The role of property rights in the development of New Zealand's seafood industry

*Corresponding author. Tel.: #64-3-546-9175 ext 805; fax:#64-3-546-3329.

E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Bess).

Marine Policy 24 (2000) 331}339

The role of property rights in the development of New Zealand'sseafood industry

Randall Bess!,*, Michael Harte"!School of Business, Nelson Polytechnic, Private Bag 19, Nelson, New Zealand

"New Zealand Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24-901, Wellington, New Zealand

Received 26 January 2000; accepted 22 February 2000

Abstract

Since the establishment of New Zealand's quota management system in 1986 both property rights and institutional arrangementsfor managing wild "sheries and marine farming have continued to mature. Changes strengthening the commercial "sheries rights haveencouraged individual transferable quota owners and marine farmers to voluntarily organise into associations to better manage"sheries resources. These associations are placing increasing emphasis on the co-management of the productive capacity of the marineecosystems. However, barriers remain to the widespread uptake of co-management arrangements, such as poorly de"ned rights fornon-commercial "shers and marine farmers and/or poor integration of these rights with the management of wild "sheries, andlegislative in#exibility and inappropriate political and bureaucratic intervention. Recognising these problems, the New ZealandGovernment recently released `Fishing for the Futurea, an independent review of "sheries legislation and its administration. Thereview recommended a fundamental change from centrally managed "sheries to co-managed "sheries. This paper reviews theNew Zealand experience with property rights-based management of "sheries and explores the present and future role of propertyrights on the co-management of New Zealand's "sheries. ( 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Property rights; Integration of Rights; Individual transferable quota; Co-management; New Zealand

1. Introduction

Recurrent crises in "sheries management worldwidehave led to an almost universal call to review criticallythe public policy basis of government-centred manage-ment of "sheries resources [1}4]. The challenge for any"sheries policy and management system is to determineand enforce harvest levels that will sustain "sh stocks andaccess rights to "sheries. However, most nations continueto face problems related to overcapacity in "sheries, suchas declining catch-per-unit-e!ort, excessive competitionand overcapitalisation. Relying on input controls such aslicensing, season length and gear restriction, "sheriesmanagers have generally failed to prevent the overexploi-tation of "sh populations. New Zealand's "sheries man-agement system is arguably an exception. The adoptionin 1986 of a property rights-based quota management

system (QMS) based on individual transferable quota(ITQ) has lessened the ecological consequences of theincentive for "shers to race for "sh [5].

Since the establishment of the QMS both propertyrights and institutional arrangements for managing NewZealand's "sheries have continued to mature. In so doingthe seafood industry has been encouraged to voluntarilyorganise into associations to better manage "sheries re-sources. These associations are placing increasing em-phasis on co-managing the productive capacity of marineecosystems, however, barriers remain to the widespreaduptake of co-management arrangements.

A recent independent review of "sheries legislation andits administration commissioned by the New ZealandGovernment found that it was questionable whetherNew Zealand's QMS allowed the ecological and eco-nomic potential inherent in the management system to befully realised [6]. This paper argues that rather than reston laurels of questionable validity, New Zealand shouldalso heed the call to re-evaluate its "sheries managementsystem and look to enhance rights-based management byempowering "shers to take greater responsibility for

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"sheries decision-making, implementation and enforce-ment. For New Zealand's ITQ and non-ITQ "sheries toreach their ecological and economic potential, someproperty rights issues must be resolved.

This paper is divided into four major sections. The "rstsection describes the role of property rights in naturalresource and "sheries management. The second sectionoutlines co-management, a management alternative thatis attracting growing interest throughout the world. Thethird section describes New Zealand's QMS and thelargest non-ITQ segment, the marine farming industry.The last section discusses the future management of NewZealand's "sheries and suggests changes to the manage-ment of wild "sheries and marine farming to strengthentheir rights and responsibilities.

2. The nature of property rights

Sustainable management of natural resources is de-"ned as `meet[ing] the needs of the present withoutcompromising the ability of future generations to meettheir own needsa [7, p. 393]. Property rights is a funda-mental issue in the sustainable management of naturalresources. Property rights are essentially bundles ofrights to use or transfer resources. There are four types:open access, private property, communal property, andstate property. Feeny et al. [8] de"ne these four types.Open access is the absence of well-de"ned propertyrights, with access unregulated and open to everyone.Private property indicates the right to exclude othersfrom using a resource, and the right to regulate a re-source is vested in an individual or group. Communalproperty refers to the right to a resource held by anidenti"able community or groups of interdependentusers. State property indicates that the right to a resourceis vested exclusively in government, which determinesaccess to resources and the level and nature of exploita-tion. Each type of property right, except open access,o!ers a solution to the eventual problems of overexploi-tation and degradation of resources [9].

In e!ect, any management system that is not openaccess is a form of private property rights where some areexcluded from access to the resource. The question mustbe asked who belongs to those groups with certain rightsand duties towards the resource [10]? The greatest chal-lenge in the sustainable management of "sheries is toresolve the issue of the role of property rights [11].

Property rights can be applied to "sheries in severalways. Fishing quota can be allocated to communities orgroups by way of community development quotas orterritorial use rights, with both leading to collective ac-tions to manage "sh stocks. Quota can be allocated toindividuals (IQ), which de"nes who can access a "sheryand what right a person has to a quantity of the totalallowable commercial catch (TACC). Allocation of IQ is

theoretically intended to transform "shers' behaviourfrom that of hunters to farmers of the "sh stocks [12].When `the race for "sha is over through the allocation ofIQ, "shers then have an incentive to increase the pro"tmade on the quota caught by reducing costs and produ-cing valuable products [13]. Individual transferablequota (ITQ) is promoted as leading to more economi-cally viable "sheries since market mechanisms are al-lowed to operate, leading to a more e$cient "t between"shing capacity and available "sh stocks [1]. Hannesson[13, p. 126] views ITQ as `incentive-compatibleawith "shers and "shing "rms. Hence, both should worktogether to maximise returns on quota through e$cientuse and processing of information. However, Townsend[14] concludes that ITQ creates strong incentives for"shers to fail to report landings. According to Annala[15, p. 53], `Reliable estimates of illegal catch arenotoriously di$cult to obtain and New Zealand is noexceptiona. ITQ does not prevent some competitive be-haviour among "shers since vessels can still race to "ndthe "sh or to take up positions in preferred "shinggrounds [16].

An ITQ quota holder who is able to sneak a littleextra catch bene"ts directly in the short-term, whilethe long-term consequences (a somewhat reducedstock size due to a somewhat increased "shingmortality) are spread across all quota holders. Inaddition, "shers often tend to trade o! the certaintyof the present against the uncertainty of the future(meaning that they have high discount rates). Suchuncertainties may be large; for example, uncertain-ties about future abundance and distribution of theresource, future stock assessment "ndings, real oranticipated changes in government leaders or gov-ernment policy, concern about continued physicalability to participate in "sheries, and fear of pos-sible downturns in market demands and prices[11, p. 16].

Copes [17, p. 288] concludes that the advocates ofindividual private property have perhaps placed toomuch emphasis on the property right aspect. `The rightsto the "sh stock bestowed by the individual quota* even in the form of ITQ * are still far from fullyspeci"ed property rightsa. Without resource users havingconcurrent responsibility to manage the resource there isno guarantee that private property rights alone will insti-tute sustainable resource use [1]. Any property rights-based regime, including ITQ, is only a starting point for"sheries management.

Copes [17, p. 290] concludes that we should not bedogmatic in our choice of "sheries management systemsand that we should select that combination of availablemanagement devices `that is most bene"cial and leastde"cient in any particular set of circumstances. Above all,we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the best

332 R. Bess, M. Harte / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 331}339

possible solutions will still be #aweda. Accordingly,Townsend [14] states that essentially all forms of govern-ment-centred management systems have been expensiveto administer and enforce, especially when "shers believethat "sheries managers neither understand nor sympath-ise with the views of "shers [18]. Harding [19] arguesthat the New Zealand QMS led to the seafood industryexperiencing a rapid increase in government-imposedregulation, which will eventually lead to a level ofbureaucratisation that impedes the system's intended e$-ciency gains. In many cases, "shers demand participationin decision-making because they have lost faith in "she-ries managers' ability to solve problems, pointing outtheir lack of adequate data and incidents where "sheriesmanagement has exacerbated problems [20].

Mace [11] concludes that the most e!ective institu-tional arrangement will most likely involve shared man-agement of "sheries resources, with the balance betweengovernment and user control varying with each "shery.Sandberg [21] proposes that for a property rights regimeto work, it must have an incentive structure that balancesthe rights of "shers to harvest "sh stocks and their dutiestowards maintaining productive "sh stocks and support-ing those social structures associated with the "shingindustry. Without a balance or `correspondencea be-tween rights and duties "sheries management institutionswill fail due to a lack of legitimacy.

3. Co-management

Proponents of `co-managementa see it as a manage-ment alternative having the most potential to address"sheries problems including the provision of incentivestructures that balance the rights of "shers to harvest "shstocks. There is no widely accepted de"nition of co-management. Jentoft et al. [1, pp. 423 and 424] de"neco-management as `the collaborative and participatoryprocess of regulatory decision-making among represen-tatives of user-groups, government agencies and researchinstitutionsa. Co-management works by altering the rela-tionships among the actors in the "shery, primarily"shers and government, and striking a balance betweenthe needs of local groups for self-determination and gov-ernments' need to have assurance that "sh stocks are wellmanaged [20]. Co-management institutionalises shareddecision-making among various resource users, settingup a game in which the pay-o!s are greater for co-operation and long-term planning than for oppositionand/or competition [22]. However, co-management af-fects more than potential pay-o!s for resource users. It ismore than an incentive structure or set of rules imposedon resource users.

It [co-management] is a social system that changesthe nature of the game, the relationships between

players and what each of them strives for. Co-man-agement means an ongoing collaborative and com-municative process, where resource users and otheractors are in an entrepreneurial and creative role[1, p. 426].

Co-management is not dependent on any particulartype of property rights regime, excluding open access,however, implementing ITQ is an important step towardforming "shery groups [16]. A fundamental attraction ofco-management is that property rights are more e!ectivein sustaining "sh stocks when they re#ect the joint inter-ests of a community of users instead of individuals[23,24]. It is reasonable to expect co-management tomediate con#icting demands of di!erent groups `givena genuine commitment to the management of "sheries bya co-partnership of local knowledge, experience and ex-pertise on the one hand and state enforcement on theother, 2a [25, p. 201].

Assuming that a government has already converted"shers' catches into explicit annual numerical entitle-ments, such as ITQ, the "rst question to ask is, `whataspects of "shing can self-governing groups actuallycontrol? The answer is: almost everything 2 exceptmeasures or regulations to protect the size of the stock byrestricting e!ort or the catcha [16, p. 189]. According toPinkerton [20, p. 8], `sharing responsibility for enhance-ment is an excellent starting point for more comprehens-ive co-managementa, and once new relationships areestablished it is easier to extend co-operation to other"sheries management functions. Co-management showspromise in solving several "sheries policy problems andhas the potential to:

f promote conservation and enhancement of "sh stocks,f improve the quality of data and data analysis,f reduce excessive investments by "shermen in competi-

tive gear,f make allocation of "shing opportunities more equi-

table,f promote community economic development, andf reduce con#ict between government and "shermen,

and con#ict among "shermen's groups [20, p. 4].

However, "shers and "sheries managers typically have anantagonistic relationship since "shers often view "sheriesmanagers as distant, impersonal, insensitive bureaucrats[1], and "sheries managers view "shers as desiring todecimate "sh stocks for short-term gain [20]. It followsthat the proposal of co-management could be viewed bybureaucrats as a threat to their authority and legitimacy,although "sheries management institutions are often "l-led with inertia and unable to meet challenges broughton by resource #uctuations and crises [26]. This hascertainly been the case in New Zealand where regulatoryin#exibility has inhibited the development of "sheries'full economic and biological potential. A co-operative

R. Bess, M. Harte / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 331}339 333

approach to "sheries management would, therefore,appear highly unlikely without fundamental reassess-ment of "shers' and "sheries managers' rights to in#uence"sheries policy.

4. Rights-based 5sheries management in New Zealand

The QMS and allocation of ITQ was introduced inNew Zealand with the Fisheries Amendment Act 1986.This represented a radical departure from previous "she-ries management regimes. Detailed descriptions of themanagement of New Zealand's "sheries and of eventsleading up to the introduction of property rights-basedmanagement can be found in Sharp [3], Ga!ney [27]and Harding [19]. The seven founding aims of the QMS[28] were to:

f rebuild inshore "sheries where required and ensurethat catches were limited to levels that could be sus-tained over the long term,

f ensure that catches were harvested e$ciently withmaximum bene"t to the industry and to New Zealand,

f allocate catch entitlements equitably based on indi-vidual permit holder's commitment to the "shery,

f integrate management of inshore and o!shore "she-ries,

f develop a management system applicable on both na-tional and regional bases, and

f enhance the recreational "shery.

The QMS as introduced in the Fisheries AmendmentAct 1986 was initially viewed by most in the industry asa relatively simple and workable management system.However, the 1986 Act retained several aspects of theFisheries Act 1983, including the Ministry of Agricultureand Fisheries, now the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish),retaining the power to impose various input controlssuch as restrictions on "shing gear, "shing methods,landings, "sh size, "shing seasons, and "shing areas.These input controls were still required for managementof non-ITQ species. The traditional input controls imple-mented under "sheries management plans (FMPs), asrequired under the Fisheries Act 1983, contradicted thebasis of ITQ where quota owners are able to determinethe most e$cient timing and means of catching theirquota. Under FMPs, however, a TACC managed in partwith input controls could potentially impinge on quotaowners' rights as created by the QMS. The need to rundual management systems leads to inconsistencies inmanagement practice, and makes it more di$cult toachieve the QMS' intended degree of e$ciency and co-ordination [29].

Since the introduction of the QMS, the system hasbeen revised continually, requiring substantial time ande!ort by the MFish and the industry to implement legis-lation and policy changes. The relatively simple QMS

has become complex, bureaucratic and expensive tomanage while the industry requests that "sheries man-agement be simpli"ed. The industry contends that theincreasing complexity and bureaucracy of the QMS hasimposed unnecessary "nancial costs on individual "shersand "shing "rms, and has not provided the industryoverall with corresponding bene"ts [30]. Although theindustry supports the purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996to `provide for the utilisation of "sheries resources whileensuring sustainabilitya, several issues remain unresol-ved. One issue is that the Fisheries Act 1996 lacks anyreference to aquaculture or marine farming.

However, there is general recognition that the QMShas played a signi"cant role in improving the biologicalstatus of the "sheries resource and commercial return to"shers [5]. Since implementation of the QMS, the indus-try has experienced steady and impressive growth in thevolume and value of production. The surprising rates ofgrowth experienced during the late 1980s and early 1990swas due primarily to the expansion of the deepwater"sheries. Between 1986 and 1989 the value of seafoodexports increased by an astonishing rate of 69.3 percent.After a slight decline in the levels of production and valuein 1990, again the seafood industry experienced dramaticgrowth. Between 1990 and 1992 the value of seafoodexports increased 65.5 percent. Since 1992 overall sea-food export value has remained fairly constant. In 1998export value was $1.237 billion, only $18 million higherthan the 1992 export value. The gradual appreciation ofthe New Zealand dollar from 1992 to 1997 exacerbatedpoor international trading conditions and reduced re-turns to seafood "rms. During this time catch levelsdeclined due to reductions in some TACCs [31]. Withoutthe outstanding growth in marine farming exports, parti-cularly GreenshellTM mussels, overall seafood exportvalue and volume would have declined beginning 1992.Fig. 1 outlines New Zealand's seafood export value andvolume from 1986 to 1998.

The strengths and weaknesses of New Zealand's QMSis well documented in "sheries management literature[32}36]. New Zealand's QMS stands out from othernations since New Zealand initially applied ITQ to themajority of commercially caught species. Iceland andNew Zealand remain the only two nations that haveimplemented ITQ comprehensively. Today New Zea-land's QMS has over 180 "sh stocks present in 10 QuotaManagement Areas covering 40 species out of 100 speciescaught commercially. This represents over 85 percent ofthe total known "sh catch in the 200-mile exclusiveeconomic zone. It is the MFish's intention to bringmore "sh stocks under the control of the QMS overthe next two to three years and eventually place allcommercially caught species under the QMS. However,the QMS and allocation of ITQ is less suitable to marinefarming since it does not have a "xed output as does wild"sheries.


Fig. 1. New Zealand seafood exports by volume and value.

4.1. New Zealand 's marine farming industry

The volume and value of marine farming exports haveimproved dramatically from 1988 to 1998. Fig. 2 outlinesthe volume of exports from marine farming, and Fig. 3outlines the value of exports. As mentioned, most of thegrowth in marine farming has been driven by the out-standing success of the GreenshellTM mussel, which hassurpassed the rate of growth of all other seafood exports.From 1988 to 1998 GreenshellTM mussel export volumeincreased by 473 percent, and export value increased by413 percent. In 1998 GreenshellTM mussels became thesecond highest valued seafood export species. The exportvolume of New Zealand's farmed salmon also grewsteadily from 1988 to 1996, but the export value grew ata lower rate. Salmon prices on world markets declined asrecord growth in farmed salmon, particularly from Nor-way and Chile, substantially increased availability [31].Farmed oysters increased in export value from $4 millionin 1988 to $8 million in 1992 and then remained fairlyconstant at $10}$11 million from 1994 to 1998. Thevolume of farmed oyster exports increased steadily from734 tonnes in 1988 to a high of 1436 tonnes in 1995.

The increases in export volume and value are attribu-table to the investments made over the previous yearsand collective e!orts that have brought about severalinnovations in farming, harvesting, processing, market-ing and farm management techniques. For example, theGreenshellTM mussel sector has co-ordinated its collec-tive e!orts on issues such as the development of (1) anenvironmental policy and code of practice that helpsensure reductions in pollution and improved water qual-ity in coastal areas, (2) export market studies that assistindustry players to enter or expand overseas markets,and (3) a portfolio of research projects that ensures rel-evant research is carried out with industry support. TheGreenshellTM mussel sector, like the wild "sheries sector,has established links with New Zealand and interna-tional research institutions. The Mussel Industry Councilhas played a critical role in bringing together industry

players to collaborate on issues relevant to their long-term competitiveness in international markets. In addi-tion, the Biotoxin Management Programme, which wasa response to the "rst marine biotoxin outbreak during1992}1993, showed the prompt response by the marinefarming industry and the Government to ensure thatcon"dence remained high [31].

Marine farming ventures have expanded signi"cantly,in terms of both individual and collective e!orts. How-ever, recent issues have focused attention on coastal areasat the top of the South Island, where the majority ofmarine farming occurs, as well as some ITQ "sheries.These issues include: (1) the local government havingestablished a 3 nautical-mile exclusion zone for somebays which prohibits marine farming within the zone;(2) the recent claims that Lyprinol, which is made frommussel extract, may cure some cancers, which has led toa #urry of marine farm applications, in addition to theapplications submitted for expansion of the current mar-ine farming industry; (3) local residents and environ-mental groups opposing expansion of marine farming inthe area; and (4) local Maori tribes having "led a legalclaim to ownership of the seabed and foreshore. Theseissues have elicited a review of the current process forgranting access to the coastal seabed and water column.The current process includes the granting of a coastalpermit under the Resource Management Act 1991(RMA) for the right to coastal space for marine struc-tures, and a "sheries permit under the Fisheries Act 1983which is required to manage the marine stock. Neitherthe RMA nor the 1983 Act allow for right of renewal or"rst right of refusal. Under the joint RMA and FisheriesAct regime, coastal consents and marine farming permitsare able to be granted for a period of up to 35 years. Inpractice, however, consents for occupancy are generallygranted for much shorter periods than the maxi-mum allowed and marine farming permits matchedaccordingly.

The above issues in combination with the review of theprocess for granting access to the seabed and water


Fig. 2. Volume of exports from the New Zealand marine farming industry.

Fig. 3. Value of exports from the New Zealand marine farming industry.

column bring considerable uncertainty for the marinefarming industry. Understandably, the industry has ex-perienced di$culty in securing investment "nancing.The marine farming industry continues to work towardslegislation reform, and until its property rights are de-"ned and established, which includes determination ofcurrent and proposed coastal space occupation andstructures, the industry's growth prospects will remainuncertain.

5. Managing New Zealand:s 5sheries for the future

Despite its overall success, New Zealand's "sheriesmanagement system is failing to ful"l its potential toprovide for pro"table and sustainable "sheries. On theone hand, the MFish is still equipped with a full range of"sheries regulatory mechanisms but is increasingly reluc-tant to employ them without consensus support fromproperty rights holders. On the other hand, ITQ ownersand marine farmers face increasingly strong incentives tomanage their own a!airs but lack the legitimacy to makerules, collect funds, and purchase management servicesexcept on a totally voluntary basis. To gain the fullpotential bene"ts of New Zealand's marine resources,there is a need for changes in the approach taken towards"sheries management, starting with a change in attitudefor some "sheries managers, ITQ owners and marine

farmers. Fisheries managers generally pay too much at-tention to "sheries biology while rarely acknowledginga "shery's economic factors and its social dimension.While many ITQ owners and marine farmers are inclinedto criticise MFish's handling of their "sheries, too manyremain reluctant to take up additional authority andresponsibility for the management of their "sheries.However, the reluctance among ITQ owners and marinefarmers continues to diminish while bureaucratic ob-stacles to change remain in place. There is growing recog-nition within the industry that the management of NewZealand's "sheries needs to move away from a central-ised, bureaucratic regime to one that:

f promotes the economic viability of "shing relative toother productive sectors, and simultaneously ensuressustainability of the "shery resource; and

f facilitates an increasingly positive relationship be-tween property rights holders and "sheries managers,leading to mutually bene"cial outcomes.

For this transition to occur, the MFish must devolveadditional rights, responsibility and authority for "she-ries management to resource users and local and regionalcommunities. The development of wild "sheries and thesecurity of tenure that now permeates ITQ providesa framework for devolving "sheries management func-tions. Scott [16], in particular, argues that the allocationof ITQ in a "shery overcomes many of the obstacles to


devolved management approaches.

In many "sheries the ITQ will be less a new instru-ment of regulation, less a kind of individualproperty right, than a membership card in a self-governing "shery group. Compared to the old scat-tered voluntary inshore groups, this new type willhave access to information, will indeed produce ititself. It need not be homogenous, for its distribu-tional problems will be largely resolved by the priordistribution of ITQs [16, p. 197].

5.1. Government's role in xsheries co-management

As mentioned, the Fisheries Act 1996 de"nes the roleof central government in "sheries as providing for the`utilisation of "sheries resources while ensuring sustaina-bilitya. In practice, this should include:

f establishing the rules and regulations that enablesuccessful and sustainable "shing activity,

f ensuring that "sheries harvesting rights are clear, ap-propriate and enforceable,

f transferring management responsibilities to "sheriesrights holders,

f co-ordinating collection and provision of informationto "sheries stakeholders, and

f ensuring the e!ectiveness of management frameworksand systems, including setting standards for "sheriesmanagement plans, monitoring and auditing the per-formance of "sheries management plans, and prosecu-ting o!enders who break the law.

While the Government has taken steps toward ful"llingthis role, further resolution is required to ensure thatsome harvest rights are clear and appropriate. In addi-tion, the Government needs to create legitimacy andaccountability for recently established rights holders' as-sociations. Only the Government, through legislativeand policy instruments, can de"ne and legitimise power-sharing and decision-making arrangements, whichlegally establish and defend user rights and security oftenure [37]. The Government could also provide varioustypes of assistance and service for rights holders' associ-ations, such as co-ordinating a formal administrativestructure and holding forums to maintain interactionbetween various stakeholders.

5.2. The role of xshers in xsheries co-management

One fundamental debate in the co-management litera-ture is whether "shers can be entrusted with managingtheir own resources [37]. Unless government and itso$cials can be convinced of "shers' desire and ability tomanage themselves and their "sheries sustainably, littleprogress can be made on devolving rights, responsibilityand authority for managing "sheries. New Zealand's

seafood industry, therefore, is required to demonstrateactions that convince the Government it can organiseitself into associations capable of developing manage-ment frameworks that provide for and deliver theutilisation of "shery resources while ensuring their sus-tainability. Although currently lacking the legal right tomanage or enhance their "sheries, ITQ owners since 1996have begun to organise themselves into quota owningcompanies (QOC). At this early stage, the QOCs haveseveral key functions in common:

f to facilitate the collection of funds to "nance "sheriesmanagement activities, such as research or reseeding,and to manage the delivery of such services,

f to make "sheries management rules to achieve e!ortspreading or seasonal closures and to impose sanc-tions on non-compliance by ITQ owners,

f to represent the interests of ITQ owners in governmentprocesses that involve consultation such as the deter-mination of government required "sheries manage-ment services and the setting of TACC, and

f to defend against erosion of harvesting rights and topromote the expansion and development of manage-ment rights.

Rights holders' associations need to be relativelyfree to structure their arrangements so that they canbest develop management frameworks that provide forand deliver the utilisation of "shery resources whileensuring their sustainability. The New ZealandSeafood Industry Council, which replaced the FishingIndustry Board in 1996, anticipates that over time QOCswill take increasing responsibility for providing theirown administration, co-ordination, research, complianceand consultation as well as developing mangementplans. The MFish would oversee the auditing andmonitoring stages for each co-managed "shery's manage-ment plan.

It is expected that New Zealand's scientists, govern-ment o$cials, industry and environmentalists wouldcontinue to work together to evaluate high level speci-"cations for management procedures. This approachcould well increase international competitiveness by wayof increased innovation, reduced costs and reduced con-#ict between stakeholder groups. Fundamental to thesuccess of this approach is the establishment by Govern-ment of clearly de"ned and appropriate rights andresponsibilities for marine farmers in a way that is com-patible with the rights of ITQ owners. Once this issue isresolved, the industry must assure the Government thatproperty rights holders' associations and systems providefor sustainability of their "sheries. In so doing, bothmarine farmers and ITQ owners can develop manage-ment frameworks that e$ciently utilise their "sheries inways that reduce potential con#icts between "sheries andprovide a consistent basis for resolving con#icts whenthey arise.


6. Conclusion

The history of "shing in New Zealand shows continu-ous challenge and change. The decade since the introduc-tion of the QMS has been accompanied by industrypro"tability, unparalleled levels of investment and gener-ally improved "sh availability due to developments instock assessments and implementation of rebuildingstrategies. However, the full economic and biologicalpotential of New Zealand's "sheries has yet to berealised. Failure to further develop the property rights-based management system would incline most harvestersto adopt short-term perspectives towards "sheries man-agement. As Jentoft et al. [1] suggest, "shers do not easilyaccept government intervention, especially when this in-tervention does not make sense in the way they see theirproblems, know their "shery, and have learned to under-stand the marine environment. Government must allowITQ owners and marine farmers more involvement in"sheries management functions. As the success ofNew Zealand's marine farming industry has alreadydemonstrated, co-management is about innovation, in-tegration and sustainable resource use.

The underlying mood within the seafood industry isone of con"dence in the future, and there is generalagreement that more commercial species should bemanaged under the QMS. The main reason for thiscon"dence is that at every major crisis point the propertyrights-based "sheries management system has emergedstronger and better speci"ed. It has taken most of the lastdecade for ITQ to outgrow its experimental and tentativestatus, but now it is viewed as irreversible and secure.Although marine farming has not come under the QMS,there is growing recognition that its integration with ITQ"sheries must be improved. Recent government andstakeholder initiatives to better de"ne and manage mar-ine farming rights have been welcomed by the commer-cial sector, although many issues remain unresolved.Once some outstanding property rights issues are re-solved, New Zealand's "sheries management system willbe in a better position to ful"l its potential to provide forpro"table and sustainable "sheries.

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Documents

The role of property rights in the development of New Zealand's seafood industry