The Role of Media in Conflict Resolution

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Thematic Assessment

The Role of Media in Peace-Building

and ReconciliationCentral Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku

Researched and Prepared By:

The Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information

Institut Studi Arus Infomasi (ISAI)

(Jakarta, Indonesia)

With Technical Support From:

International Media Support (IMS)

(Copenhagen, Denmark)

July 2004



Media in Central Sulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku

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This independent report was prepared by Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI) with support from International Media Support (IMS) and does not necessaraily reflect the views of

UNDP or BAPPENAS.




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Abbreviations

AJI Alliance of Independent Journalist

ARSSI Indonesian Association of Private Broadcasting Radio

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CG Common Ground (Indonesia)

CPRU Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency

DFID Department for International Development (UK)

EC European Commission

FKKAUB Forum of Harmony and Communication among the Religious Disciples

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICCO Interchurch Organisation for Development Co-operation (NL)

ICFJ International Centre for Journalists

ICG International Crisis Group

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IFJ International Federation of Journalists

IMS International Media Support

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

INSI International News Safety Institute

ISAI Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (Institut Studi Arus Informasi)

KPI Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia)

LPS-HAM Institute for the Development of Legal Studies and Human Rights Advocacy

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MDLF Media Development Loan Fund

MMC Maluku Media Centre

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development CooperationOTI Office of Transitional Initiatives (USAID)

PRSSNI Indonesian Alliance of National Private Broadcasting Radio

PWI Indonesian Journalist Association

RRI Radio Republik Indonesia

SEAPA Southeast Asian Press Alliance

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SIUPP Press Publishing License (now removed)

SPS Union of Newspaper Publisher

TAF The Asia Foundation

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

VoA Voice of America




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Preface

The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) of the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) Indonesia has been working in North Maluku and Maluku over the last three

years with a focus on multi-sectoral recovery initiatives to complement the efforts of theGovernment of Indonesia to support post-conflict recovery, long-term peace building andsustainable development. UNDP is also developing a three-year programme in Central Sulawesiaimed at supporting the peace process, providing short-term responses to vulnerable communitiesand working with local government and civil society in the design of the future programme. In allthree provinces, UNDP works with provincial and district level partners including Government,UN agencies, international NGOs and civil society organizations.

In 2004, the CPRU commenced a planning process in cooperation with the National Planning andDevelopment Board (BAPPENAS) to identify the key longer-term challenges and opportunitiesfor crisis prevention and sustainable peace in Indonesia’s troubled regions. The outcomes of these

processes will lead to programme priorities for the next phase of programming in the provinces, aswell as a revised strategy and priorities for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme as awhole. These regional analyses have focused on three provinces – North Maluku, Maluku andCentral Sulawesi – provinces where CPRU/UNDP has supported programmes since 2001. Each

provincial analysis has consisted of three components, specifically (i) a provincial multi-stakeholder workshop, (ii) research consisting of a literature review, local perception surveys andcase studies, and (iii) thematic assessment of key aspects of crisis prevention and peace-buildingthat had been identified. The series of provincial level assessments commissioned by UNDPcovered the following thematic issues (a) local economic development and natural resourcemanagement, (b) local democratic governance, (c) media and information, (d) social cohesion andyouth, and (e) women and gender. The main conclusions of these reports are summarized in asynthesis paper, which along with all the thematic reports are available on the UNDP Indonesiawebsite at www.undp.or.id.

This thematic assessment covers the issue of the role of media in conflict and peace-building anhas been completed by The Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI) based inJakarta (see www.isai.or.id) in cooperation with International Media Support (IMS), based inCopenhagen (see www.i-m-s.dk ), was approached by UNDP and ISAI to provide technicalsupport and strategic input into this assessment process. ISAI and IMS would like to express their gratitude to the local researchers for their work in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, aswell as all the interviewees and respondents who took part in the assessments. In addition, thanksare expressed to all the national and international organisations that shared information andexperiences with the assessment team.

UNDP would like to thank BAPPENAS and the other peer reviewers of these studies. Thesestudies were made possible with financial support from the UK’s Department for International

Development and UNDP.




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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................... 6

1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 8 1.1 Media and Conflict: Analysis and Definitions........................................................................................ 8 1.2 Interrelationship between Media and Conflict....................................................................................... 9 1.3 Structural Considerations....................................................................................................................10 1.4 Content Considerations ......................................................................................................................11 1.5 Media and Conflict in Central Sulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku..................................................11

2. INDONESIA’S MEDIA LANDSCAPE – NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .................... 13 2.1 Media Legislation ................................................................................................................................13 2.2 Media Institutions ................................................................................................................................13 2.3 Professional Media Organisations and Associations .........................................................................14 2.4 Commercial Media Networks..............................................................................................................14

3. MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN CENTRAL SULAWESI.................................................. 16 3.1 Background to Conflict........................................................................................................................16 3.2 The Media in Central Sulawesi...........................................................................................................17 3.3 Provincial Traditional Media................................................................................................................25 3.4 New Information Technologies ...........................................................................................................27 3.5 Information Flows................................................................................................................................27

4. MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN MALUKU........................................................................ 29 4.1 Background to Conflict........................................................................................................................29 4.2 The Media in Maluku...........................................................................................................................30 4.3 Provincial Traditional Media................................................................................................................37 4.4 New Information Technologies ...........................................................................................................37

4.5 Information Flows................................................................................................................................39

5. MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN NORTH MALUKU.......................................................... 41 5.1 Background to Conflict........................................................................................................................41 5.2 The Media in North Maluku.................................................................................................................43 5.3 Provincial Traditional Media................................................................................................................47 5.4 New Information Technologies ...........................................................................................................48 5.5 Information Flows................................................................................................................................48

6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUPPORT TO THE MEDIA IN CENTRALSULAWESI, MALUKU AND NORTH MALUKU................................................................ 50 6.1 Strengthening the Media Environment at Provincial Level.................................................................51

6.2 Developing Professional Skills and Resources ..................................................................................53 6.3 Information Flows and Access............................................................................................................56 6.4 Supporting Community-Based Communication.................................................................................58 6.5 Considerations for Implementation.....................................................................................................60




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Executive Summary

Reliable, accurate and objective media,whether it be mainstream, alternative or traditional/non-conventional, can both help prevent and resolve conflict through theautomatic functions of responsiblydisseminating information, furtheringawareness and knowledge, promoting participatory and transparent governance, andaddressing perceived grievances. In this regard,the effects of media on conflict can be viewed both in terms of the negative repercussions thatinadvertent or overtly propagandistic mediamay have in terms of fuelling tensions and provoking conflict, as well as the potential positive impact it may have if based on basic professional standards, combined with diverseaccess to information, reasonable financial

resources and adherence to ethical codes. Suchmedia can contribute to societal reconciliation,change misperceptions and broadenunderstanding of the causes and consequencesof conflict.

The three provinces of Maluku, NorthMaluku and Central Sulawesi were hit byconflict soon after the reformasi (reform) erastarted in 1998. With reformasi came pressfreedoms under the new Indonesian Press Law(30 August 1999), which meant that all threeconflicts were covered by the first ‘free’

Indonesian media for more than 30 years.

The national media, to a fairly large extent,covered the conflicts in each province.However, due to the emergence of a number of conflicts in Indonesia in the early post NewOrder days, the continuity and depths of thiscoverage varied significantly. The nationalcoverage also tended to focus on Ambon andMaluku, whilst the coverage of the other two provinces received less consistent attention.

In all three conflict areas, the provincial

media (including mainstream, alternative,traditional and non-conventional forms)addressed the conflicts from different perspectives and with varying intensity. Manyfailed to provide consistent, independent and balanced coverage and in the early phases physical attacks against and abuse of the media by the combatant groups took place in all three provinces. Media infrastructure and buildingswere destroyed or looted and in many cases

local outlets chose to close down during themost intense fighting. This has meant that allthree provinces have had periods with none or almost no local media coverage, leavingrumours and propaganda as the prime localinformation source.

Local media in all three provinces were,and still are, accused of being biased.Sometimes these accusations came from thecombatant parties who expected the media to be their mouthpieces, whilst at other times themedia took sides in the conflict or were forcedto choose sides. In certain cases the lack of independent and balanced local coverage can be explained by the fact that local mediaowners were not sufficiently isolated from

society and their outlets reflected popular opinions. In addition, these media were part of the local business environment and thereforedependent on income from the localcommunity. Another obstacle to balancedcoverage was, and still is, ‘envelope journalism’, whereby reporters are paid tocover issues in order to ‘top up’ otherwise lowincomes.

Maybe the largest obstacle to professionalreporting remains the lack of education and professionalism among media practitioners.

Conceptual understanding and practical skillsfor objective and independent reporting wereweak, particularly after more than 30 yearswith centralised state controlled media. Incontrast to the newfound freedoms of the post New Order era, under Soeharto news wassolely provided centrally from state media andnews agencies.

Many media outlets and professionals havereceived support and participated in workshopsconducted by national and international NGOsand associations, UN agencies and

international donors. However, even with thisnew knowledge, structural obstacles stillremain in the media community preventing the practice of these skills. In addition, localinterpretation of how to address content issuesis often taken for granted. Lack of professionalism in the media has seeminglyfuelled rumours and misperceptions in the pastoften with disastrous consequences. This statusquo has also hindered attempts to address and




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resolve latent conflict issues. Furthermore, theweak commercial marketplace and lack of clear legislative or regulatory structures leavesthe media vulnerable to the types of manipulation and abuse that can trigger conflict.

The recommendations identified in this

report are aimed at supporting the media’s rolein fostering a long-term reduction in the potential for violent conflict based upon thespecific circumstances of each province as laidout in the province-specific chapters. Theyrange from the broadest long-term perspectiveof developing a strong and vigorousenvironment in which the media can properlyfulfil its potential role as the ‘fourth estate’,thereby positively influencing conflict prevention and resolution, to the most specificlevel aimed at immediate grass-roots impact

through the utilisation of local alternative andtraditional channels of communication.

Such an approach ensures that individualtraditional and alternative media can beengaged in addressing conflict related issues ina manner unique to the local environment, andthe inherent long-term role of the mainstreamand alternative mass-media can be secured for preventing and resolving conflict throughcountering manipulation and abuse,diversifying information access anddissemination, and providing skills and

resources.

The four areas identified for recommendedactivities include (i) strengthening the mediaenvironment at the provincial level, (ii)developing professional skills and resources,(iii) facilitating information flows and access,and (iv) supporting community-basedcommunication.

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1. Introduction

Professional media are a central componentof stable plural democracies. As the ‘fourthestate’, the media acts as the ‘guardians of democracy, defenders of the public interest…revealing abuses of state authority and

defending the democratic rights of citizens’.1 Inthis regard, it is assumed strong well-groundeddemocracies are less prone or vulnerable toconflict. A professional and vigorous mediacommunity can thus both prevent and resolveconflict, through the automatic functions of disseminating information, furtheringawareness and knowledge, promoting participatory and transparent governance, andaddressing perceived grievances.

Although the influence of the media during periods of conflict has long been recognized, it

is only in more recent years that it has beenspecifically addressed by the internationaldevelopment community as a means for positively impacting on conflict, both throughits function to communicate information, aswell as address issues and events in anobjective, reliable and accurate manner. Asnoted by the participants of the SIDA/UNESCO international roundtable on‘Assistance to Media in Tension Areas andConflict Situations’ in May 2003:

‘Media underpins development and

democratisation and is a vital element of conflict resolution and peace building…. An independent media is the foundation of a democracy and more

often than not the only guarantee for transparency and

good governance in conflict management and post-

conflict development efforts’ .2

The reflections outlined in this section of the report are based upon the methodologicalconsiderations and practical experiences of International Media Support (IMS) and theInstitute of Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI) in the field of media

development and freedom of expression inconflict-affected areas. The continuing debatein this field has been contributed to by a

1 ‘Mass Media: Fourth Estate’ (Mick Underwood,www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk, June 2003)2 Seminar on Assistance to Media in Tension Areasand Conflict Situations: Conclusion of Seminar Discussions and Proposed Recommendations (SIDA/UNESCO, Vaxholm 25-27 May 2003)

number of academics and media practitionersas referred to in the text. 3

1.1 Media and Conflict: Analysis and

Definitions

In order that the media be assisted toeffectively address conflict, it is essential thatthe root causes, patterns of violence and currentdynamics are clearly understood. This processrequires a detailed and specialised approach,upon which assessments of thematic issuesshould ideally be based. Moreover, conflictshould be considered as circular rather thanlinear, with the various stages of pre, mid and post-conflict overlapping one another, withoutany necessary preset course. In this regard, aconflict may theoretically pass from the overt-

conflict stage to either the pre-conflict or post-conflict stages and so forth.4

As a basic definition, the media are theseveral mediums or channels used in anorganised fashion to communicate toindividuals and groups. The most commonlyrecognized forms of media are print, audio,

3 Publications reflected in this section include ‘ConflictSensitive Journalism’ (IMS/ IMPACS, Ross Howard,March 2003); ‘An Operational Framework for Mediaand Peacebuilding’ (IMPACS, Ross Howard, January2002); ‘Assistance to Media in Tension Areas andConflict Situations’ (SIDA/ UNESCO, Vaxholm May2003); ‘Working with the Media in Conflicts and other Emergencies’ (Conflict and Humanitarian AffairsDepartment and Social Development Department,DFID, September 2000); ‘Special Report: Use andAbuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies’ (USIP,Special Report 110, October 2003); ‘Reporting theWorld’ (Conflict & Peace Forums, Jake Lynch, 2002);‘Using the Media for Conflict Transformation: theCommon Ground Experience’ (Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, www.berghof-handbook.net,2003).4 Michael Lund in ‘Media as an Instrument for

Managing Conflicts and Building Peace’ (June 2002)writes that conflicts may be perceived as goingthrough stages: “They may typically encompass avariety of simultaneous facets including stable peace inrelation to unstable peace; crisis with high levels of tension and confrontations, and breakdown of regional political mechanisms; war, stalemates; de-escalation or cessations; negotiations of settlements; settlementsimplementation; and post-settlement reconstructionand reconciliation. And several of these characteristicsoften occur at the same time. Conflicts are not uni-linear phenomena.”




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video and new information technologies,which can be divided between ‘mainstream’and ‘alternative’ outlets dependent on their structure, focus and content. Whilst the term‘mainstream’ media is relatively universallyunderstood, there is more divergence aboutwhat constitutes ‘alternative’ media. Although

this report does not seek to provide a definitivedefinition, it is assumed that ‘alternative’ mediashould fit into one or a number of thecategories below:

! The media is ‘issue-driven’ and activelysupports like-minded outlets and civilsociety initiatives;

! Alternative approaches to societal activityare promoted in contrast to existingcommercial interests and socio-economichierarchies;

! The editorial focus is based on ‘new’

perspectives, providing differentinterpretations of issues and events;

! The consumers are often niche groups;

! Maximizing profits is not a keyconsideration;

! Outlets have relatively horizontal workingand pay structures.

Although news and information are mostoften the basis for media and conflict activities,entertainment programmes, ranging from chat-shows to soap operas, are also important

mediums. In this regard, all forms of media, if based upon accurate and balanced standards,can communicate diversity and understanding.5

This report also takes ‘traditional and non-conventional’ media into consideration,including literature, poetry, music, art, ruraland urban socio-economic forums, religiousgroups and socio-ethnic ceremonies. Althoughsome of the content and structuralconsiderations outlined below are mainlyapplicable to the ‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’media, a number of the considerations are

equally relevant to ‘traditional and non-conventional’ media.

5 ‘An Operational Framework for Media andPeacebuilding’ (IMPACS, Ross Howard, January2002)

1.2 Interrelationship between Media

and Conflict

‘The media is a double-edged sword. It can be a frightful weapon of violence when it propagates

messages of intolerance or disinformation that

manipulate public sentiment… But there is another

aspect to the media. It can be an instrument of conflict

resolution, when the information it presents is reliable,respects human rights, and represents diverse views. It’s the kind of media that enables a society to make

well-informed choices, which is the precursor of

democratic governance. It is a media that reduced

conflict and fosters human security’ . 6

As indicated in the quote above, anassessment of the ‘cause and effect’relationship between media and conflict servesto more clearly present how the two entitiesimpact upon one another.

Effects of Media on Conflict - The effects

of media on conflict can be viewed in terms of the negative repercussions that inadvertent or overt propagandistic or one-sided reportingmay have in terms of fuelling tensions and provoking conflict. Conversely, the media may potentially have a positive impact if basedupon basic professional standards, combinedwith diverse access to information, reasonablefinancial resources and adherence to ethicalcodes. Such media can contribute to societalreconciliation, alter misperceptions and broaden understanding of the causes andconsequences of conflict.

Effects of Conflict on Media - The negativeeffects of violent conflict on media are wellknown. In conflict-developing situations it isfreedom of expression and the impartiality of the media that are often the initial victims. Inweakly founded democracies where editorialindependence is not sufficiently ensured, bothstate and non-state entities often succeed inmaking the media a tool for nationalistic andxenophobic propaganda. This is the case for both the state and independent media. Conflict

generating propaganda in the media can serveto provoke or escalate violence and is alsooften a convenient occasion for the authoritiesto crack down on press freedoms and freedomof expression.

Conflict also erodes media environmentsand undermines the economic viability of





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marketplaces. Although an explosion in thenumber of media is often seen during conflict,the vast majority of these have limitedresources and serve purely propaganda purposes of one side or another. In this regard,they generally do not survive long after theconflict subsides, although the resultant

degradation to the media environment oftenhas a lasting impact after the conflict.

The effects of the media on conflict andvisa-verse are dependent on the context inwhich the interaction takes place. Suchcontextual factors dictate the role and scope of the media to influence the root causes, patternsof violence and current/ future dynamics of conflict. In this regard, it is helpful to consider these factors in terms of ‘structural’ and‘content’ considerations.

1.3 Structural ConsiderationsWhen assessing the mutual impact of

media and conflict there are a number of structural issues that should be taken intoconsideration. These relate to the manner inwhich the media outlets and practitionersfunction and interact, both with one another, aswell as the authorities, civil society and general public.7

Policy and Environment - The degree towhich policy and legislation provides a spacewithin which the media can operate, and thedegree to which the judiciary can regulate and protect that space, are crucial. If legislation isused to silence the media or the courts areeasily influenced and corrupted, then it’sfunction as the ‘fourth estate’ and its role inconflict prevention and resolution will besignificantly hindered.

Conversely, if the media policyenvironment is too loose and legal and self-regulatory checks and balances are not in place, this may allow ‘rogue’ media, whose

aim is to disseminate hate speech and/or provoke conflict, to continue their activitieswithout any reasonable recourse to deter or prohibit such action. This is particularlyrelevant in transition countries where the

7 This is based upon the categories and methodologicalstructure as described in ‘Special Report: Use andAbuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies’ (USIP,Special Report 110, October 2003)

sudden presence of an unregulated or ‘loosened’ media landscape may result innumerous politically, religiously and ethicallyassociated outlets opening, potentially onlyinterested in solidifying their influence at theexpense of others.

Networking and Association - Networking

and association between journalists both withintheir immediate communities, as well asregionally and internationally, facilitatesexchange of experiences, promotion of best practices, collective stances and ‘strength innumbers’. This serves to reinforce theconfidence of media practitioners to uphold professional standards, often in isolatedcircumstances when societal, political andeconomic pressures dictate otherwise, as wellas opens avenues for support from peers, onissues from basic professional standards

training to accessing legal aid funds. Information Flows - The dissemination of a

media is crucial in considering its potential toinfluence communities. Media with lowdissemination are significantly restricted fromcommunicating to the wider public and, in thatregard, affecting public opinion. Likewise, theaccessibility of a media to the public is centralin defining its influence. If media isinaccessible (i.e. if a ‘media vacuum’ exists)either due to low technical means, prohibitivecosts, deliberate obstruction or lack of interest,

then its role will be diminished. The pluralityof certain media can also have a significantimpact, because if there is only one outlet inthe most popular and/or easily accessible form,then its influence will be significantlyenhanced due to the lack of competition.

Furthermore, the access that the media hasto timely and accurate information from primary sources is essential for balanced,objective and reliable reporting. In this regard,linkages and cooperative relations with localauthorities, civil society, academia and the

development aid community are of significantimportance.

Homogeneous or Heterogeneous MediaCommunities - The religious, ethnic and political composition of the media communitycan be instrumental in defining its orientationand possible vulnerability to bias. Withoutdiversity there is a risk that the media will failto reflect the needs and concerns of ‘the other’.In this manner, stereotypes and popular myths




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can be promulgated through the written andspoken word. Likewise, if ownership isconcentrated in one particular group, then themedia may be manipulated or fail to reflectdiversity.

Media Skills and Resources - The skillsand resources available to media outlets and

practitioners, ranging from owners and editorsto reporters, have a significant impact on themedia’s role. If there is an ingrainedunderstanding of the role of the media and the professional standards required, then the mediais more likely have a positive impact.Conversely, if these are not present then the potential for inadvertent conflict provocation,as well as purposeful manipulation and abuse,is greater.

Likewise, if the media has access todeveloped financial and institutional resourcesthis will facilitate best practices and allowmedia practitioners to perform their work effectively and in accordance with professionalstandards. Financial self-sustainability alsoremoves dependency on external sources of funding and influence, thereby strengtheningthe potential for independent media to operate.

1.4 Content Considerations

When assessing the mutual impact of media and conflict, there are a number of

‘content’ issues to be considered. These relateto the substance of the media products being published and/or broadcast. 8

Media content that promotes conflict prevention and resolution is that which, at aminimum, is based upon core professionalstandards and practices. In this manner the practice of advanced journalism skills, such asconflict sensitive journalism, investigativereporting and so forth, can have an even greater impact on facilitating conflict resolution and prevention.

In contrast, content that provokes conflictcan be roughly divided into two broad groups:that which is intended to stir emotions basedupon an imagined need to take pre-emptiveaction and that which dulls-opposition toconflict based upon an image of historical

8 This is based upon the categories and methodologicalstructure as described in ‘Special Report: Use andAbuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies’ (USIP,Special Report 110, October 2003)

enmity and inevitability of reoccurring conflict.If the surrounding environment is conducivefor the spread of conflict, both these types of content can fuel violence, whether they bedeliberate hate speech or inadvertent reportingdue to low professional standards.

Pre-emptive Action - Media content as

described above serves to engender anunsubstantiated belief that pre-emptive actionis required for self-defence. Such perceptionsare often based on a lack of information andunderstanding of the intentions andcircumstances of the other and a focus onmyths and stereotypes, perceived inequalitiesand injustices, and previous tensions betweencommunities (although the two communitiesmay have a far longer history of cooperationand mutual tolerance). This can create hysteria,drowning out more moderate voices in society.

The role of the media in providing balancedand objective information is therefore essential.

In addition, the dehumanisation of communities and creation of an image of theenemy as a mass rather than individuals withdifferent orientations and interests, serves tomake the resort to violence less personal andtherefore easier to justify.9

Historical Enmity and Conflict Inevitability- Although closely linked to the ‘pre-emptiveaction’ model, of equal concern is when media

content creates an image that the outbreak of conflict or return to conflict in unavoidable.This undermines the collective will of communities to resist the path to conflict,which may be sought only by a small minority.The establishment of such self-fulfilling prophecies is usually achieved through portraying conflict as pattern or ongoinghistorical process, thereby promoting violenceas a normal or acceptable manner in which to pursue grievances or right perceived wrongs.

1.5 Media and Conflict in Central

Sulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku

This report focuses on the media in CentralSulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku.Specifically, it provides a description of thenational media landscape which arefundamental to understanding and interpreting





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circumstances at the provincial level (Chapter 2) and presents the main findings of theassessments in Central Sulawesi, NorthMaluku and Maluku (Chapters 3-5). The finalchapter brings the assessments together toidentify commonalities and differences and aseries of recommended activity areas.

The assessments conducted as part of thisassignment were divided into two mainsections. The initial period from 14 to 30 June2004 was used for the preparation andexecution of the research in the three provinces. This involved short-term visits bythe joint UNDP, IMS and ISAI team to CentralSulawesi and North Maluku (Maluku was notvisited due to the security situation) and the

longer-term collation of the research data bythe ISAI teams on the ground in the three provinces. In each province the teams consistedof one ISAI field coordinator working withfive local researchers. The ISAI fieldcoordinators were backed-up by the ISAI teamin Jakarta. The assessment teams are shown inTable 1.

The second phase, lasting from 1 to 8 July,focused on the analysis of the data and designof targeted recommendations. This phase brought the ISAI coordinators from the three

provinces, ISAI team in Jakarta, IMS team andUNDP media assessment coordinator together for consultative meetings and report drafting.

.

Table 1 – Asssessment Team

Organisation /

RoleName

UNDPCoordinator

Irawati M. Hapsari

Emanuel Lalang Wardoyo

EriyantoISAI – JakartaTeam

Lia Ratna Palupi Nasution

Hasrul Kokoh (CentralSulawesi)

Indarwati Aminuddin (Maluku)

ISAI – FieldCoordinators

Agung Jatmiko (North Maluku)

Thomas HughesIMS Team Torben Brandt




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2. Indonesia’s Media Landscape – National Perspectives

The national media in Indonesia has seen profound changes since 1999. This section of the report outlines some considerations andinformation applicable to the national level in

Indonesia that have direct bearing on thesituation at the provincial level in CentralSulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku.

2.1 Media Legislation

There are two important pieces of legislation relating to the media in Indonesia.These are Undang-Undang Pers No.40/1999(the Press Law) and Undang-Undang Penyiaran No. 32/2002 (the Broadcast Law).

Press Law - The press law was created to

ensure press freedom and independence. Thislaw is the total revision of the former law (UU No.11/1966 and UU No.21/1982), the spirit of which was to control and manipulate themedia. In the press law of 1966 and 1982, thegovernment could intervene to shut downmedia if they violated censorship rules. Over 237 press companies were shut down as aresult of the application of these laws.

The most important thing in the UU Pers No.40/1999 is the elimination of licensed press publishing (SIUPP - Surat Ijin Usaha

Penerbitan Pers). Under the New Order regime, this license was the main obstacle for those wishing to publish. This new press lawalso guarantees that there should not be anycensorship or government interventions to shutdown media. The law also guarantees the rightof journalists to search for and spreadinformation.

Broadcast Law - The broadcast law passedin December 2002 was produced following along consultative process with all broadcastmedia owner, academics, government and non-

governmental sector.

An important part of this broadcast law isthe limitations placed on national broadcaster,cross-ownership and centralization of themedia ownership. This law manages the broadcast media in Indonesia based on the principles of diversity of ownership andcontent. The law divided the broadcastinstitution into three sections. Those threesections are The Commercial Broadcast

Institution, The Community BroadcastInstitution, and The Public BroadcastInstitution.

Another important aspect of the law is thecreation of the Indonesian BroadcastingCommission ( Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia – KPI – see 2.2 below) as the independentregulatory institution for broadcast media. Thisrole was previously in the hands of thegovernment under the Ministry of Information.

2.2 Media Institutions

There are two important institutionsrelating to the media in Indonesia. Those arethe Press Council ( Dewan Pers) and

Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI). Press Council (Dewan Pers) - The

existence of the Press Council is in the UU No.40/1999. The Press Council functions are todecide and monitor the practice of journalistethical codes, develop the communication between government and the media, and assistthe press organisations in formulating professional rules. Other important functionsinclude reviewing cases of public complaintabout the print and broadcasting media.

The Press Council is financed by media

company organisations, state assistance andother direct assistance. Although a PressCouncil was already established in the NewOrder era, the new independent Press Councilwas only created in February 2000.

Indonesian Broadcasting Commission(KPI) - The establishment of KPI is under theUU Penyiaran No. 32/2002. KPI is one of theindependent broadcast regulatory institutions.The role of the KPI is similar to the FederalCommunications Commission (FCC) in theUnited States or the Canada BroadcastingAuthority (CBA).

The KPI is in charge in deciding thestandard of the broadcasting programme,making guidelines and determining their implementation. The KPI can also give penalties against those media that violate therules and guidelines. The KPI should beestablished both in Jakarta and in the provinces. The central body consists of nine




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persons chosen by the legislative council andacknowledged by the President.

2.3 Professional Media Organisations

and Associations

Indonesian Journalist Association (PWI) -PWI was created in February 1946 and is the

oldest journalist association in Indonesia. In the New Order era (up to 1998), PWI was the only journalist association. During that time, all journalists were required to be a member of PWI, and those without PWI membershipcould not work. In addition, all chief editors of the media in Indonesia had to be members of PWI. PWI worked together with the NewOrder authorities to identify critical journalists.

Until 2002, the number of PWI memberswas 11,212 journalists who came from variousmedia. Currently, PWI has 27 branches at the provincial level and 69 representatives in thedistricts across Indonesia. Although it hasmany members, many are non-active. PWI’simage is reportedly poor mainly among theyounger journalists. PWI holds severalactivities, such as training for journalist andwriting competitions, as well as sports and artsevents.

Alliance of Independent Journalist (AJI) -Alliance of Independent Journalist (AJI) wascreated in opposition to the IndonesianJournalist Association (PWI). AJI wasestablished in December 1994 in response tothe banning of three media (Editor, Tempo andDetik) under the Soeharto’s regime. In October 1995, AJI was accepted formally as themember of International Federation of Journalists (IFJ).

Under the New Order, AJI was run as anunderground organisation since thegovernment did not acknowledge it as aninstitution. Any journalist recognised as amember of AJI was removed from the media.

The Department of Information issuedinstructions to chief editors of media to expelany journalist involved with AJI. Therefore,under the New Order, AJI was more amovement against the authorities rather than professional organisation. AJI activitiesincluded discussions and seminars about the press struggle, professional journalist training,students and pro-democracy activities, and promoting research about press issues and publication of related books.

Following the end of the New Order regime in 1999, AJI became a purely professional organisation. AJI’s activitiescurrently include holding training for journalists and advocacy against violence andabuse of the media. Other advocacy includes protection and assisting journalists under

threat. AJI also campaigns against bribery inthe media and for the development of labour unions in media enterprises. Its membership issmaller than PWI’s, although those involvedhave a reputation of being more pro-active.

Indonesian Alliance of National Private Broadcasting Radio (PRSSNI) - PRSSNI is anassociation of private (commercial) radiostations in Indonesia. It was established in 1974during the New Order and was the onlyumbrella organization for private radios.Currently there are reportedly about 1,200

private radio stations in Indonesia and by 2003PRSSNI included 816 of these across thecountry. PRSNNI has a central management inJakarta, as well as regional branches in the provinces. It held training for its members,organised radio databases and seeks to strengththe resources and abilities of stations.

Indonesian Association of Private Broadcasting Radio (ARSSI) - ARSSI wascreated in 1999 after the fall of the New Order regime when it was no longer compulsory for radios to be members of PRSSNI. However,

there is very little availably information aboutARSSI activities and the number of member.

Union of Newspaper Publisher (SPS) - SPSis an association of newspaper publishers inIndonesia. It was established in 1946. SPSrepresents newspaper’s interests, includingissues relating to price, paper supply andtaxation. SPS also holds press managementtraining and runs a newspaper database. Mostof publishing houses are members of SPS. Italso has regional branches, of which there were20 branches across Indonesia in 2003.

2.4 Commercial Media Networks

Print Media Networks - Indonesiaexperienced a boom in media publishing after the downfall of the New Order in 1998 and theelimination of the press permission certificate.Up to 2002, there were 1,676 press permits,although only 695 of them published regularly.According to the Union of Newspaper Publishers (SPS), only 30% of those 695




15

publishers were financially stable. Indonesiannewspaper encountered the classic problems of low reading capacity and poor purchasing power. As a result, many newspapers have been closed down.

A recent phenomenon in Indonesia has been the emergence of corporate owned press.

Of the approximate 695 regular publications,30% are under corporate groups. By 2003 therewere 10 corporate media groups in Indonesia,the biggest being the Jawa Pos Group andKompas-Gramedia (see Table 2). Jawa Pos has107 daily and weekly newspapers in Indonesia,while Kompas-Gramedia has almost 50 publications. Besides the national companies,there are regional publishing houses such asBali Post and Pikiran Rakyat in West Java.

Broadcast Media Networks - In Indonesiathere are 53 government radio stations under Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) and about1,200 private radios. However the precisenumbers are unknown, since many radiosoperate without licences (it is estimated thatonly 850 out of 1,200 radios in the countryhave licences). The radio phenomenon inIndonesia has been similar to the print media,with many radio stations belonging to networks

(See Table 3). By 2003, there wereapproximately 17 radio networks in Indonesia.

Table 2 – Print Media Groups in Indonesia

Corporate Media

Groups

Number of

Publishing

(as of 2003)Jawa Pos Group 107 (a newspaper in

Surabaya, and manyregional newspaper)

Kompas Gramedia Group 55 (a newspaper inJakarta and regionalones, tabloid andmagazine)

Media Indonesia Group 4 (a newspaper inJakarta and severalregional newspapers)

Pos Kota 4 (newspapers inJakarta)

Bisnis Indonesia 2 (newspapers inJakarta)

Pikiran Rakyat 5 (newspapers in WestJava)

Bali Post 4 (newspapers in Bali)

MRA Group 4 (several media inJakarta)

Bintang Advis Media(BAM)

3 (several media inJakarta)

Table 3 – Radio Networks in Indonesia

Radio Network Number of Members

MRA Media 10 radio stations in Jakarta,Yogyakarta, Bali, Bandung.Semarang

Rajawali Media

Group

3 radio stations in Surabaya

Gajahmada Group 3 radio stations in Semarang

Rajawali Group 4 radio stations in Lampung

Pentas Group 4 radio stations in Palembang

Kartika Group 3 radio stations in Liwa andLampung

Masima MediaInvestama

14 radio stations in Jakarta,Bandung, Yogyakarta, Manadoand Makassar

CPP Radio Net 40 radio stations in almost allregencies of Central Java

Suzana Radionet 8 radio stations in East Java

Arbes Network 9 radio stations in WestSumatra

Smarat Network 6 radio stations in Manado,Makassar, Palembang, Padangand Banjarmasin

MayangkaraRadionet

6 radio stations in East Java

Ramako Group 5 radio stations in Jakarta andBatam

RCM Radio Network 9 radio stations in Yogyakartaand Central Java

Volare Group 14 radio stations in WestKalimantan

Bens Radio 9 radio stations in Jakarta,Banten and Surabaya

Nirwana Group 9 radio stations in South

Kalimantan




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3. Media and Conflict in Central Sulawesi

Situated in the eastern region of Indonesia,Central Sulawesi covers an area of 68,059 sq.km. It has a population of approximately 2.07million (ranked 22nd in terms of populationafter North Sulawesi), with a populationdensity of 31 persons/sq. km. The populationis spread out over 8 districts and 1 city, withconcentrations in Donggala District (35.21%),Banggai (13.07%), Palu (12.94%) and Poso(11.20%). Smaller numbers reside in TolitoliDistrict (8.34%), Morowali (7.73%), BanggaiIslands (6.80%) and Buol (4.71%).

The media is mainly concentrated in PaluDistrict with its population of 269,083, whichmakes up the majority of the marketplace for existing media. In this regard, Palu also acts asa barometer for media development andgrowth. Palu and the other districts are locatedhundreds of kilometres from one another andthe topography includes mountains and valleyswith steep slopes thus obstructing thedissemination of media. In addition, road andtransportation infrastructure is poor.

The following chapter provides anoverview of the five main assessment areas for Central Sulawesi including (i) the mainstreammedia, (ii) alternative media, (iii) traditionalmedia, (iv) new information technologies and

(v) information flows. Although it provides anoverview of the media situation, it does not provide a holistic picture of all media outletsand forms. Additional in-depth information can be found in the Annexes 1-9.10

10 The information presented in this chapter derivesfrom the research data gathered by ISAI between 23and 30 June 2004, which looked at the performanceand development of the provincial mainstream,alternative and traditional media in Central Sulawesi,as well as examined information flows from both localand national media and their respective influence onthe general public. A sample of eleven respondents

representing provincial media stakeholders,community figures, religious leaders, security forces,government, private sector and the general public provided in-depth feedback on the role of the mediarelating to conflict. The in-depth research on mediaoutlets covered four newspapers (Radar Sulteng, Nuansa Pos, Koran MAL, Poso Pos), two alternative print media (Sangkopo, Baruga), four private radiostations (Nebula, Nugraha, RAL, Bulava) and thestate-owned radio station (RRI programmes 1, 2 and3). The main obstacles faced in undertaking theresearch were the conditions in the field, particularly

3.1 Background to Conflict11

Dutch missionaries from the early 1900ssought to convert indigenous animist groups to

Christianity in the mountainous interior of what is now Central Sulawesi province. Thecolonial administration envisioned theseProtestants as an allied population buffer against Muslim-influenced coastal kingdoms.Many of these slash-and-burn farmers wereresettled in model villages and set to wet-ricefarming by the Dutch. Most groups livingaround Poso Lake, between Poso and themission centre of Tentena, came to identifythemselves ethnically as Pamona. TheJapanese Occupation and independence in1945 was followed by a chaotic period whenMuslim rebels from South Sulawesi attackedinterior animists and Christians.

When the Suharto regime took control, themajority population of the region was stillProtestant and Pamona leaders exercised partialcontrol over the local bureaucracy. However,much had changed by the end of Suharto'sregime. In 1973, Suharto designated CentralSulawesi as one of ten new transmigration provinces. The Trans-Sulawesi Highway wascut into the rugged mountain forests to ease the

path for trans-migrants. The new roads andsettlements also attracted a flood of voluntarymigrants, especially Muslim Bugis and

relating to the distance between the provincial capital,Palu, and the centre of much of the violence, Poso(with the Muslim community being concentrated inPoso Kota and the Christian community in Tentena).Coordinating the local researcher was also problematic, as it was hard for the Muslim localresearcher to do in-depth interviews with Christianreligious figures and vice versa. The local researcherswere recruited from media and civil society backgrounds, although it was ensured that they did not

interview persons related to their own organisations .11 This section is based upon the following sources:Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999, Jakarta Post, OTIField Report Indonesia (June 2000), Central Sulawesi -Program on Humanitarian Policy and ConflictResearch (Harvard University, USA), Human RightsWatch, Inside Indonesia, Lorraine Aragon, EastCarolina University in Greenville (North Carolina,USA), International Crisis Group (IndonesiaBackgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, report, 03February 2004).




17

Makassar people from South Sulawesi. Thefinancial crisis, beginning in late 1997, spurredfurther migration into the Poso area.Competition between modernist Muslims andChristians for military posts and government positions, including that of head ( Bupati) of Poso district, intensified.

Recent Conflict in Poso

In December 1998 a street fight betweentwo youths, one Protestant and one Muslim,during a tense local political campaign, quicklydeteriorated into a religiously polarised battlein the formerly quiet, multiethnic region. Thestreet fight that began in the heart of Poso cityon the eve of both Christmas and Ramadan in1998 fed into religious tensions promoted byinflammatory graffiti during the campaign.

Soon, supporters from allied towns arrived

to reinforce the Protestant and Muslim mobs.After a week of chaotic street fighting andarson, about 200 people were injured and 400homes burned. A second escalating street fightoccurred in mid-April 2000. When a Muslimyouth was reported stabbed by a Protestant, aMuslim posse began a retaliation campaignthat the police reportedly could not handle. Byearly May over 700 homes had been burned,mostly belonging to Christians, along withseveral church buildings and a police barracks.Thousands of internally displaced persons

(IDPs), mostly Christians, fled the district.The ‘third phase’ began only three weeks

later when a group of Christians made a night-time raid on the Muslims they consideredresponsible for the earlier destruction of Christian neighbourhoods. The masked ‘ninja’group of about a dozen men is alleged to haveincluded both Protestant Pamona and Catholicimmigrants from Flores who resided in thePoso district. Fighting then intensifiedthroughout the region, abetted by localChristian militias. This third phase culminated

in a massacre of Javanese men who fled to aMuslim boarding school in a transmigrationarea south of Poso. Over a hundred were killedwith homemade weapons and their bodieswere tossed in the Poso River and mass graves.The fighting continued until the end of July2000, when three ringleaders were arrested.

Despite a few high-profile reconciliationefforts in late 2000, sporadic fighting continuedand most IDPs did not return home. Instead,

the population underwent an increasing de-facto religious segregation - Muslims in Posocity, Protestants in the highland towns.

During the first months of 2001, violenceworsened. In addition to attacks on farmers,disgruntled factions planted bombs in religious buildings and police posts. Violence surged

again at the end of 2001 when thousands of well-armed Laskar Jihad members were addedto the volatile mix of local fighters and over ahundred more persons were killed. At least half a dozen churches and 4,000 houses in thirtyvillages were burned. Roughly 15,000 more people fled their homes. Muslim militias seizedcontrol of fuel stations and roadsidecheckpoints.

After three years of episodic fighting, deathtoll estimates range from 1,000 to 2,500, withthousands more injured. Scores of churchesand mosques have been burned. Nearly100,000 have fled their homes, leaving thecapital of Poso district described at one time asa 'dead city', though some are now returning.The peace agreement formulated in Malino,South Sulawesi, was widely welcomed but hasfaced challenges in its implementation.

3.2 The Media in Central Sulawesi

3.2.1 National Media

National print media that are readilyavailable in Palu town include Kompas, Media Indonesia, Harian Fajar (Makassar) and the Jakarta Post . These are found beside tens of infotainment tabloids and magazines availablein Central Sulawesi that are published inJakarta.

Local media have allotted designatedcolumns for national information and news. Radar Sulteng sources its news from its group,while Nuansa Post and the weekly newspaper

MAL make extensive use of the Internet.Headlines are predominantly about nationalnews, with local news amounting to 40% of thetotal content. Reporters working for localmedia also often double as correspondents for national media.

In Central Sulawesi one of the most popular sources amongst the population for accessing news and information is television. National private television stations with




18

transmission stations in the region include RCTI , Metro TV and TPI . Local viewers mayalso opt for TVRI Palu, which broadcasts local programmes for three hours a day. The population in Palu also has access to cabletelevision operations serving housingcomplexes in Palu town, and even some of the

villages outside the city.

3.2.2 Mainstream Print Media

According to the Independent Alliance of Journalists (AJI), between 2000-2002, Palusaw thirty-three new print media beingestablished. However, by 2004 only a few werestill running. To date, only four newspapers based in the province’s capital continue to publish regularly.12

After the need to have a press publishinglicense (SIUPP) was removed, investment in

the print media sector sharply increased inCentral Sulawesi. A newspaper couldreportedly be started for approximately IDR 5-10 million.13 This sparked an upsurge of instantreporters working on a minimum wage, whowere often poorly versed on professional principles. As a result, editors and owners alsohad difficulty in applying stringent newsroom policies.

However, after the conflict, the number of outlets fell rapidly.14 These short-lived outletswere handicapped by poor editorial

management, inadequate printing facilities andlimited capital.15 Moreover, a number hadexisted simply to serve the purpose of propagating one side’s version of events in theconflict. Despite the decline in numbers since2002, those print media still in operation arestill hindered by the same problems.

Mainstream print media in CentralSulawesi includes Radar Sulteng , Nuansa Pos, Koran MAL and Poso Pos. The oldestnewspaper in Central Sulawesi is Mercusuar ,which is now called Radar Sulteng following

12 Data of the Kota Palu chapter of the IndependentAlliance of Journalists (AJI).13 Data of Palu City chapter of AJI, 2000-2002.14 Quoted from data of the Kota Palu chapter of theIndependent Alliance of Journalists (AJI), research onmedia in Central Sulawesi during 2000-2002. SeeTable: Growth of Printed Media in Central Sulawesi between 2000-2002.15 Interview with M. Rafik Yahya, Executive Editor of MAL, 29 May 2004.

its takeover by Jawa Pos Group. Mercusuar ,then part of Yayasan Suara Rakyat (People’sVoice Foundation), was initiated in 1969 byRusdy Toana. Its maiden publication was inSeptember 1969 in the form of a magazine. Asit was reportedly founded amongMuhammadiyah circles, it was seen as serving

as a Muhammadiyah mouthpiece. Mercusuar eventually opted for a tabloid format andstarted targeting a broader audience. KoranMAL also counts itself as one of the first publications in the province. It was establishedin July 1971 by Yayasan Al-Khairat Press,which also administered an Islamic school.MAL was initially printed as handouts and run by the Chairman of Al Khairat, HS Saggaf AlDjufrie.

Nuansa Pos was started after the SIUPPwas removed. Established in November 1998

and going by the motto ‘Conclusive and SolidReportage’, it took a tabloid format (then later turned into a broadsheet) and specialized oncrime reportage. The owners stated that theyfelt that there was a need for a newspaper providing news on development and bridgingthe gap between the public and government.16 Poso Pos was also established after the SIUPPwas removed. Published for the first time in November 1999, the paper has the motto“Palakati Sintuwu Maroso”, which accordingto the owner is designed to carry thedemocratic message.

3.2.3 Alternative Print Media

When the administration of AbdurrahmanWahid made way for that of MegawatiSoekarnoputri, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare (Menko Kesra) Jusuf Kallainitiated the Malino Declaration as a peaceagreement for Poso in February 2002. In Poso,stakeholders followed up on the declaration byforming a multi-stakeholder forum called theWorking Group for Reconciling Poso ( Pokja

RKP ). One of its projects was to promote and

campaign on peace through alternative media,such as Baruga magazine, which made itsdebut in 2001.17

16 Interview with Andi Attas Abdullah, Editor-in-Chief, and Bayu Alexander Montang, President-in-Chief of Nuansa Pos, 27 May 2004. 17 Baruga means a place for communities of allethnicities to gather and consult to resolve problems.




19

Baruga is a monthly 20-page publicationand was established to ‘counterbalance’ itsmainstream media counterparts. According toDarwis Waru, a community member andreporter, the media’s role in the conflict inCentral Sulawesi is so crucial that it may makeor break peace. With this in mind, Pokja RKP

published Baruga as an effort to reducetensions. USAID supported the magazine untilits fourth edition, whilst the coming editionsare funded by ICCO. As is commonplace withmedia managed by forums or NGOs,sustainable access to funding is an ongoingissue.18 The magazine appears to have a strongeditorial capacity and the management recentlytried to sell it to the general public as a fundraising effort to substitute production cost(editorial, printing and distribution), reportedlyfinding that the public was willing to pay for the publication.19 Pokja RKP also spreads peacemessages through information andcommunication tools such as posters.20

The Central Sulawesi chapter of Lembaga Pengembangan Studi Hukum dan Hak AzasiManusia (LPS-HAM) also utilised alternativemedia with a specific focus on conflict.21 In2002 it published Sangkopo magazine with theaim of covering human rights issues. Its other mission was to address the lack of advocacythrough the media in the province.22 In thisregard, LPS-HAM considered the media as

being quite cooperative in opening theinformation flows in Central Sulawesi in thearea of human rights education and theongoing peace process.

18 Interview with Romy, editorial volunteer for BarugaBulletin, Pokja RKP.19 Pokja RKP decided not to sell Baruga on a regular basis, due to ethical reason of accepting donor aid inorder to continue with its publication.20 Interview with Darwis Waru, Editor-in-Chief of Baruga magazine, 31 May 2004.21 LPS-HAM is the Institute for the Development of Legal Studies and Human Rights Advocacy in CentralSulawesi. It is an organization that focuses its activityin civil society strengthening and has done muchadvocacy work and critical legal education for theCentral Sulawesi community. It is a local NGO whichis part of a national network of NGOs that works onCivil Society and Human Right advocacy.22 Interview with Marthen Salu, Editorial Secretary of Sangkompo Bulletin, 27 May 2004.

3.2.4 Broadcast Media

Compared to print media, radio in CentralSulawesi had a higher survival rate followingthe conflict. Lower productions costs, wider dissemination and more straightforward permitrequirements were some of the underlyingreasons behind the comparative sustainability

of the broadcast media vis-à-vis the printmedia.

Nevertheless, before the Broadcasting Lawwas passed in 2003, radio administrators inPalu had to deal with rigorous permitrequirements set by the Ministry for Communications ( Dephub) through itsDirectorate-General for Post andTelecommunications ( Dirjen Postel ). At thetime, broadcast content was regulated by theMinistry of Information ( Deppen), based onrecommendations made by the IndonesianCommercial Broadcasters Association(PRSSNI). However, permit requirements became more lenient in 2003.

In Central Sulawesi there are five radiosthat hold official FM frequencies license andeight with AM frequencies.23 However, Paluhas at least thirteen radio stations broadcastingon FM frequencies.24 The IndonesianGovernment Radio ( Radio Republik Indonesia – RRI) in Palu, with its widespread range, nowuses simultaneously six channels on different

frequencies (FM, AM, SW). A number of commercial broadcasters assumed that the useof their channels was legal because (at thetime) the Broadcasting Law was still beingdrafted, although this is yet to be determined.In direct connection to this, the RegionalIndependent Broadcasting Commission( Komisi Penyiaran Independen Daerah – KPID) is still to be formed in the province totake over the role of PRSSNI.

23 Data processed from Data and Potential of Broadcasters in Central Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi

chapter of PRSSNI. See Annex 5 - CommercialBroadcasters holding Frequency Permits in CentralSulawesi.24 Most of radio stations in Palu are illegal and they donot mention their station’s call sign. The localresearcher screened the FM frequencies around Paluand found there were radios on the followingfrequencies: 90,6; 95,2; 95,8; 97,5; 99,1; 93,0; 101,0;101,8; 102,6; 103,4; 104,2; 105,0; 105,8. Out of these13 radios, only three have valid licenses, these being101,0: Nebula FM; 102,6; Nugraha Top FM; 101,8:Best FM.




20

Before the number of radio stations startedto expand in the post-conflict period in Poso,stations holding radio frequency permits oftenlacked editorial capacity to produce news programmes, as they had for so long beenrequired to relay news broadcasted news fromRRI. After this was no longer required, stations

started to diversify by adding news programsto their entertainment shows. In this manner, Radio Nugraha has produced its own news programme since 2002. Meanwhile, Nebula,which went on air for the first time in November 1985 and reaches Palu town, mostof Donggala District and Parigi MoutongDistrict, started to seriously produce news onlywhen the Poso conflict erupted.

The change must be partially attributed tothe arrival of news agencies such as Kantor Berita Radio (KBR) 68H Jakarta (Radio News

Office 68H Jakarta) with its radio network concept. International radio stations, such asBBC and Voice of America (VoA), have alsoincluded local radio stations in their networks.Moreover, radio program producers such asInternews Indonesia and Common GroundIndonesia have developed the scope and sourceof programmes for the local radio stations.

Radio stations in Central Sulawesi include Nebula and Nugraha in Palu, whilst in Posothere is Bulava, Local Government Radio( Radio Pemerintah Daerah, RPD) Poso and

Bhayangkara Radio. RRI Palu with its three programmes 1, 2 and 3 has a broad reachcovering the province.

Radio Nebula, which airs 18 hours a day,was established by a group of school studentsin Kota Palu. At first they started a broadcastnamed Voice of Madness. However, it did notsurvive and eventually went off air. Afterwardsthe radio was taken over by PT Nebula Nada.The radio currently broadcasts on FM 101.0MHz. According to Tasrif Siara, the radio wasformed because of commercial and creativity

reasons, as well as to serve as a forum for popular aspirations. To date, Nebula isreportedly one of the province’s barometers for commercial broadcasters in terms of news programmes. The radio is also networked with KBR 68H Jakarta and Voice of America. Ituses radio programmes produced by Internewsand Common Ground. Its infrastructureappears adequate with most of its personnelhaving attended radio trainings.

Another commercial radio in Palu broadcasting news is Nugraha. It went on air for the first time in 1993. Like Nebula, itstarted out by airing on AM wavebands beforeswitching over to FM in 1997 with a broadcastrange of approximately 30 km. The radio airs21 hours a day. The radio was originally purely

intended to serve commercial ends and as ameans to channel creativity. Nugraha is nowowned by a media business network, theJakarta-based Media Network Consolidated. Nugraha also broadcasts news programmes, isa member of the BBC network and also airs programmes from Internews.

RAL ( Radio Al-Khairat ) broadcasts onAM wavebands. Like MAL, RAL is alsoadministered by Yayasan Al-Khairat. Its broadcasting permit was issued in 1994 and itsmission is to spread Islamic values. When it

made its debut, RAL adopted broadcasts of RAL Manado.25 Later, RAL also producednews programmes of which content weresourced from MAL and it is also part of theKBR 68H network.

The radio with the widest range in CentralSulawesi is Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI)Palu. The radio station, now a departmentalagency, expanded its programs to include RRIProgrammes 1, 2 and 3. The three programmesare aired at six different frequencies on FM,AM and SW wavebands. They are supplied

with (local) news from the News Desk packaged as fits the segmentation of each program.26 The editorial crew at the news desk has only seven outdated typewriters, althoughthe journalistic capacity appears strong.Broadcasts target audiences of all ages with arange that goes across provincial borders. Itcollaborates with local governmentdepartments and offices in covering news andimplementing promotional campaigns. It hasworked particularly close with the provincialInformation and Communication Office

(INFOKOM) in dealing with the Poso conflict,as well as with natural disasters.

Bulava is a radio station based in theconflict area of Poso. It went on air for the first

25 The chairman of Yayasan Al-Khairat, HS Saggaf Aldjufrie has initiated a number of media includingRAL Palu and RAL Manado, the latter also beingaffiliated to the Al Khairat network (more than 2000nodes) in the eastern part of Indonesia.26 See Annex 6 - Wattage and Broadcast Range






22

sales. Soraya, an activist with KPKP-ST,30 saidthat newspapers in Central Sulawesi shed thelimelight on criminal actions against women byincessantly exposing, for example, rape cases. No efforts are made to protect the identity of the victim.31

In contrast to the problems faced in the

print media, the percentage of intervention byowners in editorial content in radio is not large.Radio in Palu is mostly entertainment (lessnews with lots entertainment and music),although some do carry news broadcasts, oftenrelayed from an international or Jakarta basednetwork. However, dissemination is oftenlimited due to geographic factors and poor broadcast equipment.32

Radio seems to have been the mostinfluential media during periods of conflict. News can be spread rapidly, although the

content is harder to regulate for the editors andtherefore not always professional. In periodswhen the conflict has been dormant, theinformation gathered indicated that the general public apparently preferred to listen toentertainment-based radio, rather than thosecarrying a more news programmes.

The radios in Central Sulawesi do,however, seem to be trying to change theimage of, and interest in, news programmes.As an example, Radio Nebula currently broadcasts local news for 30 minutes per dayand the rest is relayed programmes. Radio Nugraha provides 20 minutes for local programmes, although this is mainly quotingthe news from local newspaper. The production costs of approximately Rp 10million per month (Rp 5,5 millions for wages,the rest is for operational cost) seem toundermine the willingness of the radios to produce their own news. RRI reportedly hasthe only long-term news programme in CentralSulawesi. The reach is wide through programmes 1, 2 and 3 and supporting

operational equipments. 33

30 KPKP-ST: Kelompok Perjuangan KesetaraanPerempuan-Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi Groupfor the Struggle for Women’s Equality).31 Interview with Soraya Sultan, Director of KPKP-ST.32 See Annex 8 (Audience Segmentation and ProgramComposition, Presence/Absence of News Programs). 33 See Annexes 6 and 8.

Internews and Common Ground are twoINGOs working with radio stations inSulawesi. They produce radio programmes thatare broadcast by a number of radio stations inPalu. Internews regularly sends three feature programmes to radio stations in Palu. These being Sahabat Alam (Friends of Nature), a

programme raising awareness about the threatof environmental destruction; Suara Bangsaku(Voice of my Nation), a programme analyzingcurrent economic, social and political events;Sehat Indonesiaku (Healthy Indonesia),addressing health issues and possible solution.Common Ground sends a radio drama seriesentitled Menteng Pangkalan to a number of radio stations in Palu through the 68H radionetwork. The programme promotes pluralismand peace, including ways for resolvingconflict.

3.2.6 Education and Skills

Reporters based in Palu and Poso havereceived considerable attention from nationaland international organisations focusing on peace journalism. Those who have undertakentraining in this area include, LSPP, which wassupported by the British Council, LP3ES, AJIand PWI. Internews, KBR-68H and CommonGround have also provided capacity-buildingto broadcasters. 34

However, human resources continue to

be an obstacle for the media, due to poor access to education for media practitioners.Moreover, most media institutions hire

journalists with either high school diploma or Dip.HE, and only Radar Sulteng newspaper hires graduates with Bachelor’s degree. RRIPalu has a centralised and routine training

programme. Of particular note, is that manyalternative media apparently have stronger human resource capacity than themainstream media.

3.2.7 Safety Issues

During the conflict, the journalists workedin difficult and hazardous circumstances duringthe conflict in the province. It was dangerous tocover events in the Poso area during the peak of the violence. According to AJI Palu, at least

34 Based on interviews, all print and electronic mediahave had received training from institutions such asLP3ES, LSPP, KBR-68H, AJI, PWI.




23

one journalist was killed from Poso Pos after losing contact with his colleagues.

Furthermore, Poli Joris, managing editor of Suara Maluku, was also almost killed when a bomb exploded and he was injured byshrapnel. Moreover, many Christian media practitioners choose to travel by sea, thereby

avoiding travelling through Muslim villages byroad. There are reportedly no recommendedsafety standards or advice for media practitioners available from professional bodiesor associations in the province.

3.2.8 Associations and Networks

The present radio and print journalistassociations in Central Sulawesi include AJI Kota Palu (Independent Journalist Alliance,Palu town) and PWI Sulawesi Tengah(Indonesian Journalist Association Central

Sulawesi branch). These two associations haveheld activities to improve the journalismquality in Central Sulawesi. Young journalistshave tended to choose AJI, while PWI containsmore senior journalists. AJI reportedly hasmore members than PWI. AJI also has a widenetwork, so journalists can meet and work withmembers outside Central Sulawesi. In somecases of advocacy, AJI has taken a firm stancein defence of the media. Beside meetings, theAJI community also has an e-mailing list.However, the services being provided by the

associations do not seem to be that extensive,mainly due to a lack of resources andknowledge about potential opportunities. Inaddition, as with elsewhere in the country, therole of the associations as trade unions insecuring collective agreements is not yetestablished.

PWI Central Sulawesi and AJI Palu haveworked on anti-bribery campaigns and promoted the importance of forming unions.The Press Worker Alliance (SPP) is alsoworking for the protection of media

practitioner’s rights. However, not all provincial media are in a position to providefull wages and welfare benefits as demanded by SPP and others.

A number of complaints against the mediahave also been issued by consumers throughthe Indonesian Consumer Organization(Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia /YLKI). This institution has a regional network including in Central Sulawesi, although its

activities and mandate are apparently not wellknown in the province.

PRSSNI is the main private radio broadcasting association. PRSSNI CentralSulawesi branch activities are concerned withcoordinating the frequency usage andadvertisement distribution, as well as

accreditation of institutions.

3.2.9 Media Policy and Legislation

The national policy regarding mediainfluences the form and environment for the provincial media. In this regard, the press law(No. 40/1999) provides for simpler mediamanagement requirements and decriminalisesmedia-related offences, thereby removingcustodial sentences. However, as with a recentcase against Nuansa Pos, the legal system stillrefers to criminal libel law in cases against the

media. Moreover, the criminal code (KUHP) isused to determine financial penalties, whichalthough smaller under the liable law, are based upon broader definitions.

An ombudsmen institution has beencreated in the form of the ‘Press Council’.Functions of the Council include monitoringadherence to professional standards andethics, as well as the resolution of legalactions or complaints against the media. TheCouncil has no authority to impose penalties,

which remains under the legal authority of the court, but also does not exclude recourseto legal channels at a later date if theresolution under the Council isunsatisfactory.35 However, the Press Councilis centred in Jakarta and regional mattersregarding the media do not always come totheir attention. Another obstacle is thatcomplaints can often not be quickly dealtwith.

Following the passing of the broadcast law(No 32/ 2002) responsibility for the regional broadcast media rests with the RegionalIndependent Committee of Broadcasting

35 Many press complaints or consumer’s complaintson press are not solved well.




24

( Komisi Penyiaran Indipenden Daerah).36 However, this has not yet been established inCentral Sulawesi. Many problems andobstacles for the broadcast media derive fromthis state of affairs such as the confusion inallocating and managing frequencies.

3.2.10 Legal Cases and External Pressure

A number of print media in CentralSulawesi have had to deal with external pressure relating to news coverage. Nuansa Pos has been accused of inaccurate andlibellous reporting twice. The first claim wasfiled by the family of Ruly Lamadjido, then the province’s governor, accusing the paper of defamation by reporting on the alleged murder of woman. The second claim was related to acorruption case involving the Office of Health

of Central Sulawesi, which went on to thecourt of appeal. Bayu Alexander Montang,Director-in-Chief of Nuansa Pos, claimed tohave abided by the principles of professional journalism, but lost the case, which was triedunder the libel laws.

Cases of external pressure against themedia, including threats and attacks on media practitioners and outlets, were also noted by theassessment team. In one example, a local person of note apparently felt that a newspaper had falsely reported about him and as a

consequence allegedly had his driver attack and beat the responsible journalist.

3.2.11 Revenue and Income Generation

Low circulation and poor retail markets arethe general picture of the print media in CentralSulawesi. Most outlets have a low number of

36 KPI’s rights: Determining program standards,arranging regulation and determining broadcastingmanual; penalizing the violation of law and broadcasting manual and program standards;coordinating and cooperating with Government,

broadcasting institution and people. KPI’s tasks:guaranteeing people to have proper and the rightinformation according to the human rights; helping themanagement of broadcasting infrastructure; buildingthe sound competition inter-broadcasting institutionsand industries; preserving the justice and balancenational informational order; collecting, researchingand responding people’s complaints, critics andappreciation upon broadcasting service; managing thehuman resource development guaranteeing professionalism in broadcasting.

subscribers, poor distribution systems andinsufficient income from advertisement. Thereare also problems connected to theindependence of the news, as the marketingdivision is often intertwined with the editorialdepartments. The biggest single income for advertisement in the print media seems to be

congratulatory advertisements on nationaldays.37

In general, radios in Central Sulawesi arerun on minimum operational costs. The radiowith the highest costs uses Rp 15 million per month (most which have costs of Rp 10million per month for wages and operationalexpenses). The private radio income comesmainly from public advertisements - nationaland local (temporary). Only radios withinternational marketing networks get better revenue. It is due to these limitations that the

local radios often do not have enough funds tocover local news themselves.

3.2.12 Ownership, Employment and ‘Envelope Journalism’

The independence of the media can bedirectly correlated to the ownership andinstitutional orientation. Aside from businessinterests, the owner of the media can influencethe editorial policy and management system. Anumber of newspapers in Central Sulawesi are privately owned such as Nuansa Pos and Poso

Pos. However, the legal entity of media business, including privately owned, is usuallya proprietary limited company (PerseroanTerbatas / PT), except Koran MAL, which is afoundation (Yayasan Al Khairat Press / AlKhairat Press Foundation).38

Although, theoretically, journalists shouldnot be engaged in the business andadministration side of a media business, inCentral Sulawesi some journalist are alsoinvolved in advertising negotiations. Thestandard wages (some still pay the employee

through an honorary system) and the lack

37 The biggest source of income for local newspaperscomes from personal advertisement, although this typeof ad is incidental. It depends on certain occasions e.g.when there is instalments of new government officials.Their colleagues, counterparts from other institutionsor business partners will place ads to congratulatethem.38 See Annex 1.




25

management allows for this mix of workingroles.39

Most media apply the regional minimumwage standard for employees’ salaries,although allowances are often not included. Inaddition, many journalists are paid per news piece submitted. The lack of standardised

salary rates for journalists allows individualmedia to set their own levels. To get by, journalists often double up as correspondentsfor national media or have a second jobelsewhere. Such conditions have a directimpact on the capacity media institutions inCentral Sulawesi.

Envelope journalism is reportedlyincreasingly becoming a topic of discussionamongst journalists in Central Sulawesi,although there were only a few journalists whoshowed a firm commitment against this practice. In reality, the vast majority of journalists are dependent on favours and bribes, both to maintain a reasonable income,as well as access resources, such astransportation, to allow them to do their work.One deputy editor also stated that as long as itdid not influence the editorial policy and themanner of the journalism, it was acceptable.

3.2.13 Gender

The number of female journalists in the print media is relatively limited and there areapparently no exact figures about how manyeditors are women. The patriarchal culturerelating to gender roles can still be clearly seenin the media. Many media managers assumethat women are much better indoors and shouldnot be working in the field as reporters.Although, it was noted that the balance of women working as DJs in the broadcast mediawas considerably higher, women were usuallyworking in administrative capacities. As a topicfor coverage, gender issues are also apparentlygiven limited coverage. Hj. Siti Haditjah

Toana, a community figure in CentralSulawesi, stated:

“Women issues have yet to be exposed,

particularly the 30-percent quota issue of women legislators in the parliament. It

demonstrates the widespread lack of support

39 See Annex 3.

of media towards women and women’s

issues.”40

3.3 Provincial Traditional Media

Central Sulawesi is home to at least threeindigenous groups, the Kaili, Lore and Buol.

Each are concentrated in differentadministrative regions, with the Kailicommunity mainly in Donggala District, theLore in Poso District, and the Buol in Toli-ToliDistrict. Each group had its own form of localinstitutions. The social stratification includesold and current patterns. Before contemporarygovernment and religious systems influencedsocial change these were strengthening faith, providing incentives, increasing the sense of shame and increasing the sense of fear. Thesegroups also had strong ties with these natural

elements supporting life, related to their placeof living and environment. Current changeshave altered the shape and nature of thesecommunities, which eventually demanded acultural change that has caused social tensions.The introduction and intervention of culturesfrom outside that have also not helped inmitigating these tensions. A research paper titled “Local Social Life Systems in CentralSulawesi”, published by the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1980 and 1981,discussed the threat posed by this kind of excess as change increasingly alienatedexisting social institutions.

Poso District is home to two indigenousgroups, the Lore and Pamona. The first isconcentrated in the two sub-districts of NorthLore and South Lore and is largely made up of Protestants and Catholics. This group lives nextto the Pamona community, who areconcentrated in the Poso Pesisir sub-district.Living in the hills as farmers, the Lorecommunity is seen as grouping together. Their power to influence policymaking at the district

and provincial level is supposedly concentratedin the sub-district capital of Tentena.Meanwhile, the Pamona community relies onfisheries and inhabits the coastal area of Poso,and has ties to the Bugis, Makassar andGorontalo people, migrant communities livingin the region. Power to influence policymaking

40 Interview with Hj Siti Haditjah Toana, a communityfigure in Central Sulawesi and provincial parliamentlegislator, 27 May 2004.




26

at the district and provincial level isconcentrated in the sub-district capital of PosoKota.

3.3.1 Indigenous Community Forumsand Ceremonies

The Poso District consists of 12 sub-

districts (Poso Kota, Poso Pesisir, Lage, SouthLore, North Lore, Central Lore, Ampana Kota,Ulubongka, Tojo, North Pamona, East PamonaSouth Pamona) and the region is inhabited byat least five ethnic groups that make up theadat (customary) community, including Lore,Pamona, Baree, To po Ta and Tojo, with eachabiding by longstanding customs and rules.Since long ago, conflict has often occurredamong adat kings, or in this case localwarlords, but there always has usually been amechanism to dampen the intensity of conflict.

‘Sintuwu Maroso’ is the Central Sulawesi’smotto denoting unity. Then there is Baruga,meaning a place to meet face-to-face whereissues are resolved through prevailing adat mechanisms. Disputes between people from asingle region will be resolved through Molibu, but when it involves two or more regions andtends to become larger, the Kayori adat ritualis called for. Kayori means reciting poems byturns and is concluded with Motambu Tanah, aritual to bury the past that involves a buffalohead as a symbol. Historically, the ritual

required the conflicting groups to make humansacrifices taken from the lower strata (slaves).Motambu Tanah literally means a forum tomeet and resolve disputes.41

During his national presidency,Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) visited Poso inAugust 2002. A ‘ Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso’ peaceagreement, or popularly known as ‘Bersatu Kuat’ , was declared. Even so, the sacral event,which was marked by the handing over of theagreement from fourteen local adat leaders tothe president, lacked effectiveness.42

‘Dero’ , a forum that takes the form of anentertaining and recreational gathering, washalted when the conflict broke out, especiallyso when it was banned by some Muslim

41 Discussion with academicians of the University of Tadulako in the office of its Research Center on Peaceand Conflict (P4K Untad).42 Tomy Waworundeng, Liputan Jurnalisme Damai:Kerusuhan Poso dari Dua Sisi, Makasar, ELSIM,2002, pp 105-112.

leaders, who are mostly based in Poso town. Dero is a forum marked by communal dances based on a set choreography that is understood by all community segments with peopleholding hands in a circle symbolising unity.

Central Sulawesi is also well known byfestival of Lake Poso, which is a folk gathering

that was regularly held each year up until theconflict. This activity stopped for securityreasons, as Tentena is a Christian area where itis considered hazardous by local communitiesfor Muslim to travel.

3.3.2 Migration, Local Government and Organised Religion

Population movements (includingtransmigration and spontaneous/ unassistedmigration), which have been ongoing for sometime, have gradually eroded the

importance and belief in indigenous symbolsand rituals. In addition, adat or socialinstitutions and values that were once referredto by locals in resolving conflict have beenlargely eroded, in part through the introduction by the New Order of a standardized system of government at the village level.43 As a result,the forum once known as ‘baruga’ changedinto the present Balai Desa (village hall).

The coastal community in Central Sulawesiis mostly Muslim and concentrated in Posotown and surroundings, while the inland

communities are dominated by Christiancommunities. The conflict was mainlyconcentrated in two regions, Poso town with itsMuslim community and migrants, and NorthPamona sub-district and its capital of Tentenawith its Christian community.

Local economic, political, social andcultural competition has taken place since long before the recent conflicts took on a religiousconnotation. As stereotypes, the Muslimcommunity has marked itself as successfulmerchants. Meanwhile, the Christiancommunity is seen as increasingly losingground in the competition. This is reflected inthe makeup of the local government of Posodistrict, with positions reportedly being mostlyfilled by Muslims. This highly vulnerablesituation has made it easy for intruders totrigger communal conflicts.

43 Law No 5 / 1979 on Village Government.




27

In this regard, tensions were vented alongreligious lines and churches and mosques werefocal points for violence. Moreover, it isalleged that at the time of conflict a number of religious leaders incited violence in the form of self-defence and based upon perceptions of historical inevitability and enmity. However, in

the post- conflict phase when calmer heads prevailed, organised religion has often played aconstructive role in trying to preach toleranceand understanding to reduce conflict relatedtensions.

3.4 New Information Technologies

3.4.1 Cellular Phone and SMS

Cellular phones have greatly changedaccess to information in Central Sulawesi,

although they have only been in operationsince early 2004 in Poso. The province’scommunity, particularly those residing in thedistricts of Palu and Poso, are now familiar with this facility.44 The speedy access of cellular phones has placed it as a primarymeans of communication, being utilised inmanner consistent with person to personsdialogue, as well as the spread of rumour andgossip (see below).

3.4.2 Internet

The Internet is becoming increasingly popular amongst selected groups in Palu.Based on interviews with stakeholders, it isoften made use of by government, academia, private sector, and local and international NGOs. Most of the mainstream media alsouses the Internet as a communication andinformation tool. The public, especially collegestudents, have started to access the Internet for entertainment and information needs.Meanwhile, only a limited number of individuals make use of the local Internet

provider as it applies long-distance call tariffsfor its services. Furthermore, in Poso Internetaccess is very limited, with only one service provider at UNSIMAR University.

3.4.3 Handy Talky

Handy-talkies are a popular communication tool in Central Sulawesi. The

44 Cellular phone coverage is not that good in PosoKota.

province’s challenging topography and limitedcellular phone coverage have made it a usefulmeans of communication. Members of radionetworks are often affiliated to amateur radioorganisations such as RAPI or ORARISulteng. It has also proven to be a significanthelp with field coordination needs.

INFOKOM,45

a department of the provincialgovernment that deals with communicationaffairs in coordination with SATKORLAK,depends heavily on handy-talkies, especiallywhen dealing with disaster and conflictmanagement issues.46

However, exactly how challenging a task itis for SATKORLAK to coordinate anddisseminate information is exemplified by thesituation during which the Poso conflicterupted or a natural disaster struck: As stated by Haris Tandimuso, Coordinator of Central

Sulawesi’s SATKORLAK:“We have a link going downwards in

our network to which we must report every

time something happened. When reports

from the District or Sub-district were latewe’d firstly access news from local

newspapers, then television, and finally from

local radio stations”47

3.5 Information Flows

3.5.1 Rumour and Gossip

A number of persons interviewed in Posostated that the local community was rife withgossip and rumour. They stated that gossip andrumour was usually exchanged around forumssuch as marketplaces, residences, food stallsand deker . 48 Youths, in particular, apparentlyenjoy ‘sharing the latest gossip’ with oneanother a form of social interaction. During theconflict, gossip on SARA (ethnic, religious,

45 INFOKOM is a Bureau within the Governor’s

Office, which handles public relations for the provincial government. The exact name in Indonesianis Biro Informasi dan Komunikasi (Biro Infokom)”..46 Interview with Haris Tandimuso, Coordinator of Central Sulawesi’s Provincial Coordinating Body for Disaster and IDP Management (Satkorlak PBP), 27May 2004.47 Interview with Haris Tandimuso, Coordinator of Central Sulawesi’s Coordinating Body for Disaster and IDP Management (Satkorlak PBP), 27 May 2004.48 Deker is a local word denoting a place to gather andsit on the sides of a concrete moat.




28

racial and class issues) issues was widespread.49 The interviewees also stated that rumour andgossip are hard to contain, and its impact canquickly fuel tensions. Ustad Abdul Gani TIsrail, an Islamic teacher and Chairman of theKota Poso chapter of the Indonesian UlemasCouncil (Majelis Ulama Indonesia – MUI ),

viewed rumour as having a major influence ona person’s soul. The impact is beyond humanlimits. He stated:

“I saw with my own eyes how innocent

and unaware people were slaughtered in themiddle of the street. Both groups took part in

this”50

Rumours that were often groundlesstherefore influenced local communitiesrelatively easily. This was particularly so inPoso where access to mass media was problematic and the general public therefore

had few ways in which to verify informationand obtain more reliable, objective and balanced interpretations of events. It was alsoreported that the lack of objective informationfuelled feeling of insecurity and prompted the belief that communities were under attack andneeded to respond to the supposed atrocities of the other side.

Ibu Mbose, a Poso resident and advocatefor women activities in her neighbourhood,stated that the local community would nolonger blindly trust gossip before they have

verified its truth. She stated:

“During the conflict lots of rumours did the rounds, and at the time the community

was easily provoked, but that’s no longer true. Now we discuss a lot and do activities

that lead to recovery of household economies that had suffered greatly during

the conflict”51

3.5.2 Media to Consumer

Poor distribution and partition betweenMuslim and Christian areas weakens print

media circulation. Media published by theMuslim community cannot come into the

49 Interview with Sergeant Second Class Sudirman, 26May 2004.50 Interview with Ustad Abdul Gani T Israil, Chairmanof the Kota Poso chapter of MUI, Chairman II of theRegional Board of Al-Khairat Poso, Administrator of the Islamic boarding school Alkautzar Poso, Chairmanof MTsN Poso Pesisir, 28 May 2004.51 Interview with Ibu Mbose, homemaker, resident of Tagolu Village, Lage Poso Sub-district, 26 May 2004.

Christian community and vice versa. Inaddition, weak purchasing power andgeographical factors also hinder the reach of print media to rural areas. The samegeographical factor also prevents the alreadyweak transmission power of radio stations fromreaching population in rural areas.

Although media access in the more remoteconflict-prone areas has improved, there is stillapparently poor access to mass media.However, the emergence of alternative media,initiated at the local level, has greatly assistedin strengthening information flows.

3.5.3 Primary Source to Media

Editors reportedly identified four maintarget groups as information sources for themedia, particularly relating to conflict. Thesewere religious leaders, military, police and

government. Members of the regional parliament were also identified, but werewidely considered to be partial in the conflict.

At the moment the relation between themedia and main identified information sourcesis good, although many often choose not to provide information as the ‘safer option’ at atime when professional standards amongst themedia are not always dependable. As stated byAmirullah Sia, the Head of the Office for the promotion of National Unity and CivilProtection ( Kesbang Linmas/Kesatuan Bangsa

dan Perlindungan Masyarakat ) of Poso districtgovernment:

“Lets be objective, some less than

interesting local media cared more for the

commercial prospect, and not how to keep

the public informed”52

52 Interview with Amirudin Sia, Head of KesbangLinmas of Poso District, 28 May 2004.




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4. Media and Conflict in Maluku

Ambon, which is the main urban area inMaluku and focal point for much of theviolence, has an area of 377 square kilometresand 206,210 inhabitants. The city is divided

along religious lines, with several quarters onlyinhabited by Christians and others by Muslims.

This chapter provides an overview of thefive main assessment areas for Malukuincluding (i) the mainstream media, (ii)alternative media, (iii) traditional media, (iv)new information technologies and (v)information flows. Although it provides anoverview of the media situation, it does not provide a holistic picture of all media outletsand forms. Additional in-depth information can be found in the Annexes 10-14.53


The Maluku Islands were a part of theJavanese Majapahit Empire and the ShrivijayaEmpire (Sumatra) before Islam was introduced

53 The research undertaken by ISAI between 23 and 30June 2004 looked at the performance and developmentof the provincial mainstream, alternative andtraditional media in Maluku, as well as examinedinformation flows from both local and national mediaand their respective influence on the general public. Asample of eleven respondents representing provincialmedia stakeholders, community figures, religiousleaders, security forces, government, private sector andthe general public provided in-depth feedback on therole of the media relating to conflict. Resource personswere interviewed individually in neutral places. Anumber of obstacles were faced in conducting theresearch. Most serious were the security considerationin the province, in particular as the assessment was being conducted soon after the re-emerged tensions inthe area. As an example a local researcher, MeyCresentya Rahail (a Christian), who befriendedanother local researcher Sahira Sangaji (a Muslim),had to keep some distance from her friend after anexternal party threatened her if they continued to

speak. This situation greatly restricted the freedom of movement for the five local researchers and themajority of information collected had to be done in theAmbon. Movement within Ambon was also restricted, particularly based on the religion of the localresearchers.54 This section is based upon the following sources:Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999, Jakarta Post, OTIField Report Indonesia (June 2000), Program onHumanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HarvardUniversity, USA), Human Rights Watch, InsideIndonesia, International Crisis Group.

in the 15th century.55 The Portuguese enteredthe region in the early 16th century and from1599 the Dutch started establishing settlementson the islands. The Dutch conquest was

completed in 1667. During the 16th and 17thcenturies the islands were a source of cloves,nutmeg and mace. The islands were ruled bythe British in the periods 1796-1802 and 1810-1817, and occupied by the Japanese duringWorld War II.

Maluku formed part of the Dutch-inspired,temporary autonomous state of East Indonesiain 1945 and existed as a separate colony of the Netherlands until 1949. With the declaration of a unitary republic in 1950 to replace the federalstate, South Maluku attempted to secede. The

revolt was led by Christian Ambonese fromAmbon island and they formed the short-livedRepublic of South Moluccas, but finally cededto the independent Republic of Indonesia.Since then, there has been intermittent ethnicand nationalist violence on the islands. Malukuformed one single province from 1950 until1999. However, in 1999 North Maluku districtwas split off as a separate province of NorthMaluku.

Recent Conflict in Maluku

For Maluku, the first major violent conflictcame in January 1999, when an argument inAmbon City between a Christian passenger and Muslim bus driver developed into a fight between largely local groups of Muslims andChristians. The fighting quickly spread to thesurrounding islands. According to nationalIndonesian media reports, unsubstantiated andexaggerated gossip and rumours played acrucial role in this development.

In the early days of the conflict local mediafrequently stopped reporting for periods

because of physical threats or warnings fromthe conflict stakeholders. In early 1999, nolocal radio stations in Ambon were broadcasting. The subsequent 18 months were

55 From Arabic phase "Al-Muluk" meaning "of kings",the areas was known by foreign traders as the “SpiceIslands”. Consist of a group of approximately 1,000islands with approx. 1,7 million inhabitants. Thecapital in Maluku is Ambon on the small AmbonIsland, whilst the capital in North Maluku is Ternate.




30

characterized by fighting, the destruction of thousands of houses, the displacement of approximately 500,000 people, the loss of thousands of lives, and the segregation of Muslims and Christians. In May 2000, Laskar Jihad militia groups arrived in South Maluku,whilst tensions rose further between religious

groups.In June 2000, President Abdurrahman

Wahid declared a state of civil emergency and by July there were approximately 14,000troops in Maluku. In late 2001, a reconciliation process started making its impact. A turning point was the December 2001 meeting between approximately 200 Muslim andChristian leaders in Yogyakarta to explore the possibility of reaching reconciliation inMaluku.

A new stage in the Ambon conflict began

in 2002 as the violence by armed groups beganto subside. At the same time, in February 2002the government made a breakthrough bysponsoring peace talks held in Malino (a townin Gowa district in South Sulawesi). The twosides agreed on eleven points, of which themost important was to cease violence, returnthe IDPs to their homes and respect for thelaw.56

As the situation became calmer in the province, apart from Ambon City, peoplestarted to return home. However, in spite of numerous negotiations and the signing of a peace agreement in February 2002, tension onAmbon Island remained high until late 2002,when a series of spontaneous 'mixings' between previously hostile groups lead to asporadic, but generally increasingly stable peace.

In April 2004, tensions again rose inAmbon in the build up to 25 April - theanniversary of the declaration of anindependent state in Maluku, when members

of the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM) raiseindependence flags (FKM has both Muslimand Christian members). Although the causesand perpetrators of the violence remainunclear, the result has been to re-inflametensions between communities in the province.

56 Eriyanto, Media dan Konflik Ambon, Jakarta, Radio68H-MDLF, 2003, hal. 171

4.2 The Media in Maluku

Much of the local media in Maluku arecurrently organised along sectarian lines andhas aroused considerable criticism for bias and provocative reporting. Of particular note,Laskar Jihad also controlled a radio station, Radio Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku,

which was highly provocative in its broadcasts.


Aside from local media, the general publicin Maluku (especially in Ambon) also receivesinformation from the national media. Thenational newspapers distributed in Amboninclude Media Indonesia and Kompas. Thesetwo newspapers arrive in Ambon around 9 or 10am. However, there are no media fromneighbouring provincial centres such asMakassar and Manado in Ambon.

There is also access to national TVchannels. Programmes from TPI, SCTV, Indosiar, Metro TV and other nationaltelevision stations can usually be watched bylocal people with TV satellite dishes. In certainareas such Urimesing, Hatalai, Negeri Lama,there is also access to local TVRI, which bothrelays news programmes from Jakarta andcovers local news.


With the relaxation of publication laws,there has been a growth in print media inAmbon. By 2002, several mass media publications appeared in Ambon and aboutthirteen newspapers were routinely published,representing their communities. In Christiancommunities, there were ten newspapers, published daily or weekly. Those papers were Bela Reformasi, Dhara Pos, Masnait, Seram Pos, Suara Maluku, Siwalima, TragediMaluku, Tual Pos, Dewa and Metro. In theMuslim community there were twonewspapers, Ambon Ekspres and Info Baru.Metro and Info Baru claim themselves as theneutral media. During the research period, only Ambon Ekspres, Suara Maluku, Siwalima, Info Baru, Metro, Dewa, Koran Info and the Ekspresi publication – calling itself analternative media – were being regularly published in the province.

The Siwalima paper was first published inOctober 1999 based on the motto “putting




31

unity and brotherhood to the fore.” Accordingto Fredom Toumohu, the acting editor of the paper, it was born from the ideas of severalChristian and Muslim leaders who wanted toreunite the two communities. When the mediawas being founded, leaders from bothcommunities were present (the wife of

previous Maluku governor Dr. SalehLatuconsina was among the founders of the paper). However, as the paper is distributed inthe Christian community, it is widely seen as aChristian paper. It is difficult to find the paper in the Muslim community, except in neutralareas such as government offices, where it can be seen alongside other newspapers.

Ambon Ekspres, which was also foundedduring the conflict period in July 1999 was atfirst owned by the Jawa Pos group. Most of theeditorial staff of the Ambon Ekspres were

former journalists of the Suara Maluku, whoresigned due to pressures related to the conflict.At that time, Ambon Ekspres started by printing the weekly paper in Makassar. Thenews reports were sent by air or sea, dependingon the situation. In peacetimes, news reportswere put in diskettes and sent by plane, whichdepart and arrive in the Christian-controlledarea. When the conflict heated up, the editors preferred to use ships, as the Ambon harbour islocated in the Muslim-controlled area.

Suara Maluku is one of the oldest papers in

the province, established for the first time inTernate in 1956. In 1990’s, Suara Malukumoved to Ambon with the motto of “DevelopTogether to Have Fair and ProsperousSociety”. Gradually it was changed into a broadsheet format, with a new motto of “FromMaluku to New Indonesia”. On May 1990,Suara Maluku Foundation started to work together with the Jawa Pos Group, but by June2003 Suara Maluku decided to separate fromthe Group. According to the Suara Malukumanaging editor, Novi Pinontoan, the

disagreement started when the Jawa Posmanagement allegedly pushed Suara Malukuto change its name into Maluku Ekspres.Another alleged reason was that the Jawa Posmanagement had decided to support the former Muslim personnel of Suara Maluku inestablishing the Ambon Ekspres.

Koran Metro was established in November 2003, when the situation in Ambon was moresecure. This daily newspaper has only limited

editorial facilities. They only have sixcomputers, two printers, and one camera for 10employees (6 persons in the editorialdepartment, two circulation and marketing personnel, and two advertisement personnel).The newest paper is Dewa, established inJanuary 2004. It motto is “Critical, Objective,

and Rational”. This daily paper was created byformer employees of Siwalima newspaper. Theeditors of the paper stated that, “at that time,we were accused of being silly persons. To behonest, we started the paper with only idealismand barely enough capital. But praised the lord, Dewa still exist until today”.57


No regular alternative print media are published in Ambon. Both Info Baru and Ekspresi tabloid described themselves as being

alternative media, although per the definitions provided in section 1.1, they would be moreaccurately classified as mainstream media.Alternative media labour under financial,human resources and distribution obstacles that prevent them from having a significant impact.Moreover, local magazines or media published by NGOs with the objectives to campaigningfor peace in Maluku are few. The appeal of such media was reportedly generally lowamongst the public surveyed.

One source of alternative media during the

heightened conflict periods was the Internet,which often published provocative newsclaiming to speak on behalf of certain religiousgroups (as further explained under 4.4.2).However, the majority of these have not beencontinued after the conflict.


In the broadcast media, there are radio Dhara, DMS, Gelora Merpati Nusantara,Manusela, RRI, Sangkakala and Yournex.Those radios are in the Christian community.

There are also radio Kabaresi, Naviri, SPMM and Suara Pelangi in the Muslim community.58 However, not all the print and broadcast mediamentioned above survived to 2004.

Before the conflict in January 1999, therewere three radio stations in operation inAmbon (not including RRI). These radios were

57 Interview with editor of Dewa newspaper.58 See Annex 10.




32

Sangkakala, Manusela and Gelora Merpati Ambon. Sangkala was established in 1991.Most of its broadcasting was religious newsand church services. Gelora Merpati focusedon entertainment, as did Manusela. After 1999,there were five new radio stations establishedin Ambon: Dutama Musik Serasi (DMS),

Naviri (broadcasting mostly preaching, songsand Al Quran readings), Yournex (focuses onreligious news), Bhara (general broadcasting),and Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku(SPMM) – reportedly controlled by Laskar Jihad and declared to be fighting for Islam inAmbon. SPMM routinely broadcast ‘tablighakbar ’ (preaching and chanting of Quranicverses by a gathering of Muslim adherents) - to push and encourage the Islamic spirit to fightagainst Christians. Often, the tabligh akbar was regarded by Christian listeners as the callto violence against Christians. The Christian

community leaders even asked the MalukuGovernor to ban the radio.59

4.2.5 Media Content

The decrease in conflict has created moreeditorial freedom for the media in Maluku.John S. Uhurella, the traditional leader ( Raja)of Tuhulele village, stated that editorialfreedom in Ambon is now much better thanfrom 1999 to 2001. According to him, thenews has improved and is more responsible.

“The journalists maybe tired of the provocative news. The news nowadays is

much more peaceful. Even when the RMS

conflict took place, the news was very

neutral”60

The majority of media editors and ownersinterviewed professed to have the samemotivation, which was to create a neutralmedia and contribute to conflict reduction andresolution. However, the reality has shown thatthis is hard to achieve due to underdeveloped professionalism, lack of resources, poor access

to information and public pressure are amongthe causes.

The editor of Suara Maluku stated thatalthough they are called a Christian paper, theyhave used various ways to maintain the balanceof the news regarding the two communities.

59 Media dan Konflik Ambon (ISAI, Eriyanto, Jakarta2003) 60 Interview with John S Uhurelle, Raja NegeriTuhulele Ambon, 10 Juni 2003

Editors of the paper have also participated inseveral trainings on conflict resolution and peace journalism. However, they felt they hadinsufficient capability to adequately addressresurgences in the conflict as seen in April2004. Several other editors in Ambon alsostated that they would not report on incidents

that might cause further unrest. However, in practice it is difficult, as one editors stated:

“The process is very complex, especially in

the midst of an ongoing conflict. I always tell

my journalists that although personal preferences do influence one’s reports, one

should not be completely subjective”

The editors of Koran Metro stated that itwas often difficult to prevent emotional contentfrom its reporters. Aner Leunufna stated:

“We cannot deny that Maluku’s situation is

very sensitive. We might not realize that

during the conflict, emotional bursts of eachcommunity are transferred to reporters and

then to the reports. It is the reality”61

Most of the radio in Ambon usually presents their programmes in three forms.These are quoting the news from the printmedia in Ambon, making its own programmesor relaying national/international programmes,and broadcasting live news or delay broadcasting from mosques, churches, tablik akbar, and so forth.62

Among the radio stations, both Duta Musik Suara (DMS) and Pelangi, sought to addressconflict issues. However, most of the radios prefer to relay the news from both inside andoutside the country, from networks includingthe BBC, KBR 68H and RRI. The reason behind this is that it is cheaper than to havereporters covering local news. Another reasonwas the lack of the operational resources.Furthermore, it seems that the stronger mediaare those that have linked themselves to wider networks, such as Jawa Pos Group and Radio,KBR 68 H, BBC, Voice of America (VoA)

and so forth.

There have been a number of peace journalism training activities in the province.AJI has worked with the British Council to provide such activities. In Ambon, AJI’s also

61 Interview with Aner Leunufna, Redaktur PelaksanaKoran Metro, 1 Juni 200462 Media dan Konflik Ambon (ISAI, Eriyanto, Jakarta2003)




33

established the Maluku Media Center (MMC),which indirectly monitor the media in Ambon.


Many of the media have sought to increasethe quality of their outlets by recruiting staff with a university education. The Ambon

Ekspres Chief Editor informed the assessmentteam that when he recruits journalists for thefirst time, he often has to teach them how totype and give them basic journalism skills.Furthermore, as one editor stated:

“It is hard to find a journalist here. In

Ambon, journalism is not very popular as a profession, because of the low income”

Many of the journalists in Ambon nowhave degree-level education. In Ambon Ekspres, there is only one of ten journalists thathave not finished his/her studies. The majorityof employees in the layout and printingdepartments have graduated from senior highschool. Staff at the paper are well-trained dueto the involvement with the Jawa Pos Group,which holds regular sessions in Makassar andSurabaya. A number of journalists alsoroutinely join trainings being run by professional bodies, such PWI, AJI, and Elsim(Makassar).

In Suara Maluku, five of eight journalists(including the chief editor) are Bachelor degree

graduates.63

The three other are still doing their studies in the university. According to theeditor, Novi Pinontoan, it is hard to find a well prepared journalist with a degree. That is whythey open the chance for college students towork in the paper. This way they can be trainedin-house.

For Siwalima newspaper, six of twelveeditorial members have degrees. The rest havegraduated from high school. According toFredom Toumohu, managing editor of Siwalima, a few journalists have been trained

by AJI about the news writing, news coveringtechniques, and how to write when the conflictoccurs.

In Dewa newspaper, five reporters havetheir degree in undergraduate, diploma and

63 See Annex 12.

high school. Nevertheless, Marthin Langoday,chief editor of Dewa, said he is still trustful of the abilities of his reporters. Trainings held bynational and international organisations have been very useful in increasing the journalist’scapacity. Mr. Langoday stated:

“Most of our journalists have joined the

trainings, whether it is about peace journalism, journalist role in conflict area by British Council, the writing and covering

techniques by AJI or even how to cover the

election process”

Koran Metro has six editorial staff (including the editor), four of whom havedegrees. However, none have joined journalism training, even when it was offeredfor free.

As a generalisation, it was found that thegradually increasing capacity of journalists inthe province is substantially derived from thecontinued training activities of the professional bodies and national and internationalinstitutions.

4.2.7 Safety Issues

Working in Ambon posses considerablesafety concerns for media practitioners.Pressure comes not only from groups in thecommunity not satisfied with the content, butalso from the authorities, who are allegedlyhostile towards the media. However, in the lasttwo years, pressure on the media has reducedsomewhat compared to the intense periods of violence from 1999 to 2001.

The conflict has also forced many of themedia to move their offices to the communitieswith which they are associated. Elly Sutrahitu,the general manager of Suara Maluku, statedthat the difficulty in eliminating the traumas of the conflict forced the management to move itsoffices in October 2003 to a “safe” area, in thiscase, being in the Christian community.

Moreover, the threats posed to the securityof the media still exist. During the latest surgein violence, the leader of an anti-RMS group,Salim Said Bahasoan, demanded that themilitary arrest the editor in chief of Siwalima, Selfanus Latekay, accusing him of supportingRMS. This allegedly surprised the editor sincethey had tried to maintain a balance in their news. The editor stated:




34

“We then reached the conclusion, that [regardless of the content of the media] in a

conflict condition, no media will be seen as

presenting completely objective news” 4.2.8 Associations and Networks

The Indonesian Journalist Association

(PWI) is the only professional organisation for journalists with a local representative and branch in Ambon. Young journalists arereportedly not interested in joining PWI. As ageneralisation, Ambon’s young journalistsseem to disagree with the previousinvolvement of PWI with the New Order andconsider the association to be slow in keepingup with current trends. PWI is also seen asdominated an older generation of journalistswho are no longer so active.

The Ambon chapter of the Indonesian

Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI) is not yetestablished. However, AJI has supported theestablishment of the Maluku Media Center (MMC). AJI also undertakes advocacy for journalists through the MMC and encouragesreconciliation through peace journalism. Inaddition to the print media, many of the broadcast media reporters are also members of the MMC.

The Maluku Media Center is an initiative by the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJIIndonesia) and the peace movement, Baku

Bae, to reconcile the Muslim and Christian journalists succeeded in establishing a jointmedia centre in the neutral zone at Mardika,which provides a place where journalists canmeet and trade information, reduceoccupational hazards and improve relations.The Maluku Media Centre (MMC) wasattacked in August 2003 by a group of youngsters, who reportedly wanted to avenge afriend who claimed to have been beaten at thesite.

The MMC was founded by AJI and Baku

Bae with support from the British Council based upon the concept of bringing Christianand Muslim journalists together, monitoringand advocacy and addressing the conflict. TheMMC gradually provided training and newscoverage on the situation in the province tonational and international media. In 2001, anumber of Maluku journalists held a strategic planning meeting for the MMC and decidedthe new missions for the Centre would be:

1. Campaigning for the improvement of journalist professionalism through trainingand education.

2. Support for journalist professionalismimprovement through training andeducation.

3. Assist and mediating the practice of peace

journalism.4. Advocacy for journalist.

Furthermore, under the auspices of theMMC, the Moluccan journalists communityhas committed itself to peace through a four points declaration, stating:

1. We, the Maluku journalists, promise toencourage the process of reconciliationand peace in Maluku.

2. We, the Maluku journalists, promise togive priority in making the heartening and

not provocative news.3. We, the Maluku journalists, promise to be

professional in conducting the profession.

4. Proclaim the government and securityofficers to solve the separatism issues,violence and terror by enforcing the lawconsistently.

At the current time, MMC has adopted arole similar to that of the IndonesianConsumers Institute Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia - YLKI) byreceiving complaints. MMC also warns mediaallegedly breaking professional standards or harming sources by publishing irresponsiblenews.

The National Private Radio Association(PRSSNI) is present in Maluku, but isreportedly not very active. There are noservices like the Indonesian Consumer Institution (YLKI) in the province working todefend the interest of consumers. The PressWorker Union (SPP) is also reportedly notvery active in the province, although this

institution is theoretically important for defending journalist’s rights (particularly pertaining to salary, subsidies and so forth).


The laws applied to media related cases bythe local courts tend to be the criminal code(KUHP), which contradicts the Press Law (No40/1999). Moreover, there is no independentombudsman at the local level to focus on




35

content and violations monitoring andadvocacy for the local media. The PressCouncil in Jakarta, as the supervisinginstitution, is limited since their function isonly to accept review cases and providesupport.

The electronic media (radio) is also in the

same position. The Independent BroadcastingCommittee (KPI) that should control the practices of the broadcast media is yet to beformed, creating an unregulated mediaenvironment open to manipulation and lessable to play a professional role.


The media in Ambon often experiences pressures from certain groups that are notsatisfied with the content. Most of the pressure

usually comes in the form of protest, includingcomplaints to the police and acts of violence.

As an example, during a period of heightened conflict in August 2001, theMaluku Governor, Saleh Latuconsina, gaveinstructions that the media limit its coverage onthe Maluku Sovereignty Front ( Front Kedaulatan Maluku - FKM) led by AlexManuputty. The Governor’s reason was thatnews about FKM could influence securityconditions. The governor even threatened totake legal measures if journalists insisted oncovering FKM and its activities. The decision No. 09a/PDSDM/IV/2001, dated 17 April2001, was circulated among the media. At thesame time, Polis Joris (Suara Maluku) andLavy Kariu (Siwa Lima) traveled to SeramIsland to cover a reconciliation meeting. Whileat sea, Joris and Kariu allegedly did not realizethat they were in the same boat with FKMleader Alex Manuputty. When the speedboat pulled over, they were reportedly shocked and both decided to stay in the island due thesecurity risk of being on the same boat as the

FKM leader. Joris and Kariu then reported the presence of the FKM leader to the police, butas soon as they left the police station they werekicked and beaten by TNI/military memberswho suspected that they were FKMsympathisers.

At the current time, much of the pressureon the media comes from those who feel thattheir names or causes have been defamed.However, almost none of these cases are

brought to court. Most of the cases are resolvedthrough ‘Letters to the Editor’. One of the biggest pressures allegedly experienced by the print and broadcast media is from the security personnel or government officials who claimthat the media has published provocative news.Edmon Tupan, TVRI reporter in Ambon, was

reportedly subjected to violent act by thesecurity personnel when covering a riot inUrimessing and Ponegoro.64


Of concern for the media in Maluku is thelack of a strong marketplace. Investors arereluctant to invest in the printing machines(due to the high cost), printing house’s areaverse to giving credit to publishers (generallythey want a cash payment) and it is hard for new media to compete since agents tend to

support older newspapers.The conflict has also significantly reduced

the advertising market in Maluku. The mainadvertisers are local government, national andinternational conflict resolution organisations.As an example, one print media only earns Rp6-7 millions per month from advertisements.

The print media survives on anapproximate readership of 30% of theinhabitants of Ambon and the districts of Tual,Masohi, Dobo, Namlea and West South-eastMaluku (MTB). Most of the media are sold byretail instead of subscriptions. According to Novi Pintontoan, the acting editor of SuaraMaluku, it is more effective as there is noguarantee of security in Ambon. During the1999 riots, Suara Maluku lost around 3,000subscribers who left the region, not having paidtheir subscription fees.

After the conflict, Ambon Ekspres isreportedly the only media that survived with acirculation of 6,000. According to AhmadIbrahim, they could sell the paper to 5,600

persons, with the 3,000 regular readers inAmbon and 1,200 subscribers in other areas,such in Masohi, Tual, Dobo, and Namlea. Ambon Ekspres could therefore break-even.65 Other media, such Suara Maluku were harder hit by the drastic decrease in circulation. This paper fell from a circulation of 11,000 to1,200-1,500 as a result of the conflict.

64 Media dan Konflik Ambon (Eriyanto, Jakarta, 2003)65 See Annex 13.




36

Other papers, like Siwalima have acirculation of 4,000. The newspaper alsochooses to use the government printingcompany ( Percetakan Negara). Most of thecopies are distributed through agents in Amboncity. In addition, the paper is also sold inSaparua district, Tual, West South-east Maluku

(MTB) and Masohi. Info Baru newspaper chooses to market its

product only in Ambon. Mochtar Touwe saidthey would like to try to attract more consistentsubscriber inside the town rather than outside.At present, Info Baru prints around 3,000copies at PT Ambon Press Intermedia.Potential readership in town reportedlyincludes both in Christian and Muslimcommunities. Metro prints about 1,500 copies,although usually only 1,000 are sold.Marketing activities are also undertaken in

other districts, including Masohi, Tual, WestSouth-east Maluku (MTB) and Namlea.

4.2.12 Expenses and Institutional Resources

The radio stations in Maluku reportedly donot have high operational costs. However, theconflict has had lasting effects in underminingthe institutional resources of the media. As theeditor of Suara Maluku, said Novi Pinontoan,stated:

“To be honest, we need to refresh the

modern paper management... We used tohave good assets in Ambon. But when the

conflict started, everything ruined. We need

physical and material assistance”

For example, Koran Metro only has sixcomputers, two printers, and one camera for 10employees (6 persons in the editorialdepartment, two circulation and marketing personnel, and two advertisement personnel).As stated by Aner Leunufna, the Koran Metromanaging editor:

“The limited equipment usually makes the

schedule late. Sometimes, the journalistshave to wait for their office mates to finish

their job”

4.2.13 Employment and ‘EnvelopeJournalism’

The growth in the media sector significantly expanded the number of media practitioners working in the province, with anaverage income of Rp 350-450,000. One major

problem that has been bothering most of themedia in Ambon is the lack of high qualityhuman resources. The average income for reporter in Ambon is around Rp 350-600thousands, and new media have employed journalists willing to work for a small paycheck.66 Most journalists also have other

sources of income. Thus, much of the financialincentive for reporters comes from envelope journalism, whereby the journalist is paid tocover a certain issue by those he/she isreporting on. Journalists commonly justify this practice by saying that it does not influence thenews. Likewise, they claim their involvementin negotiations for advertisement for their media also does not influence their reporting,for which they usually earn about 10 to 20 percent of the total.

Based on interviews with a number of

media managers, accepting envelopes (money)was not a mistake if the news source was notdirecting the journalist on what to write. Assuch, this was considered to be transportmoney, rather than bribes.

Media managers have reportedly sought todiversify the backgrounds of their staff byrecruiting from different communities. TheSuara Maluku, regarded as a Christian paper,employs two Muslims to distribute its publications to Muslim areas. Ambon Ekspres,labelled as a Muslim paper, employs six

Christians. Ahmad Ibrahim, the editor in chief of Ambon Ekspres, stated:

“We recruited them in order to show that

this paper is owned by everyone, in order to

balance the news. If there are news from theChristian point of view, we publish it”

67

4.2.14 Gender

There are only a few female journalists inMaluku. The Ambon Ekspres newspaper, for example, has only one female reporter who has been working there for three years. The same

applies to Suara Maluku and Koran Info, bothof which have only one female journalist. Thesame limited number of female journalist isseen in the broadcast media, such Suara Pelangi radio, which has one female journalistwho doubles as a reporter and an announcer.

66 See Annex 12. 67 Interview with Ahmad Ibrahim, Pimpinan RedaksiAmbon Ekspres, 28 Mei 2004, Ambon




37

According to Ahmad Ibrahim, chief editor of Ambon Ekspres, his media gives priority towomen to work in Ambon Ekspres. The problem is that only a few women apply for reporter positions. However, underlyingattitudes amongst male journalist appeared to be that women had limitations, particularly

when covering the news in conflict situation.Women are therefore more often assigned tocover ‘softer’ issues, for which they areconsidered more suitable. Moreover, much of the media in Ambon seems apathetic towomen’s issues. Most of the women who work in the print and broadcast media in Ambon are placed in the marketing, advertisement andfinancial sections. These jobs are consideredmore appropriate for women, who areapparently seen as being more meticulous indealing with details.


Conflict resolution through traditionalmedia is not new to Maluku. Before theconflict in 1999, Ambon already knewtraditional media to unite two fighting sides.According to Ichsan Malik, traditional mediaallows communities to fall back on commoncultural and social values such as Pata Siwaand Pata Lima (back as brothers and family). 68 Ichsan also asserted that these traditional media

had been well integrated into contemporarysocietal and political systems and were centralto mediating conflict.

4.3.1 Community Forums and Ceremonies

‘Tari cakalele’ is one of the most performed dance ceremonies in the province.The dance is held at the ‘baileo’ (traditionalhouse). The objective of this activity is to unitecommunities, especially those that have ‘ pela gandong ’ alliances or relations.69 This

traditional relationship can allow for easier coordination and communication betweencommunity leaders, especially in times of tension.70 For example, during the most recent

68 Lihat Ichsan Malik, Menata Masa Depan MalukuPasca Konflik, Makalah Diskusi, Juni 2004 69 See http://www.nunusaku.com/Research/R4c.htm for a description of Pela Gandong.70 “Pela” and “pela gandong” describe the alliances,relationships and associated ceremonies betweenspecific Muslim and Christian villages in Ambon and

violence in April 2004, community leadersfrom the villages of Passo and Batumerah,which has a pela alliance, communicateddirectly to anticipate the spread of tensions intheir communities. Theresia Maitimu stated:

“If issues about these two villages are

raised, we could directly counter the issues,

so that violence would not happen”

Communities in Maluku also recognise thetraditional ceremonies associated with pela gandong alliance such as ‘ panas pela’(warming the pela). However, theseceremonies were apparently little knownamongst youth and were considered rigid andunpopular. Youth seemingly preferredmainstream popular culture and commercialshows.

Before the 1980s, village heads used to be

the traditional 'rajah' in Central Maluku. Thenthe authorities introduced a new law on villagegovernment (Law No. 5 / 1979) that ruled allvillages in Indonesia would be like a Javanese'desa' with a 'kepala desa' . In some cases, suchas Passo village, the 'kepala desa' is also the'rajah', however this is not usually the case.There is also the 'latupati' , which is thetraditional leader associated with a collectionof villages. Whilst the local authorities appointthe 'kepala desa' , this is not the case for the'rajah' or 'latupati' . In this regard, theauthorities sometime act as the governmentapparatus that inaugurates local leaders and assuch the traditional and government structurescan work side-by-side in maintaining thetraditional governance culture.



Cellular phones are an increasinglysignificant form of communication in Maluku(especially in Ambon). The network in Ambon

is run by Simpati Nusantara/ Telkomsel. Some

Central Maluku. The ceremony itself reportedlyderives from the story between Desa Passo (Passovillage) under the Ternate Sultanate. The story statesthat a long time ago, when a delegation of Desa Passowas on their sea journey to pay tribute to TernateSultanate (North Maluku), their boat capsized and theywere washed ashore on an island called Tanjung Pela(sacred cape). There they declared brotherhood byturning over a rock. Since then it has been traditionalto declare brotherhood or Pela Gandong.




38

shops in Ambon also sell cell phone vouchers.There is a strong signal in Ambon that can beeasily received, both in Muslim and Christianarea. The use of cell phones serves to increasethe speed and breadth of person-to-personcommunication, the substance of which seemto mainly be similar to dialogue, rumour and

gossip. In this regard, if based upon accurateinformation from the mass media, this form of speedy communication can serve a positive benefit, although if based on misinformation itcould aggravate tensions at an alarminglyquick rate.

4.4.2 Internet

Access to information via the Internet islimited in Maluku. The majority of peoplereceive news from newspapers, radio,television and SMS. There are not many

Internet cafes in Ambon and access is oftenslow and problematic. In 2002, Ambon Ekspresopened an Internet cafe (for public use) usingVSAT technology. Although the Internetaccess is good, it does not attract manymembers of the public. As a result in 2003 thecafe closed. Before it was closed, it often used by Ambon journalists to send news for mediain Jakarta. However, most of the journalists inAmbon who work as correspondent for national media choose to send their stories byfax instead.

When the conflict was at its peak from1999 to 2001, the majority of websites aboutconflict were set up by people outside of Ambon. Moreover, the ‘information war’ between Muslim and Christian communitieswas often conducted through the Internet. Thisstarted in March 1999, based upon websitesand mailing lists. Each site consists of its ownversion (Muslim or Christian) of thechronological events in the conflict, photosfrom the battle field and the traumatic stories of atrocities.

There are many sites about the Ambonconflict made by Muslim and Christian groups.Of the Muslim sites, the most well knowninclude the site of Laskar Jihad(www.laskarjihad.or.id). There is also theKaromah site (www.karomah.cjb.net). Othersare Suara Ambon Online (www.come.to/suaraambon), Come and Save Muslims(www.connect.to/maluku) and Gema Khadijah(www.gemakhadijah.cjb.net). There were also

Christian sites. These are often multi-lingual, inDutch, Indonesian and English. These includethe Voice from Maluku (www.geocities.com/chosye). This site compiles news clippingsabout Maluku. There was also Maluku 2000(www.maluku2000.org). The provocative siteswere also present at that time of conflict such

as Ambon Berdarah Online(www.geocities.com/alifuru67) and theLawamena Victoria site (www.geocities.com/jembong_710).

4.4.3 Handy Talky

At present handy talkies are usedextensively for communication. In 1999 to2001, handy talky became the maincommunication device, particularly when other forms of communication and mass mediaeither broke down or were obstructed. The

security forces also depended on handy talkiesas their main form for communication.

4.4.4 VCD

VCD is one of the most accessiblemediums in Maluku. In stores and markets,non-copyrighted movie and music VCDs aresold cheaply. Each costs around Rp 5,000 (lessthan US$1). When conflict started, VCD became an effective medium in mobilizing thesupport. VCDs about ‘enemy attacks’ or victims of the violence were easily made and

fuelled tensions. Of particular note on theChristian side was the VCD entitled, TragediMaluku (1999). This included scenes of burning churches and alleged partiality by thesecurity forces towards to the Muslimcommunity. Another similar VCD entitled Ambon Berdarah was also released in 1999.

On the Muslim side there was a VCDentitled Jihad Fi Jazirah Al Mulk made in June2000. This depicts the struggle of the Muslimsagainst Christians, showing attacks byChristian groups and the Muslim victims.

Another VCD, Jihad di Diponegoro (2000)informs about the ‘battle’ against the Christianin the Diponegoro area of Ambon. Most of theMuslim VCDs are about the conflict in NorthHalmahera, Galela, Tobelo, dan Jailolo in early2000. These VCDs include Mujahidin Halmahera Bangkit (2000), Hidup Mulia atauMati Syahid (2000), Halmahera Berduka(2000) and Maluku Berduka (2000). Besidefrom these, other VCDs were produce showing




39

pictures from the violence, such Maluku Berduka (2000) and Konflik Berdarah Maluku2000 (this VCD was also produced in anArabic version).71



Rumour and gossip seemingly carriessignificant influence in Maluku. Much violenceallegedly occurred subsequent to theunchecked spread of false rumours. Suchgossip seemingly spread quickly in Ambon dueto the limited size of the communities. Themost popular issues in Ambon appear to bealleged plans of one community to attack theother. The mediums for spreading theserumours are usually SMS, dialogue and ‘hush-hush’. 72


During the conflict, bombastic newswithout clear verification became the mainstayof reporting distributed by many local media.This was often disseminated rapidly andwithout consideration for the potentialconsequences. Poor distribution and the partition of Muslim and Christian areas further weakened access to diverse informationsources for the general public. In this regard,the conflict-intensifying impact of the mediawas further reinforced as journalists usedrumour and gossip as their basis for reporting.Thus much of reporting reflected theunsubstantiated gossip that was alreadycirculating in the province, thereby reinforcingit and giving it added credibility. During this period the local government also involveditself, warning the media against inflammatoryand unsubstantiated reporting.73

There is also a ‘media vacuum’ in Maluku.Firstly, there are areas where there is extremelylimited media access that leaves significant

sectors of the population without accurate andtimely information about local and nationalissues. Secondly, there are only a small number of media focusing on the promotion of a

71 Dikutip dari Eriyanto, Media dan Konflik Ambon,Jakarta, Radio 68H-MDLF, 2003, hal. 15-1772 Hush-Hush is the locally used term for false rumour or gossip that cannot be substantiated.73 Wawancara Erenst Tanimahu, Wakil Kepala DinasInformasi dan Komunikasi Ambon, 1 Juni 2004

culture of tolerance and non-violence. Under aUNDP grant, since May 2003 MDLF has beenimplementing a programme supporting mediadevelopment designed to facilitate a return tolong-term peace and stability in the province,while simultaneously responding to the aboveissues in the province. Some of the activities

being covered under the programme includethe establishment of three new public serviceoriented radio stations Radio Binaya (inMasohi, Seram island and Central Maluku),and two others in Namlea, Buru island and inSaumlaki, Tanimbar islands. The aim of theseactivities is to provide media in areas thatotherwise do not have a diverse and reliableaccess to objective professional media.74


Fredom Toumahu, the managing editor of

Siwalima, stated that it was hard to getverification from certain primary sources,which is why the media often published thenews without any confirmation or verification.Fredom Toumahu stated:

“The reason is because of the condition. The

sources are usually located in other

communities and therefore difficult toaccess”

75

The trouble of accessing primary sourceswas a serious obstacle for all media in Maluku.Of note however, was the increasing use of

SMS to get sources to confirm or deny factualinformation. However, another significantobstacle was that community leaders often didnot agree to interviews with journalist fromdifferent communities. Some media had triedto get around this obstacle by using journalistsfrom other communities.

It is also apparent that the media relyextensively on the local government andsecurity forces as the main primary source of information. However, the ‘one door’ policyhinders the ability of journalists to both

maintain professional standards and keep totheir deadlines. Officials are often unavailableand the dependency on single sources meansthat the same stories and angles are oftenrepeated between media, thereby reducing

74 ‘Second Interim Narrative Report, Maluku Mediadevelopment Program’, (MDLF, April 2004) 75 Wawancara Fredom Toumahu, Redaktur PelaksanaSiwalima, 31 Mei 2004




40

reporting innovation and diversity in newscontent.




41

5. Media and Conflict in North Maluku

Geographically, North Maluku is anarchipelago covering 22,427 sq. km with anumber of small islands and roughly three-quarters of a million people. Ternate Island is

the current seat of provincial government for the nearly 320 islands and four regionalSultanates including Ternate, Tidore, Bacanand Jailolo. Christianity and Islam are thedominant organised religions, although in theinterior many people are reportedly animists.The mainstream media in North Maluku ismainly concentrated in Ternate with its population of approximately 200,000, whilstother areas, such as Tobelo, also house a fewoutlets.

Administratively, North Maluku provinceis divided into eight districts. Those districtsare Central Halmahera, East Halmahera, NorthHalmahera, South Halmahera, WestHalmahera, Sula Island, Tidore Island, andTernate City. Due to the significant distancesinvolved, this make dissemination problematicas it must be mainly undertaken by sea, whichis slow and unreliable. As a result, most mediafocus their marketing and base their content onTernate.

This chapter provides an overview of thefive main assessment areas for North Malukuincluding (i) the mainstream media, (ii)alternative media, (iii) traditional media, (iv)new information technologies and (v)information flows. Although it provides anoverview of the media situation, it does not provide a holistic picture of all media outletsand forms. Additional in-depth information can be found in Annexes 15-23.76

76 The research undertaken by ISAI looked at the performance and development of the provincialmainstream, alternative and traditional media in North

Maluku, as well as examined information flows from both local and national media and their respectiveinfluence on the general public. A sample of ninerespondents representing provincial mediastakeholders, community figures, religious leaders,security forces, government, private sector and thegeneral public provided in-depth feedback on the roleof the media relating to conflict. The survey wascarried out on six printed media (Maluku Utara Pos,Ternate Pos, Tabloid of Halut Press, Aspirasi, Mimbar Kieraha and Suara Pengungsi) and three radio stations(RRI, Radio Gema Hikmah and Radio Paksi Buana). It


Ternate was the first part of the Maluku toaccept Islam and an important sultanate from

the 12th to 17th century. The Portuguese camein 1512 to ship cloves and construct a fort,leading to decades of conflict, first with thereigning sultans of Ternate and Tidore thenlater among the Spanish, English and Dutch.The natives conquered the fort and expelled thePortuguese in 1574 and in 1606 the Sultan of Ternate signed a treaty with the Dutch andgranted them a spice monopoly. The Sultan became a vassal of the Dutch East IndiaCompany. However, by the end of the 18thcentury the spice trade had greatly diminishedand the area became an economic backwater.

Regional tensions were aggravated duringthe Suharto period, setting the stage for futureconflict. In 1975, the exclusively MoslemMakians were resettled in the Kao District of northern Halmahera, due to fears of volcaniceruptions on their island. The Makians and Kaocame into conflict because of a forced transfer of Kao land to Makians, cultural and religiousdifferences and competition over scarceresources.

Recent Conflict in North Maluku

The recent conflict in North Malukuoccurred nearly simultaneously with theconflict in Maluku. However, different with the

assessed the conflict resolution efforts by the mediamanagers through the editorial policy in NorthMaluku. The assessment was also carried out onvarious media consumers (government, communityfigures, ordinary people, military, NGO’s and mediamanagers themselves). A number of obstacles wereencountered in conducting the research. Thedeployment of researchers to the three provinces before the research methodology had been finalised in

Jakarta caused delays. Furthermore, the poor Internetconnection in Ternate, as well as the weak mobile phone signal further hindered communication. Inaddition, the local researchers found that allot of therequested data, such as on journalist trainings, was notwell document by the local media.77 This section is based upon the following sources:Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999, Jakarta Post, OTIField Report Indonesia (June 2000), Program onHumanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HarvardUniversity, USA), Human Rights Watch, InsideIndonesia, International Crisis Group.




42

conflict in Central and South East Maluku, theinitial motives of the conflict in North Malukuwere apparently more related to territorial problems and competition between the local political elites.78

The political conflict started in September 1999, when President B.J. Habibie agreed to

separate North Maluku and the Maluku province. However, the idea of establishing thenew northern province including the mainislands of Halmahera, Ternate, Tidore andBacan aroused an old rivalry between theSultanate of Ternate and Tidore. The Ternateelites under the leadership of the Sultan of Ternate (Mudaffar Syah) allegedly wantedTernate to become the transitional capital of the province before it was moved to Sidangoli,a village in North Halmahera. On the other hand, the Sultanate of Tidore insisted that

Soasiu, the capital of Central Halmahera inTidore Island, was made as the transitionalcapital, while Sofifi, a village in CentralHalmahera, which was nearer to Soasiu, would be made the capital.

The end result of the competition betweenTernate and Tidore was a law, which madeTernate the transitional capital and Sofifi thedefinitive capital. Those in Ternate reportedlyconsidered that the movement of the capital toSofifi would harm their interests in the longrun. On the other hand, Tidore, which up to

that time lagged behind Ternate in terms of economic development, would change to become the more strategic region. However,the Tidore elites feared that the Sultan of Ternate would maintain Ternate as the permanent capital, if he were elected asgovernor in local elections in June 2000.Therefore, together with the Makian elites, theTidore elites allegedly went into oppositionagainst the Sultan of Ternate.

The conflict became violent following theissuance of Government Regulation No. 42 of

1999, which developed Kao sub-district to two

78 Please see the explanation and case chronologymade by Yayasan Sagu (Sago Foundation), MalukuReport 30: Memahami Kompleksitas Konflik diMaluku Utara (Understanding the Complexity of Conflict in North Maluku), January 2000; SmithAlhadar, “The Forgotten War in North Maluku,” Inside Indonesia, No. 63, July-September 2000, pp.15-16; Thamrin Amal Tamagola, “The Bleeding Halmahera of North Mollucas,” Jurnal Studi

Indonesia, Vol 10, No. 2, 2000.

sub-districts, Kao and Makian-Malifut(containing the former Makian islandinhabitants) by changing the administration of five villages in Kao Sub-district to join thevillages with the majority of former Makianisland inhabitants. The five villages refused to join because they were ‘tied to traditional unity

with the other villages in Kao sub-district dueto their ancestors pledge’, but also because thenew administrative district centred on Malifutwould allow the Makianese to take over control of a gold mine which was the mainlocal source of revenue from the Kao villages.

Disregarding these objections, theGovernment unilaterally declared theestablishment of sub-district of Malifut inAugust 1999. That night violence broke out intwo of the five Kao villages, Sosol andWangeorak, which rejected the policy of the

regional administration. Convinced by theSultan of Ternate, the Kao laid down their arms. However, hatred ran high and in October residents of Kao attacked Malifut, killingapproximately 100 inhabitants and forcing4,000 survivors to flee to Ternate and theneighbouring island of Tidore.

The Muslim flight to Ternate and Tidorewas accompanied by a rise in religious hatredand in response the Makian’s “cleansed”Ternate of Christians. The Sultan of Ternatereportedly refused to support the violence, so

local group leaders turned to the Sultan of Tidore, a traditional rival of Ternate. Due to hissupport of Christians, the Sultan of Ternatewas quickly labelled as anti-Islamic. On theother hand, the Sultan of Tidore with his alliesused the jargon of ‘Christianisation’ to attractsupporters. In this regard the conflict, whichhad seemingly started over competition for political control and economic resources, took on an increasingly religious perspective.

Fighting continued throughout the latter part of 1999, reaching a peak in December,

with the military and police reportedly taking part in the violence. In the Tobelo sub-districton Halmahera Island, north of the Kao,Christians now attacked the local Muslimminority, reportedly killing 500 and ‘cleansing’the district of over 10,000 persons. Moreover,there were calls amongst the Muslimcommunity for a jihad to get land back and“cleanse” the area of Christians.




43

5.2 The Media in North Maluku


National media can be accessed easily in North Maluku, print as well as broadcast.Those national print media that can be found in North Maluku, are Kompas, Media Indonesia,

Koran Tempo and the Jakarta Post , besidestens of magazines and infotainment tabloids.Television such as RCTI, TPI, SCTV andMetro TV are also accessible. There is no relayTVRI station in Ternate. The North MalukuTelevision (MUTV) - a local television channel- was apparently not well liked by audiences,due to the poor quality of programming andlack of a fixed schedule. As a result, thischannel reportedly no longer regularlyfunctions.

The geographic condition of North

Maluku, which consists of many small islands,also causes difficulties for the remote areas to be routinely accessed by national media. As aresult, national newspapers are often simplystockpiled by newsagents, because it is hard tosend them to other areas, some of which areonly accessible by sea. Therefore, the localnewspapers are considered more dominantthan their national counterparts and thecirculation figures for local newspapers arereportedly increasing.


In 2000, there were 11 recorded major printed media in North Maluku. Theseincluded: Dodia, Fokus, Gema Nusantara, Info, Kabata, Koran Ternate, Mandiri, Mimbar Kieraha, Simpati, Sinter and Ternate Pos, published in the form of bulletins, newspapersand magazines. 79

In this assessment about 35 different outletswere identified. However, many of these onlyappear on a very irregular basis. IDPs andinvestors from Ambon initiated many during

the conflict in 1999. 80 Generally the print mediawere published with minimal capital andwhatever management resources wereavailable. Based on the survey data it seemsthat journalists rather than businessmen ran themajority of these media. The majority of newspapers are published in Ternate in the

79 See Annex 15.80 As it is explained in Media Assessment Report of North Maluku by ISAI in 2001.

form of tabloids and on a weekly basis. Out of these only Mimbar Kieraha and Malut Pos are published on a daily basis.

A wide range of these local and provincial print media reported on the riots, although thisoften lacked objectivity and was withoutverification of relevant sources. The majority

tended to be partisan and acted as themouthpieces for combatant groups. Thosenewspapers that declared themselves non- partisan were the Ternate Pos and Mimbar Kieraha. As a result, these newspapers cameunder pressure from the public, being accusedof one-sided reporting.

The influence of the partisan media startedto decline when the political tension begansubsiding and many media closed due to lack of capital and limited marketplace. Currently,only 4 out of the 11 print media that were published in 2000 can be found on a frequent basis. The remainder are only publishedsporadically.

As examples of the print media in the province, the daily, Ternate Pos was the firstlocal print media in North Maluku, and has been published since August 1998. Its self-declared mission is to “make social controlthrough presenting news in North Maluku”.

Recently the Jawa Pos Group extended its business by establishing a new newspaper in

the area, The North Maluku Post (MalukuUtara Pos). The North Maluku Post’s missionis “together advancing - to develop society”.According to Tauhid Arief, the Chief Editor,the initiative to establish the newspaper startedwhen the conflict in Maluku broke out. Inthose days, the majority of printed media were published in Manado, and could not bedelivered to North Maluku due to disruptedtransportation. The management in ManadoPos (North Sulawesi – member of the Jawa PosGroup) were concerned by this problem and

proposed to establish a newspaper in Ternate.In addition, they felt that the people of NorthMaluku needed a professional impartialnewspaper. Until becoming a daily in March2003, The North Maluku Post was publishedweekly.


Suara Pengungsi, which is 32-page bimonthly publication, was established in July




44

2003 to provide advocacy for IDPs. At thattime, very few newspapers published detailednews about assistance programmes or repatriation/ relocation programmes providedfor IDPs. CARDI (Consortium for Assistanceand Recovery toward Develompment inIndonesia), an INGO active in the area,

cooperated with the European CommissionHumanitarian Aid Office to support theestablishment of this magazine. The magazineemploys five staff (four in program division,with two of them are based in North Malukuand two others in North Sulawesi).

World Vision, an INGO active in NorthMaluku, produces an educational comicentitled ‘ Harmony’ aimed at 9 to 12 year olds.This bi-monthly publication is prepared and published in Jakarta and distributed to 180schools in Ternate Tobelo, Galela and Kao. It

is accompanied by a teacher’s edition to assistwith use in classrooms and covers a range of conflict-resolution related topics includingappreciating diversity, working together,communication, creative problem solving anddealing with negative situations. The publication has a feedback component and isreportedly well received by the target group.81


Radio is the most important regional broadcast media. The main obstacle for radio

broadcasts in the province is the geographicalconditions. The territory of North Malukuconsists of islands and a mainland archipelago.The distances from Ternate to the eastern coastof North Halmahera are considerable.Therefore, none of the independent radio broadcasts can be received in the entire province, except for the RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia), which is broadcasting both in FM,MW and SW. Some areas in North Maluku,including the conflict areas, are apparentlycomplete ‘media vacuums’, when it comes toindependent radio broadcasts.

The three main news stations, RRI (RadioRepublik Indonesia), Radio Gema Hikmah inTernate and Radio Suara Paksi Buana (SPB)in Tobelo, were initially assumed respectivelyas the “Government’s Radio”, the “IslamicRadio”, and the “Christian Radio”. During theconflict, the station with the most extensive

81 Interview with World Vision office in Tobelo (28May 2004)

broadcast reach, RRI, was often reportedly pressurised by the combatant parties to broadcast news in compliance with their interests. Several radio stations were attackedduring this conflict period, amongst these was Radio Gema Hikmah (Ternate) and mostcommercial radio stations closed down in

periods of fighting.The survey focused on the three biggest

radio stations in North Maluku, RRI, RadioGema Hikmah and Radio Suara Paksi Buana(SPB). The remainders are predominantlyentertainment based radio stations.

Radio Gema Hikmah first broadcasted inJuly 1994 on FM 103.0 MHZ. Its broadcastreaches Ternate and the surrounding WestTidore and West Halmahera. The mainlistening group was the Muslim community. Radio Gema Hikmah relays news from the

68H Radio News Agency, as well as BBC-London, Voice of America (VOA) and TrijayaFM. The station also runs talk shows incorporation with RRI.

Radio SPB broadcasted for the first time in1998, from Tobelo, a region with Christianmajority. Radio SPB was established by Pastor Titus under Yayasan Bintang Laut (Star FishFoundation, referring to Saint Mary whocontrols the sea), with the objective of reducingviolence among the youth in Tobelo. TheYayasan Bintang Laut also published the Bintang Laut tabloid. The foundation is now inthe process of giving the two media increased‘distance’ from the church to avoid perceptionsthat it is a Catholic station.

RRI North Maluku is one of many provincial stations in the national RRI network,supposed to be friendly to the government,which is also their source of funding. RRI broadcasts a mix of national and provincial programmes. It is supposed to have a largeaudience, not the least in the remote areas of

the province. The station has a number of talk shows, which reportedly involves a diverserange of stakeholders in the province.

5.2.5 Media Content

There seems to be no standards in the policy mechanisms applied in the respectivemedia. Maluku Utara Pos tends to use policymechanisms similar to the Jawa Pos Group.While the other media said that “they trusted




45

their reporters”, so did not need to questionissues directly related to the news coverage or bribery. In addition, separation between theeditors and other sections of the media waslacking with journalists also working for theadvertisement ‘lobby team’.

Maluku Utara Pos has begun separating the

editorial, administrative, advertisement,marketing and other processes. For the editorialsystem, the proposals and inclusion of newsstories were decided through editorialmeetings. However, it often cannot maintainthis principle, because some of the journalistsare reportedly not independent. In a regionvulnerable to political conflict, a number of journalists seemingly do not exercise sufficientself-control and have been involved in politicaldisagreements. This partisan attitudeinfluenced the news.


The basic education of journalists in NorthMaluku ranges from high school education touniversity degrees. The majority of journalistsworks without any apprenticeship or mediatraining, and as a result lack basic journalism,news writing, interviewing techniques andediting skills. However, some journalists fromthe larger newspapers have had in-housetraining.82 As an exception, Jawa Pos, throughits group, Manado Pos, has carried out training

for those in its group. In this regard, staff atMaluku Utara Pos have received in-housetraining. Only a few journalists have receivedtraining outside North Maluku. Many have joined courses on peace journalism carried out by national and international organisations based in Jakarta such as British Council, ISAI,LSPP, AJI and Internews.

A majority of the radio’s employees arehigh school and Bachelor degree graduates.Most of them have followed the peace journalism training. For the election coverage,

Gema Hikmah recruited four high schoolgraduates and five undergraduates, while Radio Paksi Buana recruited three high schoolgraduates and one undergraduate. Most of theRRI employees have non-formal educationheld by RRI in Jakarta through in-houseactivities. 83

82 See Annex 19.83 See Annex 21.

5.2.7 Safety Issues

The safety situation for journalistsreporting on other communities was extremelyhazardous during the heightened periods of conflict, with a number of media practitioners being attacked, including by their own

communities. Although the security situationhas significantly improved, many journalistsseemingly remain wary of travelling to, or reporting on, communities other than their own. Although with notable exceptions, this inturn increases the de facto segregation of theChristian and Muslim communities.

5.2.8 Associations and Networks

The only journalist association with a localrepresentative and branch in the province isPWI (Indonesian Journalists Association).

However, it does not include many young journalists and the majority are from pre-1998or are correspondents for the Jakarta media in North Maluku.

Reportedly due to the administrative andtechnical obstacles to establishing a local branch of AJI, a group of local media practitioners instead opted to create their ownassociation, the ‘North Maluku JournalistAssociation’, which is connected to AJI. Other organisations, such as the IndonesianConsumer Institution (YLKI) and PressWorker Union (SPP), are seemingly relativelyinactive.


The application of the Press Law (UUKebebasan Pers No.40/1999) in Ternate is problematic. This law should, in theory, make journalists more responsible for their reportingand uphold ethical codes. However, it is theCriminal Code, not the Press Law, which isoften applied by the law enforcement officials.

The Local Independent BroadcastingCommission (KPID) has not been established,so monitoring by such a body, as well as by theindependent ombudsman (the Press Council),is not available yet in North Maluku. As aresult of this unregulated environment, radiostations often broadcast news merely quotedfrom local print media (without check and re-check) and break the rules regulatingfrequencies.




46


The external pressure on North Malukumedia often comes from the (former)combatant parties, including threats of physicalviolence. Even when the aggrieved party is anacknowledge member of the public, the lack of

awareness about alternative legal recourseother than face-to-face dialogue, createsincentives for alternative unacceptable methodsto be used. In this regard, no legal cases were brought to the attention of the assessment team,whilst there have been a number of direct andindirect threats being made against media.

Media in North Maluku also faces external pressure from the regional authorities. The then Governor of North Maluku, Abdul MuhyiEffendie, for instance, in March 2001 issued astern written warning and a threat of denial of

coverage to five media outlets - two Jakarta- based TV stations, RCTI , TPI , and three local print media, Ternate Pos, Mimbar Kieraha,and Fokus - due to information that was“provocative” and “undermining the authorityof the Government”. All legal and informationapparatus were asked to monitor and takeaction against media that violated thisregulation. The notification had a controversialeffect on the Indonesian press at the time, as press freedoms had only recently beenintroduced in the country. AJI (Independent

Journalists Alliance) and SEAPA (South EastAsia Press Alliance) asked Muhyi Effendie “torevoke the notification”. The journalists inTernate also issued a declaration, signed by 17 journalists, asking the Governor to give anexplanation on his accusation. They alsothreatened to “boycott the entire coverage” onthe Governor, if he did not give an explanation.

In a dialogue with the Press Council inJakarta, the Governor defended his action bycharging that the media reporting in his province were sectarian, inaccurate and

unbalanced. He refused to withdraw hiswarning order, but pledged to “make theeffort” not to ban the press. “In a provincewhere civil emergency has been declared, thegovernor is the supreme authority and can issueregulations deemed necessary to maintain public order. That includes gagging the press”.By the end of the year, Governor Effendie kepthis word in not issuing an outright gaggingorder.


The newspapers in North Maluku are all printed in less than 2,000 copies.84 Even some big newspapers, published regularly, are only printed in between 500 and 1,000 copies. The biggest newspapers (such as Mimbar Kierehaand Malut Pos) are printed in about 2,000

copies with a selling price of Rp 2,000 per copy.85 Newspapers in North Maluku thereforehave a maximum daily income of Rp.4,000,000 from sales and therefore cannot relyon sales as their only source of income. Salestend to be concentrated in the provincialcapital. As an example, Mimbar Kieraha witha 2,000 circulation per day focuses 70% of itsmarketing in Ternate and only 30% outside thecity.

These media often also depend on incomefrom the advertisements. The majority of

advertisement work comes not from businesses, but from the authorities. Thesetypes of advertisements are ceremonial,congratulation and public serviceadvertisements. The only reliable income istherefore government advertisement, whichunfortunately comes very infrequently. Onlyon special occasions, such as the GeneralElection, Governor Election, or some bigregional events, do the authorities purchaseadvertisements in local media. However, it has been noted that some media, which have not

been published for long time, then suddenlyreappear and obtain these advertisements. Theaverage advertisement income per media is Rp3.000.000 to Rp 5.000.000.86

Some media are receiving assistance fromthe Government of North Maluku on an ad hoc basis based on requests proposed by mediaoutlets for specific activities. This includes thecommemoration of anniversaries as well astransportation funds to attend events outside North Maluku. The amount of assistance is between from IDR 2 million to IDR 5 million.

These funds are taken from the RegionalBudget. However, it appears that not all mediaare granted equal access to this kind of assistance.

Other sources of external assistance includefrom religious institutions. In Tobelo funds

84 See Annex 17.85 See Annex 18. 86 See Annex 18.




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have come from the local church through theYayasan Bintang Laut to develop the tabloid of Bintang Laut and Radio Suara Paksi Buana.

5.2.12 Expenses and Institutional Resources

The cost of production for the radio

stations in North Maluku is relatively small, being only around Rp 2.5 million to Rp 6million a month. This amount is sufficient to pay operational costs and salaries – and theincome from advertisements is also around thatfigure. The net income of radio in NorthMaluku is also not very large. Nevertheless, itdoes not discourage people from establishingstations and many are set up as a hobby87.

Although there are many newspapers, themajority does not have strong capital, and as aresult are in a weak condition with poor

infrastructure. Usually print media only havevery simple facilities. Most often the mediaworks from a leased building and only have alimited number of computers. Half out of 13newspapers surveyed in this report do not havetheir own spatial arrangement section, which isoften trusted to the printing shop. Out of these print media, only two have their own printing press. Many newspapers’ offices take the shapeof a “home industry”. Halut Pers in Tobelohas, for example, only has three computers,one printer, and two recording devices88. For

lay out and printing, most of the tasks on their weekly and monthly publications are done inManado, North Sulawesi.89

5.2.13 Ownership, Employment and ‘Envelope Journalism’

The number of journalists in the respectivenewspapers in North Maluku varies fromapproximately 15 to 30. The status of theemployees also varies. Some newspapers usethe system of permanent employees, othershave staff based upon honorariums. For

instance, Mimbar Kiereha and Malut Pos usethe system of permanent employees, whilst Halut Pers pays by honorarium. The journalists are paid with honorariumsaccording to the number of articles beingwritten. The standard salary of journalists in North Maluku is relatively small, from around

87 See Annex 21. 88 See Annex 17.89 See Annex 17.

Rp 300,000 to Rp 500,000 a month.90 Some journalists have side jobs as researchers,freelancers or correspondents for nationalmedia in order to maintain their income.91

The number of radio employees alsovaries. Gema Hikmah has nine employees -two reporters, four announcers, and the rest in

the administration department. Suara Paksi Buana has four in the news division - oneeditor and three announcers.92 In other radiostations employment is also based on anhonorarium system, calculated by hours on air.

The practice of ‘envelope journalism’ isreportedly widespread in North Maluku. Ingeneral, most media practitioners seem to feelthat it is acceptable to receive money fromvested interests as long it does not influencenews content.

5.2.14 Gender

According to the survey, only a few mediain North Maluku give sufficient attention togender issues. Women tend to haveadministrative and financial roles in the printmedia, or commonly work as announcers onradios, although without the prospective of being promoted to higher positions with thestations as granted to their male colleagues. News content relating to women is also mostlyabout IDP issues and crime (as victims).Gender issues are not considered important inlocal news and the biggest portions relate to politics.


5.3.1 Community Forums and Ceremonies

There are various traditional media in North Maluku that have underlying conflictresolution connotations (see Annex 23). Thetraditional media in general uses rituals toresolve inter-communal problems. However,

unification ceremonies and movements, suchas Hibualamo93, which finds its roots in the

90 See Annex 19.91 After the conflict, North Maluku is often the objectof research with a number of topics. Many journalistsin North Maluku work as interviewers or assistresearchers, who carry out field research in NorthMaluku.92 See Annex 21. 93 See Annex 22.




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province, apparently no longer influence the public as the traditional forms of governmenthave been eroded by the onset of the modernstate. In particular many of the younger generation are seemingly unaware of whatthese rituals entail.

5.3.2 Organised ReligionMuslim and Christian religious leaders

have been involved with the establishment of “The Forum of Harmony and CommunicationAmong the Religious Disciples” (FKKAUB),with the objective to unifying and resolving theconflict between the different communities.According to Reverend S. S. (Tot) Duan, theChurch leaders often provide spiritual guidancefor their congregations, as is also the case withthe ulamas (Moslem Scholars) in the mosques.FKKAUB routinely discuss the problems in

the region, which involves the local, provincialand central authorities. The activities of FKKAUB were considered effective as of 2001.

5.3.3 Communicative Art Forms

The combatant communities havereportedly undertaken informal directreconciliation efforts at the grassroots levelthrough communicative art forms94. In thisregard, the Sanggar Seni Gumarin (Art studioof Gumarin) has used local theatrical arts,

which reflected the diversity and interaction of communities in North Maluku.



Cellular phones are beginning to be a toolfor communication in Ternate and Tobelo.However, their reach is still limited, particularly in Tobelo. For telecommunication, people usually use the landline phones,although this is expected to change as it has inother areas of the country.

Short Message Service (SMS) is also becoming an alternative way of deliveringmessages. “Currently SMS is becoming anecessity, because SMS is cheap and teachesthe people to become smarter, because SMSinvites the people to communicate with

94 Interview with S. S. (Tot) Duan, religious figurefrom Forum of Harmony and Communication Amongthe Religious Disciples (FKKAUB) of Tobelo.

words,” the Secretary of MUI (the IndonesianUlamas Council) of North Maluku, KasmanHi. Akhmat said. The main obstacle to usingmobiles is the weak signal in many places.However, the perspectives for SMS to makethe spread of rumours and gossip more rapid if not based on proper information are

considerable. However, if there is access toobjective mass media this may make SMS akey tool for resolving surges in tensions basedupon misinformation.

5.4.2 Internet

Access to the Internet is very limited in North Maluku and the connection is slow. Atthe time of conflict in 1999, Internet access andusage was extremely limited and pamphletswere the main form of informationdissemination. To date, access can be obtained

through Internet shops in the Post Office of Ternate or in one of the few Internet cafes.Internet usage and access is more prevalentamongst media practitioners, although it seemsthat usage could be useful expanded for thisgroup as well.

5.4.3 Handy Talky

Handy-talky is used as a form of communication in the province. Thegeographical condition of North Maluku, withmany islands and jungle areas, encourages

people to choose handy-talkies as the means of speedy and cheap communication. At the timeof conflict, they often reportedly became asource of irresponsible informationdissemination, serving to fuel rumours andgossip rather than countering them, particularlyas communication is not secure and easilylistened in on.



At the time of conflict, it seems that the

local communities were readily provoked by

unsubstantiated rumour. The limited access toinformation through the media meant that theflow of information that was available to the public came from a very small number of sources. Reverend S.S (Tot) Duan a religiousleader from the FKKAUB in Tobelo stated:

“At the time of conflict, it was very difficult to filter the news, fortunately now people are

not so easily provoked”




49


Generally the radio stations in NorthMaluku do not work with clear audiencesegmentation. They target all groups, fromyoung to old, poor to rich. This means thatthere are no special youth stations or female

stations, like in many other places in Indonesia.From the aspect of programme composition,the radio broadcasts are thereforecomprehensive, mixing entertainment,information, spiritual programmes, and soforth. A number of radio stations, such asGema Hikmah, Suara Paksi Buana (SPB) andRRI, have their own news programmes,although the majority of news is relayed fromthe Jakarta based radio services.

Although the media is increasinglyspreading out from Ternate to other areas, such

as Tobelo, there are still some notable ‘mediavacuums’ in the province, or areas where thediversity of information access is extremelylow. Halut Pers tabloid is starting a newspaper in Tobelo. At present the only other printmedia is Bintang Laut , although it is currentlynot in operation.

During the conflict these vacuums servedto fuel tension through the inability of populations to access information. In thisregard, in 2001 USAID/ OTI funded thedistribution of Ternate / provincial papers toHalmahera to help get news of reconciliationout to the public. Although the conflict is nowdormant, such problems relating to access toinformation still exist, particularly amongstrural communities along the eastern side of Halmahera.


The Government controls information provision to the media by applying a ‘onedoor’ policy through the Information and

Communication Bureau of the ProvincialAdministration of North Maluku ( Biro Infokom). Local media managers consider these measures to be ineffective. As the chief editor of Maluku Utara Pos, Tauhid Arief stated:

“Sometimes the Infokom cannot cover all information to which the journalists would

like to have access and our journalists are

often hurried by the deadline” 95

Faiz Albaar, the general manager of Mimbar Kieraha also commented on this issue,saying:

“The high pressure of deadlines and lack of

communication between the Government and the press caused difficulty, which was

very disturbing. Because of this, the news in

those two newspapers was often

imbalanced”. 96

Faiz Albaar also said that his reportersoften faced difficulty in the efforts to maintainchecks and balance. The limitation of publishing time and inharmonious relations between the local press and government oftenmade the editors of Mimbar Kieraha decide to publish the news as it was without trying toverify with the relevant institutions. Moreover,

they also often found that when they did try toverify news, the resource persons often did notwant to comment. The difficulty to accessresource persons was also felt by the manager of Gema Hikmah news radio:

“We need better balanced and honest information, in order to provide the public a

balanced and fair coverage”97

Furthermore, as with the other two provinces, information flows between civilsociety and the media seems to be significantly

hindered by a lack of respect and trust betweenthese communities and about the other professionalism. In addition, the media seem to be predominantly focused on the authoritiesand security forces in terms of accessing‘trusted’ or ‘respected’ sources of information, potentially at the exclusion of other legitimatesources amongst academia and civil society.

95 Interview with Tauhid Arief, Chief Editor of Maluku Utara Pos.96 Interview with Faiz Albaar, General Manager of Mimbar Kieraha. 97 Interview with Alwi Sagaf, news editor of GemaHikmah Radio.




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6. Recommendations for Support to the Media in Central

Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku

This study proposes four focus areas for support to the media in these provincesincluding:

!

Strengthening the Media Environment! Developing Professional Skills and

Resources

! Facilitating Information Flows and Access

! Supporting Community-basedCommunication

Holistic Approaches - A holistic approachis required for a programme addressing mediaand conflict. This should range from the broadest level of developing a strong andvigorous media environment, to the mostspecific level of utilising local channels of

grassroots communication. Such an approachthus ensures that individual traditional andalternative media can be engaged in addressingconflict related issues in a manner unique to thelocal environment, and the inherent long-termrole of the mainstream and alternative mass-media for preventing and resolving conflict can be secured through countering manipulationand abuse, diversifying information access anddissemination, and providing skills andresources. The diagram below outlines these

considerations (Figure 1).

In this regard, the focus areas in the firstand broadest of the activity recommendation

groups – Strengthening the MediaEnvironment at Provincial Level – aregenerically applicable in all three provinces,whilst those in the last and most specific of thegroups – Supporting Community-BasedCommunication – are generally unique to each province.

Parallels between Provinces - As indicated below, the research undertaken in CentralSulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku indicatesclear parallels between the three provinces interms of the broad issues that should be

addressed in order for the media to better engage in conflict resolution and prevention. Inthis regard, the recommendations for all threehave been combined into one section.However, this is not to say that all the provinces have identical circumstances and therecommendations should therefore not beimplemented in identical formats in each.Obvious divergences are indicated in thesections below where applicable and the project formulation stage following on from

Strengthening the Media E nvironmentat Provincial Level

Developing ProfessionalSkills and Resources

SupportingCommunity-BasedCommunication

Facilitating InformationFlows and Access

General LevelEnsuring strong and secure media

environment to counter abuses andfacilitate positive role of mass media in

preventing/ resolving conflict.

Specific LevelEngaging individual local community-

based communication channels are

addressing conflict issues.

Intermediate LevelStrengthening media professionalism

and information flows to positivelyaddress conflict-inducing issues.

Figure 1 – Relationship between Components of a Holistic Approach to Media Work




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this assessment should tailor the recommendedfields to the individual situation in each province.

The more specific recommendationsoutlined below are aimed at achieving a long-term reduction in the potential for conflict, based upon the specific circumstances of each

province as laid out in the previous sections.They include specific targeted activities andshould not be seen as an exhaustive list of allthe local media’s needs vis-à-vis the conflicts.The activities are suggested within a prospective implementing timeframe of approximately three to five years and should beaddressable within reasonable budgetary limits.In regard to the latter point, it is noted that anumber of the suggested activities can beachieved through single multi-layeredinterventions and do not therefore require

individual interventions. Furthermore, therecommendations seek to build upon whatnational and international media developmentand freedom of expression actors have alreadyundertaken in the three provinces, utilisingexisting resources and reinforcing best practices. It is also suggested that prior to any programme development based upon thisreport, ISAI undertake a consultative processwith the wider national and provincial mediacommunities.

6.1 Strengthening the Media

Environment at Provincial Level

Overall Rationale - A vigorous and strongmedia environment should solidify the long-term sustainable role of the media in itsfunction as the ‘fourth estate’. In this regard, asecure and balanced environment is not only anecessity for a functional and secure media, butis also required to ensure the media’s ability to perform conflict prevention and resolutionroles as an inherent function derived from its

professionalism, as well as being a strong basisfor preventing the types of manipulation andabuse of the media that can fuel tensions.


Specific Rationale - Legislation relating tothe media must be fair, effective andenforceable, offering both checks against theexcesses of the media (in particular relating tohate speech and antagonistic reporting), as well

as protecting the media against harassment andattack. Likewise, the mechanisms and manner in which licences are allocated to the mediamust be undertaken in a transparent and balanced manner. Effective and realistic self-regulatory mechanisms should also ideally beutilised, thereby allowing issues to be dealt

with by the media community itself in the firstinstance.

Summary of Findings - Despite the presence of a Press Law and Broadcast Law inIndonesia, these are often not being applied bylaw enforcement agencies and the judiciary ateither the national or provincial level. Rather,libel laws are predominantly being applied tocases involving the media. Moreover, althoughonly a few legal cases have been undertaken inCentral Sulawesi and Maluku, and even less in North Maluku, the current precedent being set

at the national level indicates that this phenomenon may be increasing and that vestedinterests are manipulating legal procedures tointimidate and silence media institutions. Such practices may soon be mirrored at the provincial level.

Furthermore, a significant number of disputes between the media and other partiesare being settled outside of any legal or self-regulatory mechanism. Although this can leadto amicable resolutions of grievances for boththe aggrieved party and media, it also

engenders the use of unacceptable methods based upon intimidation and harassment. The presence of the Press Council offers analternative regulated process through whichdisputes can be addressed, without removingthe potential for recourse to legal channels at alater date if resolution is not found. If used inan objective manner, this could therefore be beneficially utilised by the provincial media,although it will of course not prevent therecourse to unacceptable methods for those toexplicitly seek to use manipulative or violent

means. In addition, there are numerous lawsapplicable to the media, including the PressLaw, Broadcast Law, Proprietary LimitedCompany Law, and so forth. This createscomplex environments in which the mediamust operate, which are often beyond thecapacities of single outlets to following andadhere to.

The Independent Broadcast Commission(KPI) has been created to regulate and monitor




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the broadcast media. The KPI should also beestablished at the provincial level (KPID) inorder to give recommendations on broadcastlicences to KPI and also makerecommendations to the Department of Communication about the issuance of frequency licences to local broadcast media

once every three years. Moreover, it willmonitor the content of the media, including arequirement for outlets to retain copies of all broadcasts, as well as review complaints andrecommend penalties. However, due to delaysin the establishment of the KPID, a number of broadcast media have begun and/or continuedactivities without licences. The establishmentand work of the KPI and KPID will therefore be central to the creation of secure and fair media landscapes and environments at the provincial levels.

Potential Approaches - The kinds of work that could support the media policy andlegislation include:

1. Facilitate access for provincial media toadvice and support relating to legalrequirements and processes, as well as existingnational and international legal-aid mechanism;

2. Raise awareness amongst the media at provincial levels about available self-regulatorymechanism;

3. Support self-regulatory mechanism inestablishing a presence at the provincial levels;

4. Raise awareness with the authorities andcivil society at provincial levels about relevantnational media legislation and self-regulatorymechanisms;

5. Through national professional media bodies, support the local broadcast media inrelation to the establishment and conduct of theKPI;

6. Support the KPI with executing itsfunctions with specific consideration of specialneeds and circumstance created in conflict

prone environments.

6.1.2 Associations and Networking

Specific Rationale - Networking andassociation between journalists both withintheir immediate communities, as well asregionally and internationally, provideslinkages amongst practitioners and outlets bothlocally and nationally, and facilitates exchangeof experiences, promotion of best practices,

agreement on collective needs and stances and provides for ‘strength in numbers’. This servesto reinforce the confidence and abilities of media practitioners to uphold professionalstandards and defend media rights.

Summary of Findings - Whilst in CentralSulawesi there are local representatives of a

number of professional media bodies,including the Alliance of IndependentJournalists (AJI), Indonesian JournalistAssociation (PWI), Association of PrivateRadios (PRSSNI) and others, in North Malukuand Maluku such official local representativesare on the whole absent. This is apparently dueto the administrative, technical and financialobstacles to establishing local branches. In North Maluku the local media practitionershave instead opted to create the ‘North MalukuJournalist Association’, whilst in Maluku AJI

has a strong influence through the MalukuMedia Centre (MMC). Other organisation likethe Indonesian Consumer Institution (YLKI)and Press Worker Union (SPP) were alsorelatively inactive in the three provinces. Thereare also other professional groups, such as theDPR3 in Central Sulawesi, in which participation of the active media could have positive benefits. 98 Where local representativeswere not present, the view of many media practitioners was that the influence and benefitsof professional organisations were limited.

Potential Approaches - The kinds of work that could support the media associations andnetworking include:

1. Address obstacles and support professionalmedia bodies with the establishment of localrepresentatives and/or linkages with localmedia communities;

2. Support capacity development for professional media bodies at local levels,including cooperation on implementing mediadevelopment activities;

3. Assist role of professional bodies inmonitoring and advocacy in support anddefence of local media communities.

98 ‘DPR3’ is an informal weekly gathering of peoplefrom various professions, which the membersthemselves refer to as DPR3




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6.1.3 Monitoring and Advocacy

Specific Rationale - Monitoring the contentof the media can serve both as an early warningof potential conflict-inducing practices, as wellas growing threats against the media.Furthermore, monitoring should be linked to‘action orientated’ advocacy and conflict early-

warning mechanisms. In this regard,monitoring and advocacy provides indicator of when there are increasing unwarrantedrestrictions and controls on the media; indirectand self-censorship of media practitioners andoutlets; suppression of external media sources;and media polarisation, including increasedstereotyping and hate-speech.

Summary of Findings - At presents thereseems to be only limited participation in mediamonitoring and advocacy mechanisms inCentral Sulawesi and North Maluku. Suchinvolvement that does exist is predominantlydone through national institutions in Jakarta,thereby reducing and delaying direct access toinformation about circumstances in the provinces. In Ambon, the Maluku MediaCentre (MMC) is reportedly substantivelyengaged together with AJI in media monitoringand advocacy activities.

Potential Approaches – The kinds of work that could support the monitoring andadvocacy include:

1. Develop more effective and responsivemedia monitoring activities in North Malukuand Central Sulawesi and build upon thosealready established in Maluku, to be linkedwith national and international advocacymechanisms;

2. Enhance capacity of local media to pursueadvocacy at both provincial and national levelsto address pertinent media related issues;

3. Link monitoring to national andinternational conflict early warningmechanisms and institutions.

6.2 Developing Professional Skills and

Resources

Overall Rationale - The developmentand/or restoration of professional skills andresources fosters the ability of the media toresearch, interpret and communicate aboutconflict in an objective, reliable and accuratemanner. In addition, it provides an enhanced

understanding of the media’s role and inherentresponsibilities as the ‘fourth estate’ in conflict prone environments.

6.2.1 Content Transformation

Specific Rationale - Research into professional training for journalists in conflict

affected areas has been taken a step further with initiatives to facilitate the media’s potential to communicate and relateinformation in a style specifically orientatedtowards the peaceful resolution of conflict. Themedia thus becomes a facilitator of conflictreduction, rather than a professional unattachedobserver. Content transformation activitiessuch as this aims to assist media practitionerstackle those economic, social, political andreligious issues considered too sensitive toaddress during periods of conflict.99 Not to

tackle such issues means that the root causes of the conflict are not addressed and the originalstatus quo theoretically persists with theassociated threat that conflict may re-emerge.However, if this approach is used, thechallenge lies in ensuring that the media is not‘manipulated’ to promote pre-set agendas or simply disseminate information in place of professional journalism.

Where hate speech exists, suchinterventions are often ineffective, as the propagator is usually making a conscious

decision to produce such rhetoric. Thechallenge is to use both persuasive andcoercive methods, ranging from entering into adialogue with the media and creating a criticalmass of public and professional pressure, tofacilitating national and local actors to pursuenecessary self-regulatory and/or legalrecourses.

Activities should seek to enable mediaoutlets and practitioners, both from within anarea and between areas, to share experiences,work together and utilise innovative reportingand ‘clever’ publication techniques, such ashaving controversial articles ‘vetted’ by alawyer prior to publication or having it published in another province and republishedin the applicable province. In addition, they can

99 Although this is predominantly orientated towards journalism, the use of entertainment style programmesshould also be considered, such as soap operas andother forms.




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serve to bring together a variety of media practitioners, such as journalists, editors andowners, thus facilitating the exchange of ideasand views over religious, political and ethnicdivides, thereby enhancing media professionalism through diversifyinginformation sources and knowledge. In this

regard, media outlets should also seek to reflectdiversity in terms of regional, ethnic, politicaland religious composition of society.

Summary of Findings - Despiteinflammatory reporting during previous periods of overt conflict, current professionalstandards in the three provinces appear to bereasonable when considered vis-à-vis theregional media environments andunderdeveloped access to opportunities andresources. The increasing presence of nationalmedia groups and inclusion of local outlets has

also served to heighten professionalism in localmedia institutions. However, the use of advanced professional skills, such as conflictsensitive journalism and investigative journalism, appears limited. Moreover,knowledge about conflict related topics and theability to tackle them in a constructive manner remain insufficient.

There have been a number of trainingactivities in Maluku, North Maluku andCentral Sulawesi on peace journalism (alsoreferred to as conflict sensitive reporting)

during the years, to a degree whereconsiderable duplication can be noted.Repetition in these activities has beenheightened by the attendance of the same‘elite’ journalists at the different trainings. As aresult, many of the more experienced andsenior journalists have a relatively goodknowledge of what this style of reportingentails and how it should be conducted.However, these skills are apparentlynevertheless little-used in the local media. Inspecific, this seems to be because of five main

obstacles:! Applicability to Local Context:Although many of the training activitieshave been conducted by well-versed proficient individuals, often from outside of Indonesia, they have often not beenadequately grounded in local reality. Thetheoretical nature of such activities havemade them difficult to apply to localcircumstances where media practitioner may

not have the breadth of experience toautomatically interpret them. In addition,although this could be gained throughfollow-up activities whereby the trainer liaises with the local journalists and provides practical assistance in applying such skills,this has regularly not been the case.

! Resources and Opportunity: Althoughmany media practitioners, from journalists toeditors, express an interest in practicing‘peace journalism’, it seems that workplacerealities significantly restrict this. This is because the production of peace journalismrequires additional time and resources, bothin terms of undertaking the necessaryresearch and having the funds to travel toand report from conflict-affectedcommunities. Moreover, in circumstanceswhere an editor or journalist has received

training, whilst the other has not, this maycreate purposefully obstructive or inadvertent resistance to the practice of newskills.

! Access to Information: In combinationwith the point above, the media aresubstantially dependent on the authorities to provide information. However, whether inadvertently or not, the local governmentand security forces often pursue restrictiveand cumbersome information policieshindering efficient and timely access (seefollowing section).

! Centralised and Self-Censored EditorialPolicy: A number of local media arecentrally owned by Jakarta-based mediacompanies. Although this provides access toresources and training, the editorial policiesof the local media are sometimes hemmed in by the interests of these companies.Although no overt editorial control washighlighted, this nevertheless can favour notupsetting the status quo, as well as ensuringcommercial success. Furthermore, self-censorship also appears to be exercised bythe local media regarding sensitive issues(see following section).

! Safety Concerns: Although few media professionals were reportedly injured or killed during the violence, some understandcontinued to feel threatened by the prospectof reporting from unfamiliar surroundings inareas where opposing communities reside(see following section).




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Although during the conflict period allthree provinces experienced degrees of inflammatory reporting, mainly due toinadequate professional skills and poor isolation from prevalent opinions in the localcommunities, the majority now appear to haveadopted editorial policies aimed at avoiding an

inadvertent repetition of such reporting. This in practice has led to self-censorship on a number of key topics necessary for conflict resolutionand prevention, including what are referred toas SARA issues (ethnicity, religion, race andinter-community groups).

Potential Approaches - The potentialapproaches identified for developing professional skills and resources can be dividedinto (i) skills development, (ii) knowledgedevelopment and (iii) innovative reporting and publication techniques.

Skills Development:

1. Build upon the existing pool of expertise inconflict sensitive journalism throughaddressing obstacles to the practice of suchskills (Please note that the issues of resources,income generation, access to information,safety and self-censorship are also dealt with in previous and following activityrecommendations).

2. Establish activities and networks inadvanced journalism skills, such as

investigative journalism, for ‘elite’ media practitioners, utilising innovative reporting and publication techniques (as described below).

3. Provide training for those who have not been engaged in conflict sensitive journalism, preferably through feedback-based in-house processes, incorporating a training-of-trainerscomponent with a provincial partner where possible;

4. Assist media with establishing the balance between entertainment and news content, aswell as the use of entertainment formats for

addressing conflict related issues (please refer to the section on Supporting Community BasedCommunication - Civil Society Initiatives).

Knowledge Development:

1. Develop awareness and knowledge on keyconflict related topics (SARA issues) and provide skills and resources for reporting onthem in a professional and conflict reducing/ preventing manner (as described above).

2. Facilitate cross-cutting linkages to expertsources on other thematic areas beingaddressed by UNDP (including goodgovernance, access to justice, natural resources,local economic development, social cohesionand gender).

Innovative Reporting and Publication

Techniques:

1. Establish intra and inter-provincial teamreporting activities including all three provinces and crossing ethnic, religious andregional boundaries (in connection withknowledge and skills development activitiesoutlined above);

2. Facilitate ‘clever’ publication techniquesfor media outlets, particularly relating toinvestigative journalism (in connection withknowledge and skills development activitiesoutlined above);

3. When possible, promote religious, ethnicand gender diversity and plurality amongststaff in media outlets.

6.2.2 Institutional Capacity-Building

Specific Rationale - The range andscenarios in which support can be provided tomedia institutions and practitioners to facilitatethe production of professional journalism arenumerous. Such activities may seek to providefinancial and/or organisational assistance to

media institutions already having a positiveimpact on conflict reduction and prevention, or with the potential for having such an impact.The aim of such action is to overcomeobstacles and enhance access to those essentialresources that allow media practitioners toundertake their work in accordance with professional standards and practices.

In a post-conflict situation, externalassistance can create alternative mechanismsfor media production, relocate outlets andintroduce innovative working methodologies

more suited to post-conflict environments. Itmay also involve the provision of mediainfrastructure that has either been destroyed or forcibly removed, or core financial support toreplace lost revenue as a result of reducedadvertising or circulation. Furthermore, longer-term perspectives should also aim to strengthenincome generation and financial self-sustainability, thereby reducing dependency onexternal sources of income and practices such






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acting outside of formal professional ethicalcodes and structures.

The key to such interaction is ensuring thatthere are productive and mutually beneficialflows of information between these groups.Misunderstandings often obstruct suchinformation flows, hindering the ability of the

media to communicate an objective andaccurate picture, the importance of which is paramount for addressing conflict.Unobstructed flows of information can alsoopen up innovative avenues and methods for accessing objective and accurate informationand methods for reporting during times of conflict.


Specific Rationale - By supporting thecreation of a plural independent media

environment, choice and diversity are added tothe media landscape and information access isenhanced for the general public, particularly inisolated areas. In this regard, where the solemedia might be aligned to a political, religious,ethnic or economic interest, creatingsustainable plurality provides more voices and points of view, which in turn lessens the potential influence of a single outlet.

Furthermore, where ‘media vacuums’ existand the local population have no, or extremelylimited, access to objective, reliable andobjective information, rumour and gossip is leftunchallenged as the main form of informationdissemination. However, an intervention to filla media vacuum should not createunsustainable media outlets vis-à-vis realistic prospects within the marketplace. Suchinterventions should also not be at the expenseof existing professional media that might be ina position to expand dissemination and/or broadcast range.

Summary of Findings - In Maluku, North

Maluku and Central Sulawesi there are clear examples of low media plurality and diversityin conflict-affected areas, as well as ‘mediavacuums’ both existing before the conflict andcreated as a result of it. Although many have been, or are being, addressed (as per the currentUNDP activities in Maluku being implemented by the Media Development Loan Fund) anumber of key areas continue to remain in thesame situation. As examples in Tentena inCentral Sulawesi there is very limited access to

professional media, whilst in Tobelo in NorthMaluku there is only one irregular localnewspaper and one entertainment-based localradio station.

Potential Approaches – In areas wherethere is poor access to professional media,assistance to be provided to facilitate existing

local independent professional media to extendtheir coverage to incorporate these areas, or where this is not possible, to establishindependent outlets in these areas (in thisregard consideration should be given tocommunity radio and TV, utilising existing broadcast legislation on community broadcasters). Promote diversity and pluralityin those existing local professional mediaaccessible in isolated areas.


Specific Rationale - The media does not actalone in society, but forms a part of the larger community. In this context, interaction between the media and other civil societyactors, whether they be academia, civil rightsgroups or NGO’s, is important for developing a broad understanding of key dynamics andissues, as well as being able to reflect diversityin reporting.

Dialogue and interaction with local andcentral government, as well as security forces,is helpful for media communities in conflict-affected areas, in particular to further access toinformation. This can serve to create greater understanding of the roles and needs of themedia, as well as pre-empt or reverserestrictions imposed by the authorities.

Summary of Findings - Access toinformation from local government in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi appearssomewhat restricted. Although this is notalways apparently a result of purposefulobstruction, the use of ‘one door’ information

policies results in bottlenecks and insufficientinformation reaching the media. In all the provinces, local government have informationofficers (Biro Infokom), but channels betweenthem and the media are not always fluid. Thesame situation was found for the securityforces.

One of the key reasons found amongstauthorities for not providing information was poor professionalism amongst the media and




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their assumed inability to accurately andresponsibly convey news, as well as thecontinuing institutional culture amongst civilservants of avoiding putting information in the public domain. For obvious reasons, it wasassessed that the legislative branches of localgovernment were more open to exchanges with

the media.The national news agency – Antara - also

provides national information. However, at the provincial level it was found that media did notusually directly subscribe, although they didaccess information through the Antara website(www.antara.co.id).

Linkages between civil society andacademia were seemingly more productive,although information flows were alsoapparently somewhat limited. Moreover,relations between the international aid

community and local media do not alwaysappear productive, due to media perceptionsthat these organisations were not forthcomingwith information, and perceptions amongst theinternational community that reporting is of low professional quality and often inaccurate.

Potential Approaches - The kinds of work that could support primary source-mediainformation flows include:

1. Engage local executive and legislative branches of the government and security forces

in developing mutually beneficial informationflows;

2. Raise awareness amongst the media aboutrights regarding information access, as well as professional techniques for accessing andinterpreting information (including the use of new information technologies, such as Internetand SMS);

3. Facilitate linkages between civil societyand academia with the media for the moreeffective flows of information, as well asutilisation of experts (other than just the

authorities) as sources of information andresource persons for quotation or inclusion in broadcasts.

6.4 Supporting Community-Based

Communication

Overall Rationale - In conflict situations,information is the basis for the coordination of humanitarian assistance and public

communication of messages aimed at reducingand preventing conflict. Vulnerable populations need accurate and timelyinformation in order to function and survive inthe new conditions created by conflict.However, it is during conflict that informationoften becomes confused, both in terms of

knowledge about what assistance can besought, as well as what is happening in theconflict. The lack of such information fuelsinsecurity and tensions, leading to the prevalence of rumour and unsubstantiatedinformation, which is often inflammatory andinaccurate. In this regard, the communicationof accurate, reliable and objective informationcan serve to reduce fears and the perceivedneed to take pre-emptive action in self-defence.

Based on the same logic, publiccommunication is equally applicable in post-

conflict periods when underlying conflict-inducing tensions remain and knowledgeabout, as well as understanding of, other communities is limited. As outlined in theDFID ‘Working with the Media in Conflictsand other Emergencies’ publication:

‘Mass media can help to deliver a flow of objective and accurate news and comment to

people caught up in conflicts. This provides

communities with a basis on which to take

decisions in response to the crisis affecting them. Objective reporting can also counter

propaganda and hate messages which fuel

conflict’.100

6.4.1 Community Forums

Specific Rationale - A number of importantcommunication channels exist outside of themainstream and alternative mass media that areinfluential information and communicationmediums at the local community level. Suchforums often play a central role in determiningopinions and offer the perspective of receivinginformation through a local trusted source.These channels also often bring the added

weight of tradition and/or deep-seated beliefs,which the mainstream and alternative medianormally cannot achieve. As such, local forumsare powerful and influential tools for communication. However, unlike the

100 ‘Working with the Media in Conflicts and other Emergencies’ p. 18 (Conflict and HumanitarianAffairs Department and Social DevelopmentDepartment, DFID, September 2000)




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mainstream and alternative media,communication through such channels also bring complex socio-religious connotations andnuances and are therefore not as readilyinterpretable for those outside the localcommunity.

Summary of Findings - Traditional

community forums exist in Maluku, NorthMaluku and Central Sulawesi, both throughorganised religion and long-standingcommunal practices and ceremonies. Asoutlined in the province specific sections, theseinclude local discussion forums led bytraditional community leaders, religiousceremonies and teachings, conflict resolutionceremonies, gatherings to mark significantoccasions, and so forth. Amongst other functions, such forums are used to spreadinformation and engage in community

dialogue and consensual decision-making.Moreover, they are also used for preaching andcommunicating set messages often based onlongstanding community or religious doctrine.

Potential Approaches - The kinds of work that could support community forums include:

1. Community and religious leaders to beengaged in dialogue with local authorities andnational and international project partners onthe use of traditional media for conflictresolution and prevention;

2. Community and religious leaders to be provided with tools for interpreting andcommunicating on conflict related issues,including knowledge development on keyconflict-inducing issues;

3. Where applicable, traditional and non-conventional media to be linked withmainstream and alternative media;

4. Community and religious leaders to be brought into broader processes and advise ondevelopment and implementation of conflictresolution and prevention activities.

6.4.2 Arts, Music and Literature

Specific Rationale - Both contemporaryand traditional music, arts and literature play aninfluential role on communities. These mayderive from popular culture at the nationallevel or from long-standing local traditions. InMaluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesimusic and dance are predominantly used as aform of entertainment, which itself are

channels for communication. Likewise, artsand literature also entail either explicit or implicit messages that may have societalimplications, including conflict resolution based upon subjects such as social tolerance,harmonious communal relations and humansuffering as a result of conflict.

Summary of Findings - In all three provinces, contemporary and traditional music,arts and literature deriving from both the localand national levels play an important role insocial interaction. In particular, music andassociated forms of dance provide commonground for communities to come together,thereby facilitating inter-community relationsand building trust and mutual awareness. Localand national artists also carry influence and anumber are seemingly well-disposed to usingtheir talents for the purpose of further

community relations and addressing conflict.

Potential Approaches - The kinds of work include:

1. Local and national traditional andcontemporary artists, musicians and writersshould be assisted in using their talents toaddress conflict related issues;

2. Music and art festivals and events should be supported addressing conflict issues and providing forums for communities to cometogether based upon common interests and

appreciations.

6.4.3 Civil Society Initiatives

Specific Rationale - Organised civil society plays a strong role in alternative media. Inaddressing specific issues of interest or providing forms of grass-root communication,it is civil society that is often best placed towork with local communities. Moreover, civilsociety also has the potential to identify andaddress subjects as they arise. Although suchinitiatives normally have preset agendas and

are designed to communicate specificmessages, they offer ideal platforms for communication, with the additional strength of bringing local commitment and participation

Summary of Findings - A number of local,national and international civil society and non-governmental initiatives are ongoing inMaluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi.Some of these have been formed as a result of the conflict with the aim of avoiding the re-




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emergence of violence and have utilisedalternative communication techniques tospread their messages amongst localcommunities. These include publications, posters and public dialogue forums, as well asmore developed tools that often useentertainment based mediums as conduits such

as generic soap operas and inter-active learningcomics for children. These latter activities areoften undertaken either directly by, or conjunction with, an international partner.

Potential Approaches – Approaches tosupport civil society initiatives include:

1. Whilst avoiding duplication, supportshould be provided to existing civil society andnon-governmental information andcommunication initiatives that have proveneffective thus far such as magazines, comics,radio soap operas, media centres, and so forth;

2. Civil society and non-governmentalinformation and communication initiatives thatare supported should be assisted to ensure thatthey are:

! Specifically grounded to localcircumstances and reflect local realties;

! Disseminated as effectively and widelyas is possible;

! Inter-active and allow for incorporationof feedback from communities;

! Linked to other civil society initiatives

both within and between provinces toensure coordination and sharing of lessonslearnt and development of best practices.

3. Assistance with developing institutionaland financial sustainability for civil society andnon-governmental information andcommunication initiatives.

4. When undertaken in conjunction withactivities, poster and flyers should be producedaimed at both public display and for use as‘decoration’ in private homes.

6.5 Considerations for ImplementationThe following issues are raised for

consideration:

1. Activities in the provinces need to be‘mirrored’ in Jakarta, thereby providing a local,regional and national context (and internationalif appropriate). This approach is particularlyrelevant when addressing media policy issuesand engaging national media, as well as local

media owned by or included in national medianetworks and companies.

2. In order that those supported ininterventions can use the skills and knowledgegained during the activities, the preparationstages of projects must entail carefullyorientated and separate approaches to

journalists, editors and owners/publishers, asall three groups are crucial for the successfulutilisation of training and other forms of support. To address only one of these groupscan mean that there is not a generalunderstanding within a media outletconcerning the benefits to be gained. As an oft-seen example, journalists who receive trainingmay not be able to use their new skills, becauseeditorial staff are either unaware of, or hostileto, the news-gathering or reporting concepts being introduced.

3. Long-term inter-active activities areessential for reinforcing skills learnt andresources provided, whilst in contrast‘parachute training’ often leaves little lastingimpact. Furthermore, skills development andtraining must be grounded in the local contextin order that participants find them practicallyapplicable to their local needs.

4. Accurate audience research needs to beundertaken to establish the balance betweenTV and radio in urban and rural areas.

5. When possible, activities should not start

new media outlets as the marketplace for revenue generation is already tight.Internationally funded institutions mighttherefore force existing committed individualsout of the media. In this regard, support should be channelled through those that have alreadyshown a serious commitment in conflict prevention and resolution in their localcommunities.

6. Regarding media centres, although theMaluku Media Centre (MMC) presents a positive model for such activities, caution is

expressed about trying to reproduce suchfacilitates in North Maluku and CentralSulawesi. Ambon presents a uniqueenvironment where the opposing communitiesare in close proximity and the city potentiallyhas a large enough centralised mediacommunity to sustain the Centre. In this regard,the MMC should continue to be supported.However, the effectiveness and sustainabilityof such a media centre could be more




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problematic in the other provinces and mightalso undermine the current donor-basedfunding for the MMC. Furthermore, thenetworking and resource benefits derivingfrom a media centre can be achieved throughother mechanisms, as outlined in the activityrecommendations.

7. Involvement by the public service media(RRI) in the activities should be supported.However, the activities should not seek toengage in the transformation of RRI from astate to a public service broadcaster, which is asubstantive programme to be addressed in itsown right.

8. Information and communication isunlikely to develop core journalism skills or have lasting capacity-building impact on thewider media community’s ability to professionally address the potentially sensitive

issues about which they write and broadcast.Media development aims to solidify the longer-term role of the media in its function as the‘fourth estate’. In this manner, the long-termability of the media to perform conflict prevention and resolution roles as an‘automatic’ function of its professionalism,without the requirement of externalinterventions or funding, should ideally derivefrom the creation of stable and strong mediaenvironments, skills and resources.

9. Information and communication activities

that address urgent conflict-related issues cansometimes create inertia. Such activities buildthe expectation that the local media will be paid to address urgent conflict-inducing issues,thus undermining self-initiative to take action,as to do so might deny potential income.101 Onthe other hand, such activities also providevaluable sources of income to independentmedia in underdeveloped economic markets.

101 It is often the local media that first observe tensionsrising and are therefore in a position to take action first.




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ANNEXES




Documents

The Role of Media in Conflict Resolution