The role of ethical theories in the decision making of

Australian animal ethics committees: a multi-method

examination

Mikaela Therese Ciprian

Bachelor of Science in Animal Science (Hons)

This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The

University of Western Australia

Faculty of Science

The School of Animal Biology

2015

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Abstract

In Australia, the decision as to whether animals can be used in scientific experiments

are made on a case by case basis by animal ethics committees (AECs) made up of

veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people. AECs make

their decision as a consensus based on ‘The Australian Code of Practice for the Care

and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes’. The Code prescribes that decisions should

be made using cost benefit analysis, adhering to the principles of the 3Rs and made in a

way that best provides for the animal’s welfare. The Code can be interpreted to suggest

that decisions be made using a mixture of the ethical theories utilitarianism, deontology

and virtue ethics. However, the extent to which AECs use each theory in their decision

making, and how they are influenced by subjectivism and cultural relativism, is

unknown.

Ethical decision making is influenced by three classes of factors. The first are individual

factors, such as the stakeholder role of the AEC member. The second is the ‘moral

intensity’, or ethical characteristics of the problem, which in animal experimentation

include the species used, whether the animals are suffering, and the ‘human interest’ of

the experiment. The third is the social context, or the environment in which the decision

is made, so the group dynamic of the committee will influence decision making. This

thesis investigated how AEC members use three normative ethical theories,

utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics, and the metaethical position of relativism,

to justify animal experimentation, and how their decision making is influenced by

stakeholder role, moral intensity and social context. Due to the difficulty in obtaining

data from actual AEC members, members of each of the four AEC stakeholder roles

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veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal welfare representatives and lay people

(people that have never been involved in the use of animals for scientific or teaching

activities) were used instead as a representation of an AEC.

Three approaches were taken to examine how AEC members use ethical theories and

were influenced in their decision making. The first used a discourse analysis to establish

that veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people use ethical

theories to justify animal experimentation in freely produced texts. It was assumed that

if freely produced texts argue using ethical theories, than ethical theories would be

embedded within the discourse of animal experimentation.

The second approach moved the focus to decision making, using an adaptation of the

multidimensional ethics scale to test which ethical theories are used by veterinarians,

scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people to justify animal

experimentation as ethical. The survey also added the dimension of moral intensity in

influencing decision making by comparing the use of ethical theories and approval

between four scenarios varying in their species, human interest and level of animal

suffering.

The third approach explored the social context, moral intensity and individual factors on

the use of ethical theories in decision making by running mock AEC role plays. During

the role-plays, eight protocols of varying moral intensity were discussed, recorded and

analysed using discourse analysis, comparing the discussions between two mock AECs.

The three studies suggested that veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives

and lay people use a mixture of ethical theories to discuss and justify animal

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experimentation as ethical, yet rely most heavily on utilitarian cost benefit analysis.

Stakeholder role influenced the kinds of arguments raised, approval for scenarios, and

scientific members were more dominant in discussions than lay people and animal

representatives. Stakeholder role, however, did not influence individual decision

making when the experimental species were dogs. Moral intensity influenced individual

and group decision making, and human interest was determined to be a stronger

influence than species or animal suffering. Social context influenced decision making;

instances occurred where the consensus was based on dominant group member’s

interpretations of the protocols rather than their moral intensity.

Veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people use a mixture of

ethical theories to justify animal experimentation as ethical, which mimics the Code.

The Code can then be considered a good aid for decision making. However, the impact

of relativism on decision making can still cause problems, so rational decision making

should be encourages and training in critical thinking is recommended.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................. i

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... ix

Statement of Candidature Contribution ...................................................................... xi

List of Tables ................................................................................................................ xiii

List of Figures ................................................................................................................ xv

Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 2. Literature Review ........................................................................................ 5

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 5

2.1.1. The use of Animals for Scientific Purposes ................................................... 6

2.2. Decision Making ................................................................................................ 8

2.2.1. Ethical Decision Making .............................................................................. 10

2.3. Ethical Theories ................................................................................................ 13

2.3.1. Utilitarianism ................................................................................................ 14

2.3.1.1. Utilitarianism and Animal Research ......................................................... 16

2.3.2. Deontology ................................................................................................... 18

2.3.2.1. Deontology and Animal Research ............................................................ 19

2.3.2.2. Animal Rights ........................................................................................... 19

2.3.3. Virtue Ethics ................................................................................................. 20

2.3.3.1. Ethics of Care ............................................................................................ 23

2.3.3.2. Virtue Ethics and Animal Research .......................................................... 24

2.3.4. Ethical Relativism ......................................................................................... 26

2.3.4.1. Cultural Relativism ................................................................................... 28

2.3.4.2. Relativism and Animal Research .............................................................. 30

2.4. Surveys of Ethical Decision Making ................................................................ 31

2.4.1. The Multidimensional Ethics Scale .............................................................. 34

2.4.2. Adaptation of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale ........................................ 36

2.4.3. Factor Analysis Methodology ....................................................................... 38

2.5. Ethical Decision Making through Language .................................................... 41

2.5.1. Discourse Analysis ....................................................................................... 43

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2.5.1.1. Potter and Wetherell’s Discourse Analysis ............................................... 45

2.5.1.2. Thematic Discourse Analysis.................................................................... 47

2.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 48

2.6.1. Text Discourse Analysis ............................................................................... 48

2.6.2. Multidimensional Ethics Scale Adaptation .................................................. 50

2.6.3. AEC Role Play Discourse Analysis .............................................................. 51

Chapter 3: Ethical theories are embedded in the discourse of animal experimentation ............................................................................................................. 53

3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 53

3.2. Methods ............................................................................................................ 54

3.3. Results .............................................................................................................. 59

3.4. Discussion ........................................................................................................ 91

Chapter 4. Applying the Multidimensional Ethics Scale to Animal Ethics Committees .................................................................................................................. 101

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 101

4.2. Methods .......................................................................................................... 103

4.3. Results ............................................................................................................ 111

4.4. Discussion ...................................................................................................... 126

Chapter 5. Consensus is contextual: the decision making of role play animal ethics committees is influenced by group dynamic and the debated protocol ................. 137

5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 137

5.2. Methods .......................................................................................................... 139

5.3. Results ............................................................................................................ 148

5.4. Discussion ...................................................................................................... 182

5.5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 190

Chapter 6. General Discussion ................................................................................... 193

6.1 General discussion introduction ..................................................................... 193

6.2. Ethical theories ............................................................................................... 193

6.3. Factors influencing decision making .............................................................. 195

6.4. Recommendations for AECs .......................................................................... 202

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References .................................................................................................................... 205

Appendices ................................................................................................................... 225

Appendix 1: The original scales used by Reidenbach and Robin (1988) .................. 225

Appendix 2: Articles used in the text discourse analysis .......................................... 227

Appendix 3: The adapted scales as used in the questionnaire ................................... 231

Appendix 4: Copy of the on-line questionnaire ........................................................ 233

Appendix 5: Survey Pre-test and AEC Role Play Activity Consent Form ............... 247

Appendix 6: Invitation for Online Survey ................................................................. 249

Appendix 7: Survey Pre-test and AEC Role Play Activity Invitation....................... 251

Appendix 8: Protocols for discussion by mock animal ethics committees ............... 253

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Acknowledgements

Throughout my thesis I received a lot of assistance for which I am incredibly grateful

for, and I would like to thank these people for their help. To my supervisors, Dr

Dominique Blache, Dr Laura D’Olimpio and Dr Ram Pandit, thank you for all the

direction, feedback, assistance and encouragement throughout the process. Thank you

Dominique for chairing my mock AEC sessions, letting me hoard your books, helping

make sense of it all, and the laughs at daily morning teas. Thank you Laura for

encouraging me to attend conferences or submit to journals I’d never even consider, but

mostly for always making me feel better during meetings with your enthusiasm. Thank

you Ram for your help with statistical analysis and SAS, because without you I’d be

hiding under my desk weeping. But I thank my supervisors most of all for reminding

me that my research is exciting and important when I was feeling jaded.

To the Animal Science Group staff and fellow post-graduate students, Trina, Jo, Alex,

Sam, T-Rav, Chelsea, Sharon, Penny, Stacey, Kelsie, Xixi, Cesar, Joe, Kirrin, Anna and

Lorelle, thank you for the friendship, support, and the good times in and outside of the

offices. From the other side of the school, thank you to Sophie and Jamie for the best

pep-talks, and to Nicola, Ness and Leanne for the adventures. But most of all, thank you

to my dear friend Steph “Skrilleph” Payne for all the shit talking, obsessive TV show

debriefs and for making my impulsive idea to go to Ecuador and the Galapagos Islands

a reality for us.

Thank you to Jane Prince, Susan Barker, Nicki Mitchell, Nancy Longnecker, Miriam

Sullivan and James Fogarty for giving me teaching opportunities and telling others that

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I’m a good tutor/demonstrator, and the students who provided feedback to illustrate this

point.

To all my family and friends, thank you. To my beloved parents Yasmin and Peter,

thank you for putting up with me, supporting me and, most importantly, just not asking

about the thesis. To my sister Verushka, thank you for ensuring I partake in physical

exercise and not having a problem with me basically stealing your car. To my brother

Franco, thank you for the cartoon marathons, gig and festival distraction times. Thank

you to the rest of my family for letting me not want to talk about it, and to my family in

New Zealand for looking after me during my escapes. And a big thank you to Nala,

Tron and Shmorgy for providing excellent stress relief with their cuddles and making

life infinitely better.

Thank you to my dear friends without PhDs for providing time where I didn’t have to

think about my thesis; to Caroline for the phone calls and Melbourne escapes, to

Richard for our brunches and coffee dates where we devised lists of alternative careers,

to Renuka for reminding me that I need to socialise every once in a while, and to

Marissa for the Amps, gig and festival adventures. A special thank you to Adelia for

offering to proof read my thesis, and regular thanks to Veronica, Ellen, Cheryl, Fish,

Elise, Aidan, Erin, Nat, Anne, Jazz, Emma, Dan, Oskar, Cara, Emily, Sim, Adz and

Krystel. And thanks to The Antlers for summarising my thesis feelings in their album

‘Hospice’, and providing ‘Sylvia the Thesis’ with its iconic name!

Finally, a massive thank you to my anonymous participants; without you I would not

have my data! Thank you for your time and interest that allowed my thesis to happen.

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Statement of Candidature Contribution

The work presented in this thesis is the original work of the author. It has not been

submitted for examination at any other university. I carried out the collection of data,

qualitative and statistical analyses, and manuscript preparation after discussions with

my supervisors Dr Dominique Blache, Dr Laura D’Olimpio and Dr Ram Pandit.

Mikaela Ciprian

October 2015

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xiii

List of Tables

Table 3.1. A summary table of the overall opinion, year published, continent of origin and word length of

the 20 texts subjected to discourse analysis

Table 4.1. Pretest Cronbach’s alpha values

Table 4.2. The convergence validity measures (average correlation) for each of the four frameworks

throughout the four scenarios

Table 4.3. Confirmatory factor analysis values.

Table 4.4. The factor structures and loadings of Veterinarians (VET), Scientists (SCI), Animal Welfare

Representatives (AW) and Lay People (LAY) for each of the items in response to ‘support', the use of

animals in non-invasive cancer research.

Table 4.5. The factor structures and loadings of Veterinarians (VET), Scientists (SCI), Animal Welfare

Representatives (AW) and Lay People (LAY) for each of the items in response to “reject”, the use of

animals for invasive product testing.

Table 4.6. The factor structures and loadings of Veterinarians (VET), Scientists (SCI), Animal Welfare

Representatives (AW) and Lay People (LAY) for each of the items in response to “rat”, the use of rats in

invasive cancer research.

Table 4.7. The Tucker's Coefficient of Congruence for factor pairs within the scenario “rat”. Values

greater than 0.85 denote fair similarity, while values greater than 0.95 denote good similarity.

Table 4.8. The factor structures and loadings of Veterinarians (VET), Scientists (SCI), Animal Welfare

Representatives (AW) and Lay People (LAY) for each of the items in response to “dog”, the use of dogs

in invasive cancer research.

Table 4.9. The Tucker's Coefficient of Congruence for factor pairs within the scenario “dog”. Values

greater than 0.85 denote fair similarity, while values greater than 0.95 denote good similarity.

Table 4.10. The Tucker's Coefficient of Congruence for the factor pairs between the 4 scenarios. Values

greater than 0.85 denote fair similarity, while values greater than 0.95 denote good similarity.

Table 5.1. Comparisons of the final decision for each protocol against the first decision made.

Table 5.2. Proportion of the arguments and decisions as made by each of the four groups in total, and in

both Group 1 and Group 2

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Table 5.3. The final decision made by each of the two AECs for each of the eight protocols in order of

their appearance and the time they took to reach their decision.

Table 5.4. Ratios of the times that each of the stakeholder roles referred to the experimental animals as

either their species or as the dissociative term “animal”.

Table 5.5. Count of the instances of emotional markers, superlatives and intensifiers, in terms of the

human interest, species and pain invasiveness of the protocols.

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List of Figures

Figure 3.1.The mean percentage (± standard error) of articles written by veterinarians, scientists, animal

welfare representatives and lay people in each of the four ethical theories, utilitarianism, deontology,

virtue ethics and ethical and cultural relativism.

Figure 4.1. Level of approval of each scenario by veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives,

and lay people, where 1 indicates that the participant approves of the experiment in the scenario and 7

indicated that they do not.

Figure 5.1. The proportion (mean ± standard error) of statements made by veterinarians, scientists using

animals, animal welfare representatives and lay people displaying evidence of the use of the three ethical

theories Utilitarianism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics, and Meta-theory Relativism.

Figure 5.2. Number of times each of the stakeholder roles were agreed with during the discussions.

Colours are used to distinguish agreements from Group 1 and Group 2.

Figure 5.3. Number of questions asked by mock AEC members. Colours are used to distinguish

agreements from Group 1 and Group 2.

Figure 5.4. Number of the answers and clarifications from the mock AEC members prompted by

questions raised. Colours are used to distinguish agreements from Group 1 and Group 2.

Figure 5.5. The mean proportions of arguments that were considered either technical based or ethical

based for each of the two levels of the three moral intensity components.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Animal experimentation, defined as “the use of live animals in research in the

biological, psychological and medical technological sciences” (Monamy, 1996: Pg 6), is

a controversial and emotive issue that has long been debated with the goal of achieving

political change (Swan & McCarthy 2003). Supporters emphasise the societal, medical

and knowledge furthering benefits of animal research, while opponents argue that it is

unethical to cause pain and suffering to animals being used for research. The decision as

to whether animals can be used for scientific experiments in Australia is legally required

to be made by an Animal Ethics Committee (AEC). AECs are comprised of members

from four stakeholder roles that are thought to represent the four main parties in the

debate: veterinarians, scientists who use animals, animal welfare representatives and lay

people. The four stakeholder roles are intended to bring diverse views to the decision

making process, and must make each decision as a consensus (National Health and

Medical Research Council 2013).

The role of the AEC is to ensure the use of animals is justified as required by the ‘The

Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes’

(2013), published by the Australian Government’s National Health and Medical

Research Council. The purpose of the Code is to ensure the ethical, humane and

responsible care and use of animals for scientific purposes, and to justify experiments as

ethically acceptable, by weighing if their predicted benefits are greater than the costs to

the animals involved (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). The cost

benefit analysis is an instance of utilitarianism, an ethical theory that assesses an action

as ethical based on its outcome(s). In conjunction with the cost benefit analysis, the

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Code requires that the decision must be made in a way that best provides for the

animal’s welfare, has a high standard of scientific integrity, and incorporates the

principles of Russell and Burch’s (1959) 3Rs; replacement, reduction and refinement

(National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). By having an adaptable set of

guiding principles (Rose & Grant 2013) that provide decision making priorities, the

Code adheres to the deontological theory of principlism, where a set of principles are

applied to a situation in order to aid decision making. In requiring both principlism and

utilitarian aspects in the process of decision making, the Code requires that the AEC

make their decisions based on a mixture of ethical theories. However, the extent to

which AECs use each theory is unknown. It has been suggested that AECs make their

decisions not only on cost benefit analyses and by adhering to principles, but also by

using rights based ethics, emotional ethics and personal opinion (Galvin & Herzog

1992b; Schuppli 2004; 2011). Furthermore, the process of decision making itself is

influenced by many factors. Payne et al. (1993) suggest that there are three major

classes of factors, and these can be related to AEC decision making. The first are

individual factors (Payne et al. 1993), and in an AEC it is likely that individuals will be

influenced by their stakeholder roles and past experience with animal experimentation.

The second type of factors relate to the ethical characteristics of the problem (Payne et

al. 1993) labelled the ‘moral intensity’ by Jones (1991), which in an AEC setting mean

that decisions are influenced by the species used, whether the animals are suffering, and

the purpose of the experiment. The third type of factors relate to the social context

regarding the environment the decision is made within (Payne et al. 1993), which in an

AEC will relate to the group dynamic of the committee. This thesis investigated how

AEC members use the ethical theories, utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics, and

the metatheory relativism, to justify animal experimentation, and how their decision

making is influenced by stakeholder role, moral intensity and social context.

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This thesis begins with a literature review (Chapter 2) outlining decision making, the

ethical theories commonly used to justify animal research, and methods to isolate their

use; the multidimensional ethics scale and discourse analysis. The following three

chapters examine the types of factors that influence the ethical decision making of

representatives of AEC members, rather than AEC members themselves due to the

difficulty of obtaining access to actual AEC members. Individual factors are examined

in the first experimental chapter, Chapter 3, analysing and comparing written texts from

veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people using thematic

discourse analysis for evidence that ethical theories are in fact used to construct their

arguments about animal experimentation. Chapter 4 investigates how individual factors

and the moral intensity of experimental proposals influence whether singular ethical

theories are used to evaluate animal research, using the multidimensional ethics scale.

Chapter 5 explores the social context and the dynamic of the ethical decision making

process within committees, analysing recordings from role-play AEC meetings using

discourse analysis. Chapter 6 provides a general discussion, conclusion and suggestions

for future research.

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Chapter 2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This thesis examines how representatives of AEC members, both individually and in a

committee setting, use the normative ethical theories utilitarianism, deontology, virtue

ethics and the meta-ethical approach of relativism to justify animal experimentation as

ethical. It also examines how individual and group decisions are influenced by the

individual’s stakeholder role, the moral intensity of the protocols the committee are

assessing, and the dynamic of the committee.

This literature review starts by outlining the criteria of AEC decisions as stipulated in

The Code, and the moral status of animals. It then summarises how normal and ethical

decisions are made, followed by summaries of the four ethical theories commonly used

to justify animal experimentation, and how each is applied to animal ethics. With ethical

decision making and the ethical theories outlined, the remainder of this literature review

discusses ways to measure the use of utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and

relativism in decision making about animal research. Previous studies about animal

experimentation have relied on both quantitative research in the form of surveys (for a

review see Hagelin et al. 2003), and qualitative research in the form of focus groups and

interviews (Galvin & Herzog 1992b; Knight & Barnett 2008; Knight et al. 2003;

Schuppli 2004; 2011; Schuppli & Fraser 2007). This literature review considers

quantitative research by giving a brief description of previous surveys that have

examined the use of particular ethical theories, and justifies the use of the

multidimensional ethics scale as the appropriate methodology for my research.

Qualitative methods of analysis are also examined, and the use of thematic discourse

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analysis justified. The literature review concludes by providing justification for the

three following research chapters.

2.1.1. The use of Animals for Scientific Purposes

The use of animals for scientific research is regulated within the Animal Welfare Acts

of each of the Australian states, and each of the acts require that any animal

experimentation follows ‘The Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of

Animals for Scientific Purposes’ (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013).

The purpose of the Code is to, “promote the ethical, humane and responsible care and

use of animals for scientific purposes” (National Health and Medical Research Council,

2013; Pg 1). The Code requires that the decision as to whether the case for animal use

within a proposal is justified must be made by an AEC. The Code is the document that

stipulates the structure of the AEC, asking that the decision is made by four different

stakeholder roles, labelled categories A to D in the Code, with at least one of each of the

following present at each meeting:

“(A) people with qualifications in veterinary science that are recognised as

registered veterinary surgeons in Australia with relevant experience to the

activities of the institution, (B) qualified people, in possession of a higher degree

in research or equivalent experience, with substantial recent experience in the

use of animals for scientific or teaching purposes relevant to the institution, (C)

people with demonstrable commitment to, and an established role in furthering

the welfare of animals, who is independent of the institution, and (D) a

layperson who is independent of the institution and has never been involved in

the use of animals for scientific or teaching activities” (National Health and

Medical Research Council, 2013; Pg 20).

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The AEC reviews applications for projects, only approving those that conform to the

requirements of the Code and are ethically acceptable according to its guiding

principles. These principles are identified in Section 1 of the Code as:

“(i) using animals only when it is justified, (ii) supporting the wellbeing of the

animals involved, (iii) avoiding or minimising harm, including pain and distress,

to those animals, (iv) applying high standards of scientific integrity, (v) applying

the 3Rs of Replacement, Reduction and Refinement at all stages of animal care

and use, and (vi) knowing and accepting one’s responsibilities” (National Health

and Medical Research Council, 2013; Pg 9).

Justification is achieved by cost benefit analysis, weighing the predicted scientific and

educational benefits of the project against the costs to the welfare of the animals

involved (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). These principles and

the justification of animal use are discussed and deliberated on by the AEC, who then

must reach a consensus on their decision (National Health and Medical Research

Council 2013).

Regulations for the use of animals for scientific experimentation exist because it causes

a moral dilemma. Animals hold moral status, meaning that they have interests and can

be morally wrong or be wronged (LaFollette 2007), without being moral agents, those

who are rational enough to understand they can be wronged and cause wrong (Elliott

2007), like humans. Humans are unique in that they have moral consciousness, the

ability to experience morality (Hodges 2005), and control their behaviour in ways that

make them morally accountable for their actions (LaFollette 2007). Some animals are

considered to be sentient; they have the capacity to experience pleasure and pain and

wants and desires (Singer 1995; Regan 2004). However, animals generally lack the

cognitive sophistication to recognise the moral status of others and the concept of past

8

or future, hence are assumed to be subjects of moral worth rather than moral agents

(Elliott 2007; LaFollette 2007). Animals are awarded moral status, however, are not

considered equals to moral agents. This inequality allows animals to be intentionally

harmed if it is justified in order to protect moral agents (Elliott 2007), as in the case of

the use of animals for scientific experimentation. It is further justified by the assumption

that subjects of moral worth are not harmed by humane deaths because they do not

contemplate the past or future (Elliott 2007; LaFollette 2007). However, the fact that

animals do have moral status means that regulations are needed to protect their basic

interests.

2.2. Decision Making

A decision is defined as “a deliberative process that results in the commitment to a

categorical position” (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Pg 536). The classic models of decision

making were based on rationality and utility optimisation, so that the chosen decision

outcome would be the option with the maximised expected utility (Weber et al. 2004).

However, these models were unrealistic because it is unlikely that the decision maker

would have access to all the information required to assess each possible outcome of the

decision (Etzioni 1967), nor could they generate all possible alternative outcomes or

anticipate all the consequences of each (Tarter & Hoy 1998). These models were also

unreliable because they assumed that decision making is purely rational, when in reality

there are many factors that influence decision making.

Broadly speaking, there are three major classes of factors that influence decision

making; those related to the person, the problem, and the social context (Payne et al.

1993). First, factors related to the person or identity of the decision maker include their

past experiences, established heuristics, and their preferences, values and beliefs (March

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1994), and the effort required to make the decision (Payne et al. 1993). The influence of

preferences, values and beliefs allows decision making to be influenced by emotional

processes (Miner & Petocz 2003). I predict that emotion come into play in AEC

decision making because humans generally have empathy towards animals, which

Würbel (2009) suggests is either a result of our ethical principles or our biology. Along

with emotion, I also predict AEC decision making to be heavily influenced by past

experiences; veterinarians and scientists have experience using animals and may find

AEC protocols similar to procedures they have done in their training or profession, and

draw on this information to aid their decision making.

The second class of factors that influence decision making is the problem itself,

including how much information the decision makers are exposed to which can affect

how much cognitive effort is needed (Payne et al. 1993). However, the extent of the

problem is a result of how it is interpreted by the decision maker.

The final class of factors that influence ethical decision making is the social context,

meaning that the decision making process must acknowledge that the values and

capabilities of the decision makers are diverse (Frame 2012). Within the social context,

Payne et al. (1993, pp 254) lists the social factors as the need to justify a decision to

someone else, being part of a group decision process, and being part of a competitive

decision making situation. The decision can be taken either by an individual, who must

account for the impact of the decision on others, or as a group. It is believed that

members of groups accept and promote shared values and priorities associated with the

group with which they identify (Beam 2012). Theoretically, being on the AEC indicates

that all members hold similar preferences allowing for animals to be used in research.

However, the mix of different roles as required by the Code mean that the members

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have other preferences shaped by their identities. In group decision making situations,

having a number of individuals with inconsistent and possibly conflicting preferences

may complicate the decision making process (March 1994). During the process of

achieving a consensus, a group will identify different options and debate their

arguments for and against these options, while the undecided will ask questions, gaining

more information upon which to base their decision (Frame 2012). Ultimately, a

decision will be made and voted on that reflects the majority (Frame 2012). Therefore,

the group itself, in this case the AEC, and how each person is influenced by the

arguments of each other is a considerable factor in the decision making process.

2.2.1. Ethical Decision Making

Ethical decision making differs from general decision making in that the decision must

be morally justified (Miner & Petocz 2003). A moral agent makes an ethical decision as

to what should be done in relation to the moral problem, of which the characteristics are

labelled the moral intensity (Jones 1991). Jones (1991, pp 372) defined moral intensity

as “a construct that captures the extent of issue-related moral imperative in a situation”

and that “its component parts are characteristics of the moral issue”. Jones (1991) listed

six component parts of moral intensity. Some of these component parts are relatable to

AEC decision making; the magnitude of consequences (the sum of harms or benefits

caused to the victims or beneficiaries of the moral act; Jones 1991) and the

concentration of effect (the inverse function of the number of individuals affected by an

act of a given magnitude; Jones 1991) can be included in the cost benefit analysis. Two

other components, the social consensus (the degree of social agreement that the act is

good or bad; Jones 1991), and proximity (feeling of nearness that the moral agent has to

the victims or beneficiaries of the act; Jones 1991), may also influence AEC decision

making in a relativistic or emotional manner. The final two component parts of moral

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intensity, the probability of effect (the probability that the act will take place and cause

the predicted harms and benefits; Jones 1991) and temporal immediacy (length of time

between the present and onset of the consequences of the moral act; Jones 1991)

however are not as likely to influence AEC decision making, as these are determined by

the AEC themselves and not an outside influence. The moral intensity is increased when

one or more of these components is increased, hence moral intensity varies between

issues, where individuals are likely to respond differently to moral issues as related to

the characteristics of the problem itself (Jones 1991). Jones (1991) also stated that moral

intensity does not include traits of moral decision makers or organisational factors, thus

moral intensity can be encompassed in the second class of factors that influence

decision making as suggested by Payne et al. (1993). Moral intensity relates to factors

that relate to the moral problem itself, while individual factors relate to the traits of the

moral decision maker, and organisational factors are related to the social context.

Ethical decision making is supported by observations of relevant facts, and these are

linked by value judgements and assumptions (Brown 1996). These value judgments,

which are the basis for normative statements that guide actions or beliefs, are explained

and defended using different normative ethical theories (Brown 1996). Ethical theories

are “bodies of principles and rules... about what to do when there are conflicts”

(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994; Pg. 5), prescribing ways of justifying moral

dilemmas. It has been suggested that the differences in decision outcomes can be

attributed to these value judgments (Brown 1996). Differences in ethical theories may

theoretically prevent consensus being reached because different theories base their

premises on different normative or evaluative concepts, and there is no rational way to

weigh the claims of theories against each other (MacIntyre 2008; Brown 1983).

Therefore, when arguing using different normative theories, it is possible that a

12

consensus cannot be reached unless one party is willing to yield to the theory used by

the other party.

There was a commonly held idea within philosophy that a singular theory is adhered to

when assessing an act as ethical (Eyal et al., 2010), however, it is now believed that a

singular theory is rarely used in ethical decision making. Rest (1979) argued that the

stage where people prescribe to a consistent normative moral theory is the final stage of

moral development, and this stage is rarely attained. The final stage “imagines the mind

of the rational person” (Rest, 1979, pp 36), described as those who appeal to abstract

principles that would be chosen as governing terms by those who are rational, equal,

and impartial (Rest 1979). This final stage can be attributed to some philosophers active

in the debate surrounding the ethical acceptability of animal research. Two examples are

the contemporary philosophers Peter Singer and Tom Regan who both argue that it is

unethical to use sentient animals in scientific research, yet they reach their conclusions

using different ethical theories. Singer (1995) uses utilitarianism to make his decision;

he argues that the costs to the research animals are real, while the benefits of animal

research are uncertain (Singer 1995). Because the costs to the animals are real and

animal interests are real and worth protecting, the costs are not outweighed by the

benefits, therefore, animal research is unethical. Tom Regan uses deontology to argue

his belief that sentient animals are self-conscious, but not rational beings, and thus have

the right to be treated in a way in which they are respected, and that recognises their

inherent value (Regan 2004). Regan (2004) argues that scientific research violates this

right, and therefore is unethical.

The Code does not require the use of a singular ethical theory (National Health and

Medical Research Council 2013). In addition, AEC members are not required to have

13

any formal ethical training, so it would be unlikely that individuals from AECs, or even

the four stakeholder roles, would rely purely on one ethical theory alone in their

decision making. Instead, it may be found that these individuals are using a mixture of

concepts from different ethical theories when justifying ethical dilemmas, and the Code

provides for this by including four stakeholders with different interests, knowledge and

skills to make a combined decision.

2.3. Ethical Theories

Guidelines for the use of animals for scientific purposes state that animal

experimentation is ethically acceptable if the research will provide significant benefits

to humans and is carried out in a humane manner, so that the animals are in no

unnecessary pain or distress (Canadian Council on Animal Care 1997; Committee for

the Update of the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals; National Research

Council 2011; European Union 2010; National Health and Medical Research Council

2013). However, the fact that animal experimentation causes pain and suffering to

animals causes a moral dilemma. The moral dilemma is addressed in different ways

based on the ethical theories in use by those making the argument. In particular,

utilitarianism, deontology in the form of either a contractualism or rights argument, and

virtue ethics are used to reason whether the use of animals in scientific research is

ethical (Sandøe & Christiansen 2008; Palmer 2010). In the next section the arguments

that are expressed by proponents of these theories, and how these arguments are applied

to animals, will be examined. However, as people make their assessments on personal

opinions and species preferences, the meta-ethical position of ethical and cultural

relativism and how it is used to justify animal research as ethical, will also be examined.

14

2.3.1. Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism; a framework where users are morally

obligated to act in ways that produce the best consequences (LaFollette 2007), starting

with the goals of the decision rather than rigid prescriptions of what is considered

morally right and wrong (Singer 1995). What is morally right is dependent on the

highest overall net benefit, calculated by the net sum of benefits against the costs;

therefore, the theory has become synonymous with cost-benefit analysis.

Consequentialist theory must specify which consequences are morally relevant, how

much weight we should give them as determined by the nature and number of the

interests affected and their respective probabilities, and how they should be used in

moral reasoning (LaFollette 2007). Utilitarianism varies from consequentialism in that

the sole consequence considered is happiness, and the best action is the one that

promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number (LaFollette 2007). The use of

utilitarianism may lead to moral problems; sometimes the most preferable outcome for

the majority involves causing harm or death to another, actions that are deemed

universally morally wrong within other theories. To avoid this problem, classic

utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1932) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

promoted the use of welfare utilitarianism, where the ultimate goal of a society was the

maximisation of an account of good that all rational agents would agree upon (Troyer

2003).

One of the defining frameworks of utilitarianism was that of Jeremy Bentham (1748-

1832). Bentham (1789) advocated welfare utilitarianism, and believed that morality was

based on the promotion of good within a society (defined as the sum of the individuals

of which the society was comprised). He believed that moral principles should promote

the maximum amount of pleasure for the majority in a society (Bentham 1789). The

15

good of society was determined as the sum of happiness, which Bentham defined as

pleasure with the absence of pain, of the individuals within that society where each

individual’s interests were equal to each other (Bentham 1789). Actions that maximised

happiness and avoided or minimised pain and suffering were deemed ethical. However,

Bentham awarded each pleasure the same value, and denied the fact that happiness

would be greater or lesser with different forms of pleasure (Troyer 2003). John Stuart

Mill (1806-1873) disagreed that different kinds of pleasures were equal, and addressed

this issue by adding the calculation of ‘quality’ to Bentham’s hedonistic calculus when

measuring outcomes of an action (Troyer 2003). Mill’s qualitative approach to

utilitarianism claimed that different pleasures should be awarded different values based

on how they appeal to the preferences of ‘competent judges’, who had experience in

appreciating and enjoying all these pleasures under consideration (Mill 1864; Troyer

2003). Therefore, Bentham and Mill, both advocating welfare utilitarianism, could

make different assessments of utility for the same moral dilemma, where Mill’s

assessments would give greater or lesser weights to higher or lower graded pleasures.

Contemporary philosopher Peter Singer (1995) criticised the theories of Bentham and

Mill, labelling them ‘hedonistic utilitarianism’ because their primary goal was to

maximise pleasure. Instead, Singer (1995) advocates the use of ‘preference

utilitarianism’ where moral agents should do what, on balance, furthers the preferences

of those affected. Preference utilitarianism works towards the outcome of the

satisfaction of preferences (Singer 1995). The preferences Singer (1995) refers to are

minimal and include basic wants, needs and desires such as freedom from pain, and

satisfying basic needs for food and shelter. Singer (1995) also elaborated on Bentham’s

assumption that the interests of individuals were equal by clarifying the ‘principle of

equal consideration of interests’, where the interests of all individuals are weighed

16

impartially; only the interests themselves, and the number affected are given weight.

Using this framework, racial and sexual discrimination is unethical because the

preferences of all need to be equally considered. However, while interests are weighed

equally, they are not all weighted equally, leading to the interests of some parties not

being represented in the final calculus.

2.3.1.1. Utilitarianism and Animal Research

Cost benefit analysis has been incorporated into the regulations of animal ethics

committees, or equivalent, worldwide (Canadian Council on Animal Care 1997;

Committee for the Update of the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals;

National Research Council 2011; European Union 2010; National Health and Medical

Research Council 2013). Utilitarianism has then become integral to assess animal

research as ethical. Using utilitarianism, animal research is thought to be acceptable if

the perceived benefits of the research are greater than the suffering of the animals.

Experiments must be designed with as little imposition on the animals as possible, and

the animals must be treated in ways that minimise their suffering, such as being

provided with environmental enrichment within their housing. By reducing the suffering

of the animals, animal experiments with high benefits should be deemed ethically

acceptable.

However, utilitarian arguments can also be made against animal research. Bentham

argued that animals and humans have the capacity to suffer, and that this capability was

what entitled them to equal moral consideration (Jonsen 2005; Regan 2004; Singer

1995; Bentham 1789). Bentham (1789) advocated against cruelty to animals, believing

that as animals suffer in the process of animal experimentation, it was immoral.

However, this argument can be refuted. The Code (National Health and Medical

17

Research Council 2013), and its equivalents, require that the adverse impacts on

animals used for scientific purposes be minimised. By implementing methods that avoid

or alleviate pain and distress in experimental animals their suffering is reduced, while

the suffering of those who will benefit from the research is not. For example,

subcutaneous tumours can been grown on a small number of rats that will be managed

in a way to reduce any pain and distress they may feel, and the research may benefit in

managing tumours for humans and other animals. In this situation, the good is

maximised and the costs reduced, therefore, the experiment would be ethically

acceptable.

Peter Singer provided a stronger argument then Bentham’s against animal

experimentation using preference utilitarianism. In clarifying the ‘principle of equal

consideration of interests’, Singer (1995) extended the equal consideration to sentient

animals. Singer (1995) likens taking human interests over animal interests to racism and

sexism, using the term ‘speciesist’ to describe humans giving greater moral weight to

members of their own species, simply because they are the same species. Singer (1995)

argued that the benefits of animal research are uncertain, while the costs to the animals

are real; therefore, the interests of the animals are real and worth protecting, and animal

research should not occur. Like Bentham’s argument this argument could still allow for

animal experimentation, and Singer (1995) acknowledged that there may be

circumstances where animal research could be justified, however, he pointed out that in

these circumstances, it would make no difference to use an orphaned brain damaged

human. Singer (1995) claimed that if one were to object to this, they would be

‘speciesist’.

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2.3.2. Deontology

It is generally held that in deontological theory, acts are deemed as morally right or

wrong in all circumstances, independent of their consequences (Beauchamp 2001). The

most well known theory of deontology was that of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who

aimed for objective truth based on reason (Kant 1785). Kant claimed that moral agents

should strive to act in accordance with the good will, which he believed applied to all

rational human beings (Kant 1785). This amounted to acting in accordance with reason

which reveals one’s obligation, or duty (Kant 1785). Only acts done out of duty and

following a maxim, and not self interest, were awarded moral worth (Kant 1785). Kant

(1785) required that to be ethical, people should only act according to maxims that they

could will to become universal laws, which he labelled ‘the categorical imperative’.

Therefore, using deontology, moral agents should only act according to moral principles

they will to become universal laws. Kant argued that all humans are rational beings

capable of recognising the universal validity of objective moral principles; and they

should therefore act morally, that is to say rationally, as free agents with autonomy

(Ford 2001; Kant 1785; Rachels & Rachels 2007). The moral agent is then held

responsible for their actions, allowing for the act to be judged as either moral or

immoral.

Kant’s rigid rules of deontology are objected to when, for example, it is obvious that in

some situations acting according to ‘the categorical imperative’ requires may lead to a

negative outcome. Deontology also fails to provide a solution to the problem of what to

do in situations in which two or more maxims clash. W. D. Ross (1877-1971) addresses

this issue by differentiating between two sets of duties; prima facie duties that were

general, self evident and intuitive based, and actual situational duties (Meyers 2003;

Ross 1930). When duties clashed, Ross suggested that perfect prima facie obligations

19

take precedence, or that the decision should be based on previous moral experience

(Meyers 2003; Ross 1930). Thus the moral agent still acts according to duty by

rationally deducing which principle takes precedence in the given situation. This theory

labelled ‘principlism’ was successfully applied to the field of medical ethics by

Beauchamp and Childress (1994) with their widely published book ‘Principles of

Biomedical Ethics’. They reduced the moral principles to what they considered to be the

four most crucial principles: Autonomy, Beneficence, Nonmaleficence and Justice

(Beauchamp & Childress 1994). These principles are the standards of conduct that form

the basis of moral reasoning, and instead of prescribing actions, are interpreted within

the context of the moral problem (Beauchamp 2007).

2.3.2.1. Deontology and Animal Research

Deontological arguments can be made for or against animal research. Kant (1785)

argued that the only beings that could be moral agents were humans because their

actions are controlled by reason, as opposed to animals whose actions are governed by

instinct, and that moral agents have responsibilities to other moral agents. This premise

enables the use of animals in research; the researchers have a duty towards ensuring the

welfare of other moral agents, which animal research allows. To argue against animal

research, the animal must be awarded some moral consideration, so that an act of

inflicting pain and suffering upon sentient animals would be considered morally wrong.

The most well renowned deontological argument against animal research is Tom

Regan’s animal rights argument, as discussed below.

2.3.2.2. Animal Rights

Tom Regan (2004) argues that animals capable of consciousness, sentience, and the

possession of cognitive and volitional abilities such as belief and memories are self-

20

conscious, but not rational beings. As Kant labels people of the same status ‘moral

patients’, Regan attributes this status to animals capable of these abilities. He states that

all moral agents have universal moral rights that are possessed equally amongst them,

and awards moral patients the same rights (Regan 2004). The principle basic right is a

right to respectful treatment, and as moral patients have inherent value, they must be

treated in a way that recognises their inherent value (Regan 2004). Therefore, Regan

(2004) argues that as moral patients, sentient animals must be treated with respect, and

that the use of these animals in scientific research violates this requirement of respectful

treatment and removes inherent value from the animals, seeing them as a means to an

end. Even as moral agents, humans do not have the right to override the basic rights of

animals, therefore, the use of animals in scientific research is unethical using the

argument of animal rights (Regan 2004). Regan’s view has been adopted by many

animal liberation groups who seek to abolish animal research.

2.3.3. Virtue Ethics

While utilitarianism bases morality on outcome, and deontology on intention and

actions, virtue ethics bases what is morally right on what a virtuous person would do,

and expects people to act accordingly when applying the framework to their decision

making. Character is then the basis for morality. Under the theory of virtue ethics, being

a moral person entails having certain traits of character that are morally valued, such as

truthfulness, honesty, generosity, gentleness and politeness (Beauchamp 2001; Rachels

& Rachels 2007; Murphy 1999).

The idea of a virtuous character was first established in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,

first published in 350BCE, before normative theories favouring obligations and

rightness over character became popular (Rachels & Rachels 2007). Aristotle (384BCE-

21

322BCE) believed that the aim of life, and highest good, was achieving eudaimonia

(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1. 1096a10-1098b5), often translated as either

‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’ or ‘wellbeing’ (Hursthouse 2013). Aristotle argued that

eudaimonia was achieved by living a virtuous life (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.

1099a5-25). As virtues are required for living one’s life well, morality was deemed as

being of good character (Rachels & Rachels 2007). Aristotle defined virtues as the

intermediate between excess and deficiency (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.

1106b15-1107a25), for example, the virtue of being brave is the mean between rashness

and cowardice. Under virtue ethics, the end is what determines the decision making, so

actions that promote the end must be done in accordance with being virtuous and

achieving eudaimonia to be morally right (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3. 1113b5). It

is assumed under virtue ethics that people with good character will behave virtuously

(Doris 1998), however, Aristotle argued that people were not born virtuous but must

become so by practicing being virtuous (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2. 1103a15-25).

As practicing being of virtuous character was learned from role models, not only

individuals, but the entire community had an interest in being virtuous (Aristotle,

Nicomachean Ethics 10. 1180a30-1180b5; Beauchamp 2001; Murphy 1999).

Criticising the reliance on universally applicable and rigid moral codes, Anscombe

(1958) recommended that virtue, character and emotions be placed more centrally in our

understanding of morality (Athanassoulis n.d.). This led to a resurgence of interest in

the theory over the past 30 years, with many philosophers returning to the ideas of

virtues (Trianosky 1990; Athanassoulis n.d.). One of the appeals of virtue ethics lies in

its moral motivation, where it is acceptable to put the needs of those close to you over

others. Other normative frameworks require people to act impartially to all parties

involved, yet people are more inclined to act in a virtuous manner towards people they

22

know, friends and family, than act out of duty to strangers (Rachels & Rachels 2007).

Thus virtue ethics is an appealing alternative to theories that require the moral agent to

be objective and detached, such as deontology and utilitarianism. In being virtuous,

people must act from a disposition towards virtue rather than duty, therefore, one will

visit a friend in hospital out of empathy, friendship and love, rather than because they

believe it is the right thing to do (Rachels & Rachels 2007). Virtue ethics allows for

rational emotions to guide moral decision making.

When using virtue ethics, a problem may arise when two virtues conflict, because there

is no hierarchy to rank the virtues it is unclear which virtue takes precedence in this

situation (Rachels & Rachels 2007; Foot 1978). However, another appeal of virtue

ethics is that what is considered virtuous is determined within a context, so achieving a

virtuous character will vary in different settings (Meara et al. 1996). Meara et al. (1996)

found in a comparison of texts discussing virtue ethics produced in different historical

periods that the valued virtues differed across the various contexts. The theory is then

adaptable and pragmatic, and the original problem of which virtue will take precedence

would then be a result of which is meaningful within the defined context. Virtue ethics

then appeals to common sense, however, as common sense varies and possibly

contradicts itself there is a risk that the theory can collapse into cultural relativism

(Crisp 2010). However, this claim can also be applied to other normative theories; the

influence of culture on virtues is no greater than the influence of culture on rules of

conduct in the case of deontology, and what constitutes welfare or happiness in the case

of utilitarianism (Hursthouse 2013).

Another criticism of virtue ethics is that as it is character based, it focuses on cultivating

a consistently virtuous character (Louden 1984), and it has been suggested that it is a

23

model of emulation rather than a normative theory (Doris 1998). Virtue ethics does not

directly address actions (Rachels & Rachels 2007), however, individuals can act as

according to the rules in employing the virtues (Hursthouse 2013). An alternative

solution as suggested by Louden (1984) is that as the theory cannot clearly answer what

acts are morally right or wrong, it should to be used in conjunction with another set of

rules to keep a system of law. Virtue ethics can then be used as a supplement to other

theories such as utilitarianism and principlism (Meara et al. 1996).

2.3.3.1. Ethics of Care

Ethics of care developed from virtue ethics, making care the focus of moral decision

making. It differs from virtue ethics in that it does not focus on the character of the

decision maker, but on relationships (Noddings 2012). Using ethics of care, any

decisions made will only affect those involved, while decisions made using virtue ethics

will affect the community. Care can be defined as “an approach to personal and social

morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships and affective

knowledge in a manner that can be fully understood only if care’s embodied dimension

is recognised” (Hamington 2004; Pg. 3). Ethics of care was based on the assumption of

Carol Gilligan (1982) that in Kohlberg’s (1973) assessment of moral development, girls

make moral decisions differently to boys because they focused on relationships between

the characters in the given scenarios, avoided conflicts and refused to take decisions out

of context (Allmark 1995; Blum 1988; Rachels & Rachels 2007). These assumptions

lead to the idea that individuals, particularly females, may base their moral reasoning on

relationships rather than abstract principles, implying that ethical decisions are made in

order to fulfil the needs of others, while maintaining harmonious relations (Botes 2000).

Therefore, using ethics of care, what is morally right is based on caring, empathy and

feeling rather than abstract rules or reason (Rachels & Rachels 2007), with the act of

24

sustaining and building relationships with others at the centre of decision making

(Falkenberg 2003). The theory has become popular in the fields of feminist, nursing,

counselling and medical ethics (Allmark 1995; Blum 1988; Rachels & Rachels 2007).

However, the claim that ethics of care is used predominantly by females has been

debunked, with a review by Walker (1984) claiming that there were only few sex

differences in moral development and the results of a meta-analysis by Jaffee and Hyde

(2000) concluded that there is no strong support for the claim that ethics of care is

predominantly used by women.

Ethics of care is appealing and realistic because it is based on close relationships rather

than pure objectivity, making it acceptable to put the needs of one’s family and friends

before those of other people, a way in which virtuous people will act (Rachels &

Rachels 2007). However, in lacking abstract principles, the theory can be vague because

it neglects to describe the correct way to care (Allmark 1995). This subjective approach

causes problems for users of traditional theories such as utilitarianism and deontology

because it does not prescribe strict actions or intentions. For the theory to work, people

must have the right set of values, and care in the right way (Allmark 1995). However,

individuals may privilege some values and not others, which can lead to subjective or

arbitrary decisions. It has been suggested that ethics of care, like virtue ethics, can

instead be used as a supplementary framework rather than a replacement moral theory,

used in conjunction with other normative theories (Rachels & Rachels 2007), allowing

for concepts of care to be a factor of their decision making process of moral agents.

2.3.3.2. Virtue Ethics and Animal Research

The use of virtue ethics and ethics of care appeals to people because use of the theory

acknowledges that humans and animals form attachments and relationships, and its

25

application allows emotion and compassion towards animals to factor into their decision

making (Würbel 2009). Using the theory, animal experimentation would be justified as

ethical on the basis of how a virtuous person would assess the protocol, taking into

account compassion for both humans who receive the benefits and the animals. People

form emotional attachments to animals, and it has been suggested that animals possess

characteristics that are able to elicit our empathy, for example, cute, large eyed animals

are loveable because they share features with human infants (Herzog 2010). By

anthropomorphising animals, people tend to interpret the animal’s behavioural

responses as expressions of their emotional states (Würbel 2009). People then can use

empathetic imagining, picturing themself in the place of the animal, to base a decision

that acts that harm the animal are immoral, because they assume the acts will cause the

animal pain. It has been suggested that empathy towards animals is either a result of our

ethical principles or our biology and may have resulted as an altruistic by-product

allowing people to know their kin were suffering (Würbel 2009). Empathy for animals

is a known predictor of attitudes towards animal experimentation (Furnham et al. 2003),

therefore, it is expected that empathy and other emotions will be a factor in assessments

of animal research. However, emotions are not reliable guides in decision making due to

their urgency, irrationality, and while distinctions between rational and irrational

emotions exist, conflicting emotions can be simultaneously felt within reactions to a

situation (Nussbaum 2003). Therefore, they must be scrutinised, just as beliefs should

be (Nussbaum 2003). If treated this way, emotion can be valuable to justify animal

research.

Ethics of care is based on relationships, and while humans and animals establish

relationships, the understanding of the relationship causes a problem. Traditionally,

caring relationships are reciprocal, so that the one being cared for must acknowledge the

26

actions of the carer (Falkenberg 2003), which is difficult with animals. Noddings, who

as cited by Herzog (2002), felt that only animals who had an established relationship

with the decision maker could be awarded moral standing, giving her cat as an example.

However, there are different types of relationships humans can have with animals.

Fröding and Peterson (2011) believe that animals are capable of a reciprocal friendship

with humans based on both parties gaining a mutual advantage from the relationship, as

Noddings and her cat would share. Within this premise, Fröding and Peterson (2011)

argued that farmers and the animals they raise for meat have a reciprocal relationship as

both benefit from the relationship, and that it is then immoral for the farmer to kill the

animals they have an established friendship with. Palmer (2010; Pg 48) offers an

alternative view of human animal relationships to include causal relationships, with

relation defined as “having an effect, potentially having an effect, having had an effect

on another or the existence of an interaction between one being and another”. The

causal relationships are where humans have caused, or partially caused, the animal to be

in its situation, as in the case of domestic animals, and humans then have a moral

responsibility towards these animals (Palmer 2010). In applying Palmer’s (2010)

argument to animal research, the AEC members will have a causal relationship with the

experimental animals, making decisions as to how the animals are kept and treated that

will maximise their welfare.

2.3.4. Ethical Relativism

Relativism is a metaethical position that holds that ethical truths are subjective and

relative to an individual (subjectivism) or a cultural group (cultural relativism). The

general thesis of relativism is that truth is not universal or absolute, but instead

perceived as relative (Gowans 2015). In relation to ethical relativism, individual

relativism or subjectivism sees truth as relative to the moral view of the individual,

27

while cultural relativism bases moral truth on the moral viewpoint of the individual’s

culture (Gowans 2015; Quintelier & Fessler 2012). Proponent of ethical relativism

argue that morality cannot be based on objective normative rules or principles; rather,

what is morally right is a matter of taste or intuition whereby moral views are relative to

how one feels in the case of subjectivism, or to what their culture values and practices in

the case of cultural relativism (LaFollette 1991; Beauchamp 2001). As morality is a

matter of subjective taste or preference, a relativistic approach leaves the moral agent

without the ability to judge the actions or beliefs or another (Beauchamp 2001). The

relativist claims that there are no universally valid ethical rules or principles (Ford

2001); instead what is right is relative to how the assessor feels about it. Beliefs and

judgements are therefore relative, and a particular action may be ethically acceptable in

one circumstance and inappropriate in another (Ford 2001). For example, laboratories

may use poison baits to eradicate wild or escaped rodents in their building, while

requiring humane treatment of their laboratory rodents (Epling 1989; Herzog 1988).

The problem with ethical relativism is that it is descriptively true but normatively false.

If morality is viewed as relative, then there are no universal moral rules that must be

followed and inconsistencies are permitted. As relativism denies universal moral

principles, if one holds the belief that there is no absolute truth, then they should not

believe in anything at all, including relativism (Mackie 1964; Bearn 1985). Relativism

allows for the following two statements to be true: 1) there are no absolute truths, and 2)

that it is absolutely true that there are no absolute truths (Bearn 1985). However, if it is

absolutely true that there are no absolute truths, than the second statement is in itself an

absolute truth, and the theory is thus self refuting. Subjectivism evolved as an attempt to

overcome the theory overcome this problem of self-refutation (Bearn 1985). The

subjectivist does not refer to propositions as “true”, but instead “true for me”, or “true

28

for them” when referring to the propositions of others (Bearn 1985). This leads to the

question of whether these propositions are true, or merely seem true, leading to moral

beliefs becoming simply ethical attitudes or opinions (Ford 2001). Under subjectivism,

two conflicting viewpoints can be equally correct, however, neither will be universally

valid, which is ultimately irrational. These conflicting viewpoints will be unable to be

resolved because there are no grounds for comparison when morality is subjective.

Hence, the approach is difficult to defend on the grounds of consistency.

2.3.4.1. Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism is the theory that morality is determined by one’s culture (Quintelier

& Fessler 2012). What is morally right is what the majority of people within a particular

culture at a particular time believe and practice, and members of a particular culture are

ethically obligated to abide by the moral standards of their culture. Cultural relativism

assumes that people acquire most of their personal values from their culture, and that

values and socially acceptable behavioural expectations vary from one culture to

another (Ford 2001). Therefore, what is morally right or wrong is based on what

Sumner (1906) calls “the folkways”, traditional cultural practices and attitudes based on

the authority of a culture’s ancestors, instead of having universal standards that apply to

all (Rachels & Rachels 2007). As there is no ‘universal truth’ that can be used to

compare the code of one society as better than another, relativists adopt an attitude of

tolerance toward the practices of other cultures (Rachels & Rachels 2007). Tolerance is

an appeal of relativism, and has been found to be a determinant in decision making; a

study by Sarkissian et al. (2011) found that participants in a series of studies would take

an objectivist approach to people from their own culture, but a relativist approach when

considering people of different cultures or non-human aliens. They suggested that

people are not moral objectivists, but instead they turn to a relativist intuition as they

29

actively consider different perspectives (Sarkissian et al. 2011). This, however, is

logically inconsistent as it may result in a moral agent tolerating cultural practices they

find morally abhorrent such as female circumcision, for instance, simply because such

practices are considered to pertain to others whose culture differs to their own. Thus the

moral agent could reject female circumcision within their own culture, yet tolerate it in

another culture. This leads to logical inconsistency as the moral agent would therefore

both support and reject the practice of female circumcision.

Thus, cultural relativism shares the same flaws as subjectivism. Ultimately, the theory is

self refuting; for a cultural relativist to see their own culture bound truth as absolute

contradicts the thesis of the relativist that moral truth is only ever relative or subjective

(Quine 1975). Furthermore, as a criticism of any sense of ‘tolerance’ the cultural

relativist displays, if a culture decides that the genocide of another culture is morally

right, this then challenges the ideas that the codes of all cultures are equal, and that we

must be tolerant of other cultures. The theory also allows for unfavourable acts such as

slavery, human sacrifice and female circumcision to be right within the cultures and

times they occur. This leads to inconsistency with regard to which culture to refer to

when assessing right and wrong, for example, if one is to visit a society with different

cultural mores to their own, they then will question whether they obey the laws of their

culture or the culture they are currently in (Rachels & Rachels 2007; Schmidt 1955). If

one culture is chosen over another, then tolerance of all cultures is not upheld. The

theory also does not take into account the many subcultures with different ideas and

values that make up a culture (Spiro 1986). Another problem is the extent to which

cultures actually differ; even if their beliefs are different, they may be based upon the

same values, differing on the means to obtain an end (Beauchamp 2001; Bearn 1985;

Rachels & Rachels 2007). Therefore, it could be thought that certain values or even

30

beliefs are universally required for societies to exist (Beauchamp 2001; Schmidt 1955;

Rachels & Rachels 2007). The claim that there are universal values shared by all

cultures, such as ‘protect the innocent’ and ‘take care of your children’, even if these are

interpreted in various ways in practice at different times, challenges the main

assumption of the relativist, namely, that there are no universal ethical principles.

2.3.4.2. Relativism and Animal Research

Decision making based on relativism is apparent in surveys of attitudes towards animal

research, where attitudes are inconsistent and determined by irrational emotions. In a

review of these surveys, Hagelin et al. (2003) suggested that species used and the

purpose of the experiment indicate that people have inconsistent attitudes towards

animal experimentation being ethically acceptable. Results from surveys show that

participants are less likely to approve of research using companion animals and great

apes than traditional laboratory species (Hagelin et al. 2003). Studies examining why

some species are more favourable over others found that the perception of their

sentience (Knight et al. 2009; Schuppli 2011) and the likeability of the species (Galvin

& Herzog 1992b; Knight et al. 2003) determined the acceptability of their use. While

sentience is a rational determinant of acceptably, basing a decision on the likeability of

a species is irrational because it relies on human preferences rather than logic, and may

lead to the use of species that are less valid models being used in experiments. Schuppli

(2011) identified that decisions also took into account public concern and the societal

role of the animal. The use of labels for particular species, such as whether they were

pest or research animals, was observed in other studies (Epling 1989; Galvin & Herzog

1992b; Herzog 1988). As public concern and ideas of animal species determined

decision making, these views indicate that cultural relativism dictates the acceptability

of certain animals in scientific research. As well as influencing decision making,

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societal roles of different species have been interpreted to be included in legislation;

Peggs (2010) suggested that the European Committee Directive on nonhuman animal

experiments views mice and rats as laboratory equipment, whilst ensuring that

endangered species, nonhuman primates and companion animals are preserved to the

point where it is included that cats and dogs be re-homed where appropriate. As well as

species, acceptability of animal experimentation is relative to the purpose of the

experiment; surveys have found that respondents are more likely to approve of medical

research and teaching methods than other scientific use (Henry & Pulcino 2009; Knight

et al. 2003; Saucier & Cain 2006), and this view was seen in scientists and lay people,

yet not members of animal welfare groups (Knight et al. 2009).

2.4. Surveys of Ethical Decision Making

How ethical theories are used in decision making focused on animal experimentation

has received limited attention; instead most surveys examine attitudes towards the use

of animals for scientific purposes (for a comprehensive review of attitudes toward

animal research see Ormandy and Schuppli 2014). The study of attitudes is important

because they are predictive of behaviour (Glasman & Albarracin 2006) and influence

decision making (Brown 1996). However, attitudes are just one part of the decision

making process and do not fully explain how decisions are made. It is the value

judgment stage, where normative ethical theories are used, that is the focus of my

research. Few studies have examined ethical theories, yet there are none that have

examined and compared the use of utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and

relativism.

Relativism and idealism have been examined and compared using Forsyth’s (1980)

‘Ethics Position Questionnaire’ (EPQ), a scale developed to measure the extent to which

32

individuals adopt a situationism, absolutisim, subjectivism or exceptionism approach to

assessing moral dilemmas. Galvin and Herzog (1992a) used the EPQ to compare

students and animal activists and found that most animal activists held the absolutist

response (low relativism and high idealism), believing that adherence to universal moral

principles will lead to positive consequences and the protection of the general welfare.

They concluded that differences in personal moral philosophies are related to how

people think animals should be treated (Galvin & Herzog 1992a). The EPQ was also

used by Wuensch and Poteat (1998) who concluded that relativism was significantly

correlated to support for animal experimentation, while idealism was significantly

correlated to a lack of support. Relativist beliefs then influence the approval of animal

experimentation.

Utilitarian reasoning has been examined in surveys about attitudes to animal

experimentation. The EPQ studies touched on utilitarianism; idealism bases the decision

on its consequences, but Wuensch and Poteat (1998) proposed that idealists were

reluctant to use cost benefit analyses. Instead they proposed that their participants would

think the costs would always outweigh the benefits (Wuensch & Poteat 1998).

Utilitarianism, along with care giving, was tested in Henry and Pulcino’s (2009)

‘Attitudes towards the Treatment of Animals Scale’. They concluded that the

participants in their study held a utilitarian view of the use of animals for research

where human interests were given greater weight than those of animals (Henry &

Pulcino 2009). Lund et al. (2014) confirmed that cost benefit analysis is used to assess

animal experimentation throughout the three different attitude stances of the Danish

public, who either strongly supported or rejected animal research, or were ambivalent in

their attitudes and addressed it on a case-by-case basis. Cost benefit analysis was

identified as one of the metacognitive statements used by undergraduate students to

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reflect their own thought processes in a study by Galvin and Herzog (1992b). The

participants referred to using three main processes; the first being factors relating to the

animals, secondly factors relating to the research and experimental design and thirdly

the use of metacognitive statements including projection, using emotional or logical

moral judgement, and philosophical beliefs such as rights, natural order, and personal

views on life and death and cost benefit analysis (Galvin & Herzog 1992b). These

surveys then show support for utilitarianism in assessing animal experimentation.

Two surveys by Hills (1994) and Saucier and Cain (2006) aimed to find the rational and

emotional basis for attitudes toward animal research. Hills (1994) concluded that

attitudes towards animal experimentation were determined by three interacting

motivational bases; firstly an instrumental motive where attitudes are a function of

human self-interest, secondly a function of the extent to which one empathises with the

animal, and thirdly the individual’s ‘worldview’ beliefs. Saucier and Cain (2006)

examined the arguments presented when people argue for or against animal

experimentation. They found that positive views of animal experimentation were

constructed using arguments that it furthers human well being and science, cures

diseases, and is ethical and well regulated (Saucier & Cain 2006). In contrast, negative

views of animal experimentation were constructed as inhumane and unnecessary, and

that holders of these beliefs argued that animals were mistreated and unable to consent,

and they were empathetic and sympathetic to the animals (Saucier & Cain 2006). These

studies indicated that rational emotion influences the ethical acceptability of animal

experimentation.

While the studies discussed above examine some ethical theories in attitudes towards

animal experimentation, none have tested and compared the use of the four theories

34

central to this research. The use of normative ethical theories in assessing activities as

ethical has been extensively researched within the fields of business and marketing

ethics (Loe et al. 2000; O’Fallon & Butterfield 2005), unlike in the field of animal

ethics. A survey to compare the use of multiple ethical theories in decision making

labelled the multidimensional ethics scale was developed by Reidenbach and Robin in

1988. The following section will discuss this tool, and how it can be adapted to isolate

which ethical frameworks are used to justify the ethical acceptability of animal research

by the stakeholders in the debate.

2.4.1. The Multidimensional Ethics Scale

The multidimensional ethics scale was developed by Reidenbach and Robin in 1988 to

improve the measurement of ethical evaluations of marketing activities, and to find

which ethical frameworks are relied upon other than utilitarianism and deontology

(Reidenbach & Robin 1988; 1990). They hypothesised that people use specific moral

philosophies in evaluating the ethical content of marketing situations, are consistent in

evaluating different situations, and will act in a way that reflects their evaluation of the

scenarios (Reidenbach & Robin 1988). These hypotheses were tested by asking

respondents to rate the action depicted in three scenarios, A, B and C, on a series of

seven point bipolar scales (Reidenbach & Robin 1988). The scale contained 29 items

based on deontology, utilitarianism, relativism, justice and egoism, and the final

question asked if the respondent would act in the same manner as the character in the

scenario (Reidenbach & Robin 1988), making it a 30 item scale (Appendix 1). The scale

was found to be valid and reliable with high values of Cronbach’s alphas (Reidenbach

& Robin 1988), the index of reliability associated with the variation accounted for by

the true score of the ‘underlying construct’, or hypothetical variable, being measured

(Reynaldo & Santos 1999). Reidenbach and Robin (1988) then subjected the data to a

35

factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation to provide as maximally different structures

as possible. Scenario A was thought to be a ‘practice’ or ‘situation’ effect and was

removed from the analysis; yet, the factors for B and C confirmed that philosophically

based criteria were not used in evaluating the ethical content of marketing activities

(Reidenbach & Robin 1988). The analysis indicated that decision making was situation

specific, and that people used similar patterns of criteria to evaluate a situation as they

do in making an estimate of their own behaviour (Reidenbach & Robin 1988).

Reidenbach and Robin (1988) concluded that individuals do not rely on utilitarianism

and deontology alone, and do not use concepts related to singular ethical philosophies in

evaluating marketing activities as ethical. However, the scale did not measure divergent

validity, or how the items in one theory differed from the items in the other theories.

Instead, it was noted that items within each theory highly correlated with those

associated with other theories, put down to a conceptual overlap in philosophies. While

the scale was found to be reliable, the lack of measuring divergent validity might have

contributed to the use of a mixture of theories. The authors did suggested that the scale

needs continued development (Reidenbach & Robin 1988), and part of this could be

testing items with less overlap.

In 1990, Reidenbach and Robin refined their multidimensional ethics scale, resulting in

the scale being made up of eight items from the frameworks of justice, deontology and

relativism. The data were analysed using a principal component analysis with a varimax

rotation (Reidenbach & Robin 1990), yet without explaining why different methods of

both factor analysis and rotation were used to the original scale. The analysis identified

three factors; the first one labelled ‘broad-based moral equity dimension’ included two

items based on justice, one on deontology and one on relativism (Reidenbach & Robin

1990). The second factor was labelled ‘relativistic dimension’, and included the two

36

relativism items about traditional and cultural acceptability, and the third factor labelled

a ‘contractualism dimension’ consisted of two deontological items (Reidenbach &

Robin 1990). Reidenbach and Robin (1990) concluded that a mixture of theories, the

broad-based moral equity dimension was the principle evaluative dimension, and it was

supported by relativism and contractualism; the way in which it was supported by these

latter two factors is dependent on the nature of the moral problem. While this version of

the scale has been extensively tested and used, it does not include utilitarianism, which

is integral to the field of animal experimentation.

2.4.2. Adaptation of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale

As the multidimensional ethics scale was originally designed to isolate which ethical

theories people use when assessing situations it fits within the aims of the current

research; to examine how utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism are

used to justify animal experimentation, and whether the moral intensity will influence

decision making. The multidimensional ethics scale requires adaptation to fit this

context. The scale has been previously adapted to fit contexts outside of business and

accounting ethics, including the assessment of ethical behaviour of internet users (Yoon

2011), graduate students in their academic behaviour (Yang 2012), and consumer

judgement about the use of sexual appeal in advertising (LaTour & Henthorne 1994).

While these adaptations used new scenarios, as I will need to do in my adaptation of the

survey, they used items either from Reidenbach and Robin or other variations where

items were reduced (Cruz et al. 2000; Jung 2009), without introducing any new items or

providing justification for the items they used. An adaptation to an accounting context

by Cohen et al. (1993) opposed Reidenbach and Robin’s 8-item scale due to its lack of

utilitarianism, feeling the theory was too important in accountant’s decision making to

be left out. As the Code requires a cost benefit analysis in the procedure of assessment

37

by AECs (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013), I share the view of

Cohen et al. (1993) that utilitarianism needs to be an integral part of my adaptation of

the multidimensional ethics scale for it to be valid.

A later version of the scale added the item ‘concern for caring’ to address ‘feminine

ethics’ (Cohen et al. 1996), and account for gender differences (Cruz et al. 2000). The

lack of ‘feminine ethics’ in Reidenbach and Robin’s original scale was acknowledged

by Kujala and Pietiläinen (2004) who, in response to labelling the scale to be a poor

representation of how female manager’s made moral decisions, added three principles to

their version of the scale; power dynamics, relational understanding and emphasis on

experience (Kujala & Pietiläinen 2004; 2007). Feminine ethics, based on ethics of care,

relies on the assumption that women make decisions revolved around relationships and

thus what is ethical is based on care, empathy and feeling rather than abstract principles

(Botes 2000; Rachels & Rachels 2007). Ultimately, these theories are branches of virtue

ethics, where what is morally right is based on what a virtuous person would do, and

thus, there is an interest in acting as a virtuous person. With a resurgence in use of

virtue ethics (Trianosky 1990) and compassion for animals being a factor of decision

making (Würbel 2009), it is important to include virtue ethics in the adaptation of the

multidimensional ethics scale to accurately represent how people justify animal

experimentation as ethical. The multidimensional ethics scale is a good starting tool to

establish if singular theories or a mixture of utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and

relativism is used to justify animal research as ethical. However, Reidenbach and

Robin’s original versions are inadequate to address animal experimentation and will

need to be adapted.

38

For my research, I will be adapting Reidenbach and Robin’s 30-item multidimensional

ethics scale to fit an animal experimentation context. I will test if animal

experimentation is assessed as ethical using a mixture of theories, or as singular

theories; utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics or relativism. I will also compare the

differences and similarities in the patterns of decision making for veterinarians,

scientists using animals, animal welfare representatives and lay people. Items for

utilitarianism, deontology and relativism can be adapted from the original scale.

Because the feminine ethics items developed by Kujala and Pietiläinen (2004) are not

sufficient to the context of animal research, and virtue ethics is a more inclusive and

applicable theory than feminist ethics, I will need to develop virtue ethics items from

the literature. I will remove the frameworks of justice and egoism from the scale

because the theories are rarely used to argue animal experimentation. Egoism should not

apply to the field of animal ethics as the decision makers theoretically do not

individually benefit, and thus cannot make decisions in their best interest, and justice

will not apply because the theory is anthropocentric and reliant on contributing towards

society, in which research animals are not awarded status as a moral agent.

2.4.3. Factor Analysis Methodology

Reidenbach and Robin used a ‘Principal Component Analysis’ (PCA) for their 1988

scale, yet an unspecified factor analysis on their 1990 model. PCA is used as a data

reduction tool that assumes that there are no measurement errors; therefore, the variance

of each item is due to the latent principal components, or underlying constructs, of the

test alone (McMahon 2002), which is too big an assumption to make. Reidenbach and

Robin (1988) acknowledged that there might be overlap between ethical frameworks,

and that it is unlikely that people make decisions based on the one framework. The

variance would then be unlikely to be a result of the latent principle components,

39

measured as ethical theories, therefore, they should not have used a PCA. In this

situation it is more accurate to use a factor analysis as a data reduction tool because it

uses a mixture of construct-relevant variance and construct-irrelevant error variance to

hypothesise the underlying latent constructs (McMahon 2002; Suhr 2005). There are

two formal kinds of factor analysis, confirmatory factor analyses and exploratory factor

analyses. The use of each is based on the purpose of the research. Confirmatory factor

analyses are used when it is hypothesised that only certain factors influence certain

factor indicators (Asparouhov & Muthén 2009), for example, cost benefit analysis

would be expected to only influence a factor based on utilitarianism. Exploratory factor

analyses are used for scale development, and when the data is described, summarised or

reduced to be understood (Hurley et al. 1997). Based on the assumption that

utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism are used to justify animal

experimentation, a confirmatory factor analysis will be used to test whether the theories

are used independently of each other. If this is not the case, an exploratory factor

analysis will be used to identify whether a mixture of theories are used instead.

How well the factor analysis fits the observed data needs to be established, and this is

done using a goodness of fit test (Myung 2003). Goodness of fit is found using a

method of parameter estimation, and the type of parameter estimation should reflect the

predicted outcome of the scale (Myung 2003). Maximum likelihood models focus on

the theoretical application of factor analysis and are used to identify the latent

dimensions or constructs represented by the measured variables (Hair et al. 2006),

aiming to find the factor solution that best suits the observed correlations (Hansen

1992). Therefore, a factor analysis model based on a maximum likelihood estimation

technique will be used to find if particular frameworks are adhered to in justifying

animal research.

40

Another aspect within factor analysis is the choice of rotation type. Rotation is used to

make factors more interpretable by orienting the correlations between the factors and

the indicators, resulting in distinct patterns (Wang 2005). Reidenbach and Robin used

an ‘orthogonal rotation’ in the 1988 model and a ‘varimax rotation’ in the 1990 model,

to provide as maximally different structures as possible (Reidenbach & Robin 1988;

1990). Orthogonal rotation has been used in many other studies using the

multidimensional ethics scale (Hansen 1992; Tsalikis & Ortiz-Buonafina 1990; Flory et

al. 1992), however, as it spreads variance evenly among the factors, they are likely to

become distorted (Stewart 1981). Instead, in situations where the goal of the factor

analysis is to obtain theoretically meaningful factors or constructs, oblique rotations

should be used (Hair et al. 2006; Stewart 1981). As the present work aims to produce

factors relating to different ethical theories, it is more reasonable to use an oblique

rotation in the factor analysis.

Reidenbach and Robin, in response to a critique of the multidimensional ethics scale,

mentioned that different patterns may emerge in different groups, therefore, the cultural

and subcultural implications of the different ethical theories should be examined

(Reidenbach & Robin 1995). Thus, it is a competent model for my research, which aims

to compare veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal welfare representatives and

lay people to find differences in the use of ethical theories in their decision making

process. However, the model only accounts for the process of individual decision

making, while AEC decisions are made in groups. It is still valuable to have this

information as I can compare whether the decision making process of each of the

stakeholder groups changes when in a group setting. Group decision making is difficult

to quantify using survey techniques. Therefore, in addition to the survey, my research

41

must be validated by qualitative techniques. The following sections of this literature

review discuss the use of language analysis to study the use of ethical frameworks to

justify animal research.

2.5. Ethical Decision Making through Language

Ethical debates about the use of animals for scientific experimentation are constructed

using a variety of media including written articles, speeches, interviews, and

discussions. Throughout this literature review all of these will hence be referred to as

texts. While surveys are beneficial in collecting a large sample of information, they can

be flawed in that the answers of respondents are constrained by the questions, or the

participants are unable to explain why they chose their answers (Ormandy & Schuppli

2014). Hence, in addition to survey methods, it is beneficial to study the language used

in texts where individuals or groups communicate about animal research to gain an

accurate representation of how their decisions are made. The use of language is

increasingly being understood as the most important phenomenon in the field of social

science (Alvesson & Karreman 2000).

Language is examined using qualitative analysis using one of two rough types of

methodology (Braun & Clarke 2006). The first type included methods that are

independent of theory, such as content analysis and thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke

2006). Content analysis involves establishing a set of categories and coding instances of

language within these categories where the end result is a count of linguistic instances

dealing with a certain subject (Silverman 2006). While the content analysis is replicable

and its validity is easily established (White & Marsh 2006), its pre-designed categories

may lead to categories being overlooked leading to false analysis (Silverman 2006).

Another issue is that in the final conclusion of the analysis, inferences made must be

42

established by independent means (Krippendorff 2012), making content analysis more

effective as a supplementary method. Thematic analysis is similar to content analysis,

yet focuses on the themes presented within texts, and tries to avoid the problem with

content analysis by relating the themes identified both to the research question and

previous research in regards to the themes presented (Braun & Clarke 2006). However,

like content analysis, thematic analysis has limited interpretive power being

independent of theory, and does not allow the researcher to make claims about language

use (Braun & Clarke 2006). As my research directly examines language use to indicate

ethical decision making, these non theoretical methods will be inadequate.

The second type of qualitative analysis is based on theoretical positions; using either a

fixed method such as conversation analysis, or from a broad theoretical framework,

such as grounded theory and discourse analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). Which method

is used depends on the aim of the research and the question being asked. All methods

based on theoretical positions hold different assumptions, and are used to answer

different questions. Conversation analysis focuses on how people produce their

activities and make sense of the world around them (Pomerantz & Fehr 1997). The

method assumes that talk is a structurally organised action that creates and maintains

intersubjective reality, and that understanding is displayed publically (Silverman 2006).

However, the theory is used on speech that has already been produced, therefore the

research question becomes a result of the data, rather than the data being produced for

the purpose of answering the research question (Silverman 2006). In my research I will

produce the research questions, so to use conversation analysis would conflict my

hypothesis. Grounded theory differs in that it develops explanatory theories of basic

social processes, asking how these processes happen in certain contexts from data

generated from the experiences of participants (Starks & Brown-Trinidad 2007).

43

However, the theory lacks an emphasis on the individuals involved, which is central in

my comparison of how the debate stakeholders use ethical theories in their decision

making. Discourse analysis, however, assumes that the author’s version of reality is

expressed within the texts (Lawton 2009), and would hence be a more accurate method

to use. Discourse analysis aims to understand how discourse, as presented in language,

is used to create and enact certain identities and activities (Starks & Brown-Trinidad

2007). The language of the debate stakeholders could be used to examine how they

construct their version of animal research, and how they use language to complete the

action of decision making.

2.5.1. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is the study of language in use, or language as action (Gee 2011;

Starks & Brown-Trinidad 2007). For this review, I will use the definition of discourse

as used by Potter and Wetherell (1987) which encases all forms of formal and informal

spoken interaction, and all forms of written texts. It assumes that language is used to do

things, rather than to only say things (Potter & Wetherell 1987). Language is then seen

as action. Discourse analysis holds that these actions produced are representative of

social practices (Silverman 2006), and that the ideologies of the author or speaker are

loaded within the text that they produce (Janks 1997; Price 1999). The text produced

depicts the author’s version of reality (Lawton 2009), making the identity or role that

the author or speaker aims to construct for themselves central to the analysis. These

versions of reality are constructed via the use of interpretive repertoires, defined as a

series of terms and metaphors that characterise and evaluate actions and events (Potter

& Wetherell 1987; Phillips & Jørgensen 2002). The producer of the text is presenting

their own version of reality, and even if it differs with that of others, it is still held as a

valid construction of reality; discourse analysis then assumes all constructions of reality

44

to be true (Silverman 2006). Therefore, a discourse analysis of texts produced by each

of the groups involved in the animal research debate would allow the comparison of

their accounts.

Discourse analysis assumes that language is used to construct the ideologies and

identity of the author or speaker, and is used to enact social practices. Decisions as to

whether animal experiments are ethically acceptable are expressed by an AEC using

verbal language; AEC members verbally deliberate on the ethical acceptability of each

protocol. Under the assumptions of discourse analysis, their language may be indicative

of their decision making and the ideologies they base this decision on, and can be

analysed.

As a result of being developed across a number of disciplines, including linguistics,

sociology and psychology, there is great variability between methods of discourse

analysis, to the point where different books on the subject can have no overlapping

content (Potter 2004). While it is difficult to claim how to do discourse analysis, it is

easier to describe how not to, as so to avoid ‘false analysis’. In fact, it has been reported

that many of the papers received by the journal ‘Discourse and Society’ do not use any

form of discursive or textual analysis, despite being called ‘discourse analysis’, hence,

false analyses are a problem (Antaki et al. 2002). A study by Antaki et al (2002) found

six main problems with what people called discourse analysis. The first three problems

were encountered where instead of providing an actual analysis, the papers just

provided either a summary of the data, a series of unexplained quotes, or only

acknowledged discursive speech patterns without analysing them within the context of

the discourse (Antaki et al. 2002). The other three issues described by Antaki et al.

(2002) were that authors distorted the data by showing their personal stance towards the

45

subject, extrapolated their results to entire demographics, or under-analysed using

‘circular discovery’, where evidence of a discourse, repertoire or ideology was

explained only in terms of that entity.

2.5.1.1. Potter and Wetherell’s Discourse Analysis

Potter and Wetherell’s version of discourse analysis is concerned with the way that

individuals construct versions of reality in order to do things (McKenzie 2005). Potter

and Wetherell (1987) take a socio-psychological approach to discourse analysis, and

have defined three main components to their analysis (Potter 2004; Potter et al. 1993;

Potter & Wetherell 1987). The first component is ‘function’ which assumes that

language is used to do things, therefore, language use will vary dependent on the

purpose of the communication (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Potter et al. 1990). The second

component is ‘construction’, where people use language to construct their own version

of the social world (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Potter et al. 1990). Different accounts are

constructed using pre-existing linguistic resources that are either chosen or omitted

depending on the version of reality the speaker or writer wants to present (Potter &

Wetherell 1987), which can vary based on the appropriate form of language for their

particular context. As the construction is dependent on the context of the

communication, it is also a result of the first component, function. The third component

is ‘variation’, which examines the differences between communications in regards to

their function and construction (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Potter et al. 1990). Function,

construction and variation are all interconnected and must be examined as so by

identifying the interpretive repertoires within the texts. Interpretive repertoires are

essentially the same as discourses, yet Potter and Wetherell prefer to use this term to

avoid the abstract term ‘discourse’ being seen as material (Potter et al. 1990).

Interpretive repertoires are used to invoke discursive practices which influence how text

46

is constructed, reveal grammatical features and can highlight a lack of variation (Potter

et al. 1990). Hence, the examination of interpretive repertoires is essential to Potter and

Wetherell’s method of discourse analysis.

Potter and Wetherell (1987) offer a broad theoretical framework with suggestions on

how to perform discourse analysis. They suggest that the research questions asked

should be about the construction of the text as related to its function, giving priority to

the discourse, as opposed to attitudes or cognitive processes presented within the texts

(Potter & Wetherell 1987). Once the questions are established, the collected data is

coded in order to break it down into manageable parts related to the research question,

which are then used for the analysis (Potter & Wetherell 1987). Potter and Wetherell,

like most proponents of discourse analysis, are unable to give a fixed method of

analysis. They state that people are trained just to understand the main messages of

texts, and need to abandon this thought to complete discourse analysis, instead asking

why the reader is reading this passage this way, and what are the features that have

produced this reading (Potter & Wetherell 1987). These questions must be asked

because of the assumptions of discourse analysis that communications are altered based

on the context they are produced in, and the fact that expressing the same thought using

two different grammatical structure may give the communication a different meaning

(Gee 2011).

Potter and Wetherell (1987) offer two phases of analysis. The first phase is the search

for patterns within the data, which are examined both in terms of variability and

consistency within the discursive patterns (Potter & Wetherell 1987). The second phase

of analysis involves function and consequence; hypotheses are formed about the

functions and effects of language use, and justified using linguistic evidence (Potter &

47

Wetherell 1987). In examining the function and consequences in terms of variability

and consistency, Potter and Wetherell’s method allows for the comparison of different

identities and how they construct their world views. It is then a suitable method for

analysing the language of scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people

discussing animal research. However, within qualitative methodology, validity is an

issue because it can be influenced by the subjective opinions of the researcher. Potter

and Wetherell (1987) address validity by ensuring their argument is cohesive, and

provide guidelines for ensuring the cohesiveness is met. A cohesive discourse analysis

is one in which it should be evident how the discourse fits together and how discursive

structures are used to produce effect and functions, participant orientation to what is

claimed, the creation of new problems, and fruitfulness in terms of how the researcher

explains and justifies new kinds of discourse (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Potter 2004).

2.5.1.2. Thematic Discourse Analysis

Thematic discourse analysis is based on Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) method of

discourse analysis, and aims to unravel the construction of the subject’s version of

reality (Taylor & Ussher 2001; Singer & Hunter 1999; Clarke 2005). The method

begins by identifying and grouping initial discursive themes into codes, looking for

patterns, consistency and variability and for the specific discourses as warranted by the

research question, interpreting the themes within the context of relevant literature

references (Taylor & Ussher 2001; Singer & Hunter 1999; Braun & Clarke 2006). The

text is categorised within one or more of the resulting codes, and the codes are then

examined for discursive patterns that show similarity or differences within and across

codes, allowing the discourses or underlying systems of meaning to become apparent

(Taylor & Ussher 2001; Braun & Clarke 2006). The aim of thematic discourse analysis

is to find repeated patterns of meaning, and then must occur across a data set rather than

48

within singular text (Braun & Clarke 2006), therefore, it requires a large corpus. Thus, it

is appropriate for use across texts produced by veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare

representatives and lay people, and across a series of protocols discussed by AEC

members.

2.6. Conclusion

The overall aim of this thesis is to examine how AEC members; veterinarians, scientists

using animals, animal welfare representatives and lay people, use four ethical theories,

utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism to make their decisions, and how

their ethical decision making is influenced by three groups of factors; those related to

the individual decision makers, those related to the moral intensity, and those related to

the social context the decision is made in. Therefore, I will need to address these factors

that influence decision making in my research as well as the use of ethical theories by

the AEC stakeholder roles, using participants that fit these four roles.

2.6.1. Text Discourse Analysis

It will first need to be established that ethical theories are naturally used in the discourse

of animal experimentation; that these stakeholder roles will freely argue their stance on

animal research as ethical using utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism.

To test whether these theories are used within the discourse of animal experimentation, I

will examine texts produced freely, outside of the context of my research, about animal

experimentation by veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal welfare

representatives and lay people. The texts will be analysed using discourse analysis

because the method assumes that language is a form of social practice, loaded with the

ideologies of the author (Janks 1997; Price 1999), and can be used to make apparent

how a certain reality is depicted and understood by the author (Lawton 2009). Under the

49

assumptions of discourse analysis, the texts produced freely by the stakeholder roles

will represent their world views and ideologies. If the constructed world views include

the use of ethical theories, then it can be assumed that ethical theories are in fact part of

the discourse of animal experimentation.

As discourse analysis assumes that a produced text depicts the author’s version of

reality (Lawton 2009), the identity or role that the author or speaker aims to construct

for themselves is central to the analysis. As the stakeholder roles have different

backgrounds and experiences, they will have different preferences that will be evident

in their construction of their world view. Scientists are directly involved in the process

of animal experimentation, so it is predicted that they will rely on their previous

experiments to construct their worldview of animal experimentation. Likewise, animal

welfare representatives are predicted to construct a worldview of animal

experimentation that will place greater importance on the welfare of the animals than on

the benefits of the research due to their profession. Veterinarians and lay people will be

harder to predict. Veterinarians are thought to represent the middle ground between the

scientists and animal welfare representatives because like scientists they must learn to

deal with animals as objects throughout their training and occupation (Birke et al.

2007), yet like animal welfare representatives it is suggested that they are drawn to the

field by their empathy towards animals (Bain et al. 2004). It can then be predicted that

the worldviews veterinarians construct will share similarities with scientists and animal

welfare representatives. Lay people are thought to base their acceptance of animal

research on context and sentimentality (Birke et al. 2007; Braithwaite & Braithwaite

1982; Driscoll 1992; Herzog et al. 2001), and may take a relativist approach to their

constructed worldviews on animal experimentation. As the four AEC stakeholder roles

50

have different backgrounds that will shape their preferences, it is hypothesised that they

will differ in their constructions of their worldviews about animal experimentation.

2.6.2. Multidimensional Ethics Scale Adaptation

The following chapter, Chapter 4, will expand on the ideas in the previous chapter that

ethical theories are used to construct the world views of veterinarians, scientists, animal

welfare representatives and lay people, and that their views of animal experimentation

vary based on their stakeholder role. As discourse analysis assumes that language is

action, it can be extrapolated that if ethical theories are used to construct the worldviews

of the four stakeholder roles, then they will also be used in their decision making.

Chapter 4 will examine the use of ethical theories in unregulated individual decision

making. The use of ethical theories will be tested by adapting Reidenbach and Robin’s

(1988) multidimensional ethics scale to an animal experimentation context in order to

isolate whether concepts from ethical theories are used in the evaluation of ethical

dilemmas. In addition to the influence of individual factors on decision making, this

chapter will also examine the influence of the context and circumstances of the moral

dilemma, labelled the moral intensity (Jones 1991). In an animal experimentation

context, previous research has found that aspects such as the species used, the human

interest, the scientific validity, animal suffering and availability of alternatives to

animals will all influence ethical acceptability (Hagelin et al. 2003; Ormandy &

Schuppli 2014; Stafleu et al. 1993). As these are all characteristics of the moral problem

in question, namely animal experimentation, these aspects will contribute to the moral

intensity of an experiment, and the moral intensity will differ where experiments differ

in these aspects. As the moral intensity influences decision making, it is hypothesised

that decision makers will be inconsistent across different scenarios. In this chapter, I

will be examining the acceptability of animal experimentation and which concepts from

51

ethical theories are used in decision making. I will be comparing these two measures for

differences between the four stakeholder roles to examine the role of individual factors

on decision making, and differences between scenarios to examine how moral intensity

influences decision making.

2.6.3. AEC Role Play Discourse Analysis

While it is valuable to examine the role of ethical theories in individual decision

making, AECs take their decisions as a committee. The AEC decision making process

must follow the guidelines as specified by The Code. Committee decision making and

guidelines both fall into the third group of factors that influence decision making; those

that relate to the social context of the decision. The final experimental chapter, Chapter

5, will examine the influence of the social context of the decision on how decisions on

animal experimentation are made.

As in the previous chapters, the influence of stakeholder role and the moral intensity on

decision making will also be examined. In addition, this chapter will also examine the

influence of the committee dynamic on the decision making process in a controlled

environment. Previous research has acknowledged the existence of group dynamics that

result in a bias towards scientific members (scientists and veterinarians), where non

scientific members (animal welfare representatives and lay people) were reported to feel

intimidated due to their lack of scientific knowledge (Rose & Grant 2013; Schuppli &

Fraser 2007). This bias may lead to decisions that are based on protocol modifications

about animal welfare and technical issues, rather than the ethical acceptability of the

protocol (Schuppli & Fraser 2007; Ideland 2009). It is then important to examine

committee bias.

52

Chapter 5 will apply my research to AECs, examining committee decision making by

using an AEC role play activity and discourse analysis to examine the use of ethical

theories in the decision making process. Role playing has been described as an ‘as-if’

experiment in which the subject is asked to behave as if they were a particular person in

a particular situation (Aronson & Carlsmith 1968). It has been used extensively to

describe the attitudes and behaviours of people in organisational contexts and their

processes of perception, judgement and cognition (Greenberg & Eskew 1993). The

validity of role playing varies with three characteristic dimensions; the level of active

involvement the participants encounter, whether they play a familiar or unfamiliar role,

and the degree to which the subjects are free to improvise their reaction, referring to

whether they are allowed to respond freely or in a highly restricted, specific manner

(Greenberg & Eskew 1993). These dimensions should be tailored to suit the purpose of

the role play. For example, highly involved role plays which put the participant in a

familiar role and allow them to freely respond without restriction should be used to look

at attitudes and behaviours, whilst the opposite should be used for role plays examining

psychological processes (Greenberg & Eskew 1993). As I will be examining ethical

attitudes and the behaviour of decision making as presented in language, the highly

involved role play method will be used, with individuals of each of the four AEC

stakeholder categories used to represent an AEC. Their discussions of protocols with

varying moral intensities will be recorded and subjected to a discourse analysis in order

to identify their use of ethical theories, and the influence of the committee setting on

their decision making.

53

Chapter 3: Ethical theories are embedded in the discourse of

animal experimentation

3.1 Introduction

The extent to which veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay

people use moral theories to argue the ethical acceptability of animal research is

unknown, but may become evident within the arguments they express in written texts.

Arguments are social practices; therefore, texts about the use of animals for scientific

research are evidence of a social practice, and can be analysed using discourse analysis.

This method assumes that language produces actions that are representative of social

practices (Silverman 2006), and that the ideologies of the author or speaker are loaded

within the text that they produce (Janks 1997; Price 1999). While discourse analysis

applies to and labels all communication as texts, this chapter will examine written texts

only. Written texts are constructed outside of the company of a receiver and do not rely

on a fixed context or interaction, unlike conversations. As a result the author must

provide information to establish the context of the communication, yet balance what

information is assumed with what needs to be said (Nystrand 1987). As the context that

written texts are produced in is established independent of my study, written texts will

provide diverse world views to analyse. If freely produced texts provide evidence of

reasoning using ethical theories in the author’s constructed ideology, then it can be

hypothesised that ethical theories are embedded in the discourse of animal

experimentation, and hence how people think about the topic (Hypothesis 1).

Decision making is influenced by individual factors, such as the decision maker’s past

experiences, established heuristics, and their preferences, values and beliefs (March

54

1994). These individual differences could influence the opinions of the decision makers

about animal experimentation. The code invites differences in opinions by requiring that

decisions are taken as a consensus by four different stakeholder roles. Then, the

comparison of the use of different theories by representatives of each stakeholder role to

construct their arguments would help to understand the interactions between individual

role and the use of ethics to argue their opinion. As discourse analysis concerns the

construction of the author’s version of reality (Lawton 2009), the author’s construction

of their texts would be influenced by their stakeholder role, allowing the method to be

used for comparing their arguments. It was hypothesised that veterinarians, scientists,

animal welfare representatives and lay people would differ in how they construct of

their ethical positioning on animal experimentation (Hypothesis 2). Four ethical theories

are often used in the discourse of animal experimentation to justify animal

experimentation: utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism (Palmer 2010;

Sandøe & Christiansen 2008). These four theories will then be examined within this

chapter.

3.2. Methods

3.2.1. Experimental Design

To test the first hypothesis, texts about animal experimentation were examined using

discourse analysis for arguments that were made using each of utilitarianism,

deontology, virtue ethics and relativism. The second hypothesis that veterinarians,

scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people would differ in how they

construct of their view on animal experimentation was tested by comparing and

contrasting the arguments raised in the discourse analysis for each of the four

stakeholder roles.

55

3.2.2. Articles

Texts were found using the keywords ‘animal experimentation’, ‘animal research’ and

‘animal testing’, and sourced from journal data-bases, news websites and the websites

of animal welfare groups, found using the search engine Google. Texts were sourced

with the intention of comparing texts from the various stakeholder roles. Texts from lay

people were found using Google News, choosing to pick journalists as lay people

because they were neither veterinarians, scientists, or animal welfare representatives and

to have some consistency within the articles. Animal welfare texts were sourced from

websites of established animal welfare groups. Texts by scientists were found using

Google Scholar, and texts by veterinarians were sourced using the same search engine

with the additional key word ‘veterinarian’, and later by searching the journal of the

Australian Veterinary Association. Five texts for each category were selected in the

order of being found to try and avoid a bias in the articles selected. The twenty texts

included scientific articles, news articles, feature articles and website fact sheets. The

texts were either from Australia, England, Europe or America between the years of

1983- 2009, and of varying lengths with the shortest article being approximately 600

words, and the longest approximately 6700 words (Table 3.1). The texts were labelled

VET 1-5 for the texts by veterinarians, SCI 1-5 for the texts by scientist, AW 1-5 for the

texts by animal welfare representatives and LAY 1-5 for the texts by lay people

(Appendix 2).

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Table 3.1. A summary table of the overall opinion, year published, continent of origin and word

length of the 20 texts subjected to discourse analysis

Overall Opinion

Year

Continent produced in

Length (words)

VET 1 Support 2004 Australia 1762 VET 2 Support 1998 Australia 6708 VET 3 Support 2000 Australia 2235 VET 4 Support 1983 Australia 3485 VET 5 Support 2001 Australia 3674 SCI 1 Support 2009 USA 3328 SCI 2 Support 2000 Europe 2869 SCI 3 Support 2005 Europe 4695 SCI 4 Support 2006 USA 3605 SCI 5 Support 2005 Australia 3595 AW 1 Support 2005 Europe (UK) 2567 AW 2 Permit some 2003 Australia 1156 AW 3 Against No Date Australia 2022 AW 4 Permit some 2010 USA 1239 AW 5 Permit some 2007 USA 2362 LAY 1 Support 2006 Europe 1682 LAY 2 Support 1988 USA 3150 LAY 3 Support 2004 Europe (UK) 636 LAY 4 Support 2005 Europe (UK) 1125 LAY 5 Support 2006 Europe 1245

3.2.3. Discourse Analysis

3.2.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Opinions of animal experimentation are

constructed using ethical theories

Coding was used to establish the use of ethical theories within the texts. The process of

coding involves categorising identified themes and roles, signified by language use, into

clusters that each represent a certain phenomenon (Starks & Brown-Trinidad 2007).

Codes included entire paragraphs instead of fragments because paragraphs function to

present a new idea within the text, and hence a new argument. Four codes based on the

four ethical theories were established using the following criteria:

Utilitarian: Paragraphs were coded as utilitarianism where arguments were

based on outcome, consequences, costs, benefits and attempts made to justify the use of

animals in research.

57

Deontology: Paragraphs were classed as deontological if the decision was based

on the act, or intention behind the act, regardless of the consequences. Deontological

notions of duty, rights, obligations and responsibilities were also included, as well as the

application of a set of principles.

Virtue Ethics: Paragraphs showing arguments based on character, whether their

own or that of others, was coded as virtue ethics. Ethics of care was also included,

classed as arguments made using statements based on care, compassion and empathy,

and relationships between people and animals.

Relativism: Paragraphs explicitly stating the personal opinion of the author were

coded as being instances of subjectivism. Cultural relativism was also included where

arguments were based on ‘public opinion’, cultural mores, and practices considered to

be accepted as ‘normal’

Paragraphs were coded as ‘utilitarianism’, ‘deontology’, ‘virtue ethics’ or ‘relativism’ if

they fit the above criteria, allowing paragraphs to be classed in multiple codes if

arguments using multiple theories were made within one paragraph. The four codes

were then subjected to a discourse analysis in the style of Potter and Wetherell (1987) in

order to identify common themes within the four codes, which were then examined for

patterns in function, construction and variability. The analysis then allowed the

discourses, or underlying systems of meaning, to become apparent (Braun & Clarke

2006; Taylor & Ussher 2001). These discourses were used to answer the research

question of how each of the theories are used to construct a worldview of animal

experimentation, which consisted of the qualitative analysis portion of the discourse

analysis. Validity was ensured following the method of Potter and Wetherell (1987),

particularly the stage of reader’s evaluation where the interpretations of the quotes were

evaluated by the supervisors of this research to see if they agreed with the interpretation

of the author.

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3.2.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Stakeholder differ in their use of ethical theories

As well as a quantitative comparison of stakeholder roles, a qualitative analysis was

also done. The four codes ‘utilitarianism’, ‘deontology’, ‘virtue ethics’ or ‘relativism’

were further broken down into codes based on the role of the author, resulting in sixteen

codes. For example, instances of virtue ethics by lay people were coded as ‘virtue ethics

LAY’ and utilitarianism by scientists as ‘utilitarianism SCI’, denoting the role of the

author after the theory. The codes were examined for patterns in function, construction

and variability (Potter & Wetherell 1987) between the sixteen codes, allowing the

discourses, or underlying systems of meaning, to become apparent (Braun & Clarke

2006; Taylor & Ussher 2001). The discourses were then used to answer the research

question of how each of the four stakeholder roles uses ethical theories to construct their

worldview of animal experimentation.

3.2.4. Statistical analysis

The quantitative part of the discourse analysis compared the use of utilitarianism,

deontology, virtue ethics or relativism by each of the four stakeholder roles. To account

for the articles being different lengths, the proportion of each article in each code was

used, rather than a count of paragraphs in each code for each article. As percentages and

proportions form a binomial distribution rather than a normal distribution (Zar 1999),

the proportions were transformed using a square root arcsine transformation to achieve

normal distribution. The frequency of each code was analysed using a two factor

ANOVA test with ethical theories and stakeholder roles as the main effects.

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3.3. Results

3.3.1. Use of ethical theories to construct opinions of animal experimentation

3.3.1.1. Utilitarianism

All the texts, with the exception of three, AW 4, LAY 3 and SCI 4, gave utilitarian

arguments that animal experiments were ethically acceptable when the costs to the

animals were reduced, and the predicted benefits of the research were high.

Utilitarianism accepted that the pain inherent in animal experimentation was

only justified if it produced scientific benefits that would alleviate suffering in

mankind. (VET 2)

However, the RSPCA’s policy accepts that, ‘until alternative techniques are

developed, the use of live animals in some experiments will occur. Such

experiments should only be permitted when their aims are to provide direct

benefits to humans or animals and when conducted in such a manner that pain,

suffering or distress is avoided’. (VET 3)

Animal experiments should only be performed when no alternative is available

and when the benefit of the experiment outweighs the suffering of the animal.

(SCI 3)

As this argument was raised in the majority of the texts, it appeared to be the default

pattern of thinking about animal experimentation. All of the three quotes presented

convey that the costs must be outweighed by the benefits, and use the term ‘only’ to

imply that animal experimentation is unethical unless the benefits are higher than the

costs, and that there is no alternative to cost benefit analysis.

Three themes of cost benefit analysis within the texts were identified: bias to the

benefits, bias to the costs, and alternatives to animal use. Bias towards benefits was

more common than towards cost, however, the focus related to the overall agenda of the

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text. Benefits were either presented in a list, or as specific examples. Examples linked to

helping humans or animals enabled the applications of the benefits to be understood

clearly, and indicated that the author supported animal research.

Inertial injury models in nonhuman primates have produced the full spectrum of

human head injury, from mild concussion to immediate death, and diverse

lesions such as contusions, haematomas and DAI. (VET 5)

The use of animal models has had a tremendous impact on medical progress... A

study of the American Medical Association has listed those disorders and

diseases which are now prevented or cured thanks to knowledge obtained

through animal experimentation. It was concluded that most biomedical

advances have depended one way or another upon animal experimentation.

(SCI 2)

Ageing populations prompt more neurological studies into Alzheimer’s and

Parkinson’s treatments, drug and vaccine developers say they require larger

primate samples to improve preclinical trials, and stem-cell studies will need

primates to bring the much-hyped research to the clinic. (LAY 1)

But millions of animals have been and will be used in experiments - they will be

cut open, pumped full of toxins and carcinogens, and ultimately ‘destroyed’ - in

order to further scientific knowledge and save human lives. For sentimental

reasons some may find this treatment of animals distasteful. But many major

medical advances - insulin to treat diabetes, polio vaccines, antibiotics, safe

anaesthetics, open heart surgery, organ transplantation, drug treatments for

ulcers, asthma, high blood pressure and more - would not have been won, or

would have been introduced at great human cost, were it not for animal

experimentation. There are few people alive today who have not benefited in

some way from these medical advances. (LAY 4)

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The authors chose to select medical examples of animal use, to express support for

animal experimentation by linking animal research with being able to solve these health

problems. The importance of animal research was emphasised within the texts; SCI 2

mentioned the ‘tremendous impact’ of animal models, LAY 1 outlined a ‘need’ for the

research and LAY 4 described the lives that have been saved. The descriptions gave

urgency and an appeal to emotion, indicating that animal research is a necessity. While

the previous texts emphasised the benefits, only LAY 4 directly stated a bias towards

benefits in the author’s opinion about animal experimentation.

Rather than defensively stating that concern with animal welfare is paramount,

the government and the research community should give an unequivocal

message of support for animal research. (LAY 4)

The author believed that the benefits should always outweigh the costs, regardless of the

suffering to the animals. However, this was the only instance where the author stated

their bias towards benefits. As well as human benefits, some texts listed the benefits to

animals.

Vaccines for polio and hepatitis B were developed through experiments on

animals. Medical procedures like measuring blood pressure, pacemakers, and

heart and lung machines were perfected on animals before being tried on

humans. Surgery techniques, like those to correct and prevent bone diseases,

were developed on animals. Heartworm medicine that developed from research

on animals has helped countless dogs. Cat nutrition has been better understood

through animal research, and has helped cats live longer, healthier lives. (AW

5)

Not only that, Pasteur had recently demonstrated by animal experimentation

that anthrax could be controlled by inoculation of dead bacilli, confirming that

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the benefits of vivisection were now available to all members of the animal

kingdom. (VET 2)

As a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, I worked with a group of

other scientists on a serious problem of dogs... As result of this work, the use of

agene in the milling industry was halted and the lives of countless numbers of

dogs were saved. It was not pleasant doing this kind of experimental work with

dogs, but I believe it was necessary, and it clearly had a life-saving outcome.

(SCI 1)

The authors used the fact that benefits not only applied to humans, but also to animals to

help justify their position that animal experimentation is ethically acceptable. These

statements may have been provided to counter the argument that animal research is not

translatable to humans, and hence a waste of animal life. AW 3 contrasted the other

articles by presenting the idea that the benefits of animal research are often exaggerated.

Many people think that all animal research is part of medical research - this is

not true... Although most basic scientific research using animals is probably not

directly aimed at understanding or treating human disease, nevertheless, most

researchers will justify the funding of this research on the grounds that it does

have that human relevance. (AW 3)

This text claimed that such benefits aren’t always produced, which is important as the

stated benefits are what gains public support for animal research. Furthermore, the text

claimed researchers may manipulate the stated benefits in order to gain such support.

The vast majority of animals used in research are subjected to some degree of

pain or stress during experimental procedures to which they may be subjected,

or as a result of the environment in which they are kept prior to or after those

procedures... Any benefits gained by the use of animals in teaching are

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outweighed by its tendency to convey the message that animals are merely tools

available to satisfy human research and curiosity. (AW 3)

The text acknowledged that benefits are primarily what is used to assess animal

research, and is often given more weight than the costs to the animals involved in

research, which the authors believed was a flawed assessment. By including these

statements the author presented their ideology that the cost benefit calculus is

exaggerated in terms of benefits.

Costs were presented in a different way to the benefits. Lists of costs were not given,

instead it was stated that animals suffer, making animal experimentation an ethical

dilemma.

This use of animals causes many people concern because of the potential to

cause pain and suffering to the animals involved. The use of animals in

experiments to develop safe medicines to treat humans and animals poses an

ethical dilemma. (AW 1)

We must weigh the benefits of the discoveries we hope to make from the

research with the costs of making animals suffer. We should be concerned about

how animals are treated in research, and we should all work to minimize—if not

eliminate—the number of animals who suffer. (AW 5)

Yet this use of animals in experimental physiology was not without its critics.

Even by the 18th century such literary figures as Addison and Johnson were

already critical of vivisection and its alleged benefits to science, which Joseph

Wright (1734-1797) was so graphically to depict in his painting, ‘An experiment

on a bird with the air-pump’. With visual clues Wright was able to focus on the

main elements of the emerging debate, that the excitement of scientific discovery

was only at the expense of the suffering and death of an animal. (VET 2)

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The fact that experimental animals are made to suffer causes an ethical dilemma, and

the texts acknowledged this position is held by some. Another reason, as raised by two

texts, was that the costs need to be reduced for the sake of experimental validity.

Discomfort and stress both before and during the experiment can lead to non-

specific effects such as endocrinological and immunological changes, thus

jeopardising results. (SCI 3)

If using animals for research, the scientist should use as few animals as

possible, use the best possible methods and pay special attention to minimizing

pain or discomfort in the animals... In addition, it is clear that animals that

endure pain or distress may provide erroneous data, particularly where subtle

changes in behaviour are studied. (SCI 5)

As well as making the experiment ethically acceptable, the costs need to be reduced

because of the impact on the experiment, counteracting the possible benefits. Texts

included the costs to animals to acknowledge that animal experimentation causes an

ethical dilemma and may compromise experimental validity, but not to argue against the

use of animals in research.

Cost benefit analysis was not only used for discussing animal experimentation, but also

for the replacements to animal use. However, only in the animal welfare representative

texts, LAY 5 and VET 4.

Scientists are now able to do experiments without animals that they couldn't do

before. Sometimes, a scientist can do an experiment on a tissue culture instead

of on an entire animal. For example, skin cells can be kept alive in a dish and

studied without hurting the animal beyond first taking the skin cells. Since many

tissue cultures can grow and reproduce, it can be a long time before more cells

need to be taken from a living animal. (AW 5)

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The use of animals for teaching purposes has been widely criticised overseas,

particularly in the United Kingdom (Paterson 1981) and the United States of

America (Fox and McGiffin 1981)... In this country, most of these experiments

involve killing the animals, then dissecting them in studies on anatomy. One can

argue that suitable plastic models are available and that it should not be

necessary to kill animals for this purpose. (VET 4)

Within these quotes alternatives are made to look good, in the first one by the benefits

to alternatives, much like the other texts did with the benefits to animal

experimentation. The second quote gives the purpose of the experiment, but places a

focus on the costs of animal lives, and that the educational benefit is not outweighed

here.

3.3.1.2. Deontology

Three themes of deontological arguments were seen within the texts; action based

arguments, rights and principlism. Action based deontological arguments, mimicking

the idea of a categorical imperative, were raised by AW 3 and 4.

Animals should not be subjected to any pain, fear or anxiety which can be

avoided...

No endangered species should be used for experimental purposes. Threatened

species should only be used under constraints which prevent risk of death or

serious injury as required in human experimentation. Capture and

transportation of wildlife for laboratory use must be subject to regulation and

inspection both nationally and internationally. (AW 4)

Animals should not be viewed as mere tools for research and education. (AW 3)

AW 4 reported that actions were either acceptable or unacceptable, using terms such as

‘should’ and ‘must’ to make the idea of duty central to their assessment. AW 3 argued

66

definitively against the use of animals in research, however, this text later contradicted

itself by stating that veterinarians need to practice surgery on animal models. The author

then could not conform to the deontological idea of the categorical imperative, a

statement that is always held.

Rights based arguments were raised throughout the texts, and were inconsistent in

whom the rights were awarded to. Rights were most commonly discussed in terms of

the animal rights movement, as was done by the articles VET 2, 4, SCI 1, and all the

LAY texts.

The slogan "equal rights" was central to the campaign for full voting rights for

women and racial minorities and was soon extended to a wide range of

economic and social issues. For some people, animals seemed the next logical

group in need of "liberation" from the "oppression" of others. (LAY 2)

The texts explained the concepts of animal rights, but discredited the movement. In the

example above, the author used inverted commas to present these concepts as ideas of

others rather than the author’s own, and pointed out that this belief is only held by a

minority within society. More texts discussed human rights than animal rights. Three

texts awarded rights to animal researchers, or acknowledged that researchers had rights.

Until such time as the majority of Australians are persuaded that animal

experimentation should not be carried out, and that is translated into legislative

form, experimenters have a right to use animals within the regulations and

guide-lines imposed on such use by government and the scientific community’.

(VET 3)

Hoffmann, who will retire in two years, has previously gone to court to protect

his right to do research. (LAY 1)

67

Frances Power Cobbe argued that the moral right to conduct experiments on

animals was not dependent on any supposed benefits such as ‘prolongation of

our life, bodily health or the relief of pain’. (VET 2)

These texts assumed humans have the right to do research, hence appealing to the

discourse that animal experimentation is a normal and socially accepted occurrence.

Other texts suggested that humans also have the right to challenge research and protest.

The eleven-member committee voted 5–4 against the licence, but the local chief

veterinary surgeon overruled the decision, and the licence was granted in

November. However, six members of the committee have now exercised their

right under Swiss law to challenge the licence. (LAY 1)

"There are already sufficient laws in place to deal with any kind of illegal

activity," she told New Scientist. "I don't think there's a justification for even

more legal restrictions for people's right to protest." (LAY 3)

The texts depicted humans not only having the right to research, but the right to oppose

research as well, indicating that rights attributed to people can conflict the rights of

others.

Animal rights were discussed by three texts, and none of these attributed specific rights

to animals. Only one text, VET 4, acknowledged that animals may have rights.

The AVA has made no serious attempt to look at the morality of the problem in

terms of animal welfare or animal rights, but then the animal welfare

organisations have also failed to recognise those concepts. (VET 4)

While suggesting that animals may have rights, the text did not state what rights animals

do have. AW 5 did not state that animals have rights, but refuted the right for humans to

use animals for experimentation.

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It is not our right to use animals in research. It is a borrowed privilege. Without

a choice, these animals are giving their lives to science. We must ensure that the

gift of their life is worthwhile. And if an animal was born specifically for

research, then we are doubly obliged to treat them well. (AW 5)

The text stated that animal use is a privilege rather than a right, awarding animals some

moral status without being full moral agents that have rights. SCI 1 presented a belief

that animals do not have rights, but were still worthy of moral consideration.

I do not believe that animals have rights. However, as an animal lover, I

strongly believe that people who have animal pets or who use them in their work

have legal and moral obligations to not unnecessarily hurt or abuse them. (SCI

1)

While denying animals rights, the author awarded animals some moral consideration by

stating they should not be unnecessarily harmed or abused. However, this statement was

framed by ‘being an animal lover’. As the author acknowledged that they were basing

this decision on emotional attachment to animals, their statement was also influenced by

virtue ethics.

Arguments based on principlism were commonly referred to throughout the texts.

Russell and Burch’s 3Rs were used as guiding principles, and were mentioned in VET

3, SCI 3 and 4, AW 1, 3, 5, and LAY 4 and 5, and indirectly in AW 4.

The guiding principles are replacement, reduction and refinement (the Three

Rs), first proposed by Russell and Burch in 1959 in their book The principles of

humane experimental technique. (SCI 3)

Research with laboratory animals is a privilege granted by society and, as such,

comes with the responsibility for conduct in a humane way. In many arenas, this

is formalized by reference to the three Rs of Reduction, Replacement and

Refinement. (SCI 4)

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A key component of the Code is that proposals for the animal use should

indicate full consideration of that are called the ‘ R's’. These are the principles

of Reduction, Replacement and Refinement which have been adopted in many

countries as the benchmark procedures aimed at minimising the use of animals

in research. (AW 3)

The 3Rs were described as guiding principles and formalisations that need to be

followed worldwide, allowing for standardised animal experimentation. However, as

the 3Rs are also used as part of the utilitarian cost benefit analysis and are based on

ensuring animal well being is prioritised, this also shows the use of multiple theories.

3.3.1.3. Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics was used throughout the texts to construct instances of virtuous and

vicious characters. Which roles were constructed in which way helped the author to

persuade the reader to adopt their point of view. Virtuous and vicious constructions

differed based on the purpose of the articles. The roles that were portrayed in a virtuous

manner were those who accepted and contributed towards animal experimentation.

Most people who oppose animal research are certainly not terrorists, and the

fringe animal rights zealots, who can be found among the many kind, intelligent

people in animal rights organizations, set back their cause by their extreme

actions and statements. Many of the less extreme members of animal rights

groups may actually condone experiments on animals, if they can be shown to

help people. (SCI 1)

"I am doing this research for the benefit of animals," says Dubey. "What really

disturbs me is that they say they took the cats to a veterinarian, but whatever the

veterinarian knows about this disease he has learned from my work." (LAY 2)

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One woman, who works for a contract research establishment, has been

targeted for five years. "It started with a phone call telling me to sell my shares

and progressed to actual death threats through the post. It got more and more

aggressive, culminating in explosions outside my house where my car and my

husband's car were firebombed," she said. (LAY 3)

Well trained staff who like animals and sympathize with their feelings are

essential. They must be observant and make their observations known to the

director of the laboratory or other person with authority to act in all cases. (AW

4)

SCI 1 drew a distinction between those who supported humane animal experimentation

and those that were outright against it. Those who supported animal research were

portrayed to be of moral character, kind and intelligent, while the ‘terrorists’ and

‘zealots’ were against animal research. A negative portrayal of people against animal

experimentation was also used in LAY 2 and 3, texts that presented narratives where

scientists had their work restricted by animal activists. In these examples scientists were

portrayed as victims, which positioned the reader to sympathise with the researchers by

conveying their frustration and fear through narrative and quotes to construct a

victim/oppressor dynamic, with sympathy encouraged towards the scientists positioned

as victims in these scenarios, while activists were portrayed to be of vicious character.

The researchers were positioned sympathetically by showing their unhappiness and fear

first hand through quotes and narrative, while completing the virtuous task of helping

humans and animals. In LAY 2, the scientist outlined the purpose of his research; to

benefit cats. The scientists were seen to be passionate about their work which is saving

the lives of humans and animals. As a result, they were portrayed as virtuous. Scientists

were working towards making a better life for humans and animals, and therefore were

acting in a way that was ethical. AW 4 differed in that the text called for animal staff to

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be sympathetic and like animals, showing virtuous traits towards animals, sharing

qualities with the scientist in LAY 2.

The vicious constructions were of people opposed to the use of animals for scientific

experimentation. Animal rights activists were portrayed as violent, ignorant and

deranged.

The most terrifying part of her article is the following: “In 2005, Jerry Vlasak, a

Southern California trauma surgeon and leader of the North American Animal

Liberation Front, which is an animal rights organization, told a U.S. Senate

committee that he could justify killing researchers”... It is a problem for

research institutions all over the United States and in the rest of the world. (SCI

1)

Since February 2003, extremists decided to target Japanese companies

contracting work to Huntingdon Life Sciences. One man described how his

company had received animal body parts and bomb hoaxes. One of their

directors was physically attacked on his way to work and was left "very shocked

and very depressed". (LAY 3)

SCI 1 made animal rights activists a threat to the reader, assumed to be scientists, by

describing it as a global problem. The articles provided narratives depicting violence by

animal activists, including breaking into laboratories and stealing animals, and

threatening, beating and even firebombing the cars of people associated with animal

research. Other tactics used included making the animal activists look ignorant, and

therefore wrong in their stance.

A radical minority failed to be persuaded that vivisection had any merit

whatsoever and broke away to form their own antivivisection organisations...

Avowedly sentimentalist and animal loving, it eschewed the Whiggish preference

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for the rationality of science, and failed to be convinced that animal

experimentation yielded any results that would benefit mankind or even the

animals themselves. (VET 2)

What sane person, for example, could possibly support the recent statement of

PETA that they would not support an experiment that would sacrifice 10

animals to save the lives of 10,000 people? ...

If, as animal rights groups say, the medical problems of humans ought to be

studied on people, then it seems that the problems of animals ought to be

researched on animals. However, in reading the literature produced by animal

rights organizations, I have been impressed by the complete lack of discussion

on how to do research on the biomedical needs of animals. (SCI 1)

One example of a false or misleading statement came on the heels of a break-in

at the University of California, Riverside. Researcher Mark Chappell lost much

of his data on the evolution of hemoglobin in deer mice when 300 mice were

taken by an ALF group in April 1985. After the raid, ALF members made

statements that Chappell's research was useless to humans because oxygen is

transported totally differently in the blood of deer mice than it is in the blood of

humans, a statement obviously false to anyone with even a limited biology

education. (LAY 2)

Apart from a few eccentrics, we all value human life over and above animal life.

(LAY 4)

The logic of animal rights activists was challenged, and their sanity questioned in order

to discredit their arguments. By presenting the character of the activists as violent and

ignorant, the readers were positioned to vilify them and disregard their beliefs, resulting

in the reader supporting the researchers and the use of animals for scientific purposes.

Therefore, within the characterisation of scientists as virtuous and animal activists as

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vicious in their narratives, virtue ethics was used by lay people to support animal

research.

Two of the articles constructed vicious characters who did not support humane

measures in animal experimentation.

The cross examination of two other physiologists, JS Burdon Sanderson and his

assistant Professor Emanuel Klein, had a critical influence on the findings of the

Royal Commission... Klein’s evidence cast further doubt on the routine use of

anaesthetics by admitting that they were only used for convenience to restrain

animals to avoid biting and scratching, rather than to minimise pain. Klein

confessed under cross-examination that ‘he had no regard at all … for the

suffering of animals’. (VET 2)

The PETA investigation alleged that there was an institutional lack of regard for

the welfare of animals within the facility and described specific instances of

alleged cruelty to animals in the reports prepared by their undercover employee.

(AW 2)

Disregarding animal suffering was depicted as a vice, correspondingly, such vices were

cast as traits outside of the humane animal experimentation discourse. In addition AW

3, as previously quoted, portrayed researchers as manipulating the benefits of animal

research to persuade others to support their cause, thus showing them as dishonest, and

their character assessment helped persuade the reader to lose support for animal

experimentation.

Two themes of ethics of care were identified in the texts; human animal relationships,

and animal welfare measures. The relationships established within the texts tended to

depict companion or nursing relationships.

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With increasing prosperity it was now possible for animals to play a more

intimate role in human society and even be introduced to the family home not

just for their utility as guard dogs and working animals, but as companions...

Within the anti-vivisection movement many supporters admitted they were

motivated by an emotional attachment to their pets. It was unthinkable that

dogs, the same species as their beloved pets, could be subject to the suffering

and pain of vivisection procedures. (VET 2)

RSPCA Australia has an ongoing relationship with Hill’s Pet Nutrition, the

manufacturers of Hill’s Science Diet. Hill’s provide food free-of-charge to all

the animals housed in RSPCA shelters for adoption, and the company also

sponsors the annual RSPCA Million Paws Walk...

At Hill's, we've built a reputation as a company with the highest ethical

standards. Our mission is to help enrich and lengthen the special relationships

between people and their pets. We believe that good science and compassionate

animal care are inseparable. We neither tolerate nor condone the inhumane

treatment of dogs and cats for any reason. Therefore, all animal studies

supported by Hill's must comply with our policies to ensure exceptional and

humane animal care. (AW 2)

The key component of the enrichment programme is the animal-care staff, whose

members must be motivated and educated. (SCI 3)

Nursing care must be provided to all animals following surgery or other

injurious interventions. Competent staff should be available at all times, day and

night, weekends and holidays to care for experimental animals. They must make

rounds for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the animals' health and well-

being. (AW 4)

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VET 2 provided examples of established relationships between humans and animals,

and presented them in a positive way, highlighting that having empathy for animals was

a valued virtue. AW 2 highlighted two relationships; the first, a partnership between

food company Hills and welfare group the RSPCA, and the second made use of a

mission statement from Hills to describe the ‘special relationship’ between people and

their pets. The Hill’s statement used emotional language that highlighted the bond

between humans and animals. By associating themselves with Hills, the RSPCA aligned

themselves with this ideology, thereby supporting the virtuous image created for both

organisations. SCI 3 and AW 4 suggested that the nursing staff adopt a carer

relationship with animals, placing high importance on animal welfare.

Ethics of care was used frequently throughout the articles to reduce the costs to the

animals, thus being used in conjunction with utilitarian reasoning. The need to address

ethics of care was shown in a quote in AW 5.

Should these animals be kept in cages their entire lives? On the one hand, strict

laws insure that the cages are warm, clean, and big enough. On the other hand,

they are still kept in cages. A cage can never be as interesting, stimulating, or

open as a natural habitat. This can be a problem- especially for the more

intelligent animals like dogs, cats, pigs, and primates. They can become

tremendously lonely and bored unless they have things to play with or ways to

get more exercise. (AW 5)

AW 5 portrayed the animal condition as negative unless their enrichment requirements

were met. Therefore, the care of the animal and its mental wellbeing were a condition of

animals being used for scientific research. Reasoning using ethics of care was seen in all

the texts by veterinarians, scientists, and animal welfare representatives.

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Animal behaviourists hold the view that no animal should be placed in a

position in which it is unable to fulfill all its natural behavioural needs. (VET 4)

If the Huntington’s disease mice are provided with a complex cage environment

that provides opportunities to hide, nest, gnaw and forage, the disease

progresses much more slowly than in mice kept in barren cages, and in fact the

mice mimic the progress of the human disease more closely. Thus, by providing

a better environment for the mice, researchers have a more realistic ‘model’ of

Huntington’s disease that they can use to try to understand how to treat the

disease. Of course the mice are happier too. (AW 1)

Careful handling from a young age, together with conditioning to experimental

and husbandry procedures, will probably reduce these stress responses

considerably, and for this reason cages should be provided with shelter or

hiding places. (SCI 3)

These examples focused on animal handling and environmental enrichment as areas

where animal care can be addressed. The reason for addressing animal care was to

reduce the stress of the animals, thus making the costs lower and more likely to be

outweighed by the benefits of the experiment. The texts then used ethics of care to

strengthen their utilitarian arguments, showing a combination of multiple ethical

theories to construct their opinions.

3.3.1.4. Relativism

The texts used both subjectivism and cultural relativism in their arguments. There were

three common themes in the subjective arguments; support for animal experimentation,

opposition towards animal experimentation, and heavy persuasion. Support for animal

experimentation was either constructed using personal opinions about the benefits of

animal experimentation, or framed as disagreeing animal activists. Three texts provided

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clear positive examples of the benefits of animal experimentation. SCI 1 and SCI 5

talked about their personal research, but the difference between the two texts was that

SCI 5 only provided factual outcomes while SCI 1 gave personal opinions and feeling

associated with his research which helped shape his world view on animal research.

Emotional language was also evident in the personal opinion depicted by SCI 2 on the

drug Thalidomide.

Later in this essay, I will offer some of my own views on the benefits that have

been derived from using animals as experimental models in biomedical research

from the long-term perspective of nutrition science research... It is hard to

express the pleasure I felt with this accomplishment based on animal

experiments...

I am amazed that, until recently, many people did not believe that animals

experience pain and many academics do not believe that animals have feelings.

(SCI 1)

The thalidomide tragedy... Notably, this disaster has been used for many years

by activists to prove the irrelevance of medical animal experimentation as they

believe it showed that even extensive animal testing failed to demonstrate the

potential teratogenic nature of the drug. Actually, as Rowan correctly stresses,

“thalidomide was not adequately tested, and after the tragedy, drug registration

authorities around the world immediately increased their animal-testing

requirements. (SCI 2)

The author of SCI 1 related their support for animal experimentation to personal

feelings, thus their support was constructed using relativism as well as utilitarianism in

terms of the benefits. Within giving personal opinions, the author of SCI 1 used highly

emotional language in order to help persuade the reader to agree with their position. The

author of SCI 2 also used emotional language to gain the reader’s support. The author

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emphasised the situation by using emotionally loaded words such as tragedy and

disaster to describe the outcome of the research, yet came to the conclusion that the

problem was due to insufficient testing. Other texts framed the author’s opinions as

challenging opposition to animal experimentation.

Whatever flaws the philosophy may have, a growing number of people have

found the ideals of the animal rights movement appealing...

"I have never seen an experiment where there weren't alternatives to using

animals," says Newkirk. Among those alternatives she lists prevention of disease

rather than searching for a cure. (LAY 2)

So what did the working party come up with? In Wolff’s own words, ‘the hybrid

view’, which, as he added, is the ‘current policy’. When I asked the panel

whether this was not a bit of a fudge...

But are the ethical issues really that complex? I don’t think so. The question is

whether one adopts a human-centred morality or not. The reality is that most of

us - including all the members of the working party - do adopt the philosophical

outlook of ‘categorical human superiority’ in practice. Apart from a few

eccentrics, we all value human life over and above animal life. But fewer and

fewer people are prepared to put the case for a human-centred morality in

public. (LAY 4)

1 have not attempted to argue against the radical proposition that society no

longer needs to conduct experiments on animals. There are many in the

community who hold this view. They follow the beliefs and arguments of

philosophers such as Singer (1977) and Regan (1982). However, they rarely

argue their positions as rationally and logically as do their philosophical

leaders; more frequently they revert to emotional and political presentations...

(VET 4)

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The authors in these examples clearly integrate their personal opinions to juxtapose

those of individuals who oppose the use of animals for scientific purposes by pointing

out the flaws in their logic, as did LAY 2 and VET 4. LAY 4 offered a strong opinion of

support for animal research, and referred to the hybrid view as ‘a bit of fudge’. The

author instead believed; that animal research should occur because people value human

life more than that of animals, and that regulations were designed to appease the

activists and that science should be embraced.

Four of the authors presented their subjective opinions against animal experimentation

within their texts. These opinions were constructed using either clear emotional

language, or as subtle arguments.

The tests involved are particularly repugnant, as they usually involve poisoning

the animals concerned - death is often the endpoint measured. A particularly

extreme example is the Draize rabbit eye test, where the subject substance is put

into the eyes of rabbits, often producing horrendous damage and pain. (AW 3)

By describing the draize test as repugnant, extreme and horrendous, the author shared

their emotive position and aimed to persuade the reader to feel the same. In contrast, the

following subtle arguments were also made against certain uses of animals:

Unfortunately, there are still many experiments that cannot be done on "animal

substitutes" like tissue cultures or on computers. (AW 5)

However, the use of animals is an important aspect in some areas of research

and, in an ideal world, alternatives would be available. (AW 1)

In an ideal world, people would not perform experiments on animals. For the

people, they are expensive. For the animals, they are stressful and often painful.

(LAY 5)

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The first two texts, AW 5 and AW 1 acknowledge the need for animal experimentation,

but provide a subjective opinion against its use by framing their arguments with terms

such as ‘unfortunately’ and ‘in an ideal world’, the term also used by LAY 5. The

authors acknowledge that animal research is undesirable, appealing to the discourse that

animal experimentation is a necessary evil.

The other way in which subjectivism was used amongst the texts was to persuade the

reader to act in a way similar to the opinion suggested by the author.

Serving on an AEC is demanding, both in terms of the responsibility it conveys

and the time required to read the experimental protocols and attend meetings.

Membership is usually unpaid. It has always been difficult to find enough

veterinarians. If you are interested, it is best to contact the institution concerned

and ask to speak to the Chair of the AEC...

Active participation in this area for veterinarians is interesting, satisfying and

worthwhile. (VET 3)

There is no simple solution to avoiding animal testing. There are things that you

can do to help reduce the amount of testing carried out, such as avoiding buying

'new improved' formulations and checking labels to see if a company makes

claims about animal testing and asking what these claims mean. (AW 2)

Did you know that the changes in laboratory animal welfare have primarily

come from the concerned voices of caring people who are not themselves

scientists? People like you. These people have learned about the issues. They

have used their knowledge to make convincing arguments to their legislators

and to other people. They have been persistent. They have been effective! ...

One way ordinary people have brought extraordinary change is by being careful

about what they buy. For example, cosmetic companies have been forced to

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radically change how many animals they do research on, and what kind of

research they do. Why? Because people did not want to buy products from

companies that did needless experiments on animals. (AW 5)

VET 3 presented their personal opinion of sitting on an AEC as difficult, but

worthwhile, in order to persuade vets to join an AEC. AW 2 and AW 5 presented their

personal opinions against the use of animals for product testing by using persuasive

language to encourage the reader to share their opinion and enact a behavioural change

against buying products tested on animals.

Arguments using cultural relativism were constructed using reference to public opinion

about animal experimentation. There were two themes of public opinion on animal

experimentation identified within the texts: either as support, or as an area of concern.

Public support of animal experimentation was made clear in the following quotes.

"When it comes down to it, the public wants product safety testing and medical

breakthroughs," says Trull. "I don't think they are willing to trade off animal

research for Alzheimer's disease and AIDS." (LAY 2)

To the general public, animal experimentation had been responsible for the

introduction of a new era of scientific medicine and aseptic surgery. (VET 2)

Both LAY 2 and VET 2 chose to include instances where the author or person being

interviewed spoke for the public, and framed the benefits of animal experimentation as

the public’s priority. Other texts framed the public view of animal experimentation as

an area of concern, even if the texts ultimately showed support for it.

The majority of the public relied on the integrity of the scientific community in

refuting the emotional arguments of the antivivisectionists and felt comfortable

that legislation ensured that experimental animals were not subject to

unnecessary pain. (VET 2)

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The use of animals for research, teaching or testing is controversial in Western

society. It is frequently the subject of media articles and of public

demonstrations and arouses strong feelings in many people. (VET 3)

The Australian community is becoming increasingly aware of matters relating to

animal welfare...

Western cultures have come to assume that feelings for and treatment of animals

is a reflection of feelings for fellow human members of the culture. (VET 4)

In a humane society there is clearly a moral obligation to ensure that any harm

caused is kept to an absolute minimum. Indeed, opinion polls have shown that

the public only accepts research using animals where this is the case. (AW 1)

In 1966, Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) in response to growing

public concern for the issues of pet theft. (SCI 4)

Instead of emphasising the benefits to society, these texts instead emphasised the

public’s concern for animals, and the need for research to be humane. While the texts

provided instances in cultural relativism by providing generalised public opinions, the

emphasis on relationships between humans and animals is evidence of using the

reasoning of ethics of care, and the emphasis on benefits can frame the arguments of

LAY 2 and VET 2 to be influenced by utilitarian reasoning.

3.3.2. Effect of stakeholder role on the construction of opinions of animal

experimentation

3.3.2.1. Veterinarians

The version of reality about animal experimentation that veterinarians constructed was

one where it was only ethically acceptable if it were considered to be humane.

Veterinarians shared the ideology that animal experimentation is assessed using cost

benefit, and that benefits are given greater weight.

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In the vivisection debate the utilitarians were able to reconcile the infliction of

pain on animals as acceptable only if it was compensated by results that

benefited mankind. (VET 2)

Animal models have been invaluable in elucidating the pathogenesis of many

human afflictions, no more so than in the field of neurotrauma research. (VET

5)

As the costs needed to be negated by the benefits, veterinarians referred to a discourse

of humane animal experimentation. Veterinarians also shared the ideology that

regulations should be privileged, in particular The Code (VET 3, 4 and 5). AECs were

privileged in VET 3 and 5, and the 3Rs were privileged in VET 3 and 4.

ANZCCART strongly supports the implementation by scientists and teachers of

the ‘Three Rs’ principles... It is important that Australian veterinarians

understand the issues associated with animal experimentation, including the

principles of ‘Replacement, Reduction and Refinement’. (VET 3)

Animal models of TBI are used according to a defined code of practice (such as

the Australian Code of Practice For the Care and Use of Animals For Scientific

Purposes, 1997) and approved by the Animal Ethics Committee of the institution

conducting the research... they protect the welfare of animals by ensuring that

their use is justified, the numbers used are minimised, and pain and distress are

avoided. (VET 5)

The articles emphasised the importance of AECs and the 3Rs to enforce the idea that

animal research is heavily regulated. VET 5 differed from the other texts in that it

privileging primate models by negatively viewing the use of different species instead,

due to primate use no longer being acceptable in society. Veterinarians referred to the

ideologies of others, acknowledging groups against the use of animals in research (VET

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2, 3 and 4) and of philosophers (VET 4). They hence showed knowledge of discourses

against the use of animals in experiments, even if they did not support them.

3.3.2.2. Scientists

Scientists constructed a similar version of reality about animal experimentation as the

veterinarians; that it was ethically acceptable if the benefits outweighed the costs to the

animals involved. All texts excluding SCI 4 focused on the benefits of animal

experimentation, stating the importance and its need to be done. SCI 5 differed in that

reminded the reader that animals are not perfect models, pointing out how they often

mimic symptoms rather than full diseases.

Rats and mice are obviously very different from humans and the simpler brain

cortical structure of rodents would make it impossible to display the same kind

of complex symptoms as humans. This paper will emphasize, however, that

animal research is very important for our understanding of human psychiatric

illness. (SCI 5)

While acknowledging the flaws, the article still justified the use of animals positively.

With the exception of SCI 2, the articles privileged the need to be humane in animal

experimentation, discussing regulations in order to protect the animals used. The other

texts mentioned animal care requirements (SCI 1), the 3Rs (SCI 3 and 5), guidelines

and committees (AECs and IACUCs, SCI 4 and 5). SCI 3 and 4 privileged welfare due

to the use of animals in science being a privilege (SCI 4) and the link between welfare

and science (SCI 3). In particular, the 3Rs, committees (SCI 3 and 4) and environmental

enrichment (SCI 3) were privileged.

The guiding principles are replacement, reduction and refinement (the Three

Rs), first proposed by Russell and Burch in 1959. When animals are used, the

people involved have an obligation to safeguard their welfare and minimise

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discomfort; this will also generally be beneficial for both the animal and the

experimental outcome. (SCI 3)

Two texts acknowledged that animal experimentation causes a moral dilemma (SCI 1

and SCI 5), yet presented arguments to justify their stance that animal experimentation

was ethically acceptable.

3.3.2.3. Animal Welfare Representatives

The version of reality about animal experimentation that animal welfare representatives

constructed placed a greater focus on animal welfare requirements that had to be met for

it to be ethical. The authors relied on animal welfare ideologies, sharing values and

beliefs associated such as cost benefit analysis, the 3Rs, animal ethics committees

(AECs) and animal welfare acts. The texts all focused on these points, which were

privileged by being presented in a positive manner. AW 2, 4 and 5 all privileged

committees (AECs and IACUCs), regulations and guidelines to protect research

animals. The 3Rs were privileged in AW 1, 3 and 5 and humane experimentation and

animal enrichment in AW 1, 3 and 4.

The 3Rs are also important from an ethical standpoint, as research using

animals has the potential to cause pain, suffering or distress. This can arise

from the experiments themselves or from the way that animals are housed. In a

humane society there is clearly a moral obligation to ensure that any harm

caused is kept to an absolute minimum. Indeed, opinion polls have shown that

the public only accepts research using animals where this is the case. (AW 1)

Transportation and handling of these and all other animals must be humane,

providing the same high standards of sanitation, ventilation and temperature

control as for animal quarters. Transportation should be conducted by the most

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rapid means feasible. The size of the cage must permit normal postural

adjustments for any animal. (AW 4)

At the same time, AW 2 and 5 also privileged the idea of stopping the use of animals in

product testing they deemed unnecessary. AW 3 shared this position, taking a stronger

stance against experiments, and included agricultural research and the use of animals in

teaching as unnecessary animal use.

There is no simple solution to avoiding animal testing. There are things that you

can do to help reduce the amount of testing carried out, such as avoiding buying

'new improved' formulations and checking labels to see if a company makes

claims about animal testing and asking what these claims mean. (AW 2)

One way ordinary people have brought extraordinary change is by being careful

about what they buy. For example, cosmetic companies have been forced to

radically change how many animals they do research on, and what kind of

research they do. Why? Because people did not want to buy products from

companies that did needless experiments on animals. (AW 5)

The main problem with animal research which claims to relate to the causes of

human disease or development of human disease therapies, is that animals are

not humans. Results with ‘animal models’ of human diseases can therefore be

very misleading. (AW 3)

AW 2 and 5 went further in that they gave the reader information on avoiding animal

experimentation, while AW 3 took a more negative tone and de-privileged the overall

use of animals for human benefits. While AW 3 was against most kinds of animal use,

AW 2 and AW 5 still accepted the use of animals for scientific research, just not

product testing.

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3.3.2.4. Lay People

Lay people constructed a version of reality about animal experimentation where it was

an acceptable practice that was being compromised by regulations and animal activists,

with the exception of LAY 5. Ideologies supporting animal experimentation were

evident. The texts that supported the practice focused on the idea that the use of animals

in scientific research resulted in benefits to society, and that humans will always be

privileged over animals (LAY 2 and 4).

Animal research helps in the battle against disease and disability, and thereby

improves human welfare, but is also necessary for the general pursuit of

knowledge - what is referred to as blue-sky research - whether or not that

research will have any immediate benefits. (LAY 4)

They held the idea that animal experimentation was a societal norm. This ideology was

built by either explicitly described by the authors in the case of LAY 1, 2 and 4, or by

using quotes from pro-animal research groups or animal researchers to privilege animal

experimentation.

"When it comes down to it, the public wants product safety testing and medical

breakthroughs," says Trull. "I don't think they are willing to trade off animal

research for Alzheimer's disease and AIDS." Mishkin agrees: "There is certainly

a cost to animal research, but the question that must be asked is 'What's the cost

to another concern-humans?' The answer is that we will always value humans

more than animals." (LAY 2)

All five texts provided direct quotes supporting animal experimentation with the

exception of LAY 5, who merely paraphrased scientists and took a weaker stance on the

issue. The articles by LAY 2 and LAY 4 were the most opinionated, stating support for

animal experimentation and de-privileging the welfare stance in favour of scientific

discovery (LAY 4).

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Rather than defensively stating that concern with animal welfare is paramount,

the government and the research community should give an unequivocal

message of support for animal research. (LAY 4)

Quotes showing an alternative view against animal experimentation were used in two

texts, yet not further elaborated on (LAY 3) or were then discredited later in the article

(LAY 1). LAY 5 was the only text that privileged alternatives to animal

experimentation, yet was the only text not to present a background of the philosophies

behind the animal rights movement. The other texts focused on the fear of the

antivivisectionists held by researchers and the influence it has had on the regulations of

animal experimentation, de-privileging them.

One woman, who works for a contract research establishment, has been

targeted for five years. "It started with a phone call telling me to sell my shares

and progressed to actual death threats through the post. It got more and more

aggressive, culminating in explosions outside my house where my car and my

husband's car were firebombed," she said. The cars were written off, but the

blast also caused £5000 damage to the front of her house, shattering the

bedroom window where the couple were sleeping. "It really is frightening and

life changing," she says. (LAY 3)

LAY 1, 2 and 3 presented the activists as manipulative and violent and talked about

laws protecting against activists, while presenting the researchers as victims by using

emotional language to privilege them.

3.3.3. Effect of stakeholder role on the use of ethical theories

There was no interaction effect between stakeholder role and theories used. The use of

utilitarian arguments was significantly higher than the use of virtue ethics, deontology

and relativism (p = 0.0005). Each stakeholder role used language indicative of

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utilitarianism, deontological, virtue ethics and relativist reasoning in their articles. For

each of the four theories, their use by veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare

representatives and lay people did not differ (Figure 3.1).

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3.4. Discussion

Using discourse analysis, instances of reasoning using ethical theories were identified

within freely produced texts, supporting the hypothesis that ethical theories are

integrated in the discourse of animal experimentation. The texts were predominantly

comprised of utilitarian reasoning, but also included reasoning using deontology, virtue

ethics and relativism. Because these theories are all applied in constructing opinions

about animal experimentation, a mixture of theories were used to construct the

worldview of the author. The second hypothesis that veterinarians, scientists, animal

welfare representatives and lay people would differ in how they construct their view on

animal experimentation was supported. The four roles did not differ in their use of each

of the four ethical theories, but differed in the ways they constructed their texts and

which themes they presented in their reasoning.

Ethical theories were used in freely produced articles about animal experimentation.

When faced with a moral dilemma, an individual will begin to theorise morally, using

reasoning to justify the way in which they will deal with the dilemma (LaFollette 2007).

The authors of the texts had different reasons to construct their written texts, but as each

of the texts involved certain aspects of animal experimentation, the authors were

prompted to consider a moral dilemma. The consideration of a moral dilemma then

prompted the author to provide reasoning to justify their ideologies about animal

experimentation. As utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism were used to

present the ideologies constructed by the authors of their own free will, it can be

assumed that they are integrated within the discourse of animal experimentation.

Utilitarianism was the dominant theory used, with most texts using cost benefit analysis.

The authors of the texts differed in whether they privileged the costs or the benefits,

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based on the purpose of the article. Arguments privileging the benefits were more

common, listing mostly health benefits for both humans and animals in order to show

support for animal experimentation. These arguments were similar to those found in a

study by Swan and McCarthy (2003) of arguments used to debate animal rights on the

internet. People who argued against animal rights constructed the use of animals as

something that is both beneficial and necessary for human welfare (Swan & McCarthy

2003). Most of the texts I examined used this argumentative strategy to argue for animal

experimentation, providing lists of examples of medical processes that were developed

with the use of animals. The texts provided evidence of the benefits of animal

experimentation to back up the claims that the authors made that animal

experimentation is necessary, and therefore ethically acceptable. Interestingly, examples

included animal health benefits, as though to negate arguments that animals do not

benefit from animal experimentation, and the arguments also seen in Swan and

McCarthy (2003) that animal experimentation is detrimental to human health because

humans and animals are different. If animals also benefit, then it can be argued that

there is still some value in animal experimentation. By focusing on the human and

animal benefits, the texts were constructed to present a world view that animal

experimentation is beneficial for human and animal health, and persuade the reader to

support animal experimentation.

Only one text, AW3, focused on the costs to the animals. In addition, this text was the

only one that constructed animal experimentation as unethical. The text gave in depth

descriptions of particular procedures and described them using negative emotional

language. The arguments presented in AW 3 were similar to the pro-animal rights

arguments identified in the study by Swan and McCarthy (2003). The people who

supported animal rights presented their arguments within a discourse of animal

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suffering when discussing animal use, reconstructing this use as pain and suffering for

the animals with the aim to illicit sympathy and guilt in the reader (Swan & McCarthy

2003). While the texts privileging the benefits constructed animal experimentation as a

thing of hope and progress, those privileging the costs instead construct it as cruelty.

The focus on either costs or benefits then served a purpose to shape the opinion of the

reader to either support or oppose animal experimentation, based on the opinion that the

author constructs.

Even though it was common to emphasise the benefits, the majority of the texts

acknowledged that the costs needed to be outweighed by the benefits, and the need for

the costs to be reduced. The texts then acknowledged a discourse of humane animal

experimentation. Humane animal experimentation is required within the animal

experimentation guidelines of most developed countries (Canadian Council on Animal

Care 1997; Committee for the Update of the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory

Animals; National Research Council 2011; European Union 2010; Knight 2011;

National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). It then might be that the authors

of the texts I have examined acknowledge this discourse because of the guidelines they

are privy to. The texts that were less focused on this discourse were by lay people, who

in the context of this study were not required to know the guidelines of animal

experimentation, unlike lay members of actual AECs. Veterinarians, scientists and

animal welfare representatives, however, are more involved with animal

experimentation and should be aware of the role these guidelines have on their careers.

Another reason why the humane animal experimentation discourse was not relied upon

by the lay people was that their texts were mostly written as narratives about victimised

scientists and explaining the need for animal experimentation to overcome the

opposition that it faces. As these texts were arguing a different agenda, it did not rely on

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the discourse as heavily, while texts about the use of animals in research needed to

emphasise that animal experimentation is humane.

While utilitarianism was the dominant theory used, it was used in conjunction with

deontology, virtue ethics and relativism. Opinions were structured using multiple

theories to build arguments about animal research. However, the problem with

theorising using multiple concepts from different theories is that it becomes irrational

(LaFollette 2007). As utilitarianism is consequence based and deontology is action

based, using both is difficult because you need to be aware of when to follow rules and

when to appeal to consequences (LaFollette 2007). In this situation it is then better to

use principlism rather than strict deontological rules, because principlism will give

priority as to which principles are appealed to. The document that the Australian AEC

relies on, the Code, offers a series of principles, one of which is that the 3Rs are adhered

to (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). The majority of the texts

raised the 3Rs and noted that they must be met to allow animal experimentation to be

ethically acceptable, showing an adherence to principles. The texts were then able to

construct a world view of animal experimentation that relied on principles to be met that

impacted on the cost benefit analysis, allowing for deontology to be used with

utilitarianism in decision making.

The texts also appealed to ethics of care and virtue ethics, yet both theories in

conjunction with utilitarianism. Ethics of care was present within the texts as making

improvements to animal welfare such as environmental enrichment and reducing animal

handling. These improvements contributed to the utilitarian calculus by reducing the

weight of the costs, making it more likely that the experiment will be ethically

acceptable. Ethics of care is then capable of being a supplementary theory (Rachels &

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Rachels 2007) to utilitarianism, and can be used within the discourse of humane animal

experimentation. Virtue ethics can also be used within the utilitarian calculus because

the theory is pragmatic in that what is considered to be the virtuous way to act in one

situation will not necessarily be the virtuous way to act in another (Meara et al. 1996).

However, virtue ethics was found in the texts most frequently as in the forms of

narratives that constructed virtuous characters for those who supported animal

experimentation and vicious characters that aimed to abolish it. The use of narrative

performs a social action (Johnstone 2001) and provides not only the author’s

construction of a series of events, but also their moral orientation, and to whom they

attribute responsibility and blame (Edwards 1999). In addition, narratives are known to

be valuable as persuasive texts, having the power to influence attitudes and beliefs

particularly when the reader is absorbed in the story and there is a likable protagonist

(Green & Brock 2000). The authors of the texts that used narratives, SCI 1 and LAY 1,

2, and 3, constructed events that had scientists as the protagonists who were responsible

for human progress, and blamed animal activists and regulations for halting this

progress. These texts were then able to persuade the readers to sympathise with the

scientist protagonists, and influence them to have negative attitudes towards those who

were burdening the scientists. Virtue ethics in terms of character was then very effective

in persuading the author to support animal experimentation, rather than in constructing

their world view of animal experimentation.

Relativist arguments, relying on both subjectivism and cultural relativism, were used to

construct the author’s world view. Subjectivism was used to persuade the reader to

agree with the author’s stance on animal experimentation. Instances of subjectivism

relied on emotional and persuasive language. Emotional language relies on value

judgements held by the receiver of the text (Macagno & Walton 2010), leading the

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author to deliberately choose words that will lead the reader to the same value

judgements, and then conclusion as the author. Subjectivism was not present in the

more serious articles what were reporting an aspect of animal experimentation, but in

the articles that were aiming to argue either for or against animal experimentation.

Subjectivism was then used with a purpose to construct the author’s worldview. The

authors used cultural relativism by adding instances of public opinion in their texts.

However, the opinions shared usually were similar to that of the author, building

support for their argument by showing it was the wider opinion. Cultural relativism was

also implied within each of the articles as they all assumed that animal experimentation

was a social norm. The assumption that animal experimentation is a social norm is an

argumentative strategy that has also been seen in arguments made by the participants of

the study by Swan and McCarthy (2003) who argued against animal rights. If the use of

animals is a norm, it is perceived as a practical rather than moral issue (Swan &

McCarthy 2003). Those against the use of animals then feel no moral obligation to not

use animals, so the use of animals is normal, and support can be built for animal

experimentation. As the texts examined were constructed with the assumption that

animal experimentation is a social norm, they support animal experimentation.

There were similarities and differences between the arguments raised by the four

stakeholder roles. The idea of a humane animal experimentation where ethical

acceptability was only granted if the benefits outweighed the costs were shared by

veterinarians, scientists and animal welfare representatives, but not by the lay people.

Instead, the lay people took an anthropocentric view of animal experimentation rather

than focusing on the welfare of the animals, and were not as supportive of the 3Rs as

the other roles. The difference between lay people and the other roles may be because

the texts were written by journalists. While not finding it in his own study of television

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and printed news, Kruse (2001) reviewed literature that suggested that the media

focused on dramatic conflicts between social actors rather than the issues under debate.

The texts by lay people that I examined used this tactic, placing the greater emphasis on

the narrative then the ethical acceptability of animal experimentation. The lay people, in

this instance being journalists, were then writing to the conventions of their jobs. The

other roles also constructed their world views as their roles dictated; veterinarians and

scientists were mostly formal and authoritative in their writing, providing their own past

experiences to back up their position. Animal welfare representatives also wrote fitting

their role of promoting animal welfare, which directly involves minimising costs to the

animals. They were the only role to go into the animal costs in as much detail as the

other texts did of the benefits of animal experimentation and discussed alternatives to

animals. It then appears that the role of the author influences the arguments that they

present about animal experimentation.

While the texts were representative of the stakeholder’s beliefs regarding animal

research, there was a bias with regards to where and how the articles were written. The

way in which the articles were selected neglected to ensure that they were from an

Australian perspective only, weakening the application of the research exclusively to the

Australian model of AEC. However, there were difficulties in obtaining only Australian

articles, for example, finding statements that belonged to five different animal welfare

organisations within Australia. European, particularly British, and American texts tend

to share a similar view to Australians about animal experimentation, so articles from

these countries were a better option than from countries that do not share a western

perspective of animal experimentation. The type of article was a factor that influenced

the language used due to specific writing conventions. Scientific articles are written to

be direct and factual, therefore it was expected that they would contain less emotional

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language as part of the standards set by the journal they are published in, as seen in the

articles by veterinarians and scientists. It was unlikely to find an article by the general

public that was written to these conventions; instead they were news or feature articles

that were able to use emotive language. However, there were also differences within the

lay people texts, as three of the five articles were published in scientific publications. To

avoid bias, members of the four categories could be interviewed about how they discuss

animal experimentation, standardising both the specific topics they were to discuss and

the format of their communications. The crossovers between members were another

problem faced in the selection of papers for analysis. Veterinarians can be considered

both scientists and veterinarians, and in fact two of the publications thought to be by

scientists were actually by laboratory animal veterinarians. The two groups could also

fall into the category of animal welfare if they were contracted to animal welfare

groups, or in the field of animal welfare research. Animal welfare representatives often

have veterinary or scientific training too, so they may be influenced by those roles as

well. A way to address role bias would to be interview AEC members that have already

been assigned their roles, or a role play activity, so that they have a definite identity.

However, in addressing these issues it would remove the representation of society that I

aimed to examine in this study.

This study supported the hypotheses that ethical theories are integrated in the discourse

of animal experimentation, and that veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare

representatives and lay people would differ in how they construct their view on animal

experimentation was supported. Because discourse analysis assumes language is action,

it is expected that if ethical theories are used to construct opinions about animal

experimentation, then they will also be used in the process of ethical decision making.

As the four roles presented arguments using aspects of utilitarianism, deontology, virtue

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ethics and relativism, these theories should be present in their decision making. The

following two chapters will examine the use of ethical theories in the process of

individual and group decision making by veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare

representatives and lay people.

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Chapter 4. Applying the Multidimensional Ethics Scale to

Animal Ethics Committees

4.1 Introduction

In ethical decision making, differences in decisions are thought to be due to opposing

parties making different value judgments and assumptions, that may be expressed

through the use of ethical theories (Brown 1996). Theoretically, the use of more than

one ethical theory to make a value judgement may be inconsistent because the theories,

at a normative level, are conceptually incommensurable (MacIntyre 2008). MacIntyre

(1979) proposed that different ethical theories use different evaluative concepts, so there

is no rational way to weigh the claims of opposing theories (Riordan 1991; Lurie &

Albin 2007). If this is true, it is a possibility that the fact that the debate remains

unresolved is a result of stakeholders using different singular theories. While the idea

that a singular theory is adhered to in assessing an act as ethical is commonly held

within philosophy (Eyal et al. 2010), it is often not the case in real world decision

making. It has been suggested that the use of a singular ethical theory is achieved at the

final stage of moral development, a stance not commonly reached by the majority of

decision makers (Rest 1979). Instead, decision makers are only capable of using a

mixture of philosophical theories, whether or not they are aware they are doing so

(Elliott 2007). The previous chapter provided evidence that a mixture of arguments

structured as utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and ethical and cultural relativism

were used by veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people in

persuasive discourse about the ethics of animal research. The mixture of theories may

then be extended to decision making. Therefore, it was hypothesised that a mixture of

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ethical theories will be used during the ethical decision making about scientific

experimentations involving animals.

As ethical decision making takes place within a social context, the process must

acknowledge the diversity of values and capabilities of all the decision makers involved

(Frame 2012). The Australian AEC model invites diversity in incorporating four

different perspectives of veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay

people (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). It is believed that

members of groups accept and promote shared values and priorities associated with the

group with which they identify (Beam 2012). Stakeholder role has been found to

influence attitudes towards animal experimentation, identifying that only scientists

supported the use of primates for research, and had higher support for animal use for

medical research than lay people and animal welfare representatives (Knight et al.

2009). This evidence is supported by the results in Chapter 3 that showed differences in

how animal research was discussed by different roles. Therefore, it was hypothesised

that stakeholder role will influence the ethical decision making process about scientific

experiments involving animals.

Ethical decision making is dependent on the characteristics of the moral problem, or

moral intensity. For example, acceptance for animal research is stronger when animals

are used for medical than for psychological research, and that students were less likely

to support scenarios listing the words ‘painful’ or ‘death’ in the question (Hagelin et al.

2003). The proposed species used in the experiment also changed how respondents

perceived animal research, showing lower levels of support for research using cats, dogs

and nonhuman primates than small rodents (Hagelin et al. 2003). If people base

attitudes towards animal research on the types of experiments and species used, it can

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be assumed that these factors will influence their ethical decision making process.

Therefore, it was hypothesised that moral intensity will influence the ethical decision

making process of individuals justifying if animal research is ethically acceptable. In

addition, as the moral intensity is also affected by its interpretation, it was also

hypothesised that stakeholder role would influence the level of interpretation of the

moral intensity.

4.2. Methods

4.2.1. Experimental Design

Participants were surveyed to isolate their use of utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics

and ethical and cultural relativism in justifying animal experimentation as ethical. The

survey was targeted at veterinarians, scientists that use animals, animal welfare

representatives and lay people to test the influence of stakeholder role on decision

making patterns. To test the influence of moral intensity, the survey contained four

scenarios that differed by human interest, species and the invasiveness of the

experiment. The effects of moral intensity and stakeholder role were examined for both

decision making and scenario approval.

4.2.2. Assessment of the use of ethical theories

In order to test these hypotheses a method that was able to isolate the use of different

ethical theories was required. The multidimensional ethics scale by Reidenbach and

Robin (1988) was developed to improve the measurement of ethical evaluations of

marketing activities, and to find which ethical frameworks are relied upon other than

utilitarianism and deontology. In allowing for the use of ethical theories to be isolated, it

suited testing the first hypothesis that assessments would use a mixture of ethical

theories. This hypothesis was tested in two ways. The first was as a confirmatory factor

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analysis to determine whether the four ethical theories were good models of decision

making. The second was as an exploratory factor analysis to test what aspects of each of

the theories influenced the decision making. As the multidimensional ethics scale was

also developed to test if people assessed scenarios differently (Reidenbach & Robin

1988), it was also appropriate to test the role of moral intensity on decision making.

4.2.2.1. Development of the Questionnaire

The original 30 item multidimensional ethics scale (Reidenbach & Robin 1988) was

adapted to fit an animal experimentation context (Appendix 1). Their original

questionnaire was made up of items from five ethical theories: utilitarianism,

deontology, relativism, egoism and justice (Reidenbach & Robin 1988). To adapt the

questionnaire the concepts of egoism and justice ethics were removed because the

theories are not common to the discussion of the ethical acceptability of animal

research. Instead, virtue ethics items were added as the theory is often applied to animal

experimentation. The questionnaire contained three relativist items, eight utilitarian

items, five deontology items and seven virtue ethics items, retaining most of the items

from Reidenbach and Robin’s (1988) model. Three relativist items were retained, losing

‘Acceptable/Unacceptable to people I most admire’ and ‘Acceptable/Unacceptable to

my family’ because they were thought not to influence the acceptability of animal

research. Four utilitarian items ‘Leads to the greatest/Least good for the greatest

number’, ‘Results in a positive/Negative cost-benefit ratio’, ‘Maximises/Minimises

pleasure’ and ‘Compromises/Does not compromise an important rule which I live by’

were lost. Three replacement items were added: ‘This experiment benefits/does not

benefit society’, ‘The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is/is not justified’

and ‘It is acceptable/unacceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gains’.

Two more were altered to replace ‘Ok/Not ok’ and ‘Good/Bad’ with the terms

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‘acceptable’ and ‘morally acceptable’. Three deontological items were retained, and the

other two ‘Violates/Does not violate an unwritten contract’ and ‘Violates/Does not

violate an unspoken promise’ were combined into concepts of being duty bound. Two

items were constructed from this premise, one placing the duty on animal welfare and

the other on scientific progress. The virtue ethics items were all written for the purpose

of the questionnaire, and revolved around concepts of empathy, sympathy, cruelty,

suffering, dignity and replacing the research animal with humans and pets owned by the

respondents. The final item asked ‘I approve/do not approve of this experiment’, to be

used as an assessment of whether the respondent supported the scenario. All of the

items were deliberated on by myself and my supervisors and were determined to fit the

proposed ethical theory each were meant to represent. A list of all the items of the scale

used in the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 3.

4.2.2.2. Scenarios of different moral intensity

The questionnaire (Appendix 4) proposed four short scenarios based on the following

two sentences: “(Animals/Dogs/Rats) are being used to test the safety of a new

(cleaning product/drug expected to help cancer patients). It is expected that the

experiment will be (highly/non) invasive to the animals.” The first two scenarios,

labelled ‘support’ and ‘reject’ depicted the moral intensity extremes using non-specified

species, stating ‘animals’. ‘Support’, the low moral intensity scenario, was a non

invasive experiment testing cancer drugs while ‘reject’ was a highly invasive

experiment safety testing a cleaning product, and hence had high moral intensity. These

were designed to be instantly accepted and rejected to serve as reference points. The

other two scenarios depicted a highly invasive experiment with high human interest,

aiming to compare the use of rats (labelled ‘rat’) and dogs (labelled ‘dog’) in safety

testing for a cancer drug. It was expected that there would be a difference in decision

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making based on the species as it is known to influence attitudes towards animal

research (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 1982; Driscoll 1992; Hagelin et al. 2003; Herzog et

al. 2001). The scenarios were simplified as not to influence the respondents by use of

emotional language, as the wording of the question is a factor that influences survey

response (Brady & Wheeler 1996; Braithwaite & Braithwaite 1982; Driscoll 1992;

Hagelin et al. 2003; Herzog et al. 2001; Hills 1994; Stafleu et al. 1993; Sullivan et al.

1978).

4.2.2.3. Survey demographics

The questionnaire contained demographic questions. Respondents were asked whether

they owned pets and had experience on an Animal Ethics Committee, along with basic

demographic questions asking their gender, age, nationality, education, religious beliefs

and whether they were raised in an urban or rural environment (Appendix 4). The final

question asked “Of the following four options, how would you describe yourself?”, with

the options corresponding to the four AEC categories. The answer to this question was

the dependent variable of the survey. The questionnaire received institutional Human

Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approval in March 2010 for the pre-test, and then

again for the online questionnaire in February 2011, from the University of Western

Australia (RA/4/1/4388). Consent was determined in two ways; for the pre-test,

participants were required to sign consent forms (Appendix 5), while participation was

taken as consent for the online questionnaire.

4.2.2.4. Pretest of the survey

The questionnaire was pre-tested on 24 people, six each of veterinarians, scientists

using animals, animal welfare representatives and lay people. As the respondents had

been recruited for the experiment in Chapter 5, the surveys were collected over a six

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month period between June and December 2010. The respondents did not indicate any

problems with understanding the survey, and the data was analysed using SAS

Enterprise Guide (Version 4.3). The preliminary analysis found that the scales used to

represent the latent ethical theories had high Cronbach’s alpha values for scenario 1

(Table 2), showing high reliability and internal consistency among the scale items

(Reynaldo & Santos 1999). Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 had high values for veterinarians and

scientists, and scenario 3 and 4 had high values for animal welfare groups, yet low

values for the lay people (Table 4.1). However, these results may have been due to the

small sample sizes, which also prevented the running of factor analyses. No items were

removed during the pre-test because there was no consistency in which items were poor

representations of the constructs.

Table 4.1. Pretest Cronbach’s alpha values

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Veterinarian 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.80 Scientists 0.87 0.70 0.89 0.86 Animal Welfare Representatives 0.88 0.43 0.89 0.85 Lay People 0.64 0.35 0.52 0.18

4.2.2.5. Survey administration

The online questionnaire was hosted by the website “Survey Gizmo” for eight months

between the dates May and December 2011. Participants were sent the same contact

letter including the link to the survey, as seen in Appendix 6, but the method of contact

differed by group. Veterinarians were recruited through the secretaries of the Australian

Veterinary Association (AVA) for each state who then distributed the invitation to their

members. Scientists were recruited through the departments of natural sciences at each

of the universities in Australia and were asked to distribute the survey to their staff. This

method was also used to contact the “lay people”, instead contacting non scientific

university departments. For the animal welfare representatives three animal welfare

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groups were contacted: the Australian Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Animals (RSPCA), Animals Australia and Humane Research Australia, who then

passed the invite on to their members. The recruitment process was started in May, with

reminder emails sent again in October and December.

4.2.3. Data Analysis

The approval of the scenario, the final item of the scale, was measured using a two-way

ANOVA with Bonferroni t-tests to measure differences between multiple means (Peng

2009). The tests were run on SAS 9.2, with the codes used in Peng (2009).

4.2.3.1. Factor Analysis

Both confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) and exploratory factor analyses (EFA) were

run for each of the four scenarios. Confirmatory factor analysis is used when it is

hypothesised that only certain factors influence certain factor indicators (Asparouhov &

Muthén 2009). As the research aimed to test if singular ethical theories are used to

justify animal experimentation as ethical, the CFA was used to see if the variables

would assort into the four expected ethical theories. A model that assigned each item of

the scale to their respective ethical theory was designed using SAS 9.2, with the

expectation that the data would assort into four factors of utilitarian, deontological,

relativist and virtue ethics variables. A maximum likelihood model was used (Hair et al.

2006) because the CFA aimed to identify the latent dimensions, or constructs

represented by the measured variables. To assess whether the model was appropriate for

the data, hence that singular theories were used to assess animal research as ethical, two

measures were used. The first was the Goodness-of-Fit Index (GOFI), in which values

greater than 0.90 indicate the model is a good fit (Hair et al. 2006). The second was a

Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test, which tested a null hypothesis that the observed and

109

estimated covariance matrices were equal (Hair et al. 2006). Goodness of fit is

determined by a high p-value that indicates no statistical significance between the

observed covariance matrices of the data and the expected covariance matrices of the

model because the likelihood of the covariance matrices being equal decreases with

smaller probabilities (Hair et al. 2006).

It was assumed that the CFA model assorting items into the four moral theories would

be a poor model of fit. Hence, EFAs were run to identify which constructs contributed

to the decision making processes. A maximum likelihood factor analysis was used due

to the focus on the theoretical applications of the data (Hair et al. 2006). The data was

grouped by the stakeholder role to allow for the role of stakeholder in decision making

to be compared before the factor analyses were run for each scenario, using SAS

Enterprise Guide (Version 4.3). The retaining factors were based on the percentage

variance retained, which maintained consistency and allowed for comparison. By

examining scree plots along with the percentage of variance explained, it was

determined that three factors be retained. An oblique promax rotation was used because

it is the best method of rotation when the goal of the EFA is to obtain theoretically

meaningful factors or constructs (Hair et al. 2006). This rotation allows for factors to be

correlated (Hair et al. 2006), and as a result communality estimates were set to allow

squared multiple correlation with all the other columns. As standard, the analysis set

communalities greater than one to one and employed Kaiser’s normalisation. For each

analysis, the three factors were determined to be made up only of items with factor

loadings greater than 0.4 (Hair et al. 2006). Finally, to allow between group and

between scenario comparisons, ‘Tucker’s Congruence Coefficient’ (φ) was calculated

using the method of Lorenzo-Seva and ten Berge (2006). Tucker’s Congruence

110

Coefficient values of 0.85-0.94 indicated fair similarity, and values higher than 0.95

showed good similarity between two nominated factors.

4.2.3.2. Reliability and Validity

For the CFA, construct reliability was calculated according to Hair et al (2006) and was

found to be high in the scenarios of support (0.86), rat (0.88) and dog (0.94), and low in

reject (0.54). Validity was examined in the form of convergent validity, the extent to

which indicators of a construct share a high proportion of variation (Hair et al. 2006).

The convergent validity was found by examining the factor loadings for each of the

predicted items within each construct. Utilitarian and relativist constructs had high

convergent validity. Deontological items were either high or highly negative, except for

the item ‘duty to animal welfare’ which was low across the scenarios. Virtue ethics

items had low convergent validity, and were negative for the items concerning ‘dignity’

and ‘animals like one’s pets’.

The reliability of the EFA was tested using Cronbach’s alpha. Examining the alpha

values, the same seven items were found across groups and scenarios to have low or

negative values, meaning these items were not measuring the same construct as the rest

of the items on the scale were (Reynaldo & Santos 1999). Two deontological items;

‘violates my idea of fairness’ and ‘duty to ensure animal welfare is paramount’, and five

virtue ethics items; ‘empathy’, ‘sympathy’, ‘cruelty’, ‘suffering’ and ‘acceptability if

the experiment were to be performed on humans’ were removed. Once these items were

removed the Cronbach’s alpha values increased (for each of the four stakeholder roles;

support > 0.90, reject > 0.88, rat > 0.92, and dog > 0.93), indicating high internal

reliability (Reidenbach & Robin 1988). Reidenbach and Robin’s measures of validity

were followed (1988), breaking down the scales into their philosophical frameworks.

111

The scales showed the highest convergent validity in the scenario dog and least in reject

(Table 4.2). Utilitarianism was the theory with the consistently highest convergent

validity (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2. The convergence validity measures (average correlation) for each of the four frameworks

throughout the four scenarios

Support Reject Rat Dog Relativism 0.50 0.40 0.63 0.63 Utilitarianism 0.59 0.49 0.68 0.68 Deontology 0.50 0.46 0.59 0.58 Virtue Ethics 0.61 0.49 0.44 0.63

4.3. Results

4.3.1. Survey response rate

The website logged 692 respondents, however only 377 questionnaires were logged as

completed, giving a valid response rate of 54.48%. Of these 98 were veterinarians, 117

identified as scientists, 59 belonged to animal welfare groups and 103 fell into the “lay

people” category. Two-thirds were female and one-third male, 80.90% owned pets, and

75.33% had not participated on an AEC previously. However, each of the four

categories contained individuals who had previously participated on AECs; 26

veterinarians, 34 scientists, 25 animal welfare representatives and 8 lay people. Of the

respondents, 75.07% of the respondents identified as Australian, 70.02% were raised in

urban over rural environments and 65.78% had postgraduate qualifications.

4.3.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The CFA model testing factors made up of pure utilitarianism, deontology, relativism

and virtue ethics was a poor fit for all four scenarios (Table 4.3). When the data were

analysed by stakeholder group, the model was still a poor fit (Table 4.3), indicating that

112

veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people used a mixture of

ethical frameworks in their decision making.

Table 4.3. Confirmatory factor analysis values.

Scenario Total VET SCI AW LAY Support Goodness of fit 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.53 0.66

χ² probability <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 Reject Goodness of fit 0.82 0.74 0.73 0.64 0.66

χ² probability <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 Rat Goodness of fit 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.61 0.61

χ² probability <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001

Dog Goodness of fit 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.59 0.61 χ² probability <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001

4.3.3. Exploratory Factor Analysis

Instead of the concepts assorting into their assigned ethical theories, six common factors

were identified throughout the analysis, and will hence be referred to. The first was

‘multiple theories’ which was made up of items from each of the four theories in

proportions greater than half. The second was the relativist factor of ‘customs’, made up

of the items traditionally and culturally acceptable. A variation of customs was labelled

‘relativism’, and differed in that it included the item of individually acceptable. The

next two factors were dominantly utilitarian; ‘generic utilitarianism’ was the third

factor which included concepts of utility, efficiency, societal benefits, and morality

based on balance and harm/benefit analysis. The forth factor, ‘justification’, covered the

utilitarian items that were specifically about the justification of animal experiments in

regards to the pain and consequences of it, and asking if could be justified for scientific

gain. The fifth and sixth were ‘deontology’ and ‘virtue ethics’, designated to factors

where items of these theories were dominant.

113

4.3.3.1. Scenario 1- Support

Differences in stakeholder role were seen in using an undisclosed animal in a non

invasive experiment to develop a drug to help cancer patients. The first factor for the

veterinarians was justification, but included generic utilitarian and a deontological item.

Their second factor was labelled generic utilitarian, yet this also included the

deontological duty item, and their third factor was relativist, yet included the virtue item

regarding dignity. The first factor for scientists was made up of multiple theories, their

second expressed both justification utilitarianism and deontology, while their third

factor was labelled generic utilitarian, but included the deontological duty item. The

animal welfare representatives had a deontological based first factor that included two

utilitarian items, their second factor combined customs, generic utilitarianism and virtue

ethics, and their third factor combined justification and relativism. The first factor for

the lay people was made up of the customs and generic utilitarian factors with an

additional deontological item of duty, the second factor was deontology with two

justification items, and the third virtue ethics with the item of societal benefits (Table

4.4). Only two factors, the deontological second factors for scientists and lay people,

were found to be fairly similar using the co-efficient of congruence (φ= 0.89).

114

Tab

le 4

.4. T

he

fact

or s

tru

ctu

res

and

load

ings

of

Vet

erin

aria

ns

(VE

T),

Sci

enti

sts

(SC

I), A

nim

al W

elfa

re R

epre

sen

tati

ves

(AW

) an

d L

ay P

eop

le (

LA

Y)

for

each

of

the

item

s

in r

esp

onse

to

‘su

pp

ort'

, th

e u

se o

f an

imal

s in

non

-in

vasi

ve c

ance

r re

sear

ch.

Sca

le I

tem

s*#

Eth

ical

F

ram

ewor

k

Fac

tor

Str

uct

ure

s^ (

Loa

din

g)

V

ET

S

CI

AW

L

AY

C

ultu

rall

y ac

cept

able

/una

ccep

tabl

e R

elat

ivis

m

1 (0

.43)

1

(0.8

2)

2 3 (0

.57)

(0

.41)

1

(0.5

6)

Indi

vidu

ally

acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

R

elat

ivis

m

3 (0

.99)

1

(0.6

3)

3 (1

.00)

-

(<0.

4)

Tra

diti

onal

ly a

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le

Rel

ativ

ism

3

(0.4

5)

1 (0

.47)

2

(0.4

3)

1(0

.45)

O

utco

me

is e

ffic

ient

/ine

ffic

ient

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.92)

3

(0.5

7)

- (<

0.4)

1

(0.7

3)

Ben

efit

s/do

es n

ot b

enef

it s

ocie

ty

Uti

lita

rian

ism

2

(0.5

8)

1 (0

.66)

2

(0.4

8)

1 3(0

.59)

(0

.44)

M

axim

ises

/min

imis

es b

enef

its

whi

le m

inim

isin

g/m

axim

isin

g ha

rm

Uti

lita

rian

ism

-

(<0.

4)

3 (0

.64)

2

(0.4

1)

1(0

.68)

O

n ba

lanc

e, m

oral

ly a

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.6

0)

1 (0

.81)

1 2

(0.4

3)

(0.4

5)

-(<

0.4)

Out

com

e pr

oduc

es th

e gr

eate

st/l

east

uti

lity

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.64)

3

(0.5

2)

3 (0

.71)

1

(0.8

3)

Acc

epta

ble/

not a

ccep

tabl

e if

act

ions

can

be

just

ifie

d by

thei

r co

nseq

uenc

es

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.5

6)

2 (0

.43)

3

(0.6

7)

-(<

0.4)

The

pai

n ca

used

to th

e an

imal

dur

ing

the

expe

rim

ent i

s/is

not

ju

stif

ied

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.7

3)

2 (0

.55)

3

(0.4

3)

2(0

.73)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

to u

se a

nim

als

in e

xper

imen

ts f

or s

cien

tifi

c ga

ins

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.8

5)

1 (0

.49)

1

(0.6

8)

2(0

.68)

Mor

ally

/not

mor

ally

rig

ht

Deo

ntol

ogy

1 (0

.72)

1 2

(0.4

8)

(0.6

1)

1 (0

.69)

2

(0.7

2)

Obl

iged

/not

obl

iged

to a

ct th

is w

ay

Deo

ntol

ogy

- (<

0.4)

1

(0.4

4)

1 (0

.68)

1 2

(0.4

4)

(0.4

7)

I ha

ve/d

o no

t hav

e a

duty

to e

nsur

e sc

ient

ific

pro

gres

s is

par

amou

nt

Deo

ntol

ogy

2 (0

.46)

2 3

(0.5

3)

(0.4

6)

1 (0

.65)

2

(0.6

9)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

if th

e an

imal

s ar

e tr

eate

d w

ith

dign

ity

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

3

(0.5

3)

1 (0

.60)

2

(0.7

9)

3(0

.92)

A

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le if

my

pet w

as in

this

sit

uati

on

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

- (<

0.4)

-

(<0.

4)

2 (0

.72)

3

(0.5

4)

*The

item

s w

ere

subj

ecte

d to

an

obliq

ue p

rom

ax r

otat

ion.

#

Ite

ms

with

two

num

bers

indi

cate

that

the

item

load

ed o

nto

mul

tiple

fac

tor

patte

rns.

^

1 in

dica

tes

the

item

ass

orte

d in

to th

e fi

rst f

acto

r, 2

the

seco

nd a

nd 3

the

thir

d

115

4.3.3.2. Scenario 2- Reject

Diverse factors were found in assessing the use of undisclosed animals in an invasive

experiment to develop cleaning products. The first factor for veterinarians used multiple

theories dominated by utilitarianism, the second was based on utilitarian justification

and the third on customs. The scientists also had a first factor based on multiple

theories, their second on generic utilitarianism and third on utilitarian justification

including the deontological scientific duty item. The first factor of the animal welfare

representatives was also multiple theories, but had very few items from each of the

theories. Their second was made up of generic utilitarian items along with the

deontological duty item, and their third was deontology, classed as so because the virtue

ethics dignity item could be interpreted as deontological. The lay people also had a

multiple theory first factor, but this was dominated by relativist items. Their second

factor was generic utilitarianism with the tradition item, and their third factor was

deontological (Table 4.5). The only factors found to be fairly similar from the co-

efficient of congruence test were the generic utilitarian factors for scientists and lay

people’s second (φ= 0.88).

116

Tab

le 4

.5. T

he

fact

or s

tru

ctu

res

and

load

ings

of

Vet

erin

aria

ns

(VE

T),

Sci

enti

sts

(SC

I), A

nim

al W

elfa

re R

epre

sen

tati

ves

(AW

) an

d L

ay P

eop

le (

LA

Y)

for

each

of

the

item

s

in r

esp

onse

to

“rej

ect”

, th

e u

se o

f an

imal

s fo

r in

vasi

ve p

rod

uct

tes

ting

.

Sca

le I

tem

s*#

Eth

ical

F

ram

ewor

k

Fac

tor

Str

uct

ure

s^ (

Loa

din

g)

V

ET

S

CI

AW

L

AY

C

ultu

rall

y ac

cept

able

/una

ccep

tabl

e R

elat

ivis

m

3 (0

.61)

1

(0.4

5)

- (<

0.4)

1

(0.6

9)

Indi

vidu

ally

acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

R

elat

ivis

m

1 (0

.81)

1

(0.8

3)

1 (0

.82)

1

(0.5

5)

Tra

diti

onal

ly a

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le

Rel

ativ

ism

3

(0.8

5)

- (<

0.4)

-

(<0.

4)

2 (0

.44)

O

utco

me

is e

ffic

ient

/ine

ffic

ient

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 (0

.45)

2

(0.8

0)

2 (0

.81)

2

(0.6

6)

Ben

efit

s/do

es n

ot b

enef

it s

ocie

ty

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.5

9)

2 (0

.70)

2

(0.4

7)

2 (0

.48)

M

axim

ises

/min

imis

es b

enef

its

whi

le m

inim

isin

g/m

axim

isin

g ha

rm

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.7

7)

1 (0

.54)

2

(0.6

3)

2 (0

.60)

On

bala

nce,

mor

ally

acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 (0

.59)

1

(0.7

7)

2 (0

.69)

1

(0.7

0)

Out

com

e pr

oduc

es th

e gr

eate

st/l

east

uti

lity

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 (0

.67)

2

(0.6

1)

2 (0

.57)

2

(0.9

3)

Acc

epta

ble/

not a

ccep

tabl

e if

act

ions

can

be

just

ifie

d by

thei

r co

nseq

uenc

es

Uti

lita

rian

ism

2

(1.0

2)

3 (0

.53)

3

(0.7

3)

3 (0

.60)

The

pai

n ca

used

to th

e an

imal

dur

ing

the

expe

rim

ent i

s/is

not

ju

stif

ied

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.8

1)

1 (0

.80)

1

(1.0

8)

3 (0

.74)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

to u

se a

nim

als

in e

xper

imen

ts f

or

scie

ntif

ic g

ains

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.58)

3

(0.8

2)

2 (0

.40)

-

(<0.

4)

Mor

ally

/not

mor

ally

rig

ht

Deo

ntol

ogy

1 (0

.67)

1

(0.8

5)

1 3 (0

.51)

(0

.41)

3

(0.8

0)

Obl

iged

/not

obl

iged

to a

ct th

is w

ay

Deo

ntol

ogy

1 (0

.60)

1

(0.6

1)

1 (0

.62)

3

(0.4

9)

I ha

ve/d

o no

t hav

e a

duty

to e

nsur

e sc

ient

ific

pro

gres

s is

pa

ram

ount

D

eont

olog

y -

(<0.

4)

3 (0

.41)

2

(0.6

1)

1 (0

.54)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

if th

e an

imal

s ar

e tr

eate

d w

ith

dign

ity

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

-

(<0.

4)

1 (0

.69)

3

(1.0

1)

3 (0

.42)

A

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le if

my

pet w

as in

this

sit

uati

on

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

1 (0

.51)

1

(0.7

7)

1 (0

.44)

1

(0.6

2)

*The

item

s w

ere

subj

ecte

d to

an

obliq

ue p

rom

ax r

otat

ion.

#

Ite

ms

with

two

num

bers

indi

cate

that

the

item

load

ed o

nto

mul

tiple

fac

tor

patte

rns.

^

1 in

dica

tes

the

item

ass

orte

d in

to th

e fi

rst f

acto

r, 2

the

seco

nd a

nd 3

the

thir

d

117

4.3.3.3. Scenario- 3 Rat

For the third scenario, involving rats used in an invasive cancer research, each of the

four groups had multiple theories make up their first factors. The most similar were

veterinarians and animal welfare representatives, which were identical apart from two

inclusions of the relativist cultural item in the veterinarians and the deontological

obligation item in animal welfare representatives. The other two groups differed from

this structure in which utilitarian items were included, and the lay people differed by

including all three deontological items, yet only the virtue ethics item regarding pets.

The second factor for veterinarians, animal welfare and lay people all were made up of

predominantly generic utilitarian constructs, while for the scientists it was

predominantly deontological. Identical third factors, the customs factor was found for

all four groups (Table 4.6). The co-efficient of congruence tests found nine fairly

similar factor pairs and good similarity was found for two of the animal welfare

representatives’ first factors shared with veterinarians and the lay people (Table 4.7).

118

Tab

le 4

.6. T

he

fact

or s

tru

ctu

res

and

load

ings

of

Vet

erin

aria

ns (

VE

T),

Sci

enti

sts

(SC

I), A

nim

al W

elfa

re R

epre

sen

tati

ves

(AW

) an

d L

ay P

eop

le (

LA

Y)

for

each

of

the

item

s

in r

esp

onse

to

“rat

”, t

he

use

of

rats

in in

vasi

ve c

ance

r re

sear

ch.

Sca

le I

tem

s*#

Eth

ical

F

ram

ewor

k

Fac

tor

Str

uct

ure

s^ (

Loa

din

g)

V

ET

S

CI

AW

L

AY

C

ultu

rall

y ac

cept

able

/una

ccep

tabl

e R

elat

ivis

m

1 3 (0

.53)

(0

.41)

3

(0.9

1)

3 (0

.70)

2 3

(0.4

2)

(0.4

5)

Indi

vidu

ally

acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

R

elat

ivis

m

1 (0

.89)

1

(0.6

1)

1 (0

.73)

1

(0.7

7)

Tra

diti

onal

ly a

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le

Rel

ativ

ism

3

(1.0

5)

3 (0

.82)

3

(0.7

9)

3 (0

.95)

O

utco

me

is e

ffic

ient

/ine

ffic

ient

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.73)

1

(0.4

3)

2 (0

.83)

1 2

(0.4

1)

(0.5

2)

Ben

efit

s/do

es n

ot b

enef

it s

ocie

ty

Uti

lita

rian

ism

2

(0.6

6)

2 (0

.42)

2

(0.5

2)

2 (0

.92)

M

axim

ises

/min

imis

es b

enef

its

whi

le

min

imis

ing/

max

imis

ing

harm

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.55)

1

(0.6

2)

2 (0

.95)

1

(0.5

8)

On

bala

nce,

mor

ally

acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 (0

.77)

1

(0.5

3)

1 (0

.69)

1

(0.7

7)

Out

com

e pr

oduc

es th

e gr

eate

st/l

east

uti

lity

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.85)

-

(<0.

4)

2 (0

.80)

2

(0.9

4)

Acc

epta

ble/

not a

ccep

tabl

e if

act

ions

can

be

just

ifie

d by

th

eir

cons

eque

nces

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 2 (0

.48)

(0

.44)

2

(0.4

1)

1 2 (0

.52)

(0

.52)

1 2

(0.5

3)

(0.4

8)

The

pai

n ca

used

to th

e an

imal

dur

ing

the

expe

rim

ent i

s/is

no

t jus

tifi

ed

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.7

4)

1 (0

.79)

1

(0.7

0)

1 (0

.61)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

to u

se a

nim

als

in e

xper

imen

ts

for

scie

ntif

ic g

ains

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 (0

.67)

-

(<0.

4)

1 (0

.54)

2

(0.5

0)

Mor

ally

/not

mor

ally

rig

ht

Deo

ntol

ogy

1 (0

.65)

1

(0.5

9)

1 (0

.57)

1

(0.6

6)

Obl

iged

/not

obl

iged

to a

ct th

is w

ay

Deo

ntol

ogy

2 (0

.56)

2

(0.6

4)

1 (0

.42)

1

(0.4

8)

I ha

ve/d

o no

t hav

e a

duty

to e

nsur

e sc

ient

ific

pro

gres

s is

pa

ram

ount

D

eont

olog

y 2

(0.4

2)

2 (0

.93)

-

(<0.

4)

1 (0

.50)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

if th

e an

imal

s ar

e tr

eate

d w

ith

dign

ity

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

1 2

(0.4

2)

(0.4

8)

1 (0

.53)

1

(0.7

4)

2 (0

.53)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

if m

y pe

t was

in th

is s

itua

tion

V

irtu

e E

thic

s 1

(0.8

7)

1 (0

.74)

1

(0.8

3)

1 (0

.72)

*T

he it

ems

wer

e su

bjec

ted

to a

n ob

lique

pro

max

rot

atio

n.

# I

tem

s w

ith tw

o nu

mbe

rs in

dica

te th

at th

e ite

m lo

aded

ont

o m

ultip

le f

acto

r pa

ttern

s.

^ 1

indi

cate

s th

e ite

m a

ssor

ted

into

the

firs

t fac

tor,

2 th

e se

cond

and

3 th

e th

ird

119

Table 4.7. The Tucker's Coefficient of Congruence for factor pairs within the scenario “rat”.

Values greater than 0.85 denote fair similarity, while values greater than 0.95 denote good

similarity.

Animal Welfare Representative

Factor 1 Scientist Lay People Veterinarian 0.865 1.02 0.892 Scientist - 0.867 <0.85 Animal Welfare Representative - - 0.956 Animal Welfare

Representative

Factor 2 Scientist Lay People Veterinarian <0.85 0.940 0.906 Scientist - <0.85 <0.85 Animal Welfare Representative - - <0.85 Animal Welfare

Representative

Factor 3 Scientist Lay People Veterinarian <0.85 0.882 0.948 Scientist - 0.862 <0.85 Animal Welfare Representative - - 0.902

4.3.3.4. Scenario 4- Dog

For their first factors; veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representative and lay

people were classified as multiple theory decision makers when assessing the scenario

involving dogs used in an invasive cancer research. This factor had identical items for

the veterinarian and scientists, and animal welfare representatives and lay people

differed from this pattern with the addition of the duty to ensure scientific progress item.

Each group produced a Generic Utilitarian second factor, where that of the

veterinarians and scientists were the same, and animal welfare representatives and lay

people differed with the additional items regarding harm minimisation/benefit

maximisation. The latter two groups also included items of deontology and care in their

second factor. The third factor for each of the groups was customs (Table 4.8). Nine

factor pairs were found to be fairly similar, while seven shared good similarity. All of

the first factors showed good similarity except between veterinarians and scientists.

Only one pair, scientists and lay people shared good similarity for factor 2, and

veterinarians and animal welfare representatives for the third factor (Table 4.9).

120

Tab

le 4

.8. T

he

fact

or s

tru

ctu

res

and

load

ings

of

Vet

erin

aria

ns (

VE

T),

Sci

enti

sts

(SC

I), A

nim

al W

elfa

re R

epre

sen

tati

ves

(AW

) an

d L

ay P

eop

le (

LA

Y)

for

each

of

the

item

s

in r

esp

onse

to

“dog

”, t

he

use

of

dog

s in

inva

sive

can

cer

rese

arch

.

Sca

le I

tem

s*#

Eth

ical

F

ram

ewor

k

Fac

tor

Str

uct

ure

s^ (

Loa

din

g)

V

ET

S

CI

AW

L

AY

C

ultu

rall

y ac

cept

able

/una

ccep

tabl

e R

elat

ivis

m

3 (0

.65)

3

(0.8

5)

3 (0

.78)

3

(0.8

5)

Indi

vidu

ally

acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

R

elat

ivis

m

1 (0

.80)

1

(0.9

5)

1 (0

.90)

1

(0.7

7)

Tra

diti

onal

ly a

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le

Rel

ativ

ism

3

(1.0

4)

3 (0

.77)

3

(0.9

4)

3 (0

.78)

O

utco

me

is e

ffic

ient

/ine

ffic

ient

U

tili

tari

anis

m

2 (0

.95)

2

(0.6

5)

2 (1

.09)

2

(0.7

4)

Ben

efit

s/do

es n

ot b

enef

it s

ocie

ty

Uti

lita

rian

ism

2

(0.5

3)

2 (0

.73)

2

(0.6

1)

2 (0

.62)

M

axim

ises

/min

imis

es b

enef

its

whi

le m

inim

isin

g/m

axim

isin

g ha

rm

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.5

0)

1 (0

.55)

1 2

(0.4

6)

(0.5

3)

1 2 (0

.46)

(0

.43)

O

n ba

lanc

e, m

oral

ly a

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.8

6)

1 (0

.87)

1

(0.8

3)

1 (0

.65)

O

utco

me

prod

uces

the

grea

test

/lea

st u

tili

ty

Uti

lita

rian

ism

2

(0.7

5)

2 (0

.84)

2

(0.7

0)

2 (0

.78)

A

ccep

tabl

e/no

t acc

epta

ble

if a

ctio

ns c

an b

e ju

stif

ied

by th

eir

cons

eque

nces

U

tili

tari

anis

m

1 (0

.74)

1

(0.4

3)

1 (0

.78)

1 2

(0.4

8)

(0.4

4)

The

pai

n ca

used

to th

e an

imal

dur

ing

the

expe

rim

ent i

s/is

not

ju

stif

ied

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.7

6)

1 (0

.63)

1

(0.7

8)

1 (0

.74)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

to u

se a

nim

als

in e

xper

imen

ts f

or s

cien

tifi

c ga

ins

Uti

lita

rian

ism

1

(0.7

7)

1 (0

.49)

1

(0.8

0)

1 (0

.63)

Mor

ally

/not

mor

ally

rig

ht

Deo

ntol

ogy

1 (0

.80)

1

(0.7

4)

1 2 (0

.50)

(0

.41)

1

(0.7

9)

Obl

iged

/not

obl

iged

to a

ct th

is w

ay

Deo

ntol

ogy

1 (0

.49)

1

(0.5

0)

1 (0

.71)

1

(0.6

2)

I ha

ve/d

o no

t hav

e a

duty

to e

nsur

e sc

ient

ific

pro

gres

s is

par

amou

nt

Deo

ntol

ogy

- (<

0.4)

-

(<0.

4)

1 (0

.54)

1

(0.4

4)

Acc

epta

ble/

unac

cept

able

if th

e an

imal

s ar

e tr

eate

d w

ith

dign

ity

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

1

(0.8

2)

1 (0

.48)

1

(0.8

6)

1 2 (0

.58)

(0

.42)

A

ccep

tabl

e/un

acce

ptab

le if

my

pet w

as in

this

sit

uati

on

Vir

tue

Eth

ics

1 (0

.64)

1

(0.6

0)

1 (0

.72)

1

(0.7

3)

*The

item

s w

ere

subj

ecte

d to

an

obliq

ue p

rom

ax r

otat

ion.

#

Ite

ms

with

two

num

bers

indi

cate

that

the

item

load

ed o

nto

mul

tiple

fac

tor

patte

rns.

^

1 in

dica

tes

the

item

ass

orte

d in

to th

e fi

rst f

acto

r, 2

the

seco

nd a

nd 3

the

thir

d

121

Table 4.9. The Tucker's Coefficient of Congruence for factor pairs within the scenario “dog”.

Values greater than 0.85 denote fair similarity, while values greater than 0.95 denote good

similarity.

Animal Welfare Representative

Factor 1 Scientist Lay People Veterinarian 0.946 1.14 0.955 Scientist - 1.09 0.965 Animal Welfare Representative - - 1.13 Animal Welfare

Representative

Factor 2 Scientist Lay People Veterinarian 0.918 0.929 0.907 Scientist - <0.85 0.951 Animal Welfare Representative - - <0.85 Animal Welfare

Representative

Factor 3 Scientist Lay People Veterinarian 0.905 0.954 0.887 Scientist - 0.912 0.932 Animal Welfare Representative - - 0.891

4.3.4. Scenario Comparison

Similar patterns of decision making between the four scenarios was the most evident in

veterinarians. Their first and second factors were fairly similar for three scenarios,

support, rat and dog. For their third factor, veterinarians had fairly similar decision

making patterns between the scenarios of reject and rat (φVETReject,Rat = 0.837), and reject

and dog (φVETReject,Dog = 0.895), and rat and dog shared good similarity (φVETRat,Dog =

0.958; Table 4.10). Scientists were the least consistent in their decision making patterns.

Only the scenarios reject and dog were assessed with fair similarity in their first

(φSCIReject,Dog = 0.915) and second factors (φSCIReject,Dog = 0.866), and dog and rat were

assessed as having a fairly similar third factor (φSCIRat,Dog = 0.885;Table 4.10). Animal

welfare representatives decision making patterns were fairly similar for the first factor

of reject and rat (φAWReject,Rat = 0.872), and had good similarity between rat and dog

(φAWRat,Dog = 1.077). Rat and dog were also fairly similar in their second factors

(φAWRat,Dog = 0.871) and had good similarity between scenarios in their third factors

(φAWRat,Dog = 0.959; Table 4.10). The decision making patterns of the lay people shared

good similarity for the first factor of reject and rat (φLAYReject,Rat = 1.050) and between

122

rat and dog (φLAYRat,Dog = 1.241). Rat and dog were also fairly similar in their second

(φLAYRat,Dog = 0.944) and third factors (φLAYRat,Dog = 0.870). The two scenarios reject and

dog also shared fairly similar patterns in their second factor (φLAYReject,Dog = 0.809;

Table 4.10).

123

Tab

le 4

.10.

Th

e T

uck

er's

Coe

ffic

ien

t of

Con

gru

ence

for

th

e fa

ctor

pai

rs b

etw

een

the

4 s

cen

ario

s. V

alu

es g

reat

er t

han

0.8

5 d

enot

e fa

ir s

imila

rity

, wh

ile v

alu

es g

reat

er t

han

0.95

den

ote

good

sim

ilari

ty. Vet

erin

aria

ns

Fac

tor

1 R

ejec

t R

at

Dog

Fac

tor

2R

ejec

t R

at

Dog

Fac

tor

3 R

ejec

t R

at

Dog

S

uppo

rt

<0.

85

0.82

5 0.

854

S

uppo

rt

<0.

85

0.88

3 0.

916

S

uppo

rt

<0.

85

<0.

85<

0.85

Rej

ect

- <

0.85

<0.

85

Rej

ect

- <

0.85

<

0.85

R

ejec

t -

0.83

7 0.

895

Rat

-

- 0.

927

R

at

- -

0.88

8

Rat

-

- 0.

958

Sci

enti

sts

F

acto

r 1

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

F

acto

r 2

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

F

acto

r 3

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

Sup

port

<

0.85

<

0.85

<0.

85

Sup

port

<

0.85

<

0.85

<

0.85

S

uppo

rt

<0.

85

<0.

85<

0.85

Rej

ect

- <

0.85

0.91

5

Rej

ect

- <

0.85

0.

866

R

ejec

t -

<0.

85<

0.85

Rat

-

- <

0.85

R

at

- -

<0.

85

Rat

-

- 0.

885

An

imal

Wel

fare

Rep

rese

nta

tive

s

F

acto

r 1

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

F

acto

r 2

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

F

acto

r 3

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

Sup

port

<

0.85

<

0.85

<0.

85

Sup

port

<

0.85

<

0.85

<

0.85

S

uppo

rt

<0.

85

<0.

85<

0.85

Rej

ect

- 0.

872

<0.

85

Rej

ect

- <

0.85

<

0.85

R

ejec

t -

<0.

85<

0.85

Rat

-

- 1.

077

R

at

- -

0.87

1

Rat

-

- 0.

959

Lay

peo

ple

F

acto

r 1

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

F

acto

r 2

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

F

acto

r 3

Rej

ect

Rat

D

og

Sup

port

<

0.85

<

0.85

<0.

85

Sup

port

<

0.85

<

0.85

<

0.85

S

uppo

rt

<0.

85

<0.

85<

0.85

Rej

ect

- 1.

050

<0.

85

Rej

ect

- <

0.85

0.

809

R

ejec

t -

<0.

85<

0.85

Rat

-

- 1.

241

R

at

- -

0.94

4

Rat

-

- 0.

870

124

4.3.5. Approval of protocols

Scientists on average were the most likely to approve scenarios, with animal welfare

representatives as the least likely (Figure 4.1). As expected, “support” was the most

approved scenario and “reject” the lowest, and the rat scenario was deemed more

acceptable than dog. There was a significant interaction effect between the group and

scenario (p = 0.0069, df = 9), however, there were also highly significant differences

between the four stakeholder groups (p < 0.0001, df = 3) and the scenarios (p < 0.0001,

df = 3). The four stakeholders had similar approval of the “reject” scenario except

between scientists and animal welfare representatives (p = 0.0068). The reject scenarios

all significantly differed from each role’s approval of the “support” scenario (p <

0.0001). The scientists’ approval of “support” was the significantly higher than all other

approval values (p < 0.0001). Scientists gave similar approval of “rat”, the second most

approved scenario, as veterinarians did to “support” (p = 0.44), and gave similar yet

higher approval to “dog” as veterinarians did to “rats” (p = 0.49). The lay people’s

highest approval was that of “support”, which was similar to the approval veterinarians

gave “support” (p = 0.08) and “rat” (p = 0.26) and scientists gave “dog” (p =0.63). In

their approval of the scenario “dog”, the veterinarians were similar to animal welfare

representatives in their approval of “support” (p = 0.97) and the lay people of “rat” (p =

0.75). The approval given by lay people of “dog” was similar to the approval given by

the animal welfare representatives in the scenarios “rat” (p = 0.69) and “dog” (p = 0.11),

and the animal welfare representatives were similar in their approval of these two

scenarios (p = 0.29).

125

Fig

ure

4.1

. L

evel

of

app

rova

l of

eac

h s

cen

ario

by

vete

rin

aria

ns

(●),

sci

enti

sts

(●),

an

imal

wel

fare

rep

rese

ntat

ives

(●)

and

lay

peo

ple

(●)

, w

her

e 1

ind

icat

es t

hat

th

e

par

tici

pan

t ap

pro

ves

of t

he

exp

erim

ent

in t

he

scen

ario

an

d 7

ind

icat

ed t

hat

they

do

not

.

1234567

Sce

nari

o 1

Sce

nari

o 2

Sce

nari

o 3

Sce

nari

o 4

Ap

pro

val

Sco

re

126

4.4. Discussion

The first hypothesis that individuals used a mixture of ethical theories to justify animal

research was supported. The confirmatory factor analysis concluded that factor models

made up of singular ethical theories were a poor fit for the data, and the exploratory

factor analysis confirmed that mixtures of theories were used. The data indicated that

individuals freely base their decisions about animal experimentation on a mixture of

theories, thus mirroring the prescriptions of the Code. The Code then provides a realistic

decision making framework. The second hypothesis that decision making was

influenced by stakeholder role was supported. Stakeholder role influenced the overall

approval for each scenario and factor patterns in ‘support’, ‘reject’ and ‘rat’, but not

‘dog’. As stakeholder role did not influence factor patterns of the four roles in the

scenario ‘dog’, it is suggested that their shared relationship with dogs as pets was a

greater influence on their decision making than their stakeholder role. The third

hypothesis that decision making was also influenced by moral intensity was also

supported. The four scenarios received different factor patterns and approval ratings.

While species influenced decision making, it was identified that human interest was the

biggest determinant of decision making. Finally, the hypothesis that moral intensity was

influenced by stakeholder role was supported, indicating that the four stakeholder roles

differ in how they interpret and give weight to the moral intensity.

The multidimensional ethics scale suggested that individual decisions justifying animal

protocols as ethical were made using concepts from utilitarianism, deontology, virtue

ethics and relativism. Factors labelled multiple theories were the first and most

significant factor (Reidenbach & Robin 1988) for each of the stakeholder roles in three

of the scenarios, ‘reject’, ‘rat’ and ‘dog’, and for scientists in the scenario labelled

‘support’. Hence, the majority of the decisions were made using concepts from each of

127

the four ethical theories. My results are supported by previous versions of the

multidimensional ethics scale in business ethics studies that found ethical dilemmas are

assessed using multiple ethical theories (Brady & Wheeler 1996; Hansen 1992; Kujala

2001; Reidenbach & Robin 1988; Tsalikis & Ortiz-Buonafina 1990). However, the

results from each of these studies contradict the common held idea within philosophy

that a singular theory is adhered to in assessing an act as ethical (Eyal et al. 2010). The

use of a singular theory implies that the decisions are made to adhere to set rules or

abstract principles, and are thus based on rationality alone. Real world decision making

is framed by the impacts the decision will have on the broader socioeconomic and

political forces that affect and are affected by the decision, and is hence not a purely

rational process (Frame 2012). In fact, the Code proposes that the decisions are to be

made using a mixture of utilitarianism in the cost benefit analysis and deontological

principlism by applying the 3Rs, and requires scientific members that may draw on their

previous experiences to aid their decision making. The Code then conflicts the

traditional rational decision making models by not adhering to pure rationality. The

Code then provides a realistic framework for decision making; as the decisions made in

this survey were not prompted by any regulatory framework, it provided a realistic

examination of how veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay

people justify animal experimentation. The individuals were found to rely on different

concepts from utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and relativism in their decision

making, and as the Code allows for concepts from different theories to be used, it

provides a set of realistic guidelines for AEC decision making.

As hypothesised, moral intensity influenced the decision making. The influence was

depicted by the factor patterns and the items that made up these factors. The three

scenarios with high moral intensity, ‘reject’, ‘dog’ and ‘rat’, generally consisted of

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multiple theories as the first factor, generic utilitarianism as the second and customs

third. The scenario with low moral intensity, ‘support’, had the most diverse factor

patterns amongst stakeholders, which was unexpected considering it was designed to be

instantly accepted. The scenario was designed to have a lower moral intensity due to its

low invasiveness. Jones (1991) proposed that issues of higher moral intensity require

more sophisticated moral reasoning than when the moral intensity is low, and hence

‘support’ may not have required such a complicated process of decision making

requiring constructs from multiple theories. However, this instance supports the idea

that the same conclusion can be reached when individuals argue using different ethical

theories. In contrast, invasive scenarios were fairly similar in their factor structures,

predominantly a mixture of ethical theories. Invasive experiments have a higher moral

intensity, which produce harsher ethical judgements because of a higher perceived

violation (Sparks & Siemens 2014). A harsher judgement may rely on higher cognition,

thus requiring thinking outside of a set prescription because there will be animals

harmed, which must be reduced to be deemed ethical. It is then easier for the decision

maker to consider a number of theories in their decision making. Examining the labelled

factor structures, it can be suggested that invasiveness is the aspect of moral intensity

that has the greatest influence on the decision making process.

Stakeholder role affected the decision making patterns in three scenarios; ‘support’,

‘reject’ and ‘rat’, resulting in varied factor patterns between the four roles. The four

stakeholder roles hence bring value judgements to the process of decision making, and

meet the Code’s requirement for diversity in decision making. However, the roles were

not consistent in their decision making. Veterinarians were the most consistent in their

factor patterns across the scenarios, and had first and second factor patterns dominated

by utilitarianism, with relativist third factors. Lay people were the second most

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consistent group, and had first factors that were dominated by utilitarianism and

relativism. The factor patterns of Animal welfare representatives were mostly multiple

theories, as were those of the least consistent of the stakeholder roles, scientists.

Consistency may then be a result of having a preference towards a particular theory,

such as how veterinarians had a preference towards utilitarianism, and lay people

towards utilitarianism and relativism. However, consistency in decision making is

desirable, but not a necessity (Moore 2007), providing that the decisions made are

neither irrational nor illogical (Angell et al. 2007). The consistent use of a theory will

not consider the fact that decisions need to be contextual, and may vary on their moral

intensity. The less consistent roles, animal welfare representatives and scientists are

thought to be the extremes in the debate, and it could be that in their inconsistency they

are more aware of the role of moral intensity in decision making. It may then be that

moral intensity is a stronger determinant of decision making than stakeholder role.

Stakeholder role did not influence the final scenario ‘dog’. Scientists and veterinarians

shared identical factor patterns for the scenario, and the factor patterns of the lay people

and animal welfare representatives only differed from these factor patterns by an

additional item. In contrast, the four stakeholder roles had different factor patterns from

each other in their assessment of the other protocols using either rats or an unnamed

species. It can be assumed that there is a value held by individuals that will override the

influence of stakeholder role in decision making when dogs are used for research. The

inconsistency in decision making here lies in the scenario instead of with the

stakeholder roles, indicating that people’s relationship with dogs may be a stronger

influence on their decision making than their stakeholder role. There is estimated to be

4.2 million dogs owned as pets in Australia (Animal Health Alliance 2013), and 80% of

the survey respondents indicated that they owned pets. As a result the participant’s

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acceptance of dogs as research animals may have challenged by their feelings towards

dogs as pets, or the relationship between owners and pets. The respondents did not share

this feeling with rats, or unnamed species, showing moral inconsistencies that are

considered the norm within the field of human and animal interactions (Herzog 2010).

People show preferences to companion animals, and may be unable to accept these

species as tools, and only be able to attribute them pet status. This preference towards

companion animals is shared throughout society, regardless of their stakeholder role,

leading to individuals using the same moral concepts to evaluate the use of dogs in

animal research.

As well as the factor patterns, approval of the scenarios was influenced by moral

intensity. Pain and human interest clearly impacted the differences between the

scenarios ‘support’ and ‘reject’. Comparing the invasive scenarios ‘rat’ and ‘dog’, with

‘support’, the non invasive scenario, demonstrates that people are less likely to approve

invasive research, meaning that pain to the animal influences decision making. The

difference in approval between ‘rat’ and ‘dog’ indicated that people are more accepting

of research on rats than on dogs. Arluke and Sanders (1996) examined the

‘sociozoological scale’, in which animals are ranked as good or bad on how they fit the

roles that they are expected to play in society. On their scale the good animals are pets,

which are just below humans due to their eagerness to fit into our social order, and

useful tools such as research and production animals that must be de-

anthropomorphised (Arluke & Sanders 1996). Bad animals are the ones that do not

conform to their given role in society including vermin that cross human set boundaries

and threaten to contaminate people through disease (Arluke & Sanders 1996). Both

species were awarded tool status in my survey, yet outside of this context most people

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will consider dogs as pets and rats as vermin. The approval in the survey reflected the

roles these species hold outside of the context of the survey.

While ‘rat’ and ‘dog’ were both for cancer research, both scenarios had higher approval

than the other highly invasive scenario, ‘reject’. Hence, it can be argued that human

interest is the most important determinant of approval of animal research, as supported

by Stafleu et al. (1993). My study then corroborates the common conclusion that

attitudes towards animal research is influenced by the species used, the pain the animal

feels and the human interest of the research (Driscoll 1992; Galvin & Herzog 1992b;

Hagelin et al. 2003; Henry & Pulcino 2009; Knight et al. 2009; Knight & Barnett 2008;

Lund et al. 2014; Phillips & McCulloch 2005). Moral intensity is then a determinant of

the approval of animal experimentation. As approval is dependent on moral intensity,

animal experiments must be approved on a case by case basis.

Approval of animal use in scientific experimentation was also influenced by stakeholder

role. Scientists had the greatest approval for each scenario, followed by veterinarians

and lay people. Animal welfare representatives were the least likely to approve of the

scenarios. The data supports that of Knight et al. (2009) who found that scientists were

more likely to approve of animal use than lay people and animal welfarists, and that lay

people fell between the ‘extreme’ positions. However, my study, in opposition to the

conclusions of Knight et al. (2009) did not show that the animal welfarists were

opposed to the use of all animals. Animal welfare representatives scored neutral for

scenario 1, showing they have the potential to support animal research if it is non

invasive and has high human interest. The different method of recruitment and number

of stakeholders surveyed could explain the discrepancy between my study and that of

Knight et al. (2009). Knight et al. (2009) used groups labelled Compassion in World

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Farming, Society of Protection of Animals Abroad and Vegan Society. While

Compassion in World Farming and the Society of Protection of Animals Abroad can be

interpreted to acknowledge the use of animals by humans, the underlying belief behind

veganism is that it is morally wrong to use animals for human gain. By surveying

members of the Vegan Society, the data of Knight et al. (2009) may have been skewed,

leading to their conclusion of unidimensional rejection of all animal use by animal

welfarists. The animal welfare representatives in my experiment were recruited from

animal welfare groups. Due to the confidentiality outlined in the ethics application,

animal welfare representatives were not asked what organisation they came from. The

organisations originally contacted were the RSPCA, Animals Australia or Humane

Research Australia, so respondents may be associated with these organisations. While

Animals Australia is opposed to animal use to further scientific progress (Animals

Australia n.d.), Humane Research Australia aims to replace animal research with

alternatives (Humane Research Australia 2012) and the RSPCA uses animal welfare

science to base their knowledge of welfare on, and has scientists associated with their

organisation (RSPCA 2013). It can then be assumed that the animal welfare

representatives from these groups would support some forms of animal research.

In addition, different stakeholders were included in my study than that of Knight et al.

(2009). Knight et al’s (2009) survey included scientists, lay people and animal

welfarists, but it did not include veterinarians. My data showed that veterinarians were

less likely to approve of the experiments than the scientists, but more likely than the lay

people. Veterinarians require animal research for their professional training and

advancement; this shared experience with the scientists would allow them understand

the use of animals in research, and experience its benefits in their education. Hence,

veterinarians would be more open to the use of animals for research than lay people and

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animal welfare representatives. It can then be suggested that approval of the use of

animals in research is related to the training and experience of the stakeholder role.

While approval was influenced by both moral intensity and stakeholder role, there was

also a significant interaction between the two, indicating that veterinarians, scientists,

animal welfare representatives and lay people differ in how they interpret the moral

intensity. Interactions between moral intensity and personal factors have been

established to influence approval of ethical dilemmas, for example, there are differences

in how American and Thai students interpret the moral intensity of software piracy

(Kini et al. 2004), how American and Malaysian managers perceive moral intensity

when harm is done to a victim (Karande et al. 2000) and age, gender and degree in

college students (Silver & Valentine 2000). In my study, veterinarians and scientists

both gave similar approval ratings to different scenarios: scientists ‘rat’ and

veterinarians ‘support’, and veterinarians ‘rat’ and scientist’s ‘dog’. Veterinarians

appeared to attribute higher moral conflict to the scenarios than scientists. Scientists are

required to use animals in research as models or tools that are bred to be standardised, a

process that contributes towards their objectification (Birke et al. 2007). The

objectification could allow scientists to see dogs not as pets, but as research animals.

The scenario is then of a similar moral acceptability to how the veterinarians would

view the typical laboratory animal, rats, but not dogs similar to the pets they treat within

their profession. Three other similarities were the approval of ‘rat’ by lay people,

‘support’ by animal welfare representatives and ‘dog’ by veterinarians. Veterinarians

treat dogs as their client’s pets within their profession, but are required to use dogs in

their education and training, hence they have benefited from using dogs as a tool.

Veterinarians attributed a similar level of moral conflict to the use of dogs as animal

welfare representatives did to the use of animals in ‘support’ using non invasive

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research with high human interest, and lay people to ‘rat’. The approval of ‘rat’ and

‘dog’ for lay people gave interesting results. When using a typical laboratory animal in

‘rat’ lay people were similar to veterinarians in their approval, but more aligned with the

animal welfare representatives when using a companion animal in ‘dog’. The assumed

relationship that the lay people felt with dogs made them more unlikely to approve of

animal research, and assess similarly to a stakeholder role that generally opposes animal

use. Stakeholder roles interpreted the scenarios to have varying moral intensity from

each other. While these inconsistencies are expected in individual assessments, they

may lead to problems in group decision making, as made by AECs because some roles

may find certain experiments more ethically acceptable than others.

Despite having high reliability, there were some issues with the scale that need to be

addressed. Email comments received while the questionnaire was on-line indicated that

some participants felt that the scenarios did not provide enough detail to make an

assessment. Some participants felt it was difficult to determine what ‘invasive’ and

‘non-invasive’ meant, and suggested that the animals could incur stressors that were a

result of factors such as handling and husbandry. The decision to keep the scenarios

short, and in some way vague was made to avoid language that would position the

reader to a certain view, which is a common problem in surveys regarding animal

research (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 1982; Driscoll 1992; Hagelin et al. 2003; Herzog et

al. 2001). However, to improve the questionnaire, it would be worth comparing two

versions of the scenarios with different levels of detail to test the effect of wording on

the responses.

The participants themselves were another limitation. As raised in the previous chapter,

the difficulty in obtaining lay people caused a lack of representation of an actual AEC,

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as they were recruited from universities while the Code requires that members are not

affiliated with the institution where the research occurs (National Health and Medical

Research Council 2013). These members may be influenced by their connection to their

institution. However, eight of the lay people responded in the survey that they either

were members of or had previously sat on an AEC, therefore, these members are truly

representative of an AEC. Ideally, future incarnations of this survey would be conducted

using only actual AEC members; however, this was not an option in this study due to

the difficulty in obtaining permission from AECs to participate.

Another issue with the adaptation of the multidimensional ethics scale concerned the

items. In a problem also faced by Reidenbach and Robin (1988), some of the items

could be interpreted as multiple theories. While the items were deliberated upon and

pretested, further attempts to use this survey should refine the items to attempt to reduce

their interpretation as multiple theories.

Seven items, two deontological and five virtue ethics, were removed because they

reduced the validity of the scale. These removals contributed to in an imbalance in the

number of items for each theory. Previous versions of the scale have shared this

imbalance (Hansen 1992; Kujala 2001; Reidenbach & Robin 1988; 1990; Tsalikis &

Ortiz-Buonafina 1990), however, these texts have not previously acknowledged it as an

issue. The removal of the five items meant that the tool did not measure virtue ethics to

the extent as expected, despite being a theory known to influence decision making

regarding animal experimentation. These items all had the potential to be interpreted as

irrational decision making based on emotion, which would be an instance of

subjectivism rather than virtue ethics, with the difference being that virtue ethics is

rational and aims to be consistent. The dropped items dealt with concepts of empathy,

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sympathy, cruelty, suffering and acceptability if the experiment were performed on

humans. The language of one of the retained items, the preservation of dignity, was not

as emotionally loaded as the dropped items, such as ‘this experiment is cruel’. Another

reason this item may have been retained is because it may have been measuring

deontology, as dignity is concept central to that theory too. The dropped items measured

constructs different to the rest of the scale; these items were likely to be measuring

emotion. The argument that emotional items may have been poorly represented in the

model is strengthened in that one of the deontological items dropped regarded fairness,

which may have been wrongly interpreted as an emotional construct associated with

violation and inequality. Further development of this scale should test items of virtue

ethics with variations of their wording to test if they can be included without

emotionally loaded language.

Individuals use a mixture of ethical theories to justify animal research as ethical, and

both their assessment and overall approval are influenced by the moral intensity of the

scenario and the decision maker’s stakeholder role. However, the ultimate decision

about the acceptability of the use of animals in scientific experiments is made by ethical

review committees. As the ultimate decision is made within a committee setting, the use

of ethical theories in justifying animal research needs to be examined in the committee

context, as well as individually, in order to improve the decision making capabilities of

animal ethics committees.

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Chapter 5. Consensus is contextual: the decision making of

role play animal ethics committees is influenced by group

dynamic and the debated protocol

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate the use of ethical theories in the decision process of AECs

to gain better understanding of the dynamic between the different stakeholder roles.

Ethical decisions about the use of animals for scientific purposes are made using

concepts from a number of ethical theories by individuals. However, decisions

regarding animal research are not made individually, but by an animal ethics committee

(AEC), made up of veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal welfare

representatives and lay people. In Australia, the ‘Australian Code for the Care and Use

of Animals for Scientific Purposes’ (The Code) stipulates that decisions to use animals

in research protocols must be based on a thorough, fair and inclusive process of

discussion and deliberation, and made as a consensus by the AEC (National Health and

Medical Research Council 2013). Group decision making requires that individuals with

inconsistent preferences reach a certain level of agreement (March 1994), so since the

Code requires the decision to be made by four stakeholder roles that are likely to have

inconsistent preferences, it may be difficult for the AEC to reach a consensus. However,

the previous two chapters established that the four stakeholder roles express their

preferences using a mixture of ethical theories. If pure ethical theories are used a

consensus is difficult to achieve because the theories are based on different evaluative

concepts and are then conceptually incommensurable (MacIntyre 1979; Brown 1983).

Therefore, it was hypothesised that because individuals use a mixture of ethical theories

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to justify animal experimentation as ethical, AEC decision making will use a mixture of

ethical theories to reach a consensus (Hypothesis 1).

To achieve a consensus, a group will identify different options that they will then debate

their arguments for and against, while the undecided will ask questions to gain more

information upon which to base their decision (Frame 2012). Ultimately, the decision

will reflect the preferences of the majority. However, problems may arise due to the

composition and dynamic of the committee. AECs often see a committee bias toward

the scientific members, who are better than the lay members at communicating their

preferences (Schuppli & Fraser 2007). It has been suggested that this bias may lead to

decisions being based on modifications about the protocol rather than ethical

justification, because it is easier to reach a consensus based on factual exertions of

expert opinions than abstract reasoning (Schuppli & Fraser 2007; Ideland 2009). If

scientific members dominate the discussion, then the discussion is likely to be about

animal welfare and technical issues, rather than the morality of the proposal. It is then

important to determine the committee dynamic, particularly which stakeholder roles

dominate the discussions and influence the other stakeholder roles. It was hypothesised

that during the process of decision making, AEC members would be influenced by each

other, hence committee dynamic influenced ethical decision making (Hypothesis 2).

Because individuals hold different preferences, there may be inconsistencies between

committees. Committees may have different overall preferences that can lead to two

committees making different decisions on the same protocol, as found in 79% of the

protocols reviewed in Plous and Herzog’s (2001) study of institutional animal care and

use committees (IACUCs, the American equivalent of AECs). As a result of the

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different preferences held by their members, it was hypothesised that committees will

differ in their decision making outcomes (Hypothesis 3).

The ethical acceptability of animal experimentation is influenced by the moral intensity.

As shown in the previous chapter, the species used, level of animal suffering and human

interest influenced the approval of animal experiments in individual decision making.

As individuals will bring their preferences, and different roles are influenced differently

by moral intensity, it was hypothesised that group decision making will be influenced

by moral intensity (Hypothesis 4).

5.2. Methods

5.2.1. Experimental Design

I conducted an in-depth analysis of the AEC group discussions of protocols with

varying moral intensities. Due to difficulty in observing and recording an actual AEC,

role play committees made up of members from the four stakeholder roles were

established. The influence of individual AEC stakeholder roles on the group decision

was measured by examining the arguments presented in the discussions using discourse

analysis. I identified which ethical theory was predominantly used by each role, whether

arguments were based on technical or ethical aspects, and which of the stakeholder roles

spoke, were agreed with, asked questions and answered questions the most to establish

if any role was dominant in the discussions. The differences between the committee

decisions was measured by comparing the final decisions of the protocols, the

arguments the committees raised, and which roles dominated the discussions. To test

moral intensity, eight protocols of varied intensity were devised and given to the mock

AECs to discuss, generating data for analysis. I compared the final decisions between

the protocols, the arguments the committees raised, the vocabulary used to describe the

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study subjects, and which protocols had the most technical or ethical based arguments

and instances of agreement and emotional language markers. This research was

approved by the University of Western Australia’s Human Research Ethics Committee

(RA/4/1/4041).

5.2.2. Data Collection: Animal Ethics Committee Role Play

Role play activities were used to simulate the decision making process of AECs. Role

play activity requires that the subject behave as if they were a particular person in a

particular situation (Aronson & Carlsmith 1968). The participants had to assume the

role of a member of an AEC and behave as an AEC member would during the

committee meeting. This study examined ethical attitudes and the behaviour of decision

making as presented in language, therefore, it was necessary to use a highly involved

role play which put the participant in a familiar role, allowing them to freely respond

without restriction (Greenberg & Eskew 1993). To ensure the participants were in a

familiar role, as well as to accurately reflect an AEC, veterinarians, scientists using

animals, representatives from animal welfare organisations, and lay people were

recruited. In total there were 22 participants recruited; five veterinarians, four scientists,

four animal welfare representatives, seven lay people and two members that acted as

both scientists and animal welfare representatives. The method of recruitment of

participants varied according to their role. For scientists, the recruitment email was sent

to the science faculties of the University of Western Australia, and disseminated

amongst staff, resulting in the recruitments of six scientists, two of whom which also

identified as veterinarians. Another scientist was recruited through the distribution of

the invitation by a national wildlife research group. Following unsuccessful attempts to

directly invite veterinarians around the Perth metropolitan area, veterinarians were

recruited through an invitation sent to staff and final year veterinary medicine students

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at Murdoch University’s School of Veterinary and Biomedical Sciences (WA), which

was successful in recruiting two final year veterinary students. For animal welfare

representatives, the invite was sent to the RSPCA and local animal refuges, of which

The Cat Haven provided two participants, however one was unable to complete any of

the role plays. The other participants were recruited as personal contacts of the author

and supervisors, or of other participants, resulting in the recruitment of one veterinarian,

four animal welfare representatives and seven lay people. Of the lay people, only two

were affiliated with the University; one as an undergraduate student, and the other as a

PhD candidate. Each participant was given an invitation letter explaining the research

(Appendix 7). Within these letters was a statement that participation was voluntary, and

that they were able to withdraw their consent if they wanted to. Once they had read the

letter and agreed to participate, the participants then signed a consent form (Appendix

5). Each person was asked to complete a survey for a survey pre-test (Chapter 4), and

paid $25 per session they attended, including completing the survey.

Low recruitment numbers resulted in only two AEC role play groups. Each group

discussed eight protocols with differing levels of human interest, animal suffering and

species. For each session eight people, two from each of the four stakeholder roles, were

invited. However, in seven of the eight meetings participants could not attend with late

notice, which led to an inconsistent representation of the four stakeholder roles

throughout the sessions. On two occasions, participants were required to play a role

different to the one that they were originally designated; however, both participants had

some experience in both the stakeholder roles they acted as. The participants were sent

the protocols via email a week before the session to allow reading time. At the meetings

they were then asked to perform the role of an AEC member from the stakeholder role

they identified with, and encouraged to express their opinions on the protocol and

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whether it should be approved or disapproved. To ensure anonymity, each person was

given a false name.

The protocols for discussion varied in their levels of moral intensity (Appendix 8).

There were eight different protocols with three two-level aspects. The first was human

interest. The high human interest protocol called Agent X focused on a pharmaceutical

intended to impede the growth of cancerous tumours. The low human interest protocol,

Compound Q, aimed to investigate any possible side effects of a new food additive. The

second aspect was the species used; half of the protocols used rats, while the other half

used dogs to test if there would be an expected difference in the acceptance of protocols

using a pest species that has become the stereotypical lab animal and companion

animals. The third aspect was the level of suffering; half were high involving the

animals exhibiting pain behaviour, and the other half low involving animals showing

diminished activity after treatment from which they soon recovered. The protocols

consisted of the general aim of the research, descriptions of the experimental proposal,

and the costs and the benefits of the research to keep it short and manageable for the

participants. Each protocol was labelled according to the committee group and the order

in which the protocol was discussed, for example, the first protocol discussed by Group

1 was labelled G1P1.

During the sessions, the participants were asked to come to an agreement on each

protocol, and to actively express their opinions on all aspects of the protocols. The

sessions were run by the co-ordinating supervisor of the project, who played the role of

the chair using his previous AEC experience. The sessions were recorded and then

transcribed by Digital & Audio Transcription Services (Digital & Audio Transcription

Services 2007). Once received, the transcripts were checked against the tapes, and

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pauses were added. The occurrence of pauses were used to break the texts down into

lines, that were further broke down into stanzas, denoted by a change in subject (Gee

2011).

5.2.3. Hypothesis 1: AECs use a mixture of ethical theories to justify animal

experimentation

5.2.3.1. Discourse Analysis

For each protocol, I compared the proportions of arguments that were ethics based,

discussing the impact of the animal or whether the protocol was morally acceptable, to

arguments that were technical based, offering improvements to the protocols to make

them ethically acceptable. Arguments could be classed in either category, or as both

technical and ethical. The transcripts of each protocol were also examined to find which

ethical theories arguments were constructed with using the Potter and Wetherell (1987)

method of discourse analysis. The method involved finding patterns within the data in

the forms of variability and consistency, and then forming hypotheses about the

functions and effects of the data using linguistic evidence (Potter & Wetherell 1987).

The overall research question of the analysis was how each of the ethical theories are

used by AEC members to construct their worldview of animal experimentation,

meaning that codes were established for each of the four ethical theories utilitarianism,

deontology, virtue ethics and relativism. Each stanza was coded to categorise identified

themes as signified by language use (Starks & Brown-Trinidad 2007) based on the

following criteria:

Utilitarian: Stanzas were coded as utilitarianism when the decision making was

based on outcome, or arguments associated with utilitarian concepts such as

consequences, costs, benefits and attempts made to justify the use of animals in

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research. This included instances where the members offered suggestions that would

then allow approval, using an outcome based assessment.

Deontology: Stanzas were coded as deontological if the decision was based on

the act, regardless of the consequences, including outright rejections either for the use of

animals, or particular procedures. Deontological notions of duty, rights, obligations and

responsibilities were also included, as well as the application of a set of principles.

Virtue Ethics: Both virtue ethics and ethics of care were coded. Stanzas were

coded as virtue ethics if assessments were made on the person’s character, whether their

own or the hypothetical researchers. Stanzas were coded as ethics of care arguments if

they included emotional statements based on care, compassion and empathy, and

references to relationships between people and animals.

Relativism: Stanzas where the participants discussed their personal opinion were

coded as being instances of subjectivism. Cultural relativism was also included where

arguments were based on “public opinion”, cultural mores, and practices considered to

be accepted as ‘normal’.

The stanzas were coded as one or multiple ethical theories and the codes were then

subjected to a discourse analysis in order to identify common themes within the four

codes, which were then examined for patterns in function, construction and variability

to allow their underlying systems of meaning, to become apparent (Braun & Clarke

2006; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Taylor & Ussher 2001). The discourse analysis resulted

in identifying common themes discussed by the AECs, and which ethical theories were

used to structure the given arguments. Validity was ensured following the method of

Potter and Wetherell (1987) particularly the stage of reader’s evaluation where the

interpretations of the quotes were evaluated by the supervisors of this research to see if

they agreed with the interpretation of the author.

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5.2.3.2. Statistical analysis

The proportions of ethical and technical based arguments were calculated for the 16

transcripts, and then transformed using an arcsine transformation to try to achieve a

more normal distribution (Zar 1999). Once transformed, a t-test was run to compare if

the mean proportions of ethical and technical arguments were equal. The proportion of

stanzas stating arguments framed in each of the four ethical theories were calculated for

each stakeholder role for each of the protocols. The proportions were then transformed

using an arcsine transformation to try to achieve a more normal distribution, as

percentages form a binomial distribution rather than a normal distribution (Zar 1999).

Once transformed, a two-way ANOVA test was run using SAS Enterprise Guide (SAS

Institute 2006-2010) to compare the if differences in means were a result of stakeholder

role or ethical theory, or an interaction between the two.

5.2.4. Hypothesis 2: Committee dynamic influences ethical decision making

5.2.4.1. Qualitative assessment of interactions between committee

members

The interactions between committee members were measured firstly by finding

instances within the transcripts where individuals were explicitly influenced by other

committee members in their decision making. Influences were noted when members

directly asked, referred to, agreed with or spoke to another member, or if members were

involved in an argument with other members.

5.2.4.2. Quantitative assessment of interactions between committee

members

Committee interaction was also measured quantitatively by looking at instances of

dominance by certain stakeholder roles. The first decision made was compared to the

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final decision to test if the first instance of a member deciding would influence the rest

of the committee. Another measure compared the proportions of the discussion as

spoken by each of the stakeholder roles, assuming the dominant roles would speak the

most. Dominance was also measured by counting which stakeholder roles were agreed

with the most, because this implied that they were influencing the rest of the committee.

Authority was also measured by counting and comparing which stakeholder roles asked

and answered the most questions. Members who asked questions needed information

from others and hence were in a subordinate role to those who answered (Mishler

1975), and those who answered were in a role of authority and dominance.

5.2.4.3. Statistical analysis

The proportions of the discussion as spoken by each stakeholder role were transformed

using an arcsine transformation and subjected to a one-way ANOVA test with

stakeholder role as the single factor. Comparisons of stakeholder roles in the

agreements, questions and answers were compared using chi square (χ2) tests for

homogeneity.

5.2.5. Hypothesis 3: Committees differ in decision making outcome

5.2.5.1. Quantitative assessment of differences in committee decisions

For each protocol the final outcomes was determined either as an acceptance, a

resubmission or a rejection. The outcomes were tabulated to compare whether the two

committees made different decisions about the same protocol. In addition, reasons

leading to these decisions and differences between the decisions of the two groups were

identified and reported within the discourse analysis. Differences between committees

in their decision making were also examined by the measures of dominance in section

5.2.4.2, and comparing the differences between the two groups.

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5.2.6. Hypothesis 4: Moral intensity influences group decision making

5.2.6.1. Quantitative assessment of the impact of moral intensity on

decision making

The effect of moral intensity on the final decision was made by comparing the final

decisions in section 5.2.5 and arguments made in section 5.2.3 for each level of human

interest, species and pain felt by the animals. For each level of human interest, species

and pain I compared the proportions of arguments that were ethics based, discussing the

impact of the animal or whether the protocol was morally acceptable, to arguments that

were technical based, offering improvements to the protocols to make them ethically

acceptable. Arguments could be classed in either category, or as both technical and

ethical. The impact of species on decision making was further explored by analysing the

vocabulary used to describe the experimental subject. The moral status of an animal

changes when it is a pet or an object (Herzog 2010), therefore, it was important to

compare the words the AEC members used to label the animals. Moral intensity was

also estimated by examining emotional markers in the language. The markers chosen

were superlatives and intensifiers, both identified as expressions of emotional language

(Tagliamonte & Roberts 2005; Claridge 2007). As protocols with higher moral intensity

would enact an emotional response, superlatives and intensifiers were expected to be

used in these protocols more than ones with lower moral intensity.

5.2.6.2. Statistical analysis

The proportions ethical and technical based arguments were calculated for each of the

16 transcripts, and then transformed using an arcsine transformation to try to achieve a

more normal distribution (Zar 1999). Once transformed, three two-way ANOVA tests

were run using SAS Enterprise Guide (SAS Institute 2006-2010) to compare if there

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were interactions between the proportions of ethical and technical arguments and human

interest, species and pain felt by the animals. Post hoc examinations were done using t-

tests. The ratio between the times the animals were called by its species name and using

the generic term “animal” were calculated to compare which term was used more often

for each rats and dogs. The frequency of superlatives and intensifiers were compared

using chi square (χ2) tests for homogeneity for each of the aspects of moral intensity.

5.3. Results

5.3.1. Hypothesis 1: AECs use a mixture of ethical theories to assess animal experimentation

5.3.1.1. Qualitative assessment of the use of ethical theories 5.3.1.1.1. Agent X, Dog, High Pain

When Agent X was tested on dogs experiencing high levels of pain, both groups asked

that the protocol be resubmitted. Each of the four ethical theories was used to reach

these decisions, either to make a decision or to provide an argument towards one. The

arguments focused on either the welfare of the animal or the scientific flaws within the

protocols. Welfare issues caused animal welfare representative Betty to outright reject

the protocol.

I don’t like it. When I read it, um…I don’t think the benefits will outweigh any

cost,… oh yeah, is that the right way round? Yeah um so I think the cost to dogs

is… not um enough for the supposed benefit of the drug…

...

the cost of… these sorts of experiments… where they’re basically kept in a cage

for 12 months… and by the looks of it they’re not walked, they’re not petted,

they’re,

they just sit there… growing tumours… for I… so nup… I disagree with it.

(Betty, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- utilitarianism and virtue

ethics)

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Betty specifically used a utilitarian cost benefit analysis, however, placed her focus on

the costs the dogs would face in terms of their welfare, basing these costs of ethics of

care. By using ethics of care, her utilitarian argument was supported by virtue ethics,

showing the use of multiple theories. Others raised welfare issues that focused either on

reducing the suffering of the dogs, or ensuring that they were provided with

environmental enrichment.

I think, If the model was justified and they discussed the enrichment… and

concerns for the… wellbeing of the dogs

(Sally, Scientist, Group 1- virtue ethics)

And um… But I’m thinking dogs, they’re social animals, they’re used to being in

packs, and to be kept in isolation the whole time would just add to their…

psychological welfare concerns.

(Lauren, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- virtue ethics)

... But...to isolate an animal for a year and a half is unacceptable.

(Melissa, Scientist, Group 2- deontology)

Sally and Lauren argued using virtue ethics, showing concern for the welfare of the

dogs and how their treatment caused welfare issues, relating the problem to the nature

of dogs. However, Melissa stated that the act of isolating the dog for a long period of

time was unacceptable without condition, making it a universal rule regardless of the

benefits that it would bring, using a deontological argument. Arguments about the

scientific flaws within the protocols were raised in both groups, contributing to the final

decision making.

Yep, I’d agree with that too. Um… If the researchers could come back and

could… um… justify… the model… with sufficient… um information then… they

might have a chance of getting through but then they need to actually

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convince… the commission… um with some strong evidence that, that this is the

best model.

(Erin, Scientists, Group 1- utilitarianism)

I just… don’t think that that’s enough… information for me… to wonder why…

we are inducing growth of a… stomach tumour. I mean… tumours are all

different mixed and there are genetic components in there as well. So something

that may… induce a growth in… stomach tumours, and… we may test agent ‘x’

in dogs… this may not act the same way in humans

(Anne, Veterinarian, Group 2- utilitarianism)

As the participants required more information in order to justify the experiment, there

was an underlying assumption in their arguments that the purpose of the experiment,

reducing tumour sizes, was an acceptable use of animals for experimentation. The focus

of the outcome of the experiment positions the arguments to utilitarianism by placing

the emphasis on the experimental benefits. In three occasions, the animal model was

challenged. In Group 2, lay person John offered an alternative to possibly increase the

benefits of the research.

Also… if it is actually necessary to do it in dogs, is there some reason… a dog…

that has stomach cancer… surely they could… kind of, they already have

stomach cancer. Instead of having to induce… the cancer in a healthy dog…

that would be an alternative.

(John, Lay Person, Group 2- utilitarianism)

Although this idea was rejected on the basis of being unscientific, John was trying to

maximise animal welfare by having the protocol not inducing cancer in dogs. Other

members suggested that mice be used instead.

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I agree; um… they talk about this… this agent ‘x’ being effective against

advanced cancer, well if that’s the case… there’s no reason why they couldn’t

have… a larger tumour in a mice, in a mouse growing subcutaneously.

... The other good thing about using mice… to demonstrate efficacy in the first

case, is that… the subcutaneous tumour of a certain size has no impact

whatsoever on the movement of a mouse. The mice can be kept in cages with

each other means they get to socialise with each other.

(Melissa, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

Uh I… I think it’s mostly the fact that… I, I don’t think dogs have a close enough

physiology for them to have any… medical… research benefits… in this … this

sort of study. Um… I mean they’ve found that, what is it, mice have a closer…

um physiology than dogs do to humans so,… um… why not… use mice which

have a fast metabolism so…

(Betty, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- utilitarianism and relativism)

Melissa’s argument to use mice was framed to improve animal welfare, as subcutaneous

tumours allowed for animal enrichment to be achieved easier. Using a method that

caused less animal suffering was an instance of ethics of care, but as she was still

balancing costs and benefits, her argument was based on both virtue ethics and

utilitarianism. Betty claimed that mice were a better model than dogs, yet provided her

personal experiences as justification, taking a relativistic approach by basing her

decision making on her opinion. Other members based arguments on their personal

opinions.

Because inducing cancer in dogs... ah just doesn’t... doesn’t feel right

(Lauren, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- relativism)

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Um... I know a lot of um… medicines, medicines and stuff which wouldn’t have

been possible without… testing on animals but I’m, I’m still not sure… about

using animals, and um the just having animals that are there for us to test on.

(Nancy, Lay Person, Group 1- utilitarianism and relativism)

Animal welfare representative Lauren expressed her personal feelings towards the

research, while lay person Nancy acknowledged the cost benefit analysis, yet ultimately

based her assessment on her personal feelings. In her case, Nancy overruled the cost

benefit analysis with her opinion, hence ultimately referring to a relativistic claim, even

after considering utilitarianism arguments when making her decision.

5.3.1.1.2. Agent X, Dog, Low Pain

Group 2 awarded resubmissions to both the high and low pain protocols testing Agent X

on dogs. Group 1, however, rejected the low pain experiment. The differences between

the decisions of the two groups can be put down to the interpretation of the protocols.

The negatives, or the potential negatives and their inability to address them far

outweigh the potential benefits for this in my mind another reason to reject this.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism and relativism)

Um in overall, I think I’m now no longer reading... the potential benefit of the

research. I just cannot see past the... negatives in the... protocol to even... care

now why they’re doing it... and I would object again.

(Sally, Scientist Group 1- utilitarianism and relativism)

In Group 1, the AEC members acknowledged that they were no longer assessing the

costs and benefits, instead basing their rejection of the protocol on the fact that the

researchers ignored their previous suggestions of improvements, having interpreted the

protocols incorrectly as a resubmission. The decisions were therefore based on their

personal frustration rather than the costs and benefits of the protocol. Group 2, however,

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justified their decision without reference to any other protocol, which allowed for

participants to be able to see benefits without their judgements influenced by the

previous protocols.

... So... you know... it sounds like the compound that they’re proposing to study

has... a lot of promise but... there’s a lot of things I would want to know... about

the study before... I would... approve it.

(Carol, Veterinarian, Group 2- utilitarianism)

Carol, the veterinarian, acknowledged the potential benefits but needed her concerns to

be addressed before she could approve it, which contrasts with the statements made by

Group 1. This decision, labelled by a lay person Bill, of a “revise and resubmit” was

agreed upon by seven members of the committee, each providing utilitarian reasoning

as above, agreeing that if the welfare of the dogs could be improved and their problems

addressed, they would approve of the experiment. Both groups presented similar

arguments as the protocols with high pain, focusing their arguments on the flaws with

the science and improving the welfare of the animals.

I... um had... felt... firstly that... the dogs are... individually housed for 12 months

and... dogs, I don’t think, would like that as, as pack animals and companion

animals, I think that would be... psychologically pretty challenging for them. ...

Um endoscopy sounds pretty invasive to be... to be done as often as they were

going to do them. I thought perhaps they could use an ultrasound or something

like that to monitor the... tumours.

(Lauren, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue

ethics)

The arguments were based on mostly utilitarian or virtue ethics arguments showing

welfare concerns and offering suggestions to reduce the costs towards the dogs

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involved. Virtue ethics was used to show concern and assess aspects of the protocols on

the way the dogs were treated.

And then if you took it out of their water, why wouldn’t you be able to have, why

wouldn’t the dogs be able to be back with... um either like their owners or

something else that’s a much less stressful environment. Um because, yeah,

there’s nothing in here about animal care during the... the time of the... um the

first 12 months or the last, the last six... the six months before they’re

euthanized.

(Hannah, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- virtue ethics and relativism)

Hannah assumed that the dogs were, or could be, pets. Her suggestions were skewed by

how dogs are seen as pets, using cultural relativism. Subjectivism was also used in

arguments.

I don’t know what I’m doing. I feel sad that a dog’s going to die at the end

...

Oh, no, I’ve, I’ve had an endoscopy... before but I’m just concerned because like

my recovery time was so long, and I was in so much pain... you know. Like...

my... stomach area…

(Audrey, Lay Person, Group 1- relativism)

Um... I don’t... I think testing things... testing products for humans on animals is

like... apples and oranges. Um I just think they’re too different to be able to...

say um... that it’s, it’s gonna be... good for humans.

(Rebecca, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- relativism)

Personal opinions influenced decision making; lay person Audrey based her decision

making on her feelings, while animal welfare representative Rebecca’s argument was

based on a personal belief. Rebecca’s belief led her to take a deontological approach

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against animal research, despite being able to apply utilitarianism though to the

protocol.

But... yeah, um... that’s just my blanket... belief. I know, I can see that this would

be... um if, if this product was a goer it would be um... a really good benefit but I

just.

(Rebecca, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- utilitarianism and

deontology)

The term “blanket belief” and the fact that she holds this belief despite being able to see

the benefits confirms this as a deontological belief; the act is wrong regardless of the

consequences or situation. In response to her belief, the rest of the committee provided

arguments in order to change her mind. Ultimately, Rebecca changed her decision to a

utilitarian structured statement after listening to the arguments of others and relying on

her past experiences, showing subjectivism influencing her decision.

Um if all our... um questions were addressed... um to the, the fullest extent and...

um concessions made to welfare... made to the fullest extent, then I could go for

this.

(Rebecca, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- utilitarianism)

Finally she conceded that justification with low costs to the animals would make the

experiment acceptable, agreeing on a resubmission with the rest of the AEC.

5.3.1.1.3. Agent X, Rat, High Pain

The two groups came to different decisions on the protocols testing Agent X on rats

experiencing a high amount of pain. Group 1 rejected the protocol while Group 2 asked

that it be resubmitted. Both groups raised arguments about the scientific flaws in the

protocols and lack of animal welfare considerations.

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My... issue still with the protocol... is a lack of experimental readouts. I feel

they’re not maximising the animals by... getting as much information as

possible. They say they don’t feel agent x will result in hypoglycaemic

hyperinsulinemia, but don’t test for it. They’re using endoscopy to measure

tumour growth, there may be a better less invasive method, or other analyses

that could be done regularly, body weight checks etcetera... to maximise... the

use of the animals.

(Sally, Scientist, Group 1- utilitarianism)

Um but I… also have concerns that the animals are going to be um… perhaps in

distress, for the last two weeks of the exposure. Um I… don’t understand why

that the experiment couldn’t be cut short… um before or as soon as the animal is

displaying any signs of distress. Um I also would prefer… or would for this to

take place, that the animals do have environmental enrichment… and um

socialisation with other rats.

(Lisa, Veterinarian, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

Sally, a scientist, provided a list of alternative tests that should be run in order to

maximise the experimental output, which would make the protocol ethically acceptable

to her. This argument relied on the assumption that the benefits of the experiment were

worthwhile, and as her suggestions would increase the benefits, it was an instance of

utilitarianism. In contrast, veterinarian Lisa focused on animal welfare in her

suggestions to improve the acceptability of the protocol, using ethics of care by

ensuring the treatment of the rats was as humane and free from distress as possible. The

use of animals for science was questioned, with members referring to the discourse

surrounding the debate about the use of animals in research.

You’ve um… you’ve got to try these things on something, so, um whether it’s

rats or mice or whatever, it’s all the same. I… I, I imagine that, you know… as

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you get up the scale with going to dogs and things, well, you know, that’s a bit

out, but… um you’ve got to go somewhere, and uh I don’t agree with the…the

uh… the behaviours that’s going to happen to these uh rats. ...

(Kurt, Lay Person, Group 2- utilitarianism and relativism)

I’ve got this image in my mind of that’s… that’s all… people out there that want

to go stomping into… animal houses and let all the animals free. This is exactly

the kind of image they want to get hold of, and this is what justifies their actions.

We don’t want to be… um you know, going back 30 years and allowing this sort

of thing to happen.

(Lauren, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- relativism)

Lay person Kurt argued that, as medicines need to be tested, using rodents was more

acceptable than dogs, showing a preference towards dogs. Lauren, an animal welfare

representative referred to the role of animal liberationists in the debate, suggesting this

research was an example that enabled animal liberationists to justify their actions. By

referring to her knowledge of animal liberationists she implied that the research was

ethically unacceptable, as it could be used by animal liberationists to convince the

public that this experiment was cruel. Like in the dog protocols, Group 2 suggested that

the protocols could instead use mice as an alternative species.

They could do subcutaneous tumours in mice and do, I mean if the mode of

administration of this… un potential cancer drug is IP, there’s no reason why

they couldn’t do IP… and then look for changes in the sub C tumour which is

not invasive at all, which can be measured with callipers over the skin. There’s

no problems then.

(Melissa, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

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The suggestion of using a smaller and less developed species in a less invasive way

removed the problems in scientist Melissa’s opinion, increasing the animal welfare of

the protocol. When it came to the final decision making, utilitarianism was used.

I think… they can… try to justify why they would… have a pilot study first,

based on the changes that we have made. It wouldn’t be a straight no from my

point, because… I think if you can… relieve the suffering of cancer patients…

cancer, human cancer patients, by… trying to reduce their hyperglycemia and

hyperinsulinemia and decrease the ketone production… then… you’re

potentially doing some good to these cancer patients. And it might also…

reverse on what the effects they have done to the rats in the first place. So…

trying to balance that… if, if the project is… gives them a positive result, then…

you can actually have a positive outcome. So I think it can be justified.

(Anne, Veterinarian, Group 2-utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

Um I think that the cost to the animals is, is great and while um... it could be um

an important... um... well the AKT could make it safer and more efficient, but I

think that if the science isn’t, isn’t correct then... it can’t be approved because

obviously there’s a lot of flaws from what you’re all saying. So.

(Amanda, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- utilitarianism)

Veterinarian Anne used ethics of care and utilitarian reasoning to support the research

because she could see the large benefits it would have. Animal welfare representative

Amanda also felt these benefits were of value, but was persuaded by the opinions of the

rest of the group to reject the protocol based on the flaws in the methodology they had

identified. Group 1’s interpretation of the protocol was what led to its rejection.

I have a concern that we’ve... this is the third time we’ve considered this

application and they, they still miss the point about concerns and don’t address

them fully. Even though we’ve explained... our reservations, they don’t seem to

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be able to... grasp the importance of those points, which concerns me about their

ability to conduct this... potentially very beneficial research... well within their

group.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group 1- virtue ethics)

Their rejection was based on their interpretation of the protocol being revised, instead of

as a new protocol. The arguments were based on the researchers being unable to take

their instructions; therefore, virtue ethics as a character assessment shaped their decision

making.

5.3.1.1.4. Agent X, Rat, Low Pain

Both groups requested a resubmission for the Agent X protocols where rats were

subjected to low levels of pain. Discussions focused on the flaws within the science of

the protocols and a disregard of animal welfare.

I had a question about that, actually about… how um… consistent the dose is…

having it ad lib in the drinking water like that. Um… Yeah, I would have thought

that, perhaps, to do a standard… dose based on body weight it might be… a... a

better way… to practice than it is… so that the dose is consistent.

(Erin, Scientist, Group 1- utilitarianism)

I think… the reason that everybody goes to intra-peritoneal injections in rodents

is because… rodents are small… and it’s the easiest place… for the

experimenter to put the injection in. But… I object… because inter-peritoneal

injections are bloody painful… Um anybody that’s done any abdominal surgery

on, on animals without live anaesthetic when they hit the peritoneal the animal

twitched, seriously. It hurt.

(George, Veterinarian, Group 1- relativism and virtue ethics)

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And also… it is written here that they are kept in individual cages. So if that’s

the case, I would want to know the… size of the cages, whether it is… actually…

going to be… a healthy environment for them to live in. And also… they would

definitely be… decreasing their social activity because they are kept in

individual cages, so… why can’t you just put different rats, different, in all in

one cage?... Or half of them in one cage and half of them… not in a cage. And

then… at least they still… have social activity.

(Anne, Veterinarian, Group 2- virtue ethics)

Scientist Erin made suggestions to maximise the utility of the protocols, while George

the veterinarian based his improvements to the protocol on subjectivism, expressing his

negative feelings towards intra-peritoneal injections and stating these injections were

selected only because it was easy. He also referred to past experiences using his role as

a veterinarian to base his opinion on and applied ethics of care to the animal, requesting

a method that would not hurt them. Ethics of care was also seen in Anne’s request for

enrichment, asking for the rats social requirements to be met by housing multiple rats

together. In Group 1, the resubmission appeared to be a result of the group requiring

further clarification of their queries and for the researchers to adhere to their suggestions

of improvements to the protocol.

I think… we need to clarify… the points we’ve… raised um and review again.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group - utilitarianism 1)

Um yep. I think I would prefer, prefer if they did um… administer orally some…

way because um… it seems like it’s going to be quite painful… if it’s intra-

peritoneal.

(Jade, Lay Person, Group 1- utilitarianism and ethics of care)

The decision was based on reducing the costs rather than referring to the utility of the

research, which was the focus of the decision making in Group 2.

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I would agree with what’s been said, but… I think that the research sounds… um

like it has some really… some possibly really um important outcomes. So I think

that… they just need to explain… a lot of their methods… they just require

explanations, so we understand why… um they are doing it the way they are. In

particular, they haven’t really mentioned pain at all, and I think that it’s

important that they… um… are more specific about their expectations of

whether pain is expected, how much pain is expected. ...

(Amanda, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism and ethics of care)

The members of Group 2 specified that the research did have valuable benefits, but also

required their queries to be met, maximising the benefits and reducing the costs, as

opposed to Group 1 who focused on reducing the costs.

5.3.1.1.5. Compound Q, Dog, High Pain

The protocols using dogs in an experiment that caused them a high level of pain in order

to devise a cheaper preservative were rejected by both groups. As in previous protocols,

the AEC members had issues with the lack of animal welfare and scientific

justifications within the protocols, contributing to their rejection. However, the overall

rejections were based on the low benefits and high costs, using utilitarian rationale.

I agree if that maybe they want to… disprove that expectation, but… uh… the…

their justifications for this research is saving… a frozen dinner company 75% of

these costs. And in my mind… that’s not a significant enough benefit.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism)

Um I think it’s not… I think the cost of it is more than the… potential benefit,

like the dogs… are suffering a bit more, and just to… cut back on costs on

preservatives. And um yeah… I’m not too happy with this experiment…

(Jade, Lay Person, Group 1- utilitarianism and relativism)

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… Um… and also… for me, the cost benefit was… this is a very high cost to the

animal with very little benefit… for the human outcome.

(Lauren, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- utilitarianism)

The AEC members actively weighed the costs and benefits when coming to their

personal decision, which was emphasised by the use of pronouns “I” and “me” in the

framing of the decision statement. Their decisions focused on the fact that the

preservative was not enough to warrant animal research, and this argument was

strengthened by animal welfare representative Betty, using cultural relativism.

Also with the general… I’m assuming that this is likely for a Western based

market… and the way that society trends has been going… towards the no

artificial preservatives, no… added preservatives, no… artificial flavouring and

colourings, and all the rest… um who knows whether this sort of thing would be

obsolete in the next couple of years anyway.

(Betty, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- relativism)

Betty’s decision making about the utility of the preservative was influenced by her

observation of a cultural shift away from preservatives in Western society. She deemed

that the product will be unnecessary if the public are not willing to use it in the future,

basing her decision on her understanding of public opinion. Another argument using

cultural relativism, in conjunction with virtue ethics and utilitarianism, was made by

veterinarian Anne in questioning species use.

Um… And what kind of use (is) possible in other animals, and for a shorter…

amount of time, for example rats… and maybe see if they’ve got the same.

Because rats are… have… you know same digestive systems, and why can’t you

just use rats… as compared to dogs? ... and then… if the animals (dogs)… are

fit enough to be re-homed, they can do that. They don’t actually have to

euthanize the animals… for the experiment.

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(Anne, Veterinarian, Group 2- relativism, virtue ethics and utilitarianism)

Anne suggests using rats, the traditional laboratory animal as a substitute to dogs which

can be interpreted as cultural relativism or as utilitarianism in reducing the suffering to a

species that requires a smaller timeframe. However, cultural relativism was evident in

her suggestion that the dogs could be re-homed, emphasising the role of dogs as pets.

5.3.1.1.6. Compound Q, Dog, Low pain

Protocols testing Compound Q where the dogs experienced low levels of pain were

rejected by both groups. Both groups rejected the decisions based on the perceived

flaws with the scientific justification of the protocols, animal welfare problems, and the

fact that they did not believe the benefits were sufficient to warrant the suffering to the

animals.

I... um just think that there’s no information about how the animals will be

kept... so or their quality of life for an entire year. A... dog in a kennel for an

entire year... without any sort of enrichment, which is potentially could be

what they’re planning on doing... uh is no quality of life and they would be

better off euthanized from the kennel. So I would say... no, given that it doesn’t

seem to have... a great benefit.

(Amanda, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- utilitarianism and virtue

ethics)

I thought that… to have the animals’ euthanised after the end of the project is a

bit farfetched. Um you can possibly… try to find out if there are problems…

with the organs… by doing blood tests or ultrasounds and tests like that, that

are non invasive and wouldn’t cost the life of the animal. Because if… the

effects of the compound… Q doesn’t actually cause any… form of…

detrimental effects to any of the organs, then you potentially would have

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euthanised the animal… for a really small… issue in the animal, and it’s

probably just not worth it.

(Anne, Veterinarian, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

The arguments tended to be framed using utilitarian cost benefit analysis, but also

incorporated virtue ethics in the focus on the quality of life of the dogs. Members also

argued the lack of benefits of the research.

Could I say first up, C2 that, I think that the uh experiment is quite trivial... the

benefit is trivial... and I don’t think that anybody should be killing dogs... for

that reason.

(Ingrid, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- utilitarianism and virtue

ethics)

I should probably mention the fact that the… just the benefit of the research

isn’t particularly great… and they couldn’t justify this type of experiment.

(John, Lay Person, Group 2- utilitarianism)

Both speakers focused on the lack of benefits using utilitarian reasoning, yet Ingrid’s

argument was stronger as she referred to the experiment as trivial, discrediting its

purpose. However, Veterinarian George argued there were potential benefits of the

research not outlined by the protocol which could make the research ethically

acceptable.

... Um on the points that (the animal welfare representatives) have raised...

there are some... quite important... um spin offs from this research. If, if it can be

shown that... uh this preservative.. is safe and it does do a good job of...

maintaining the palatability, attractiveness... uh all the rest of it of frozen foods,

that’s important for... um some parts of... human medicine. Uh particularly um

dietary requirements for geriatrics and... um people with um... mental

problems... um where... providing them with... an attractive meal is a really

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important... uh thing. And if, if that... if they’re able to improve the quality of the

feed, uh the food that people are being offered in... those sorts of institutions...

uh where they need to do that, then this does have some potential benefits for

human medicine.

(George, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

George appealed to emotion by framing the benefits towards groups of people that

society are generally empathetic towards, using virtue ethics in his argument.

Arguments using empathy to frame the benefits were also used by scientists Sally and

Melissa.

Can I say that if it was in say... medicine for children to make it more...

palatable, drinkable, would that change... an opinion? I have a 3 year old

daughter who... has to take Panadol on the odd occasion and doesn’t want it

‘cause it’s not red or white or pink or whatever her favourite is on the time.

Would that make any difference? Just a random question.

(Sally, Scientists, Group 1- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

I, I agree. I think if they just applied that this um… this preservative could be

used in other ways if, if it makes… I don’t know… certain medicine’s more

appealing then it will be administered to third world countries and it makes

children take their medicine…

(Melissa, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

The benefits were framed to be for children, and as people are generally more

empathetic to children than adults, they may interpret an experiment that benefits

children as more worthwhile than one that benefits the public. Other members

challenged the arguments reframing who received benefits.

I still keep coming back to the fact that this is... to save frozen dinner companies

75% of their costs towards preservatives, and in my mind, that doesn’t justify...

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the... cost to the animals. If they had the nous to say this could... change the

face of medicating 3 year olds... then... maybe that would be different, but

that’s not their... intention, they don’t see that.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

The intended benefits were not sufficient, but could be reconsidered if these alternative

benefits were offered within the protocol instead of by other members. As with the

previous protocols involving dogs, the species was questioned.

… Why not rats which are better for toxicity, or even mice. Uh… and… what

else? …they may… may not live long enough… so that’s why a rat might be

ideal because you could house… two or three rats together in a cage and they

could still be social. They can still access… the food, and… it’s just a more

ideal animal for this kind of study.

(Melissa, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

... Also I think that if, if that’s the aim... um for human consumption then... it

could be tested in an animal which is... not considered a companion animal,

and which has large cultural significance... in our community. So... I... still

feel that given the cultural significance of companion animals, that to test this...

on a companion animal... um is too greater cost and not that necessary.

(Amanda, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- utilitarianism and

relativism)

While scientist Melissa based her decision on utilitarianism, maximising the experiment

by improving animal welfare and suitability, Amanda used cultural relativism,

privileging dogs over other species on the basis of their cultural significance to humans

as companions. The use of shelter animals as an alternative was also ruled out, using

deontological reasoning.

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I completely disagree with using shelter animals for experimentation because

that is the thin end of the wedge... leads to the path of shelters being tempted

to... sell animals for profit... It’s not on.

(Ingrid, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1- deontology and

utilitarianism)

Ingrid framed the use of shelter animals as an absolute rule for which exceptions cannot

be made. However, in considering the false alternative argument of “where will this

lead to” she alludes to the outcome, and her reasoning can be interpreted as either rule

based utilitarianism or a mixture of theories.

5.3.1.1.7. Compound Q, Rat, High Pain

The Compound Q protocols using rats that would endure a high level of pain were

rejected. All members contributed negative arguments to the discussion, and all but one

per group gave the protocol an outright rejection. Decisions were based on either

suggested improvements to the methodology and animal welfare of the protocols, or

costs benefit analysis.

Um… I also am concerned that there’s no mention of how that the rats will be

kept. Um no mention of environmental enrichment. Um they say that all the

invasive procedures will be carried out by trained personnel and they haven’t

mentioned… um what invasive procedures these will be. And… it doesn’t say…

mention anything about monitoring these rats during the 12 months or how

they’ll be monitored… So I’m not happy for the project to go ahead.

(Lisa, Veterinarian, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

Lisa displayed her concerns based on the outcome of the research, and what is

happening to the animal, exhibiting concern for animals in a decision based on both

virtue ethics and utilitarianism. However, other members within her AEC countered the

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idea that the protocol was sufficient to base rejection on, as evidenced by veterinarian

Carol’s response to animal welfare representative Rebecca regarding the protocol.

Yeah, so I think… I think it’s important to separate um… consideration of the…

whether we consider… this to be an ethical… study to proceed with… and

separate that from issues we might have about the study design...

(Carol, Veterinarian, Group 2- relativism)

Carol stated the importance of looking at the ethics of the protocol, rejecting it on the

basis that it was the use of animals for food preservatives, and not the experimental

design problems. Bill, a lay person, instead proposed that experimental design should

influence decision making.

... Considering, were it a well designed but unethical experiment, or a badly

designed but ethical experiment, the question would be harder. But this is both

not terribly well designed and of dubious morality. So it kind of… the two act

together in this case.

(Bill, Lay Person, Group 2- relativism)

Bill was of the opinion that both the experimental design and ethics were to be taken

into account for decision making. These differences show that the individuals used

different aspects of each protocol to make their decision, incorporating subjectivism in

each member’s interpretation of how they make their decisions. The cost benefit

arguments were used throughout the discussions, and complicated by veterinarian

George in Group 1. He suggested that the protocol had alternate benefits, maximising

the research by applying the benefits to a group that people felt more empathetic

towards, using virtue ethics and utilitarianism to persuade the other members that the

research could have greater benefits. However, lay person Audrey disagreed with his

argument.

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I don’t like the use of preservatives in food as it is. Um I just don’t think it’s

healthy... I don’t, I don’t think it benefits anything, just so... food looks pretty.

Like... food is there to keep people alive, and you know to obtain as many

vitamins and... um... things to help your body work, rather than... just...

something looks pretty, and a carrot looks super orange as opposed to slightly

faded orange.

(Audrey, Lay Person, Group 1- utilitarianism and relativism)

Audrey based her rejection of the protocol on a subjective argument that the research

had no significant purpose. Veterinarian Susan agreed with Audrey’s opinion that the

benefits were not of enough value.

I still... fail to appreciate the, the benefit of this research. I... appreciate

George’s ... support of the benefits, potential benefits... but in my mind the

benefits don’t outweigh the cost, even if they have a much more scientific

approach to what they’re trying to do.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism)

Susan based her decision on the costs and benefits, regardless of improvements that

could be made, using a utilitarian argument, contrasting to that of Audrey who based

her assessment on a subjective personal opinion.

5.3.1.1.8. Compound Q, Rat, Low Pain

When rats testing Compound Q experienced a low amount of pain, the two groups

awarded the protocol a resubmission instead of a rejection. As with the previous

protocols, arguments were made regarding the science of the protocol, and improving

the animal welfare.

First of all I would like to see… some justification for… um for feeding animals…

um before they,… before they actually go ahead and do that,… there’s a whole

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heap of stuff that they could be doing with in-vitro studies, looking for the

cytopathic affect on… on different cell lines,… uh kidney line… liver line, things

like that. Um and to see whether or not there, there are likely to be any affects

from feeding this stuff… Um… But yeah, that, that those are my major objections.

(George, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism)

Okay. And also, I… I have concerns… there’s nothing… mentioned about the

environment that the rats will also be living in… If it’s an enriched environment

or if it’s just in a cage by themselves, or if in a social setting or... I have concerns

with that.

(Lisa, Veterinarian, Group 2- utilitarianism and virtue ethics)

George offered improvements to the methodology to allow the research to be accepted,

implying the research had the potential to be approved of. In contrast, Lisa used virtue

ethics to emphasise animal welfare being integral to the acceptance of the protocol

rather than the methodology or outcome. Despite not being rejected, 4 of the 7 members

in Group 1 and 4 out of 6 members in Group 2 stated that the benefits did not warrant

animal use.

I still have issues with the fact that there is something that works alright to

maintain the colour of frozen food, and this is clearly a money saving…

exercise… for the… frozen food company and… therefore, for me, the expense to

the animal doesn’t… outweigh the benefit… of the work although the… impact

on the animal is probably reasonably benign in, in the sense in that it’s a couple

of hours of diminished activity, that’s arguably not a, doesn’t have a huge

welfare impact on those individual animals but I’m still not sure of the, the

benefit of that work.

(Susan, Veterinarian, Group 1- utilitarianism)

I uh… I don’t necessarily think that the benefits of this outweigh the costs. Um I

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agree that it if this is just to save the company money, they already have a

compound that works effectively except for the discolouration of a food product.

... I don’t think that… there is enough benefit to… yeah… to outweigh the costs.

(Hannah, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism)

Cost benefit analysis was actively used to deem this protocol to have insufficient

benefits, despite the low costs to the animals, showing a belief that food preservatives

were not important enough to warrant animal use. Yet, the acceptability may have

changed if the benefits were increased, as Veterinarian George often did by attributing

the benefits to a vulnerable group in society, using virtue ethics to get an emotive

response from the others to agree with the benefits. Another alternative benefit was

reducing food wastage.

I think… also… just showing a little bit more research into… the benefits um… so

that… if there was a limitation on food wastage… um something more than for

humans to find it appetising… I think it has to be a real merit for it or I don’t

think it’s worthwhile.

(Hannah, Scientist, Group 2- utilitarianism)

Hannah, a scientist, used a different but realistic approach that the rest of the group

could identify in order to highlight the potential in the research. Animal welfare

representative, Betty, used an argument based on cultural relativism to maximise the

benefits of the research.

And to continue that thought is the second and third generations of this, of this

building up, cause frozen foods and frozen meals and that does seem to be an

increasing… um part of, of western society at least… um and possibly has

implications for, for wider society as well, like third world countries or

whatever… but um… with epigenetic studies, the way they are going sort of

things, and looking at things further down the line how your grandparents and

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your parents have affected the, the next… uh set of offspring… um how this can…

can have an effect further down the line.

(Betty, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2- relativism and utilitarianism)

Betty applied the current state of society to help maximise the benefits, increasing the

acceptability of the research. In their terms for resubmission both groups required that

the benefits be elaborated on, hoping that the researchers would frame their benefits to

include their suggestions. The resubmission implies that groups could see the benefit

when rats were used in food preservative experiments, but only when they would

experience a low level of pain and suffering. The use of rats in experiments was not as

much as a problem as the use of dogs, as stated by lay person Tessa.

Honestly… a rat’s a rat to me. If you saw a rat in the kitchen you’d kill it, let’s be

honest… um to me anyway. But… we have to think… what can you see with 20

rats. So I’d like them to either… to prove that they can… in other cases that they

can see… proper statistics come from a small group like that. That would be more

my concern… not really… the issue with the killing the rats or whatever.

(Tessa, Lay Person, Group 2- relativism and utilitarianism)

Tessa related the role of rats, as pests, within our society, using cultural relativism in her

assessment. As rats are species you can kill without a problem in some circumstances,

this shaped her idea that it is acceptable to use rats in experiments where they are killed.

5.3.1.2. Quantitative assessment of the use of ethical theories

Throughout the sixteen protocols, 65.6% of the arguments were classed as being based

on technical aspects of the protocols. Technical based arguments were not significantly

more common than arguments based on ethical aspects, which accounted for 50.8% of

the arguments (p = 0.31). The proportion of arguments used in each of the four theories

were influenced by an interaction between the ethical theory and the stakeholder role (p

< 0.0001), but may have been skewed by the significant effect of ethical theory (p <

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0.0001). Utilitarian reasoning was the dominant theory for each of veterinarians,

scientists, animal welfare representatives and lay people, however, deontological, virtue

ethics, and relativist arguments were also used (Figure 5.1). At least half of the

arguments were structured in a utilitarian manner for each stakeholder role (Figure 5.1).

Each group used multiple ethical theories; all but the lay people used the four theories to

structure their arguments and decisions. With the exception of lay people, virtue ethics

was the second most frequently used theory, followed by relativism and deontology

(Figure 5.1). The lay people differed in that relativism was their second most frequently

used theory, virtue ethics was third and they did not use deontological reasoning (Figure

5.1). There was no significant effect of stakeholder role on each of the ethical theories

used (p = 0.3099).

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5.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Committee dynamic influences ethical decision making

5.3.2.1. Qualitative assessment of interactions between committee

members

The discourse analysis uncovered situations where the majority of the committee

directly influenced the final decision. In Group 1, the two animal welfare

representatives were participating for the first time during this protocol, and outlined

that their decision making was influenced by the rest of the group members.

Yeah uh I would say that um I would be willing to go um and agree with the rest

of the group... if um the consensus is that... they shouldn’t get another go

because they have come back three times, and I think it’s fair to reject... reject

them. Um but having not been here I’m... willing to just go with whatever the

rest of the group concedes, I don’t feel qualified to...

(Amanda, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 1)

Their uncertainty led them to follow the rest of the group’s decision, as they did not feel

qualified and included in the decision making process. Group 2 had a situation during

protocol 6 where animal welfare representative Rebecca shared her deontological

rejection of animal research. The rest of the group then asked for clarification and

offered alternative protocols to test whether she would support variations on the

protocols.

If we... were given more justification of how that would... something would be

showing that, be a sufficient answer? If they came back with a response... to that

effect?

(John, Lay Person, Group 2)

Would you consider the use of dogs in this experiment if... I guess I can’t

guarantee that the dogs... won’t... ever... experience any discomfort, but if they

could... decrease that discomfort and also address any discomfort that...

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occurred, like proper monitoring during the experiment... and that they could

possibly re-home the animals after the experiment, would you then... consider...

the use of dogs in this experiment?

(Lisa, Veterinarian, Group 2)

The other members did not support her view and sought to change it, eventually

succeeding when bringing in The Code and legal requirements to the decision making.

Um if all our... um questions were addressed... um to the, the fullest extent and...

um concessions made to welfare... made to the fullest extent, then I could go for

this.

(Rebecca, Animal Welfare Representative, Group 2)

Rebecca changed her view due to the pressure of the rest of the committee, finally

achieving a consensus in decision making.

5.3.2.2. Quantitative assessment of interactions between committee

members

The first decision made in each of the protocols was similar to, and thought to influence,

the final decision made in thirteen of the sixteen protocols. The first decision was made

by scientists in seven of the sixteen protocols, animal welfare representatives in five and

veterinarians in four protocols. There were only three instances where different

decisions were made by the initial decision maker and the group consensus. Two of

these decisions were made by animal welfare representatives and one by a scientist

(Table 5.1).

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Table 5.1. Comparisons of the final decision for each protocol against the first decision made.

5.3.3. Quantitative assessment of the influence of the committee dynamic on

decision making as compared between 2 AECs (Hypotheses 2 and 3)

Committee dominance was quantitatively measured by who spoke the most. Overall,

veterinarians dominated the discussions, but only significantly in Group 1 (Table 5.2; p

< 0.0001). In Group 2, the lay people talked significantly less than the veterinarians and

animal welfare representatives (Table 5.2; p < 0.0007).

Table 5.2. Proportion of the arguments and decisions as made by each of the four groups in total,

and in both Group 1 and Group 2

Overall G1 G2 Veterinarians 0.43a 0.51a 0.35b Scientists 0.19 0.15 0.23bc Animal Welfare Representatives 0.24 0.19 0.29b Lay People 0.14 0.15 0.13c a denotes p < 0.001, c denotes p < 0.0007

Human Interest

Species

Pain

Group

Initial Decision Maker

Initial Decision

Consensus

Agent X Dog High 1 Animal Welfare Representative

Rejection Resubmission

2 Scientist Resubmission ResubmissionDog Low 1 Scientist Rejection Rejection

2 Scientist Resubmission ResubmissionRat High 1 Animal Welfare

RepresentativeRejection Rejection

2 Animal Welfare Representative

Rejection Resubmission

Rat Low 1 Veterinarian Resubmission Resubmission

2 Scientist Resubmission ResubmissionCompound

Q Dog High 1 Animal Welfare

RepresentativeRejection Rejection

2 Veterinarian Rejection RejectionDog Low 1 Animal Welfare

RepresentativeRejection Rejection

2 Veterinarian Rejection Rejection

Rat High 1 Scientist Rejection Rejection

2 Veterinarian Rejection RejectionRat Low 1 Scientist Rejection Resubmission

2 Scientist Resubmission Resubmission

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Authority of stakeholder roles measures did not fit the expected χ2 ratios of

homogeneity assuming each stakeholder role would be equal. AEC members agreed

with the veterinarians the most and lay people the least (p < 0.05). In Group 2, scientists

and veterinarians received an equal number of agreements, while in Group 1 there was a

difference of 27 between the two roles; veterinarians were agreed with more often than

scientists (Figure 5.2).

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Veterinarians Scientists Animal Welfare Representatives

Lay People

Count

Figure 5.2. Number of times each of the stakeholder roles were agreed with during the discussions.

Colours are used to distinguish agreements from Group 1(█) and Group 2 (█).

The stakeholder roles were uneven in the number of questions they asked (p < 0.05).

Lay people asked the most questions, and scientists were the least likely to ask (Figure

5.3). Veterinarians and animal welfare representatives answered the most questions, and

lay people the least (p < 0.05; Figure 5.4).

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Veterinarians Scientists Animal Welfare Representatives

Lay People

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Figure 5.3. Number of questions asked by mock AEC members. Colours are used to distinguish

agreements from Group 1(█) and Group 2 (█).

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Veterinarians Scientists Animal Welfare … Lay People

Count

Figure 5.4. Number of the answers and clarifications from the mock AEC members prompted by

questions raised. Colours are used to distinguish agreements from Group 1(█) and Group 2 (█).

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5.3.4. Differences between the final decisions of two AEC models and the

effect of moral intensity on the final decision (Hypothesis 3 & 4)

Different patterns of acceptance were observed between the two AEC role play groups.

Group 1 allowed three protocols for resubmission: two utilising Agent X and one with

Compound Q (Table 5.3). Group 1 approved of the Agent X protocols where dogs were

subjected to high pain and where rats experienced low pain. Only one compound Q

protocol, using rats that would experience low pain, was awarded resubmission. The

other Compound Q protocols were rejected. The protocols awarded resubmission were

the first three discussed by Group 1, who rejected the forth through to eighth protocols

(Table 12). Group 2 allowed more resubmissions than Group 1; all Agent X protocols

were subjected to resubmission, while only the Compound Q protocol where rats were

subjected to low pain was awarded a resubmission (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. The final decision made by each of the two AECs for each of the eight protocols in order

of their appearance and the time they took to reach their decision.

Human Interest

Group 1 Group 2 Species Pain Order Consensus Time Order Consensus Time

Agent X Dog High 1 Resubmission 19.39 2 Resubmission 23.15 Dog Low 7 Rejection 14.51 6 Resubmission 32.24 Rat High 5 Rejection 24.49 4 Resubmission 37.41 Rat Low 3 Resubmission 31.10 7 Resubmission 10.25 Compound Q

Dog High 4 Rejection 22.11 8 Rejection 11.10 Dog Low 6 Rejection 16.05 3 Rejection 21.24

Rat High 8 Rejection 22.56 5 Rejection 14.11 Rat Low 2 Resubmission 30.20 1 Resubmission 22.35

5.3.5. Quantitative assessment of the impact of moral intensity on decision

making (Hypothesis 4)

The human interest of the protocol impacted whether the AEC members used technical

or ethical based arguments (p > 0.0001). Agent X protocols were discussed using a

higher proportion of technical than ethical arguments (p > 0.0001), and Compound Q

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protocols were discussed using a higher proportion of ethical based arguments (p =

0.02). Species and level of pain did not impact whether technical or ethical arguments

were more common (p > 0.05; Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5. The mean proportions of arguments that were considered either technical based (█) or

ethical based (█) for each of the two levels of the three moral intensity components.

Veterinarians, animal welfare representatives and lay people referred to dogs as their

species more often than the dissociative term “animal”, while scientists used both terms

evenly (Table 5.4). Veterinarians and lay people were consistent in preferring to use the

species name for both rats and dogs. However, animal welfare representatives used the

term animal to refer to rats more often than their species name, as did scientists (Table

5.4).

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Agent X Compound Q Dog Rat High Pain Low Pain

Proportion

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Table 5.4. Ratios of the times that each of the stakeholder roles referred to the experimental

animals as either their species or as the dissociative term “animal”.

Veterinarians ScientistsAnimal Welfare Representatives

Lay People

Dog:Animal 71:47 37:38 51:44 20:16

Rat:Animal 73:62 25:34 11:28 27:10

Moral intensity did not influence the use of emotional markers, with the exception that

superlatives were used more in Agent X protocols than Compound Q protocols (p <

0.001). Intensifiers were a more prominent marker of emotional language than

superlatives, but did not differ by level of moral intensity (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5. Count of the instances of emotional markers, superlatives and intensifiers, in terms of the

human interest, species and pain invasiveness of the protocols.

Superlatives IntensifiersAgent X 21a 206Compound Q 3 206Dog 10 205Rat 14 207High Invasiveness 10 216Low Invasiveness 14 196

a denotes p< 0.001

5.4. Discussion

As hypothesised, members of the mock animal ethics committees used a mixture of

ethical theories to justify animal experimentation protocols as ethical, yet their

discussions were dominated by utilitarian reasoning. The hypothesis that members were

influenced by each other was supported by instances within the discussions. Even

though the study only recruited enough people for two committees, there were

differences in their group dynamics which led to the two committees reaching different

decisions on two occasions, but reached their conclusions due to different reasons.

Moral intensity was found to influence decision making, however, so was the order in

which the protocols were discussed. AEC decisions appear to be the product of many

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different factors including the committee dynamic, particularly which stakeholder roles

are dominant, and the protocol itself.

The arguments made by the mock AEC members predominantly used utilitarian

reasoning, however, there were also instances of deontological, virtue ethics and

relativist based arguments. Utilitarianism, in the form of cost benefit analysis, has

become the standard method of assessment for AECs. Previous studies have shown that

students (Galvin & Herzog 1992b) and AEC members use utilitarianism in their

assessments (Schuppli 2004; 2011; Ideland 2009). However, these studies also

identified other moral philosophies such as notions of animal rights, and feelings of

intuition and emotion influence their decision making process (Galvin & Herzog 1992b;

Schuppli 2004; 2011). My data provided evidence that subjectivism, emotion, care

towards animals and character assessments of the researchers were used alongside cost

benefit assessments to judge animal protocols as ethically acceptable. It can then be

inferred that AEC members use a mixture of ethical theories in their decision making,

instead of the singular theories often used by moral philosophers (Eyal et al. 2010). The

use of pure utilitarianism can allow for protocols with high animal suffering to be

acceptable, providing the benefits are perceived to be extremely high. The Code

prevents this scenario by implementing a mixture of ethical theories in its process of

decision making; the principles of the 3Rs must be addressed in animal protocols, and

the Code emphasises the importance of animal welfare (National Health and Medical

Research Council 2013). The 3Rs, an instance of deontological principlism, provide

standards to protect animals, and the emphasis on welfare takes into account the

compassion humans feel for animals, bringing virtue ethics into the assessment. The

Code then allows for pragmatic decision making, and in order to do so it is important

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that a mixture of concepts from different ethical theories is prescribed because this

allows for many ethical issues of relevance to be highlighted and critically examined.

As AEC decisions are made as a group consensus, all members must make the decision

together and are influenced by each other in the decision making process. However, it

appeared that the “scientific members”, veterinarians and scientists, had greater

influence than the “lay roles”, animal welfare representatives and lay people. Scientific

members made the first decision eleven out of the sixteen times, and veterinarians were

the role that spoke, were agreed with, and answered questions the most. The scientific

members established themselves as authority figures, and hence were able to control the

discussions. Lay members on the other hand asked the most questions, and expressed

feeling of not knowing what they were doing within the discussions, taking a

subordinate role. It is a requirement of the AEC that the lay people have never been

involved in the use of animals for scientific or teaching purposes (National Health and

Medical Research Council 2013). This requirement may lead them to feeling

disadvantaged; lay people may feel that they do not know as much as the others, leading

them to contribute less to the discussions. Schuppli and Fraser’s (2007) study of

Canadian AECs found that the lay people expressed that they often felt intimidated and

isolated by the scientific members on their committee, and were afraid to voice their

opinion, feeling that they would be discounted. Discounted lay members is a problem

because it has been previously suggested that when scientific members dominate, the

discussion becomes about technical improvements rather than whether the protocol is

morally acceptable, because technical discussions are easier to reach a consensus on

than an ethical decision (Ideland 2009). Within my mock AEC discussions, there was an

insignificant, yet overall higher proportion of instances of arguments that were

technical, and based around things that could easily be fixed, than arguments about

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whether each protocol was ethically acceptable. As the purpose of this study was to test

the ethical decision making of the AEC, the technical arguments aimed to improve the

acceptability of the protocol, but detracted from the moral debates I wanted to analyse.

Technical bias is addressed in the Dutch model of the AEC; before protocols reach the

AEC they are addressed by a local science committee who evaluate the scientific merit

of the protocol, leaving the AEC to justify the protocols based on the scientific

significance against the cost to the animals (de Cock Buning & Theune 1994). In order

to address the problem of AEC discussions mostly being technical, the Code could

recommend that before reaching an AEC, protocols would be scrutinised by a local

science committee, or equivalent. As the technical details will be addressed by the local

science committee, AEC discussions would be based on the moral justification of

protocols. In turn, all members may feel more at ease in expressing their opinions

because the scientific members would not necessarily feel like they have greater

authority over the lay members.

Reaching a group consensus was made difficult when some members went against the

decision made by the majority of the committee. This situation occurred during G1P6

when Rebecca, an animal welfare representative, expressed that she did not support

animal research for human purposes. She was then questioned by the rest of the

committee, who gave her hypothetical amendments in the hope that she would accept

the research if these were met. Once she admitted that she could support the use of

animals in specific conditions, conforming to the rest of the group, they stopped

questioning her. Rebecca made it difficult to achieve a consensus, so the rest of the

group felt the need to make her agree with them. It has been suggested that the AEC

have only members who see value in animal use (Knight & Barnett 2008), so this

problem is likely to be avoided in a real AEC context. There was a similar instance of

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peer influence in Group 1 during Protocol 5, where animal welfare representative

Amanda said that she did not feel qualified and was happy to go with the rest of the

group in her decision making. This instance was another example of how group

decision making can be uneven; Amanda supported the research until she heard the

arguments made by the rest of the committee, and she based her assessment on their

opinions rather than her own. In group decision making, people have different

preferences, but their preferences all need to be expressed and deliberated on rather than

being discounted for the majority rule.

The two committees reached the same consensus in all but two of the protocols. My

results may not be comparable to that of Plous and Herzog (2001) due to the much

lower sample size of committees addressed, and the fact that the protocols assessed

were designed specifically for my experiment. The differences in decisions within my

research occurred in two of the Agent X protocols where Group 1 rejected the protocols

because they interpreted them as resubmissions, while Group 2 awarded resubmissions

to protocols they interpreted as original submissions. The resubmission idea was

perpetuated by the veterinarians in Group 1, who were the dominant members. Group 2

was more evenly distributed in which roles acted with authority than Group 1. The

effect of dominant decision makers on committee decision making was then evident

within Group 1. Group decision making involves people with inconsistent values and

preferences (Frame 2012; March 1994), and if certain members dominate the

discussions, the committee might be convinced to agree with these dominant members,

thus forming the majority. Any future training for AECs should then address how the

chair can deal with dominant members and those who do not feel confident in giving

their opinion, and aiming for the opinions of each of the AEC members to be equally

heard.

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Moral intensity, as determined by human interest, species and level of suffering,

influenced the approval of the protocols. Compound Q, a food colouring additive was

rejected in more instances than Agent X, which tested a cancer drug. Members

themselves stated that improving food colour did not warrant animal use, but did see the

potential benefits Agent X could have for human medicine. Discussion about Agent X

were more technical, while Compound Q were more ethical, indicating that the mock

AEC members had a moral objection to the purpose of the protocols. In addition,

discussions surrounding Agent X used more emotional language markers in the form of

superlatives than Compound Q, indicating the AEC members used positive emotions in

their decision making towards cancer research. Human interest has been identified as

the main determinant in assessing animal research as ethical (Stafleu et al. 1993), and

there is a plethora of survey data to support this claim, as reviewed in Hagelin et al.

(2003). Ideland (2009) found that Swedish AECs also privileged medical procedures,

believing that medical reasons were always good enough to allow animal research to be

assessed as ethical within a public discourse that believes that scientific research brings

“hope for humanity”. As Agent X protocols achieved this goal, they were more often

deemed ethically acceptable with changes to the protocol. However, the fact that the

Chinese government has passed laws requiring the that new imported “non-special-use”

cosmetics undergo animal testing (Humane Society International 2014) and that other

product safety testing using animal experiments still occurs means that the goal of

achieving “hope for humanity” is not aimed for by all AECs.

The use of dogs was less ethically acceptable than rats, indicating that species

influences decision making. When discussing the protocols using dogs, stipulations of

their resubmissions made by the AEC asked that dogs be replaced with rodents because

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they were better toxicity models, and allowed for the tumours to be grown less

invasively. Replacement of species could be interpreted as a solution to welfare issues

rather than species preference because it fits within the principles of the 3Rs. However,

there were instances of the rejection of protocols using dogs where their cultural

significance to western society was raised. Others stated they did not have a preference,

but their preference was still evident in the discussions as dogs were referred to as pets,

with ongoing suggestions made that they should be re-homed. While enrichment

concerns were raised for both species, re-homing was only an option considered within

the dog protocols. Another difference was the way the committee members labelled the

animals; dogs were called dogs instead of being referred to as “the animals”, yet this

term was commonly used to label rats. The differences in the ways dogs and rats were

discussed can be attributed to the influence that animal characteristics have on attitudes

towards animal experimentation. People tend to be against the use of companion

animals in scientific research and justify this view using characteristics such as;

cuteness or attractiveness, brain size and attributing higher mental abilities to these

species, personal affection for these species, and relationships they hold with these

species (Ormandy & Schuppli 2014). Alternatively, rats are small brained yet have been

shown to be intelligent (Davis 1996), are generally labelled as pests that threaten human

safety and cross boundaries set by humans (Arluke & Sanders 1996). As dogs are seen

as companion animals and rats are either pests or typical laboratory animals, their roles

dictate how they are treated by society, and their ethical acceptability as research

animals.

The intensity of pain that the animals were to experience in the protocols had an

interesting effect on acceptability of the protocol. Both groups allowed a resubmission

for the protocols asking Compound Q to be tested on rats that would experience low

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levels of pain, but rejected the protocol when the rats were suffering. While Group 2

accepted all of the protocols testing Agent X, Group 1 rejected the protocol tested on

rats when they were suffering, but allowed for resubmission when they would not

experience as much pain. Interestingly, Group 1 asked that the Agent X protocol where

dogs would suffer to be resubmitted, yet rejected the protocol where dogs would

experience low pain. It appeared that the influence of animal pain was outweighed by

another factor: the order in which protocols were discussed.

Comparing the acceptance of the protocols with the order in which each was discussed

by the committee revealed that the order in which the protocols were presented

influenced decision making. The last five protocols were rejected by Group 1, who

showed their frustration in their discussions towards the repetitiveness of the protocols.

Their decision making was likely influenced by their frustration, as evidenced by

veterinarians Susan and George’s rejections of the Agent X protocol using a dog

experiencing a low level of pain based on the researchers “inability to address the

potential negatives” and the fact that they “appear not to have taken anything on board”

in regards to addressing the committee’s concerns. The committee was then unable to

make decisions on the content of the protocol, skewing their decision making process.

Group 2 did not face this problem, having interpreted each protocol as a new one, not a

resubmission. To have prevented this problem, the protocols should have had clearer

distinctions, and the instructions to the committees should have explicitly stated that

each protocol was separate from the previous ones.

Another issue experienced in this research was that of recruitment. Firstly, there were

only enough individuals recruited for two mock AECs. Any additional committees

might not have been influenced by the order of protocols the same way that Group 1

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were. A greater sample size of committees would then increase the validity of

measuring the effect of moral intensity. The second issue was the availability of the

participants. There were occasions when participants were unable to make the role play

activities without giving enough notice to organise a replacement, and it was difficult to

find replacements due to the specific nature of the roles. This problem was difficult to

address during the experiment, and resulted in unequal representation of the four roles.

One way to prevent this problem would have been to run the study examining real

AECs, as they would have access to a full committee, and presumably, to be able to

organise replacements at late notice. This would also ensure that all the members

correctly understood the Code, and would not have made unrealistic suggestions, for

example suggesting that animals were to be rehomed due to the participant’s

unawareness that research animals are usually destroyed after experiments. However, if

real AECs were examined the protocols would have been actual applications, and it

would be more difficult to establish different levels of moral intensity, and variations of

species, animal suffering and proposed outcomes of experiments.

5.5. Conclusion

Decisions about the ethical acceptability of animal experimentation are influenced by

the social context in which the decision is made in. Even though the ethical

acceptability of the protocols varied with moral intensity, these effects could be

overridden by the dynamic of the group. In Group 1 the greatest influence over protocol

acceptance was the order of the protocols, due to the dominant members of the group

assuming the protocols were the same resubmissions of the first protocols they

discussed. The decisions from the mock AEC committees were expressed

predominantly using utilitarian reasoning, which was used in conjunction with other

ethical theories. Aspects of virtue ethics, relativism and, to a lesser extent, deontology

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were also employed. While it is perfectly rational and consistent to make moral

decisions using a singular ethical theory, it is unlikely that most people make moral

decisions in this way. Pragmatically, the Code allows for multiple ethical theories to be

used by AECs by including multiple stakeholders and considering principles as well as

animal welfare alongside using cost benefit analysis. Consequently, the decisions made

are unlikely to be consistent or repeatable, yet they are contextual and practical:

resulting in a decision made by a group of people in a specific time or place.

192

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Chapter 6. General Discussion

6.1 General discussion introduction

This thesis aimed to investigate how veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal

welfare representatives and lay people use four ethical theories, utilitarianism,

deontology, virtue ethics and relativism to justify animal experimentation, and how their

decision making is influenced by stakeholder role, moral intensity and social context. It

was found that veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal welfare representatives

and lay people used a mixture of ethical theories in their decision making. The majority

of the arguments were structured in the style of utilitarianism, but the arguments also

included deontological, virtue ethics and relativist reasoning. Decision making was

influenced by stakeholder role of the decision maker, the moral intensity of the

protocols examined and the social context the decision was made in. The Code then is

an adequate framework for the AEC, however, measures can be taken to improve AEC

efficiency.

6.2. Ethical theories

A mixture of ethical theories were found to be used by veterinarians, scientists using

animals, animal welfare representatives and lay people in how they constructed their

opinions of animal experimentation, and within their individual and committee decision

making. It then appears that a mixture of ethical theories are applied to justify animal

experimentation as ethical. Animal experimentation is an ethical dilemma, and ethical

dilemmas are thought about in terms of ethical theories (Elliott 2007). It is believed that

only individuals at Rest’s (1979) final stage of moral development are able to reason

using a pure ethical theory, and that people who have not reached this stage use a

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mixture of concepts from different theories in their decision making. AEC members are

not required by the Code to have any previous training in making ethical decisions, and

are hence likely to use a mixture of concepts from various ethical theories. However, the

fact that their decision making relies on concepts from multiple theories reflects the

Code. The Code requires decisions be made using utilitarianism in requiring

justification by a cost benefit analysis and deontology by having principles that need to

be addressed (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). Ethics of care and

virtue ethics are also including in the decision making process of the Code as each

application is assessed on a case by case basis, and the wellbeing of the animal is

supported (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). The Code then seems

to be an accurate representation of how people justify animal experimentation. If

individuals were to use a singular theory they would be unable to reach a consensus

based on arguing using incompatible premises (MacIntyre 1979; Brown 1983), so it is

more productive for AEC members to use a mixture of concepts from different theories

within the context of the Code.

While a mixture of theories were used to justify animal experimentation as ethically

acceptable, utilitarianism was the dominant theory throughout the three studies. It is

understood that cost benefit analysis is the standard assessment for animal

experimentation, having been incorporated in regulations around the world (Canadian

Council on Animal Care 1997; Committee for the Update of the Guide for the Care and

Use of Laboratory Animals; National Research Council 2011; European Union 2010;

National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). In addition to being the standard

assessment for animal experimentation, cost benefit analysis was also the basis for

classical decision making models that were based on utility optimisation (Weber et al.

2004). It may be that utilitarianism is ingrained in the discourse of decision making,

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regardless of the context of the decision, and is the default model of decision making.

However, my results suggested that decisions are made using utilitarianism in

conjunction with deontology, relativism and virtue ethics. There are then benefits in

using utilitarianism with other theories over using pure utilitarianism. Introducing

deontology into the calculus allows for certain actions to be deemed either acceptable or

unacceptable as a rule, and allows for guiding principles as priorities in decision

making. Ethics of care is used within the cost benefit to reduce the costs to the animals,

however, virtue ethics is not as well accommodated for within the Code. Emotion has

been identified as a factor used in the assessment of animal research (Galvin & Herzog

1992b; Schuppli 2004; 2011), so concepts regarding emotion using virtue ethics could

be introduced into the decision making process to accurately represent the assessment of

animal protocols. The introduction of supplementary versions of virtue ethics has been

previously raised; Nussbaum (2001) suggested rational emotions such as empathy

would be a valuable ethical ability in justifying animal use, providing that individuals

scrutinise their emotions as they would other beliefs. Emotion can be conveyed using

both virtue ethics and ethical relativism, with the difference being that virtue ethics is

rational and aims to be consistent. Virtue ethics should then be included as opposed to

relativism because its subjectiveness would be detrimental to the running of the

committee. It would then also be beneficial to the working of the AEC if the chair were

trained to recognise relativist arguments.

6.3. Factors influencing decision making

6.3.1. Individual factors

Decision making is influenced by factors related to the individual, and this thesis

investigated the factor of stakeholder role. As expected, the three studies identified

differences between stakeholder roles; the Code requires that the AEC is made up of

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members from four different stakeholder roles, inviting holders of different preferences

and asking them to reach a consensus (National Health and Medical Research Council

2013). The differences in stakeholder role were thought to be a result of the profession

and past experiences of each of the roles. Scientists and veterinarians were the most

accepting of animal experimentation. The constructed professional opinions sharing the

value of animal research, were the most accepting of the survey scenarios, and led the

group discussions where they often compared the protocols to previous research and

procedures they had done using animals, focusing on the benefits of animal

experimentation. Professional roles have also been found to influence the use of ethical

theories in medical ethics; Robertson (1996) found that nurses had a virtue ethics

approach to the principle of beneficence while doctors were more utilitarian. Their

approaches were linked back to the goals of their profession; nurses care for patients

while doctors look to cure them, placing emphasis on the consequences while nursing

emphasises the relationship between the patient and the nurse (Robertson 1996). The

professional goals of veterinarians and scientists are consequence based, and this was

reflected by their arguments in chapters 3 and 5.

The animal welfare representatives differed, placing greater focus on the costs than the

benefits in their arguments, and were the least accepting of animal experiments, despite

the fact that they ultimately showed support for the use of animals in experiments that

had high human interest. It should be noted that the animal welfare, and not the animal

rights, perspective must be held for the AEC to function as the latter perspective holds

that animals should not be used for human gain. If an AEC member held this view they

would outright reject all proposals, and it will lead to a situation as seen in Chapter 5

where those who hold opposite views try and convince the other party to share their

view. Animal welfare representatives then acted within the expectations of people

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holding the animal welfare perspective. Animal welfare representatives, in their role, are

more focused on having a caring relationship with animals, and would be expected to

have more of a virtue ethics approach, as seen in chapter 5.

Lay people were not as predictable in their opinions and arguments as the other

stakeholder roles. The lay people that participated throughout my experiments shared an

exception rather than a profession; the only thing they had in common with one another

is that they had not used animals for scientific purposes, were not veterinarians and did

not actively represent animal welfare. Because their backgrounds were different from

each other, they might have had different preferences to each other, while the other

stakeholder roles were made up of people who shared the same preferences. An issue

with the lay people is that they did not necessarily fit the role of the actual lay person on

an AEC. The lay people in Chapter 3 were journalists. In Chapter 4 the lay people were

recruited from universities, conflicting the rule that lay people are independent of the

institution, and two of the lay people in Chapter 5 were students at the institution during

the Mock AEC role play activities. However, these problems were all a result of not

being able to use actual AEC members.

The lay people were then more likely to hold back in discussions, as seen in studies by

Schuppli (2004). In turn, lay members holding back led to scientific members,

veterinarians and scientists, led the discussions and acted as the authorities, thus they

constructed and acted as the dominant members in the AEC. The dominance of

scientific members has led to a problem as noted by Ideland (2009) and Schuppli and

Fraser (2007) that discussions become heavy in technical improvements to the

protocols, and my study also had a higher, although statistically not significantly,

number of technical than ethical arguments. The technical discussions, which in my

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study determined the interpretation of the protocols, can be addressed with the addition

of a local science committee such as in the Dutch model of the AECs (de Cock Buning

and Theune, 1994). The science of the protocols will then be justified, leaving the

committee to only discuss the morality of the proposed projects.

6.3.2. Moral Intensity

Decision making appeared to be reliant on the moral intensity of the project in both

individual decision making (Chapter 4) and group decision making (Chapter 5). Moral

intensity was examined by looking at known influencers of attitudes towards animal

experimentation; the human interest of the experiment, the suffering to the animals

involved and the species used. In terms of moral intensity, research has generally

concluded that animal experimentation is acceptable when the human interest is high,

animal suffering is low, and this approval changes with the species used (Driscoll 1992;

Galvin & Herzog 1992b; Hagelin et al. 2003; Henry & Pulcino 2009; Knight & Barnett

2008; Knight et al. 2009; Lund et al. 2014; Phillips & McCulloch 2005). I examined

moral intensity by comparing two levels of human interest, suffering to the animals and

species in my survey and mock AEC protocols. The human interest can be interpreted

as the benefit, and animal suffering as the cost, so the moral intensity was justified using

utilitarian reasoning.

Human interest influenced decision making and the construction of opinions about

animal experimentation. The text discourse analysis presented animal experimentation

in terms of what medical procedures had resulted from it, and the texts showed a bias in

presenting the benefits over the costs. In the survey, scenarios for cancer treatments had

higher approval than the one using animals to test the toxicity of a cleaning product. In

the mock AEC role play, Agent X protocols that tested a tumour inhibiting drug were

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awarded resubmissions three times more than the Compound Q protocols that were

testing food additives. The fact that the protocols were awarded a resubmission

indicated that the mock AEC felt that there was enough of a potential benefit that the

protocols would have been approved if they were more scientifically sound.

Interestingly, the AECs also offered alternative benefits for the Compound Q protocols,

saying they would support its use if it would contribute to helping children, the disabled

or the elderly. The three studies either built support for animal experimentation or

preferred experiments where the benefits of animal experiments fit into the public

discourse that scientific research brings ‘hope for humanity’ as suggested by Ideland

(2009). By having experimental benefits that give hope for humanity, these protocols

would be ethical under a utilitarian calculus, and would then just need the protocols to

be adjusted and animal welfare increased to lower the costs, which would be easier to

achieve.

The level of pain also influenced the utilitarian calculus to aid decision making. The

survey scenarios with high animal suffering were given lower approval, and the mock

AECs only granted resubmissions of the low pain rat Compound Q protocols. So while

the animal suffering did affect the ethical acceptability of the protocols, it was in

conjunction with the human interest. Costs and benefits are then being looked at

together to make assessments of the ethical acceptability of animal experiments.

However, like the constructions of opinions, the mock AEC discussions had a greater

focus on the benefits than the costs to the animals. The resubmissions were based on the

potential benefits that the research had, and the costs were what needed to be addressed

for the experiment to be passed. The benefits might then be what determines ethical

acceptability, and is seen as something that will not change. The costs to the animals

were treated as things that could be changed. From these studies, I agree with Stafleu et

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al. (1993) that human interest is the main determinant of approval for animal

experiments because there is a bias to the benefits in decision making, and the costs to

the animals can be reduced more easily to allow experiments to be ethically acceptable.

Both the survey and the mock AEC role play studies indicated that rats were more

acceptable as research species than dogs. It was thought that these results were because

of people’s attitudes toward dog as pets, however, these studies did not attempt to

measure whether the difference in acceptance of species was due to other morally

relevant differences between species, such as cognitive capacity. If privileging of dogs

were due to their status as pets, as indicated in quotes presented in Chapter 5 by Animal

Welfare Representatives Hannah and Amanda, the participants were using relativism or

virtue ethics in their assessments. The survey had a lower approval rating in the dog

protocols than the rat ones, and this was mirrored in the mock AEC and the

resubmissions granted to the rat Compound Q protocol, which was not acceptable in

dogs. Both committees discussed species and stated that they would feel the same

whether it was a dog or a pig, a dog or a rat, or a dog or a mouse, providing that the

species was justified. However, there were differences in how the species were talked

about. In dog protocols, replacements of rodent models were suggested, yet in rat

protocols these were not. This difference may be due to the fact that the processes

suggested were less invasive to animals; subcutaneous tumours are commonly grown on

rats and mice and were an alternative to internal tumours, thus the decision would be

welfare based rather than based on species. However, the difference between species

was clearest in talking about the animals and where they would go after the experiment.

Mock AEC members suggested that dogs should be re-homed or returned to their

owners, while these options were not raised for rats, basing their decisions on virtue

ethics and ethics of care by asking for similar care of the experimental dogs as they

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would give to their own pets. So despite saying they would not feel differently about

different species, there were indicators in their language and final decisions that dogs

were not as acceptable for scientific research as rats were. While rats are generally not

liked outside of the laboratory and treated as tools inside of them, dogs are beloved

family pets (Arluke & Sanders 1996; Herzog 2010), and it seems unlikely that people

can separate that association in their decision making. The relationship between people

and dogs also overrode the factor of stakeholder role in the decision making patterns in

the survey, thus implying that this association of dogs as pets is held by all and a bigger

influence than their past professional experiences. People’s relationships with particular

species tended to determine their acceptability as a research animal, making the decision

based on emotion rather than rationality.

6.3.3. Social context

The social context that the decision was made in did not change the fact that a mixture

of ethical theories were used in justifying animal experimentation. However, the final

decision as to whether animal experiments were ethically acceptable or not differed

between the studies. In chapter 3, the authors gave their opinions of animal

experimentation in their written texts, and the texts by veterinarians, scientists and lay

people were clear in their support for animal experimentation, except for animal welfare

representatives that tended to show opposition to certain types of animal experiments.

The positions of the authors were clearly presented in their texts, and were not

influenced or contested by others, as was the approval of the surveys. However, group

decisions were influenced by the others on the committees, where individuals did not

express opinions until the end, or changed their opinion after listening to others.

Committee final decisions are made to reflect the majority (Frame 2012), and there are

occasions where members are influenced by the consensus already having been reached

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or because of time constraints (Loff & Black 2004). It is possible that, in this study,

AEC members were influenced by each other, and felt the need to reach the consensus

without offering their own personal opinion. I feel that the outcome of group 1was

influenced mostly by their interpretation of the protocols as a series of resubmissions

instead of independent protocols. The dominant members were the ones who pushed

this agenda, and the others seemed to agree with them. The group decision making

process would then only be based on mostly utilitarian reasoning if their dominant

members were to use the theory. However, it was difficult to compare the individual

decision making with the group decision making because I did not clearly measure if

the individual decision outcomes and the group consensus outcomes were different. I

suggest that if this experiment were to be repeated, each individual would be asked their

opinion before the AEC meeting, so that the opinions could be compared with the group

decision.

6.4. Recommendations for AECs

Recently, the decisions made by AECs have been questioned, causing frustration for

both the scientists and those aiming for improved animal welfare (ABC Radio National

2013). It is then essential to identify some of the problems in AEC decision making, and

how in future these problems can be addressed.

The technical discussions, which in my study determined the interpretation of the

protocols, can be addressed with the addition of a local science committee such as in the

Dutch model of the AECs (de Cock Buning and Theune, 1994). Then, the science of the

protocols will be justified, leaving the committee to only discuss the morality of the

proposed projects. However, this may not address the problem of how to justify the

moral acceptability of the protocols.

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The Code recommends that a mixture of theories be used in its guiding principles. It

includes utilitarianism in requiring that a cost benefit analysis be used to justify the

experiment, deontology in having principles and ethics of care in ensuring the

importance of animal welfare. The three studies found that these concepts are being

adhered to in real life decision making by veterinarians, scientists, animal welfare

representatives and lay people. The Code then provides a realistic and pragmatic model

for decision making by requiring that AECs use a mixture of ethical theories in their

decision making. However, the three studies also identified that relativism was used in

decision making, which can be detrimental to the goal of achieving a rational decision.

The chair should then be trained to identify decisions based on relativism, and prevent

these opinions from influencing other members.

The use of a mixture of concepts from different ethical theories may lead to a problem

of AECs being inconsistent in their decision making. However, inconsistency is not

necessarily a problem in decision making. Consistency could be viewed as a desirable

feature of decision making, but not a ‘must’ (Moore, 2007), and should be separated

from irrationality or illogicality (Angell et al., 2007). Real world decision making

should be accounted for in order to make a moral decision. As decisions are made using

a mixture of ethical theories for the majority of society, inconsistency is more realistic

than the perfect use of one ethical theory. Inconsistency in decision making is then not a

problem providing that the decisions made are pragmatic, rational and ethical, as

scrutinised as in the case of virtue ethics. The training of AEC members may be

beneficial. Schuppli (2004) identified that AECs may benefit from training as opposed

to just providing members with guideline documents, and Loff and Black (2004)

suggested that human research ethics committees would benefit more from intensive

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training in critical thinking than studying the relevant guidelines and laws. One aspect

of critical thinking involves evaluating evidence and arguments independently of an

individual’s prior beliefs and opinions (West et al. 2008). Based on this aspect, if AEC

members are trained in critical thinking, then they will be able to recognise when they

rely on their relativistic views, and that they should not base their decision making on

these views, and hence make more rational decisions. Training in critical thinking will

benefit AEC members, however, it should still be taught in the context of the role of the

AEC. Smith (2003) suggested that critical thinking programs needed thinking tasks

commonly encountered in organisations in the case of business managers, and scenarios

used to train AECs should be based on previous protocols to set as benchmarks for

decision making.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: The original scales used by Reidenbach and Robin (1988)

A priori normative philosophy scales* Egoism Scales: Self Promoting/Not Self Promoting Selfish/Not Selfish Self Sacrificing/Not Self Sacrificing Prudent/Not Prudent Under No Moral Obligation/Morally Obligated to Act Otherwise Personally Satisfying/Not Personally Satisfying In the Best Interests of the Company/Not in the Best Interests of the Company Utilitarian Scales: Efficient/Inefficient OK/Not OK If Actions can be Justified by Their Consequences Compromises/Does Not Compromise an Important Rule by Which I Live On Balance, Tends to be Good/Bad Produces the Greatest/Least Utility Maximizes/Minimizes Benefits While Minimizes/Maximizes Harm Leads to the Greatest/Least Good for the Greatest Number Results in a Positive/Negative Cost-Benefit Ratio Maximizes/Minimizes Pleasure Deontology Scales: Violates/Does Not Violate an Unwritten Contract Violates/Does Not Violate My Ideas of Fairness Morally Right/Not Morally Right Obligated/Not Obligated to Act This Way Violates/Does Not Violate an Unspoken Promise Justice Scales: Just/Unjust Fair/Unfair Does result/Does not result in an equal distribution of good and bad Relativist Scales: Culturally Acceptable/Unacceptable Individually Acceptable/Unacceptable Acceptable/Unacceptable to People I Most Admire Traditionally Acceptable/Unacceptable Acceptable/Unacceptable to my Family * The actual form of the scale was as follows: Just _:_:_:_:_:_:_ Unjust The instructions that followed each scenario and preceded each listing of the 33 scale items were as follows: “Please give your beliefs to the action described in the scenario by placing a check (√) between each of the opposites that follow. Thank you.”

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Appendix 2: Articles used in the text discourse analysis

VET 1 Bain, S, Maastricht, S, Bate, M & Noonan, D 2004, 'The role of veterinarians in the care

and use of animals in research and teaching', ANZCCART News, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-3. Available from: <https://www.adelaide.edu.au/ANZCCART/news/ANZCCART_NEWS17_1.pdf>. [2nd February 2015].

VET 2 Baker, KD 1998, 'Vivisection debate in nineteenth century Great Britain: a muted echo

in colonial and early post-colonial Australia', Australian Veterinary Journal, vol. 76, no. 10, pp. 683-689. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-0813.1998.tb12283.x/abstract>. [2nd February 2015].

VET 3 Baker, RM 2000, 'Animal experimentation and the veterinarian', Australian Veterinary

Journal, vol. 78, no. 8, pp. 546-548. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-0813.2000.tb11900.x/abstract>. [2nd February 2015].

VET 4 Smith, JB 1983, 'Animal welfare and the Australian veterinarian', Australian Veterinary

Journal, vol. 60, no. 10, pp. 299-302. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-0813.1983.tb02813.x/abstract>. [2nd February 2015].

VET 5 Finnie, JW 2001, 'Animal models of traumatic brain injury: a review', Australian

Veterinary Journal, vol. 79, no. 9, pp. 628-633. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-0813.2001.tb10785.x/full>. [2nd February 2015].

SCI 1 Gershof, SN 2009, 'Animal experimentation- a personal view', Nutrition Reviews, vol.

67, no. 2, pp. 95-99. Available from: <http://nutritionreviews.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/2/95.abstract>. [2nd February 2015].

SCI 2 De Deyn, PP, D'Hooge, R & van Zutphen, LFM 2000, 'Animal models of human

disorders-general aspects', Neuroscience Research Communications, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 141-148. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/1520-6769(200005/06)26:3%3C141::AID-NRC2%3E3.0.CO;2-V/abstract>. [2nd February 2015].

SCI 3 Baumans, V 2005, 'Science-based assessment of animal welfare: laboratory animal',

Revue Scientifique et Technique, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 503-514. Available from: <http://europepmc.org/abstract/med/16358504>. [2nd February 2015].

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SCI 4 Morris, JB, Everitt, J & Landi, MS 2006, ‘United States guidelines and regulations in

animal experimentation’ in In Vivo Models of Inflammation, eds CS Stevenson, LA Marshall & DW Morgan, Birkhäuser Verlag, Basel, pp. 193-202. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-7643-7520-1_11>. [2nd February 2015].

SCI 5 Van Den Buuse, M, Garner, B, Gogos, A & Kusljic, S 2005, 'Importance of animal

models in schizophrenia research', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 550-557. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1440-1614.2005.01626.x/full>. [2nd February 2015].

AW 1 Robinson, V 2005, 'Finding alternatives: an overview of the 3Rs and the use of animals

in research', School Science Review, vol. 87, no. 319, pp. 111-114. Available from: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.372.3672&rep=rep1&type=pdf>. [2nd February 2015].

AW2 RSPCA Australia 2013, The use of animals in product development. Available from: <

http://kb.rspca.org.au/afile/7/2/>. [2nd February 2015]. AW3 Animals Australia n.d., Animal experimentation. Available from:

<http://www.animalsaustralia.org/factsheets/animal_experimentation.php>. [2nd February 2015].

AW4 Animal Welfare Institute 2010, Animal Welfare Institute Policy on the Use of

Vertebrate Animals for Experimentation and Testing. Updated version available from: <https://awionline.org/content/awi-policy >. [2nd February 2015].

AW5 ASPCA 2007, Animal Testing. Available from:

<www.weigo.url.tw/easy/english/Animal%20Testing-2.doc>. [2nd February 2015].

LAY 1 Cyranoski, D 2006, 'Animal research: primates in the frame', Nature, vol. 444, no. 7121,

pp. 789-970. Available from: <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v444/n7121/full/444812a.html>. [2nd February 2015].

LAY 2 Vaughan, C 1988, 'Animal research: ten years under siege', BioScience, vol. 38, no. 1,

pp. 10-13. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1310639?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>. [2nd February 2015].

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LAY 3 Bhattacharya, S 2004, Scientists demand law against animal rights extremism in The

New Scientist. Available from: <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4913-scientists-demand-law-against-animal-rights-extremism.html#.VM8mn2iUfAk>. [2nd February 2015].

LAY 4 Guldberg, H 2005, The ethical case for animal research in Spiked. Available from:

<http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/1035>. [2nd February 2015]. LAY 5 The Economist 2006, Testing Times in The Economist. Available from: <

http://www.economist.com/node/7033990>. [2nd February 2015].

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Appendix 3: The adapted scales as used in the questionnaire

Relativist Scales This experiment is culturally acceptable/Unacceptable This experiment is individually acceptable/Unacceptable This experiment is traditionally acceptable/Unacceptable Utilitarianism Scales The outcome of this experiment is efficient/Inefficient This experiment benefits/Does not benefit society This experiment maximises/Minimises benefits while minimising/Maximising harm On balance, this experiment tends to be morally acceptable/Unacceptable The outcome of this experiment produces the greatest/Least utility This experiment is/Is not acceptable if actions can be justified by their consequences The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is/Is not justified It is acceptable/Unacceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gains Deontology Scales This experiment violates/Does not violate my ideas of fairness This experiment is morally/Not morally right I am obliged/Not obliged approve of this experiment I have/Do not have a duty to ensure animal welfare is paramount I have/Do not have a duty to ensure scientific progress is paramount Virtue Ethics Scales I can/Can not empathise with the animals I am/am not sympathetic towards the animals This experiment is/is not cruel This experiment is acceptable/unacceptable if the animals are treated with dignity The animals in this experiment are/are not suffering This experiment is acceptable/unacceptable if animals like my pet were in this situation This experiment would be more/less acceptable if performed on humans

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Appendix 4: Copy of the on-line questionnaire

Questionnaire: How Veterinarians, Scientists using Animals, Animal Welfare Representatives and Lay People Assess Animal Experimentation.

Before you begin this questionnaire, could you please answer a few demographic questions? Please select your choices for each question by clicking the appropriate circle.

1. Do you own any pets?

○ Yes ○ No

2. What is your gender ○ Male ○ Female ○ Other

3. Which age bracket do you fit into? ○ Under 18 ○ 18-34 ○ 35-54 ○ Over 55 ○ I do not wish to answer this question

4. How would you describe your nationality? ○ Australian ○ Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander ○ Asian ○ African ○ American ○ European ○ I do not wish to answer this question

5. How would you describe the area where you were raised? ○ Urban ○ Rural

6. How important is religion in your life? ○ Very important ○ Important ○ Not very important ○ Not important at all

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7. What is your level of Education? ○ Some High School Education ○ High School Graduate ○ University Graduate ○ Postgraduate Education ○ Other

8. Are you or have you ever been a member of an Animal Ethics Committee? ○ Yes ○ No

9. Of the following four options, how would you describe yourself?

○ A person with qualifications in veterinary science ○ A person who uses animals in scientific or teaching activities ○ An active member of an animal welfare organisation with a demonstrable commitment to furthering animal welfare ○ None of the above

Approval to conduct this research (RA/4/1/4388) has been provided by The University of Western Australia, in accordance with its ethics review and approval procedures. Any person considering participation in this research project, or agreeing to participate, may raise any questions or issues with the researchers at any time. In addition, any person not satisfied with the response of researchers may raise ethics issues or concerns, and may make any complaints about this research project by contacting the Human Research Ethics Office at The University of Western Australia on (08) 6488 3703 or by emailing to hreo-research@uwa.edu.au All research participants are entitles to retain a copy of any Participant Information For and/or Participant Consent Form relating to this research project.

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The role of Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) is to ensure that the use of animals in scientific experiments is justified. Imagine that you are a member of an AEC. It is your responsibility to assess protocols of experiments that use animals and take a decision as to whether the experiment is acceptable or not. You will be asked to read through four short hypothetical scenarios. For the purpose of the survey, the type of animal will not always be specified. Please assess each scenario using the 24 scales that follow them. For each scale, please mark where your opinion is best represented between the two statements. To assist you, here is an example. Example: Animals are used to test the safety of a new cleaning product. It is expected that the experiment will be non invasive to the animals.

This experiment results in a positive cost-benefit ratio

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

This experiment results in a negative cost-benefit ratio

This questionnaire takes a maximum of 20 minutes to complete.

Before you start, please read some definitions from "The Australian Oxford Dictionary" (2002) for clarity. Duty: A moral or legal obligation; a responsibility; the binding force of what is

right. Efficient: Acting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or

unnecessary effort Empathy: The power of identifying oneself mentally with (also fully

comprehending) a person or object of contemplation. Invasive: Involving the introduction of instruments into the body. Obligation: A binding agreement; a bond. Sympathy: The act of sharing or tendency to share (with a person, etc) in an emotion

or sensation or condition of another person or thing. Utility: The condition of being useful or profitable, a profitable thing

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Scenario 1: Animals are used to test the safety of a new drug expected to help cancer patients. It is expected that the experiment will be non invasive to the animals.

The outcome of this experiment is efficient

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment is inefficient

This experiment is acceptable if animals like my pet were in this

situation

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if animals like my pet were in

this situation This experiment is acceptable if

the animals are treated with dignity

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if the animals are treated with

dignity This experiment is culturally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is culturally

unacceptable This experiment benefits society ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not benefit

society I am sympathetic towards the

animals ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am not sympathetic towards the

animals On balance, this experiment

tends to be morally acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ On balance, this experiment

tends to be morally unacceptable This experiment is acceptable if actions can be justified by their

consequences

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not acceptable if actions can be

justified by their consequences I have a duty to ensure animal

welfare is paramount ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure

animal welfare is paramount The outcome of this experiment

produces the greatest utility ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment

produces the least utility This experiment is individually

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is individually

unacceptable This experiment maximises

benefits while minimising harm ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment minimises

benefits while maximising harm It is acceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ It is unacceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

I can empathise with the animals

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I can not empathise with the animals

This experiment would be more acceptable if performed on

humans

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment would be less acceptable if performed on

humans The animals in this experiment

are suffering ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The animals in this experiment

are not suffering This experiment is traditionally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is traditionally

unacceptable I have a duty to ensure scientific

progress is paramount ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure

scientific progress is paramount The pain caused to the animal

during the experiment is justified

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is not

justified This experiment is morally right ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not morally

right This experiment violates my

ideas of fairness ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not violate

my ideas of fairness

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I am obliged to approve of this experiment

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am obliged to disapprove of this experiment

This experiment is cruel ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not cruel I approve of this experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not approve of this

experiment

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Scenario 2: Animals are used to test the safety of a new cleaning product. It is expected that the experiment will be highly invasive to the animals. This experiment is culturally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is culturally

unacceptable This experiment violates my

ideas of fairness ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not violate

my ideas of fairness I can empathise with the

animals ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I can not empathise with the

animals The outcome of this experiment

is efficient ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment

is inefficient The animals in this experiment

are suffering ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The animals in this experiment

are not suffering I have a duty to ensure scientific

progress is paramount ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure

scientific progress is paramount On balance, this experiment

tends to be morally acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ On balance, this experiment

tends to be morally unacceptable This experiment is acceptable if animals like my pet were in this

situation

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if animals like my pet were in

this situation I have a duty to ensure animal

welfare is paramount ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure

animal welfare is paramount The outcome of this experiment

produces the greatest utility ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment

produces the least utility This experiment is individually

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is individually

unacceptable This experiment maximises

benefits while minimising harm ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment minimises

benefits while maximising harm It is acceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ It is unacceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

This experiment is acceptable if the animals are treated with

dignity

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if the animals are treated with

dignity This experiment is cruel ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not cruel

This experiment benefits society ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not benefit society

The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is

justified

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is not

justified I am sympathetic towards the

animals ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am not sympathetic towards the

animals This experiment is traditionally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is traditionally

unacceptable I am obliged to approve of this

experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am obliged to disapprove of

this experiment This experiment is acceptable if actions can be justified by their

consequences

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not acceptable if actions can be

justified by their consequences This experiment is morally right ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not morally

right

240

This experiment would be more acceptable if performed on

humans

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment would be less acceptable if performed on

humans I approve of this experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not approve of this

experiment

241

Scenario 3: Rats are used to test the safety of a new drug expected to help cancer patients. It is expected that the experiment will be highly invasive to the animals.

I have a duty to ensure animal welfare is paramount

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure animal welfare is paramount

The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is

justified

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is not

justified It is acceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ It is unacceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

This experiment is acceptable if animals like my pet were in this

situation

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if animals like my pet were in

this situation This experiment is cruel ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not cruel

I have a duty to ensure scientific progress is paramount

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure scientific progress is paramount

On balance, this experiment tends to be morally acceptable

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ On balance, this experiment tends to be morally unacceptable

The animals in this experiment are suffering

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The animals in this experiment are not suffering

I can empathise with the animals

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I can not empathise with the animals

This experiment maximises benefits while minimising harm

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment minimises benefits while maximising harm

This experiment is individually acceptable

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is individually unacceptable

I am sympathetic towards the animals

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am not sympathetic towards the animals

The outcome of this experiment is efficient

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment is inefficient

This experiment is acceptable if actions can be justified by their

consequences

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not acceptable if actions can be

justified by their consequences This experiment is morally right ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not morally

right This experiment benefits society ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not benefit

society This experiment is culturally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is culturally

unacceptable This experiment violates my

ideas of fairness ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not violate

my ideas of fairness This experiment is traditionally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is traditionally

unacceptable I am obliged to approve of this

experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am obliged to disapprove of

this experiment The outcome of this experiment

produces the greatest utility ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment

produces the least utility This experiment would be more

acceptable if performed on humans

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment would be less acceptable if performed on

humans

242

This experiment is acceptable if the animals are treated with

dignity

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if the animals are treated with

dignity I approve of this experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not approve of this

experiment

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Scenario 4: Dogs are used to test the safety of a new drug expected to help cancer patients. It is expected that the experiment will be highly invasive to the animals.

This experiment would be more acceptable if performed on

humans

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment would be less acceptable if performed on

humans This experiment is acceptable if animals like my pet were in this

situation

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if animals like my pet were in

this situation This experiment is individually

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is individually

unacceptable This experiment benefits society ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not benefit

society The outcome of this experiment

is efficient ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment

is inefficient I am sympathetic towards the

animals ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am not sympathetic towards the

animals This experiment is acceptable if actions can be justified by their

consequences

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not acceptable if actions can be

justified by their consequences I have a duty to ensure scientific

progress is paramount ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure

scientific progress is paramount This experiment is acceptable if

the animals are treated with dignity

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is unacceptable if the animals are treated with

dignity The outcome of this experiment

produces the greatest utility ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The outcome of this experiment

produces the least utility I am obliged to approve of this

experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I am obliged to disapprove of

this experiment The animals in this experiment

are suffering ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The animals in this experiment

are not suffering It is acceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ It is unacceptable to use animals in experiments for scientific gain

This experiment maximises benefits while minimising harm

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment minimises benefits while maximising harm

This experiment is cruel ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not cruel On balance, this experiment

tends to be morally acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ On balance, this experiment

tends to be morally unacceptable The pain caused to the animal

during the experiment is justified

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ The pain caused to the animal during the experiment is not

justified This experiment violates my

ideas of fairness ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment does not violate

my ideas of fairness This experiment is traditionally

acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is traditionally

unacceptable I have a duty to ensure animal

welfare is paramount ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not have a duty to ensure

animal welfare is paramount I can empathise with the

animals ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I can not empathise with the

animals

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This experiment is morally right ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is not morally right

This experiment is culturally acceptable

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ This experiment is culturally unacceptable

I approve of this experiment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ I do not approve of this experiment

245

Thank you for your participation in this survey. If you have any questions or comments, do not hesitate to contact us on ciprim01@student.uwa.edu.au .

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Appendix 5: Survey Pre-test and AEC Role Play Activity Consent Form

23 June 2010

I, (the participant) have read the information provided and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this activity, realising that I may withdraw at any time without reason and without prejudice.

I understand that all information provided is treated as strictly confidential and will not be released by the investigator. The only exception to this principle of confidentiality is if documents are required by law. I have been advised as to what data is being collected, what the purpose is, and what will be done with the data upon completion of the research.

I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided my name or other identifying information is not used.

______________ __________________ Participant Date

Thank you Associate Professor Dominique Blache Mikaela Ciprian The University of Western Australia The University of Western Australia Crawley WA 6009 Crawley WA 6009 Phone: 6488 3587 Phone: 6488 2518 Email: dbla@animals.uwa.edu.au Mobile: 0423 191 168 Email:ciprim01@student.uwa.edu.au

School of Animal Biology

The University of Western Australia

35 Stirling Hwy, Crawley, 6008

T +61 8 6488 3587 F +61 8 6488 2243 E dbla@animals.uwa.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code: 00126G

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Appendix 6: Invitation for Online Survey

16 May 2011 To Whom It May Concern: You are invited to participate in a PhD experiment about the functioning of Animal Ethics Committees (AECs). The study investigates the decision making process of each of the 4 categories of members sitting on Animal Ethics Committees; veterinarians, scientists using animals, people involved in animal protection groups, and lay people. Therefore, the participation of four groups of people is required. The participants have been recruited through the Australian Veterinary Association, Australian animal welfare groups such as the RSPCA, Voiceless, Humane Society International and Animals Australia, and Australian Universities. In choosing to participate, you will be asked to complete an online questionnaire. In the questionnaire, you will be asked to rate four experiments on a series of seven point scales, and this will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The questionnaire can be found here: http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/516164/How-Animal-Experimentation-Is-Assessed You will not be asked to provide any personal details, therefore anonymity is ensured and your personal information will not be published. Your participation in this study does not prejudice any right to compensation, which you may have under statute or common law. Participation in this survey is voluntary. As such you may end the questionnaire at any time without giving reason or justification. In this case your data will be deleted. Completion of the questionnaire will be taken as evidence of consent to participate in this study. The Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Western Australia requires that all participants are informed that, if they have any complaint regarding the manner, in which a research project is conducted, it may be given to the researcher or, alternatively to the Secretary, Human Research Ethics Committee, Registrar’s Office, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia (telephone number +61 8 6488 3703). All study participants will be provided with a copy of the Information Sheet and Consent Form for their personal records.

School of Animal Biology

The University of Western Australia

35 Stirling Hwy, Crawley, 6008

T +61 8 6488 3587 F +61 8 6488 2243 E dbla@animals.uwa.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code: 00126G

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Your responses are important to this project. Should you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact us. Thank you Associate Professor Dominique Blache Mikaela Ciprian The University of Western Australia The University of Western Australia Crawley WA 6009 Crawley WA 6009 Phone: 6488 3587 Phone: 6488 2518 Email: dbla@animals.uwa.edu.au Mobile: 0423 191 168 Email: ciprim01@student.uwa.edu.au

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Appendix 7: Survey Pre-test and AEC Role Play Activity Invitation

4 January 2010 To Whom It May Concern: You have been selected to participate in a PhD experiment about how Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) decide if an experiment is ethical. This study requires the participation of four types of people; veterinarians, scientists using animals, people involved in furthering animal welfare, and “lay” people. The participants have been recruited through the Australian Veterinary Association, the RSPCA and the University of Western Australia. This study aims to find the role of ethics and emotion in the decision making process of Animal Ethics Committees, investigating any differences between the four categories; veterinarians, scientists using animals, people involved in animal protection groups, and lay people. You will be asked to complete a questionnaire and to participate in a role play activity during four sessions. During the first 90 minute session you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire is designed to find what ethical frameworks are used in assessing as experiment as ethical, and will take 30 minutes to complete. You will be asked to rate an experiment on a series of seven point scales, each aligned to a particular ethical framework. The analysis of these surveys will show if there are differences between the four AEC categories in which frameworks they use to assess experiments. The remaining hour of the first session will be a role play activity. You will be asked to take on the role of an AEC member of the category that best describes you (veterinarian, scientist using animals, a member of a group dedicated to animal protection, or a “lay” person), and discuss two protocols involving animal experimentation. The discussions will be taped and analysed to see what language is used in describing the animal and the protocol. There will be eight protocols to discuss, two per hour long session. The sessions will be run monthly between September and December. If you wish to participate, you will be compensated $25 per hour for the inconvenience. Your participation in this study does not prejudice any right to compensation, which you may have under statute or common law. Participation in this experiment is voluntary, therefore you may withdraw your consent at any time without giving reason or justification. In this case your data will be deleted.

School of Animal Biology

The University of Western Australia

35 Stirling Hwy, Crawley, 6008

T +61 8 6488 3587 F +61 8 6488 2243 E dbla@animals.uwa.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code: 00126G

252

The Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Western Australia requires that all participants are informed that, if they have any complaint regarding the manner, in which a research project is conducted, it may be given to the researcher or, alternatively to the Secretary, Human Research Ethics Committee, Registrar’s Office, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia (telephone number +61 8 6488 3703). All study participants will be provided with a copy of the Information Sheet and Consent Form for their personal records. Your responses are important to this project. Should you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact us. Thank you Associate Professor Dominique Blache Mikaela Ciprian The University of Western Australia The University of Western Australia Crawley WA 6009 Crawley WA 6009 Phone: 6488 3587 Phone: 6488 2518 Email: dbla@animals.uwa.edu.au Mobile: 0423 191 168 Email: ciprim01@student.uwa.edu.au

253

Appendix 8: Protocols for discussion by mock animal ethics committees

Protocol: High Suffering, High Human Interest, Species: Dog Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to find whether the pharmaceutical Agent X can impede the growth of cancerous tumours. Akt, a protein involved in cellular survival pathways, plays a central role in regulating tumour cell survival and cell cycle progression. A hyperactivation of Akt signalling is thought to cause the activation or over expression of tumour growth factor receptors, or inactivation of tumour suppressors, therefore targeting this pathway with Akt inhibitors may offer a strategy to combat human cancers. Previous studies have shown that the inhibitors GSK690393 and GSK690693 have been shown to reduce the growth of tumours, therefore it is assumed that this agent will also inhibit the growth of cancerous tumours. To test the efficiency of Agent X in the reduction of tumour growth, cancer will be induced in 20 dogs using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea. Half of the animals will receive Agent X, and the other half will receive a placebo, and after 6 months the animals will be euthanized, and the sizes of the tumours in each group will be compared. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis January 2011 The dogs will be obtained at 12 months of age. All animals will be administered 50µl/ml N-methyl-N-nitrosourea dissolved in their drinking water, provided ad libitum, for the first 12 months of the experiment. The animals will be kept individual cages for 12 months, and every 3 months their stomachs will be monitored for tumour sizes using endoscopy. Animals without tumours present after the twelve months will be discarded. January 2012 The animals will be split into two equal groups, the control group and the treatment group. The treatment group will receive 30mg/kg/d of Agent X 5 days a week for 6 months via intraperitoneal injections. The control group will receive 30mg/kg/d of saline solution 5 days a week for 6 months via intraperitoneal injections. The animals will be monitored for the presence of tumours throughout the six months, and the dosages will be adjusted for any changes of bodyweight. July 2012 The animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone. The tumours will be removed and their volumes measured by the equation V= L × W × D / 6 where V is volume, L is length, W is width, and D is depth. The tumour sizes will be compared between the treatment and control groups. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals In previous studies using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea to induce stomach tumours in dogs, the dogs started exhibiting behaviour indicating pain and distress during last 2 months of exposure. It is expected that the dogs will exhibit the following behaviours during the last two months: cowering into the corner of their pen, unwillingness to move, whimpering, an increased respiratory rate and vomiting. Analgesics will be administered, however it is expected that these behaviours will persist.

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Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether Agent X is efficient in impeding the growth of cancerous tumours. If successful, this experiment can be adapted to human clinical trials to test whether this substance can reduce the size of tumours in people suffering cancer. It may also lead to the use of this pharmaceutical as a method of cancer prevention.

255

Protocol: High Suffering, High Human Interest, Species: Rat Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to find whether the pharmaceutical, Agent X, can impede the growth of cancerous tumours. Akt, a protein involved in cellular survival pathways, plays a central role in regulating tumour cell survival and cell cycle progression. A hyperactivation of Akt signalling is thought to cause the activation or over expression of tumour growth factor receptors, or inactivation of tumour suppressors, therefore targeting this pathway with Akt inhibitors may offer a strategy to combat human cancers. Previous studies have shown that the inhibitors GSK690393 and GSK690693 have been shown to reduce the growth of tumours, therefore it is assumed that this agent will also inhibit the growth of cancerous tumours. To test the efficiency of Agent X in the reduction of tumour growth, cancer will be induced in 20 rats using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea. Half of the animals will receive Agent X, and the other half will receive a placebo, and after 6 weeks the animals will be euthanized, and the sizes of the tumours in each group will be compared. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis January 2011 The rats will be obtained at 12 weeks of age. All animals will be administered 50µl/ml N-methyl-N-nitrosourea dissolved in their drinking water, provided ad libitum, for the first 12 weeks of the experiment. The animals will be kept individual cages, and every 3 weeks their stomachs will be monitored for tumour sizes using endoscopy. Animals without tumours present after the 12 weeks will be discarded. April 2011 The animals will be split into two equal groups, the control group and the treatment group. The treatment group will receive 30mg/kg/d of Agent X 5 days a week for 6 weeks via intraperitoneal injections. The control group will receive 30mg/kg/d of saline solution 5 days a week for 6 weeks via intraperitoneal injections. The animals will be monitored for the presence of tumours throughout the 6 weeks, and the dosages will be adjusted for any changes of bodyweight. June 2011 The animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone. Their stomachs will be removed, and the tumours will be removed and their volumes measured by the equation V= L × W × D / 6 where V is volume, L is length, W is width, and D is depth. The tumour sizes will be compared between the treatment and control groups. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals According to pilot studies testing the effectiveness of N-methyl-N-nitrosourea in inducing stomach tumours in rats, the rats started exhibiting behaviour indicating pain and distress during last 2 weeks of exposure. It is expected that the rats will exhibit the following behaviours during the last two weeks: cowering into the corner of their pen, unwillingness to move, an increased respiratory rate and vomiting. Analgesics will be administered, however it is expected that these behaviours will persist. Potential Benefits of the Research

256

This research aims to find whether Agent X is efficient in impeding the growth of cancerous tumours. If successful, this experiment can be adapted to human clinical trials to test whether this substance can reduce the size of tumours in people suffering cancer. It may also lead to the use of this pharmaceutical as a method of cancer prevention.

257

Protocol: High Suffering, Low Human Interest, Species: Dog Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to investigate any possible side effects of a new food additive, Compound Q, in dogs. The compound is derived from the preservative ILH76, and it is expected that this new compound will reduce the loss of colour in frozen dinners. To test for long term side effects, a feeding trail will be run using 20 dogs. Half of the animals will receive feed containing Compound Q, and the other half will receive the standard laboratory feed, and after 12 months the animals will be euthanized, and subjected to a post-mortem examination, testing their organs for damage. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis The dogs will be obtained at 12 months of age. The control group of 10 animals will be fed the standard dog feed ad libitum. The treatment group will receive the standard dog feed with 10% Compound Q ad libitum. The animals will receive these feeds for 12 months. After the 12 months, the animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone, and subjected to a post-mortem examination for any irregularities within their organs. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals Previous studies of ILH76 have shown that the animals fed this compound exhibit behaviour indicating pain and distress during last 2 months of exposure. It is expected that the dogs will exhibit the following behaviours during the last two months: cowering into the corner of their pen, unwillingness to move, whimpering, an increased respiratory rate and vomiting. Analgesics will be administered, however it is expected that these behaviours will persist. Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether the consumption of Compound Q causes any dangerous side effects. If it is found to be safe, this can allow for frozen dinners to retain their colour, making them more appetizing for humans.

258

Protocol: High Suffering, Low Human Interest, Species: Rat Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to investigate any possible side effects of a new food additive, Compound Q, in rats. The compound is derived from the preservative ILH76, and it is expected that this new compound will reduce the loss of colour in frozen dinners. To test for long term side effects, a feeding trail will be run using 20 rats. Half of the animals will receive feed containing Compound Q, and the other half will receive the standard laboratory feed, and after 12 months the animals will be euthanized, and subjected to a post-mortem examination, testing their organs for damage. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis The rats will be obtained at 12 weeks of age. The control group of 10 animals will be fed the standard rat pellet feed ad libitum. The treatment group will receive the standard pellet feed with 10% Compound Q ad libitum. The animals will receive these feeds for 8 weeks. After the 8 weeks, the animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone, and subjected to a post-mortem examination for any irregularities within their organs. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals Previous studies of ILH76 have shown that the animals fed this compound appear to exhibit behaviour indicating pain and distress during last 2 weeks of exposure. It is expected that the rats will show the following behaviours during the last 2 weeks: cowering into the corner of their pen, unwillingness to move, an increased respiratory rate and vomiting. Analgesics will be administered, however it is expected that these behaviours will persist. Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether the consumption of Compound Q causes any dangerous side effects. If it is found to be safe, this can allow for frozen dinners to retain their colour, making them more appetizing for humans.

259

Protocol: Low Suffering, High Human Interest, Species: Dog Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to find whether the pharmaceutical Agent X can impede the growth of cancerous tumours. Akt, a protein involved in cellular survival pathways, plays a central role in regulating tumour cell survival and cell cycle progression. A hyperactivation of Akt signalling is thought to cause the activation or over expression of tumour growth factor receptors, or inactivation of tumour suppressors, therefore targeting this pathway with Akt inhibitors may offer a strategy to combat human cancers. Previous studies have shown that the inhibitors GSK690393 and GSK690693 have been shown to reduce the growth of tumours, therefore it is assumed that this agent will also inhibit the growth of cancerous tumours. To test the efficiency of Agent X in the reduction of tumour growth, cancer will be induced in 20 dogs using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea. Half of the animals will receive Agent X, and the other half will receive a placebo, and after 6 months the animals will be euthanized, and the sizes of the tumours in each group will be compared. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis January 2011 The dogs will be obtained at 12 months of age. All animals will be administered 50µl/ml N-methyl-N-nitrosourea dissolved in their drinking water, provided ad libitum, for the first 12 months of the experiment. The animals will be kept individual cages for 12 months, and every 3 months their stomachs will be monitored for tumour sizes using endoscopy. Animals without tumours present after the twelve months will be discarded. January 2012 The animals will be split into two equal groups, the control group and the treatment group. The treatment group will receive 30mg/kg/d of Agent X 5 days a week for 6 months via intraperitoneal injections. The control group will receive 30mg/kg/d of saline solution 5 days a week for 6 months via intraperitoneal injections. The animals will be monitored for the presence of tumours throughout the six months, and the dosages will be adjusted for any changes of bodyweight. July 2012 The animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone. The tumours will be removed and their volumes measured by the equation V= L × W × D / 6 where V is volume, L is length, W is width, and D is depth. The tumour sizes will be compared between the treatment and control groups. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals In previous studies using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea to induce stomach tumours in dogs, the dogs started exhibiting diminished activity during the last 2 months of exposure, however after this time period the animals appeared to return to their normal behaviour. It is expected that these animals will have a similar reaction. Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether Agent X is efficient in impeding the growth of cancerous tumours. If successful, this experiment can be adapted to human clinical trials

260

to test whether this substance can reduce the size of tumours in people suffering cancer. It may also lead to the use of this pharmaceutical as a method of cancer prevention.

261

Protocol: Low Suffering, High Human Interest, Species: Rat Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to find whether the pharmaceutical, Agent X, can impede the growth of cancerous tumours. Akt, a protein involved in cellular survival pathways, plays a central role in regulating tumour cell survival and cell cycle progression. A hyperactivation of Akt signalling is thought to cause the activation or over expression of tumour growth factor receptors, or inactivation of tumour suppressors, therefore targeting this pathway with Akt inhibitors may offer a strategy to combat human cancers. Previous studies have shown that the inhibitors GSK690393 and GSK690693 have been shown to reduce the growth of tumours, therefore it is assumed that this agent will also inhibit the growth of cancerous tumours. To test the efficiency of Agent X in the reduction of tumour growth, cancer will be induced in 20 rats using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea. Half of the animals will receive Agent X, and the other half will receive a placebo, and after 6 weeks the animals will be euthanized, and the sizes of the tumours in each group will be compared. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis January 2011 The rats will be obtained at 12 weeks of age. All animals will be administered 50µl/ml N-methyl-N-nitrosourea dissolved in their drinking water, provided ad libitum, for the first 12 weeks of the experiment. The animals will be kept individual cages, and every 3 weeks their stomachs will be monitored for tumour sizes using endoscopy. Animals without tumours present after the 12 weeks will be discarded. April 2011 The animals will be split into two equal groups, the control group and the treatment group. The treatment group will receive 30mg/kg/d of Agent X 5 days a week for 6 weeks via intraperitoneal injections. The control group will receive 30mg/kg/d of saline solution 5 days a week for 6 weeks via intraperitoneal injections. The animals will be monitored for the presence of tumours throughout the 6 weeks, and the dosages will be adjusted for any changes of bodyweight. June 2011 The animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone. Their stomachs will be removed, and the tumours will be removed and their volumes measured by the equation V= L × W × D / 6 where V is volume, L is length, W is width, and D is depth. The tumour sizes will be compared between the treatment and control groups. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals In previous studies using N-methyl-N-nitrosourea to induce stomach tumours in rats, the rats started exhibiting diminished activity during the last 2 weeks of exposure, however after this time period the animals appeared to return to their normal behaviour. It is expected that these animals will have a similar reaction. Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether Agent X is efficient in impeding the growth of cancerous tumours. If successful, this experiment can be adapted to human clinical trials

262

to test whether this substance can reduce the size of tumours in people suffering cancer. It may also lead to the use of this pharmaceutical as a method of cancer prevention.

263

Protocol: Low Suffering, Low Human Interest, Species: Dog Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to investigate any possible side effects of a new food additive, Compound Q, in dogs. The compound is derived from the preservative ILH76, and it is expected that this new compound will reduce the loss of colour in frozen dinners. To test for long term side effects, a feeding trail will be run using 20 dogs. Half of the animals will receive feed containing Compound Q, and the other half will receive the standard laboratory feed, and after 12 months the animals will be euthanized, and subjected to a post-mortem examination, testing their organs for damage. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis The dogs will be obtained at 12 months of age. The control group of 10 animals will be fed the standard dog feed ad libitum. The treatment group will receive the standard dog feed with 10% Compound Q ad libitum. The animals will receive these feeds for 12 months. After the 12 months, the animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone, and subjected to a post-mortem examination for any irregularities within their organs. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals Previous studies of ILH76 have shown that the animals fed this compound appear to have diminished activity for approximately 2 hours after feeding, however after this time period the animals appear to return to their normal behaviour. It is expected that these animals will have a similar reaction after being fed Compound Q. Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether the consumption of Compound Q causes any dangerous side effects. If it is found to be safe, this can allow for frozen dinners to retain their colour, making them more appetizing for humans.

264

Protocol: Low Suffering, Low Human Interest, Species: Rat Overview and General Aim of the Project This project aims to investigate any possible side effects of a new food additive, Compound Q, in rats. The compound is derived from the preservative ILH76, and it is expected that this new compound will reduce the loss of colour in frozen dinners. To test for long term side effects, a feeding trail will be run using 20 rats. Half of the animals will receive feed containing Compound Q, and the other half will receive the standard laboratory feed, and after 12 months the animals will be euthanized, and subjected to a post-mortem examination, testing their organs for damage. Experimental Proposal- Cost-Benefit Analysis The rats will be obtained at 12 weeks of age. The control group of 10 animals will be fed the standard rat pellet feed ad libitum. The treatment group will receive the standard pellet feed with 10% Compound Q ad libitum. The animals will receive these feeds for 8 weeks. After the 8 weeks, the animals will be euthanized using an intravenous injection of Sodium pentobarbitone, and subjected to a post-mortem examination for any irregularities within their organs. The animals will be disposed of using the standard biological waste disposal procedure. The Cost of the research to the animals Previous studies of ILH76 have shown that the animals fed this compound appear to have diminished activity for approximately 2 hours after feeding, however after this time period the animals appear to return to their normal behaviour. It is expected that these animals will have a similar reaction after being fed Compound Q. Potential Benefits of the Research This research aims to find whether the consumption of Compound Q causes any dangerous side effects. If it is found to be safe, this can allow for frozen dinners to retain their colour, making them more appetizing for humans.