilty about things which youhave done or have not done?" Finally, antici-pating a major theme in research on moraldevelopment in the 1950's, MacKinnon ex-amined the relationship between adherenceto moral standards and the parents' use of"psychological" rather than "physical" dis-cipline, the former term being applied to"those measures which seek to have the childfeel that he has fallen short of some ideal orthat he has hurt his parents and consequentlyis less loved by them because of what he hasdone" (1938, p. 498). As hypothesized,parents of non-violators, especially fathers,were more likely to resort to psychologicaldiscipline and less likely to employ physicaldiscipline than parents of violators.

In the light of his data, MacKinnon con-cludes that, in refutation of the conclusionsof Hartshorne and May, "The findings ofthe present investigation lend support to atheory of the consistency of personality"(p. 500).

DESPITE THE promising character of Mac-Kinnon's work, it was twenty years beforesocial scientists once again turned to psy-choanalytic theory as a guide for research onmoral development. In the interim, however,there were at least two studies that investi-gated overt moral behavior. Wright (1942)designed an experiment to measure the gen-erosity of eight-year-old children in sharingtoys with a friend vs. a stranger of the sameage. Children were overwhelmingly more

generous to the latter than the former. Inaddition, the investigator found that thechild's perception of another's generositywas directly related to how generous he him-self was prepared to be. The subjects cameprimarily from professional and middle classfamilies and presumably included both sexes,but no breakdown of results by sex or classis reported.

Variations in both of these categories andseveral others as well were examined sys-tematically ten years later in an ingeniousand comprehensive study with Turkish chil-dren by Ugurel-Semin (1952). This investi-gator studied 291 youngsters between theages of four and sixteen attending the kin-dergarten and primary schools of Istanbul.In the experiment the child was faced withthe necessity of deciding how to share a sup-ply of nuts with a friend momentarily absentfrom the room. Responses were classified inthree categories: selfish (giving the otherless than one's self), equalitarian (sharingequally), and generous (giving more to theother). The major findings were as follows:

Age: Selfishness tends to decrease as thechild grows older; equalitarianism rises; gen-erosity increases also, but reaches a maximumat seven-eight years of age and fluctuatesthereafter tending to be less frequent thanequalitarian decisions.

Sex: No appreciable difference betweenthe sexes on any of the three variables.

Socio-economic level: Marked differencesappear among the three social class levels("Poor," "Rich," and "Middle Class"). Thepoor children were the least selfish and highon generosity; the rich tended to be gen-erous rather than equalitarian; middle classchildren were least generous and most selfish.(These class differences obtained with familysize held constant.)

Family size: Children from larger familiestended to be more generous and less selfishthan only children. (This analysis did notinclude controls for the relation betweenfamily size and socio-economic status.)

Ugurel-Semin also carried out a contentanalysis of the comments made by the chil-dren in the course of the experiment and

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related these comments both to the child'sage and the particular decision he made. Theanalysis led the author to the following gen-eral conclusion:

The process of moral thought is characterizedby five different tendencies whose commontrait is found in the change from centraliza-tion to decentralization.Moral thought moves (a) from external con-sideration of the moral situation at hand to-ward internalization of moral understanding,(b) from being linked to the present momenttoward consideration of life as a whole, (c)from a consideration of a specific connectionto the linking up of various connections, (d)from an individual and personal considerationof the moral action toward reciprocity and co-operation, and (e) from unilateral considera-tion of the moral rule toward its mutual un-derstanding. (The latter two traits have beenclearly explained by Piaget) (pp. 471-472).

The similarities between Ugurel-Semin'sconceptions and those of Piaget are evenmore pronounced than the final parenthesissuggests, for, like Piaget, the author has in-terpreted her data primarily in cognitive,evaluative, and maturational terms withoutregard for emotional, motivational, or socialpsychological implications. Noteworthy inthis regard is her failure to consider thesignificance for the process of moral devel-opment of the observed differences in re-sponse associated with socio-economic statusand family size. We must therefore look toother researches for the integration of thecognitive and maturational aspects of moraldevelopment with the affective and social-psychological. Some progress in this direc-tion was made possible during the 195O'sthrough the resurgence—this time on a broadscale—of psychoanalytically-oriented studiesof moral standards and behavior.

Ill PSYCHOANALYTICALLY-ORIENTED STUDIES OF MORAL

DEVELOPMENTTHE NEW WAVE of studies of moral de-

velopment following World War II wasstimulated not by psychoanalysis alone butthrough a remarkable fusion of psycho-analytic dynamics, post-Hullian behaviortheory, and hypotheses derived from the con-cepts and data of social anthropology and

sociology. The imaginative scope requiredfor such a strange and sweeping coalition isreflected in the somewhat farfetched char-acter of the first representative of the newapproach. As part of a broader cross-culturalstudy of Child Training and Personality,Whiting and Child (1953) undertook to in-vestigate the developmental antecedents ofguilt, the last variable being defined opera-tionally as the presence or absence in a so-ciety of "patient responsibility for illness."Amazingly enough, Whiting and Child wereable to obtain confirmation for a number oftheir hypotheses. For example, they foundsupport for their prediction that guilt (asmeasured by patient responsibility) wouldbe more likely to occur in societies employ-ing severe techniques of socialization, suchas strict and frequent punishment or en-forcing of rapid changes in habit patterns.

Encouraged by these results, Whiting andhis students (Faigin 1952; Hollenberg1952; Chasdi 1954) undertook a secondstudy of internalization of moral values withthe focus not only on the culture as a wholebut on individual children within three con-trasting cultures in the Southwest: a Mormoncommunity, a Texan town, and a Zunipueblo. The general method devised by theseinvestigators for measuring internalization ofmoral values is of some interest inasmuch asvariations of the same technique have sincebeen adopted, apparently quite independ-ently, by most of the workers engaged instudies of moral development. The methodis but one step removed from Piaget's pro-cedure, since it requires the child to com-plete a story in which the "hero" has com-mitted some form of moral transgression.The difference, however, is an importantone, since instead of being asked what thehero "should" do, the child is free to dealwith the implied moral conflict in whateverway he wishes. In this particular instance,the investigators used a rather complexmethod of scoring based on the frequency ofreference to "painful consequences" as theresult of the morally-deviant act. In line withtheoretical prediction, the Mormon childrenshowed the highest levels of internalizationand the Zuni the lowest. The major hy-

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pothesis of the study, however, had to dowith the relation between the degree of in-ternalization and the type of discipline usedwith the child. Specifically, arguing frompsychoanalytic theory, the authors postulatedthat the degree of internalization varies posi-tively with the extent to which denial of loveis used as the principal technique of dis-cipline for the child; in other words, themore the child is disciplined through with-drawal of affection, the more likely he is tointernalize moral values. This hypothesis wasconfirmed not only across the three cultures(with Mormon parents placing heaviest re-liance on this method), but also within eachof the three cultures (Chasdi 1954).

During the past ten years, a number ofdifferent investigators (Allinsmith I960; Al-linsmith and Greening 1955; Aronfreed1959, I960, and 1961; Bronfenbrenner1961; Heinicke 1953; Hoffman and Saltz-stein I960; Maccoby 1959; Miller andSwanson I960; Sears, Maccoby, and Levin1957; Sears, Rau, and Alpert I960; UngerI960), often using different methods formeasuring both parental behavior and in-ternalization, have nevertheless obtained re-sults consistent with the same general hy-pothesis. Since most of these studies haverecently been carefully reviewed by Hoffman(1961), we need only to quote that author'sgeneral conclusion:

. . . the use of psychological discipline(which includes techniques that appeal to thechild's needs for affection and self-esteem andhis concern for others), especially in the con-text of an affectionate parent-child relation-ship, appears to foster the development of aninternalized moral orientation, especially withrespect to one's reactions following the vio-lation of a moral standard (p. 26).

But as is readily apparent from a readingof Hoffman's painstaking survey, the pre-ceding generalization, valid as it probably is,nevertheless conceals under its very gen-erality a multitude of major lacunae, quali-fications, ambiguities, and even contradic-tions. To begin with, there is the fact notedby Hoffman that the majority of the studiesreported used males as subjects. Where bothsexes have been included, there are im-

portant differences within the general pat-tern, with certain parental variables showingstronger relationships for boys and othersfor girls. Moreover, as a number of investi-gators have pointed out (Burton, Maccoby,and Allinsmith I960; Bronfenbrenner 196la,1961b; Hoffman and Saltzstein I960; Sears,Rau, and Alpert I960), these variations pre-sent certain features consistent with Freud'stheory of differential personality develop-ment in the two sexes (Freud 1933; Bron-fenbrenner I960). The following quotationfrom Hoffman and Saltzstein is representativeof the trends discerned:

These findings suggest that the psychologicalforces induced in the discipline situation andwhich contribute to internalization are differ-ent for boys and girls. In girls it seems to beanxiety over the loss of the parent's love.This is consistent with Freud's notion thatthis kind of anxiety is central in the moraldevelopment of girls, and with the recent re-search findings reported by others. In boys,on the other hand, it seems to be guilt overthe effects of one's behavior on the parent(pp. 11-12).

The issue of sex differences is seen to beeven more complex when one examines theresults of the relatively few studies that haveobtained and analyzed behavioral data notonly about the mother but the father as well.Almost without exception, the results forthe two parents are different, and what ismore, these differences usually vary for thechild of each sex (Allinsmith and Greening1955; Hoffman and Saltzstein I960; Sears,Rau, and Alpert I960; Bronfenbrenner196la). In other words, the behavior offathers and mothers tends to affect sons anddaughters somewhat differently. The avail-able data as yet are insufficient, however, topermit a clear statement of the nature ofthese contrasting effects.

Finally, there is the question of the rele-vance, for all of the above relationships, ofthe family's class position. Unfortunately,most of the researches that have paid atten-tion to socio-economic status treated the vari-able as a control rather than a matter ofsubstantive interest in its own right. Neverthe-less, the two or three studies that have givenexplicit attention to this factor (Miller and

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Swanson I960; Aronfreed 1959; Bronfen-brenner 1961a) suggest rather strongly thatthe social position of the family modifies ingreater or lesser degree the behavior ofparents and children of both sexes as well asthe functional relationships between them.Bronfenbrenner (196lc) has recently pro-posed a theoretical model for viewing thesecomplex multiple relationships in a singletheoretical frame. Specifically, he proposesthat the relationships between parental be-havior and internalization of standards bythe child is typically curvilinear rather thanlinear, with the critical point representingan optimal balance between parental affec-tion and discipline. Since average levels ofaffection and discipline tend to differ forvarious combinations of sex of parent, sex ofchild, and family's social position, the ob-served relations between parental behaviorand internalization vary more or less sys-tematically from one social context to an-other. It remains to be seen whether thistheoretical model proves tenable and usefulin the light of subsequent research.

We have now seen enough of the "newlook" in studies of moral development sothat it may be instructive to compare it withthe earlier work of Piaget and his followers.

IV PIAGET VS. THE "NEW LOOK"THE NEW APPROACH to research on moral

development differs from its classic prede-cessors in a number of striking respects.First of all, the more recent studies givevirtually no attention to age differences inmoral response. Although experimental sub-jects have ranged in age from four or fiveyears to college level, the possibility of de-velopmental stages in moral development hashardly been raised.

Second, just as the Piaget approach hasbeen one-sided in its emphasis on the cogni-tive, conscious, and evaluative aspects ofmoral development, so has the new look,true to its psychoanalytic-behavioristic ori-gins, directed its attention almost exclusivelyeither to emotional, unconscious elements, orto overt behavior in specific situations.Piaget's eternal query, "What should Peterdo?" is heard no more.

Third, while Piaget and his followers gavefirst consideration to describing the contentof moral judgments, the current approach,in keeping with its psychoanalytic orienta-tion, focused almost immediately on devel-opmental antecedents and gave short shriftto the comparative analysis of the phenomenabeing predicted. This "historical" bias isreflected most sharply by a striking omissionin the numerous comparisons by sex, class,and culture appearing in the current litera-ture. These analyses jump immediately to ananalysis of differences in relationships be-tween parent behavior and moral standardsof the child and by-pass almost completelythe question of sex, class, or cultural differ-ences, in the dependent variable itself. Doboys and girls differ in their capacity to resisttemptation ? Do middle class children exhibitmore guilt than lower class children ? Exceptin a few isolated instances, such questionsremain unanswered in most current re-searches, despite the fact that the relevantdata are obviously available.

But along with the contrasts, there aresimilarities as well. Like Piaget and his col-laborators, the new investigators of the fiftiesbegan by treating morality as if it were aunitary trait and were only gradually forcedby their own data to a more differentiatedconception. As a number of investigatorsacknowledge (Allinsmith I960; Burton,Maccoby, and Allinsmith I960; Maccoby1959; Sears, Rau, and Alpert I960), indicesof guilt, confession, resistance to temptation,all of which are used to measure internaliza-tion, consistently show only low inter-corre-lations at best. Thus, after a review of studiesdone at Harvard and Stanford, Maccoby(1959) concludes: "Our results . . . argueagainst a single-process theory of moral de-velopment"; a conclusion reminiscent ofDurkin's final statement after her third at-tempt to replicate relationships required byPiaget's unitary conception:

. . . justice, operationally defined, is suffi-ciently complex that any theory which attemptsto explain "The Development of the Idea ofJustice in Children" is, from the start, doomedto inevitable generalization and consequenterror (1959a, p. 295).

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Finally, despite their concern both withcovert needs and conflicts and overt behavior,the protagonists of the new look, like theirmore traditional predecessors, have left un-explored the relation of verbal response toeveryday action. Instead, the two types ofdata remain compartmentalized. As a result,virtually nothing is known about the rela-tion of projective measures of conscience andguilt to behavior in actual interpersonal situa-tions.

The contrasts and similarities between oldand new approaches to the study of moraldevelopment point up needs and opportu-nities for the research of the future. We con-clude with a consideration of these develop-ing perspectives.

V THE SHAPE OF RESEARCHTO COME

SOME OF THE GAPS revealed by the fore-going analysis are already being bridged byresearch currently under way. Hoffman(196lb), for example, has brought togetherthe two major approaches to the study ofmoral orientations through combining in-vestigation of cognitive, affective, and de-velopmental aspects. For this purpose, heuses the concepts and methods of Piaget todefine a series of "conscience types" and thenemploys incomplete stories and parent inter-views to get at emotional correlates and de-velopmental antecedents. Working with asample of middle class seventh graders ofboth sexes, Hoffman has distinguished threecontrasting types as follows: (1) humanistic,"those whose moral judgments consideredthe circumstances and were supported interms of principles based on human need;"(2) conventional, "those whose judgmentsdid not consider the circumstances and whoseprinciples were based more on moral con-ventions;" and (3) externals, "whose judg-ments indicated moral orientations based onthe fear of punishment" (p. 2).

Three groups of children were deliberatelyselected from the larger sample to fit eachof the three types. The basis of assignmentwas their response to questions requiringthem to make moral judgments about norm

violations and to give the reasons for theirjudgments. The children were then asked tocomplete two stories dealing with moraltransgressions. On the basis of the results,Hoffman draws tentative conclusions suchas the following:

. . . humanists are more apt to sustain a highlevel of guilt for a relatively long period oftime when the consequences of their actionfor others are severe and irreversible. Butwhen the consequences are relatively minorand easily rectified, they are more likely to re-duce their guilt through confession and repa-ration.. . . external boys . . . have developed de-fenses allowing them to avoid guilt (p. 3).

As the last sentence indicates, Hoffman,like many of his predecessors, finds con-sistent sex differences in his data, particularlyin studying the familial antecedents of thethree conscience types. Nevertheless, Hoff-man's preliminary conclusions in this spheregive confirmation to earlier findings:

Generalizing most broadly and tentativelyfrom our findings, it appears that the combi-nation of affection and inductive disciplinemay be prerequisite for the development ofinternalized moral structures and that varia-tions in parental behavior over and above thispattern may account for the particular kind ofinternalized moral structure that develops:humanistic, conventional, or perhaps others.

< With this broader framework in mind, themain difference between the humanist andconventional parents seems to be that the hu-manists appeal more to "approach" motives,i.e., concern for the parent and the desire toattain an ideal; while the conventionals ap-peal more to "avoidance" motives, i.e., avoid-ance of parental withdrawal of love and re-spect (pp. 5-6).

Hoffman's study offers considerable prom-ise for extending our understanding of therelationships between cognitive and affectiveaspects of moral orientation and their de-velopmental antecedents. At the same time,in necessarily narrowing his research focus,Hoffman has excluded two important aspectsof moral phenomena. First, he has restrictedhis study of the affective sphere to the singlevariable of guilt. Second, he leaves unex-plored the whole question of the overt be-havior of his subjects in real-life situations.

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FORTUNATELY, the first of these areas iscurrently being surveyed by Aronfreed(1961), who has undertaken a descriptivestudy of the nature, variety, and social pat-terning of protective responses to moraltransgressions. On the basis of story comple-tions from a sample of 122 sixth graders ofboth sexes from two social class levels, thisinvestigator has identified twelve distinctdimensions of moral response which can bereliably distinguished by independent judges.The nature of these variables will be dis-cussed in connection with the author's sys-tematic analysis of differences in the pat-terning of moral orientation by sex and socialclass.

Considering first differences between boysand girls, Aronfreed finds that the latter aresignificantly more likely than boys to givestory endings in which the blame is placedon others (focus on external responsibility),corrective mechanisms are initiated only atthe behest of someone else (external initia-tion), and the moral response is exhibitedbefore others (display). In short, in theauthor's words, "girls rely more than boyson external definition of moral conse-quences."

As Aronfreed observes, this finding wouldseem to be at variance with the belief com-monly held in our society that girls showgreater conscientiousness and moral sensi-tivity than boys. Indeed, in the pioneer studyof Hartshorne and May (1930), as well asthe earlier work of Terman (1925), girlsconsistently received higher scores than boyson tests of moral knowledge and sensitivityto both conventional and ideal social stand-ards. Similarly, one of the few investigationsin the 1950's to report sex difference inmoral standards (Sears, Maccoby, and Levin,1957) reports a significantly higher propor-tion of girls among those classified as show-ing evidence of "highly developed con-science" (p. 384). Finally, the fourth andlast significant sex difference in Aronfreed'sown data reveals that girls are more likelythan boys to give story endings involvingapology.

Aronfreed suggests a resolution of theseeming contradictions in the research data

by pointing out the "responses such as con-fession and apology may be regarded assomewhat externally orientated corrections ofdeviance" (p. 30). He notes further that intests of actual performance of honesty, againreported by Terman (1925) and Hartshorneand May (1928), girls did more poorly thanboys under conditions when they thoughtthat their actions would not be known toothers. This contrast points up the im-portance of supplementing verbal indices ofconscience development with measures ofovert behavior.

In the realm of socio-economic differences,Aronfreed finds that middle class children"show more evidence of self-criticism thando working class children and are considera-bly less likely to resolve transgressionsthrough the perception of unpleasant fortui-tous consequences or a focus on external re-sponsibility" (p. 26). In comparing the dif-ferences by sex and class, Aronfreed con-cludes as follows:

Social class differences appear to center onthe distinction between moral consequencesdefined primarily in terms of the child's ownactions and those defined primarily in termsof external events. Sex differences, in con-trast, seem to reflect more of the variabilityin the extent to which moral consequences oc-curring in the child's own actions are never-theless dependent on the support of the ex-ternal environment (p. 27) .

Finally, although age was not a variable inhis own research, Aronfreed offers a con-clusion regarding the role of maturationalfactors in moral development identical withthat reached in our own survey of studies inthe Piaget tradition:

. . . it should be pointed out that the natureof the associations between social positionsand moral responses does not easily lend it-self to the view, suggested by Piaget's inter-pretation of moral development, that differenttypes of moral orientation sequentially emergewith advancing age or experience. It wouldseem more appropriate that internal and ex-ternal orientation in moral behavior be un-derstood as relatively stable end-results of dif-ferent patterns of social re-enforcement (p.31) .

ALTHOUGH HOFFMAN'S AND Aronfreed'sresearches will fill in some of the gaps left

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unexplored in previous work, two majorproblem areas remain strangely untouchedby today's growing number of researchers onmoral development. The first of these is theintriguing question of the relation betweenthe ideological and protective aspects ofmoral response and their manifestations ineveryday life. The study is yet to be carriedout in which Piaget-type moral judgments,responses to incomplete stories, and be-havioral indices of the kind recently de-scribed by Maccoby (1960) are combinedwithin a single research design to investigatehypotheses regarding the interaction of thecognitive, affective, and behavioral dimen-sions of moral orientation.

But the most curious, and perhaps themost serious, void in current studies of moraldevelopment lies in the once over-workedarea of age changes. No one seems to beasking the question of how the projectiveand objective manifestations of guilt, ex-ternalization, resistance to temptation, andaltruism emerge and develop in the growingchild. The fact that the child's maturationallevel may not be as determining an influencein moral development as was once believeddoes not in any way detract from the sci-entific importance of age-developmentalstudies. On the contrary, as the evidencemounts in favor of the view that humanmorality is man-made rather than an inevita-ble product of organismic evolution, under-standing of the genetic process of moral de-velopment becomes even more urgent andintriguing. Such changes over time, however,must be studied not against a purely chron-ological scale, but in context of the ever-changing matrix of social relationshipsthrough which the child is molded to man'sestate.

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5:04

19

Nov

embe

r 20

14