THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE PRAETORIAN GUARD IN THE EVENTS OF

AD 69, AS DESCRIBED BY TACITUS IN HIS HISTORIAE.

By

SANDRA OTTLEY B.A. (Hons.)

This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of

The University of Western Australia in the School of Humanities,

Discipline Group of Classics and Ancient History.

2009.

In loving memory of my Mum.

iii

Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without my two supervisors,

Professor Brian Bosworth and Professor David Kennedy. To both of them I would like

to express my sincere gratitude. Their combined knowledge has added to the material

quality of this thesis and I have benefited constantly from their encouragement, careful

attentions and guidance. Any faults that remain, I claim as my own.

I am also indebted to all of the staff of the Discipline Group of Classics and

Ancient History at the University of Western Australia. Each staff member in his or her

own way has contributed to the completion of this thesis. In particular, I would like to

thank Dr Glenys Wootton for her friendship and support, Dr Judith Maitland for proof

reading my chapters, Professor John Melville-Jones for his assistance with numismatics

and inscriptions, Dr Lara O’Sullivan for her help in the translation of a number of Greek

passages and Mr Richard Small for all his administrative assistance. These people,

along with all the other individuals associated with the Discipline Group, have made

writing this thesis a truly enjoyable experience.

This thesis could not have been completed without the help of the staff of the

Reid Library in particular the staff of the Scholars Centre, Dr Toby Burrows, Mrs

Susanna De Melo Howard and Mrs Azra Tulic. They have provided a relaxed study

environment and have always been there to assist when the need arose. In addition, I

would like to thank the staff responsible for organising Inter Library Loans, Ms

Michelle Coles and Mrs Anne Lim. Their assistance has been invaluable. I also wish to

extend my gratitude to my fellow postgraduate students who have freely offered their

friendship and assistance, especially Mrs Sue Hart and Mrs Cecilia Leong-Salobir for

their consideration and kindness at the time of my Mums’ passing.

I should also like to express my thanks to the staff at the British School at Rome.

In particular, Mrs Geraldine Wellington for her polite and efficient handling of my visit

to the School and Mrs Maria Pia Malvessi for arranging my visits to the Biblioteca

Nazionale and the Italian Army base in Rome, the Caserma Macao, both of which stand

on the site of the former castra praetoria. At the Caserma Macao I was fortunate to

have Colonel Maurizio Tarquini as my guide. His enthusiasm for my project and his

willingness to help was humbling. At the Biblioteca Nazionale the library’s architect

Mr Terralavoro also proved a keen guide.

However, most of all I would like to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to my

family. I have been the recipient of the unending support of my husband Brian Ottley,

iv

and the love and encouragement of my parents, Ron and Gwen. My Mum did not live

to see this project completed, but I know she would have been very proud. I am also

grateful for the continuing interest of my brother, Ron, sister-in-law, Annette, and niece,

Sarah, in my thesis. They have contributed to this work in ways they will probably

never realise. Last but not least, I would like to express my thanks to the furry creatures

especially Mushtar, who have been such an important part of my life. Long may their

paws grace my computer keyboard.

v

Abstract

In AD 69 the Praetorian Guard played an important, often crucial role, in both the

political and military events of the year. Frequently referred to as the ‘Year of the four

emperors,’ AD 69 was a year of marked political upheaval, assassination and civil war.

Three men, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius all ruled briefly as emperor, until Vespasian

emerged as the ultimate victor, restoring peace to the Roman world and establishing the

Flavian dynasty (AD 69 – 96). Tacitus documented the events of this turbulent year in

vivid detail in the surviving books of his Historiae. Fortunately, for the purposes of this

study Tacitus’ narrative frequently highlights the actions and motivations of not only

the Praetorian Prefects, but also the Praetorian officers and the rank and file of the

Guard.

This thesis intends to bring together the Praetorian Guard, the year AD 69 and

the historian Tacitus. It will examine comprehensively the involvement of the

Praetorian Guard in the most significant political and military events of the year and

will explore the behaviour and motivations of the Praetorian Prefects, the Praetorian

officers and the Praetorian soldiers. Although there have been a number of excellent

studies on Tacitus’ Historiae, no previous survey of this year has focussed exclusively

on the Praetorian Guard. While Tacitus’ narrative forms the basis for the study the

chance survival of three other parallel though briefer accounts – the biographies in

Plutarch and Suetonius, and the epitome of Cassius Dio’s history – allows some

opportunity to assess his historical accuracy. Non-literary sources, such as coins,

inscriptions and archaeological remains are also employed for this purpose whenever

possible.

It will become clear during the course of this thesis that while the actual role

played by the Praetorian Guard under each emperor varied considerably, one factor

remains constant: their overall importance and contribution to each reign was

considerable, though not necessarily always positive, and their decisions and subsequent

actions could determine the course of events.

vi

Contents

Abbreviations and Ancient Citations vii

List of Maps viii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: The Imperial Praetorian Guard

Introduction 14

Organisation 14

Recruitment 27

Length and Conditions of Service 31

Officers of the Praetorian Guard 37

Other forces in Rome 45

Conclusion 54

Chapter Two: The Praetorian Guard and the End of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty

Introduction 59

Nero’s Praetorian Prefects 59

The Revolt of C. Julius Vindex 64

The end of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty 68

Conclusion 78

Chapter Three: The Assassination of Galba

Introduction 81

Galba’s Praetorian Prefect 81

Galba’s Praetorian Guard 83

The Praetorian Prefect and the adoption debate 84

Between the adoption and the conspiracy 91

The Praetorian Guard and Otho’s conspiracy 95

The reaction of the Praetorian Guard to Otho’s conspiracy 108

Conclusion 118

Chapter Four: Otho and the First Battle of Bedriacum

Introduction 120

The aftermath of Galba’s death and Otho’s Praetorian Prefects 121

vii

Otho’s Praetorian Guard 127

The Praetorian mutiny 132

The Praetorian Guard fights for Otho 142

The death of Otho 169

Conclusion 171

Chapter Five: The New Praetorian Guard of Vitellius

Introduction 174

The Praetorian Guard after the death of Otho 174

Vitellius’ Praetorian Prefects 178

Vitellius’ Praetorian Guard 180

The Second Battle of Bedriacum 187

The mobilisation of Vitellius’ Praetorian Cohorts 189

The march to Rome 191

The Praetorian Guard and the war in Campania 193

The battle on the Capitol 195

The Praetorian Guard and the battle for Rome 199

Conclusion 202

Chapter Six: The Praetorian Guard under Vespasian

Introduction 204

Vespasian’s Praetorian Prefects 204

Vespasian’s Praetorian Guard 218

Conclusion 224

Conclusion 226

Appendices:

One: Inscriptions 233

Two: The castra praetoria 235

Three: Nero’s Praetorian Prefects 239

Four: The coup of Nymphidius Sabinus 242

Four: ‘Military class of anonymous denarii’ 259

Bibliography: 261

viii

Abbreviations and Ancient Citations

Journal titles are abbreviated in accordance with L’année philologique. The names and

titles of classical authors and texts are abbreviated in accordance with the Oxford

Classical Dictionary (3rd Edition), with the exception of Cassius Dio, which is

abbreviated simply to Dio.

For Tacitus’ Historiae all Latin quotes are from the Teubner text of H. Heubner

(Stuttgart, 1978). Translations of Tacitus’ text are taken from the Loeb Classical

Library edition (Cambridge 2003).

Unless otherwise specified all quotes from and translations of all other ancient texts are

taken from the Loeb Classical Library editions.

The paragraph and sentence numeration used for the Historiae is adopted from the

Teubner text of H. Heubner (Stuttgart, 1978).

ix

List of Maps

I Northern Italy and the French Riviera Coast

II Italy

III Rome

x

Map I

Northern Italy and the French Riviera Coast

(Adapted from Ash 2007, xii)

xi

Map II

Italy

(Adapted from Shotter 1993, xvii). `

xii

Map III

Ancient Rome

(Adapted from Shotter 1993, xvi).

1

Introduction

The late Roman Republic had witnessed the army, or sections of it, as the makers and

the supporters of a succession of powerful political and military figures, from C. Marius

to the leaders of the Second Triumvirate. With the establishment of the Principate, the

new standing armies were stationed on the distant frontiers of the Empire and

mechanisms were found to politically neutralize them. The new system worked well,

with only minor exceptions, for almost a century. The new political rulers of the

Roman Empire, however, still required force and needed to have this military support

visible and at hand. The imperial Praetorian Guard fulfilled that role. Initially, they

were stationed in towns throughout Italy, but from the reign of Tiberius (AD 14 – 37),

in the capital itself. The Praetorian Guard represented the army as a whole and if the

need arose could provide force in support or defence of the Princeps. A novelty of this

new system was the role not only of the Guard as an institution, but now of its Prefects.

Ironically, this new centre of influence and power arose principally from political, rather

than military necessity. Emperors needed to be able to delegate some of their

responsibilities and who would be better suited to the tasks than the trusted and talented

subordinates to whom they entrusted their lives? At an early stage one encounters a

Praetorian Guard and Praetorian Prefects who are important players in imperial politics.

The former were inevitably more reactive, while the latter could be active and

manipulative.

The imperial Praetorian Guard was instituted c. 27 BC and for the early years of

the Augustan Principate we have little evidence of their whereabouts and activities.

However, from the reign of Tiberius they became a powerful institution and a very

visible part of the political and topographic landscape of Rome. The infamous

Praetorian Prefect, L. Aelius Seianus (Sejanus), who served as sole Praetorian Prefect

for much of Tiberius’ reign, became a powerful and influential man in his own right.

His influence over the emperor is well documented in Tacitus’ Annales. Sejanus is

viewed as an ambitious man, whom Tacitus tells us sought to overthrow the very

emperor he served. While his aspirations remain the subject of debate, Sejanus’ tenure

as Prefect demonstrated the immense power that a Praetorian Prefect was capable of

amassing given the right circumstances.

Naturally, the influence wielded by any Praetorian Prefect depended to a certain

extent on his own character and on the character of the reigning emperor. However, all

Praetorian Prefects must have enjoyed considerable influence at court. Firstly, they were

2

responsible for safeguarding the life of the Princeps and hence were men the emperor

trusted. Secondly, they would have been in regular and close contact with the emperor.

Finally, they commanded the only armed force in Italy. From the Julio-Claudian period

we can identify, with certainty, fourteen men who served as Praetorian Prefect.1

Tiberius’ successor, Gaius (AD 37 – 41), became emperor with the aid of

Sejanus’ successor in the Prefecture, Q. Naevius Cordus Sutorius Macro. Macro, had

he lived long enough, might well have outdone Sejanus in his reputation for villainy.

Gaius reigned for only four years and fell victim to a Palace conspiracy which included

officers of the Praetorian Guard, most notably the Praetorian tribune, Cassius Chaerea.

With the death of Gaius, Praetorian soldiers, having discovered Gaius’ uncle Claudius

(AD 41 – 54) hiding behind a curtain in the Palace, took him to the Praetorian barracks

and proclaimed him emperor. The Senate was powerless to stop the Praetorians and

they were forced to accept the accession of Claudius. When Claudius died, possibly at

the hands of his wife and niece, Agrippina, the Guard were quick to throw their support

behind Nero (AD 54 – 68), ensuring his accession. The Praetorian Prefect, Sex.

Afranius Burrus, who served in the first part of Nero’s reign, exercised considerable

influence at his court. However, unlike Sejanus, Burrus is portrayed as one of the better

Praetorian Prefects. On his death, natural or otherwise, Nero promoted the notorious

Ofonius Tigellinus to the Praetorian Prefecture. Tigellinus, and in particular his

colleague, C. Nymphidius Sabinus, were to play a crucial role in the decision of Nero to

commit suicide.

This brings us to the year AD 69 and it is the role of the Praetorian Guard in this

year that is the focus of this study. AD 69 is a year of marked political upheaval,

political assassination and civil war. A year not only of great significance in Roman

history, but full of themes still relevant in today’s world. Four men, Galba, Otho,

Vitellius and Vespasian reigned. It was the support that Galba received from the

Praetorian Prefect, Nymphidius, and the Praetorian Guard that helped to ensure his

eventual success against Nero. Early in AD 69, Galba fell victim to a Palace coup

organised by Otho. Crucial to Otho’s successful coup was a handful of Praetorian

speculatores. Later when Vitellius challenged Otho for the Empire, in battle in northern

Italy, the Praetorian Guard were the principal component of Otho’s army. When his

Praetorians were defeated at the First Battle of Bedriacum, Otho committed suicide.

1 Q. Ostorius Scapula, P. Salvius Aper, L. Seius Strabo (Augustus), L. Aelius Seianus (Augustus and Tiberius), Q. Naevius Cordus Sertorius Macro (Tiberius and Gaius), M. Arrecinus Clemens (Gaius), Rufrius Pollio, Catonius Iustus, Rufrius Crispinus, L. Lusius Geta (Claudius), Sex. Afranius Burrus (Claudius and Nero), L. Faenius Rufus, Ofonius Tigellinus and C. Nymphidius Sabinus (Nero).

3

As emperor, one of Vitellius’ first acts was to dismiss the former Praetorian

Guardsmen and to create a new Guard from the legionaries that served in the armies

stationed along the German frontier. Otho’s former Praetorians, having lost their

positions and future security, willingly joined the forces mustering in support of

Vespasian, of which they formed an important part. In a bitter street battle in Rome

itself, the old Praetorians of Galba, Otho and now Vespasian fought the new Guard of

Vitellius. When the Vitellian forces were defeated, Vitellius was put to death.

Vespasian was finally able to put an end to the civil wars, establish the Flavian dynasty

and reform the Praetorian Guard, shattered by the upheavals of the year. While the

actual role played by the Praetorian Guard varies markedly from one emperor to the

next, it is one of the purposes of this thesis to demonstrate that their contribution to each

reign is considerable and that their actions often help to determine the course of events.

Fortunately, Cornelius Tacitus, arguably Rome’s greatest historian, records the

events of this turbulent year in vivid detail in his Historiae. As Campbell so neatly

describes it – “For the civil wars of 193 – 7 and the deterioration of ordered government

after the death of Caracalla in 217, there is no account comparable, in depth of analysis

or detailed evocation of atmosphere, to that of Tacitus for the earlier period.”2

This thesis intends to bring together the Praetorian Guard, the year AD 69 and

the historian Tacitus. It will study in depth all aspects of the Praetorian Guard in a year

of civil wars, as described by Tacitus’ Historiae. No previous study of the year AD 69

has focussed exclusively on the Praetorian Guard, and this thesis aims to bring a new

perspective to the study of this important military institution. It will aim to examine

what role the Praetorian Guard played in the events and answer the important question

of how significant the Guard were in determining the political and military outcomes of

the events which took place in the period AD 68 – 9. This is an important area of study,

particularly in a period of civil war, as it examines the role of the army in politics, and

in particular the position of the Praetorian Guard as the only source of military force at

the centre of power. The examination of the complicated relationships between

emperors, Praetorian Prefects, officers and soldiers in time of civil war, following the

demise of a great dynasty, is an important military enquiry.

What is

even more fortunate for this thesis is Tacitus’ frequent focus on and reference to the

actions and motivations of the Praetorian Guard.

While Tacitus’ narrative forms the basis for the study, the purpose of this thesis

is not to examine his Historiae as primarily a work of literature. For the last twenty

2 Campbell 1984, 371 – 2.

4

years and particularly since the publication of A. J. Woodman’s Rhetoric in Classical

Historiography3 and A. Cameron’s (ed.) History as Text4 there has been a growing

trend in the study of Roman history to approach the ancient sources primarily as literary

constructs rather than as mines of information about their subjects. This has been an

important development in the study of ancient history. Perhaps the most significant

example of this type of approach, in the period being studied in this thesis, has been R.

Ash’s Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leadership in Tacitus’ Histories,5

In the Historiae Tacitus covered a period spanning twenty-eight years

commencing on 1 January AD 69 and ending with the death of Domitian in AD 96.

However, only the first four books and the first twenty-six chapters of Book 5 are extent

and cover the period from the civil wars of AD 69 to the first few months of AD 70.

This comprises 226 large-format Teubner pages, by far the largest of the ancient literary

sources.

which

addresses a number of important aspects of this period. However, as important as this

trend has been in ancient history, it is still essential to attempt to understand the actual

events of any particular period. This thesis then aims to strip Tacitus and the other

ancient authors of their rhetoric and demonstrable biases and examine what remains for

logical consistency and overall credibility.

Book 1 of the Historiae summarizes the situation after the death of Nero and

goes on to examine the early part of AD 69, including the death of Galba, the accession

of Otho and the movement of the Vitellian legions from the German frontier. Book 2

introduces the presence of the fourth contender for the Principate, Vespasian, and

describes the defeat of the Othonian forces by Vitellius at the First Battle of Bedriacum.

Vespasian is declared emperor in the East and Vitellius arrives in Rome. The third

book details the Second Battle of Bedriacum and Antonius Primus’ march on Rome.

Book 4 gives an account of the revolt on the German frontier by Civilis, as well as

discussing some of the problems being experienced in the Senate. The surviving

chapters in Book 5 give a brief account of the Jews and describe the suppression of

Civilis’ revolt by the Roman general, Cerialis.

The events Tacitus describes in the surviving books of the Historiae occurred

during his youth, possibly when he was around thirteen or fourteen years old.6

3 Woodman 1988.

Hence,

he was old enough to understand the cataclysmic events unfolding, to be aware of the

4 Cameron 1989. 5 Ash 1999. 6 For example see Wellesley 1972, 9; Chilver 1979, 25; Damon 2003, 22.

5

polarizing of society between the successive contenders for the Empire and perhaps old

enough for his experience to leave him with entrenched views.

Tacitus published the Historiae in the early years of the second century AD,7

and in composing this work he should have been able to draw on both contemporary

documents and some thirty years of written and oral compositions, potentially a great

deal of material should have been available to him. Unfortunately, the source material

available to any ancient writer is often difficult to identify, particularly as they rarely

name their sources and even when they do it is usually far from clear how extensively or

directly a source has been consulted.8 The written compositions would have included

the works of Aufidius Bassus, the elder Pliny and Cluvius Rufus, however, the identity

of Tacitus’ principal source remains elusive. There are traces of a ‘common source,’ of

which Bassus, Pliny and Rufus are the main contenders, in Plutarch, Suetonius and

Tacitus. However, no definitive conclusions can be reached and the identity of this

‘common source’ remains the subject of scholarly debate.9

Senatorial archives would have provided Tacitus with important information,

particularly for events taking place in Rome. However, many of the major events of the

year actually took place away from the capital and for these Tacitus probably relied on a

variety of eyewitness accounts both written and oral, although he cites no oral source.

Nevertheless, it seems quite probable that Tacitus’ father-in-law, Cn. Julius Agricola, is

the source for his information concerning Otho’s naval expedition to southern Gaul and

Liguria.

10

In addition, Tacitus’ narrative must be read with the understanding of the

political preconceptions of its author. While Tacitus claims impartiality, these claims

do not stand up under close scrutiny, although Tacitus probably acted with sincerity and

since he tries to be an honest historian, he himself often provides us with the facts which

conflict directly with his own theories.

In particular, Agricola related to Tacitus (Agr. 7.1) how his own mother had

been murdered by the Othonian raiders. It would have been difficult for Tacitus not to

allow the shocking killing of his wife’s grandmother to influence his views, if not

against Otho, at least against the undisciplined and lawless behaviour of the soldiers.

11

7 For example see Wellesley 1972, 5; Chilver 1979, 22; Damon 2003, 4; Ash 2007, 2.

Tacitus also has a serious preoccupation with

a number of themes. Of great importance to this study and obvious throughout the

8 Ash 2007, 26. 9 Syme (1958, 674 – 6) calls him ignotus. Interesting discussions on various aspects of the ‘common source’ can be found in, for example Syme 1958, 176 – 90 and App. 29, 32, 76, 77; Townend 1960, 98 – 120; 1961a, 227 – 48; 1964a, 337 – 77; Wellesely 1972, 6 – 10; Chilver 1979, 26 – 7; Martin 1981, 189 – 96; Chilver and Townend 1985, 19 – 20; Murison 1992, xii – xiii; Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 3 – 5. 10 Wellesley 1972, 9; Damon 2003, 23. 11 Wellesley 1972, 12.

6

Historiae, is his concern with military indiscipline and the influence the average

soldiers could wield in times of civil conflict. An army, indeed any part of the army can

create an emperor (Tac. Hist. 2.76.4). Soldiers, Praetorian or otherwise could be both

the strength and weakness of every emperor.

When it comes to recording the behaviour, actions and motivations of the

Praetorian Guard we must consider if we can expect bias from Tacitus towards that

military force. Firstly, Tacitus was a senator and in his Historiae and Annales he is

often fascinated by the Senate, frequently painting a picture of its powerlessness under

the emperors – emperors who ruled with the support of the Praetorian Guard. This must

have been particularly galling when those emperors treated the Senate as a body or

individual senators with disdain or something even worse. Moreover, it is difficult to

imagine that a senator such as Tacitus ever fully accepted the idea that a Praetorian

Prefect was more important at the emperor’s court than any senator. On a more

personal level, Tacitus knew the harsh realities of civil war through his own experience

and through those of his father-in-law.

Tacitus was also writing shortly after the emperor Nerva adopted Trajan.

Nerva’s palace was, like Otho’s, invaded by members of the Praetorian Guard set on

vengeance for the murder of the previous emperor Domitian. Nerva, fearful of the

Praetorians, adopted Trajan, a man with a military background and at that time in charge

of the powerful German legions. Trajan went on to successfully neutralize both an

army revolt on the Danube and a potential rival in the East. The parallels between these

events in AD 96 – 8 and the events of AD 69 have been well recognized in scholarship.

However, when Tacitus writes about the Praetorians in AD 69, we cannot know for

certain whether or not he had in mind the Praetorians whom he and his audience had

known in AD 96, and as a consequence what effect it would have on his writing,

although one would have to assume that it would only adversely affect his portrayal of

the Guard. Taking into consideration these factors, it should come as no surprise if we

discover, in Tacitus’ narrative, an element of bias against the Praetorian Guard.

The historical accuracy of Tacitus’ account is continually assessed by reference

to the other extant literary and non-literary sources. Fortunately, three parallel accounts

of the year AD 69 have survived. The survival of these three accounts gives us the

opportunity to compare and contrast the account of the events offered by Tacitus. The

7

accounts comprise Suetonius’ Lives of Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian, Plutarch’s

Lives of Galba and Otho and the epitomes of Cassius Dio’s Books 63 – 5.12

Before briefly examining Suetonius’ Lives, it is worth noting that Greek and

Roman history and biography, although both were regarded as branches of literature,

had some important differences. History belonged on the highest level of literature,

while biography belonged further down the scale.

13

Suetonius’ Lives of the Caesars is usually considered to have been published

around AD 119 – 122, although it cannot be certain whether they were all published

simultaneously.

History dealt primarily with the

deeds of great men and one of the vital functions of Roman (and Greek) historiography

was to enable the reader to draw lessons from history. Biography, on the contrary,

attempts to portray a subject’s life in such a way as to illustrate both character and

times. The emphasis is on the individual rather than the events. In order to illustrate

character a biographer will often include material which can be seen as trivial.

14 Unlike his fellow-biographer, Plutarch, Suetonius abandoned the

chronological framework and adopted a method that employed subject headings, such

as wars, legislation, virtues, vices and so on, under which he sorts his material. All the

Lives follow a similar general pattern, with minor variations. As a biographer

Suetonius’ interest is focused entirely on the individual who is the subject of the

biography, everything else is excluded save that which illustrates the central person in

some way. Suetonius is also concerned with illustrating the extent to which each

emperor conformed, or failed to conform as the case may be, with the imperial ideal.15

The lives of the four emperors of AD 69 are not as lengthy as many of

Suetonius’ earlier biographies and account for approximately sixty-two pages of Latin

text in the Loeb edition. To compile his lives of Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian,

Suetonius would have had access to the same type of material that was available to

other writers such as acts of the senate, histories, biographies and the memoirs of

individuals. It would, however, seem that Suetonius did not make a great deal of use of

As a consequence, we should expect that Suetonius’ interest in the Praetorian Guard

will be minimal and will primarily be restricted to events that illustrate in some way the

character of the reigning emperor.

12 Josephus’ account of the Jewish war is useful for this study, however, because it treats the events of the period in a peripheral fashion, it is of substantially less importance than the accounts of Suetonius, Plutarch and Dio. 13 Morgan 2006, 8. 14 Shotter 1993, 6. 15 Murison 1992, vi.

8

Tacitus. Like Tacitus, Suetonius may have been able to consult some of the participants

in the year AD 69.

Suetonius, unlike Tacitus, was from the equestrian order. His father, Suetonius

Laetus, was an equestrian tribune in the Othonian legio XIII at the time of the war

between Otho and Vitellius and probably participated in the First Battle of Bedriacum

(Suet. Otho 10.1). His father may also had first hand experience of the disgrace

inflicted on the thirteenth legion by Vitellius and of the terrible atrocities inflicted on

the towns of Cremona and Bononia (Bologna) by the ex-Othonian soldiers (Tac. Hist.

2.43.2; 67.2; 3.32.2). Suetonius himself, however, does not seem to have been born

until early in the reign of Vespasian and hence had no personal recollection of the

events of AD 69. Suetonius advancement along the career for men of equestrian status

may well have been assisted by his association with C. Septicius Clarus, who in AD 119

became one of the Hadrian’s Praetorian Prefects (SHA Hadrian 9.4).16

Plutarch is a few years older than Tacitus and hence the events of AD 69 took

place when Plutarch was a young man, possibly in his late teens or early twenties.

Plutarch was from a wealthy family from Chaeronea, a provincial town in Boeotia in

central Greece. He was well educated in rhetoric and philosophy. Although he

traveled to Rome on numerous occasions, forming friendships with important Romans,

he spent most of his life in Chaeronea.

Suetonius’

lower social status, his father’s military career and his friendship with a Praetorian

Prefect might make him less critical of the behaviour of the Praetorian Guard than

Tacitus.

17

Plutarch wrote many varied works, including his biographies, which he wrote in

Greek. Most of the essays are grouped in pairs, known as the Parallel Lives. However,

four separate biographies which are not included in the parallel series are also extant.

These include the lives of Artaxerxes and Aratus and for our purposes the Roman

emperors Galba and Otho. The biographies of Galba and Otho occupy approximately

fifty-three pages of Greek text in the Loeb edition, and probably formed part of a

continuous history of the Roman emperors from Augustus to Vitellius; indeed the

narrative is unbroken from the end of Galba into Otho. These biographies may well

Plutarch, unlike Tacitus, can be viewed as an

outsider, an observer of the events. The civil wars of AD 69 were not being fought on

Greek soil, therefore Greeks were able to be detached observers of the unfolding

turmoil.

16 Shotter 1993, 3. 17 Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 1 – 2.

9

have been written during the reign of Domitian.18

Books 63 – 65 of Dio’s Roman History cover the period from the death of Nero

to the accession of Vespasian. However, the description of Nero’s demise does not

begin until quite late in Book 63 (chapter 23) and from this point until the beginning of

AD 70, account for forty-five pages of Greek text in the Loeb edition. Our present day

version of Dio’s Roman History for AD 69 is the epitome of John Xiphilinus. The

epitome is not a summary in the modern sense of the word, but is rather a case of

Xiphilinus striking out a handful of words here, a whole paragraph there and

occasionally a whole episode which would have occupied a number of pages. However,

in general he preserves Dio’s own words and his epitome is largely a series of abridged

excerpts.

As a member of the upper social

classes, we can expect that Plutarch would share many of the same biases exhibited by

Tacitus in his writings and indeed the biographies of the emperor’s Galba and Otho

clearly show Plutarch’s distaste for uncontrolled soldiery.

19 Although Dio composed his history in Greek, the fact that he composed an

annalistic history demonstrates his traditional Roman outlook. However, in the

surviving epitomes of AD 69 there is little trace of an annalistic framework and the

effect is one of “biographical history.”20

Dio was writing much later than all of our three other principal ancient authors,

possibly beginning preparation in AD 197 with completion sometime c. AD 219.

21 Dio

presumably had access to all the written accounts that our earlier authors did. He would

also have had access to the accounts of Tacitus, Plutarch and Suetonius, although

understanding the relationship between Dio and these earlier writers is far from clear.

While there are clear similarities between Dio, Plutarch and Suetonius, there is nothing

that cannot be explained by the notion that all three used a common source. However, it

would seem likely that Dio made very little, if any, use of Tacitus’ Historiae.22

In historical studies every generation tends to interpret the past in light of its

own experience and there is little doubt that this is true about Dio. Dio might have been

writing long after AD 69 but he was a senator, like Tacitus, and was an eye-witness in

Rome as a young senator during the shameful conduct of the Guard in AD 193. In

addition, in AD 229 when Dio served as consul ordinarius, with the emperor, he was

allowed to spend two months of his consulship outside Rome because of the hostility of

18 Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 1 – 3. 19 See Millar 1964, 2. 20 Murison 1999, 1 – 22. 21 Millar 1964, 30. See also Murison 1999, 11. 22 Murison 1999, 17.

10

the Praetorian Guard towards him. Apparently, his reputation for disciplinary severity

had preceded him from Pannonia.23

As a consequence his views about the Praetorian Guard are likely to be doubly

coloured by his senatorial perspective and his recent personal experience. Dio was a

partisan of Septimius Severus and although Italy was spared the brunt of the civil wars

this time, the impact on Dio, of living through the first civil conflict in 120 years, must

have given him insights and views about the civil wars of AD 69. In addition, these

civil wars had a further parallel to the events of the first century AD: in Dio’s time, too,

the established Antonine dynasty had ended badly with a tyrannical and quite unsuitable

man on the throne (Commodus) and powerful Praetorian Prefects.

Non-literary sources will also be employed whenever possible to help evaluate

the accuracy of our literary sources. These are not without their difficulties and

limitations. Coins issued during the period of this study are mainly for purposes of

propaganda, and although a representative cross section of these issues survives the

interpretation of them is often extremely difficult and usually based on supposition

rather than fact.24 Moreover, it is impossible to prove whether the emperor in whose

name a coin was minted had any involvement in the design.25 There was no change in

the previous Neronian standards for the gold and silver content of the coins during AD

69.26

Of particular importance is the survival of inscriptions naming former Praetorian

officers. Their number is not large but they give us vital clues to the subsequent career

of these men after the upheavals of AD 69. Through prosopographical studies on

named people in the written sources in general, it is possible to identify family

connections and infer possible political links and alliances or enmities. As for papyri,

there are few of any importance for the study of the Praetorian Guard in this period, the

exception being the papyrus which seems to indicate that Ti. Julius Alexander served as

Praetorian Prefect.

The group of anonymous military denarii which makes reference to the Praetorian

Guard are the most important coins for this study.

The remains of the castra praetoria are the most important archaeological

source. However, the site has never been thoroughly examined and the area that the

Praetorian camp once occupied is now the home to the Caserma Macao and the National

Library, hence any future work on the remains is extremely unlikely. As part of my

23 Millar 1964, 23 – 4. 24 Murison 1992, xiii. 25 Morgan 2006, 3. 26 Harl 1996, 91 – 2.

11

research I was fortunate to be able to spend approximately four weeks in Rome and was

able to visit the site of the former castra praetoria and view what remains of the

Praetorian camp externally and from within the grounds of the library and the military

base. Walking around the entire site gave me an understanding of the size of the camp

and standing at the base of the remaining walls allowed me to appreciate how the

building must have dominated the surrounding area. My guide at the Caserma Macao,

Colonel Tarquini, arranged for me to walk on the top of a section of the extant walls

(with his careful assistance). The view was amazing and gave me an appreciation of

how the soldiers in the castra praetoria were able to observe not only the city, but also

the approaches to Rome. I was also able to view the walls including what appeared to

be remains of contubernia and black and white mosaics. In a more general context,

spending time in Rome allowed me to gain a much better understanding of the ancient

texts. My understanding of the geography and topography of the city of Rome was

greatly enhanced and it is an understanding that no map or diagram has ever been able

to provide.

Despite the undoubted importance of the Praetorian Guard to the political and

military history of the Roman Empire, they have received relatively little interest from

scholars over the years. The principal works on the Praetorian Guard remain, M.

Durry’s Les Cohortes Prétoriennes, published in 1938, and in the following year A.

Passerini’s Le Coorti Pretorie.27 The only monograph on the Praetorian Guard written

in English is by B. Rankov and R. Hook. Although a brief survey and with an emphasis

on the appearance of the Guard, this last is a useful introduction to the Praetorians. The

Praetorian Guard has occasionally been the primary subject of journal articles, by

scholars such as B. Dobson and D. J. Breeze,28 D. L. Kennedy29 and L. Keppie.30

Keppie’s survey on the Praetorian Guard prior to AD 23 was particularly useful for the

first chapter of this thesis. However, the number of articles devoted specifically to the

Guard is minimal. Obviously, any monographs, of which there are a considerable

number, concerned with the Roman army in general have incorporated a discussion of

the Praetorian Guard. The most useful for the completion of this study is that of J. B.

Campbell.31

27 Durry, 1968. Passerini 1939.

However, in works of this nature the space that can be assigned to the

Guard is generally limited. In addition, while the Praetorian Guard are mentioned in a

number of both articles and books, devoted to the period AD 68 – 9, there are no articles

28 Dobson and Βreeze 1993, 88 – 112. 29 Kennedy 1978, 275 – 301. 30 Keppie 1996, 101 – 124. 31 Campbell 1984.

12

which specifically deal with the role and activities of the Guard. The Praetorian Guard

of the Julio-Claudian period has also been the subject of two unpublished doctoral

theses.32

Over the years the Praetorian Prefects have also, somewhat surprisingly,

received generally limited interest from scholars. In 1942, L. L. Howe published his

study on the Praetorian Prefects from Commodus (AD 180) to Diocletian (AD 305) and

more recently, in 1994, J. Migl released his survey of the Praetorian Prefects from the

reign of Constantine (AD 306) to Valentinian (AD 375).

33

The corpus of work devoted to the historian Tacitus is extensive and I do not

propose to list these works here, with the exception of acknowledging the importance of

R. Syme to the study of Tacitean literature. His two-volume work on Tacitus, published

in 1958, remains an important and influential study.

34 Tacitus’ first historical narrative

was the Historiae and there have been a number of important attempts to interpret the

surviving four and half books. These include the monographs of B. W. Henderson,35 P.

A. L. Greenhalgh,36 K. Wellesley37 and M. Gwyn Morgan.38 Of importance to this

thesis were Wellesley’s work, which provided a plain narrative of the events of the year

AD 69, and the most recent work by Morgan, who has provided an insightful and fresh

approach to the period. My debt to the later is considerable. However, the aim of these

monographs is to take a holistic view of the events of the year AD 69, while this thesis

has attempted to view the unfolding events solely from the perspective of the Praetorian

Guard. This thesis is also indebted to the historical commentaries on all or sections of

Tacitus’ Historiae, composed by scholars such as H. Heubner,39 K. Wellesley,40 G. E.

F. Chilver,41 G. E. F. Chilver and G. B. Townend,42 C. Damon43 and R. Ash.44

The opening chapter of this thesis is concerned with the Praetorian Guard as a

military unit. The aim of the chapter is to provide the reader with as comprehensive an

understanding as is possible of this military unit. It is expected that a comprehensive

understanding will assist in assessing the accuracy of Tacitus’ portrayal of the Guard in

32 Kerr 1992. Bingham 1998. S. Bingham is currently working on a book titled, The Praetorian Guard: A Concise History of Rome’s Elite Special Forces. The book is due for publication in December 2009. 33 Howe 1942. Migl 1994. 34 Syme 1958. 35 Henderson 1908. 36 Greenhalgh 1975. 37 Wellesley 1989. 38 M. Gwyn Morgan 2006. 39 Heubner, 1963 – 72. 40 Wellesley 1972. 41 Chilver 1979. 42 Chilver and Townend 1985. 43 Damon 2003. 44 Ash 2007.

13

this tumultuous period. The chapter surveys the organisation of the Praetorian Guard,

including the number of cohorts and the contentious issue of the nominal strength of

each cohort. There is considerable discussion on their length and conditions of service,

with a comparison being continually drawn between the soldiers serving in the

Praetorian Guard and those serving in the legions. The establishment of the Praetorian

Prefecture, the prerequisites of soldiers serving as tribunes and centurions, and the

likely geographical and social origins of the Praetorian soldiers, are also considered. At

the conclusion of this chapter, a portrait of the Praetorian Guard on the death of Nero is

drawn.

Chapter two examines the role of the Praetorian Prefects, Praetorian officers and

the rank and file of the Guard in the downfall of the last Julio-Claudian emperor, Nero.

While lying outside Tacitus’ narrative and the year AD 69, the death of Nero is of

crucial importance. Not only because it was the event that led to the civil wars of AD

69, but more significantly because of the importance of the role played by the Praetorian

Prefects, Nymphidius Sabinus and Ofonius Tigellinus, in defecting from Nero and

persuading the soldiers of the Guard to follow suit. The actions of the Praetorian

Prefects were of paramount importance in Nero’s decision to commit suicide. The

chapter is designed to establish a benchmark for the behaviour of the Praetorians, with

which we can compare and contrast their behaviour in AD 69.

The core of this thesis follows with chapters three to six and are assigned to the

study of the Praetorian Guard in the events of AD 69, as described by Tacitus. One

chapter is devoted to the role played by the Praetorian Guard under each of the four

emperors of the year, Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian. Each chapter analyses in

detail the involvement of the Praetorian Guard in the most significant political and

military events of the year and wherever possible will explore the behaviour and

motivations of the Praetorian Prefects, the Praetorian officers and the Praetorian

soldiers. The historical accuracy of Tacitus’ portrayal is assessed by comparing and

contrasting his account with the other extant sources. Conclusions will be drawn at the

end of each chapter, while a summary of these conclusions, and any patterns of

continuity or change, which only becomes evident at the end of this survey, will be

discussed in the final section of this thesis.

14

Chapter One

The Imperial Praetorian Guard

Introduction Before commencing any detailed analysis of Tacitus’ portrayal of the role of the

Praetorian Guard in his Historiae, it is vital to have as comprehensive an

understanding as is possible of all facets of this military force. This involves obtaining

an awareness of where they were recruited from, how they were organised, the length

and conditions of their service, as well as knowledge of their officers and the other

forces that were located in Rome with them. Only when we have a detailed

understanding can any attempt be made to interpret their decisions, their actions and

the role they played in any particular event. Additionally, a broad knowledge of the

Praetorian Guard will help to provide the familiarity required to judge the accuracy of

Tacitus’ portrayal of the Praetorian Guard in AD 69.

The Greek historian Cassius Dio (53.11.5) tells us that in 27 BC Augustus’ (30

BC – AD 14) first act was to secure a decree granting the Praetorian Guardsmen

double the pay of the legionary soldiers. In approving an act that granted a higher rate

of pay for the Praetorians and thereby distinguished them from the rest of the Roman

army, the Senate sanctioned their existence.45

Conveniently, it also gives us a date for

the formal organisation of the imperial Praetorian Guard. Yet while the emperor

Augustus may have established the Praetorian Guard of the imperial period, the

concept was not new. The idea of armed men acting as a bodyguard to Roman

generals had its origins well back in the Republican era (Livy 2.20.5 – 13), although it

is not until the first century BC that the term cohors praetoria begins to occur in

ancient literature to describe this type of unit. Moreover, it is in the period of the civil

wars of the late first century BC that we find the immediate origins of the Praetorian

Guard. What Augustus did was to modify and adapt, in the changed circumstances

following the Battle of Actium, a Republican institution to suit his own requirements.

Organisation

Number of Cohorts

There are only two literary references which provide us with a possible indication of

the number of Praetorian cohorts in the early first century AD: Tacitus (Ann. 4.5),

45 Durry 1968, 77.

15

when he reviews the military forces of the Empire in AD 23, reports that there were

nine Praetorian cohorts, while Dio (55.24.6) states that, there were ten cohorts of 1000

men each in the reign of Augustus. Scholars have tended to accept Tacitus’ account

because epigraphic evidence appears to support his statement.46 However, this does

not mean that there were nine Praetorian cohorts in existence after the Battle of

Actium. Tacitus (Ann. 4.5) was describing the situation in AD 23 and we lack any

evidence for the size of the Praetorian Guard prior to this date. It is possible that the

total number of cohorts fluctuated under Augustus.47

Nonetheless, it would seem that towards the end of Augustus’ reign at least

nine Praetorian cohorts were in existence. Gravestones discovered at Aquileia, which

have been dated to the Augustan period, report cohorts numbered II, VI, VII, VIII and

VIIII.

48 Moreover, the cohortes urbanae created under Augustus bore the numbers X,

XI and XII, in what has been assumed to be a direct continuation of the numbers

allocated to the Praetorian cohorts.49

Why nine cohorts were retained has been the subject of some speculation.

Ideally, Augustus needed a substantial military force at his disposal in or near Rome

for security reasons. The force needed to be large enough to carry out the daily duties

of protecting the emperor and his family, providing messengers and general ‘policing’

duties, but Augustus would not have wanted its size to be so large as to appear too

monarchical. Preferably, one can imagine that Augustus would have wanted the force

to have a rationale with Republican roots. Therefore, it would appear that the number

of cohorts could have come about by two alternative paths. Firstly, it could have been

largely an accidental outcome of the civil wars. After the death of M. Antonius

(Antony) Octavian found himself in command of the troops who had served in both his

own and Antony’s Praetorian cohorts. They probably numbered in the thousands.

Octavian then formed these into a number of cohorts, which may have been nine to

begin with, or over time, the original number underwent changes as discharges took

46 Coh. II: CIL V 924; coh. VI: CIL V 912, 8274, Supp. 186; coh. VII: CIL V 925, 931, 8283; coh VIII: CIL V 886, 904, Patsch 1891, 101, no. 1, 102, no. 2; coh. VIIII: CIL V 918. Photographs of the surviving stones can be found in Brusin 1992, Vol. 2, nos. 2827, 2834 – 6, 2839 – 41, 2844 – 9, 2851. Passerini (1939, 48), in an attempt to reconcile the number given by Dio with Tacitus, suggests that the cohors speculatorum counted as the tenth unit. Echols (1958, 381) proposes that the Germani corporis custodes constituted the tenth cohort. 47 Passerini 1939, 44 - 50; Keppie 1996, 107. 48 See n. 43. An early inscription (CIL V 905) to a member of an unidentified cohors XII has also been discovered. 49 Freis 1968, 36 – 8. The existence of a separate group of Urban cohorts is first documented in Augustus’ will, where he made separate provisions for them. See Tac. Ann. 1.8, 4.5. For a discussion of the Urban cohorts see pp 44 - 8.

16

place. By the death of Augustus, or certainly by AD 23, nine Praetorian cohorts were

in existence.50

Alternatively, it is possible that the final number of cohorts that Augustus

arrived at was no accident and that the total was deliberately set at a number that was

politically acceptable. For example, Durry suggests that the number was deliberately

kept below ten to prevent a comparison being drawn between the Praetorian cohorts

and a legion at full strength, “…jamais encore une légion n’avait été casernée dans

Rome.”

51 Unfortunately, the way in which nine Praetorian cohorts came into being is

not easily discernible.52

Epigraphic evidence indicates that the number of cohorts was increased from

nine to at least twelve during the Julio-Claudian period (AD 14 – 68).

53

It remains unclear when the actual increase took place. Taking into account

Tacitus’ statement about the size of the Guard in AD 23, it can probably be safely

assumed that the increase took place after this date, perhaps sometime during the

period AD 37 – 47 when Tacitus’ narrative is missing.

An inscription

(CIL V 7003 = ILS 2701) dedicated to C. Gavius Silvanus documents that he was a

tribune in the XII Praetorian cohort. We have confirmation from Tacitus’ Annales that

Silvanus was indeed a tribune of the Praetorian Guard who was mixed up in the

conspiracy of Piso (Ann. 15.50), played a role in the death of L. Annaeus Seneca (Ann.

15.60 – 1) and, although later absolved of any wrongdoing, committed suicide (Ann.

15.71). As a consequence of this inscription and Tacitus’ narrative, we can be

reasonably certain that there were at least twelve Praetorian cohorts by AD 65.

Presumably, this increase in the number of cohorts also included an increase in the

actual number of soldiers rather than just a redistribution of the soldiers already

serving in the existing nine cohorts.

54 However, the discovery in

1976 of an inscription (AE 1978 286) from Lecce dei Marsi in central Italy has

challanged this position.55 This inscription reports an otherwise unknown A. Virgius

Marsus, who served as a tribune in a cohors XI and IV in the praetorium56

50 Keppie (1998, 153, 240 n. 13) suggests that nine cohorts may reflect some fusion of the Praetorian cohorts of Octavian and Antony after Actium. See Passerini (1939, 44 – 50) for a number of other possibilities.

of the

51 Durry 1968, 77 – 8. See also Keppie 1998, 153. 52 My thanks to Professor D. L. Kennedy for discussing his thoughts on the reasons behind the creation of nine Praetorian cohorts. 53 Cohors XI: CIL III 4838 = ILS 2033; CIL V 2513; VI 2762 – 2765; NS 1906, 212. Cohors XII: CIL V 7033 = ILS 2701, 7162, 7258 = ILS 2031, VI 2766 – 8. 54 Durry 1968, 79; Keppie 1996, 108. 55 See Appendix One for the text of this inscription. 56 The praetorium is the tent which was occupied by the magistrate in command of a military camp.

17

deified Augustus and Tiberius Caesar. Virgius’ service in the praetorium spanned the

reign of two emperors and it is easiest to suppose that he served in Rome a few years

either side of AD 1457 and as there is no evidence for the size of the Guard under

Augustus, this possibility cannot be ignored. However, various other suggestions have

also been put forward to explain this inscription, including that Virgius held the two

posts but that they were well separated in time.58 The editors of L’ Année

Epigraphique suggest that a cohort XI and consequently a cohort X were

commissioned around AD 14 but were disbanded soon after,59

One of the most obvious times for the permanent increase in the number of

cohorts to at least twelve would seem to be after the accession of Claudius, principally

because Claudius owed his elevation to members of the Praetorian Guard, a fact

clearly emphasised by literary and numismatic sources.

leaving nine cohorts for

most of the period up to the reigns of either Gaius (AD 37 – 41) or Claudius (AD 41 –

54). One possible reason for this short-term increase in the number of Praetorian

cohorts may have been around AD 9 and the Varian disaster. Dio (56.23.2 – 3) tells us

that Augustus was greatly distressed over the loss of Varus’ legions and went to great

lengths to find new recruits for the army. Dio (56.23.3) indicates that these new

recruits were sent to Tiberius in Germany, but it is possible that Augustus retained

some of the newly recruited soldiers in Rome, forming two extra cohorts, which were

later disbanded when the perceived threat eased.

60

57 Keppie 1996, 108.

However, just because the

Praetorians were responsible for his elevation does not necessarily mean that Claudius

would increase their numbers. The large donative which Claudius issued on his

accession (Suet. Claud. 10.4; Joseph. AJ 19.247) was clearly enough to buy the

Praetorians’ loyalty, and the continuing monetary donatives (Dio 60.12.4) and other

rewards (Suet. Claud. 21.4) which Claudius gave to celebrate his accession seem to

have been enough to maintain their support. Indeed, the increase in the number of

cohorts may actually predate AD 41 and Claudius’ accession. Bohn observes that a

58 Letta (1978, 11) writes that his first tribunate was in a cohors IIII c. AD 14, followed by a similar rank in the cohors XI soon after AD 23. Dobson (1993a, 248) is inclined to Letta’s interpretation. 59 AE 1978 286. Two more suggestions of a similar nature have come from Echols (1958, 380), who proposes that initially Augustus’ Praetorian cohorts numbered twelve, three of which were later ‘hived off’ to form the cohortes urbanae and from Keppie (1996, 109), who suggests that Virgius served in a cohors XI, which is later known as the cohors XI urbanae. Virgius would then have been promoted from the Urban cohorts into the Praetorian Guard – a sequence of post holdings that became customary in later times. The distinction between the two units may not have been as rigid under Augustus as it was later to become. Rankov and Hook (1994, 5) are also inclined to the view that the last three Praetorian cohorts were simply redesignated as Urban Cohorts towards the end of Augustus’ reign. 60 Suet. Claud.10.1 – 4; Dio 60.1.1 – 4; Joseph. AJ 19.247; BJ 2.204 – 14; cf. Aur. Vict. Caes. 3.15. B.M. Coins, Rom. Emp. Vol. 1, 165 n. 5, 166 n. 8.

18

soldier named C. Iulius Zoili filius Montanus served in the XII Praetorian cohort.

Montanus originated in Heraclea Sintica in Macedonia and was clearly a peregrinus,

having acquired the civitas only recently, possibly on enlistment, because his father’s

name is still Greek. His praenomen is that of the emperor Gaius, which would indicate

that Gaius enfranchised him and therefore the increase in the number of Praetorian

cohorts must have occurred in or before his reign.61

During the civil wars of AD 69 Vitellius increased the number of cohorts to

sixteen (Tac. Hist. 2.93.2). However, Vespasian returned to the Augustan system of

nine cohorts, as attested by an inscription (CIL XVI 21 = ILS 1993) from AD 76. By

the end of the first century AD, a tenth Praetorian cohort reappears and Domitian has

been viewed as the most likely instigator of this increase,

62

The number of Praetorian cohorts remained at ten from the reign of Trajan until

the end of the third century AD.

although the possibility

that Nerva was responsible cannot be ruled out. Nerva experienced considerable

problems with the Praetorian Guard. The Praetorians were angered at the murder of

Domitian and demanded that Nerva hand over to them those responsible for his death.

Nerva refused but the soldiers continued their demands and eventually Petronius and

Parthenius were surrendered to the Guard, who subsequently had them killed (Dio

68.3.3 - 4; Pliny Pan. 6.1). Consequently, Nerva may have deemed that it would be

wise to increase the size of the Praetorian Guard with soldiers that were loyal to him.

63 The number of cohorts was decreased during the

reign of Diocletian (Aur. Vict. Caes. 39), while Constantine finally disbanded the

Praetorian Guard altogether, after they had backed his rival Maxentius, and chose not

to replace them with any other military force (Aur. Vict. Caes. 40; Zosimus 2.17.2).

The exact date for the disbanding of the Praetorian Guard is uncertain but it would

seem to have occurred by AD 318 and almost certainly by AD 331.64

Effective

i. The literary and epigraphic evidence

While we can be reasonably certain regarding the number of cohorts at any given time,

we are unfortunately poorly informed about the size of the individual cohorts. Each

61 Bohn 1883, 5 – 6. See CIL VI 2767 = ILS 2032. Durry (1968, 79) accepts Bohn’s theory, as does Syme (1939, 243). Keppie (1996, 111), on the contrary, is not convinced by this argument. 62 Durry 1968, 80 – 1; see Suet. Dom. 23: miles grauissime tulit. 63 CIL XVI 95, 98, 124, 135, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 156. 64 Sinnigen (1957, 35 n. 11, 91, 92 n. 21) argues that the most likely date would have been AD 318 when the Prefect of Rome was called away for a month for a meeting with the emperor, an indication perhaps that some important urban reform was pending.

19

cohort contained six centuriae and each had a cavalry component (equites Praetoriani)

similar to some of the auxiliary regiments.65 Until Durry’s work on the Praetorian

Guard in 1938, it was usually held, on the evidence of Dio (55.24.6), that under

Augustus the cohorts were 1000 men strong. Durry propounded the novel view that

under Augustus a Praetorian cohort was a cohors quingenaria equitata. Since that

time, Durry’s theory has been widely, but certainly not universally, accepted by

scholars.66

The earliest literary source to mention the actual effective of the Praetorian

Guard is Tacitus (Hist. 2.93.2). In a well-known passage regarding the changes that

Vitellius implemented on his arrival in Rome in AD 69, Tacitus writes: Insuper

confusus pravitate vel ambitu ordo militiae: sedecim praetoriae, quattuor urbanae

cohortes scribebantur, quis singula milia inessent.

67 Durry argues that Tacitus is

stating here that, not only was the number of cohorts extraordinary, but so was the

effective. “…le sens est: non seulement, on enrôlait seize cohortes prétoriennes et

quatre urbaines, mais encore chacune devait avoir 1000 hommes.”68 Durry supports

his argument with evidence from the second century AD Praetorian laterculi.69 (There

are no Praetorian laterculi from the first century AD.) From a study of these laterculi,

Durry concludes that the Praetorian cohorts were quingenaria until AD 193, at which

time Septimius Severus raised them to milliary strength. Consequently, Durry believes

that Dio’s statement (55.24.6) is anachronistic.70

However, a re-evaluation of the same laterculi has come up with some rather

different figures. Kennedy found that Durry failed to take account of mortality rates

65 Grant 1974, 88; Keppie 1996, 111. Speidel (1994, 31) suggests that Praetorians, serving as horsemen, would have numbered at least 400 and perhaps up to 1000 men. 66 For example, milliary cohorts: Mommsen 1879, 30 – 1; Richmond 1927, 13; Passerini 1939, 58 – 68; Africa 1971, 8 n. 25; Kennedy 1978, 288; Chilver 1979, 16 – 8; Campbell 1984, 162 n. 6; Speidel 1994, 31. Quingenary cohorts: Durry 1968, 81 – 7; Syme 1939, 243; Watson 1969, 17; Smith 1972, 487 – 8 and n. 37; Birley 1969, 64; LeBohec 1994, 21; Rankov and Hood 1994, 8; Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 40; Nippel 1995, 92; Keppie 1996, 112; Webster 1998, 97; Goldsworthy 2003, 58; Morgan 2006, 14; Southern 2007, 117. Gilliver (2007, 196) suggests that the original cohorts were quingenary, but raised to milliary by the time of Domitian. 67 “Besides this, the different classes of service were thrown into confusion by corruption and self seeking: sixteen praetorian, four city cohorts were enrolled with a quota of a thousand men each.” See also Tac. Hist. 2.67.1, 4.46.1; Suet. Vit. 10.1. 68 Durry 1968, 82. 69 Laterculi list the Praetorians by their cohorts and their centuries. They are lists compiled at the time of the honesta missio, which took place every two years and carried the date of entry into the service, the tria nomina – tribe, filiation and father, and their grade. 70 Durry 1968, 82 – 7. Syme (1939, 243) found that Durry’s theory helps explain Herodian’s account of the way in which Septimius Severus increased the garrison at Rome. Herodian (3.13.4) informs us that Severus multiplied the garrison by four. If Septimius Severus doubled the Praetorian Guard from 500 to 1000 and added the legio II Parthica, the numbers are almost trebled, which Syme (1939, 243) felt is close enough to Herodian’s statement. See also Birley (1969, 65) for a discussion of Herodian’s statement.

20

and losses through permanent disability over the sixteen or so years of a soldier’s

service. This means that Durry’s figures may be incorrect and his conclusions that the

Antonine cohorts were quingenaria have to be rejected. On the contrary, Kennedy

suggests that the cohorts were almost certainly milliary under the Antonine emperors

and from the figures obtained from the laterculi, that the size of the cohorts in the

Severan period was more likely to have been 1500 men, bringing them in line with the

Urban cohorts.71

Nevertheless, both Durry and Kennedy have demonstrated an increase in the

strength of the Guard in the late second century AD. Most scholars have followed

Durry in attributing this increase to Septimius Severus.

While instructive, regrettably neither of these studies is able to prove

beyond doubt the effective of the Praetorian cohorts in the first century AD.

72 Yet while there may be

abundant evidence to indicate that Severus dismissed the existing Praetorian

Guardsmen and replaced them with his own soldiers, drawn from his legions, there is

no written evidence to indicate that Severus actually increased the effective, so an

alternative explanation needs to be considered. Kennedy judges, from studying the

laterculi, that the increase took place between AD 144 and the end of the second

century AD. While clearly AD 193 fits this period, a possibility other than Severus

exists. Herodian (1.11.5) tells us that after his escape from Maternus’ plot, Commodus

surrounded himself with a stronger Guard. Of course, this could mean that Commodus

simply increased the numbers of Guardsmen on duty at any particular time, or

alternatively it may indicate that he increased the overall effective of the Praetorian

cohorts.73

ii. The archaeological evidence

From the above discussion, it is clear that literary and epigraphic evidence is either

insufficient or too unreliable to enable us to know, with any certainty, the effective of

the Praetorian Guard in the Julio-Claudian period. To overcome this problem,

numerous scholars have turned their attention to examining the size and layout of the

castra praetoria, which was specifically constructed in the reign of Tiberius (AD 14 –

71 Kennedy 1978, 286. See CIL VI 32515, 32516, 32518, 32519, 32520. Kennedy states that he followed Durry in excluding those laterculi that refer to periods involving abnormal warfare. Scheidel (1996, 126 n. 95) agrees with Kennedy that the cohorts in the Antonine period were milliary. However, he has explained that there is a major error in Kennedy’s analysis of the data. See also Bertinelli Angeli (1974, 3 – 12) who concluded her study with the comments “…certo è comunque che non può esserci proporzionalità alcuna fra il numero, in percentuale o assoluto, dei soldati missi honesta missione, che si ricava dai latercoli, e la reale consistenze sia della legione che della coorte pretoria, per la quale non rimane altro che far appello all’informazione letteraria.” 72 Durry 1968, 86. See for example Birley 1969, 64 – 6; 1972, 197; Smith 1972, 487 – 8. 73 Kennedy 1978, 296 – 8.

21

37) to house the Praetorian Guard and the Urban Cohorts.74 Unfortunately, the ground

that the castra praetoria occupied is still in use today. One-half of the previous

Praetorian camp continues to be used as a military establishment by the Italian Army

and the other half is now home to the Biblioteca Nazionale,75

The camp was constructed c. AD 21 – 23 during the Prefecture of the infamous

L. Aelius Seianus

hence excavation of the

site has been very limited.

76 (Sejanus). It was located on the Viminal Hill, overlooking the

city, beyond the pomerium between the via Tiburtina and the via Nomentana and was

built to the pattern of the camp of the Roman legion.77 The castra praetoria covered

16.72 hectares (440m x 380m). Investigation of the site carried out in 1873 revealed

barracks of two storeys. Contubernia, which were built into the fortress walls to

provide extra accommodation, have also been discovered.78

If we draw a straight comparison between the castra praetoria and a standard

legionary fortress, the castra praetoria could easily have housed some 5000 men.

However, the question

remains as to whether we have enough archaeological evidence to draw any definite

conclusions about the effective of each cohort.

79

Due to the proximity of the castra praetoria to Rome, it probably did not require a

headquarters building, a legate’s house or a granary, so we can assume that a garrison

of around 6 – 7000 men was possible.80 Clearly, the castra praetoria would have had

no difficulties housing twelve quingenaria cohorts (nine Praetorian and three Urban)

or approximately 6000 soldiers. In addition, assuming cohorts of 500 men, the

increase in the size of the Praetorian Guard from nine to at least twelve cohorts, or

approximately an extra 1500 men, should also have been relatively easily

accommodated. Certainly, the increased number of cohorts did not result in any

enlargement of the ground area of the fortress.81

However, the castra praetoria may well have been able to hold many more

soldiers. As noted above, barrack buildings of two storeys have been discovered.

Kennedy estimates that barracks of two storeys would have provided accommodation

74 See Tac. Hist. 3.84. 1 – 3, Ann. 4.2.; Pliny HN 3.67; Suet. Tib. 37.1; Dio 57.19.6; Aur. Vict. Caes. 2. For a more detailed description of the castra praetoria see Appendix Two. 75 Small sections of the external walls of the Praetorian camp can be viewed from inside both of these establishments, and under the Library buildings, one can still see the inner buildings of the Praetorian camp. Access to these remains, however, is not permitted. 76 See PIR2 A 255. 77 Nash 1981, 221. 78 Richmond 1927, 13. 79 Keppie 1996, 111 – 2. 80 Richmond 1927, 12; Keppie 1996, 112. 81 Kennedy (1978, 286) suggests that the increase may not necessarily have led to overcrowding as the Urban cohorts may have been moved out. However, this is not supported by any evidence.

22

for about 10 000 soldiers.82

Extra accommodation would also have been made available with contubernia

built into the outer walls of the camp. If these chambers were present in the entire

perimeter, it has been estimated that there would have been around 340 of them.

The question that is yet to be answered with any precision

is when these two storey barracks were constructed. Were they part of the original

design or later additions as the number of cohorts and their effective increased?

Assuming they were part of the original design, we would have to assume that the

camp was constructed to hold more than just twelve cohorts of 500 men.

83

With the standard eight men to each contubernium, there would be accommodation for

at least a further 2500 soldiers.84 Combining the accommodation provided by the two

storey barracks and the contubernia, the castra praetoria should have been able to

accommodate twelve milliary cohorts (nine Praetorian and three Urban) from the

outset.85

However, if the Praetorian Guard and the Urban cohorts were both milliary

from the beginning this would mean that the castra praetoria would have had to

accommodate c. 15 000 soldiers after the number of Praetorian cohorts had been

increased. Of course milliary cohorts did not necessarily contain 1000 men therefore,

15 000 is the highest figure possible. Kennedy views it as debatable whether the camp

would have been sufficient for 15 000 men in the third century AD without the

addition of a third storey,

86

The addition of a third storey is certainly not impossible. The barracks would

have resembled the tenements of both Rome and Ostia.

thus it seems unlikely to have been adequate for so many in

the first century AD. Another point to consider is that if Dio (52.24.6) is correct and

the Urban cohorts numbered 6000 in the reign of Augustus, the castra praetoria would

have been required to hold 18 000 soldiers by the time Gaius increased the number of

Praetorian cohorts. This seems like an impossibly large figure.

87 Richmond notes the

heightening of the outer enclosure walls at various times, for one of which he proposes

a Caracallan date, perhaps the intention here was to overtop the highest of the internal

buildings,88

82 Kennedy 1978, 287.

which may indicate buildings of three storeys at this time. However, when

this putative third storey was built is not known.

83 Durry 1968, 53. 84 See Bingham 1998, 275. 85 Rankov and Hood (1994, 6) suggests that a capacity of 12 000 men may have been possible. 86 Kennedy 1978, 287. 87 Packer (1971, 83) proposes that the Vigiles’ barracks at Ostia had three floors 88 Richmond 1927, 22; Kennedy 1978, 287.

23

However, it is possible that it was never the intention to concentrate the entire

Praetorian Guard within the castra praetoria. A legionary fortress was usually about

20 hectares in size, but the fortress at Bostra was only 16.5 hectares,89 closer in

keeping with the size of the castra praetoria, and there is ample evidence for

detachments of the legion being scattered throughout the province.90 Perhaps, then,

the castra praetoria was built to a size that assumed the permanent out-posting of

sizable detachments. Unfortunately, it is simply not possible to estimate how many

troops these out-postings may have involved, hence it is also not possible to know how

much this relieved the pressure on the accommodation within the castra praetoria.

Later, pressure on accommodation could also have been eased with the right of

conubium that was granted by Septimius Severus; married soldiers may have been

allowed to live outside the barracks.91

Therefore, based on the archaeological evidence, one would probably have to

assume that the Praetorian cohorts were quingenaria in the Julio-Claudian period,

particularly as 500 “…was the standard size for a cohort at this time, in the legions and

among the auxiliary infantry forces.”

92 However, this interpretation is not without its

problems and is based solely on the large numbers of soldiers that the camp would

have been required to hold when the Praetorian Guard was increased to at least twelve

cohorts. Nonetheless, because such debate exists, it will be necessary to take into

account the possibility that they numbered 1000 men when analyzing their military

contribution in AD 69. In addition, it will be interesting to note if it is possible to

estimate the likely effective of the Praetorian Guard, based on their success, or

otherwise, in the battles in which they were involved in AD 69.93

Location

Suetonius (Aug. 49.1), in his discussion of the disposition of the military forces of the

Empire under Augustus, writes:…ceterum numerum partim in urbis partim in sui

custodiam adlegit…neque tamen umquam plures quam tres cohortes in urbe esse

passus est easque sine castris, reliquas in hiberna et aestiva circa finitima oppida

dimittere assuerat.94

89 Parker 2000, 134.

This passage has usually been interpreted to mean that only three

90 The evidence is most conveniently located in Kennedy 2004, 217 – 24, especially 220 – 1. 91 Kennedy 1978, 287. 92 Keppie 1996, 112. See also Rankov and Hood 1994, 8. LeBohec (1994, 21) believes that the archaeological evidence is decisive and that the Praetorian cohorts were up to 500 men strong. 93 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the battles, in which the Praetorian Guard was involved. 94 “…(Augustus) employed the remainder partly in the defence of the city and partly in that of his own person… However, he never allowed more than three cohorts to remain in the city and even those were

24

of the nine Praetorian cohorts were stationed in Rome at any given time.95 However,

two alternative interpretations have been suggested. Firstly, that Suetonius is telling us

that the three Urban cohorts were kept at Rome and that all the Praetorian cohorts were

located outside the city,96 or secondly, that the three cohorts which remained in the city

were perhaps a combination of Urban and Praetorian units and were rotated on a four

year cycle.97 Neither of these two alternative interpretations has been broadly accepted

by scholars. Nevertheless, they probably should not be dismissed so quickly,

especially as Suetonius’ narrative (Aug. 49.1) does not rule out the possibility that the

cohorts remaining in the city could have been either Praetorian or Urban or some

combination of both. In addition, it does seem a little strange for Augustus to have

enlisted Urban cohorts and then not keep at least one of them in Rome, especially

given their responsibility for the general security of the city.98

In addition, Keppie states that “there is no secure epigraphic evidence for the

presence of the Guard in Augustus’ reign,”

If Augustus stationed

them outside the capital, what was the purpose of creating them in the first instance?

99

Grant proposes that Augustus did not retain all the Praetorian cohorts in Rome

because he may have felt that a concentration of all the cohorts would have constituted

a danger rather than a protection to his life. Having them all together may have

tempted other potential leaders to corrupt their loyalty.

so perhaps Suetonius does in fact mean

that all the Praetorian cohorts were initially billeted outside the city. There are also

few literary references to the Praetorian Guard before AD 14, although this may be

explained by the lack of literary sources for this period. Nonetheless, it does seem that

there were Praetorians present in Rome when Augustus died in AD 14 (Tac. Ann. 1.7;

Dio 56.42.1, 57.2.2), though this does not mean that all the cohorts in Rome at that

time were Praetorian.

100

without a permanent camp; the rest he regularly sent to winter or summer quarters in the towns near Rome.”

However, it should be noted

95 For example see Passerini 1939, 49 n. 1; Durry 1968, 43 n. 2; Echols 1958, 379; Grant 1974, 88 – 9; Gilliver 2007, 196. Echols (1958, 380) argues that the three units of the Guard stationed in Rome regularly accompanied Augustus when he left the city, leaving no Praetorians in Rome at those times. He bases this claim on the fact that M. Agrippa in 21 BC and Saturninus in 19 BC were unable to control the serious riots, which resulted from election disputes. 96 Mench 1968, 10. 97 Fries (1967, 38) citing the view of Pflaum. “Bedenkt man allerdings, daß von den insgesmt 12 Kohorten (neun der Prätorianer – und drei der Stadtkohorten) sich jeweils nur drei in Rom aufhalten durften, so ergeben sich bei Berücksichtigung der Ablösung je vier Abteilungen, die in vierteljärigem Turnus wechselten.” 98 For more information on the role of the Urban cohorts see pp 44 – 8. 99 Keppie 1996, 116 and n.112. “I have counted some 50 praetorians who may belong in the Guard of Augustus, Tiberius, Gaius or Claudius. It is difficult to be sure that a man was serving before AD 14.” 100 Grant 1974, 89.

25

that Tiberius, who was far more obsessed with his personal safety than Augustus, did

not seem to feel that having all the Guard together in the city was a danger to his life.

Alternatively, Augustus may have been eager not to give the impression of ruling by

force of arms. In Republican times, armed men under official military command

would not normally be present in Rome, except on special occasions such as the

celebrations surrounding a triumph. Therefore, an armed force surrounding Augustus

may have been viewed as un-Republican.101 Kerr suggests a much more practical

reason behind Augustus’ decision, namely that the distribution of soldiers was because

there were no barracks readily available in Rome and Augustus was unwilling to spend

the money constructing such a facility.102

Unfortunately, Suetonius (Aug. 49.1) does not tell us in which towns the

Praetorian cohorts were billeted, describing them as finitima oppida. Keppie thinks

that towns such as Ostia, Tibur, Praeneste, Antium, Terracina or even Alba Fucens

could be candidates.

Certainly, finding accommodation in Rome

for all the soldiers may have been a difficult task, so to spread the burden the troops

may have been distributed throughout the towns surrounding the capital.

103 Regrettably, epigraphy offers little help because few

inscriptions of the appropriate date have been found. Some interesting but problematic

inscriptions, however, have been found at Ostia where several epitaphs report members

of a VI cohort (CIL XIV 215, 223, 4494 = ILS 9494, 4495). One soldier from this

cohort was given a public funeral and a site for his tomb was paid for by the city of

Ostia because he died attempting to extinguish a fire (CIL XIV 4494 = ILS 9494). If

these inscriptions have been correctly dated to the Augustan period, they would

indicate the presence of a Praetorian cohort in Ostia before their concentration in the

castra praetoria.104 However, Keppie is inclined to think that all the inscriptions from

Ostia, including this one, may be dated later than the Augustan period, “perhaps much

later.”105

101 Echols 1958, 379; Grant 1974, 89; Rankov and Hook 1994, 4; Keppie 1998, 153. LeBohec (1994, 20) proposes that Augustus distributed the troops throughout the cities of Latium until the inhabitants of Rome became accustomed to seeing armed men in the streets.

If Keppie is correct in his dating here, the presence in Ostia of these

inscriptions would indicate that Praetorian cohorts might well have been billeted in

Ostia after the construction of the castra praetoria, although clearly it does not rule out

the possibility that Praetorian cohorts were billeted there in Augustus’ time also.

102 Kerr 1992, 9. 103 Keppie 1996, 115. See Durry (1968, 44) for other possible locations. 104 Vaglieri (Not. Scav. 1912, 23) attributes ILS 9494 to the Augustan period owing to the low level at which it stands. Ashby (1912, 157 – 8) agrees with Vaglieri’s dating. Meiggs (1973, 46) suggests that a Praetorian cohort may have been stationed in Ostia because Augustus used the harbour more than once in his travels. See Suet Aug. 82.1: Si quo pervenire mari posset, potius navigabat. 105 Keppie 1996, 115 n. 106.

26

More solid epigraphic evidence has been discovered at Aquileia in the north

east of Italy, where fourteen epitaphs of early members of the Praetorian Guard have

been found over the last two centuries.106 These inscriptions are evidence of the

presence, at Aquileia, of Praetorian cohorts numbered II (one example), VI (3), VII

(three or four), VIII (four) and VIIII (one).107 Dessau suggests that under Augustus

three cohorts were permanently based at Aquileia, three at Rome, and three in a yet to

be identified northern Italian town.108 A pre-existing Praetorian presence at Aquileia

would certainly help to explain the speed with which the infantry component of

Drusus’ Praetorian force reached the borders of Pannonia in response to the mutinies,

which broke out on the accession of his father, Tiberius, in AD 14.109 The number of

inscriptions seems to indicate that a contingent of the Guard was stationed there over a

long period, certainly long enough for a cemetery for its members to be established and

to grow to some size.110

By the time of Tiberius’ reign, we begin to find a number of references in our

ancient sources, to the location of the Guard, although they provide us with little more

than a general description. Dio (57.19.6) writing about the year AD 20, notes that the

Praetorians were posted separately, just like the Vigiles, in different wards of the city.

Tacitus (Ann. 4.2) informs us that before the construction of the castra praetoria, the

Praetorian cohorts had been dispersas per urbem and Suetonius (Tib. 37.1) writes that

before Tiberius built their camp, the Guard per hospitia dispersae continerentur. From

these three passages, it would seem that under Tiberius, just prior to their concentration

in the castra praetoria, the majority of the Praetorian Guard was located throughout

the city of Rome. While the bulk of the Praetorian cohorts were initially stationed

outside Rome (Suet. Aug. 49.1), there had probably been over the years a gradual

transfer of troops to the capital.

111

However, our three sources are clearly talking only about troops stationed in

Rome at that time and as a result do not rule out the possibility that other members of

the Praetorian Guard continued to be stationed outside the capital. The aforementioned

inscriptions from Aquiliea, of which Keppie states that it is an undoubted fact that they

are certainly pre-Claudian, may also represent an out-posting of Praetorians after the

106 Keppie 2007, 36. See n. 43 for a list of these inscriptions. 107 Keppie 1996, 115. Keppie, (1996, 115 n. 108) notes that an early inscription to a member of an unidentified cohors XII (CIL V 905) has also been discovered at Aquileia. 108 Dessau 1975 Vol. 1, 257 109 Keppie 1996, 115. Levick (1986, 71 – 73, 247 n. 8) discusses the chronological implications. 110 Keppie 1996, 115 – 6. 111 Keppie 1996, 116.

27

construction of the castra praetoria.112 This may also be the case for the inscriptions

from Ostia discussed above, which Keppie believes may be dated much later than the

Augustan period.113

The castra praetoria remained the home of the Praetorian Guard and the Urban

cohorts until the Praetorians were disbanded by Constantine (Aur. Vict. Caes. 40;

Zosimus 2.17.2). However, in AD 270 the emperor Aurelian constructed the castra

urbana on the Campus Martius specifically to house the Urban cohorts.

Therefore, the permanent out-posting of small garrisons of

Praetorians, in towns surrounding Rome may have been standard practice even after

the construction of their permanent barracks on the outskirts of the city.

114

Recruitment

There is no conclusive evidence available to indicate from where a Republican

proconsul might recruit the members of his cohors praetoria; he presumably chose

them from among the legions assigned to him in his province. Alternatively, they may

have been conscripts, volunteers or his clients and friends. During the civil wars of the

late first century BC, the new cohortes praetoriae of Antony and Octavian were either

made up principally of time-served soldiers who chose to remain on active service or

they were recruited directly from their legions.115

However, following the Battle of Actium, the legions, which had been at least

one source of recruits for the Praetorian cohorts, were permanently posted on the

frontiers and in the provinces. Consequently, Augustus may have simply found it

easier to recruit men who were available locally, and hence under the Empire the

Praetorian Guard may have been recruited directly from civilian life. Certainly, no

epigraphic evidence exists from the early Empire, with the exception of AD 69, that

suggests that soldiers were transferred from their legions to the Praetorian Guard.

Recruits were usually between the ages of 18 and 20, with a resultant mean of around

19 years of age.

116 Due to the better service conditions enjoyed by the Praetorian

Guard, recruits were doubtless always volunteers.117

112 Keppie 1996, 116.

It can also safely be assumed that

candidates for the Praetorian Guard had to be of free birth and Roman citizens.

113 Keppie 1996, 115 n. 106. 114 Echols 1958, 384. 115 Keppie 1983, 33. 116 Scheidel 1996, 111; 2007, 426. Durry (1968, 239 – 57) and Passerini (1939, 146 – 91) provide comprehensive accounts of the geographical and social origins of the Praetorian Guard from its inception until the end of the third century AD. See also Šašel 1972, 474 – 80 and Scheidel 1992, 281 – 97. 117 Brunt 1990a, 194. For a discussion of the service conditions of the Praetorian Guard see pp 29 – 36.

28

Indeed, Tacitus (Ann. 4.5) provides an explicit statement about the recruiting

grounds for the Praetorian and Urban cohorts in AD 23:…insideret urbem proprius

miles, tres urbanae, novem praetoriae cohortes, Etruria ferme Umbriaque delectae aut

vetere Latio et coloniis antiquitus Romanis.118 However, if this had ever been official

policy it seems that it was quickly relaxed. Dio (56.23.4) notes that there were Gauls

and Germans serving “in the praetorian guard,” who were released along with

Augustus’ German bodyguard following the Varian disaster. Inscriptions dated to the

Augustan period, or at least to a pre-Claudian date, found at Aquileia,119

Inscriptions also attest the presence of non-Italians in the Praetorian Guard

from an early period, although they are not securely dated. They include a Norican

(CIL III 4838 = ILS 2033), two Macedonians (CIL VI 2645 = ILS 2030; CIL VI 2767 =

ILS 2032), and possibly two soldiers from Narbonensis (CIL VI 2763; ILS 2023),

while Pliny (HN 25.17) has written about a Spanish Guardsman.

record

Guardsmen born at Bononia (two), Faesulae, Suessa, Cremona, Mutina, Florentia,

Fanum, Urvinum, Albintimilium and Perusia. Of these places only six or just over

half, would satisfy the recruiting area outlined by Tacitus. The recruiting ground was

further extended by Claudius when he granted the right of citizenship to the Anauni

(an Alpine tribe) because its members were already serving in the Praetorian Guard

(CIL V 5050 = ILS 206).

120 Moreover,

according to Aurelius Victor (Caes. 3.15), the centurion121 who discovered Claudius

hiding behind a curtain in the Palace after the assassination of Gaius came from Epirus.

While some provincials clearly served in the Guard in the Julio-Claudian period, there

is no means of knowing the exact proportion of provincials to Italians.122

Despite the disruptions of AD 69, the Praetorian Guard continued to be

overwhelmingly Italian.

123

118 “…the capital possessed a standing army of its own: three urban and nine praetorian cohorts, recruited in the main from Etruria and Umbria and Old Latium and the earlier Roman colonies.”

Furthermore, from the examination of laterculi under

Hadrian, it appears that the Guard still consisted of 89% Italians, while soldiers from

the provinces accounted for just 11%. Under Antoninus Pius, the percentage of

Italians serving in the Guard increased to 94%, with just 6% with a provincial

119 See n. 43. 120 Syme (1939, 246) also quotes ILS 2027 as an early example of a Praetorian Guardsman from Spain. 121 Aurelius names the centurion as Vimius. Vimius is not mentioned by Suetonius (Claud. 10.2 – 3) or Dio (60.1.2 – 3), while Josephus (AJ. 19.3.1) calls him Gratus. 122 Durry (1968, 256) believes that the transformation of the recruitment in the Guard runs parallel to that of recruitment into the legions, but at a much slower pace. A theory rejected by Syme (1939, 245 – 6) because Durry accepted the idea that Vespasian excluded Italians from the legions “without demur.” 123 See Tac. Hist. 2.67.1, 2.93, 4.46.1; Suet. Vit. 10. See also Passerini 1939, 169 – 71.

29

origin.124

It was the reforms of Septimius Severus in the late second century AD that

finally brought significant changes to the geographical origins of the Praetorian Guard.

Severus dismissed the Praetorians: since they had murdered and not avenged the

emperor Pertinax, they were tainted with treason (Dio 74.10.1 – 3; Herodian 2.13.6 –

7; SHA. Sev. 6.11). In their place Severus took his legionaries, the men who had made

him emperor, from the Danubian frontier and a great surge of Thracians and Illyrians

inundated the Rome cohorts. Dio (75.2.6) tells us how shocked and horrified the

citizens of Rome were at these new hideous and terrifying Praetorians.

It should be noted however, that these figures are not true statistics but

simply possible indicators based on a small number of epitaphs and the chance

survival of evidence. If the epitome of Dio (75.2.4) is accurate, just before the arrival

of Septimius Severus in Rome, the Praetorian Guard was being recruited from Italy,

Spain, Macedonia and Noricum.

125 Epigraphy

and nomenclature supply adequate confirmation of a change in the origin of the Guard

at this time.126 However, this does not mean that Italians never served in the Guard

again. Even in the third century AD some Guardsmen of Italian origin can still be

detected (CIL XVI 147, 153). They may well have been ex-legionaries since some

recruitment for the legions, in Italy, is recorded during and after the reign of

Severus.127

While there is relatively abundant evidence for the geographical origins of the

Praetorian Guard, there is only scant evidence for their social origins because

unfortunately, the city stated as the origin for a Praetorian Guardsman is no guide as to

his social class. However, it seems likely that the majority of the rank and file of the

Praetorians would have come from the lower social strata. Dio (52.27.4 – 5) makes

Maecenas advise Augustus to enrol in the army the hardiest of men who are most

likely to gain their livelihood through brigandage if they were not engaged in military

service. It is likely that Maecenas’ advice is related more to the conditions in Dio’s

own time than to those of the Augustan period. Millar notes that Maecenas’ speech is

“…a serious, coherent, and fairly comprehensive plan for coping with what Dio

124 Durry 1968, 246. See CIL VI 32515 (Hadrian), 32519, 32520 (Antoninus Pius). 125 See also Tacitus (Hist. 2.88.1 - 2, 93.1, 99.1) who portrays a negative picture of the legionaries from the German frontier that entered Rome with Vitellius in AD 69. 126 Syme 1939, 246. Benefiel (2001, 226), in her evaluation of a newly discovered fragment of a third century AD Praetorian laterculus, found that the text of this inscription is characteristic of other third century AD laterculi. Twelve out of fifteen soldiers in this inscription came from the border provinces of Pannonia, Dacia, Moesia and Thracia. The other three were from Tarsus, Caesarea Germanicia and Carthage. These demographics agree with the statistics compiled by Passerini (1939, 175 – 7), who found that the majority of the third century AD Guard originated in Pannonia, Moesia and Thrace. 127 Brunt 1990a, 193 n. 23.

30

conceived to be the evils of his time” and that Dio’s comments about brigandage are a

clear reference to what happened in Italy when Severus ceased to recruit the Praetorian

cohorts locally.128 Dio (77.10.1 – 7) possibly had in mind the adherents of Bulla who

pillaged Italy for two years. However, this does not make Dio’s observations incorrect

for the Augustan period. Tacitus (Ann. 4.4) has Tiberius complain that the men who

tended to volunteer for service within the army were often “the destitute and the

vagrant.” Moreover, the conduct of the Praetorians under Commodus and in AD 193

does not indicate that they were any better.129 Dio (74.8.1) and Herodian (2.2.2, 2.4.4)

intimate that under Commodus the Guardsmen had been engaged in plunder and in AD

193 the Praetorians murdered Pertinax and then auctioned off the Empire to the highest

bidder (Dio 74.9.1 – 11.6). All of this evidence supports the notion that the Praetorian

soldiers were drawn from the elements within the population that may well have turned

to banditry for their livelihood if a career in the army was denied to them.130

There is evidence, which indicates that some Praetorians did, however, belong

to the provincial bourgeoisie. Durry

131 quotes several examples, which include the

father of one Praetorian who was a duumvir at Novianum Vetus (CIL IX 2772), the

brother of another who was a quatuoruir (CIL V 2069) and the eques of the first cohort

who was a decurion in his village at the age of 4 (CIL IX 3573)! However, these

Praetorians are likely to be the exception.132 It is probably more accurate to assume

that there may have been a preference to enlist those from military families, the sons of

evocati, or of legionaries, or of sailors.133

What is also worth briefly noting is that the majority of the Praetorian soldiers

were most probably poorly educated, often illiterate and living at a time where

credulity was widespread and omens, portents and ‘signs’ were all part of everyday

life.

Length and Conditions of Service

From the time of Augustus, Roman emperors depended heavily on the support of the

imperial Praetorian Guard to maintain their position. It comes as no surprise then, that

the Guard were, from the very beginning, privileged above all other soldiers. A soldier

128 Millar 1964, 106 – 9, 76. See also Brunt 1990a, 193. 129 Contra Dio 75 .2.4 – 6. 130 Brunt 1990a, 193 n. 23, 194. Goldsworthy (2003, 76) writes “…service in the ranks seems to have been most attractive to the poorer sections of society.” 131 Durry 1968, 253. 132 Passerini, 1939, 164 – 9; Syme 1939, 247; Durry 1968, 253; Brunt 1990a, 193 n. 23 133 Durry 1968, 253. See CIL III 4487; JÖAI (Jahreshefte) 1933, 138 – 9, fig. 69; CIL VI 2491.

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in the Praetorian Guard could look forward to higher rates of pay, better conditions and

service in Rome as compared to military duties in a remote province, perhaps with the

enemy nearby.134

The Praetorian Guardsmen served fewer years than did their legionary

counterparts. According to Dio (54.25.6), in 13 BC Augustus decreed that the

Praetorians would serve for a period of twelve years and legionaries for sixteen years.

By AD 5, the length of service was increased to sixteen years for Praetorians and

twenty years for the soldiers in the legions (Dio 55.23.1).

135 This period of twenty

years for a legionary did not include their additional employment, usually a further five

years as evocati. It was also not uncommon to find Praetorians serving for longer than

their prescribed sixteen years. Up until the end of the second century AD Praetorians

were only discharged every two years, so soldiers that enlisted in an odd year would

serve for seventeen years as a standard. Furthermore, when an emperor was short of

finances and wanted to economise on the retirement entitlements, or when he was

engaged on an expedition, retirement was suspended. This occurred under Marcus

Aurelius who, during his wars on the Danube, did not allow retirements in AD 166 and

170.136 By the third century AD, the Praetorians were sent to join the legions and

legionaries join the Guard, hence the duration of their service is obscured. Inscriptions

indicate that one soldier served in the legions for six years and twenty-one years in the

Guard (CIL VI 2697), and another soldier served for ten years in the legions and

twenty-five years with the Praetorians (CIL VI 32660).137

Besides their shorter service period, the Praetorian Guardsmen also received

substantially more pay than legionaries did.

138

134 It has long been assumed that service in the Praetorian cohorts, either in the ranks or as centurions, also ensured better prospects of promotion over men who served as legionary centurions and who had been promoted through the ranks or directly commissioned as centurions. See Domaszewski, 1967, 103, 195; Durry 1968, 140 – 6, 191. However, this theory has been convincingly found lacking by Birley (1988a, 189 – 205) and Dobson and Breeze (1993, 88 – 112).

However, ascertaining the actual

amounts involved is not simple and requires some speculation. For the year 27 BC,

Dio (53.11.5) informs us that Augustus’ first decree gave the Praetorians double the

135 Kennedy (1978, 295), in his study of Praetorian laterculi, demonstrates that in both AD 69 and 193 legionaries, recruited to the Guard, were not expected to serve as Praetorians for the remainder of their twenty five years (twenty years prior to Vespasian), for which they had originally enlisted. Neither did they have to serve in the Guard for the sixteen years required of direct recruits to that unit. They were simply required to serve only the balance of sixteen years over their service with the legions. 136 Durry 1968, 263. See CIL VI 2380, 2381. 137 Kennedy (1978, 293) feels that this text may be corrupt and that the time he spent in the Praetorian Guard should be amended to eleven or twelve years. Then his service would have been six years in the legions, eleven or twelve in the Guard and four or five years as an evocatus. 138 Durry (1968, 272) suggests that the higher rate of Praetorian pay was in part justified by the fact that the cost of living would have been higher in Rome and that the uniforms worn by the Praetorian Guard would need to be replaced on a more regular basis.

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pay that the legionaries received.139 At that time the legionaries were earning 225

denarii per year (Tac. Ann. 1.7). Therefore, if we take Dio’s statement at face value, it

would imply that Praetorian pay was 450 denarii a year.140 These figures, it seems,

were quickly increased. By the death of Augustus in AD 14, it has been estimated that

the Praetorians were receiving 750 denarii per year and the soldiers of the Urban

cohorts 375 denarii, while the legionaries’ pay rate remained at 225 denarii.141

It was not until shortly before Domitian’s German campaign that the

legionaries of the Roman army received a pay increase (Suet. Dom. 7.3). By adding a

fourth stipendium, Domitian effectively increased pay by one third. Therefore,

legionary pay increased to approximately 300 denarii.

142 Although the Praetorians are

not specifically mentioned, it seems very unlikely that they did not receive an increase

on the same scale as the legionaries. Certainly, the Praetorians were deeply grieved

and angered by the murder of Domitian (Suet. Dom. 23.1; Dio 68.3.3 - 4; Pliny Pan.

6.1) and one can speculate that they might not have felt so strongly about Domitian’s

murder if he had refused them the pay rise he gave to the legionaries. If the

Praetorians did receive the same increase in pay, it has been estimated that this would

have effectively taken Praetorian pay to 1000 denarii per year.143

The next certain increase in army pay was under Septimius Severus (Herodian

3.8.4), although Durry has conjectured that the pay of the Praetorians was increased by

Commodus who added a fifth stipendium.

144 However, Brunt argues that the direct

accounts are against Durry’s hypothesis.145 In addition, Passerini suggests that

Herodian would not have failed to note an increase in pay under Commodus if such an

increase had occurred.146 How large the pay increase was under Severus is unknown

and numerous suggestions have been forwarded over the years. In 1938 Durry

proposed that Severus increased Praetorian pay to 1700 denarii,147

139 Brunt (1950, 55) following Domaszewski, argues however, that Dio has “misunderstood his authority” and that Augustus doubled the existing rate of pay of Praetorian soldiers rather than paying them twice the rate of the legionaries. See also Campbell 1984, 110. Note that all figures quoted refer to the rate of pay of a private. Promotion through the ranks resulted in higher rates of annual pay.

while Brunt

140 Passerini (1939, 105) proposes that the rate for Praetorians was 480 denarii, since the legionaries pay had not been precisely doubled from its old rate of 120 denarii. 141 See Brunt 1950, 71; Durry 1968, 265 – 7; Watson 1969, 97 – 8; Grant 1974, 92; LeBohec 1994, 212. Speidel (1992, 88) and Goldsworthy (2003, 94) discuss legionary pay rates only. 142 See Passerini 1939, 108; Brunt 1950, 71; Durry 1968, 266 – 7; Speidel 1992, 88; Le Bohec 1994, 212; Goldsworthy 2003, 94; Southern 2007, 115. 143 See Brunt 1950, 71; Durry 1968 266 – 7; Watson 1969, 98; Le Bohec 1994, 212; Southern 2007, 115. 144 Durry 1968, 266 – 7. 145 Brunt 1950, 56. 146 Passerini 1946, 109 and n. 2. 147 Durry 1968, 266 - 7.

33

speculates that Severus increased Praetorian pay to 1668 denarii, legionary pay to 500

denarii, and pay for the Urban cohorts to 833 denarii.148

After the increase by Severus, the next pay rise that is known to us occurred

under Caracalla (Dio 78.36.3) Again, the actual increase is unclear, but Brunt

following Durry suggests that Praetorian pay rose to 2500 denarii, while pay in the

Urban cohorts increased to 1250 denarii and legionary pay to 750 denarii.

149 Le

Bohec quotes slightly different figures of 2250 denarii for Praetorians, 1125 denarii

for the Urban cohorts and between 6 – 700 denarii for the legionaries.150 The final rise

in the soldier’s pay occurred under Maximinus Thrax, who according to Herodian

(6.8.8) doubled their pay. This would effectively take the basic pay of the legionaries

to 1800 denarii on Speidel’s calculations.151

In terms of praemia militiae Praetorians also seem to have received

substantially more than their legionary counterparts. In AD 6, a proposal by Augustus

concerning time-expired veterans awarded 5000 denarii to the Praetorians and 3000

denarii to the legionaries (Dio 55.23.1). The praemia was increased to 5000 denarii

for legionaries and 6250 denarii for the Praetorian Guard under Caracalla (Dio

77.24.1). Whether this was the first increase since Augustus is unknown.

If the Praetorian Guard received a similar

increase in pay, their basic pay would be approximately 5000 denarii based on Brunt’s

suggested Praetorian pay under Caracalla. However, perhaps what is more important

for this study than the exact pay rates is that it can be demonstrated that Praetorian

Guardsmen received a consistently and considerably higher basic pay than did the

soldiers serving in the legions.

In addition, the Praetorian Guardsmen were also better treated in the

distribution of donativa. Not only did they receive more per man, but also some

donatives were given to the Praetorians alone. As time went by the donatives to the

Praetorians became more frequent and disproportionately greater. These payments

were unconnected with regular pay and depended heavily on the political

circumstances of the time and the situation in which the reigning emperor found

himself.

148 Brunt 1950, 56 – 7. Le Bohec (1994, 212) quotes figures of 1500 denarii for the Praetorian Guard, 450 denarii for the legionaries and 750 denarii for the Urban cohorts. Watson (1969, 98) put Praetorian pay at 1500 denarii after the increase by Severus. Speidel (1992, 88) speculates that legionary pay under Septimius Severus was closer to 600 denarii, while Goldsworthy (2003, 94) proposes 450 denarii for legionaries under Severus. 149 Durry 1968, 267; Brunt 1950, 71. 150 Le Bohec 1994, 212. Watson (1969, 98) also quotes a figure of 2250 denarii for Praetorians under Caracalla. Speidel (1992, 88) put legionary pay, by the time of Caracalla, at 900 denarii. Goldsworthy (2003, 94) is in agreement with Speidel’s figures. 151 Speidel 1992, 88.

34

Initially, Augustus seems to have managed to rein in the tradition of exorbitant

donatives that were common in the late Republic.152

On his accession, Gaius followed Tiberius’ example and doubled his

predecessors’ legacies, at least for the Praetorian Guard (Dio 59.2.2). The unique

circumstances surrounding Claudius’ accession dictated special measures and ensured

that the Praetorians received the immense sum of 3750 denarii (Suet. Claud. 10.4),

while Josephus (AJ 19.247) quotes an even higher figure of 5000 drachmai. Suetonius

(Claud. 10.4) mentions only the promise of money to the Guard, but it seems unlikely

that no other troops received a donative.

In 29 BC he gave 250 denarii to

120 000 of his veterans (Dio 44.46; SHA. Sev. 7.6), and Dio (55.6.4) tells us that in 8

BC Augustus granted a donative to the army to mark the entry of his grandson Gaius

Caesar into public life, although which branches of the army benefited are not

specified. In his will Augustus left 250 denarii per man to the Praetorians, 125 denarii

to the Urban cohorts and 75 denarii to the legionaries and the auxiliaries (Tac. Ann.

1.8; Suet. Aug. 101.2). Tiberius continued Augustus’ example of moderation, although

he did double the legacies left by Augustus in his own name (Suet. Tib. 48.2; Dio

57.5.3, 6.4), but he left the very same amounts as Augustus in his will (Suet. Tib. 76;

Dio 59.2.2). However, the grant of 1000 denarii by Tiberius to the Praetorians, in

order to reward their loyalty following the fall of Sejanus (Suet. Tib. 48.2; Dio 58.18.2

– 3), marked a dramatic increase in imperial benevolence.

153

As Campbell so correctely notes, Claudius’ donative was significant in two

ways. Firstly, the immense amount of the gift was in stark contrast to the

comparatively moderate amounts given previously. Secondly, with the exception of

Tiberius’ donative to the Praetorians following the fall of Sejanus, previous donatives

had been in the form of a voluntary grant, mainly testamentary bequests. Claudius’

payment established the idea that a new emperor should pay a donative in his own

right. It cannot have gone unnoticed that Claudius, an unlikely aspirant to the throne,

had managed to secure his succession based on a huge donative.

Indeed, Josephus (AJ 19.247) states that

Claudius did promise a similar grant to the armies wherever they were posted. This

donative may have been five times the annual pay of a Praetorian.

154

152 For example Lucullus gave his soldiers 20 000 sesterces during his campaigns in the east (Horace, Ep. 2.2.33; Plut. Luc. 37.4). Octavian promised his soldiers 4000 denarii after the second capture of Rome (App. BCiv. 3.94). Watson (1969, 108) notes that in the Republic it was customary to distribute part of the spoils among the troops at the end of a successful campaign and the prospect of booty became a major incentive to enlistment.

Claudius also

153 Campbell 1984, 166 – 8. Coins celebrating the Praetorian Guard were also minted by Claudius. Campbell (1984, 167) suggests that these coins may have been distributed as part of the donative. 154 Campbell 1984, 187.

35

followed Augustus’ example, by giving a donative to the army to mark Nero’s entry

into public life (Tac. Ann. 12.41; Suet. Nero 7.6.2). However, the Praetorians alone

received 25 denarii on the anniversary of his accession (Dio 60.12.4), presumably a

gesture of good will.

When Nero became emperor (AD 54) he promised the Guard all that Claudius

had bestowed on them (Tac. Ann. 12.69; Dio 61.3.1) and following the demise of the

Pisonian conspiracy, he gave the Praetorians a monthly grain dole and a donative of

500 denarii (Tac. Ann. 15.72; Suet. Nero 10.2). At the end of Nero’s reign C.

Nymphidius Sabinus, one of the Praetorian Prefects, bought the allegiance of the

Praetorian Guard for the aspirant Galba by promising them 7500 denarii. He also

promised the legionaries 1250 denarii (Plut. Galba 2.2; Suet. Galba 16.2) thus, the

Guard was being offered the equivalent of ten years full pay. The donative, however,

was not paid and Galba was to suffer as a consequence.155

Otho was forced to promise the Praetorian Guard 1250 denarii following an

outbreak of indiscipline (Tac. Hist. 1.82.3)

156 and he also paid for the soldiers’

vacationes munerum (Tac. Hist. 1.46.2). (The figure promised to the legionaries, if

any was actually promised to them, is unknown). The known donatives of Vitellius

and Vespasian seem unbelievably small in comparison with what had been on offer

before. Fabius Valens managed to dissuade his troops from sacking Vienne with a gift

of 75 denarii per man (Tac. Hist. 1.66.1) and Vitellius also paid for the soldiers’

freedom from duty (Tac. Hist. 1.58.1). Vespasian made an initial promise to the

Syrian legions, but these were restrained, and Tacitus (Hist. 2.82.2) tells us that ne

Vespasianus quidem plus civili bello obtulit quam alii in pace….157 When Mucianus

arrived in Rome following the defeat of Vitellius, he, along with Domitian, distributed

25 denarii to the troops (Dio 64.22.2). What donative Titus gave is unknown but

whatever it was, Domitian matched it on his accession (Dio 66.26.3). Domitian gave a

further donative to mark the occasion of peace with Decebalus; this donative, however,

was confined to the troops that took part in the war (Dio 67.7.3).158

While the Praetorian Guard were certainly better off in many respects, like the

legionaries they were prohibited from entering into a matrimonium iustum or

155 For a discussion of Nymphidius’ promised donative see Chapter Two and for Galba’s refusal to pay the donative see Chapter Three. 156 For the ‘Praetorian mutiny’ see pp 129 – 39 . 157 “…even Vespasian did not offer more for civil war than others did in time of peace.” 158 The donatives of AD 69 – 70 are discussed in detail in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. For information on the size of donatives after the Flavian dynasty see Durry 1968, 268; Watson 1969, 111 – 4; Campbell 1984, 169 – 71; LeBohec 1994, 214 – 7.

36

legitimate marriage during their term of service, at least until the time of Septimius

Severus.159 This did not mean that soldiers were not able to form long-term

relationships with women or raise children, only that these unions were not legally

recognised and any children resulting from the union were considered illegitimate.160

However, once they had completed their service, the Praetorian Guardsmen received

military diplomata, which allowed them the right of conubium with one woman of

peregrina status that the veteran might marry after discharge. Any children from this

marriage were to be regarded as if they were the children of two Roman citizens.

There was no grant of citizenship to any children, who had been born prior to the

issuing of the diploma.161 It is accepted that legionaries did not receive diplomas in

ordinary circumstances.162 Moreover, the right of conubium with a woman of

peregrina status is also usually viewed as having been denied to legionaries.163 The

fact that the right of conubium was denied to legionaries accounts for the inconsistent

fact that Praetorians, like auxiliary soldiers and members of the fleet, but unlike

legionaries, were issued diplomata on discharge – their unions needed formal, written

sanction.164

Moreover, as Campbell notes, these discharge diplomata not only granted

special privileges and proved the status of the discharged Praetorians but, they also

emphasised the special relationship that existed between the Guard and the emperor.

On the diplomas of the Praetorians, the emperor addressed them in the first person –

tribui, whereas, in the other diplomas issued to auxiliaries and sailors, the third person

159 Parker 1928, 237; Campbell 1978, 154, 165. A passage from Dio (60.24.3) relating to AD 44 states, “He (Claudius) gave the rights of married men to the soldiers, since, in accordance with the law, they were not permitted to have wives.” For a discussion of the nature of these laws, see Phang 2001, 115 – 33. 160 Campbell 1978, 154; Phang 2001, 2 – 3; Schiedel 2007, 418. 161 Roxan 1981, 265. See also Syme 1939, 247; Grant 1974, 92 – 3; Campbell 1984, 442 – 4; Phang 2001, 53 – 85. Phang (2001) provides the most comprehensive discussion on marriage in the Roman Army. Durry (1968, 297 – 301) suggests that the Praetorians received diplomata, unlike the legionaries, because the legionary is the true and regular soldier of the Roman people. The diplomata demonstrate that the Praetorians were not front line troops and were in some ways comparable to the auxilia. However, it is difficult to imagine any emperor relegating his Praetorian Guard to the level of the auxilia. For examples of Praetorian diplomas see CIL XVI 134 – 56. 162 For example Parker 1928, 246; Campbell 1978, 159; 1984, 439; Roxan 1981, 265; Rankov and Hook 1994, 9; Phang 2001, 61. No legionary diplomas have ever been found with the exception of the diplomas for veterans of Legions I and II Adiutrix, which were special cases, (Phang 2001, 61 and n. 24). 163 Implied by Watson 1969, 136; Alston 1995, 215 n. 23. Campbell (1984, 442), however, disagrees and argues that the legionaries also received conubium with a woman of peregrina status. “…it is hard to see why they (legionaries) should have been treated less well than the auxilia.” Phang (2001, 74) believes that it is not possible to make a decision: “at best we can suggest that some legionaries may have received these privileges from 88 onward, but in the absence of legionary diplomas the question remains moot.” 164 Syme 1939, 247; Grant 1974, 93; Brunt 1990a, 209.

37

was used – imperator…dedit. Moreover, on the Praetorian diplomas the phrase “to

those soldiers who have bravely and loyally completed their service” was included.165

While the service conditions of the Praetorian Guard seem overwhelmingly

favourable in comparison to the legionaries, there is one area where service in Rome

may be considered a disadvantage – life expectancy. Life expectancy is generally

regarded as a useful indicator of the overall quality of life of a given population.

166 In

his comprehensive study of the demography of the Roman army, Scheidel found that

the death toll within the Praetorian Guard, during their years of service, was

considerably higher than in the legions.167 This decreased life expectancy within the

Praetorian Guard can possibly be explained by death in combat. Certainly under

Trajan, and in particular from the time of Marcus Aurelius, the Guard’s role in

imperial military expeditions must have imposed a heavy toll.168 However, Scheidel

found that “the difference between the rates of loss implied by the altars of the equites

singulares of the more peaceful first half of the 2nd c. and those suggested by the later

rosters of the praetorian guardsmen remains too tenuous to substantiate this idea.”169

Possibly life in Rome was more unhealthy than life on the frontiers and therefore the

average Praetorian had a lower life expectancy than did his legionary counterpart.170

The Officers of the Praetorian Guard

Praetorian Prefects

Due to the relative importance of the Praetorian Prefect in the life of the emperor and

to the political scene at Rome, it is worth briefly tracing the development and history

of the Prefecture in the years before AD 69. Dio (55.10.10) informs us that in 2 BC

Augustus appointed the first two praefecti praetorii – Prefects of his praetorium.171

165 Campbell 1984, 111, 287 – 8.

Prior to this time, it is impossible to reconstruct the method of command used,

166 Scheidel 1996, 117. 167 Scheidel 1996, 117 – 29. 168 Kennedy (1978, 286, 288) explains that the higher rate of loss in the third century AD in comparison to the second century AD is due to the increasing frequency of the battles in which these units were engaged. 169 Scheidel 1996, 128. 170 Scheidel 1996, 128 – 9. There are several interesting books and articles on health in ancient Rome. Some of the more recent publications include Bruun 2003, 426 – 34; Sallares 2002; Scheidel 1994, 151 – 75. Scobie (1986, 399 – 433) has written an interesting and entertaining article on the slums and sanitation in Rome. 171 For a definition of praetorium see n. 53. Howe (1942, 10 n. 3) writes “the basic function of the office is indicated by the title praefectus praetorio, Prefect of the praetorium of the emperor as military commander.” Grant (1974, 94) proposes that there was no Republican precedent for this appointment, although Agrippa or Maecenas may have had some control over the Praetorians whenever Augustus was absent from Rome.

38

although it seems probable that the tribunes of the individual Praetorian cohorts

received their orders direct from the emperor.172 Augustus may have initially felt that

the aversion to stationing troops in Italy would have been less, if those troops came

under his direct control rather than some other military officers.173 Alternatively,

Augustus may have wanted to keep himself as the sole focus of Praetorian loyalty,

continuing a system that had worked well after the Battle of Actium.174

However, by 2 BC Augustus’ feelings obviously changed and he appointed Q.

Ostorius Scapula and P. Salvius Aper as his first two Praetorian Prefects. Numerous

suggestions have been put forward to explain Augustus’ decision to appoint Prefects.

Possibly Augustus found that he was simply too busy to oversee the day-to-day

activities of the Guard.

175 Then again, the establishment of permanent positions may

have been the culmination of a process which had seen Augustus, at various times,

delegate overall command to one or more of the tribunes.176 Syme, however, felt that

the appointment of the Prefects was related to the political crisis of that year and the

events surrounding the banishment of Augustus’ daughter Julia,177

The fact that Augustus chose to appoint two Prefects has also been the subject

of some debate. In Maecenas’ speech, Dio (52.24.2) has him remark, that having two

Prefects had the advantage that if one was unable to perform his duty there would

always be another one available to guard the emperor. A similar advantage would also

apply if the loyalty of one of the Prefects were suspect.

a point to which we

will return.

178 Certainly, subsequent

history would show that Praetorian Prefects, such as Sejanus, Nymphidius or S.

Tigidius Perennis, might become very powerful and pose a threat to the emperor.

Consequently, throughout the more than three centuries during which the post existed

“there were barely a dozen occasions on which a Prefect was appointed without a

colleague.”179

172Grant 1974, 93; Brunt 1983, 59; Kerr 1992, 10; Rankov and Hook 1994, 7; Bingham 1998, 32. Certainly, in the Julio-Claudian period and later, it is widely accepted by scholars that individual cohorts were commanded by tribunes. See Echols 1958, 380; Durry 1968, 143; Dobson 1978, 75 – 87; Keppie 1996, 113.

However, we might ask, if Augustus, in 2 BC, was in a position to

173 Grant 1974, 93. 174 Kerr 1992, 10. 175 Grant 1974, 93 – 4. 176 Brunt 1983, 60. 177 Syme 1980, 64. See also Syme 1974; Kerr 1992, 10 – 11. Keppie (1996, 113) states that some change in the disposition of the cohorts prompted the appointment of Prefects. 178 Campbell (1984, 116 – 7) proposes that the appointment of the two Prefects was a security measure designed to decrease their potential political influence. 179 Grant 1974, 94.

39

foresee the future political influence that Praetorian Prefects would be capable of

wielding?

Durry, following Mommsen, proposes instead the ancient Republican principle

of collegiality.180 Dessau suggests that the question of collegiality, or the division of

powers, was of less importance than a practical point: that the cohorts were initially

distributed in towns outside the city and thus one Prefect remained in Rome while the

other one was stationed somewhere outside it,181 perhaps travelling from town to town

where the soldiers were billeted. Kerr believes that the argument that Augustus

appointed two Prefects as some kind of a safeguard, in case of disloyalty from one of

them, is to some extent invalidated by the fact that by AD 14, and possibly earlier,

Augustus had appointed a single Prefect, L. Seius Strabo.182

In addition, Kerr suggests that if Syme is correct in suggesting that the

appointment of the Prefects was related to the political events surrounding the exile of

Julia in 2 BC, then maybe the appointment of two Prefects was to resolve a more

immediate problem, rather than in anticipation of some future treachery.

Perhaps Augustus

changed his mind about the inherent dangers of a sole Prefect or he may simply have

had more implicit trust in Strabo than he did in the men he appointed initially.

183 If

Augustus recognised the need to take active measures to protect the interests of his two

grandsons, whom he possibly intended to be joint rulers on his death, is it possible to

link the double Prefecture to this co-regency? Kerr certainly feels that Augustus’

concerns over the succession and his desire to protect his grandsons may have caused

him to appreciate the dangers of leaving a void in the command structure of the

Praetorian Guard. This would be especially true if the tribunes of the Guard had some

how been involved in the scandal surrounding Julia. Therefore, Kerr believes that it is

possible to regard the appointment of two Prefects as recognition of the important role

they would play in the transfer of power on Augustus’ death.184

The first two Prefects, Scapula and Salvius Aper, appointed by Augustus, were

from the equestrian class (Dio 55.10.10). Again, the reasons behind Augustus’

180 Durry 1968, 158 and n. 1. Southern (2007, 116) also believes that the principle of collegiality was the reason Augustus appointed two Prefects. 181 Dessau 1975, vol. 1, 257 - 8. Brunt (1983, 60) notes that duality meant that one Prefect could remain at Rome while another was deployed elsewhere, as occurred with Strabo and his son Sejanus, when Sejanus went with Drusus to Panonnia. 182 Kerr 1992, 12. See Tac. Ann. 1.7.1. Strabo, although only an equestrian, was extremely well connected. His mother Terentia was apparently the sister in law of Maecenas and his wife belonged to one of Rome’s greatest families – the Cornelii Lentuli (ILS 8996). Grant (1974, 94) also mentions Valerius Ligur as a single holder of the office, but the reference in Dio (60.23.3) is not clear. 183 Kerr 1992, 12 184 Kerr 1992, 11.

40

decision to employ equestrians in this post have sparked discussion among scholars.

Durry suggests, that the achievements of Maecenas so impressed Augustus that he felt

compelled to appoint other members of this order to important imperial positions.185

On the other hand, Augustus may have felt that members of the equites were less likely

to have any loyalty to a senatorial faction,186 although it should be remembered that

members of the equestrian class would have had senatorial patrons and even relations

in some cases. Moreover, as the Praetorians functioned as a personal bodyguard,

having a senator in charge might have created friction between the Senate and the

Princeps, and could perhaps have been dangerous,187 particularly given many senators’

nostalgia for the Republic and their personal ambitions.188 Augustus may have found

it difficult to ask a senator to serve in a post that was not an elected magistracy, had

little or no precedent and that would be subordinate to the emperor.189 Alternatively,

Augustus may also have felt more comfortable with an equestrian holding such a

position because as an eques, his origin largely excluded him them from being a rival

for the Principate.190

There were no procedures or systems in place for promotion of future

Praetorian Prefects. The emperor chose to appoint to the position the type of men

whose friendship and loyalty he felt were beyond question, who were generally

competent and who could command the respect of the Praetorian soldiers.

This fact, however, did not stop the eques Cornelius Gallus from

making a nuisance of himself in Egypt (Suet. Aug. 66). Nor did it prevent M. Agrippa

reaching a powerful position, or curtail the ambitions of Sejanus. Still, it was to be a

further 200 years before an equestrian Praetorian Prefect, Macrinus, would become

emperor and even then many of the senators were offended by his elevation (Herodian

5.2.1; SHA. Macrinus 2.1, 7.1 – 4).

191 Marcius

Turbo, Hadrian’s Prefect, seems to have been a perfect example. He was a good

soldier, he held court in the small hours of the morning and was said to have

proclaimed that a Praetorian Prefect should die on his feet (Dio 69.18.4).192

185 Durry 1968, 157 and n. 6.

Praetorian

Prefects, it would seem, could also come from varying backgrounds. Some Prefects,

such as Strabo and his son Sejanus, were related to senatorial families (ILS 8996),

186 Grant 1974, 94. 187 Brunt 1983, 60. 188 For example see Joseph. AJ 19.186; Tac. Agr. 3.1. 189 Campbell 1984, 117. 190 Campbell 1984, 117; Kerr 1992, 13. 191 Millar 1977, 126; Campbell 1984, 116. See Syme (1980, 77): “Chance and personalities prevail when Caesar selects his deputy and companion.” 192 Vespasian (Suet. Vesp. 24) is claimed to have said a similar thing about emperors.

41

while some came from a low rank in society. For example, Nymphidius, Prefect in the

reign of Nero, was the son of a freedwoman (Tac. Ann. 15.72; Plut. Galba 9.1).193

The Praetorian Prefect was originally simply the commander of the Praetorian

cohorts and in strict legal terms was the conduit through which the emperor exercised

command over these troops.

Similarly, the Prefect, Oclatinius Adventus, began his career as a speculator of the

Guard and then went on to become a procurator of Britain (Dio 79.14.1; CIL VII

1003).

194 Initially, the Praetorian Prefecture was senior to the

praefectus annonae and, until the Flavian period, the office ranked below the

Prefecture of Egypt.195 It is clear enough why the Praetorian Prefects became so

important; they were responsible for the emperor’s personal safety and had under their

control a large body of troops in Rome.196 Probably from their first appointment, but

certainly by the end of the first century AD, they came to carry out a vital role on the

advisory councils of the emperor.197 No doubt, because of the Prefect’s presence in

Rome, the emperor would have found it convenient to delegate to them, unofficially,

many tasks he wanted performed. Over time the Prefects would have taken on a whole

variety of functions, which were not necessarily related to their primary role.198 The

close proximity of the Prefects to the emperor and their subsequent ability to influence

general policy no doubt led to the development of juridical and, in the Late Empire,

financial functions. Unfortunately, the process by which all this came about is now

untraceable.199 How much power and influence an individual Prefect could obtain

depended largely on the character of the individual Prefect and his emperor. Prefects

like Sejanus and Perennis acquired authority and control, which far outweighed the

formal powers of their position.200

193 For a discussion on the background of Nymphidius Sabinus see pp 62 - 6.

194 Howe 1942, 10. This is indicated by the fact that the emperor himself, not the Praetorian Prefect, gave the watchword (signum) to the tribunes of the cohorts. See Tac. Ann. 1.7, 13.2; SHA Pius 12.6, Marc. 7.3. 195 See for example Passerini 1939, 220; Turner 1954, 64; Brunt 1983, 60. Ti. Julius Alexander may have been the first ex-Prefect of Egypt to be promoted to the Praetorian Prefecture. For a discussion of Alexander as a possible Praetorian Prefect, see pp 208 - 11. 196 Grant 1974, 94; Millar 1977, 123; Campbell 1984, 116. 197 Austin and Rankov 1995, 227. 198 Campbell 1984, 116. See also Millar (1977, 122 – 31) and Austin and Rankov (1995, 227 – 8) for a discussion of the Prefects expanding military and administrative role in the second and third century AD. 199 Brunt 1983, 60. For an examination of the Praetorian Prefects from the time of Constantine to Valentinian see Migl 1994. 200 Campbell 1984, 116.

42

The Praetorian Prefects were not necessarily professional soldiers201 and only

in exceptional circumstances did the Praetorian Prefects take to the field of battle

before the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The first Prefect to command an army in the field

was Otho’s Praetorian Prefect, Licinius Proculus, although he shared the command

with Otho’s brother, Titianus and two generals, M. Celsus and C. Suetonius Paulinus

(Tac. Hist. 2.3.3). The most famous Prefect to command an army in the field is

arguably the rather unfortunate Cornelius Fuscus, who, in AD 86, lost his life in the

crisis of the Dacian invasion of Moesia.202

Tribunes and Centurions

The majority of the centurions203 who served in the Rome cohorts were promoted to

that position through the ranks of the Praetorian Guard, either during their regular

service period or at the end of their careers when they received the evocatio, although

not all soldiers who received the evocatio would find themselves advanced to the

centurionate.204 The Praetorian Prefect responsible would normally promote

guardsmen to the centurionate. However, alongside these centurions, promoted from

the ranks of the Guard, were soldiers who had been directly commissioned into the

centurionate. Many of these directly commissioned centurions were from the

equestrian order and had usually commenced their military career in the legions before

being transferred to the Rome centurionate.205 While the favour of an important

person (a senatorial governor for example) probably secured their original commission

in the legion, a transfer to the Rome centurionate would be a special favour that would

require the emperor’s approval.206 While the transfer of an individual from the legions

to the Rome centurionate was of great significance for the individual, this route

provided only a small minority of the places to be filled in Rome.207

The Rome centurionate formed a select group of about 150 men, representing

the finest of the Praetorians and the legionaries. They would have shared a certain

unity, not because they shared a common social background, but because they shared a

common rank and as they moved between the legions and the units in Rome they

would have developed acquaintanceships. Many would have spent their entire adult

201 Campbell 1984, 114. 202 Suet. Dom. 6.1; Dio 67.6.5, 68.9.3; Eutropius 7.23.4; Orosius 7.10.4. 203 Birley (1988c, 206 – 7) notes that centurions were specifically officers, not non-commissioned officers because their records were maintained by the emperor’s staff in Rome. 204 Breeze 1993, 19. See also Dobson and Breeze 1993, 94 n. 17, 104; Rankov and Hook 1994, 10. 205 Dobson 1993c, 202. See also Dobson and Breeze 1993, 104 – 5; Breeze 1993, 253. 206 Dobson and Breeze 1993, 98. 207 Dobson and Breeze 1993, 104; Dobson 1993d, 136.

43

life together, within the Praetorian Guard. The second factor that knitted this group of

soldiers together was their length of service. A soldier would normally reach the rank

of centurion after he had served for fifteen to twenty years and would then often serve

until death.208 A centurion had a principal goal; to be promoted to the rank of primus

pilus.209 However, regardless of how long a centurion served, or by which route he

arrived at the centurionate, there was no guarantee that he would go on to the

primipilate.210

It was unlikely that there was any set age for a centurion to be promoted to the

primipilate. Promotion could be reached early or late in a career depending on the

centurion’s ability and the patronage he enjoyed.

211 The youngest recorded primus

pilus was Blossius Pudens who died at forty-nine years of age (CIL VI 3580 = ILS

2641). However, the minimum age for a centurion to become a primus pilus was

likely to be around fifty. Service in the legionary centurionate was an essential pre-

requisite if a centurion wanted to progress to the primipilate. As there was no

Praetorian primipilate, the career structure provided a path for a centurion, from the

Praetorian Guard, to the legionary centurionate and thereby ensured that he had the

opportunity to reach the primipilate.212 Service as a primus pilus was an essential pre-

requisite to becoming a tribune in the Praetorian Guard. “Die stadtrömischen Tribunen

wurden immer aus den primipilares rekrutiert.”213 This ensured that the men who

served as tribunes in the Praetorian Guard were experienced and proven soldiers.214

A centurion would usually serve as a primus pilus for a year.

215 A number of

possibilities would then be available to the centurion. He could retire, usually going

back to his municipality to play an important role in civil society, or he could stay on

as a primipilaris, possibly in the numerus at Rome or attached to a legion. The

primipilari might be promoted to Prefect of the Camp, Prefect of the legion in Egypt or

tribune of the Praetorian Guard. Men from the different sources of recruitment could

take any of the different paths.216

208 Dobson 1993c, 203; Dobson and Breeze 1993, 88 – 124. See also Campbell 1984, 102 – 4.

In an examination of the origins of the primipilares

it was demonstrated that they tended to come from Italy or colonies in the provinces

209 Dobson 1972, 203. A primus pilus was the chief centurion of a legion (Dobson 1993c, 102). 210 Dobson and Breeze 1993, 105. 211 Dobson 1993b, 162. 212 Dobson 1972, 203; 1993c, 207. 213 Dobson 1978, 75. See also Brunt 1983, 59; Keppie 1996, 113; Dobson 1993b, 148. 214 Rankov and Hood 1994, 10; Keppie 1996, 113. See also Watson 1969, 88. 215 Dobson 1993c, 205. 216 Dobson 1993b, 148; 1993c, 207, 217.

44

therefore, they probably had a family history of service in the military and from their

nomina they were part of families that had been citizens for some generations.217

Praetorian tribunes were recruited from the primipilares. It is quite probable

that the tribunes of the Urban cohorts and the Vigiles were also recruited from the

primipilares from the very beginning, but there are few or none of their careers from

the pre-Claudian era.

218 However, by the time of Nero a standard sequence of post

holdings for officers of the Guard was in place,219 evidenced by the careers of M.

Vettius Valens (CIL X 395 = ILS 2648), C. Gavius Silvanus (CIL V 7003 = ILS 9199)

and L. Antonius Naso (CIL III 14387 = ILS 9199). For reference the inscription of M.

Vettius Valens appears below:220

M. Vettio M. f. Ani. | Valenti | mil. coh. VII pr., benef. praef.

pr., | donis donato bello Britan. | torquibus armillis phaleris, | evoc. Aug.,

corona aurea donat., | coh. VI vig., stat., coh XVI urb., cho. | II

pr., exercitatori equit. Speculatorum, princip. | praetori leg. XIII Gem.,

ex trec. Leg. VI | Victr., donis donato ob res prosper. | gest. contra

Astures torq. phaler. arm., | trib. coh. V vig., trib. coh. XII urb., trib.

coh. | III pr., [trib] leg XIIII Gem. Mart. Victr., | proc. imp. Caes. Aug.

prov. Lusitan., | patron. coloniae, speculator. X h. c., | L. Luccio Tele-

sino C. Suetonio Paulino cos. (CIL XI 395 = ILS 2648)

The essential qualification remained that all tribunes had been a primus pilus. This

standard sequence of posts included tribunates in the Vigiles, then in the cohortes

Urbanae, and finally in the cohortes Praetoriae.221 The length of tenure of the

tribunates in Rome is not known, but a year was probably normal, although some may

have held their tribunate for longer or rejoined the numerus primipilarium while

waiting for another post.222

217 Dobson 1993b, 157; 1993c, 209. See also Birley 1988a, 189 – 285.

After their final tribunate in the Praetorian cohorts, men

might return to the provinces, possibly to be primus pilus again. A favoured few might

218 Dobson 1993b, 148. 219 Dobson 1993b, 402; Keppie 1996, 113. 220 See Appendix One for the other two inscriptions. See also Millar 1977, 125. 221 Keppie 1996, 113. Syme (1939, 243) suggests that promotion through the three corps of the urbana militia, was “not merely frequent but regular and almost rigid.” 222 Dobson 1993b, 169; Rankov and Hook 1994, 10. The numerus primipilarium was a creation of Augustus, some of whom were stationed at Rome, while some were attached to the legions (Dobson 1993b, 150). They are first attested in AD 16. Tacitus (Ann. 2.11) writes: equitum vado tramittit. Praefuere Stertinius et e numero primipilarium Aemilius.

45

reach the procuratorship and a couple of primipilares in each generation might attain

the great Prefectures.223

As Dobson notes the logic of this career structure is quite clear, the

primipilares were not only the most experienced soldiers, but they owed the position

they had acquired to the emperor.

224 Consequently, the Praetorian tribunes were

usually experienced and proven soldiers and it would seem that the primary reason for

the promotion of a primus pilus to the Rome tribunates was to ensure that reliable men

held these important posts.225

Other Forces at Rome

Urban Cohorts

When the cohortes urbanae came into existence is not certain,226 although it seems

that they had been established by AD 23 (Tac. Ann. 4.5). Durry speculates that

Augustus may have created the Urban cohorts at the same time as he established the

Praetorian Guard (c. 27 BC), with the intention of compensating the Senate and

thereby making the presence of the Praetorian Guard more tolerable.227 Scholars,

however, have not always accepted Durry’s theory.228 Echols on the other hand

suggests that in 16 BC Augustus detached three Urban cohorts from their regular

Praetorian status and assigned them as regular city police to the personal command of

the Urban Prefect. He goes on to explain that the change of status for the Urban

cohorts would not have involved, in 16 BC, the downgrading that it would have

involved later. At that time the Praetorian Guard was not the powerful cohesive unit

personally fashioned by Sejanus c. AD 23. On the contrary, in 16 BC the units were

scattered and semi-independent, commanded by their individual tribunes.229

223 Dobson 1993b, 153.

However,

224 Dobson 1993b, 148. See also Birley 1988c, 206 – 9; Campbell (1984, 104) proposes that the idea that the emperor was ultimately responsible for the promotion of centurions was true only in theory because it seems unlikely that any emperor would have had the time to concern himself with every centurion in the Roman army. However, an emperor may have been more personally involved with the selection of Praetorian centurions. Moreover, what was probably important was the perception of the centurion that it was the emperor who was promoting him to his new position. 225 Dobson 1993b, 169. 226 CIL X 4872 = ILS 2021 is the earliest known inscription were the title urbana is used. The epitaph was erected at Rome early in the reign of Tiberius (AD14 – 37). 227 Durry 1968, 12. 228 Kerr (1992, 9) believes that we should treat with caution Durry’s theory that Augustus created the Urban cohorts as some sort of compensation to the Senate because the exact date of the formation of the unit is not clear. Freis (1967, 4 – 5) rejects Durry’s theory because, although the commander of the Urban cohorts was a senator, he was still appointed by Augustus. 229 Echols 1958, 380. Le Bohec (1994, 21) writes that Augustus created the units in 13 BC, however, he presents no argument to defend this date.

46

it would seem that a date towards the end of Augustus’ reign is just as probable.230

Suetonius (Aug.49) defines the role of these cohortes urbanae as the guards of

the city, a type of police force. Confirmation of this role comes from Tacitus (Ann.

6.11), who informs us that the duties of their commander was to overawe the slaves

and that part of the population which is disorderly and reckless unless it fears a strong

hand.

Augustus and Tiberius may well have become convinced by the disturbances which

took place in Rome during the years before AD 7 (Suet. Aug 19.1; Dio 55.27.1 – 3)

that the establishment of such a force was necessary.

231

In the first century AD, the Urban cohorts were under the command of a

praefectus urbi, a person of senatorial rank who had served as consul.

While they may have acted as a police force, the Urban cohorts were still

considered a regular part of the imperial army (Tac. Ann. 4.5).

232 The City

Prefect was ostensibly a state official or magistratus, similar to the consuls, and as

such, they were commanders-in-chief of their own cohorts. However, the emperor

selected the praefectus urbi and he was subject to his will just like any other senior

senator filling an important role.233 It seems that M. Valerius Messala Corvinus was

the first Urban Prefect to be appointed by Augustus c. 26 or 25 BC, with general

supervisory duties. However, Messala resigned after only a few days because he did

not know how to discharge his duties (Tac. Ann. 6.11). Augustus did not appoint

another Prefect until c. 16 BC when he selected T. Statilius Taurus who, according to

Tacitus (Ann. 6.11), maintained the post admirably.234 In AD 13 L. Calpurnius Piso

assumed the office retaining it for twenty years and he was honoured by a public

funeral decreed by the Senate (Tac. Ann. 6.11). At the time of Nero’s suicide, T.

Flavius Sabinus, the brother of the future emperor Vespasian, was Urban Prefect. By

the second century AD the cohortes urbanae had passed into the control of the

Praetorian Prefect.235

As with the Praetorian Guard, the number of cohorts in existence and their

effective is unclear. Tacitus (Ann. 4.5), in his review of the military forces in the

Empire for AD 23, tells us that there were three cohortes urbanae in existence.

However, for AD 5 Dio (55.24.6) notes that they were organised into four cohorts and

230 Webster 1998, 98. 231 See also Ulpian Dig. 1.12.1. 232 Grant 1974, 96; Le Bohec 1989, 13; Webster 1998, 98. See Tac. Ann. 6.11.3 – 11; Suet. Ner. 7.2. 233 Fries 1967, 4 – 5; Grant 1974, 97. Tacitus (Ann. 6.11.3 – 11) analyses the position of the City Prefect. 234 See also Dio (54.19.6) who states that Taurus was placed in charge of the whole of Italy. 235 Echols 1958, 384; LeBohec 1994, 22.

47

had in total 6000 members or 1500 men per cohort.236 Tacitus’ figure of three

cohortes urbanae, in the reign of Augustus, is usually accepted as being correct,237

particularly as their cohorts seem to have been numbered X, XI, and XII, in a direct

sequence from the cohortes praetoriae.238 The effective of each cohort is still debated,

with scholars arguing for cohorts ranging from 500 to 1500 men per cohort.239

However, based on the archaeological evidence of the castra praetoria,240

A fourth Urban cohort was added by either Gaius or Claudius. The earliest

reference to a cohors XIII urbana is found in the will of a soldier dated to AD 48 (CIL

X 1416). Following the assassination of Gaius, the Urban cohorts were involved in a

short lived attempt to restore the Republic before abandoning this dangerous path and

joining the Praetorian Guard in supporting Claudius. Josephus, in the Bellum

Judiacum (2.205), notes that the consuls were supported by three Urban cohorts, while

in the Antiquities (19.188) the number he gives is four. Echols feels that because the

Antiquities deals with the assassination of Gaius and Claudius’ accession in greater

detail, it is more likely to be Gaius who added the fourth Urban cohort.

it would

seem that the cohorts were 500 men strong, although units of 1000 men per cohort

cannot be dismissed entirely.

241

Claudius also stationed a cohort at Puteoli

Gaius

possibly increased the number of Urban cohorts at the same time as he increased the

Praetorian Guard to at least twelve cohorts. 242

236 Echols (1958, 381 - 2) suggests that since only three Urban cohorts have been attested before the reign of Gaius/Claudius and that throughout Roman imperial history only two types of cohorts are attested – cohors miliaria and cohors quingenaria – Dio’s 6000 city Guards consisted of three cohortes Urbanae miliariae plus a fourth unit whose strength totalled 3000 men. These 3000 men were the custodes urbis, the regular police force at Rome from the days of the Republic.

and one at Ostia to guard against

fires (Suet. Claud. 25.2) and, although the text does not specifically indicate the

designation of these units, many modern commentators believe that they were Urban

237 For example Echols 1958, 382; Africa 1971, 8; Grant 1974, 95; Le Bohec 1989, 22; Keppie 1998, 189; Webster 1998, 98. 238 Freis 1967, 37: “Die Prätorianerkohorten haben die Nummern I – IX, die Stadtkohorten von X aufwärts.” See also Echols 1958, 380; Durry 1968, 12; Le Bohec 1989, 12; Webster 1998, 98; Keppie 1998, 188. 239 Echols (1958, 382) favours cohorts of 1000 men each, as does Africa (1971, 8). Grant (1974, 95) states that they were initially 1000 men each, later being increased to 1500. Durry (1968, 15) argues that their effective was the same as the Praetorian Guard, then 500. LeBohec (1994, 22) believes that their initial strength was 500 men raised to 1000 men by Vitellius, decreased again to 500 men by Vespasian before possibly being raised to 1500 men by Septimius Severus. Keppie (1996, 112; 1998, 189) favours Urban cohorts that were 500 men strong. 240 See pp 19 - 22. 241 Echols 1958, 382; Africa 1971, 8. 242 Cohors XV may well have been dispatched originally to Puteoli, as four inscriptions found at Misenum attest (Webster 1998, 99 n. 1)

48

cohorts.243 A cohors XV urbana is also on record during the reign of Nero. It appears

on an inscription (CIL III 14387 = ILS 9199) for the tribune Antonius Naso, while a

cohors XVI is attested from a single inscription dated to AD 66 (CIL XI 395 = ILS

2648). No inscription which includes a cohors XIV can be dated with any assurance

before AD 137 (CIL IX 5839). However, logically, the existence of a cohors XV and

XVI under Nero would prove the existence of a cohors XIV at the same time,244

Tacitus (Hist. 2.93.2) tells us that after defeating Otho, Vitellius reinstated four

Urban cohorts, each of 1000 men. In AD 70, when Vespasian decreased the number of

Praetorian cohorts from sixteen to nine, the number of Urban cohorts remained at four

(CIL XVI 21).

especially as a cohors XIII was part of the force in AD 48 (CIL X 1416).

245

The Urban cohorts shared a common and restricted recruiting ground with the

Praetorian Guard (Tac. Ann. 4.5), but as with the Guard, this initial recruiting ground

was probably widened over the years. Nevertheless, the Urban cohorts remained

overwhelmingly recruited from Italians. Fries calculates, from the limited surviving

evidence that in the first two centuries AD, 86.5% of men serving in the Urban cohorts

were of Italian origin, with the remaining 13.4 % having a provincial origin.

246

Suetonius (Aug. 49), in his summary of Octavian’s disposition of his military

forces, states that initially he never allowed more than three cohorts to remain in Rome

at any given time, the rest were sent to summer and winter quarters in towns close to

Rome. Whether these were Urban or Praetorian cohorts and the possible identity of

these towns has been discussed previously.

247 However, once the castra praetoria was

built, the majority of the Urban cohorts shared this camp with the Praetorians, although

some may have been distributed throughout the city in various “police stations.” 248

The close association between the Praetorian Guard and the Urban cohorts,

however, went much deeper than the sharing of the same barracks and is clearly

indicated by the practice of issuing joint diplomata (CIL XVI 95, 98, 124). This

practice ceased with the reign of Septimius Severus, when the issuing of separate

243 Baille Reynolds 1927, 111; Echols 1958, 383; Rainbird 1986, 157; Keppie 1998, 188; Webster 1998, 98. LeBohec (1994, 22 – 3) however, proposes that the cohorts sent to Ostia and Puteoli were in fact cohorts of Vigiles. 244 Echols 1958, 382 – 3. 245 See Roxan (1993, 67 – 74) for an interesting discussion of a military diploma from AD 85 for a member of the Urban cohorts. 246 Fries 1967, 57. The reforms of Septimius Severus had little effect on origins of men serving in the Urban cohorts, as Fries (1967, 60) found that some 90.61% of men who served in the Urban cohorts after Severus’ accession continued to be Italian in origin 247 See pp 22 – 6. 248 LeBohec 1994, 22.

49

diplomata became standard, indicating that the close association between the two units

was at an end (CIL XVI 134). This is hardly surprising considering that Severus

replaced the largely Italian Praetorians with his Illyrian legionaries. The divide

between the two urban forces, begun by Severus, was completed by Aurelian, who in

AD 270, had the castra urbana constructed on the Campus Martius for the Urban

cohorts.249 The Urban cohorts survived the disbandment of the Praetorians, but during

the fourth century AD they gradually lost any remaining military role.250

Vigiles

The Vigiles were established by Augustus in AD 6 (Dio 55.26.4; Suet. Aug. 30.1;

Strabo 5.3.7). They were not strictly a military force in the first century AD, although

they were developed into one under subsequent emperors.251 According to Dio

(55.26), Augustus initially raised the force as an experiment, but their success ensured

that he made them into a permanent institution. The Vigiles have usually been

described as having two principal roles; fire fighting and nighttime police work,

although fighting fires was probably their primary role.252 Their night patrols would

have taken both remedial and preventative action in the event of a fire and would have

dealt with brawls, petty crime and the rounding up of runaway slaves.253 How many

patrols went out and how many went in each patrol is not known. The equipment was

rudimentary, but effective, with each patrol carrying a range of equipment, including

buckets, axes, blankets and ladders, as well as vinegar, pikes and brooms.254 The

comic scene at the end of Cena Trimalchionis was probably not a rare occurrence.255

249 Echols 1958, 384.

250 Echols 1958, 384; LeBohec 1994, 22. In addition to the Urban cohorts based in Rome, there were two provincial Urban cohorts, one based at Lugdunum, the other at Carthage. However, the importance of these provincial cohorts to this present study is negligible, so an examination is not warranted. For a discussion of these provincial Urban cohorts see, Durry 1968, 13; Bérard 1988, 159 – 72. 251 Baille Reynolds 1927, 17; Watson 1969, 19; Le Bohec 1994, 22. For an account of the Republican history of fire fighting and Augustus’ early experiments with the Vigiles see Sablayrolles (1996, 5 – 26). The remainder of Sablayrolles first chapter (pp. 26 – 65) provides an excellent introduction to the Vigiles. 252 Rainbird 1986, 147; Keppie 1998, 189. Sablayrolles (1996, 469) claims that the primary role of the Vigiles was one of a watchmen preventing fires, rather than actually fighting fires. “Milice du guet plus que corps de sapeurs-pompiers, elles remplissaient une mission de prévention dont les incessantes patrouilles nocturnes étaient sur le terrain la manifestation concréte.” 253 Webster 1998, 100. 254 Reynolds 1927, 100; Daugherty 1992, 231; Webster 1998, 100; Sablayrolles 1996, 354 – 61. 255 Petronius 78.7. Itaque vigiles, qui custodiebant vicinam regionem rati ardere Trimalchionis domum effregerunt ianuam subito et cum aqua securibusque tumultuari suo iure coeperunt. Among other equipment used by the Vigiles were siphones or pumps to help extinguish fires. However, the ballista, frequently assigned to the Vigiles, for the demolition of buildings, has been rejected by Sablayrolles (1996, 367) on the grounds that it was impractical.

50

In 7 BC Rome was divided into fourteen regions and this arrangement was

utilized in the organisation of this new unit (Dio 55.8.7; Suet. Aug. 30.1). Each of the

seven cohorts of Vigiles was responsible for the safety of two of the regions of Rome.

It seems logical that the two regions for which each cohort was responsible would be

adjacent to each other and the sites for the barracks located as close as practicable to

the boundary between the two regions.256 Unfortunately, not all the sites of these

barracks have been identified, although four out of seven seem to have been located

with some certainty. None of the remains found, however, date to the time of

Augustus, therefore it cannot be ascertained if these were the original locations for the

barracks.257 The Notitia urbis, of the fourth century AD, tells us that there were also

fourteen excubitoria in addition to the main barracks, presumably there would be one

per region, but again it is not possible to say if they formed part of the original

Augustan system.258 The well-preserved barracks at Ostia affords us the best

model.259

There is little doubt that the number of cohorts established by Augustus

numbered seven (Dio 55.26.4 – 5), but once again the actual effective of the cohorts

has been widely debated.

260 There seems little doubt that they were milliary by the

early third century AD. Two inscriptions are the key, both of which list the whole of

the First cohort of Vigiles (CIL VI 1057, 1058). One is securely dated to AD 210,

while the other inscription, by comparison with the first, has been dated to AD 205.261

Rainbird believes that the inscription from AD 210 clearly indicates that the cohort

was milliary at that time, and through a close examination of both inscriptions has

argued that the cohorts were doubled in size in AD 205 and therefore, prior to this

time, were most likely quingenary.262

The force was originally composed of freedmen (Dio 55.26.5; Strabo 5.3.7),

which probably reflects the fact that fighting fires had previously been a servile

occupation. However, to create such a large and disciplined group of slaves would

256 Baille Reynolds 1926, 23 – 4; Durry 1968, 17; Watson 1969, 19; Daugherty 1992, 229 – 30. Dio (57.19.6) confirms for us that the cohorts of Vigiles lived separately from each other. 257 Baille Reynolds 1926, 24 – 5. 258 Rainbird 1986, 149. 259 A full description of this barrack building is provided in Meiggs (1973, 305 – 8). The earliest barrack building for the Vigiles in Ostia may well have been constructed under Domitian (NS 1970, 290 – 3; Sablayrolles 1996, 47). 260 For example, Milliary cohorts: Baille Reynolds 1926, 22 – 3; Watson 1969, 19; Le Bohec 1989, 22; Webster 1998, 99 – 100; Quingenary cohorts: Durry 1968, 18; Birley 1969, 64 – 5; Rainbird 1986, 150 – 1; Daugherty 1992, 230; Sablayrolles 1996, 30. 261 Rainbird 1986, 150 – 1. 262 Rainbird 1986, 150 – 1. For a comprehensive discussion of these two inscriptions see Rainbird 1976, Chapters three and five. See also Durry 1968, 18 and Sablayrolles 1996, 30 – 2.

51

probably have caused a popular outcry; hence Augustus chose to employ freedmen.263

There may have been problems in recruiting the required numbers of freedmen

because during the reign of Tiberius it was found necessary to add some inducement.

Therefore, in AD 24, the lex Visellia was passed, in which the Vigiles gained Roman

citizenship after completing six years of service.

The use of non-citizens emphasises their early non-military character, a fact that is also

clear from Tacitus (Ann. 4.5), who in his review of the armies of the Empire fails to list

the Vigiles.

264 The qualifying period for Roman

citizenship was later reduced to three years.265 By the second century AD the Vigiles

were largely recruited from freeborn citizens. When exactly this change came about is

not known, but it seems certain that it was before AD 166, when epigraphic evidence

(AE 1912 230) indicates freeborn men in the Vigiles. Moreover, from the proportion

of one freedman to ten freeborn, in this inscription, it could be supposed that freeborn

men had been able to enter the Vigiles for some time.266

The overall command of the Vigiles fell to the praefectus vigilum, who was an

equestrian officer appointed by the emperor.

267 The post was inferior to that of the

Prefects of the annonae, urbi and praetorio.268 The length of time that a Prefect of the

Vigiles held office is not known, although they may have held office until there was an

opening for their promotion or until their retirement.269 The name of the first Prefect

of the Vigiles has not come down to us, but we are able to identify forty-eight Prefects

from the first to the fourth century AD.270 However, our most famous Prefects were

notorious for something other than their command of the Vigiles.271

263 Baille Reynolds 1926, 23. See also Sablayrolles 1996, 34 – 7.

Such examples

include Sutorius Macro, the Prefect of the Vigiles who helped to bring down Sejanus

and was promoted to Praetorian Prefect as a result; Tigellinus, who was the praefectus

vigilum and then elevated to the Praetorian prefecture under Nero (Tac. Hist. 1.72.1),

and Plotius Firmus who was certainly the Prefect of the Vigiles before being promoted

to the Praetorian office by Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.46.1). The command structure under the

Prefects was the same as for the Praetorian and Urban cohorts. Their tribunes had

264 Durry 1968, 19; Watson 1969, 19. See Gaius 1.32b; Ulpian 3.5. 265 Watson 1969, 19. See Ulpian 3.5. 266 Baille Reynolds 1926, 67 – 8; Watson 1969, 19. 267 Sablayrolles 1996, 26. 268 For example see, Watson 1969, 20; Daugherty 1992, 230; Le Bohec 1994, 22. 269 Baille Reynolds 1926, 30 – 1 . 270 Sablayrolles 1996, 67. 271 Baille Reynolds 1926, 31; Daugherty 1992, 229.

52

been primipili in the legions and their centurions had been former Praetorian

Guardsmen.272

The length and conditions of their service is largely unknown, although they

may have been of similar standing to that of the imperial fleets at Misenum and

Ravenna.

273 Initially, their pay was probably lower than that of the legions;274

however, as we have already seen, centurionates and tribunates in the Vigiles played an

important role in the career structure for ambitious primipilares, and therefore their

pay and conditions must have eventually matched that of the legions.275 This may

have occurred as early as the reign of Tiberius, as the legacies left by this emperor

indicate that the Vigiles were on equal footing with the pay of the legions (Dio 59.2).

The length of service is unknown but Sablayrolles suggests, by comparing the few

surviving epigraphic lists, between twenty and twenty six years.276

As to their ultimate fate, “…les cohortes de vigiles n’existaient plus en 386.”

Subsequent

changes in the length and conditions of service in other corps, however, may have seen

different conditions and shorter terms of service for the Vigiles. 277

Speculatores

Under the Empire, within the ranks of the Praetorian Guard, the elite Praetorian

horsemen formed an inner corps of bodyguards known as the speculatores Augusti.278

272 Keppie 1998, 189. See also pp 41 - 3. For a comprehensive discussion of the tribunes and centurions in the Vigiles see Sablayrolles (1996, 137 – 174).

The term “Augusti” was used initially to distinguish the speculatores associated with

the Praetorian Guard from those of the legions. However, after AD 23 when all the

Praetorian cohorts were billeted in the castra praetoria, the speculatores were fully

273 Baille Reynolds 1926, 65. Sablayrolles (1996, 315 – 53) provides the most detailed account that we have of the service conditions, recruitment and discharge provision of the Vigiles. 274 Baille Reynolds 1926, 68; Watson 1969, 99. 275 Watson 1969, 99. Sablayrolles (1996, 42) proposes that the Vigiles can be seen as a proper military force as early as AD 31 and the fall of Sejanus. “…l’épisode de 31 avait administré le prevue qu’on pouvait faire appel aux vigiles comme à une troupe de métier en cas de crise grave et qu’on pouvait avec succès les opposer aux prétoriens, meme s’ils paraissaient a priori moins redoutables.” 276 Sablayrolles 1996, 325. 277 Sablayrolles 1996, 61. 278 See ILS 2014. Speculatores had been known before Augustus’ time. They had formed a regular part of Roman legions, with each legion having a sub-unit of ten speculatores. These mounted cavalrymen acted as scouts, messengers and spies for their legion. Reconnaissance was so vital to any Roman general in the field and so risky that these speculatores became their bodyguard. See Grant 1974, 90 – 1. Caesar (BAfr. 37.1) mentions them as part of his army. Antony formed his speculatores into a cohort, which was honoured on his coinage, (Crawford 1974, 544/12). Octavian is recorded as having stayed at the house of one of his speculatores, (Suet. Aug. 74.3). These legionary speculatores continued to exist during the Empire when they regularly carried important dispatches and carried out the various functions of a military police. When legionary speculatores came to Rome, they were quartered in the castra peregrina, which was located on the Caelian Hill. See Baille Reynolds 1923, 168 – 89; Baille Reynolds and Ashby 1923, 152 – 67.

53

integrated into the Rome cohorts and were no longer known as the emperor’s own, but

as part of the Praetorian Guard; they were as much the emperor’s men as all the

others.279 The speculatores were answerable to the Praetorian Prefect.280

It is not completely certain how many men comprised this unit. Speidel feels

that they can hardly have been less than 300, otherwise Tacitus (Hist. 2.33.3) would

probably not have singled them out on the field of Otho’s withdrawal before the First

Battle of Bedriacum in AD 69.

281 In addition, a soldier known by the name of a

trecenarius commanded the speculatores by the middle of the first century AD and

this has led to the conjecture that the unit comprised 300 men,282 although for most of

the Julio-Claudian period, the commander is simply known as the centurio

speculatorum. This high-ranking centurion exercitator was the drillmaster for the

unit.283 Durry speculates that a Praetorian soldier was eligible to become a speculator

after having served for six or seven years.284

Their main duty was to prevent the emperor from being assassinated

285 and

they were responsible for clearing a path for the emperor through crowds, using their

non-lethal spear butts. The most noted example of this occurs when a speculator

almost wounded the emperor Galba with his lancea286 while attempting to keep the

mob at bay (Suet. Galba 18.1). The emperor probably employed speculatores for

these tasks, rather than the Germani custodes corporis, because they did not want to be

seen using foreigners against Roman citizens.287

279 Speidel 1994, 34. See AE 1976, 18, 21, 22. None of these gravestones add the title Augusti or Caesaris. However, one diploma from AD 76 (CIL XVI 21) does distinguish speculatores from Praetorians.

The speculatores in Rome were, like

their legionary counterparts, also employed in the rapid delivery of important messages

and dispatches between the emperor and the provinces, providing information, secret

or otherwise, to the ruler (Suet. Aug. 49.3). There is also reason to believe that they

were used for more unsavoury activities, such as espionage, arrests, guarding suspects

280 LeBohec 1994, 23. 281 Speidel 1994, 34. Durry (1968, 108) and LeBohec (1994, 23) are in agreement that the speculatores numbered around 300. 282 Durry 1968, 109. 283 Durry 1968, 110; Speidel 1994, 34. See ILS 2648. 284 Durry 1968, 109. 285 Grant 1974, 91. Suetonius (Claud. 35.1) reports that speculatores accompanied Claudius to banquets. 286 The lancea was the special weapon of the speculatores. It has become known to us from a gravestone relief, (AE 1955 24). Its long shaft ended in a knob and it had a short broad heart shaped blade with a cross bar. Both ends were therefore designed for crowd control. See Speidel 1994, 33. The role played by the speculatores in the assassination of Galba will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 287 Speidel 1994, 35. This argument is strengthened by Tacitus’ remark (Ann. 15.58.2) that Nero trusted the Germani precisely because they were foreigners.

54

or detainees and the executions of condemned men.288 However, their treason in the

death of Nerva in AD 97 resulted in the loss of their role as the emperor’s bodyguard.

The emperor Trajan may have replaced them with the hastiliarii, an escort picked from

the newly established equites singulares Augusti.289

Germani corporis custodes

Besides Praetorian cohorts, some of the generals of the Republican period employed

foreign bodyguards for their personal protection. Marius brought to Rome a group of

men referred to as Bardyiae (Plut. Marius 43), while in Spain, Sertorius employed a

group of Celtiberian spearmen as a guard, an act that offended the Roman soldiers

(App. BCiv. 1.112). Caesar (BGall. 7.13.1) has informed us that sui Germani, some

400 horsemen whom he had with him from the beginning, saved the situation when his

regular cavalry got into difficulties in the face of an attack by Vercingetorix’

cavalry.290 In 49 BC when Caesar went to Spain, 900 horsemen went with him (App.

BCiv. 1.41). Eight hundred horse-guards accompanied Caesar to Egypt after the Battle

of Pharsalus (App. BCiv. 3.106), and in the African War of 46 BC when Caesar faced

Labienus, Caesar found that he too had a mounted guard of Gauls and Germans (Caes.

BAfr. 19). Shortly before the Ides of March 44 BC, Caesar dismissed his former

Spanish Guard (Suet. Iul. 86), an action which possibly made the Germani his sole

bodyguard.291

Augustus had initially had a bodyguard of Calagurritani, but after the Battle of

Actium he replaced these with German horsemen and they became known as the

Germani corporis custodes.

292 Some debate has arisen over the composition of the

unit, although Speidel argues convincingly that they were solely a cavalry unit.293

Regarding their effective in the first century AD, there is no reliable evidence; perhaps

400, the number Caesar (BGall. 7.13.1) had with him in 52 BC. Josephus (AJ 19.122)

for AD 41, however, calls their commanding officer a chiliarchos or a commander of

1000 men, suggesting a much-enlarged horse Guard under Gaius.294

288 Grant 1974, 91; Bingham 1998, 139.

289 Speidel 1994, 35 and 171 n. 40. 290 These German horsemen were probably the precursor of the later Germani corporis custodies. 291 Speidel 1994, 15; Webster 1998, 101. 292 The two seminal works on the Germani corporis custodes are by Bellen (1981) and Speidel (1994). 293 Speidel 1984, 38 – 40, 1994, 16. See also Durry 1968, 22. Bellen (1981, 56) states they were a mixed unit of cavalry and infantry because they were part of the watch that guarded the palace. 294 Speidel 1984, 31 suggests a figure between 500 and 1000 men. Rankov and Hook (1994, 12) also quote a figure of 500 men. LeBohec (1994, 23) notes that they could have numbered anything between 100 and 500 men.

55

They were recruited from the banks of the Lower Rhine and as such were also

referred to as Batavi (Suet. Gaius 43; Dio 55.24.6). The commanding officer of the

Germani was usually known as the curator Germanorum. Their squadrons were

known as decuria rather than the military turmae. This made it easier for emperors to

appoint commanders from outside the army.295

Following the defeat of Varus, in the Teutoberg Forest, in AD 9, Dio (56.23.4)

tells us that Augustus exiled the Gauls and Germans serving in his bodyguard to

certain islands.

Gaius, for example, appointed slaves

and gladiators (Suet. Gaius 55; Joseph. AJ 19.122). Claudius preferred to use

freedmen (CIL VI 4305) and Nero chose to return to gladiators (Suet. Ner. 30.2, 47.3;

Plut. Galba 8.6; Dio 63.27.2b).

296 The danger they posed was in their closeness to the emperor rather

than in their numbers. We do not know if Augustus ever recalled his former Guard.

However, five years later, at the beginning of Tiberius’ reign, the Germani are once

again to be found in Rome (Tac. Ann. 1.24). During the reigns of Gaius, Claudius, and

Nero, members of the Germani corporis custodes became used to receiving rich gifts

in exchange for their loyalty297 and in AD 65 Nero bestowed his name and citizenship

on the Germani, evidenced by a gravestone which mentions three horse guards called

Tiberius Claudius (ILS 1730 – 2). However, in AD 69 Galba dismissed the Germani

and sent them home (Suet. Galba 12.2). From AD 69 to 98 the Germani corporis

custodes disappear. No literary references and no physical remains tell us if the

Flavian emperors had a foreign bodyguard in Rome. Later, possibly under Trajan, the

new cavalry guard – the equites singulares Augusti was instituted.298

Conclusion

While our knowledge of the imperial Praetorian Guard is not always as comprehensive

and clear as we would like it to be, it should be possible to draw a satisfactory

portrayal of the Praetorian Guard on the eve of the suicide of the emperor Nero.

Moreover, we should be able to identify at least some of the factors that are likely to be

important in determing the role the Praetorian Guard would play in the events of AD

69.

295 Speidel 1994, 27. 296 See also Suet. Aug. 49.1. For a discussion of the exile of the Germani from Rome see Speidel (1984, 40 – 42) and Bellen (1984, 40 - 41). 297 Speidel 1994, 21 – 7. The new found wealth of the Germani, in the reigns of Claudius and Nero, can be seen in their massive gravestones, which have been found in two graveyards belonging to the horse Guard across the Tiber. Twenty-five gravestones have been found. See Bellen 1981, 62 – 81. 298 Speidel 1984, 43; 1994 passim.

56

Almost certainly, there were at least twelve Praetorian cohorts, each with a

possible effective of 500 men, including speculatores. The majority of the Praetorians

were billeted at the castra praetoria on the outskirts of Rome. The Praetorians were

largely Italian by birth, with the provincial component of the Guard around 10% and

although the evidence is very limited it would seem reasonable to assume that, the

majority of the Guard came from the lower social classes.

With the possible exception of a shorter life expectancy, the service conditions

of the Praetorian Guard were considerably better than those of the legionary soldiers

serving on the frontiers. Their regular pay was much higher and they received higher

donativa on a much more frequent basis. Praetorian Guardsmen also had to spend

fewer years in service than their legionary counterparts did and they had the added

bonus of being able to contract a legally valid marriage with a peregrina once they

were discharged.

The Praetorian Guard shared Rome with a number of other units. There were

possibly six Urban cohorts serving at this time with an estimated 500 men per cohort.

The Urban cohorts shared the accommodation in the castra praetoria with the

Praetorians. The Germani corporis custodes were present in Rome at the time of

Nero’s suicide, but Galba disbanded them when he arrived in the capital. Although not

a military unit, the Vigiles at this time, numbered seven cohorts of an estimated 500

men per cohort.

Throughout the Julio-Claudian period the Praetorian Prefects were often a

dominant and important part of the emperor’s court. Some Prefects such as Sejanus,

Macro, Burrus and Tigellinus are well known to us through our ancient sources and the

influence they wielded over their respective emperor is well recorded. However, all

Praetorian Prefects, whether or not they were the overriding influence at the emperor’s

court, were men of some importance. This importance came from three factors.

Firstly, their role as protector of the emperor’s person meant that the emperor must

have trusted them implicitly. Secondly, their access to the emperor ensured that

senators or equestrians seeking favour from the emperor would seek them out. Finally,

they commanded the only armed force in Italy. The support of the Praetorian Prefect

and through them the Praetorian Guard was vital to any emperor not only on their

accession, but throughout their reign. Moreover, the support of the Praetorian Prefect

and Guard was vital to any would be usurper.

However, in this year of civil war this position of prominence enjoyed by the

Praetorian Prefects would surely change. Galba’s Prefect, Cornelius Laco, might have

57

enjoyed a dominant position in the emperor’s consilium, but by the time Otho became

emperor, the Prefect’s position was declining in importance and in Vitellius’ Principate

the Praetorian Prefects are not much more than names on the page. The reasons for

this decline are obvious. With the arrival of the legions from Germany and the East,

the Praetorian Guard are no longer the only soldiers in Italy, hence their commander

loses one of the aspects of his position that made him so important to the emperor. In

addition, the generals that commanded these powerful armies, men such as A. Caecina,

Fabius Valens, Antonius Primus and G. Licinius Mucianus would become enormously

important to the emperor or to the prospective emperor. They would decide the

outcome of the battles and maintaining their loyalty would be what mattered. It would

not be until the reign of Vespasian, when the generals and the legions had returned to

the frontiers that we will see the importance of the Praetorian Prefects reemerge at

Rome.

While the importance of the Praetorian Prefects declines during this year, the

Praetorian soldiers, on the other hand, would become increasingly more important. In

civil war soldiers were not fighting barbarians but other Romans, therefore the

potential always existed that their loyalty could be tampered with and that they could

be brought round to support another candidate for the Principate. Their demands had

to be addressed and if possible met. Galba would fail to consider his soldiers

discontent and face the consequences. However, the importance of the soldiers is

perhaps no better illustrated by Tacitus than in the short reign of Otho. Otho would

need the Praetorians to fight for him and hence he had to accede to their demands. The

leaders of the Flavian faction would also court the Praetorian soldiers, promising them

reinstatement in the Guard after Vitellius had dismissed them.

This brings us to the all-important point of what motivated the Praetorian

soldiers to maintain their allegiance, or not as the case may be, to the reiging emperor.

The Praetorian soldiers had consistently demonstrated their loyalty to the Julio-

Claudian emperors. This loyalty was no doubt maintained by the service conditions

that they enjoyed, particularly their average pay and the donatives that they received.

Considering the nature of Roman society it would come as no surprise that if these

service conditions was threatened their allegiance to the emperor would be stretched.

The financial problems that Nero encountered, particularly towards the end of his

reign, might have been enough to bring the Praetorians to desert him. Certainly,

financial considerations and the failure of Galba to reward the Praetorian soldiers for

their services and his poor relationship with the soldiers were vital factors in the

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success of Otho’s conspiracy. The soldiers’ intense hatred of Galba was enough and

Otho did not need to offer a donative.

What then did Vitellius and Vespasian offer their soldiers to motivate them to

support their bid for the Principate? No excessive donatives are recorded as being

paid, yet Vitellius and Vespasian must have offered some reward. This reward,

perhaps among other things, had to be service in the Rome cohorts. Certainly Tacitus

(Ann. 1.17), in the speech that he puts in the mouth of Percennius, clearly indicates that

soldiers stationed on the frontier viewed with resentment the service conditions of the

Praetorians. This was potentially a source of great danger, but how great is difficult to

determine.299

To provide something of a yardstick for the behaviour of the Praetorian Guard

in AD 69, in the next chapter we will examine the role played by the Praetorian Guard,

including their Prefects, their officers and their soldiers, in the downfall of the last

Julio-Claudian emperor.

Without a leader this resentment was probably generally harmless.

However, when a senator offered them the opportunity to earn the salary of and enjoy

the service conditions of a Praetorian Guardsman their resentment found a voice.

299Rostovtzeff (1926, 84) proposes that the military movements of AD 68 – 69 were largely a protest by the provincial armies against a military tyranny at Rome, which was supported by the Praetorian Guard. However, Syme (1939, 244) notes that it is a theory that has not found widespread acceptance and Talbert (1977, 74) concludes that there was simply no evidence to support this theory.

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Chapter Two

The Praetorian Guard and the End of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty

Introduction

Tacitus’ Historiae commence on 1 January AD 69. The emperor, S. Sulpicius Galba

and T. Vinius Rufinus were the consuls (Tac. Hist. 1.1.1). The sole commander of the

Praetorian Guard was Cornelius Laco (Tac. Hist. 1.13.1; Plut. Galba 13.1). Two weeks

later on 15 January, all three men had been murdered and M. Salvius Otho was

proclaimed emperor, first by the Praetorians (Tac. Hist. 1.27.2; Plut. Galba 25.1; Suet.

Otho 6.3; Dio 64.5.3) and then by the Senate (Tac. Hist. 1.47.1; Plut. Galba 28.1; Suet.

Otho 7.1; Dio 64.8.1). Otho’s dramatic rise to the Principate was primarily due to the

actions of the Praetorian Guard, or at least to a small faction within the Guard (Tac.

Hist. 1.25.1; Plut. Galba 24.1; Suet. Otho 5.2; Dio 64.5.3). However, before beginning

an analysis of the considerable part played by the Praetorian Guard in these events, it is

necessary to step back and examine the significant role the Praetorian Guard played in

establishing Galba as emperor in the first instance. An understanding of the behaviour

and motivations of the Praetorian Prefects, the Praetorian officers and the soldiers in

these momentous events, will provide a useful gauge for comparing and contrasting

their role in the subsequent events of AD 69.

Unfortunately, we have no account from Tacitus on the demise of Nero. The

extant Annales break off two years before the suicide of Nero and the Historiae begin

approximately six months after Nero’s death. However, we do have the accounts of the

Roman biographer Suetonius and the Greek historian Cassius Dio. There are also

several insightful passages to be found in the Plutarch’s biography of Galba and in the

introduction of Tacitus’ Historiae, which can be used to help us interpret the role played

by the Praetorian Guard.

Nero’s Praetorian Prefects

The Praetorian Prefects at the time of Nero’s suicide were Ofonius Tigellinus300 and C.

Nymphidius Sabinus.301

300 See PIR2 S 540. Dio (62.13.3) calls him Sophronius Tigellinus.

In comparison to the limited amount of knowledge that we

301 See PIR2 N 250.

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have of the numerous men that were to hold the Prefecture in the year AD 69,302 the

lives of these two men are relatively well known to us. This is clearly due to the fact

that Tigellinus and Nymphidius served as Praetorian Prefects for a much longer period

of time than any of the men who undertook the role in AD 69. Tigellinus had been

promoted to the Praetorian Prefecture following the death of Sex. Afranius Burrus303 in

AD 62 (Tac. Ann. 14.51; Dio 62.13.3) and Nymphidius became his co-Prefect in the

aftermath of the Pisonian conspiracy in AD 65.304

Consequently, these two men had far

longer to leave their mark on the historical record. Considering the vital role that the

two Prefects, particularly Nymphidius, were to play in bringing about the end of the

Julio-Claudian dynasty, it is worth briefly recounting what we know about their lives.

Ofonius Tigellinus305

Tigellinus is first introduced briefly into Tacitus’ account (Ann. 14.48) in AD

62, as the father-in-law of Cossutianus Capito. Even at this stage, Tigellinus seems to

have possessed considerable influence at Nero’s court, as Tacitus (Ann. 13.33) informs

us that Capito, who had been banished for extortion to Cilicia, had only just recovered

his senatorial rank through the intervention of his father-in-law. At some time between

AD 55 and 62, Tigellinus was promoted praefectus vigilum

306 and following the death

of the Praetorian Prefect Burrus in AD 62, he was elevated to Praetorian Prefect with L.

Faenius Rufus307 as his colleague (Tac. Ann. 14.51; Dio 62.13.3). In AD 65, Faenius

Rufus was implicated in the Pisonian conspiracy and consequently Nymphidius Sabinus

was appointed as Tigellinus’ colleague (Tac. Ann. 15.72; Plut. Galba 2.1). At the same

time, Tigellinus along with Petronius Turpilianus and Cocceius Nerva308

Tigellinus and at least some cohorts of the Praetorian Guard accompanied Nero

on his grand tour of Greece, which probably commenced in the autumn of AD 66 (Suet.

Ner. 19.2; Dio 63.11.2, 12.3, 13.1, 14.3; CIL VI 2044). From the time of Nero’s return

had triumphal

ornaments bestowed on them, presumably for their role in helping to suppress the

conspiracy. Nero apparently exalted Nerva and Tigellinus so far that he not only placed

statues of them in the Forum but in the Palace as well (Tac. Ann. 15.72).

302 There were eight men who held the Praetorian Prefecture in AD 69: Cornelius Laco (Galba), Plotius Firmus and Licinius Proculus (Otho), Publilius Sabinus, Julius Priscus and Alfenus Varus (Vitellius), Arrius Varus and M. Arrecinus Clemens (Vespasian). 303 See PIR2 A 441. 304 See Tac. Ann. 15.72. 305 For Tigellinus’ early life see Appendix Three. 306 Roper 1979, 348. 307 See PIR2 F 102; CIL XV 1136, 1137. 308 The future emperor. An inscription (CIL VIII 10117 = ILS 293) notes his other honours, but does not mention the ornamenta triumphalia.

61

from Greece until the time of his death, we have scant information on Tigellinus; even

his actual role in the downfall of Nero is obscure.309 Nevertheless, his betrayal of the

emperor is well recorded (Tac. Hist. 1.72.1; Plut. Galba 2.1; Joseph. BJ 4.492) and he

does not seem to have done anything to rally the Praetorian soldiers behind Nero.310

There was much popular support for Tigellinus to be punished under Galba

(Tac. Hist. 1.72.1; Plut. Galba 17.2; Suet. Galba 15.2; Dio 64.3.3), but he seems to have

managed to ingratiate himself with all the right people. Tacitus (Hist. 1.72.2) tells us

that Vinius saved Tigellinus because he had protected his daughter, Vinia Crispina,

from Nero during the early days of the rebellion. Vinius was one of the first to offer

support to Galba in his revolt against Nero (Plut. Galba 4.4). Once Nero had become

aware of Galba’s revolt and the identity of his principal supporters, one can imagine that

their families in Rome would have potentially been in danger. Tacitus (Hist. 1.72.2; cf.

Dio 64.3.3) finds it credible that Tigellinus acted to save Vinius’ daughter, but has

added that he does not believe that the protection of Vinia was in anyway an act of

mercy, but rather to guarantee his own survival. Plutarch (Galba 17.2) is in agreement

with Tacitus that Vinius saved Tigellinus, but not because he had saved his daughter,

rather Vinius had been the recipient of substantial financial advances from Tigellinus.

Not only did Galba protect Tigellinus’ life, but he also published an imperial

edict which charged the people with undeserved hostility towards him (Suet. Galba

15.2; Plut. Galba 17.4). When Otho seized power very early in AD 69, he sent orders

to Tigellinus (who was at the baths of Sinuessa) that his hour had come and Tigellinus

committed suicide by cutting his throat with his razor (Tac. Hist. 1.72.3; Plut. Otho 2.1

– 3).

C. Nymphidius Sabinus311

As to Nymphidius’ early career, we have scant information. It is likely that an

inscription from Pannonia records an early military post held by Nymphidius,

312

possibly praefectus alae. Unfortunately, only a very small section of the inscription

remains:

309 The possibility that Nymphidius was also in Greece with Nero and Tigellinus is discussed below. 310 Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 40. A full discussion of the role played by both Tigellinus and Nymphidius in Nero’s demise follows. 311 For Nymphidius’ early life see Appendix Three. 312 Chilver (1979, 50) suggests that it is not impossible that Nymphidius visited the province of Pannonnia after he was appointed Praetorian Prefect. An inscription (CIL VI 6621) from Rome names a slave belonging to Nymphidius.

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I.o. m. | C. Nym|phidius | Sabinus | [pr]ae[f.]….(ILS 1322)

Praefectus ala was an equestrian post and assuming that Nymphidius did indeed serve

in this position, he could have gained the appointment in one of several ways. During

the early years of the first century AD it was possible for a primus pilus to serve as a

praefectus, as they would automatically gain equestrian status on attaining the rank of

chief centurion.313 Alternatively, as was the case in the latter first century AD,

Nymphidius may have attained the position because he was already a young man of

equestrian status.314 If this was the case, Nymphidius probably had to serve in a number

of civilian and military posts, which were usually undertaken sequentially.315 There

does not seem to have been any particular fixed term for the post of praefectus, or

indeed for the prerequisite positions, but three or four years seems to have been about

the average for each one.316 Either of these two options would indicate that

Nymphidius had served in the military, in some capacity, for a number of years.

Finally, there were various types of single commissions, which could be held by

equestrian officers. One group held the command of an ala without any other posts

being recorded. Of all the single commissions for praefectus recorded, only one does

not belong to the period between the latter years of the reign of Nero and the early years

of Vespasian.317

Nymphidius was definitely in Rome in AD 65 at the time of the Pisonian

conspiracy, because following the suppression of the scheme, we read that Nero

bestowed consularia insignia upon Nymphidius for his services (Tac. Ann. 15.72; cf

Dio 62.27.4). The bestowal of insignia (quaestorian, praetorian or consular) on non-

senators was a mark of imperial favour. They conferred appropriate senatorial status on

public occasions, but did not involve formal admission to the Senate.

Consequently, this would seem to be a popular option when

Nymphidius served as praefectus and may well be the way in which Nymphidius came

to this post. However, we have no way of knowing this.

318

313 From the Flavian period, centurions ceased being offered commands in the auxilia, instead those thought capable of higher command went to Rome to be tribunes in the Rome cohorts (Keppie 1998, 184 – 5). For a discussion of centurions and the Rome cohorts see pp 41 – 3.

Grants were

commonly made to Praetorian Prefects. Under Tiberius, L. Aelius Seianus (Sejanus)

and Q. Naevius Cordus Sutorius Macro both received praetorian insignia (Dio 57.19.7;

314 Webster 1998, 146; Dixon and Southern 1992, 24. 315 The steps on the military cursus were normally praefectus cohortis, tribunus legionis and praefectus ala, (Birley 1961, 138 – 9; Webster 1998, 146, Keppie 1998, 184). 316 Dixon and Southern (1992, 24) note “after holding such commands it was then possible to rise to a post in the imperial service, or even a seat in the Senate. See also Holder 1980, 78; Webster 1998, 146. 317 Holder 1980, 78. 318 Millar 1977, 308.

63

58.12.7). According to Tacitus (Ann. 11.4) the Praetorian Prefect under Claudius,

Rufrius Crispinus, was also the recipient of praetorian insignia,319 while during the

reign of Nero, Burrus received consular ornamenta (ILS 1321). In the Antonine period,

awards to Praetorian Prefects were exclusively consular.320

Although there are two lacunae, probably of quite substantial size, in the text of

Tacitus at the end of the Pisonian conspiracy, it would seem that Nymphidius was also

rewarded for his role in uncovering the conspiracy with elevation to the Praetorian

Prefecture, replacing Faenius Rufus. It would also appear that Tacitus was going to

provide us with a character sketch of Nymphidius, on this his first appearance in the

Annales, but the lacunae have also deprived us of the majority of the details.

These awards were not

restricted to Praetorian Prefects however, as under Claudius the freedman Narcissus was

awarded quaestoria insignia for his role in the downfall of Messalina (Tac. Ann. 11.38),

with Pallas being awarded praetoria insignia (Tac. Ann. 12.53).

As previously noted, from August AD 66 to early AD 68 Nymphidius’ colleague

in the Prefecture, Tigellinus, and at least some cohorts of the Praetorian Guard, are

recorded as being in Greece with Nero (Suet. Ner. 19.2; Dio 63.11.2, 12.3, 13.1, 14.3).

Nero apparently left Helius, his libertus, in charge of Rome and Italy, with authority of

life and death over senators, equites and citizens (Dio 63.12.1). It has usually been

assumed that Nymphidius stayed in Rome to command the remaining cohorts of the

Praetorian Guard,321

If Nymphidius did indeed remain in Rome, it seems somewhat unusual that Nero

entrusted affairs to Helius rather than to his Praetorian Prefect. In addition,

Nymphidius’ absence from Rome at this time could be indicated by the fact that it was

Helius who sent reports to Nero that a conspiracy was under way and that he should

return from Greece at once (Dio 63.19.1 – 2). One would have expected such reports to

have come from the commander of his security forces rather than his freedman.

in what would certainly be the most logical division of Nero’s

security forces. However, we have no direct evidence to indicate decisively whether

Nymphidius accompanied Tigellinus and Nero to Greece or whether he remained in the

capital. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence that we can draw upon would seem to

indicate that Nymphidius might also have been in Greece with his emperor.

322

319 Rufrius Crispinus is later described by Tacitus (Ann.16.17) as a Roman knight of senatorial rank.

320 Bosworth 1980, 270 – 1 n. 13. 321 For example, see Griffin 1987, 180; Rudich 1993, 234; Damon 2003, 104. 322 There is no mention of a conspiracy in Suetonius’ account (Ner. 23.1); rather Suetonius writes that Helius reminded Nero that the affairs of the city required his attention. However, as Wiedemann (CAH2 X, 256) notes, the fact that Helius braved the Adriatic in winter would indicate that he was deeply worried about the possibility of a conspiracy.

64

When Helius’ messages failed to elicit a response from Nero, he went personally to

Greece to warn his emperor of this alleged conspiracy. This time Nero responded by

returning to Rome immediately (Dio 63.19.1 – 2). Once again it is rather surprising,

given the nature of the stated emergency, that the mission to bring Nero back to Rome

was left in the hands of a freedman rather than to the Praetorian Prefect, or at least a

detachment of Praetorian soldiers, and may indicate that Nymphidius was also absent

from Rome at this time.

Nonetheless, it was not unheard of for an emperor to leave Rome and the

security forces under the control of a person other than a Praetorian Prefect. When

Claudius left Rome for Britain in AD 43/4, he entrusted the affairs of the capital,

including the command of the troops, to his colleague in the consulship and very close

friend, L. Vitellius (Dio 60.21.2). However, there is a substantial difference between

Claudius leaving his consular partner in charge and Nero apparently bypassing consuls,

senators and possibly a Praetorian Prefect to select a freedman. If Nymphidius was

overlooked by Nero, and a freedman chosen in his stead, one cannot help but wonder if

it had any effect on Nymphidius’ loyalty toward Nero.

Nymphidius was to play a significant role in the downfall of Nero (Tac. Hist.

1.5.2; Plut. Galba 2.1 – 2; Suet. Galba 16.1; Dio 64.3.3). In the weeks following

Nero’s suicide, our ancient sources (Tac. Hist. 1.5.2; Plut. Galba 8.1, 9.1, 3, 13.4) claim

that Nymphidius wanted to seize the empire for himself, but his attempt was

unsuccessful and he fell victim to his own Praetorian soldiers before Galba arrived in

Rome (Tac. Hist. 1.5.2; Plut. Galba 14.6).

The Revolt of C. Julius Vindex, the Rhine armies and Galba

Before turning to the role played by the Praetorian Guard in the downfall of Nero it is

worthwhile examining briefly the events on the Rhine frontier. Without outlining the

important events taking place outside Rome, it will not be possible to assess accurately

how significant the role the Praetorians played actually was in bringing about Nero’s

suicide.

It was the revolt of C. Julius Vindex which set in motion a series of events that

ultimately led to the fall of Nero and the outbreak of civil war.323

323 There are a number of interesting and informative articles on the revolt of Vindex including, Kraay 1949, 129 – 149; Brunt 1959, 531 – 59; Hainsworth 1967, 86 – 96; Shotter 1967, 370 – 381; 1975, 59 – 74; Daly 1975, 75 – 100.

Nero was informed

about the uprising of Vindex while he was in Neapolis on the anniversary of his

mother’s death, c. 24 - 27 March AD 68 (Suet. Ner. 40.2). Assuming this dating is

65

correct then the revolt in Gaul probably began about the middle of March.324 The aim

of Vindex’s rebellion was to overthrow Nero.325

In response to the revolt of Vindex, L. Verginius Rufus the governor of Upper

Germany marched his legions out of their base at Mainz presumably with the intention

of putting down the rebellion. There is no evidence in the ancient sources to indicate

that Nero ordered Verginius’ action but it is difficult to image that Nero did not call

upon him. The armies of Verginius and Vindex meet in battle at Vesontio, probably

around the end of April or early May AD 68.

Vindex appears to have had no

imperial ambitions himself, offering the imperial office to S. Sulpicius Galba, then

governor of Hispania Tarraconensis (cf. Dio 63.23). Dio (63.23) and Suetonius (Galba

9) imply that Vindex’s decision to offer Galba the imperial position was previously

unknown to Galba before the rebellion began. On the contrary, Plutarch (Galba 4.2 – 3)

notes that even before the declaration of open hostilities Galba had received letters from

Vindex which he did not trust, although he chose not to betray Vindex to Nero as a

number of other provincial governors had done. However, regardless of Galba’s

knowledge of the rebellion, once it had got underway Vindex seems to have written to

Galba again offering him the imperial power. Galba was initially undecided but

eventually agreed to take up Vindex’s offer. He adopted the title of General of the

Roman Senate and People (Plut. Galba 5.1 – 2; Suet. Ner. 10).

326 The forces of Vindex were massacred

(Dio 63.24.41; Plut. Galba 6.3). According to Dio (63.24.4) and Plutarch (Galba 6.4)

the German armies offered to make Verginius emperor immediately following the

battle. Verginius, however, repeatedly refused their offer,327

The accounts of both Dio and Plutarch seem to indicate that the decision to

make Verginius emperor was a spontaneous one initiated by the rank and file, which is

certainly possible. Alternatively, the offer to make Verginius emperor may well have

and when he finally

managed to convince the troops that he did not want to be emperor, the troops returned

to supporting Nero (Plut. Galba 6.3; Tac. Hist. 1.8.2).

324 Murison 1993, 5. Hainsworth (1962, 87) suggests that the revolt may have begun on the Ides of March. Shotter (1975, 64) concludes that the revolt started on March 11 and the news reached Nero on March 19. 325 Kraay 1949, 129 – 49; Chilver 1957, 29 – 30; Brunt 1959, 545; Hainsworth 1962, 86; Daly 1974, 77 –9; Rudich 1993, 210 –11. See also Dio 63.22.2 – 6; cf. Dio 63.24.4a; Plut. Galba 4. 326 Scholars have argued for a variety of dates, see Kraay 1949, 129 n. 5; Shotter 1975, 69, 73; Murison 1993, 7 – 11. 327Dio (63.25.1) speculates that Verginius refused the imperial title simply because he did not feel that it was right for soldiers to bestow the supreme power upon anyone (as he declared it was the prerogative of the senate and people) or that he felt no desire for the imperial office. Fabius Valens, however, maintained that Verginius refused because he was from an equestrian family, his father was unknown, and consequently if he accepted imperial power he would be unequal to it but safe if he refused it (Tac. Hist.1.52). Plutarch (Galba 6.2) notes that Verginius said that he would not assume the imperial power nor would he allow the imperial power to be given to anyone whom was not chosen by the senate.

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been planned by ambitious officers within the legions who managed to win over the

support of the rank and file with the opportunity of more plunder.328

Meanwhile in Rome, Nero was apparently not overly concerned by the uprising

of Vindex (Dio 63.26.1; Plut. Galba 5.3; Suet. Ner. 40), although he may have placed a

price of 10 million sesterces on his head (Dio 63.26.3).

Indeed one of

Verginius’ officers, Pedanius Costa has been recorded as urging Verginius to move

against Nero (Tac. Hist. 2.71).

329 Nero seems to have believed

that the revolt would be easily defeated and that it would give him the grounds for

securing new levies of money and committing more murders (Dio 63.26.3; cf. Plut.

Galba 5.4; Suet. Ner. 40). Nero’s relative inaction over the news of the revolt of Vindex

is quite feasible. At this stage there was no hint of involvement of any of the governors

in the armed provinces.330

However, while Nero had seemed generally unconcerned about the revolt of

Vindex his attitude changed considerably when he learnt of Galba’s betrayal (Dio

63.27.1; Plut. Galba 5.4; Suet. Ner. 42). There is no firm evidence to indicate exactly

when this news may have arrived. It is possible that by this time the news could have

been carried by ship for at least part of the journey.

Moreover, Nero must have been confident that the legions

stationed along the Rhine were more than capable of dealing with a local insurrection,

as was shown to be the case.

331 While no certainty exists, it can

probably be assumed that Nero was in possession of the information about Galba by

mid April,332 possibly before the battle at Vesontio took place. While Nero was right to

be more concerned about the revolt of a Roman provincial governor, he would have

known that Galba only had at his disposal one legion. Moreover, if the dating is correct

Nero had no cause to doubt the loyalty of the German legions and their superior

numbers would have been more than enough to suppress Galba in the same manner that

they went on to defeat Vindex.333

It is likely that Nero would have heard about Verginius’ victory at Vesontio

early in May which would have been welcome news. However, he was also probably

328 Talbert 1977, 72. See Tac. Hist. 1.51. 329 Suetonius (Ner. 41) notes that Nero received a number of further urgent dispatches at Antium, which sent Nero into a state of terror, but he does not elaborate on their contents. 330 Shotter 1975, 65. 331 Shotter 1975, 66. Plutarch (Galba 7.1) tells us that Icelus made the journey from Rome to Galba in Clunia in seven days with the official messengers arriving two days later. However, Plutarch makes the comment that this speed was ‘incredible.’ So bearing this in mind, a journey time of 10 – 14 days does not seem unreasonable. 332 Shotter 1975, 67. 333 Brunt 1959, 539.

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informed of the troop’s subsequent offer to make Verginius emperor.334 Nero must

have recognised the possibility that Verginius might change his mind at any time and

accept the offer of his troops.335 Alternatively, the troops may make the offer to another

person, who would not refuse. This coupled with the news about Galba’s revolt would

undoubtedly have created Nero grave concern. To add to Nero’s woes, Dio tells us that

Turpilianus and the forces he commanded had joined Galba.336 Regrettably we do not

have any details of how Nero reacted to any of this news. Tacitus (Hist. 1.89.2),

however, notes that Nero lost his throne nuntiis magis et rumoribus quam armis…, and

it is possible that at this stage the messages and reports that he was receiving from Gaul,

Germany and Spain were misleading, inaccurate or simply misunderstood by Nero. As

Syme notes “…rumour both anticipated and determined the course of events…”337

If Nero believed, which seems feasible, that the German legions had deserted

him and did not receive or did not believe reports that Verginius had refused their offer

to make him emperor, he must have realised that the situation was potentially very

grave and this may explain why Nero began to undertake some serious measures. He

had the senate vote Galba a public enemy (Plut. Galba 5.4), he removed the consuls

from office becoming sole consul in their place (Suet. Ner. 43.2) and he began to recruit

soldiers from the urban masses and even from slaves (Suet. Ner. 44). Nero also set

about gathering military forces

338

With the apparent loss of most of his provincial armies, Nero gave up any hopes

of salvaging the situation with arms (Dio 63.27.1a). Yet even now the situation was not

hopeless. Following the battle of Vesontio the movement against Nero seems to have

diminished.

and an advance guard lead by Rubrius Gallus and

Petronius Turpillianus was sent against the rebels (Dio 63.27.1).

339

334 Shotter 1975, 70.

Verginius and his army were not completely disloyal and had in fact

returned to supporting their emperor. Galba still only had the support of a handful of

troops at his disposal, possibly numbering less that the Praetorian Guard. Nero’s

335 The loyalty of Verginius to Nero and when and if he actually deserted Nero is a well debated topic. In favour of Verginius’ loyalty to Nero until the end see, Kraay 1949, 144 – 6; Chilver 1957, 32 – 3; Syme 1958, 179; Grant 1970, 242. For the argument that Verginius had abandoned Nero by the time of the battle of Vesontio see, Brunt 1958, 538 – 40; Hainsworth 1967, 89; Shotter 1967, 373 – 5; Daly 1975, 81 – 2; Murison 1993, 16. 336 This may be the dispatch which Suetonius (Nero 47) refers to which informed Nero that ‘other armies’ had also revolted. 337 Syme 1937, 12. 338 From the fleet he attempted to recruit a new legion, the Legio I Adiurtrix, but it was not formed in time to have been of any use. See Tac. Hist. 1.6. Detachments were recalled from Germany, Britain and Illyricum which had been sent to the Caspian Gates where they were waiting to take part in an expedition against the Albani, (Tac. Hist. 1.6; Suet. Nero 19). These included the Legio Italica and the Legio XIV Gemina Martia Victrix. See Tac. Hist. 2.11.1; 27.2. 339 Shotter 1967,

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situation was actually still quite sound. Although, it would seem, for whatever reason,

that he did not perceive the situation in such a positive light. What would then go on to

make matters even worse for Nero was his own inability to command respect at such a

dangerous time coupled with the actions of the Praetorian Guard, in particular their

Praetorian Prefect, Nymphidius Sabinus.

The end of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty

Although Nero seems to have believed that the Rhine armies had turned against him, if

he had retained his composure and the Praetorian Guard had remained loyal, Galba’s

revolt would probably have ended very differently. What was to prove decisive in the

end was that the Praetorian Guard and the Senate transferred their support from Nero to

Galba. One can imagine that if Nero had retained the support of these two groups he

may well have survived Galba’s revolt.340 In particular, it is the actions of the

Praetorian Prefect Nymphidius which are crucial at this time. Indeed, Chilver suggests

that Nymphidius proved to be the decisive force on Galba’s behalf, and Daly proposes

that the importance of the role of the Praetorians contradicts what Tacitus (Hist. 1.4.2)

believes was the most important lesson of Nero’s death: that an emperor could be made

elsewhere than at Rome.341 While for Brunt, the desertion of the Praetorians sealed

Nero’s fate.342

In the earliest stages of the revolt against Nero we hear nothing of the activities

of any section of the Praetorians. Even after Nero had learnt of Galba’s betrayal (Plut.

Galba 5.3; Suet. Ner. 42; Dio 63.27.1) and had commenced making plans to defend his

Empire (Suet. Ner. 44.1 – 2; Dio 63.27.1), there are no indications as to the role he

expected the Praetorian Guard to play. One could speculate that Nero intended that the

Praetorians remain in Rome and if the need arose to protect the city itself. However, in

the end none of Nero’s military preparations proved necessary. In fact, Tacitus (Hist.

Certainly, it would appear that the Senate were unlikely to choose to be

the next emperor a man who was not suitable to the Praetorians or at least to their

Prefects, and it is possible that the Senate simply endorsed the decision of the Praetorian

Guard (Plut. Galba 7.2). Certainly, the Senate had been powerless to stop the Guard

declaring Claudius emperor, after the assassination of Gaius (Suet. Claud. 10.1 – 4; Dio

60.1.4; Joseph. AJ 19.247, BJ 2.204 14; Aur. Vict. Caes. 3).

340 Shotter 1967, 375. Syme (1937, 13) notes that even after Nero’s death, it was not certain whether Galba had secured the empire because the armies of the Rhine were still mutinous and Verginius was slow to declare for Galba. The situation remained in the balance. 341 Chilver 1957, 32; Daly 1975, 84. See also Shotter 1975, 64. 342 Brunt 1990b, 18. Bradley (1978, 273) agrees with Brunt, that the loss of the Praetorian Guard was fatal to Nero.

69

1.89.2) informs us that Nero: nuntiis magis et rumoribus quam armis depulsus….343 It

would also seem that he was defeated by his own inability to deal with the situation344

Tacitus (Hist. 1.5.1) claims that: Miles urbanus longo Caesarum sacramento

imbutus et ad destituendem Neronem arte magis et impulsu quam suo ingenio

traductus….

and by the betrayal of his Praetorian Prefects, who subsequently corrupted the loyalty of

the soldiers.

345

While Tigellinus may have agreed to desert Nero, there can be no denying that

Nymphidius quickly seems to have taken the leading position. Plutarch (Galba 8.2)

records that immediately after Nero’s death Nymphidius ordered Tigellinus to lay down

his sword; presumably, Tigellinus then ceased to exercise the functions of his position.

Whether Tigellinus tried to oppose his dismissal is not known. On the contrary,

Tigellinus may have actually left his position quite willingly, having chosen to distance

himself from the events in expectation of disaster.

Tacitus, unfortunately, does not tell us specifically who manipulated the

loyalty of the Praetorians. While the Praetorian tribunes may have been involved in

some way, it would be reasonable to assume that the men most capable and in the best

position to undertake such an act would be the Praetorian Prefects. Tacitus’ brief but

telling comments are supported by Plutarch’s account. Plutarch (Galba 2.1 – 2) is in

fact more specific than Tacitus, naming Nymphidius along with Tigellinus as the men

who persuaded the soldiers to proclaim Galba emperor. Later Plutarch (Galba 14.2 – 3)

puts a speech into the mouth of a Praetorian tribune, Antonius Honoratus, in which he

laid the blame for the soldiers’ betrayal of Nero firmly on Nymphidius.

346

However, as we have seen, Tigellinus’ betrayal of Nero is evident (Tac. Hist.

1.72.1; Plut. Galba 17.3; Joseph. BJ. 4.492) and is clearly supported by the fact that he

was saved from punishment under Galba. Now whether Tigellinus was saved through

bribery (Plut. Galba 17.2) or through his protection of Vinius’ daughter (Tac. Hist.

1.72.2), is somewhat irrelevant; what is obvious is that he clearly sided with the Galban

supporters in Rome and successfully managed to ingratiate himself with Vinius, at the

Alternatively, a serious and

chronic illness (Plut. Galba 17.4, Otho 2.1) may have prevented him from playing any

further role and he may have known that it was in his best interests to step aside.

343 “ had been driven from his throne rather by messages and rumours than by arms.” As Syme (1937, 12) writes, “Rumour both anticipated and determined the course of events….” 344 Talbert 1977, 80; Griffin 1987, 186; Wiedemann CAH X2 , 261. See Dio 63.27.1 – 2; Suet. Ner. 47. 345 “The city soldiery had long been accustomed to swear allegiance to the Caesars, and had been brought to desert Nero by clever pressure rather than by their own inclination.” Damon (2003, 104) notes that the phrase arte et impulsu “reflects Tacitus’ focus on the emotional after-effects of Nymphidius’ failed coup.” 346 Rudich 1993, 232.

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very least.347 The speed with which Tigellinus seems to have sought refuge with the

family of Vinius clearly indicates that he believed that Galba had more than a good

chance of defeating Nero.348 Not only did Tigellinus survive into Galba’s reign, but his

followers continue to appear in the literary sources. Plutarch (Galba 23.4) has a general

reference to the adherents of Tigellinus and Nymphidius who treacherously joined

Otho’s plot against Galba, while Tacitus (Hist. 1.24.1) names Maevius Pudens, one of

Tigellinus’ closest friends, as the man who helped to inflame the minds of the soldiers

against Galba. However, if Tigellinus had a hand in encouraging his associates to

support Otho in his bid for the Principate, he certainly miscalculated, as it was Otho

who was responsible for Tigellinus’ ultimate demise.349

Why the two Praetorian Prefects, who owed their present position to Nero,

would choose to betray him is not made clear by our extant sources. Undoubtedly, the

Praetorian Prefects would have been aware of the same rumours and messages as Nero

(Tac. Hist. 1.89.2) and these rumours and messages may well have influenced their

decision to desert their emperor. Clearly though, both Prefects saw better prospects for

their future in deserting Nero and supporting Galba. If they thought otherwise, they

would not have acted as they did. If the Prefects believed that Nero’s days were

numbered, and Nero’s behaviour here would not have helped, supporting Galba would

at least have given them a chance of surviving after Nero’s death. There would be no

better way of earning the new emperor’s gratitude than to ensure the death of Nero and

to secure Galba’s elevation.

350

As for the Praetorian officers, we hear very little about their actions and

motivations during the events surrounding Nero’s downfall. According to Suetonius

(Ner. 47.1 – 2), Nero tried to induce the tribunes and centurions of the Praetorian Guard

to join him in his flight. In response some of the officers gave vague answers.

351

Others openly refused to accompany him, while one soldier apparently cried out: Usque

adeone mori miserum est?352

347 Rudich 1993, 233. Griffin (1987, 182) comments that Tigellinus’ caution may only have turned to disloyalty after Nymphidius took the initiative.

This incident, if it did occur, must have taken place

before the Senate had voted Nero an enemy of the state (Suet. Ner. 49.2); otherwise we

would expect that the officers would have arrested him if they did not intend to aid him.

348 Chilver 1979, 135. 349 The involvement of these people in the downfall of Galba will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Three. 350 Brunt 1990b, 18. 351 Bradley (1978, 272 – 3) notes that an appeal to the lower ranking officers implies that the Praefecti had already broken their allegiance to Nero. 352 “Is it so dreadful a thing then to die?” (Virg. Aen. 12.646).

71

By refusing their emperor’s request for aid, the Praetorian officers demonstrated

disloyalty towards him. This is not the first time that some officers of the Guard had

shown their infidelity towards Nero. The involvement of Praetorian tribunes and

centurions in the Pisonian conspiracy is well recorded by Tacitus (Ann. 15.49).

We have no indication from our surviving authors as to why the Praetorian

officers chose to side with their Prefects rather than with their emperor. When first

introducing the Pisonian conspiracy, Tacitus (Ann 15.49) notes that two of the most

resolute adherents were to be found in the Praetorian tribune, Subrius Flavus, and a

centurion in the Guard, Sulpicius Asper. Once the conspiracy had been uncovered,

Nero asked Subrius Flavus what had motivated him to forget his military oath. Tacitus

(Ann. 15.67) has him respond: Oderam te…nec quisquam tibi fidelior militum fuit, dum

amari meruisti. Odisse coepi, postquam parricida matris et uxoris, auriga et histrio et

incendiarius extitisti.353 Sulpicius Asper, when Nero questioned him for the reasons

behind his treachery, answered that it was the only service that “could be rendered to his

(Nero’s) many infamies.”354 These responses would indicate that these Praetorian

officers were disgusted by the behaviour of their emperor, and while we may suspect

the views of the senator Tacitus in these words, we cannot rule out that these two

officers did indeed feel this way. It was the same feeling of contempt and disgust

towards Nero that is expressed by our upper class Roman and Greek authors,355

What can be assumed is that these Praetorian centurions and tribunes, because of

their career structure, largely owed their positions to the emperor.

and the

tribunes, as equestrians, may have shared these views. However, whether the officers in

charge of the Praetorians at the time of Nero’s death felt the same way about Nero’s

behaviour is not evident from our extant sources.

356

353 “I hated you…and yet there was not a man in the army truer to you, as long as you deserved to be loved. I began to hate you when you turned into the murderer of your mother and wife – a chariot driver, an actor, a fire-raiser.”

Moreover, the

officers in the Guard would have received a substantial annual pay. As noted in the

previous chapter, the average Praetorian soldiers received considerably more pay than

did their legionary counterparts. During the reign of Augustus it is estimated that a

centurion serving in the legions or in the Praetorian Guard received five times the pay of

a Praetorian soldier, while the Praetorian tribunes would be earning substantially more

354 See also Suet. Ner. 36.2; Dio 62.24.2 – 3. 355 For example see Tac. Ann. 14.20; Dio 62.29.1, 63.6.3 – 4, 8.2 – 3, 9.1 – 6. When Suetonius (Ner. 19.3 – 25) starts to write about Nero’s “shameful and criminal deeds,” he begins with a full account of his theatrical performances. 356 Dobson 1993b, 148. See also Dobson and Breeze 1993, 98; Birley 1988c, 206 – 9. For a discussion on the promotion of Praetorian soldiers to the rank of centurion, to primus pilus of a legion, then to tribunates in the Rome cohorts see pp 41 – 3.

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than the centurions. Centurions could look forward to the prospects of further

promotion to a primus pilus and possibly to tribunates in the Rome cohorts.357

Again, no doubt, there must have been some discussion about deserting Nero

between the Praetorian Prefects, some senatorial supporters of Galba and the Praetorian

officers, but this cannot be substantiated from the surviving literature. What would be

interesting to know, but is beyond recovery now, is the number of Praetorian officers

that were in some way tied to the senatorial elite. It would be a wise policy on the part

of senators to actively cultivate the friendship of Praetorian tribunes or centurions. In a

particularly significant passage we find Agrippina, after falling out with her son Nero

and in search of a faction, receiving Praetorian tribunes and centurions with courtesy

(Tac. Ann. 13.18). Evidently, the favour of the officers could be sought and could be of

some benefit. That the officers of the Guard could actively take sides in a dispute or be

part of a faction is indicated by Tacitus (Ann. 12.41), when he notes that it was

necessary for Agrippina’s plans to remove the tribunes and centurions who sympathised

with Britannicus. Why would senators not also court the Praetorian officers? After all,

they had a close relationship with the soldiers of the Guard, they had the ear of the

Praetorian Prefects and were, at times, in contact with the emperor. Indeed, Claudius

had the Senate pass a decree which forbade soldiers to enter the houses of senators in

order to pay their respects (Suet. Claud. 25). This can hardly be for any other purpose

than to prevent senators and soldiers becoming too familiar and the latter developing

bonds of obligation to someone other than the emperor. Claudius would have been well

aware of the damage an alliance between senators and the soldiers could do from the

downfall of his predecessor Gaius. Moreover, senators and Praetorian officers had

worked together during the Pisonian conspiracy (Tac. Ann. 15.50). Therefore,

discontented members of the Senate may have actively worked to suborn the loyalty of

the Praetorian officers.

Praetorian tribunes also enjoyed a lucrative career, with hopes of future advancement.

Furthermore, the majority of the Praetorian centurions would have been serving as

soldiers in the Guard for approximately fifteen years and most of the Praetorian tribunes

would have been approximately fifty years of age. These were experienced soldiers and

one suspects that like the Praetorian Prefects they would not have deserted Nero if their

long-term future was not guaranteed in some way.

358

357 Dobson 1993b, 148, 159, 1993c, 207, 217; See also Campbell 1984, 103 – 4. For a discussion of the service conditions of Roman soldiers see page 29 – 36.

In addition, the Roman aristocracy was likely to be the only

group that could promise the officers a similar standard of living to that which they

358 Campbell 1984, 117 – 8.

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were presently enjoying, if the reigning emperor was overthrown. Unfortunately, while

the links between the senators and the equestrian Praetorian officers seem highly likely,

we have no direct evidence to prove that it was a decisive factor in the behaviour of the

tribunes and centurions at the time of Nero’s downfall.

As for the regular soldiers, they had no innate desire to see Nero removed. No

initiative came from the soldiers themselves and in order to get the Praetorian soldiers

to desert Nero it proved necessary to offer them a substantial donative. The size of the

donative which was needed to ensure that the troops betrayed Nero would seem to

indicate that the average Guardsmen was loyal to his emperor. Even when Nero was in

flight, a veteran of the Guard duly saluted him (Suet. Ner. 48.3; Dio 63.28.1). It is not

difficult to understand why the rank and file were not the prime movers in Nero’s

downfall. Neither the Praetorians nor their legionary colleagues were the victims of

Nero’s criminal behaviour. Therefore, unlike the senatorial elite, they had nothing to

fear from him. The social origin of the majority of the soldiers was from the lowest

classes359

Tacitus (Hist.1.5.1) does not specify who was actually responsible for promising

the donative to the soldiers. He simply notes that the donative promised in Galba’s

name was not given. On the other hand, according to Suetonius’ account (Galba 16.1),

the praepositi, presumably either the Praetorian Prefects or the officer of the Guard,

promised the donative.

and it is these classes that were distraught at the death of Nero (Tac. Hist.

1.4.3).

360

The donative promised to the Praetorian soldiers to ensure their support of Galba

was extraordinary. Plutarch (Galba 2.1 – 2) quotes the figures of 7500 drachmai

(denarii) for members of the Praetorian Guard and 1250 drachmai (denarii) for the

legionaries.

Plutarch (Galba 2.1 – 2) claims that it was Nymphidius and

Tigellinus who promised the largess, while Dio (64.3.3), on Galba’s entry into Rome,

has the Praetorians demanding from him the money that had been promised by

Nymphidius. While our sources seem to indicate that both Prefects were responsible for

promising the donative, when we consider the relative importance of the two men after

Nero’s death we would have to assume that Nymphidius actually took the primary

responsibility.

361 It was the largest donative ever promised to the Praetorians.362

359 For a discussion of the social origins of the Praetorian soldiers see pp 28 – 9.

This

360 Murison (1992, 73) presumes that the sum of the donative had been agreed on beforehand between Nymphidius and at least some of the Praetorian tribunes. 361 Chilver (1979, 50) notes that this figure has been challenged, because a donative of this size was unequalled for many years to come, “but Nymphidius was unparalleled too.” Little and Ehrhardt (1994,

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huge donative was, in Plutarch’s eyes (Galba 2.3), responsible for the downfall of both

Nero and Galba and would have inflicted much greater evils upon the world than any

previously inflicted by Nero. The closest comparison to this donative would be the

donative received by the Guard from Claudius following his accession. At that time,

the Praetorian soldiers received the immense sum of 3750 denarii according to

Suetonius (Claud. 10.4) or the even higher figure of 5000 drachmai (denarii) quoted by

Josephus (AJ 19.247).

It would be most interesting to know if Nymphidius promised this enormous

donative on his own initiative, or whether he was instructed to offer the soldiers that

sum. If Nymphidius acted on his own initiative, it may have been an attempt to secure

his own future. He must have been aware that Galba could not hope to pay out such an

enormous sum of money even if he had wanted to. This would compromise his position

with the soldiers, which could only further improve Nymphidius’ position.363

The donative could have been more appealing to the Praetorian soldiers if the

claim of Suetonius (Ner. 32.1), that Nero was financially destitute and could no longer

find enough money to pay the soldiers or provide the veterans with their benefits, is

accurate. Whether Suetonius is referring here to the Praetorians alone or all the soldiers

within the Empire is impossible to know. However, it can probably be safely assumed

that Nero’s overriding concern would be the troops standing on his doorstep. It would

also be much more difficult to explain a delay in making payments to the soldiers in

Rome, than to those stationed in the provinces, who may have experienced delays in

receiving their pay in the past through for example, adverse weather conditions. Talbert

suggests that Suetonius’ claim reads suspiciously like a standard accusation levelled

against a bad emperor, especially as no other source indicates that the soldiers deserted

Alternatively, Nymphidius may have known that the Praetorian soldiers would not be

easily turned against their emperor and a large donative was the only way to secure their

support. However, what if Nymphidius was not acting on his own initiative, but was

following instructions given to him by supporters of Galba in Rome? Even though

there is no evidence, it is difficult to believe that there had not been some collaboration

between Nymphidius and members of the Senate at some point. If this assumption is

correct, then the blame for promising such an irresponsible donative, which has been

laid at Nymphidius’ door (Plut. Galba 2.2 – 3), would at least have to be shared around.

41) state that the Praetorians could expect a considerably larger payment than they had received in the past because the prospect of deserting an emperor who was still present was much riskier. 362 For the donatives given to the Praetorian Guard prior to this time see pp 32 – 4. 363 Shotter 1993, 128 – 9; Rudich 1993, 235. See also Plut. Galba 8.1.

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Nero because they had not been paid.364 Yet simply because it does not appear in any

other source does not mean that Suetonius’ claim is inaccurate.365

As early as AD 54, Dio (61.5.5) has recorded that Nero had managed to exhaust

the funds of the imperial treasury and had to find new sources of revenue. The

confiscation of a large amount of property in Africa may have been one attempt on

Nero’s part to find a new source of income.

Even the

parsimonious Tiberius seems to have struggled to find the money for veteran soldiers,

complaining that the state was not equal to the burden “unless the veterans were

discharged only at the end of twenty years service,” (Tac. Ann. 1.78). Moreover, there

can be no denying that Nero experienced financial hardship during his reign.

366 Furthermore, early in Nero’s reign some

veterans had been sent to Neronian colonies (Tac. Ann. 14.27), an act which Bradley

suggests may imply that these veterans had received grants of land instead of cash

payment on their discharge. Bradley also suggests that there is a connection between

this passage in Tacitus (Ann. 14.27) and Suetonius’ (Ner. 32.1) claim, that Nero had no

funds for the praemia militum.367 There is also confirmation in Plutarch (Galba 5.4)

that Nero was short of funds at the end of his reign, as when Nero heard about the revolt

of Galba he apparently informed his friends that “an excellent idea had occurred to him

in his need of money”: he would simply seize Galba’s estates.368

There is also the issue of Nero’s reduction in the weight of the precious metal

coinage. There had been a gradual reduction in the weight of the aureus from the

Republican era, through the Julio-Claudian period, until the reign of Nero. However,

Nero’s reduction of 4% in AD 64/5 was notable and of quite a different order from the

gradual reduction that had occurred previously. There was also a reduction in the

weight and silver content of the denarius at the same time. Griffin describes this

reduction in the weight of the precious metal coinage as an undeniable fact that

confirms Nero’s financial difficulties in his last years.

369

Furthermore, the sources are littered with tales of Nero’s extravagance and

excesses and his endless pilfering of imperial funds. Several examples should suffice.

Following the Great Fire of AD 64, Nero engaged in an extravagant rebuilding

364 Talbert 1977, 72. See also Bradley 1978, 165 – 6. 365 Campbell (1984, 173) suggests that if the problem of paying the soldiers was widespread and prolonged it doubtless will have seriously damaged Nero’s popularity with the army. However, Campbell notes that it is possible that Suetonius’ generalization was based on one or two well-known incidents. 366 See Pliny (HN 18.7.35) who claims that Nero put to death six landowners, who between them owned half of Africa. See also Wiedemann CAH2 X, 599. 367 Bradley 1978, 184 – 5. 368 For Nero’s plans to use the war for pillaging the wealthy provinces, see Suet. Ner. 40.4. For Nero’s other attempts to secure additional sources of revenue, see Suet. Ner. 32.1 – 4. 369 Griffin 1987, 189. See also B.M. Coins Rom. Emp. Vol. 1, xix – xx.

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programme, including the immense Domus Aurea. Suetonius (Ner. 31.1 – 2) provides

us with details of the elaborate construction. The costs involved caused Tacitus (Ann.

15.45) to remark: Interea conferendis pecuniis pervastata Italia, provinciae eversae

sociique populi et quae civitatium liberae vocantur,370 while the incident involving

Caesillius Bassus and the buried treasure of Dido (Tac. Ann. 16.1.1 – 2; Suet. Ner.

31.4), has Tacitus (Ann. 16.3.1) commenting: Gliscebat interim luxuria spe inani,

consumebanturque veteres opes quasi oblatis, quas multos per annos prodigeret. Quin

et inde iam largiebatur; et divitiarum exspectatio inter causas paupertatis publicae

erat.371

In addition, while Tiridates made his way to Rome, in order to be crowned king

of Armenia, Nero provided him with a daily expenditure of 800 000 sesterces from the

public treasury (Suet. Ner. 30.2; Dio 63.2.2). The journey lasted for nine months (Dio

63.2.2). By ingratiating himself with Nero, Tiridates also managed to extract gifts from

him worth 200 million sesterces (Dio 63.6.5). Moreover, Nero apparently believed that

fortunes were made to be squandered, professing admiration and praise for Gaius

because he had managed to spend the vast fortune that Tiberius had left him. As for

himself he never thought twice about giving away or wasting money, declaring that

only stingy and niggardly men kept a correct account of their expenditure, while fine

and magnificent men squandered money (Suet. Ner. 30.1; cf. Gaius 37.3). The

argument could of course be made that Nero’s extravagance affected only his private

wealth and not the state’s funds, but this argument does not take into account the close

connection between the emperor’s private wealth and the state’s resources. Any

emperor who spent his own money unwisely could seriously affect the level of funds in

the aerarium.

372

While these examples do not prove that Nero had trouble paying his soldiers,

they do indicate that such difficulties could have been possible. A promise of a large

donative to the soldiers for betraying their emperor would certainly have been more

appealing if they were not sure when they were next going to be paid, and this would

help to explain why the soldiers chose the path they did.

370 “Meanwhile, Italy had been laid waste for contributions of money; the provinces, the federate communities, and the so-called free states, were ruined.” See also Suet. Ner. 31.4. 371 “Meanwhile, on the strength of this idle hope, his extravagance grew, and treasures long accumulated were dispersed on the assumption that others had been vouchsafed which would serve his prodigality for many years. In fact, he was already drawing on this fund for his largesses and the expectation of wealth was among the causes of national poverty.” See also Suet. Ner. 31.4. 372 Griffin 1987, 199 – 200.

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There is very little mention of the reaction of the Germani corporis custodes to

Nero’s suicide. Unlike the assassination of Gaius, where the foreign bodyguard clearly

showed their disapproval at his assassination (Joseph. AJ 19.119 – 27, 139 - 52), we

hear of no similar outbursts from them at the death of Nero. As far as we know (our

sources are very meagre at this time) it would seem that they did nothing to stop Nero’s

fall or avenge his death. It would have to be assumed that they were compliant with the

wishes of the Praetorians and the Senate. John of Antioch notes that the Senate held

discussions with the Praetorians and the other troops that guarded the emperor and the

royal court, and persuaded them to join the Senate against Nero.373 This reference to

‘other troops’ is possibly the German bodyguard. Apparently, these other troops fell in

with the plans of the Senate and deserted Nero. Why the Germani chose to abandon

Nero, if this is the path they elected to take, is unknown. Speidel speculates that the

faith of the German troops may have been destroyed when they heard about the revolt in

Lower Germany.374

The final hours of Nero’s life are well documented in a particularly famous

passage by Suetonius (Ner. 47.3 – 49.4). However, what role the Praetorian Guard

played and how the events taking place behind the scenes unfolded is somewhat less

than clear, but it is almost certain that the Praetorian Prefects, particularly Nymphidius,

were involved. At some point on his final day, Nero crossed over the Tiber River to the

Servilian gardens, where he met the tribunes and centurions of the Praetorian Guard

(Suet. Ner. 47.1). Suetonius (Ner. 47.1) implies that it was all the tribunes and

centurions, but this seems unlikely, rather it was the tribune and centurions of the cohort

on duty at the time. The meeting was surely requested and organised by Nero. At this

meeting, Nero tried to persuade the officers to join him in his flight from Rome (Suet.

Ner. 47.1). The officers, as noted previously, refused to join him. No doubt

Nymphidius or Tigellinus had already won over the officers to Galba’s cause by this

time.

375

At midnight when Nero awoke, possibly in a villa in the Servilian gardens or at

the palace, he found that his guard of soldiers had left (Suet. Ner. 47.3; Dio 63.27.3).

Dio (63.27.2b) tells us that it was the Senate that actually ordered the soldiers

surrounding Nero to be withdrawn, but in all likelihood it was probably their Prefects or

officers that instructed them to return to their camp. Sometime after Nero’s

One can imagine that the officers then informed their Prefects of this meeting

and of Nero’s intentions to flee the city.

373 John of Antioch (fr 91 Muell. v. 25 – 35) quoted in Loeb Dio vol. 8, p. 187. 374 Speidel 1994, 29. 375 Walter 1976, 246.

78

aforementioned meeting in the Servilian gardens, it would seem that Nymphidius and at

least some senators went to the Praetorian camp (Dio 63.27.2b). It seems highly

improbable that this was the first occasion that the possibility of deserting Nero and

supporting Galba had been discussed by the Prefects and Galba’s senatorial supporters.

However, this is probably the first time that the proposal was put before the soldiers.

Once the support of the soldiers had been secured, the senators declared Nero a public

enemy and proclaimed Galba emperor (Dio 63.27.2b). At the same time, the release of

Galba’s freedman Icelus (Suet. Ner. 49.4), who had been imprisoned by the Praetorian

Guard, was doubtless carried out.

Deserted by all his soldiers and followers, Nero took up the offer of his

freedman Phaon to shelter and rest in his suburban villa (Suet. Ner. 48.1; Dio 63.27.3).

The details of Nero’s journey to Phaon’s villa are reported differently in Suetonius (Ner.

48.1 – 4) and Dio (63.27.3 – 28.5), but that need not concern us here. Whether Nero did

indeed hear the shouts of the Praetorian soldiers, as he passed by the camp (Suet. Ner.

48.2) cannot be verified, although considering the events unfolding in the camp at that

time it is not impossible. Shortly after a note arrived for Phaon, announcing that Nero

had been declared a public enemy, a centurion of the Praetorian Guard raced into the

villa and discovered that Nero had stabbed himself in the throat (Suet. Ner. 49). Even

though Suetonius (Ner. 49.4) states that the centurion only pretended to aid Nero, he

probably did try to save his life. The Senate may have wanted Nero alive, ut puniatur

more maiorum (Suet. Ner. 48.2).

Conclusion

From this examination of the demise of Nero, a number of important points can be

drawn. The outbreak of revolt in Gaul was the catalyst which would ultimately bring

about Nero’s suicide. However, it would appear that the German armies had returned to

supporting their emperor before he died. Either Nero was not aware of this or simply

did not believe the messages coming from the frontier. Maintaining the support of the

armies in Germany, he could have crushed Galba’s rebellion. However, no matter what

the armies in Germany were doing or were to go on to do, Nero could not hope to

remain emperor without the support of the Praetorian Guard in Rome, hence his

ultimate downfall was largely due to the failure of his Praetorian Prefects, in particular

the Prefect Nymphidius, to stand with him in his most desperate hour.

Moreover, Verginius, by refusing the empire for himself and by passing the

responsibility to the Senate merely ensured that by default the decision would fall to the

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Praetorian Prefect. The senate were unlikely to choose a man to be the next emperor

who was not suitable to the Praetorians or at least their Prefect and it seems likely that

the senate simply endorsed the decision of the Praetorians. Indeed Icelus, on his arrival

in Spain, tells Galba that the army proclaimed him emperor first, followed by the senate

and the people. The senate had also been powerless to stop the Praetorian Guard

declaring Claudius emperor after the assassination of Gaius.

No matter how poor an emperor Nero was, the Praetorian Prefects betrayed their

role as the emperor’s protectors, as did the Praetorian tribunes and centurions. The

reasons why these men chose the path they did remains somewhat obscure, but we

cannot rule out the involvement of the senators influencing their final decision. The

Praetorian Prefects and the Praetorian officers enjoyed particularly good renumeration

from the reigning emperor; therefore, for them to betray Nero they must have believed

that financially they would be no worse off than they had been under the Julio-

Claudians. The only men who could offer this type of financial reassurance were the

senators. Their decision may also have been influenced by Nero’s financial hardships

and his inability to respond adequately to Galba’s revolt.

After the death of Nero, the Praetorian soldiers seem to have been burdened with

considerable guilt for betraying their emperor (Tac. Hist. 1.5.1). Undoubtedly, they

were persuaded to abandon Nero by their Praetorian Prefects, who offered them a

sizeable donative. Like the Praetorian officers, they may have been assisted in their

final decision by concern over Nero’s inability to provide for discharged veterans. The

financial hardship may even have gone further than funding the praemia militium and

could have been affecting regular salaries towards the end of the period. If this is

correct, the behaviour of the Praetorian soldiers is quite understandable and not as self-

serving as it would initially seem. Certainly, they had sworn a military oath to protect

Nero and his Principate, but Nero was also under obligation to his soldiers. Nero might

well have let them down before they abandoned him.

While we have only the odd reference to this period in Tacitus’ Historiae, what

Tacitus does write seems to be well supported by the more detailed accounts in our

other literary sources. Now what will be most significant and particularly interesting is

to discover whether the behaviour and motivations of these three groups – the

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Praetorian Prefects, the Praetorian officers and the soldiers – alter during the year of

civil war.376

376 Between the time of Nero’s death and the arrival of Galba in Rome, the Praetorian Prefect Nymphidius Sabinus attempted a coup against Galba. For a comprehensive discussion of this attempted coup see Appendix Three.

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Chapter Three

The Assassination of Galba

Introduction

Cornelius Laco was the sole Praetorian Prefect throughout the short and turbulent

Principate of S. Sulpicius Galba.377

Tacitus’ account, however, provides us with much more than just the details of

the actions of the Praetorian Prefect. We also hear of the dismissal of Praetorian

officers (Tac. Hist. 1.20.3), the involvement of members of the Praetorian speculatores

in Otho’s conspiracy (Tac. Hist. 1.25.1) and the feelings and motivations of the ordinary

soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.18.3). Unfortunately, none of our other literary sources gives the

same prominence to the Praetorian Guard as we find in Tacitus’ Historiae.

Tacitus, in his Historiae, accords Laco a significant

role in most of the major events of Galba’s reign. Laco was one of Galba’s most trusted

advisers (Tac. Hist. 1.13.1): he was given an influential part in the adoption debate (Tac.

Hist 1.13.1 – 14.2), initially chosen to be a member of a delegation to the German

armies (Tac. Hist. 1.19.2), his incompetence is considered a factor in the success of

Otho’s conspiracy (Tac. Hist. 1.26.2) and on the day of Galba’s murder, Laco was one

of the advisers who recommends that the emperor leave the Palace and confront Otho

(Tac. Hist.1.32.2 – 33.2). Tacitus portrays Laco as deceitful (Hist. 1.14.1, 39.2)

incompetent (Hist. 1.24.2, 26.2) and aggressive (Hist. 1.33.2). While Plutarch (Galba

13.1, 29.4) and Suetonius (Galba 14.2) also record the influence that Laco apparently

had over Galba, they lack the detail provided by Tacitus, while the epitome of Dio fails

to even mention the Praetorian Prefect.

Galba’s Praetorian Prefect

When Cornelius Laco actually received his appointment to the Praetorian Prefecture is

uncertain. However, he was definitely promoted to this position before Galba arrived in

Rome (Plut. Galba 13.1). There is no direct evidence to indicate whether Galba

intended Laco to become Nymphidius’ colleague in the Prefecture, or whether Galba

intended Laco to replace Nymphidius. However, after Nymphidius’ death, Laco

became sole Praetorian Prefect.

377 For Laco see PIR2 C 1374. Suetonius (Galba 23) claims that Galba met his end in the seventh month of his reign, while Dio (64.6.52) maintains that Galba ruled for nine months and thirteen days.

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Laco was an equestrian member of Galba’s staff in Spain serving as an assessor,

or legal assistant (Suet.Galba 14.2). What previous military or administrative

experience Laco had is unknown. Syme believes that Laco was “destitute of military

experience,”378 an opinion shared by Morgan, who claims that he “brought no military

and little administrative experience” to his new position.379 On the contrary, Shotter

states that as an assessor used his legal knowledge to help the civil and military

authorities when they were dispensing justice, the position would have required

considerable expertise.380

As in the case of most other appointments to the Praetorian Prefecture, relevant

experience may not necessarily have been Galba’s prime consideration when he

selected Laco. Emperors usually appointed men whom they trusted implicitly,

381 and

although Galba may have been the governor of Spain for the previous eight years he had

spent enough time in Rome to be well aware of the potential power of the men who held

the position of Praetorian Prefect. Laco then was clearly a man Galba felt he could trust

and rely upon. Laco had probably served Galba well during his governorship and

proved his loyalty during the days after Galba announced his intention to revolt against

Nero. The Prefecture was Laco’s reward for his service. Additionally, due to his long

absence in Spain, Galba may have had few other options open to him and he might have

preferred to choose a man who was well known to him, rather than an unknown

Praetorian tribune or the like, who was based in Rome. Laco’s promotion may also

have been aided by a common friendship, as both Laco and Galba seem to have been

intimates of L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus (Tac. Hist. 1.14.1; Suet. Galba 17).382

Our literary sources indicate that Laco had considerable influence over Galba

along with T. Vinius Rufinus and Galba’s freedman, Icelus (Tac. Hist. 1.13.1; Plut.

Galba 13.1, 29.4; Suet. Galba 14.2). It was the combined influence of these three men

over Galba which according to our sources was to prove disastrous for him and his

Principate (Tac. Hist 1.6.1; Plut. Galba 13.1, 29.4; Suet. Galba 14.2). Why Laco was

so influential with Galba is not reported, but the answer can probably be found in the

same reasons for Laco’s promotion to the Praetorian Prefecture: time spent together in

Spain, the relative isolation of Galba from Rome and shared friendships. Galba

378 Syme 1958, 151. 379 Morgan 2006, 36. 380 Shotter 1993, 124. The job specification is given in the Digest 1.22.1. 381 Millar 1977, 126; Campbell 1984, 116. 382 For a more detailed discussion of the relationships between Laco, Galba and Piso see pp 81 – 2. For Piso, see PIR2 C 300; CIL VI 31723 = ILS 240.

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apparently had a sexual preference for full-grown men (Suet. Galba 22), but none of our

sources indicates that Laco and Galba shared this type of relationship.

Galba’s Praetorian Guard

The Praetorian Guard inherited by Galba was ostensibly the Praetorian Guard that had

existed under Nero.383

Galba may have enrolled some of his own pedites and equites singulares, who

had served on his staff in Spain, in the Neronian Guard. We cannot be certain that these

men even accompanied Galba to Rome, though it is surely highly likely. Moreover,

Suetonius (Galba 10.3) informs us that Galba chose young equestrian men, gave them

the title of evocati and had them stand guard duty before his bedchamber “in place of

the regular soldiers.” These young equites may have formed the nucleus of Galba’s

own ‘Praetorian Guard.’ Certainly, as the proclaimed Roman emperor, Galba would not

only have wanted, but also needed, to be surrounded by the symbols of an emperor,

symbols which would have included Praetorians.

We have no evidence that Galba made any large-scale changes

to the members of the rank and file. Unlike Vitellius, who expanded the Praetorian

Guard to reward some of his troops (Tac. Hist. 2.93.2) and Septimius Severus, who

cashiered the former Guard and replaced it with his own soldiers (Dio 74.10.1 – 3;

Herodian 2.13.6 – 7; SHA Sev. 6.11), there is no indication that Galba took any such

action. Regarding the soldiers under Galba’s command in his province, the legio I

Aduitrix remained in Spain when Galba set out for Rome, while the VII Galbiana, the

new Spanish legion Galba enrolled, which accompanied the emperor to Rome, was

ultimately dispatched to Pannonia (Tac. Hist. 1.6.2, 2.86.1; Suet. Galba 10.2).

Unfortunately, we have no information on what happened to these men. We can

speculate that as these men seem to have formed a private bodyguard to Galba, they

might have accompanied him to Rome. As members of the equestrian order, they were

unlikely to be rewarded for their loyalty by inclusion into the ranks of the Praetorian

Guard, but some may have been offered places as senior centurions or tribunes in the

Guard. Certainly, we know of one Praetorian tribune who owed his position, not to his

military experience, but rather to his friendship with Galba (Tac. Hist. 1.31.3); and

Tacitus (Hist. 1.20.3) has recorded the dismissal of two Praetorian tribunes, who may

have been replaced by amici of Galba’s. Any Praetorian centurions and tribunes who

reached the end of their tenure in their position and who could be safely promoted, or

any officers that retired during Galba’s reign, may also have been replaced with Galba’s

383 For a summary of the Neronian Guard see pp 54 – 5.

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own men. This would certainly explain the Praetorian soldiers’ distrust of the officers,

commented on by Tacitus (Hist. 1.36.1), discussed below.

The Praetorian Prefect and the adoption debate

Laco arrived with Galba and his entourage in the capital in late AD 68. This period lies

outside Tacitus’ timeframe for his Historiae. Therefore, our account of Laco’s

Prefecture only begins in early January AD 69 with his role in the adoption debate,

where we find that Tacitus has given him a prominent role in the proceedings. Even

before news reached Rome of the revolt in Upper Germany, Galba had apparently been

considering, with a few close friends, the question of adopting a successor (Plut. Galba

21.1). It was expected that Galba would announce his successor on 1 January AD 69,

when Galba and Vinius assumed the consulship (Plut. Galba 21.2). Clearly, this did not

happen and it seems Galba made no move to announce a successor until he heard the

reports that the legions from Upper Germany were demanding another emperor (Tac.

Hist. 1.12.1 – 2 ; Plut. Galba 22.1; Suet. Galba 17; cf. Dio 64.5.1). Now Laco, Vinius

and Icelus, Galba’s three most intimate advisers, who frequently quarrelled with each

other, and who over small issues worked for themselves, were divided into two parties

when it came to the choice of successor (Tac. Hist. 1.13.1). Vinius favoured M. Salvius

Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.13.2; Plut. Galba 21.1), while Laco and Icelus preferred no one

particular person, but were united in supporting anyone other than Otho (Tac. Hist.

1.13.2).

On 10 January, Galba held a meeting (Tac. Hist. 1.14.1). Besides Laco and

Vinius, Galba invited Marius Celsus, the consul elect, and the Urban Prefect, A.

Ducenius Geminus (Tac. Hist. 1.14.1). Plutarch (Galba 23.3) adds Otho to the list of

those men present at the announcement of Galba’s heir, but this may be incorrect and

done to intensify the humiliation Otho felt when he realised he had been overlooked.384

Tacitus (Hist. 1.14.1) is uncertain as to whether Piso was Galba’s own choice or

whether, as Tacitus seems to favour, that Galba was influenced in his decision by his

At this meeting, Galba announced that he would adopt Piso Licinianus (Tac. Hist.

1.14.1). The meeting itself seems completely pointless, because Galba did not seek any

advice from any of the men present, nor did he elicit opinions about the qualities of Piso

as a potential successor. One cannot help but wonder if this announcement is used by

Tacitus to illustrate the characters of and the bad feelings between Galba’s principle

advisers.

384 Morgan 2006, 60.

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Praetorian Prefect. Laco apparently supported Piso because they shared an intimate

friendship. This friendship seems to have been in existence for some time, as Tacitus

(Hist. 1.14.1) states that the two men had met at the house of Rubellius Plautus. As

Nero ‘advised’ Plautus to retire to his family estates in Asia in AD 60 (Tac. Ann. 14.22),

Laco and Piso must have met prior to this date and hence been acquainted for at least

nine years. The friendship appears to have endured Piso’s exile (Tac. Hist. 1.21.2, 48.1)

and Laco’s service in Spain. Laco’s support for Piso was understandable and sensible.

If Laco wanted to continue as Praetorian Prefect, after the death of Galba, Galba’s

successor would have to be a man who also knew and trusted him. Considering the

hostility between Laco and Vinius (Tac. Hist. 1.13.1 – 2; 33.2; 39.2), Laco would hardly

have wanted Otho, the man Vinius favoured, as the new emperor. Under such

circumstances, one can image that Laco may have struggled to retain his position as

Praetorian Prefect for long after Galba’s death.

Whether, as Tacitus (Hist. 1.14.1) claims, Laco craftily treated Piso as if he were

a stranger, is impossible to determine. Why Laco would prefer not to disclose a close

friendship with Piso is obvious. If Galba believed that Laco was recommending Piso

for adoption based solely on his ability and character rather than because of their

friendship, Laco’s opinion would be likely to carry more weight with Galba. It is

difficult to believe though, that Galba was completely unaware of the links between his

Praetorian Prefect and the man he chose to be his heir. Galba trusted Laco enough to

promote him to the position of Praetorian Prefect, therefore we can assume a reasonably

close relationship between these two men. In addition, the friendship between Piso and

Laco was of long standing (Tac. Hist. 1.14.1) and Galba must have been well

acquainted with Piso to have adopted him, whether or not Suetonius’ (Galba 17)

comments about Piso already being Galba’s private heir are correct. Considering this

web of close relationships, it seems highly unlikely that Galba was unaware of the

friendship that existed between Laco and Piso. Tacitus must have also been aware of

these close friendships, so what was Tacitus’ purpose here? Perhaps his comments

were intended to highlight Laco’s potentially deceitful nature. Furthermore, it also

demonstrates that Laco was quite capable and may have been quite willing, if the need

arose, of manipulating his emperor.385

No other literary sources even mention Laco in relation to the adoption of Piso.

Indeed Tacitus’ account of how Galba actually came to adopt Piso, is somewhat at odds

with the statements of both Suetonius (Galba 17), who has Piso picked out by Galba

385 Morgan 1993b, 576.

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from the morning crowd and Plutarch (Galba 23.1), who notes that Galba suddenly sent

for Piso without any previous notice of his intentions.386

If Suetonius (Galba 17) is correct in his statement that Piso had long been one of

Galba’s special favourites and that Galba had already nominated Piso as his heir to his

name and property,

387 then Laco’s support of Piso would be somewhat inconsequential.

Certainly, Galba had lost his wife, Aemilia Lepida, and his two sons some thirty years

before (Suet. Galba 5.1) and as a man with a long and proud family tradition (Suet.

Galba 2), it would be somewhat unusual if he had not already designated an heir to his

name,388 but he may have been reluctant to adopt Piso openly before Nero’s death for

fear of offending the emperor.389 It would also seem that after such a long period of

bachelorhood, Galba did not intend to take another wife. Galba picked, in Piso, a man

who reflected his own character (Tac. Hist. 1.14.2, 38.1). That he should pick a young

man who was not the oldest surviving son in his own family and who had a

distinguished ancestry (Tac. Hist. 1.15.1 – 3, 48.1), could be expected.390 Moreover,

Galba would also have been acquainted with Piso’s father and elder brother, as all three

men had accompanied Claudius to Britain (Suet. Claud. 17.3, Galba 7.1; Dio 60.21.5).

In addition, the fact that Galba was prepared to adopt Piso as his successor, in spite of

Piso’s lack of experience and regardless of the general enthusiasm for Otho to be

adopted (Tac. Hist. 1.13.2 – 4; Plut. Galba 21.1 – 2, 23.1), would seem to indicate that

Galba knew him and his family intimately.391

However, whether or not Suetonius is correct in claiming that Piso was already

Galba’s private heir, the behaviour of the Praetorian Prefect, as recorded by Tacitus

(Hist. 1.14.1 – 2), remains completely credible.

392

386 Chilver (1979, 72) notes that this circumstantial account given by Tacitus, which names four colleagues can hardly by his invention. He believes that Townend (1964a, 354) is correct when he writes, that Tacitus’ story derives from a source familiar with inner history, such as Cluvius Rufus.

Assuming that Piso was already

Galba’s heir and Laco was aware of the contents of Galba’s will, he was wise to offer

his support to Piso. Undoubtedly, Galba would have been pleased that his chosen heir

would enjoy the support of his Praetorian Prefect. On the contrary, if Galba had not

387 Murison (1993, 69) suggests that Suetonius’ source for this information might have been Pliny the Younger, who seems to have been acquainted with Piso’s widow, Verania Gemina (Pliny Ep. 2.20.2 – 5). 388 Murison 1993, 68; Damon 2003, 135. 389 Murison 1993, 68. 390 Murison 1992, 78; 1993, 67. 391 Murison 1992, 78. Townend (1964a, 354 – 5), however, finds that the idea of this tradition is “manifestly impossible” and argues that Suetonius’ account of the adoption is derived from Pliny the Elder. He believes that Pliny cannot have been confident of the connection between Galba and Piso, qualifying it in some way that made Plutarch omit it altogether, while Tacitus gave preference to the account of Cluvius Rufus. Murison (1993, 67 – 8), on the contrary, believes that it is quite feasible that Galba had already named Piso as his heir, possibly as early as AD 60. 392 Chilver 1979, 73.

87

marked Piso out for adoption before this day, Laco would have given him his support

based solely on their close friendship.

Laco’s adversary Vinius, as noted previously, favoured Galba adopting Otho

(Tac. Hist.1.13.2; Plut. Galba 21.1). Importantly, not only did Otho have the support of

Vinius, but he seems to have enjoyed the favour of the majority of the soldiers (Tac.

Hist. 1.13.4; Plut. Galba 21.2).393

Cn. Cornelius Dolabella

Otho also had the support of those members of

Nero’s court who remained (Tac. Hist. 1.13.4) and he was a popular choice among

many of Galba’s friends (Plut Galba 23.1). 394 is the only other candidate mentioned in the adoption

debate and Plutarch (Galba 23.1) is surely right in recording his name.395 Dolabella

was a relative of Galba, possibly the grandson of his long dead brother.396 Tacitus

(Hist. 1.88.1) was clearly aware of the close relationship between Galba and Dolabella,

and he knew about Dolabella’s subsequent fate (Hist. 2.63.1 – 64.1), yet it is strange

that he does not choose to mention him in the adoption debate.397 Perhaps Tacitus

preferred to restrict the debate to one between Laco and Piso, and Vinius and Otho,

particularly as the divisions between Laco and Vinius were to surface again at the

crucial time of Galba’s assassination. Introducing Dolabella at this time would have

destroyed the antithesis Tacitus was creating.398 In addition, in this adoption debate,

one of the aims of Tacitus or his source seems to be to bring out the devastating

consequences that the inability of Galba’s senior advisers to work together had on him

and on his ability to govern. As Morgan notes, Galba becomes a pawn in their private

struggle.399 This may also explain why Icelus enjoys far less importance in the

emperor’s counsels in Tacitus’ account, than he receives in the accounts of Plutarch

(Galba 20.4) and Suetonius (Galba 14.2).400

393 Tacitus (Hist. 1.13.2) notes that Vinius and Otho were on friendly terms and that the common gossip was already anticipating a marriage between Otho and Vinius’ daughter. However, where Tacitus represents the support as a fact, but the marriage arrangements as a rumour, Plutarch (Galba 21.1) reports the agreement to marry as fact and uses it to explain Vinius’ support for Otho. The importance of the support of the soldiers and the effect on Otho of being overlooked for adoption by Galba will be discussed below.

Tacitus may also have used this adoption

394 See PIR2 C 1347. 395 Chilver 1979, 69; Morgan 1993b, 574. 396 Syme 1988a, 115. 397 Chilver 1979, 69. 398 Syme (1958, 151 n. 3) also believes that Tacitus deliberately omits Dolabella’s name because it “would have interfered.” It could also be argued that Tacitus chose not to mention Dolabella because he realized that he was never under serious consideration by Galba, especially as Galba disbanded the Germani because he suspected that the German horse-guards “were more favourably inclined” toward Dolabella, near whose gardens their camp was located (Suet. Galba 12.3). See also Morgan 1993a, 282 n. 39. For a further discussion of Dolabella see pp 136 – 8 . 399 Morgan 1993b, 575. See Tac. Hist. 1.12.3. 400 Morgan 1993b, 574 – 5.

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debate, which is somewhat reminiscent of the consilium between Pallas and Narcissus

over who was to be Claudius’ new wife following the death of Messalina (Tac. Ann.

12), to demonstrate how Laco outwitted his rival Vinius.

The castra praetoria was chosen as the place in which Galba would announce

the adoption of Piso (Tac. Hist. 1.17.2; Plut.Galba 23.2; Suet. Galba 17), although other

alternative places, including the rostra and the Senate house, were initially considered

(Tac. Hist. 1.17.2). Bearing in mind that Galba had just been exclaiming, in his speech

to Piso, that his own elevation to the Principate had been due to the will of the Senate

and People of Rome, the decision to announce the adoption in the Praetorian camp was

not necessarily the obvious choice. Tacitus (Hist. 1.17.2) gives us no indication of how

the decision was reached, or who favoured what alternative. He has, however, justified

their decision with the groundless argument that the men present thought that

announcing the adoption in the camp would be a seen as a mark of honour by the

soldiers.401 Nonetheless, the decision to announce the adoption in the Praetorian camp

clearly indicates that Galba and his advisers were well aware of the realities of

power.402

The Praetorian Guard received Galba’s speech with mixed, but generally

unfavourable reactions. Tacitus (Hist. 1.18.2) describes the speech Galba delivered to

the assembled soldiers as one that became an emperor. Galba announced that he was

adopting Piso, following the precedent set by the deified Augustus, and he downplayed

the significance of the troubles in Germany, stating that the fourth and twenty second

legions were being led astray by their leaders, but order would soon return. The

emperor did not flatter the soldiers and there was no mention of a donative. Honourable

Galba understood the necessity of flattering the troops, but he stubbornly rejected the

concept of bribery, which was clearly the most effective means of gaining the soldiers’

support.

Galba should have learnt from the events surrounding Claudius’ accession of

AD 41 (Suet. Claud. 10.1 – 4; Dio 60.1.1 - 4; Joseph. AJ 19.247, BJ 2.204 – 14) and the

accession of Nero in AD 54 (Tac. Ann. 12.68 – 9; Suet. Claud. 45, Ner. 8; Dio 61.3.1)

that the support of the Praetorian Guard was essential for any successful candidate.

403

401 Morgan 2006, 61.

The detail given by Tacitus, of Galba’s speech to the Praetorians, is not

repeated in any other extant source.

402 Greenhalgh 1975, 39 – 40. Morgan (2006, 61) comments that practical considerations may also have played a part in the decision to announce the adoption in the Guard’s camp. The Guard could be paraded quicker than the Senate called into session and Galba had nothing to gain by delay. 403 Ash 2002, 24. Morgan (1993b, 579) describes the speech as “short and sharp, abrasive and authoritarian.”

89

The reaction of the soldiers is largely predictable. According to Tacitus (Hist.

1.18.3), the tribunes, centurions and soldiers who were closest to Galba responded in a

satisfactory manner. This generally positive reaction, by the soldiers closest to the

emperor, is to be expected as it would have been injudicious and dangerous to respond

in any other fashion, but their satisfactory reaction is no indication that they were

sincere in their loyalty to Galba.404

Undoubtedly, the Praetorians were disappointed that the promised donative was

still not forthcoming. Plutarch (Galba 23.2) agrees that the soldiers were secretly

disloyal and sullen on the occasion of Piso’s adoption, because even under these

circumstances Galba had not seen fit to give them their promised largess. Plutarch

(Galba 23.2) also adds that the soldiers were in fact led to believe that they would

receive “if not the whole of it, at least as much as Nero had given.” If this were

accurate, one would imagine that Galba’s failure to pay this reduced amount would only

have fuelled greater hostility among the Praetorians.

On the other hand, among the remaining

Praetorians, there was a gloomy silence because “they had lost through war the right to

a gift which had been theirs even in times of peace” (Tac. Hist. 1.18.3).

Tacitus (Hist. 1.18.3) is adamant that, even at this late stage, a small show of

generosity on the part of Galba would have been enough to win the loyalty of the

soldiers, but stingy old Galba was ruined by his strictness and excessive severity. Both

Plutarch (Galba 23.2) and Suetonius (Galba 17) are in agreement with Tacitus, that the

failure to pay the donative was a very significant factor in the troops’ disloyalty to

Galba. As discussed in the previous chapter, a massive donative had been promised by

the Praetorian Prefect, Nymphidius Sabinus, in the name of Galba, in order to ensure

that the Praetorian soldiers would betray Nero (Tac. Hist. 1.5.1; Plut. Galba 2.1 – 2;

Suet. Galba 16.1; Dio 64.3.3). The soldiers began to have doubts about whether the

donative was going to be paid even before Galba arrived in Rome (Tac. Hist. 1.5.1) and

failure to pay this donative would seem to have been a significant factor in the downfall

of Nymphidius.405

Whatever the merits of Galba’s famous statement, the Praetorian soldiers had

long been accustomed to receiving rewards for their service beyond their normal salary.

These doubts were confirmed when Galba arrived and there

continued to be no sign of even a small financial gesture to the soldiers. Galba was

sticking by his honourable, if dangerous, policy of selecting, not buying his soldiers

(Tac. Hist. 1.5.2; Plut. Galba 18.2; Suet. Galba 16.1; Dio 63.3.3).

404 Ash 2002, 25. 405 See Appendix Three.

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On Nero’s accession they had received substantial donatives (Tac. Ann. 12.69.4; Dio

61.3.1) and Nero had rewarded them after the suppression of the Pisonian conspiracy

(Tac. Ann. 15.72; Suet. Ner. 10.2). This particular donative was probably in the service

lifetime of many of the Praetorians still on active duty in Galba’s reign. Now in the

aftermath of the suicide of Nero the soldiers must surely have felt that they had done

enough to qualify for some type of reward. They had not only turned on the last

surviving member of a dynasty to whom they had previously demonstrated consistent

loyalty (Tac. Hist. 1.5.1), but they had also murdered their own Praetorian Prefect, in

their camp, in order to save Galba’s fledgling Principate (Plut. Galba 14.6). Wellesley

claims that the Praetorians had “done less than nothing” to deserve a donative.406 This

may be morally quite accurate, but it is what the Praetorian soldiers believed that is

important here. The practice of paying a donative was dangerous, but not as dangerous

as refusing to pay one, and the simple fact was that the soldiers were in the habit of

receiving these extra rewards and it was now almost impossible to break the convention

without creating much discontent within the ranks. Galba had also failed to realise that

he was in no position to put a stop to the practice of issuing a donative.407

Furthermore, the soldiers were concerned that Galba was not only breaking an

old precedent but also setting up a pattern for succeeding emperors (Plut. Galba 18.2).

This would indicate a permanent change in their service conditions and would

ultimately leave the soldiers worse off, something Tacitus (Hist. 1.25.2) writes

concerned all soldiers. Bearing in mind the nature of Roman society, the concern of the

Praetorians to safeguard their future income is completely understandable. In addition,

besides the lack of a donative, the Praetorian soldiers may have been disappointed to

hear that Piso was going to be the next emperor, particularly after Otho, as we shall see,

had worked so hard to win their favour.

408

It can be argued that the state treasury funds were too low to afford even the

smallest of donatives. The potential financial difficulties that Nero may have found

himself in have already been discussed in the previous chapter, and indeed financial

concerns were one of Galba’s priorities (Tac. Hist. 1.20; Plut. Galba 16.2 – 3; Dio

64.3.4c ) Certainly, lack of financial resources may have been one of the reasons,

besides questions of military discipline, for Galba refusing to pay the donative.

However, Galba seems to have been an independently wealthy man (Tac. Hist. 1.49.2;

Plut. Galba 3.1, 29.1). His stepmother Livia Ocellina, who was exceptionally rich, had

406 Wellesley 1989, 31. 407 Murison 1992, 74. 408 Morgan 2006, 62.

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adopted Galba in her will (Suet. Galba 3.4, 4.1). Consequently, it is possible that he

could have afforded to pay a donative of a modest amount out of his own resources.

Certainly, Claudius managed to come up with the resources to finance the sizable

donative he promised to the Praetorians (Suet. Claud. 10.4; Jos. AJ 19.247), even after

the extravagance of Gaius’ reign (Suet. Gaius 37.1 – 3). However, how long a donative

of modest amount was likely to have satisfied the Praetorians cannot even be speculated

upon. At this stage, the Praetorians might have even viewed the payment of a small part

of the donative as an insult.

Did Galba receive any advice on the issue of a donative from his Praetorian

Prefect? It could be expected that Laco would be responsible for informing his emperor

of the feelings of the soldiers under his command. No attempts by Laco to offer Galba

advice on this issue are reported in our extant sources and if Tacitus’ portrayal of Laco

is accurate, it would appear that Laco made a poor Prefect, unacquainted with the spirit

of the soldiers (Hist. 1.26.2) and socortia (Hist. 1.24.2). However, just because there is

no record of Laco offering Galba any advice regarding the donative, does not rule out

the possibility that he may have tried to get Galba to relent and pay some of the

promised donative to the Praetorians. Still, the evidence clearly indicates that Galba

was a strict disciplinarian (Tac. Hist. 1.5.2, 18.3, 35.2; Plut. Galba 15.4, 29.4; Suet.

Galba 6.2 - 3, 7.1, 9.1; Dio 64.3.1 – 2) and completely careless of the need to deal with

the discontent within the army.409

Therefore, any appeal Laco may have made would

probably have gone unheeded in any respect.

Between the adoption and the conspiracy

Between the announcement of Piso’s adoption in the Praetorian camp and the beginning

of Tacitus’ discussion of Otho’s conspiracy, Tacitus narrates three events, two of which

are directly relevant to the Praetorian Guard. The first concerns a proposed embassy to

Germany (Tac. Hist. 1.19.2). In the days immediately following the adoption of Piso,

frequent reports reached Rome regarding the revolt in Germany. In response, the

Senate voted to send a delegation to the armies stationed there. There was a secret

discussion (between whom is not recorded), regarding whether Piso should be part of

this delegation. The Senate did, however, vote to send Laco, but Laco apparently

vetoed their plans (Tac. Hist. 1.19.2). Laco was not in any kind of position to veto a

vote taken in the Senate and by doing so Tacitus has him assume the power of the

tribune and their right to veto the Senate’s acta. Tacitus is being either ironical or

409 Chilver 1957, 32.

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perhaps trying to highlight the influence Laco possessed at this time. Nevertheless, if

the event occurred, it is most likely that it was Galba who refused to let his Prefect leave

Rome. Unable to come to any agreement, the senators left the choice of delegates to

Galba, but he too was apparently unable to reach a firm decision (Tac. Hist. 1.19.2).

However, what Tacitus fails to tell us at this point is that a delegation was indeed

dispatched to Germany, to be recalled later by Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.74.2). Tacitus’

omission is surely designed to ensure that the scene he has created, in the early days of

January, is one of confusion and indecision,410

The second incident concerns the dismissal of four tribunes, two from the

Praetorian Guard and one each from the Urban Cohorts and the Vigiles (Tac. Hist.

1.20.3).

while the actions ascribed to the

Praetorian Prefect only contribute to the disorder, uncertainty and the general lack of

authority in Galba’s Principate.

411

The tribunes named are Antonius Taurus and Antonius. Naso from the

Praetorian cohorts, Aemilius Pacensis from the Urban Cohorts and Julius Fronto from

the Vigiles (Tac. Hist. 1.20.3). Regarding the Praetorian tribunes, our knowledge of

Antonius Taurus is not comprehensive, but there seems to be a strong indication, based

on an inscription (AE 1939 55) that he came from Heliopolis (Baalbek) in Syria and

survived for many years after his enforced early retirement.

Unfortunately, Tacitus (Hist. 1.20.3) does not indicate why they were

dismissed, but claims that their removal was no assistance in ceteros (presumably other

officers), but only served to arouse their fears, as they believed that individual officers

were being removed from their positions “because all were suspected” – but of what

were they suspected?

412 Antonius Naso does not

appear in Tacitus’ narrative again, but we know from an inscription (CIL III 14387 =

ILS 9199), also discovered in Heliopolis, and from coins413 that he was a career soldier.

He survived his dismissal by Galba and continued his career unimpeded by the rapid

changes of emperor in AD 69. He went on to serve as tribune of the first Praetorian

cohort and as an imperial procurator in the provinces of Pontus and Bithynia during the

Flavian period in AD 77 or 78.414

410 Morgan 1993b, 581.

411 Tacitus (Hist. 3.57.1) also mentions a centurion by the name of Claudius Flaventinus, who was a centurion dishonourably discharged by Galba. Whether he actually served in the Rome cohorts is not stated. 412 Birley 1988b, 42 – 44. For the text of this inscription see Appendix One. See also Pflaum (1960, 87 – 8). 413 Br. Mus. Pontus cet. 1, 104; Bithyniae Wadd. Rec. As 1, 236 – 7. 414 Birley 1988b, 41. For the text of this inscription see Appendix One. See also PIR2 A 854; Pflaum 1960, 85 – 7.

93

The tribune Aemilius Pacensis from the Urban cohorts regained his post under

Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.87.2) and he was one of the officers placed in charge of the fleet

dispatched by Otho to the coast of Gallia Narbonensis. However, his mutinous troops

put him in chains (Tac. Hist. 2.12.1) and we hear no more of him until he died fighting

in defence of the Capitol against the Vitellian forces (Tac. Hist. 3.73.2). His cognomen

is rare. Kajanto writes that Pacensis, as a cognomen, derived from the town of Pax

Julia (Augusta) in Lusitania, but is only able to cite this one example.415 An alternative

place of origin, for this man, may be the town of Fréjus, which was officially known as

Forum Iulii Octavanorum Colonia Pacensis Classica.416

Otho also reinstated Julius Fronto to his position. However, he too was thrown

into chains at the battle at locus castorum. It was feared he would join the Vitellians,

because his brother, Julius Gratus, was fighting on the Vitellian side. Gratus was

likewise in custody for fear he would join the Othonians (Tac. Hist. 2.26.1 - 8). Again,

their names are no guide for their origin, except that they are more likely to have come

from Narbonensis or one of the colonies in another province, rather than being from

Italy.

If Pacensis had grown up in

Fréjus, we may have the reason behind his inclusion on Otho’s naval expedition to

Narbonensis.

417

Based on the evidence of the possible origins of these officers, (the two Antonii

came from Syria and Julius Fronto had a brother serving on the Rhine), Birley questions

whether Galba dismissed these men because of the suspicions he already held about the

loyalty of the armies in the east and the north-west.

418 However, there may be other

possible explanations. Firstly, they may have been considered suspect because of their

relationship with the previous Praetorian Prefects. The parallel tradition does not

discuss the dismissal of these four individual officers, but it does indicate that many

men lost their position because of their involvement with the previous Praetorian

Prefects.419 For example, Suetonius (Galba 16.1) writes: Ceterum praetorianos etiam

metu et indignitate commovit (Galba), removens subinde plerosque ut suspectos et

Nymphidi socios.420

415 Kajanto 1965, 199. Cf. Birley 1988b, 41.

While in Plutarch (Galba 23.4) we find that “most of the adherents

of Tigellinus and Nymphidius, men who had once been in high honour, were now cast

416 My thanks to Professor D. L. Kennedy for noting this possibility. 417 Birley 1988b, 41. 418 Birley 1988b, 44. 419 Damon 2003, 146 – 7. 420 “The praetorians he filled besides with both fear and indignation by discharging many of them from time to time as under suspicion of being partisans of Nymphidius.”

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aside and of no account, treacherously went over to Otho.” In addition, in the planning

of Otho’s conspiracy against Galba, Tacitus (Hist. 1.25.2) writes that the two

speculatores put in charge of the conspiracy worked on the fears of the officers by

treating them as if they were suspected per beneficia Nymphidii. These accounts seem

to indicate that large numbers of people, not necessarily all soldiers, lost their positions

in Galba’s attempt to sweep away anyone associated with the previous Prefects. This

may include Tacitus’ four tribunes. If this is the case, it seems likely that the dismissal

of the officers belongs to an earlier period in the reign, rather than to the few days

between the adoption of Piso and Galba’s assassination, as Galba is unlikely to have left

officers whom he felt were suspect in their posts for months after Nymphidius’ failed

coup attempt.421

The third alternative worth considering is that these tribunes were suspected of

some immediate crime.

422 Certainly, Tacitus’ phrase (Hist. 1.20.1) per eos dies would

seem to indicate that their dismissal coincided closely, with the adoption of Piso. It is

possible that these four tribunes were involved in Otho’s conspiracy in some way,

although if Galba knew of the involvement of four senior officers in a plot to overthrow

him it seems rather unusual that their punishment stopped at merely removing them

from their posts. There are also no reports that the men were interrogated in order to

discover who was behind the plot. Nor does the fact that Otho reinstated two of the

tribunes prove that they were working on his behalf. Rather than being part of Otho’s

conspiracy, Morgan suggests that these four tribunes may have failed to deal adequately

with the unease amongst the men under their control.423

Regardless, however, of the actual reason that these tribunes were under

suspicion, their dismissal had the effect of arousing the fears of the other officers, that

they too could be driven from their office (Tac. Hist. 1.20.3). In fact, Plutarch (Galba

23.4) indicates that many of the men cast aside by Galba went over to Otho. That these

men, soldiers or otherwise, would then chose to side with Otho is hardly surprising.

After their removal, they must have felt that their only hope of being reinstated to their

However, it is difficult to

believe that Galba would interfere with the careers of four men of equestrian rank for

this reason alone; consequently, Galba must have had a more serious reason for

dismissing them. Therefore, their association with the previous Praetorian Prefects

seems the most logical explanation.

421 Damon 2003, 146. Damon (2003, 146) also suggests that this postponement may be the reason why Tacitus does not mention the connection between Nymphidius and the discharged tribunes. 422 Chilver (1979, 82) believes that the dismissal of the tribunes does indeed date to the early days of AD 69, as does Morgan 1993b, 584; 2006, 62. 423 Morgan 2006, 62.

95

former positions lay with Otho, either once he was declared Galba’s heir or on his

succession following Galba’s death. When Galba finally announced the adoption of

Piso, these men were possibly as aggrieved as Otho.

One further event that requires comment, which may have taken place at some

point between the adoption and Otho’s conspiracy, is the dispatch of a delegation to the

Praetorians from the army in Upper Germany. Suetonius (Galba 16.2) claims that on 1

January AD 69, when the legions stationed in Upper Germany refused to swear

allegiance to Galba, they also resolved to send a deputation to the Praetorians,

informing them that they were displeased with Galba and wanted the Guard to choose

an emperor who was acceptable to all the armies. Unfortunately, we have no further

information on this delegation, even whether it was actually sent. However, if the

delegation was sent to Rome, its mission would have been rendered futile by the events

rapidly unfolding both in the city and on the Rhine frontier.424 Suetonius’ sentence,

however, does indicate the real debt that Galba had to the Praetorians. Moreover, the

ability of the Praetorians to create an emperor, indicated by the events of AD 41 and 54

was obviously recognised and accepted by the armies of Germany.425

The Praetorian Guard and Otho’s conspiracy

Our literary sources clearly indicate that members of the Praetorian Guard were deeply

involved in all aspects, from the planning to the execution, of Otho’s coup against

Galba and hence it requires careful examination. In addition, Tacitus (Hist. 1.24.2,

26.2) implies that the success of Otho’s conspiracy was partially due to the inadequacies

of the Praetorian Prefect. As the principal role of the Praetorian Prefect was to protect

the life of the emperor and command the Praetorian cohorts, Laco failed in this respect,

as Galba lost his life just five days after the adoption of Piso. However, before

accepting Tacitus’ assessment of Laco’s ability, the nature of Otho’s plot needs to be

examined. How much time did Laco have to uncover the conspiracy? How many

people were involved? Who was involved? Could we reasonably expect that Laco

should have foreseen the threat posed by Otho? Only when these aspects of Otho’s plot

have been examined will it be possible to accurately gauge the failings or otherwise of

Galba’s Prefect.

Firstly, it appears that Laco had only four days to discover Otho’s coup. Otho

clearly expected Galba to adopt him and make him his heir (Tac. Hist. 1.13.4; Plut.

424 Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 73. 425 Murison 1992, 75 – 6. Cf. Shotter 1993, 130

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Galba 23.3; Suet. Otho 5.1; Dio 64.5.2; Aur. Vict. Caes. 6), an expectation, which it

would seem, was not unrealistic on the part of Otho.426 When Galba declared his

intention to revolt against Nero, Otho was the first of the provincial governors to offer

his support (Tac. Hist. 1.13.4; Suet. Otho 4.1; Plut. Galba 20.2). Nor was Otho an

inactive partisan and while the war lasted he was the splendidissimus of Galba’s

immediate supporters (Tac. Hist. 1.13.4), “inferior to none as a man of affairs” (Plut.

Galba 20.2). Otho assisted Galba financially and practically (Plut. Galba 20.2), and

during Galba’s journey from Spain to Rome, Otho and Galba apparently shared the

same carriage for many days on end (Plut. Galba 20.2). Otho was always honoured by

Galba (Dio 63.5.2) and as previously stated, Otho came well supported by the majority

of the city soldiery (Tac. Hist. 1.13.4; Plut. Galba 21.2), by those members of Nero’s

court who had not been removed (Tac. Hist. 1.13.4), and he was a popular choice

among a number of Galba’s friends (Plut. Galba 23.1). Otho also seems to have

secured the friendship of Plotius Firmus, the commander of the Vigiles (Tac. Hist.

1.46.1). According to Suetonius (Otho 4.2), there was hardly anyone who did not both

think and openly declare that Otho was the only man worthy to succeed Galba, and even

Galba himself found him a more engaging character than Piso (Plut. Galba 21.2).427

Still Galba chose Piso, an action that clearly upset Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.21.1; Plut. Galba

23.3; Suet. Otho 5.1; Dio 64.5.2) and it was his failure to be appointed Galba’s heir that

seems to have spurred Otho into action (Suet. Otho 5.1; Dio 64.5.2),428

Tacitus (Hist. 1.23.1), however, sows some seeds of doubt about how long Laco

may have had to discover the conspiracy against his emperor. He brings to our attention

the fact that Otho had long been attempting to win popularity with the soldiers, which

Tacitus (Hist.1.23.1) claims may have been either because Otho was laying the

foundations for his succession or because he was preparing for some bold step. An

argument can probably be developed for both of Tacitus’ options. Without doubt, a

successful coup attempt against Galba, without the support of the Praetorians or some

other branch of the army, was unlikely to have been contemplated by Otho. Yet, on the

other hand, the support of the Guard was crucial in a successful transition of power, on

leaving Laco

with just four days to uncover and act against Otho’s plans.

426 Stolte 1973, 186. 427 My thanks to Professor A. B. Bosworth for providing a translation of this particular passage. “As for Galba it was always clear that he placed the public good above his private interests and was endeavouring to adopt for himself not the most engaging character but the person who would be of greatest service to the Romans.” 428 Chilver (1957, 33) agrees that Otho did not intend to destroy Galba at the outset, but wanted adoption, as does Morgan (2006, 58 – 9).

97

the death of an emperor, a fact which Otho would have been well aware. If Otho had

indeed intended to usurp Galba’s position, from the earliest days of Galba’s revolt (Tac.

Hist. 1.23.1), then Laco would indeed have been the inept Prefect described by Tacitus.

However, is this what Otho was actually doing?

As early as Galba’s journey from Spain, Tacitus (Hist. 1.23.1) claims that Otho

began to court the soldiers’ favour. He apparently addressed all the oldest soldiers by

name, reminding them how they had attended Nero together. He helped some soldiers

through his influence or provided them with financial assistance. Frequently, he

allowed a complaint or double edged remark concerning Galba to drop and he was

engaged in a number of other things that “disturbed the common soldiery” (Tac. Hist.

1.23.1). These actions, however, are hardly evidence to indicate that Otho’s intention

was to overthrow Galba. Rather Otho seems to be simply acting in a sensible manner

and being realistic about the importance of the goodwill of the soldiers in successfully

governing Rome, particularly at such a turbulent time.429

The main debate surrounding this particular chapter from Tacitus (Hist. 1.23.1 –

2), however, is that it is uncertain to which troops Otho is offering his favour. As there

is no reference in our extant literature to the presence of Praetorians on Galba’s journey

to Rome, Otho would have to be courting the soldiers of the Legio VII Galbiana, who

accompanied the new emperor from Spain (Tac. Hist. 1.6.2). However, three details

indicate that Tacitus believed that Otho was actually courting Praetorian soldiers on the

journey to the capital. Firstly, Tacitus (Hist. 1.23.1) claims that Otho addressed all the

oldest soldiers by name. Considering that the seventh Galbiana was a newly formed

legion and that Otho had been absent in Lusitania for the previous ten years, the only

soldiers that Otho would remember and who would remember him would be the older

Praetorian soldiers.

Building up a large client

base, particularly of soldiers, would only help to improve his chances of being accepted

as the future emperor, once Galba had adopted him. In addition, the actions undertaken

by Otho at this stage can hardly be described as clandestine, as he addressed the soldiers

in itinere, in agmine, in stationibus (Tac. Hist. 1.23.1). Clearly, neither Laco nor

anyone else found his behaviour suspicious at the time.

430

429 Morgan (2006, 58) also feels that the behaviour of Otho was not sinister.

Secondly, Otho apparently reminded the soldiers how they had

attended Nero together (Tac. Hist. 1.23.1). As Nero never visited any province other

than Greece, the soldiers that attended Nero, along with Otho, had to have been

Praetorian Guardsmen. Finally, Tacitus (Hist. 1.23.2) adds that these soldiers

430 Damon 2003, 152.

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complained of the difficult marches because they were more accustomed to going by

ship to the lakes of Campania and the cities of Achaia than climbing the Pyrenees and

the Alps. Again, this is clearly a reference to the Praetorian Guardsmen.431

However, as noted above, we have no explicit evidence from any of our literary

sources of Praetorian soldiers being present on Galba’s journey to Rome, although it

should be noted the sources and the details they contain about his journey are not

abundant. Consequently, it has been suggested that Tacitus may have incorrectly

identified the troops whom Otho courted en route or perhaps simply focused on Otho’s

efforts with the soldiers that would make the difference in January AD 69.

The

obvious conclusion then is that a detachment of Praetorian Guardsmen was sent from

Rome to accompany Galba’s march.

432

Alternatively, Otho may have attempted to ingratiate himself with the Legio VII

Galbiana, but when that legion had been ordered from Rome he turned his focus onto

the Praetorians.433 Heubner suggests that the historical tradition is simply lacunose.434

Nevertheless, the possibility does exist that a detachment of Praetorians was sent

out from Rome to meet and escort Galba. We know that Nymphidius dispatched “an

abundance of royal furniture and service” from Nero’s Palace for the new emperor to

use on his long journey to the capital. This furniture was clearly at Narbo when

representatives of the Senate met with Galba (Plut. Galba 11.1). It is not entirely clear

whether the furniture was already in Galba’s possession, but it is most likely that it

arrived at the same time as the senators.

435

Still, it does seem rather unusual that Plutarch fails to mention the movement of

the Praetorian soldiers, particularly as he writes in relative detail on the activities of

their Prefect, Nymphidius, in the weeks after the death of Nero (Galba 8 – 9, 13 – 14).

However, because Galba initially refused to use the furniture provided by Nymphidius

until he was persuaded by Vinius that he should make use of Nero’s riches, Plutarch

may have been more interested in using the incident to illustrate Galba’s character and

The movement of both senators and valued

Palace furnishings over such long distances would surely require the presence of

soldiers not only to oversee the transportation of the furniture but to provide protection

for the senators.

431 Frequent trips to Campania are recorded for Nero and therefore for the Praetorian cohorts that accompanied him. See Tac. Ann. 14.4 – 13, 15.33, 16.10, 19; Suet. Nero 20.2. For evidence of the Praetorians being present in Greece see Suet. Ner. 19.2; Dio 63.10.1 – 3. 432 Damon 2003, 152. 433 Chilver 1957, 33; 1979, 85. See Tac. Hist. 2.86.1. 434 Heubner 1963, 62 – 4. 435 Murison (1993, 28 – 9) believes that the senatorial party came equipped with the furniture, while Little and Ehrhardt (1994, 60) suggest that the furniture travelled separately, arriving earlier than the senators.

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how easily he could be manipulated by Vinius: “…and in general the aged man (Galba)

let it be seen little by little that he was going to be under the direction of Vinius” (Plut.

Galba 11.2). With his focus elsewhere, Plutarch may well have overlooked the

presence of a small detachment of Praetorians. The fact that Galba formed his own

bodyguard (Suet. Galba 10.3), an act that may have rendered the presence of

Praetorians unnecessary, in no way rules out the possibility that Nymphidius still

dispatched Praetorian soldiers to meet and escort their new emperor.

The other measure that Otho apparently employed in order to win the favour of

the Praetorian Guard was bribery. Tacitus (Hist. 1.24.1) tells us that Maevius Pudens,

one of Tigellinus’ closest friends, who now seems to be working for Otho, added fuel to

an already smouldering fire by distributing 100 sesterces to each member of the cohort

that stood on guard duty, whenever Galba dined at Otho’s house.436

Bribery of the Praetorian Guard is a serious accusation. When any person other

than the emperor attempts to bribe the Praetorians, it is provocative behaviour indeed

and rarely recorded. The attempt of Nymphidius Sabinus to buy the Praetorians’ loyalty

and the intrigues of Agrippina (Nero’s mother) with the Praetorians are the best attested

(Tac. Ann. 13.18.2, 21.4). The size of the alleged bribe is considerable. One hundred

sesterces represented about three percent of a Praetorian’s salary or approximately

eleven days pay.

Substantially, the

same story is reported by both Plutarch (Galba 20.4) and Suetonius (Otho 4.2), but the

two biographers have Otho acting directly, not through the agency of Maevius Pudens.

The money was apparently given to the cohort, without any attempt at concealment,

presented as a way of showing honour to Galba, but according to our sources in reality

it aimed at gaining the support and favour of the soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.24.1; Plut. Galba

20.4).

437

436 Claudius seems to have been the emperor, who began the practice of having a cohort of Praetorians on duty during dinner (Suet. Claud. 35; Dio 60.3.3). Dio’s (64. 5.3) rather brief account mentions Otho’s bribery of the Praetorians, but this only occurs after Otho had set his conspiracy in motion.

Yet again, however, the question remains as to what Otho aimed to

achieve with his bribery. Certainly, he could have been plotting to overthrow Galba,

although this seems unlikely, especially as Tacitus indicates that Otho made little

attempt to cover up his actions, carrying out his overt bribery in the presence of Galba

and most probably Laco, Vinius and Icelus who accompanied Galba everywhere (Suet.

Galba 14.2). Were Laco, Galba, Vinius and Icelus really so incompetent that they

could not see Otho laying the foundations for a coup attempt?

437 Damon 2003, 153.

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Furthermore, Laco and Icelus, as Tacitus (Hist.1.13.2) indicates, do not seem to

have been on good terms with Otho and one way of discrediting him in the eyes of

Galba would be by using his actions against him. Attempted bribery of the Praetorian

Guard would be a very satisfactory place to start. Yet again, Otho’s actions are not

deemed suspect at the time, and it is only in hindsight that they were thought to be

potentially treasonable, by Tacitus. What seems more likely is that Otho, well aware of

the negative feelings of the Praetorian Guard toward Galba, particularly over his failure

to deliver a donative, was trying to distance himself from Galba’s regime. By

demonstrating that he felt differently about rewarding the soldiers, he was safeguarding

his position, after Galba had adopted him.

To highlight further Otho’s corruption of the Praetorians, Tacitus (Hist. 1.24.2)

writes that Otho added to the significance of his public bribery by secret gifts to

individuals. One of the boldest acts of this corruption involved the speculator Cocceius

Proculus, who was involved in a dispute with his neighbour regarding property

boundaries. Otho bought up the property of Proculus’ neighbour and gave this property

to Proculus. Suetonius (Otho 4.2) also records this incident, but provides only the basic

details, not naming Proculus or even mentioning that he was a speculator. In fact, we

cannot be certain that the man discussed by Suetonius was even a soldier. The fact that

Otho was able to get away with such behaviour was according to Tacitus (Hist. 1.24.2)

due to the socortia of Laco, “who equally failed to see what was notorious and what

was secret.” This is probably the most serious accusation levelled against Otho,

especially as his service to Proculus was apparently conducted in private, and because

of the prominent role speculatores were to eventually play in Otho’s conspiracy (Tac.

Hist. 1.25.1). Unfortunately, we do not know anything more about the life of Proculus,

nor is he named as one of the speculatores in Otho’s plot against Galba.

That Otho actively cultivated the Praetorian Guard is clear; to what end remains

debatable. While the possibility that Otho always intended to overthrow Galba cannot

be ruled out, the evidence does not indicate that this was necessarily Otho’s purpose.

Some of Otho’s actions were provocative and he was obviously aware of the importance

of securing the support of the soldiers. However, it can probably be safely assumed that

while Otho was convinced that he was going to be Galba’s heir it would be unlikely that

he would have done anything to jeopardise that outcome. Why take the risk of a

conspiracy being uncovered when Otho would achieve what he wanted without any

danger to himself? Otho then cultivated the Guard with the intention of ensuring a

trouble free succession. Consequently, the decision to assassinate Galba only became

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Otho’s chosen path after Galba’s decision to adopt Piso, and again we can state that the

Praetorian Prefect only had four days to realise that Otho was so dismayed about

Galba’s decision to adopt Piso that he would conspire to murder their emperor.

With Galba’s adoption of Piso, the Praetorian Guardsmen whom Otho had spent

so long courting were no longer of any use in ensuring a straightforward succession, but

Otho would still have had their support and it was simply a matter of turning their

support to another task.438 Otho’s friendly relationship with members of the Praetorian

Guard would give him a firm base of support for his coup attempt. However, the factor

that is probably much more significant to the eventual outcome of Otho’s conspiracy

than Otho’s relationship with members of the Praetorian Guard was the Guardsmen’s

attitude towards their present emperor. How loyal were the Praetorians to Galba before

Otho set in motion his plans to become emperor? The evidence would indicate that

their loyalty had already been truly stretched by Galba and his failure to pay the

promised donative. We have already noted the sullen and discontented reception that

Galba received from the Praetorians when he announced the adoption of Piso in the

Praetorian camp, where the soldier’s gloomy silence “ominously foreshadows their

passive disloyalty.”439

The Praetorian Guard, particularly a handful of speculatores, form the

fundamental part of Otho’s conspiracy. To carry out his plot, Tacitus (Hist. 1.25.1)

claims that Otho put Onomastus, another one of Tigellinus’ closest friends, in charge of

the task. Onomastus then won over to Otho’s cause Barbius Proculus, a tesserarius, and

Veturius, an optio, both speculatores.

There are also general comments from Plutarch (Galba 24. 1),

who claims that the soldiers were already dissatisfied and were only lacking an excuse

for treachery, and Dio (64.5.3) comments that Otho easily won over the rest of the

soldiers with promises because they were displeased with Galba. If Galba had handled

the Praetorian Guard differently, it could be speculated that Otho’s chances of pulling

off a successful conspiracy, regardless of his strong relationship with some of the

Praetorian soldiers, would have been drastically reduced.

440 Both men would probably have been well

known to many of the other soldiers because of the nature of their jobs.441

438 Morgan 2006, 59.

These two

men were apparently both intelligent and bold. The two speculatores were given

substantial rewards and promises by Onomastus and he ensured that they had enough

money with which to tamper with the loyalty of more soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.25.1).

439 Ash 2002, 25. 440 A tesserarius is defined by Vegetius (2.7) as one who passes on the watchword per contubernia militum. 441 Murison 1992, 104.

102

The involvement of the former Praetorian Prefect Tigellinus in these affairs is

not surprising. Tigellinus owed his survival into the reign of Galba to Vinius (Plut.

Galba 17; Tac. Hist. 1.72). Vinius had supported Otho in the adoption debate and he

may have encouraged Tigellinus to throw his money and influence behind Otho too.

The assistance of Maevius Pudens, in distributing money to the Praetorians on duty at

Otho’s house, can be seen as an example of Tigellinus providing Otho with loyal men to

help him in his bid for adoption by Galba. When Otho failed to secure the succession,

Tigellinus may have been quite a willing participant in Otho’s attempt to overthrow

Galba. For his own safety, Tigellinus would not have wanted to see Piso as the next

Roman emperor any more than Otho. Piso, his family and his friends had suffered

under Nero’s reign during the years that Tigellinus had served as Nero’s Praetorian

Prefect. For example, Piso’s brother, M. (Licinius) Crassus Frugi, consul in AD 64,

was forced to take his own life during the last years of Nero’s reign and Piso himself

had been exiled by Nero (Tac. Hist. 1.48.1, cf. 4.42). While there is no record of

Tigellinus’ involvement in either of these two events, his participation cannot be

discounted and Piso may well have harboured resentment towards the man who was so

influential in Nero’s court at that time. In addition, Laco and Piso, as already noted,

were both friends of Rubellius Plautus. Plautus was put to death, apparently at the

instigation of Tigellinus in AD 62 (Tac. Ann. 14.57 – 9). Given this information, one

would suspect that Tigellinus would not have wanted to see Piso as emperor and

therefore he willingly assisted Otho.

Regarding the planning of the conspiracy, Plutarch (Galba 24.1) also records the

involvement of Onomastus and the same two speculatores and his account closely

reproduces the events outlined by Tacitus, clearly from a common source. Suetonius’

account of the beginnings of the conspiracy, however, is somewhat different from what

we find in Tacitus and Plutarch. Suetonius (Otho 5.2) writes that Otho first entrusted

the task to five speculatores; this number was increased by ten, when each of the initial

five conspirators brought in two more men. Otho paid these men 10 000 sesterces and

promised them a further 50 000 more.442

However, while the account provided by Suetonius differs from the accounts of

Tacitus and Plutarch, two important factors are consistent. Firstly, the numbers actually

privy to the conspiracy seem to be low. The fewer persons party to the details of the

coup, the less likely it would be that the Praetorian Prefect could uncover the

442 Suetonius (Otho 5.2) adds that the previously impoverished Otho obtained the funds for this adventure by selling a lucrative position to one of the emperor’s slaves, receiving a substantial kickback of 1 000 000 sesterces.

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conspiracy. Tacitus (Hist. 1.25.1) in fact emphasises the small number of men involved

with his noteworthy statement: Suscepere duo manipulares imperium populi Romani

transferendum et transtulerunt. In conscientiam facinoris pauci adsciti.443 On the day

when the conspiracy unfolded, it appears that the number of Praetorians aware of the

conspiracy remained low. Dio (64.5.3) in his very brief account of Otho’s coup, while

not specific about the actual numbers involved, notes that just a few soldiers, who were

privy to the conspiracy, admitted Otho into the Praetorian camp.444

The presence of speculatores at the centre of the conspiracy is the second

common feature in the accounts of Tacitus and Plutarch, and Suetonius. It would be

very interesting to know the subsequent careers of Barbius Proculus and Veturius, but

unlike Onomastus, Otho’s freedman, who is to resurface on the day of Galba’s

assassination (Tac. Hist. 1.27.1), we have no knowledge of what became of them after

Otho’s conspiracy. Nonetheless, a number of factors may explain the involvement of

the Praetorian speculatores. For a Praetorian soldier to be eligible to become a

speculator, Durry conjectures that he may have had to serve for six or seven years,

Indeed, Suetonius

(Otho 5.2) comments that Otho believed that a small number of soldiers was enough,

because more would join once the conspiracy was underway. In addition, the limited

time that elapsed between the adoption and the coup attempt probably prevented the

soldiers from having the opportunity to recruit larger numbers. Assuming that these

accounts are correct and only twenty to thirty soldiers knew the actual details of the

conspiracy, detection of the plot by the Praetorian Prefect would have been a difficult

task.

445

therefore speculatores probably accounted for some of the oldest and longest serving

soldiers. If Durry is correct in this assumption, Otho is more likely to have been

acquainted with the speculatores because of his ten-year absence in Spain and this may

account for why he chose to engage their services initially. Their age and position

possibly also accorded them, and their decisions, a certain amount of respect from the

other soldiers. Moreover, the speculatores formed the inner bodyguard of the emperor,

consequently they were physically closer to him and their chance to assassinate him

would be far greater.446

443 “Two common soldiers thus undertook to transfer the imperial power, and they transferred it. Few were admitted to share the plot.”

444 See also Zonaras (64.5.2): “But Otho …rebelled against him, having at his command only thirty soldiers.” 445 Durry 1968, 109. 446 For a discussion of speculatores see pp 51 - 2. See also Suet. Galba 18.1.

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To ensure support from the other Praetorians when the plot was revealed,

Barbius Proculus and Veturius used a number of devices to work on the concerns of the

soldiers. Those soldiers of higher rank they treated as if they were under suspicion

because they had received favours from the previous Prefect, Nymphidius (Tac. Hist.

1.25.2). Their task here may well have been aided by the dismissal of the four tribunes,

discussed earlier (Tac. Hist. 1.20.3). While on the rank and file of the Guard, these two

speculatores played on their anger and disappointment regarding the donative, which

was constantly being deferred (Tac. Hist. 1.25.2). The anger and disappointment felt by

the soldiers at not having received their promised donative has already been discussed

above and undoubtedly the failure of Galba to pay the donative severely affected the

loyalty of the Praetorians to him.

In Tacitus’ (Hist. 1.26.1) account, we find details of an apparently aborted coup

attempt on the night of 14 January. The Praetorians had arranged to carry Otho off,

presumably to the Praetorian camp, as he was returning from dinner. However, because

the Praetorians were not the only soldiers in Rome at that time, the coup attempt was

postponed, because of the difficulties they were likely to encounter in successfully

carrying out their plans in the dark. The conspirators were concerned that any man

whom the soldiers from Pannonia or Germany came across, might easily be proclaimed

“in Otho’s stead,”447

The correct reason behind the coup attempt being aborted may actually be found

in Suetonius’ biography of Otho. Suetonius (Otho 6.1) claims that Otho considered

seizing the Praetorian camp immediately after the adoption of Piso was announced.

However, he did not carry his plan through out of consideration for the cohort that was

on duty at the time. This particular cohort had been on duty on the occasions that both

as they did not personally know him. This is a rather peculiar

reason, proposed by Tacitus, for the postponement of the planned coup. It would seem

to imply that the soldiers from Germany and Pannonia would have been party to the

attempted coup and that they would be moving throughout the streets of Rome looking

for Otho. This is surely incorrect. Until this time, the only army group mentioned in

association with Otho’s planned coup is the Praetorian Guard. The Praetorians sent to

“carry off Otho as he was returning home from dinner,” would surely have known when

and where to find Otho and would deliver him immediately to the Praetorian camp, a

feat they would undertake and complete on the following day without the knowledge or

assistance of any other army group (Tac. Hist. 1.27.2 ; Plut. Galba 25.1 – 2; Suet. Otho

6.3).

447 This translation is from Damon (2003, 155 - 6).

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Gaius was murdered and Nero had been betrayed. Otho felt that his actions would have

done nothing more than increase the cohort’s ill-repute. These actions, accorded to

Otho by Suetonius, are in keeping with what has been written elsewhere of his

consideration towards and appreciation of, the soldier’s viewpoint.448 Moreover, when

we consider the arguments presented in Otho’s suicide message (Tac. Hist. 2.47),

Suetonius’ reasoning here is plausible.449

Tacitus (Hist. 1.26.2) claims that there were signs of the outbreak of a revolt and

some information had found its way to Galba, but Laco was ignarus militarium

animorum consiliique quamvis egregii, quod non ispe adferret, inimicus et adversus

peritos pervicax.

450 Unfortunately, we cannot know whether the information received (if

Galba and Laco indeed received it) was specific enough to act upon. However, if

nothing else, the incident highlights the poor opinion Tacitus (1.26.1) or his source held

about the abilities of Galba’s Praetorian Prefect. Townend suggests that the historian

Cluvius Rufus was responsible for this unfavourable reference to Laco, in an attempt to

cast further aspersions on the Praetorian Prefect, about whom Rufus may have

discovered a great deal during his time in Spain.451 On the other hand Damon notes this

may simply be a general critique of Laco, or if not perhaps a reference to Laco’s,

otherwise unknown, opposition to the payment of a donative.452

On the following morning, 15 January, twenty three Praetorian speculatores met

Otho at the Golden Milestone and hailed him as emperor (Tac. Hist. 1.27.2; Plut. Galba

25.1). Just prior to this meeting, Otho had been with Galba while the emperor was

sacrificing, but had managed to provide a pretext for leaving.

453

448 Murison 1992, 104. See Suet. Otho 8.1 – 2, 9.3, 10.1, 11.1, 12.2.

The small number of

soldiers that greeted him concerned Otho and he seems to have been reluctant to go

through with the coup (Plut. Galba 25.1). The speculatores, however, were not to be

deterred; putting Otho into a sedan chair, they drew their swords and hurried him away

(Tac. Hist. 1.27.2; Plut. Galba 25.2). Other soldiers joined the original group as they

moved towards the camp, some apparently because they had knowledge of the events

and some through curiosity, some with shouts and drawn swords and some in silence

449 Shotter 1993,146. 450 “…was unacquainted with the soldier’s spirit, and he was opposed to any plan, however excellent, which he did not himself propose, and obstinate against those who knew better than himself.” 451 Townend 1964a, 356. 452 Damon 2003, 156. 453 The pretext given by Otho, in the accounts of both Tacitus (Hist. 1.27.1 ) and Plutarch (Galba 24.3), is that he had to go and meet his architect at the site of some property he wished to buy. Dio (64.5.3) only notes that when Otho heard the predictions of the soothsayer, he left Galba as if he was on some errand. Suetonius (Otho 6.2) gives us a choice of two alternatives: Otho left because he either had to inspect a house, which was for sale, or he feigned an attack of fever.

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(Tac. Hist. 1.27.2; cf. Plut. Galba 25.2). Suetonius’ (Otho 6.3) account, while similar to

the one provided by Tacitus and Plutarch, does add some colourful and interesting

details about Otho’s journey to the castra praetoria. Apparently, the soldiers initially

carried Otho in a closed sedan, as reported in Tacitus (Hist. 1.27.2) and Plutarch (Galba

25.2), but when the bearers were exhausted, Otho got out and ran, stopping when his

shoe became untied. To avoid any delay while he retied his shoe, he was immediately

lifted up and carried on the shoulders of the soldiers.

The reason that so few troops actually greeted Otho may be the necessity of

secrecy until Otho was safely inside the camp. Large numbers of soldiers in the Forum

may have attracted unnecessary attention. The smaller number could have passed

unnoticed in the daily hustle and bustle of the Forum. Moreover, the speculatores

clearly did not expect to meet any resistance, nor were they planning to make a stand in

the Forum; they simply needed to collect Otho and return him rapidly to the relative

safety of the Praetorian camp, a task they obviously completed successfully. Taking

Otho to the Praetorian camp is completely logical and hardly requires explanation.

While there may have been other forces in Rome at this time, the camp was home to the

largest number of soldiers billeted in the capital and also housed Rome’s armoury (Tac.

Hist. 1.38.2). Conveying Claudius to the Praetorian camp had proved successful after

the murder of Gaius. While it is highly unlikely that any of the Praetorians serving in

AD 69 would have been serving at the time of Claudius accession in AD 41 one can

imagine that it was an incident which would have been well known to the Praetorian

soldiers.

This particular number of speculatores may have formed a full complement

attached to a cohort. Certainly, the recruitment of all the speculatores from within their

own cohort by Barbius and Veturius would make good sense. These speculatores may

have served together for a long period, developing the trust needed to undertake such an

action together. In addition, it would be logical for these speculatores and their

respective cohort to be on duty on the day they carried out the coup. Their presence at

the Palace and in Rome would not be questioned. Therefore, it is quite possible that the

speculatores that met Otho, may represent the members of the bodyguard who had crept

away before Piso addressed the Praetorian cohort on duty at the Palace later that day

(Tac. Hist.1.31.1).454

454 Chilver 1979, 89; Damon 2003, 158.

The one exception was the speculator Julius Atticus, who

remained at the Palace (Tac. Hist. 1.35.2).

107

However, what seems unusual about the whole scene is Otho’s adverse reaction

to the small number of soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.27.2; Plut. Galba 25.1). If this was laid out

in the plans, Otho should not have been so alarmed.455 His reaction plainly implies that

he expected more soldiers to be waiting for him. Perhaps as Chilver proposes, Otho

was expecting more than one unit or he was upset because he did not recognise as many

faces as he expected to.456

When the speculatores and Otho arrived at the castra praetoria, the Praetorian

tribune Julius Martialis met them. He was the officer in charge of the watch for that day

in the camp (Tac. Hist. 1.28; Plut. Galba 25.3). Tacitus (Hist. 1.28) and Plutarch

(Galba 25.3) claim that Martialis was not part of the conspiracy. Yet, on the contrary, it

is quite possible that Martialis was well aware of what was taking place around him.

Tacitus, who focuses on why Martialis behaved as he did, neglects to tell us what his

actions were in the circumstances – namely, admitting Otho and the conspirators into

the Praetorian camp,

Otho may also have been unaware of the finer details of how

the coup was going to be carried out. He knew he could expect to be supported by the

majority of the soldiers, but the exact number that would escort him to the Praetorian

camp was not disclosed to him. However, the most likely explanation for Otho’s

consternation, at this time, was fear of assassination. When Otho saw the soldiers

waiting for him, it must have occurred to him that he was placing his life in the hands of

a small number of Praetorian soldiers. If the soldiers could betray Nero and Galba, why

could they not double cross him and collect a reward from the emperor in the process?

457 a point clearly indicated by Plutarch (Galba 25.3). Now if

Martialis were not privy to the scheme, the conspirators would not have been able to

predict what action he would have taken when they arrived at the camp, and

consequently the small group of speculatores might well have failed to gain entry.

What had been a well-planned and executed conspiracy until now would have

floundered at the gates of the castra praetoria. Therefore, it seems likely that the

conspirators would have ensured that a tribune whom they could rely upon was on duty

that day.458

Moreover, Tacitus (Hist. 1.28) notes that Martialis was indeed suspected of

complicity by the “majority,” in what would seem to be an accurate assumption.

455 Passerini 1939, 70 n. 6. 456 Chilver 1979, 90. 457 Damon 2003, 160. 458 Martialis retained his position as tribune in Otho’s reign, being unfortunate to be on duty on the night of Otho’s infamous dinner party (Tac. Hist. 1.82.3). See pp 129 - 39.

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The reaction of the Praetorian Guard to Otho’s Conspiracy

As the numbers involved in Otho’s actual coup attempt were low, the response of the

Praetorian Prefect, the Praetorian officers and the majority of the soldiers, would be of

paramount importance in deciding whether Otho would be ultimately successful in his

bid for the Principate.

The Praetorian Prefect

There is no indication from our literary sources that the Praetorian Prefect was involved

in any way in Otho’s conspiracy or that he did not maintain his loyalty to Galba until his

death. It would appear that he was at the emperor’s side when Galba received the news

that Otho’s coup attempt was underway (Plut. Galba 25.4). Tacitus does not tell us how

Laco responded to the reports, but Plutarch (Galba 25.4) claims that Laco and Vinius

stood there brandishing their naked swords. This description of Laco by Plutarch

portrays a man who was ready and willing to fight for his emperor’s life and is clearly at

odds with everything that Tacitus has told us about this man. Still, Laco’s show of

strength occurred at a time when there was no enemy nearby, and as Wellesley has

observed, when Galba really needed him, Laco was nowhere to be seen.459

One role that we could have expected to see Laco fulfil on that day was a

delegation of some sort to the Praetorian camp, yet somewhat surprisingly Laco was not

considered for either one of the two missions Galba dispatched to the castra praetoria.

Rather Galba sent three Praetorian tribunes initially (Tac. Hist. 1.31.2), and when it

became apparent to Galba that they had failed in their attempt to peacefully put an end

to the coup, Galba sent Piso to the camp (Tac. Hist. 1.34.1). Possibly Laco was simply

too unpopular with the troops

460

Nevertheless, Laco still figures prominently in Tacitus’ narrative of Galba’s

final hours, particularly when Galba is making his decision of how best to handle the

volatile situation, that he now found himself in. Tacitus (Hist. 1.32.2) writes that Galba

was torn between two proposals. Vinius encouraged Galba to barricade himself behind

the walls of the Palace and not to approach the troops (Tac. Hist. 1,32,2; cf. Plut. Galba

26.1), while the remainder of Galba’s advisers, who presumably included the Praetorian

Prefect, wanted Galba to leave the Palace and act immediately before the conspiracy

gained strength (Tac. Hist. 1.33.1; cf. Plut. Galba 26.1; Suet. Galba 19.1). When

and Galba was aware of this or perhaps the emperor

simply preferred to keep his Praetorian Prefect close at hand.

459 Wellesley 1989, 32. 460 Damon 2003, 163.

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Vinius voiced his opposition to this idea, Laco responded with threats (Tac. Hist.

1.33.2; Plut. Galba 26.1). Laco was encouraged by Icelus, whose hatred towards

Vinius, Tacitus (Hist. 1.33.2) claims, would be the ruin of the state. In the end: nec

diutius Galba cunctatus speciosiora suadentibus accessit (Tac. Hist. 1.34.1). He

decided to leave the Palace.

Unlike Plutarch (Galba 26.1), who simply summarizes the two alternate courses

of action offered to Galba, Tacitus (Hist. 1. 1.32.2 – 33.2) presents the arguments of

both sides and by placing Laco and Vinius on opposite sides of the argument, Tacitus

exploits this situation to reopen the enmity between them, which surfaced during the

adoption debate. In addition, by attempting to highlight their bitter rivalry, Tacitus adds

to the tension of the scene.461

Undoubtedly, there was tension between the Prefect and Vinius, but Tacitus, in

his effort to create this scene of tension and bitter rivalry, may well have overstated the

hostility between these two men and their importance to Galba when weighing up his

options. Firstly, the opinion that leaving the Palace would be the best alternative was

not necessarily advanced by Laco (Tac. Hist.1.33.1) and secondly, while Laco certainly

seemed to favour making a decisive move, it was favoured by “all the rest” (Tac. Hist.

1.33.1) of the men in Galba’s presence at the time, which may have included the consul

elect Marius Celsus (Plut. Galba 26.1). This is probably an exaggeration on the part of

Tacitus designed to make Vinius look isolated,

Tacitus’ audience is also given the impression that once

again the Praetorian Prefect managed to outmanoeuvre Vinius.

462

Furthermore, Suetonius’ account of the events of that day (Galba 19.1 – 2)

initially seems to differ from the account provided by Tacitus. On hearing of Otho’s

actions, Suetonius (Galba 19.1 – 2) claims that Galba decided to hold his present

position and attempted to strengthen it by gathering together legionaries who were

camped throughout the city. He was not lured out of the Palace until false reports

reached him that the trouble was over and the soldiers were ready to submit to his

orders. However, these events reported by Suetonius are the same events reported by

Tacitus. Tacitus also writes that Galba sent various emissaries to legionaries stationed

but Vinius was probably out

numbered. Therefore, the opposition to Vinius’ suggestion included far more than just

the Praetorian Prefect. The debate then, over what course of action Galba should take,

was clearly not restricted to a showdown between Vinius, and Laco and Icelus as

Tacitus’ narrative would seem to imply.

461 Keitel 2006, 231. 462 Damon 2003, 168.

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throughout the city (Tac. Hist. 1.31.2; cf. Plut. Galba 25.5) and he received reports that

the conspiracy was over before he left the palace (Tac. 1.34; cf. Plut. Galba 26.1; Dio

64.6.2). What is different about the accounts of Tacitus and Suetonius is the placement

of the events by the respective authors in their narratives. Tacitus places the debate

about how to respond to Otho’s coup (Hist. 1.32.2 – 33.2) after he had recorded the

details of Galba’s other actions (Hist. 1.31.2), while Suetonius (Galba 19.1 – 2) places

the discussion of how Galba should respond to the attempted coup first, followed by his

actual activities.

Most significantly, Suetonius’ account indicates that Galba actually followed the

advice that Tacitus (Hist. 1.32.2) has Vinius offer, at least in the first instance, and only

later decided to leave the Palace. However, even then, he did not leave the Palace on

the advice of Laco and “all the rest” (Tac. Hist. 1.33.1) but rather because he was

tricked (Suet. Galba 19.2). Was Galba then fooled into leaving the Palace? Certainly,

Tacitus (Hist. 1.35.2) records that the Praetorian speculator, Julius Atticus, approached

Galba and informed him that he had killed Otho and in one of Galba’s famous

statements, he demanded: Commilito…quis iussit? Only after Galba had received

Atticus’ report did he actually leave the Palace. Plutarch (Galba 26.2) repeats the same

story, with the same speculator and his account is quite clear that Galba only got into

his litter and left the Palace after Atticus’ dramatic declaration. Dio’s account (64.6.2),

while lacking the details of Plutarch and Tacitus, also has Galba leaving the Palace after

it was announced that Otho was dead. Considering the congruity of the sources on this

point, one would have to conclude that Galba’s decision to leave the Palace was heavily

influenced by the incorrect reports he had received. If this is accurate then the

importance of the debate between Laco and Vinius, over the course of action Galba

should take, loses much of its significance.

It can be speculated that Julius Atticus was one of the speculatores associated

with the Praetorian cohort on duty at the Palace that day and when the other members of

the bodyguard stole away to meet Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.31.1), he remained behind. Otho

and the other conspirators may have wanted to make sure they could get Galba out in

the open, in order to avoid any prolonged showdown at the Palace, where Praetorian

soldiers might find themselves fighting on opposite sides. This task was left to Atticus

and our literary sources indicate that he was successful.463

463 Morgan (2006, 68) suggests, that while it is easy to assume that Julius Atticus was an Othonian, it is just as feasible that he was acting on his own volition, with the hope of receiving some type of monetary reward for his services, which did not to eventuate. Cf. Damon 2003, 158.

Of course, Galba may well

have left the Palace without the intervention of Atticus, but the fact that he seems to

111

have played an important role in influencing Galba’s decision indicates that Otho’s

conspiracy was well thought out and cleverly executed.

Whether Laco accompanied Galba from the Palace is not clear. However, when

Galba was approaching the Forum, the gravity of the situation became clearer and there

was another debate over what action Galba should take now. Laco and Vinius are not

ranged against each other this time, but instead Tacitus (Hist. 1.39.1) claims that it had

been said that Laco considered killing Vinius without Galba’s knowledge. The reason

for this is not certain and Tacitus provides us with three possible motives. Firstly, Laco

may have wanted to appease the soldiers’ anger with Vinius’ death (Tac. Hist. 1.39.2).

There is no doubt that the soldiers hated Vinius and they sought him out and killed him

(Tac. Hist. 1.34.1; 42.1). Vinius may well have attracted the soldiers’ anger because of

his money grabbing ways (Tac. Hist 1.12.3; Plut. Galba 16.4, cf. 12.1, 18.1, 27.4). The

soldiers would find it irritating, at the very least, to hear about this man accumulating

great wealth while they went without their promised rewards. Laco may well have

accurately summed up the soldiers’ feelings, but if he was hoping that this gesture

would in some way encourage the soldiers to renew their loyalty to Galba, he may well

have been disappointed. By this stage, the situation had gone too far and this type of

gesture, one would imagine, would no longer be enough.

The second reason supplied by Tacitus, for Laco wanting to kill Vinius, was that

Vinius was privy to Otho’s conspiracy. Tacitus is certainly inclined to the opinion that

Vinius was one of the plotters.464

The final reason given by Tacitus is that Laco considered killing Vinius simply

because he hated him. Certainly, their rivalry has been documented. Bearing in mind

these three reasons, it is perhaps most surprising that Laco only considered killing

Vinius. However, the historical accuracy of the anecdote can be questioned. These

were Laco’s private thoughts and he died shortly afterwards, possibly in a matter of

This is quite feasible and his loyalty to Galba, rightly

or wrongly, must have been suspect at this time. Otho and Vinius seem to have formed

close bonds on the journey from Spain to Rome (Plut. Galba 20.3). Vinius had

supported Otho in the adoption debate (Tac. Hist. 1.13.2; Plut. Galba 21.1) and there

were the rumours of an impending marriage between Otho and Vinius’ daughter ( Tac.

Hist. 1.13.2; Plut. Galba 21.1). Laco must have been aware of these links.

Furthermore, Otho seems to have regretted Vinius’ death (Tac. Hist. 1.45.1) and there is

also Vinius’ dying claim that he was a party to the conspiracy and his murder would

have been contrary to the wishes of Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.44.1; Plut. Galba 27.4).

464 Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 81.

112

hours (Tac. Hist. 1.46.5; Plut. Galba 27.4); therefore, it can only be wondered how the

anecdote has found its way into the historical tradition in the first place. Moreover,

Tacitus’ purpose for recounting this incident, true or otherwise, seems to have been to

highlight one of the immediate causes of Galba’s downfall: the bitter feuding and

jealousy that existed amongst his closest advisers.465

Exactly how soon after Galba’s death Laco was murdered is difficult to pinpoint.

Tacitus (Hist. 1.46.5) states that he was ostensibly banished to an island, but Otho

despatched an evocatus to kill him. This would seem to imply that Laco was actually

on, or on his way to, the island when the evocatus arrived to assassinate him. However,

Plutarch’s narrative (Galba 27.4) indicates that Laco was killed around the same time as

Piso and Vinius. It is impossible to uncover the truth here, but on the sole basis that

Tacitus is more interested in the Praetorian Prefect than Plutarch is, we would have to

conclude that Tacitus’ version is more likely to be accurate.

Tacitus’ audience gets the

impression that even at this most critical time, Laco was concerned only with his

personal matters, when he should have been more concerned about the safety of the man

he was paid to protect.

The Praetorian Officers

With the exception of the aforementioned Praetorian tribune Julius Martialis, whose

knowledge of and complicity in the conspiracy seems probable (Tac. Hist. 1.28.1; Plut.

Galba 25.3), no extant literary source indicates that any Praetorian officers were

involved in, or privy to, Otho’s plot against Galba. Nevertheless, their behaviour on 15

January would indicate that their loyalty to Galba only extended so far.

Certainly, the Praetorian officers who encountered their emperor on that day

seem to have followed his orders. On Galba’s instructions three Praetorian tribunes,

Cetrius Severus, Subrius Dexter466

Furthermore, the soldiers are portrayed as being highly suspicious of their

officers. For example, after Otho arrived in the camp, the soldiers prevented their

officers from approaching the newly proclaimed emperor and repeatedly warned of the

and Pompeius Longinus went to the castra praetoria

(Tac. Hist. 1.31.2) and Amullius Serenus and Domitius Sabinus, both primipilares,

although not necessarily from the Praetorian Guard, went, on Galba’s orders, to the Hall

of Liberty to summon the German vexillation billeted there (Tac. Hist. 1.31.2).

465 Keitel 2006, 233. 466 The early part of Cetrius Severus’ career can be found on ILS 2073. He was a speculator, then from AD 48 – 51 a beneficiarius of the Praetorian Prefect and then a commentaries custodiarum. See PIR2 C 703. For Subrius Dexter see PIR2 S 683.

113

dangers the officers represented (Tac. Hist. 1.36.1). When the three tribunes, named

above, who had been despatched by Galba to establish if the mutiny could be put down

peacefully (Tac. Hist 1.31.2; cf. Dio 64.5.3), arrived at the camp, the soldiers received

them with hostility. Subrius Dexter and Cetrius Severus were attacked and threatened,

while Longinus was forcibly restrained and disarmed (Tac. Hist. 1.31.3). The harsher

treatment handed out to Longinus was not due to his position as a tribune, like the other

two officers, but because of his friendship with the emperor (Tac. Hist. 1.31.3). The

tribune who was believed to be the most loyal to Galba met with the most hostile

treatment.467

Tacitus does not specify exactly why the soldiers distrusted their officers.

Possibly their distrust of their officers simply came down to a matter of rank.

Alternatively, as the Praetorian officers would have been placed in, or confirmed in

their positions by Galba,

These examples illustrate, that at least in the minds of the soldiers, the

Praetorian officers could be expected to remain loyal to Galba.

468

However, while the soldiers may have suspected their officers of being loyal to

Galba, the officers did little to help save Galba and they seem to have quickly fallen in

line with the wishes of the soldiers. Of those officers in the Praetorian camp at the time

of Otho’s arrival, Tacitus (Hist. 1.28) informs us that rather than taking the honourable

path of defending their emperor, they chose to remain quiescent. That the Praetorian

officers chose to remain silent is perhaps not completely surprising. They were

potentially vastly outnumbered, especially as they had no idea how widespread the

conspiracy was at this stage. Working with the soldiers on a daily basis, they were also

probably well aware of the discontent towards Galba within the ranks and perhaps felt

that it would be impossible to persuade the soldiers from their chosen path.

the soldiers might have viewed them, rightly or wrongly, as

supporters of the emperor. Moreover, we do not know how significant a role the

officers played in Nero’s downfall. If they had been enthusiastic supporters of Galba,

the soldiers may have felt that this loyalty would continue, although it should be

remembered that the Praetorian officers had demonstrated, in events such as the

assassination of Gaius (Joseph. AJ 19.18, 37 – 8, 148, 191; Suet. Gaius 56; Dio

59.25.8), the Pisonian conspiracy (Tac. Ann. 15.49 – 50) and the downfall of Nero

(Suet. Ner. 47.1) that they were more likely than the soldiers to conspire against a

reigning emperor.

467 Damon 2006, 262. 468 Damon 2003, 174.

114

Of the Praetorian tribunes active on Galba’s behalf on that day, we know that at

least two of them definitely survived Otho’s conspiracy and were the recipients of

further promotions. Subrius Dexter was later promoted to the equestrian bureaucracy

under the Flavians, ending up as the governor of Sardinia in AD 74, while Galba’s

amicus, the tribune Longinus, may well have gone on to be the legate of Judaea in AD

86, the suffect consul in AD 90, and the governor of Moesia Superior and Pannonia.469

The only Praetorian officer who seems to have actively opposed Otho’s

usurpation and demonstrated his loyalty in any practical way was the Praetorian

centurion, Sempronius Densus. Tacitus (Hist. 1.43) is full of praise for this man

describing him as a “noble hero.” Densus was apparently from the Praetorian cohort

that had been assigned to protect Piso, and Tacitus (Hist. 1.43.1) has him die a valiant

death defending his charge. Densus’ actions are also reported by Plutarch (Galba 26.5)

and Dio (64.6. 4 – 51) but in these two accounts, he dies defending Galba, not Piso.

Damon suggests that the version of Piso’s death that is found in Plutarch (Galba 27.5)

was at some point merged with the story of Densus, producing the “causally coherent

sequence we see in Tacitus.” Whether it was Tacitus himself, or his source, that paired

the actions of Densus with Piso, is not possible to tell.

Unfortunately, the remainder of the named officers do not appear again in the historical

record. However, if the subsequent career of a tribune and friend of the deposed

emperor did not suffer from his relationship with Galba, it is probable that the other

officers also continued in their present positions. There is also no mention of any

Praetorian officers being discharged or put to death in Otho’s reign.

470

The Praetorian soldiers

Unlike the rather ambiguous response of the Praetorian officers, the Praetorian soldiers

seem to have greeted Otho’s revolt with great enthusiasm (Tac. Hist. 1.36.1). Plutarch

(Galba 25.3) indicates that many of the soldiers initially gave their adherence to the

coup attempt through fear and then under persuasion. Certainly, the sudden chain of

events may have startled a number of soldiers, but considering the level of resentment

towards Galba, they probably did not require much persuasion to go along with the

coup. Unlike the guilt and regret that accompanied the soldiers’ betrayal of Nero, there

is no evidence of similar feelings this time. The soldiers clearly felt little loyalty to 469 Syme 1988a, 129. A military diploma puts Longinus in the former province in July AD 96 (Roxan RMD 1978, no. 6). 470 Damon 2003, 186. Little and Ehrhardt (1994, 79) believe that it is quite possible that Plutarch and Dio have both made the same mistake independently, “in remembering that Densus alone did his duty, and then wrongly supposing that he defended the main character of the story,” instead of Piso.

115

Galba. The reasons are obvious. Galba had not only failed to offer a donative at the

time of his accession, but had also failed to pay a donative when he adopted Piso. The

soldiers had grown used to these bonuses and now they had stopped and with Piso to be

the next emperor, the soldiers may have feared that donatives would not be reinstated.

There may have been secondary reasons too. Tacitus (Hist. 1.5.2) tells us that Galba

had reintroduced strict discipline and the Praetorians missed the lax conditions under

Nero. Galba’s choice of Praetorian Prefect, who did not seem to have enjoyed the

respect of the soldiers, probably only made the situation worse.

Moreover, Galba’s actions on entering the city cannot have helped his reputation

with the soldiers. As Galba approached Rome, he was met by a group of disorderly and

tumultuous” seamen (Plut. Galba 15.3). Apparently, Nero had promised to form these

sailors into a legion and give them the rights of soldiers, and now they had come to

demand that Galba give them standards for their legion and regular quarters. Galba,

however, would not concede to their demands, angering the sailors and resulting in

some drawing their swords. In response, Galba ordered a cavalry charge which resulted

in much bloodshed (Plut. Galba 15.4; cf. Tac. Hist. 1.6.2; Dio 64.3.1 – 2). Dio (64.3.2)

claims that about 7000 died, while Suetonius (Galba 7.2) and Dio (64.3.2) both note

that the survivors were later decimated. While these events may not have involved the

Praetorian Guard directly, it must have been a frightening event and spoken volumes

about the nature of their new emperor.

The Praetorian soldiers were the recipients of two speeches given that day.

When Galba first heard of the events unfolding at the Praetorian camp, he instructed

Piso to address the Praetorian cohort on duty at the Palace (Tac. Hist. 1.29.2; cf. Plut.

Galba 35.4), while Otho delivered the second speech from the walls of the Praetorian

camp (Tac. Hist. 1.36.3).471

One of Tacitus’ principal aims with Piso’s speech seems to be to reiterate the

crucial role that the Praetorians are about to play in Otho’s coup and more widely the

role they play in imperial politics.

The aim of both speeches was to secure the loyalty of the

respective Praetorian soldiers each man was addressing. With the exception of

Suetonius’ (Otho 6.3) very brief summary of Otho’s speech, both speeches are quoted

exclusively in Tacitus’ account. The authenticity of the speeches is debatable, but they

raise some interesting points in respect to the Praetorian Guard.

472

471 Otho’s speech was possibly not his own, but the creation of Galerius Trachalus, whom Otho employed for such purposes. See Tac. Hist. 1.90.2.

By acknowledging their importance and their

ability to decide the course of events, not only does Tacitus accept the reality of the

472 Keitel 1991, 2777.

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power base at Rome, but he also has Piso put himself under obligation to the soldiers.

Tacitus (Hist. 1.29), has Piso attempting to develop a common link between him and the

Praetorian soldiers by addressing them as commilitones, or fellow soldiers. This is

clearly unjustified from what we know of Piso’s career.473 Piso also attempts to relieve

the guilt felt by the Praetorians for their betrayal of Nero, by claiming that they did not

desert Nero, but rather Nero deserted them.474

At the end of the speech, Tacitus (Hist. 1.30.3) has Piso raise the issue of a

donative, but the manner in which Tacitus has Piso promise it is vague and not likely to

be particularly effective for long.

475

The speech provided by Tacitus for Otho is what one would expect to be given

in the circumstances and Otho’s arguments are either carefully directed towards what

would have motivated the Praetorians or were arguments that the Guardsmen would

have wanted to hear.

Nonetheless, Tacitus (Hist. 1.31.1) implies that the

speech was well received by the Praetorians on guard duty, although he does add that

the initial reaction of the soldiers – haphazard and without any plan – was later assumed

a way of concealing their treachery. Tacitus (Hist. 1.31.1) is unconvinced and says that

their behaviour was normal under such conditions and it does seem somewhat unlikely

that the whole cohort was privy to the plot, regardless of Otho’s claim that the

Praetorians at the Palace were detaining rather than guarding Galba (Tac. Hist. 1.38.2).

It is probable that the cohort that Piso addressed at the Palace was the same cohort that

accompanied Galba into the Forum (Tac. Hist. 1.41.1). However, any loyalty that Piso

managed to instil in these soldiers seems to have rapidly evaporated when they saw the

armed force sent to assassinate Galba enter the Forum (Tac. Hist. 1.41.1; cf. Plut. Galba

26.4).

476

473 Damon 2003, 160; Morgan 2006, 66. The term commilitones or ‘fellow soldiers’ was probably in use on official occasions before the civil wars of AD 68 – 9, when it clearly became the usual form of address to the soldiers. Both Tacitus (Hist. 1.29 – 30; 37 – 38; 83) and Plutarch (Galba 27.3; Otho 15.3) consistently use this term in the speeches which they attribute to the emperors and the usurpers. This is unlikely to be anachronistic and Tacitus’ use of the term is part of his careful account of the relationship between the emperor and the army (Campbell 1984, 32). Obviously, in these turbulent years anyone who aspired to the purple was compelled to identify themselves closely with the troops who supported them. Even the strict disciplinarian Galba uses this word to address the Praetorian tribune Julius Atticus, when Atticus informs Galba that he has killed Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.35).

Tacitus (Hist. 1.37.1) also has Otho using the term

commilitones to address the soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.37.1), unlike Piso however, Otho

probably did the years of military service required before his quaestorship, giving him

474 Plutarch (Galba 14.2) puts a similar claim in the mouth of the tribune Antonius Honoratus, who persuaded the Praetorians to remain loyal to Galba by killing their Prefect Nymphidius Sabinus 475 Damon 2003, 162. 476 Syme (1958, 153) describes Otho’s attitude as “base and flattering.”

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at least some small justification to use the term.477

Otho also highlights the traits of Galba most relevant to the Praetorian soldiers:

he is cruel although he calls it strictness, he is greedy although he calls it frugality and

he believes in discipline although it is really just the punishment and insults that the

soldiers have to endure (Tac. Hist. 1.37). Somewhat unexpectedly, Tacitus adds no

criticism of the Praetorian Prefect Laco in Otho’s speech. However, rather predictably,

Otho’s speech returns to the theme of the unpaid donative and reiterates the message

that the situation will not alter when Piso becomes emperor, because he is too much like

Galba (Tac. Hist. 1.37.5). Yet surprisingly, while Otho criticises Galba for failing to

pay the soldiers their donative, he does not promise any financial rewards to the soldiers

and in fact, no extant literary source records any type of donative being paid by Otho to

the Praetorian soldiers. Once Otho is declared emperor, Tacitus has him make some

concessions to the soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.46.2), but a donative is never mentioned.

Tacitus is supported by Suetonius (Otho 6.3), who claims that once Otho had dispatched

emissaries to kill Galba and Piso “he made no further promises in the assembly to win

the loyalty of the soldiers than to declare that he would have that – and only that –

which they should leave to him.” Considering the obvious importance of a donative to

the Praetorian soldiers, it seems very unusual that Otho did not offer them some type of

reward for their services, but our evidence would indicate that no promise was made.

Otho cleverly ties his fortunes to

those of the Praetorian soldiers. They will survive the day together or die together (Tac.

Hist. 1.37.2). Moreover, by reflecting back to the massacre of marines on Galba’s

entrance to Rome (Tac. Hist. 1.6, 31, 37.3; Plut. Galba 15.4; Dio 63.3.1 – 2), Otho

nicely illustrates to the soldiers that Galba had no sympathy for the behaviour of

discontented troops. The threat is clear: the disobedient Praetorians could well look

forward to similar punishment.

Due to the uncertainty surrounding Galba’s actual assassin, we cannot be certain

whether a member of the Praetorian Guard carried out his murder or not. Tacitus (Hist.

1.41.3) provides us with a number of options including Terentius, an evocatus,

Laecanius whose legion is not stated, or more commonly Camurius a soldier of the

fifteenth legion. Plutarch (Galba 27.2) favours Camurius. The speculator Statius

Murcus, however, is acknowledged as having played a role in the death of Piso. It was

Murcus, along with Sulpicius Florus, an auxiliary soldier, who discovered Piso in his

hiding place, dragged him out and slew him at the door of the temple of Vesta (Tac.

Hist. 1.43.2; Plut. Galba 27.4).

477 Damon 2003, 177.

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Conclusion

The Praetorian Guard dominates Tacitus’ account of Galba’s reign. Cornelius Laco,

Galba’s Praetorian Prefect, figures prominently in Tacitus’ narrative, especially in the

adoption debate and in the debate over how Galba should handle Otho’s coup. Laco is

also portrayed as having considerable influence over Galba. Unlike Nero’s Prefects,

Nymphidius and Tigellinus, Laco maintained his loyalty to his emperor and he died as a

consequence of his role in Galba’s administration. However, while he may not have

been quite as incapable as Tacitus would have us believe, he was clearly unsuitable and

out of his depth as Praetorian Prefect. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that no

other Praetorian Prefect had had to perform his role in such trying circumstances.

Previous Prefects had served under emperors who were generally popular with the

Praetorian soldiers. Galba was extremely unpopular with the Praetorians, and by failing

to pay any type of donative Galba ensured that Laco was left to command a group of

angry and guilt-ridden soldiers. One suspects that no matter how well Laco executed

his role as Praetorian Prefect he would never have been accepted by the Praetorian

soldiers because of his relationship with Galba. It was the emperor, rather than his lack

of military experience that was Laco’s biggest handicap when it came to his role as

Praetorian Prefect.

Laco clearly failed in his role as protector of the emperor’s life. While he may

have only had four days in which to uncover Otho’s conspiracy, one has to consider

whether, as Praetorian Prefect he should have anticipated Otho’s reaction. Laco must

have been aware that Otho hoped to become Galba’s heir and he should have realised

that Otho would be bitterly disappointed when overlooked. Laco’s biggest failure then

was lack of foresight or perhaps he simply was not ruthless or quick enough to eliminate

potential threats to the new Caesar.

The Praetorian officers, although suspected of being loyal to Galba by the rank

and file, were of no practical assistance to their emperor. The reasons behind their

passive disloyalty are uncertain, although the most likely explanation is simply that they

knew they were not in a position to oppose the Praetorian soldiers. In the end they were

too few in number, so they offered no practical opposition to Otho’s coup. Although it

cannot be discounted that many of the officers may actually have felt little loyalty

towards Galba, in much the same way as the Praetorian soldiers did.

To desert Nero, the Praetorian soldiers had required persuasion and a huge bribe

and afterwards felt enormous guilt. Otho, on the other hand, was able to gain their

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support without resorting to the promise of any type of donative. This is probably

because he had no need too. Many of the Praetorian soldiers, believing that they would

soon be receiving a substantial payout from Galba might have sunk into debt, a fact that

was probably responsible for the death of Nymphidius Sabinus.478

Tacitus’ portrayal of the Praetorian Guard during Galba’s reign would appear to

be generally accurate. The actions, behaviours and motivations he attributes to the

Praetorian Prefect, Laco, and the Praetorian soldiers is quite believable. Laco

undoubtedly enjoyed a prominent position at Galba’s court, however, Tacitus may have

exaggerated his prominence to serve his own purpose, particularly his desire to create a

atmosphere of division and discord among Galba’s advisors. While we cannot

necessarily condone the behaviour of the Praetorian soldiers, their behaviour as

described by Tacitus is logical. Financial security in a society such as Rome must have

been of paramount importance too all people, not just to the Praetorian soldiers.

However, even if

they were not in debt, the soldiers’ resentment towards Galba, by the time Otho’s

conspiracy came to fruition was probably at such a pitch that a donative simply was not

needed. In addition, Otho from the very beginning of Galba’s Principate may well have

courted the Praetorian soldiers, however, it was Galba’s failure to reward them for their

services and his inability to command the soldiers’ respect, which led them to betray

him.

On Galba’s death, Otho enjoyed the support of the Praetorian soldiers.

However, because the soldiers had played such a significant part in bringing him to

power, would Otho find himself a hostage to their demands and would they dominate

his Principate?

478 See Appendix Three.

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Chapter Four

Otho and the First Battle of Bedriacum

Introduction

During the reign of Galba, Tacitus assigned to the Praetorian Prefect, Cornelius Laco,

an important and influential role. In contrast, throughout Otho’s reign, Tacitus

mentions the Praetorian Prefects sparingly. This is not surprising. For the second half

of Otho’s Principate a considerable part of Tacitus’ narrative takes place outside Rome

and at considerable distance from Otho, with whom the Praetorian Prefects seem to

have remained (Hist. 2.33.1, 46.2). Tacitus’ focus here is on the battles between the

forces of Otho and the Vitellians. However, even during the first part of Otho’s

Principate, when the emperor is at Rome, the Praetorian Prefects are mentioned only in

passing and what influence, if any, they had over Otho is not discussed. For Otho’s

reign, it is the Praetorian soldiers who are the dominant and influential force, not only in

the capital, but also on the field of battle.

Tacitus develops four dominant and overlapping themes concerning the

Praetorian Guard during this period. Firstly, Otho is unable to control his soldiers and

consequently, he is often forced to make decisions based on the will of the Praetorians.

Secondly, the loyalty shown by the Praetorians to Otho is excessive and dangerous.

Thirdly, the Guard are distrustful of their officers and members of the senatorial elite,

frequently accusing them of treachery to Otho and finally the Praetorian soldiers, partly

because of their distrust of their superiors, repeatedly behave in a manner that can be

considered mutinous. Consequently, Tacitus is critical at all times of the behaviour of

the Praetorian soldiers and of the relationship between them and Otho.

Plutarch’s narrative is generally supportive of Tacitus’ account, although it

would seem that the two authors were heavily reliant on a common source. The

epitome of Dio is inevitably brief and fails to mention the Praetorians. Nevertheless,

the themes in Dio’s account are similar to those in Tacitus, as are the themes present in

Suetonius’ biography of Otho. However, the negative portrayal of the Praetorian

Guard, by our extant sources, is hardly surprising considering the manner in which Otho

came to power. Senators, in particular, cannot have been impressed by the idea that a

handful of speculatores were given the opportunity to create an emperor.479

479 For senatorial disgust at the manner of Otho’s elevation see: Tac. Hist. 1.50.1; Dio 64.8.2 – 9.2, 10.2. See also Tac. Hist. 2.52.1. Otho made many attempts to win over the senators. He forgave M. Celsus (Tac. Hist. 1.71.1 – 2; Plut. Otho 1.1 – 2), Verginius Rufus was given a second consulship (Tac. Hist.

Therefore,

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it will be interesting to discover if Tacitus, or his sources, have overstated his four

central themes relating to the Praetorian Guard and thereby distorted the reality of the

situation.

The aftermath of Galba’s death and Otho’s Praetorian Prefects

Considering that a small number of Praetorian speculatores were responsible for Otho’s

elevation to the Principate and that the Praetorian Guard was Otho’s principal, if not

only support, it is difficult to imagine that the Praetorians would not have been in an

influential position following Galba’s assassination (Tac. Hist. 1.46.1 cf. Dio 64.9.2).

Additionally, Tacitus (Hist.1.45.1 – 2) is in no doubt that shortly after Galba’s death the

Praetorian Guard was on the verge of rioting and that Otho could have lost control of

them at any moment. However, the degree to which their position allowed the

Praetorian soldiers to impose their will on the emperor, and the degree to which Otho

struggled to control them and their actions, can be viewed as debatable.

Tacitus (Hist. 1.45.1 – 47.1) claims that the temper of the Praetorians was eager

and threatening and that the Guardsmen were engaged in criminal behaviour, with the

day of Galba’s assassination as one “spent in crimes.” Indeed, Otho even had to be

carried through the heaps of dead bodies littering the Forum (Tac. Hist. 1.47.2). Yet for

all these claims, Tacitus provides no precise incident where Otho actually lost control of

his soldiers in the aftermath of Galba’s murder. Tacitus does not tell us what manner of

criminal activities the soldiers were supposedly engaged in, nor where the piles of dead

bodies came from or who actually did the killing. In fact, Tacitus and Plutarch only

note the deaths of three men. Plutarch (Galba 27.5) even quotes a saying by

Archilochus,480 to illustrate his point, that while so few men died, many men submitted

petitions for largess. Murison quite rightly comments that the idea that the Forum was

piled high with bodies is nothing more than Tacitean exaggeration.481 Of course, it

would be naïve to imagine that some of the Praetorians did not take the opportunity,

which the tumultuous events would have presented, to engage in some type of criminal

behaviour. However, our extant sources, including Tacitus’ narrative, simply do not

support the idea that the majority of the Praetorian soldiers were close to anarchy.482

1.77.2; Plut. Otho 1.2) and some exiles who had previously been restored by Galba were given their property back (Plut Otho 1.4) or were granted the money that was left from the sales of property confiscated by Nero (Tac. Hist. 1.90.1). Men, preeminent in age or reputation, Otho promoted to priesthoods (Plut. Otho 1.3).

480 “Only seven lay dead on the ground, where we trod their bodies under foot. But we who slew are a thousand.” (Bergk, Lyr. Gr. Frag. ii.4 p. 398). 481 Murison 1999, 49. 482 Morgan 2006, 93.

122

Not only were the Praetorians supposedly mutinous, but Tacitus (Hist. 1.45.2)

also claimed that the soldiers were not satisfied with the deaths of Galba, Piso and

Vinius, but had singled out A. Marius Celsus, the consul designate, for punishment

(Tac. Hist. 1.45.2; Plut. Galba 27.6). Tacitus tells us that Celsus had been Galba’s

faithful friend to the very end and the soldiers hated his vigour and honest character, “as

if they were vicious qualities” (Tac. Hist. 1.45.2), but he has neglected to inform us that

on the day of Otho’s coup Celsus tried to persuade the soldiers to defend Galba (Plut.

Galba 27.6). Otho, however, managed to save Celsus from the wrath of the Praetorians

and an immediate death by lying to the soldiers and telling them that he wanted Celsus

to suffer severer punishment (Tac. Hist. 1.45.2; Plut. Galba 27.6). Otho was forced to

lie to the Praetorians because he was afraid to oppose their wishes (Plut. Galba 27.6).

Celsus’ ultimate fate is left in the balance by Tacitus (Tac. Hist. 1.50.1 – 1.70.3)

as he embarks on a long excursus on the events unfolding in Germany. However, we

know from Plutarch (Otho 1.1) that Otho met with Celsus the following day. When

Tacitus (Hist. 1.71.1) does finally return to the events in Rome, he is quick to remind

his audience that Otho had been forced to save Celsus from the fury of the Praetorians.

At this meeting, Otho and Celsus are reconciled, to the joy of every respectable citizen

and even the soldiers now admire Celsus’ principal virtue, loyalty, which only the

previous day had been grounds for his death (Tac. Hist. 1.45.2, 71.1 – 2; Plut. Otho 1.1).

Clearly, whatever anger the Praetorians felt toward Celsus dissipated rapidly and

although Otho may have had to give his soldiers the opportunity to settle down after the

initial bloodshed, he was in the end able to implement his chosen course of action.

Considering Celsus’ loyalty to Galba (Tac. Hist. 1.45.2) and his actions on the

day of Galba’s assassination (Plut. Galba 27.6), the calls for his death cannot be seen as

unexpected. What is perhaps more surprising than the calls for the death of Celsus, is

that he was the only one the Praetorians wanted punished. There must have been other

men whom the Praetorians considered loyal to Galba, for example, the three Praetorian

tribunes, who went to the camp at Galba’s behest to try to put down the mutiny (Tac.

Hist. 1.31.2). Moreover, in comparison to the actions of the legionaries serving under

Vitellius, who demanded and successfully achieved the punishment of many individuals

(Tac. Hist. 1.58.1 – 2), the behaviour of the Praetorians can be viewed as moderate and

restrained.

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Nevertheless, the worst was, according to Tacitus (Hist. 1.46.1), still to come:

Omnia deinde arbitrio militum acta.483

However, when we consider the two men chosen for the position of Praetorian

Prefect, Plotius Firmus and Licinius Proculus, both could just have easily been Otho’s

own choice as the choice of the Praetorian soldiers.

The soldiers took the initiative of choosing their

own Prefects (Tac. Hist. 1.46.1). If this is correct, it is unprecedented in the history of

the Praetorian Guard. At no other time, with the possible exception of AD 193, were

the rank and file of the Praetorians allowed to, or in a position to, undertake such

measures. However, this does not necessarily mean the action of the soldiers was

carried out against the wishes of Otho, or that he tried, but ultimately failed, to stop the

Praetorians. Otho may well have been happy to allow them this liberty as a type of

reward for their services to him.

484

Unfortunately, not much is known about these two men until their elevation to

the Praetorian Prefecture. Plotius Firmus began his military career as a common

soldier, most probably in the ranks of the Praetorian Guard.

Plotius Firmus had apparently

been a partisan of Otho’s before Galba’s assassination and Licinius Proculus was

clearly close enough to Otho to have men suspect him of being involved with Otho’s

conspiracy (Tac. Hist. 1.46.1). Considering that both men would have been very

acceptable to Otho as his new Prefects, one has to wonder if Otho recommended them

as Prefects to his soldiers and sought their approval for his choice, rather than as Tacitus

states that the initiative came from the soldiers.

485 At some point, he was

promoted to praefectus vigilum. His rise from the ranks to a senior equestrian post, as

Prefect of the Vigiles and now onto the Praetorian Prefecture was somewhat unusual.486

However, his spectacular rise is reminiscent of Nero’s Prefect, Tigellinus. Chilver

suggests that Plotius Firmus may have been the father of C. Tullius Capito

Pomponianus Plotius Firmus, who was consul in AD 84 and possibly related to Plotius

Grypus, who became a senator under Vespasian.487

483 “The soldiers’ will was henceforth supreme.”

Plotius Firmus is not mentioned in

any other extant source. Licinius Proculus, Otho’s other Prefect, is however, mentioned

by both Plutarch (Otho 7.4, 11.1, 13.1) and Zonaras (Dio 64.10.2) but like Tacitus,

neither of them says anything about his earlier career. Damon claims that by not adding

any details about Proculus, Tacitus gives the impression that his friendship with Otho

484 For Plotius Firmus see PIR2 P 503 and for Licinius Proculus see PIR2 L 233. 485 Damon 2003, 191. 486 Baille Reynolds 1927, 33, 122 – 7; Chilver 1979, 103; Damon 2003, 191. 487 Chilver 1979, 103. For Plotius Grypus see Tacitus Hist. 3.52.3; Devijver 1976, 649.

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was the only reason he received the position,488

According to Tacitus (Hist. 1.46.1), the Praetorian soldiers were also responsible

for the election of Flavius Sabinus as Urban Prefect, because they “had an eye on his

brother Vespasian.” Plutarch’s account (Otho 5.2) of the election of Sabinus is

somewhat different from Tacitus’ version. Unlike Tacitus (Hist. 1.46.1), who locates

the election of Sabinus as Urban Prefect at the beginning of Otho’s reign, Plutarch

(Otho 5.2) places his appointment in March, just before Otho left Rome. On this point,

Tacitus is probably correct because it is unlikely Otho would wait over two months to

appoint an Urban Prefect. However, other aspects of Plutarch’s version appear more

reliable than Tacitus’ account. Plutarch (Otho 5.2) writes that Sabinus was actually

appointed by Otho because Otho hoped that the appointment of Sabinus would be a

precaution against a threat from Vespasian. There is no mention of the involvement of

the Praetorian soldiers. One can imagine that it would be Otho, rather than the

Praetorians, as Tacitus proposes, who would have been acutely aware of the threat

Vespasian could pose. Consequently, if appeasing Vespasian was the purpose of

Sabinus’ appointment (Tac. Hist. 1.46.1; Plut. Otho 5.2), then the decision to appoint

him as Urban Prefect was probably Otho’s.

although personal friendship with the

emperor was probably the best recommendation a potential candidate for the Praetorian

Prefecture could have.

489

Moreover, even if Tacitus’ account were sound in all other respects it seems

most likely that it would be the Urban cohorts who would have elected their Prefect, not

the Praetorians,

490 or at the very least would have had some sort of role in the process.

If the Urban cohorts did actually elect Sabinus, their reason for choosing him may have

been primarily related to the fact that he was well known to them, having been the

Urban Prefect under Nero, while Ducenius Geminus, Galba’s appointee (Tac. Hist.

1.14.1), may well have been a relative stranger to the troops. Anyway, after the murder

of Galba, it would have been unlikely that Ducenius Geminus would have been able to

keep his post.491

488 Damon 2003, 191.

These points all throw considerable doubt on Tacitus’ account of

Sabinus’ appointment. It would appear that Tacitus has chosen to ignore the parallel

tradition found in Plutarch and instead has attempted to create a situation where the will

489 Chilver (1979, 104) also found Tacitus’ attribution of Flavius’ appointment to the soldiers, somewhat suspect. 490 Chilver 1979, 104. 491 Morgan 2006, 94.

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of the troops is paramount492

The Praetorian soldiers also demanded of their emperor that the payments

usually made to centurions to secure vacationes should be abolished (Tac. Hist. 1.46.2).

Vacationes were an exemption from military service secured by the payment of a given

amount of money to the centurions, and according to Tacitus (Hist. 1.46.2), it amounted

to an annual tax on the soldiers. In order to secure the necessary money to pay for some

relief from their military duties, the poorest soldiers were often forced to resort to petty

thieving and menial occupations. The wealthier soldiers would be subjected to the most

arduous tasks, in order to ensure that they would eventually succumb to their workload

and purchase some relief. On return from vacationes these soldiers would be financially

ruined and lazy instead of energetic. Consequently, the measure had a demoralizing

affect on all the soldiers (Tac. Hist. 1.46.2 – 4). The abolition of these payments was in

Tacitus’ opinion (Hist. 1.46.4), a measure which was useful and was later established as

a fixed rule of service by the good emperors.

and may be taking every possible opportunity, accurate or

not, to illustrate his theme.

Otho agreed to the soldiers’ request, but in an attempt to avoid upsetting the

centurions, he promised that the imperial treasury would pay the annual vacationes

(Tac. Hist. 1.46.4), thereby ensuring that the centurions would not lose any income.

Otho, obviously, wanted to make sure that he maintained a good relationship with the

Praetorian centurions, especially as at least some of them might have been appointees of

the previous emperor, Galba. In view of the importance Tacitus places on the

introduction of this measure, it is somewhat surprising that there is no mention of it in

any other literary source. Again, Tacitus may have chosen to use the material simply

because it fits in well with his idea of an emperor held hostage to the will of the

soldiers.

This request for the payment of vacationes, made by the Praetorians, might have

been influenced by the events in Germany. From Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 1.58.1) it

would seem that one of the first actions Vitellius undertook after being hailed emperor

was to pay the fees for vacationes to the centurions out of his own pocket. Vitellius was

hailed emperor by his troops on 2 January, so if the sequence in Tacitus’ narrative were

correct, Vitellius would have given his soldiers this concession sometime around 4 – 5

January.493

492 Damon 2003, 193.

Bearing in mind that Galba was aware of the mutiny in Germany, which

began on 1 January, before he announced the adoption of Piso on 10 January (Suet.

493 Suetonius (Vit. 8.1) notes that as soon as Vitellius entered the camp, he granted every request made by anyone, but unfortunately does not provide details of the requests.

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Galba 16.2 – 17; Dio 64.5.1), there should have been enough time for the news of

Vitellius’ measure concerning the payment of vacationes to reach Rome by the time of

Otho’s coup. Therefore, the Praetorian Guard may have responded to the news from

Germany, that Vitellius had made this concession to his troops and demanded the same

benefit from Otho. On the contrary, Otho himself may have granted the benefit to the

Praetorians once he heard that Vitellius had introduced the measure.494 By failing to

note that Vitellius had introduced the same measure in Germany until much later in his

narrative, Tacitus gives his audience the impression that it was the Praetorians who

were alone in raising the complaint.495

There can be no doubt that the payment of this money to the centurions, to

receive vacationes, was burdensome to the troops. In the mutinies of AD 14, the abuses

in the allocation of exemptions were one of the grievances expressed by the soldiers

(Tac. Ann. 1.17, 35). However, the financial relief that this measure would have bought

cannot have been as substantial or as immediate in its affect as a sizable donative.

Nevertheless, the payment of vacationes seems to be the only financial reward the

Praetorian soldiers sought from Otho or that Otho pledged to his troops. It has been

noted in the previous chapter that when Otho addressed the Praetorians from the camp

walls (Tac. Hist. 1.37.1 – 38.2) he did not promise the soldiers a financial incentive for

overthrowing Galba. Nor do any of our sources indicate that Otho actually paid any

sort of donative to the soldiers at any time. If a donative had been paid, it seems

unlikely that both Tacitus and Plutarch would have failed to record the action.

Moreover, Tacitus may have turned the situation

around and had the Praetorians demand the payment for vacationes, rather than have

Otho grant it to them.

496 The

only reason one could suspect that Tacitus would fail to record the payment of a

donative would be because the donative was restrained and sensible, and knowledge of

this fact would destroy the scene that Tacitus creates. It is also possible that Otho’s

promise to pay for vacationes was a temporary solution, designed to give him some

time to pay a proper donative and gain some instant popularity without any immediate

sizable outlay,497

494 Damon (2003, 193) suggests that Otho may actually be matching Vitellius rather than anticipating him.

but that does not account for the failure of the sources to mention

Otho’s promise of a donative to the Praetorians.

495 Morgan 2006, 94. 496 Morgan (2006, 95) writes that the failure of the troops to demand a donative is proof that the soldiers were under control. 497 Chilver 1979, 150 – 1.

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When one considers the importance of the promised but unpaid donative in the

events surrounding the deaths of both Nero and Galba, it seems highly irregular that

Otho did not give the troops at least a small financial bonus. It is simply not possible

that Otho was unaware of the importance of a donative, especially as he has already

demonstrated his adroit handling of the soldiers prior to his coup. The soldiers may

have felt that the donative promised by Galba was cancelled when he died, although that

does not release Otho from his obligation to pay a donative to mark his accession, a

gesture which was begun by Tiberius when he doubled the legacies left by Augustus in

his own name (Suet. Tib. 48.2; Dio 57.5.3, 6.4.) It is of course possible that the soldiers

could be motivated by something other than money. The Praetorians turned on their

Prefect Nymphidius Sabinus and there is no indication that a donative was offered or

requested by the soldiers (Plut. Galba 14.1 – 3). After the so called Praetorian

mutiny,498 the Praetorian Guardsmen were downcast when their officers surrounded

Otho and stripped off their badges of rank, demanding release from a service that had

become too dangerous (Tac. Hist. 1.82.3). In addition, Plutarch (Otho 6.1 – 2) tells us

that the Praetorians became more disciplined and eager to be commanded by Spurinna,

after the German troops had insulted their honour. Perhaps the troops felt that Galba’s

death was enough reward.499

Otho’s Praetorian Guard.

Otho inherited the Praetorian Guard of Galba. The regular soldiers of the Guard

remained unchanged and there is no indication from our extant literary sources that

Otho dismissed any of the Praetorian officers, who may have been placed in their

positions by Galba. However, there is one stark difference between the Guard of Galba

and that of Otho: the Praetorian soldiers were loyal to their most recent emperor. What

appear to be early attempts by the Vitellians to suborn their loyalty failed and even

when Otho had decided to end the war against Vitellius many of the soldiers remained

faithful to him (Tac. Hist. 2.46.2; cf. Dio 64.12.1; Plut. Otho 15.1 – 2). No extant

author offers any definitive reasons for Otho’s popularity with the Praetorians and the

answer can probably be found in a mix of factors. Otho had replaced the unpopular

Galba, whom as we have seen, the Praetorian Guard did not warm to. Otho tried to

associate himself with Nero (Tac. Hist. 1.78; Plut. Otho 3.2), to whose family the

Praetorian Guard had usually shown devotion (Tac. Hist. 1.5.1). In addition, the

498 For a discussion of the ‘Praetorian mutiny,’ see pp 129 – 39. 499 Morgan 2006, 95.

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Praetorian Guard, or members of that body, was responsible for Otho being emperor, so

in a sense they may have seen him as ‘their emperor.’

In the days after Otho’s coup, Praetorian soldiers formed part of a delegation to

the armies in Upper and Lower Germany, to the Legio I Italica, and to the troops

stationed at Lugdunum (Lyons). Tacitus does not specifically comment on whether

these were Praetorian officers or soldiers of the Guard. However, the fact that Tacitus

used the term praetoriani to describe them would seem to indicate that they were not

from the officer class, but rather from the rank and file, perhaps under the command of a

centurion or tribune. Otho had recalled the embassy previously sent to Germany by

Galba and dispatched another delegation in the name of the Senate. In addition to the

Praetorians, the delegation consisted of a number of senatorial legati. The purpose of

the Praetorians was to show the delegation honour (Tac. Hist. 1.74.2; cf. Suet. Otho

8.1).500 However, while the presence of the Praetorians may indeed have increased the

authority of the delegation, the real purpose of the Praetorians was to report to Otho

about the behaviour of the senators.501

The prospect of the Praetorians being able to intermingle with the legionaries

may well have been another of the reasons that Otho included the Praetorians in this

delegation. If this is the case, the idea was a sensible one. The Praetorians might have

been able to persuade the legionaries to abandon Vitellius and support Otho, perhaps by

offering financial incentives or service in the Rome cohorts. However, the Praetorians

were immediately returned to Rome by Fabius Valens,

Considering that the loyalty of the envoys was

swayed with little difficulty, as they remained all too easily with Vitellius (Tac. Hist.

1.74.2), Otho was correct to send Praetorian soldiers with them. Undoubtedly, the

soldiers communicated the actions of the legati to Otho.

502

Tacitus (Hist. 1.74.3) reports that Valens did, however, give the returning

Praetorian soldiers epistulas, written in nomine Germanici exercitus, addressed to the

Praetorian and Urban cohorts. The letters apparently contained a combination of threats

before they could mix with

the troops (Tac. Hist. 1.74.2). Valens clearly felt that there was a risk in letting the

Praetorians remain and it would seem that no one attempted to persuade them to join the

Vitellian side.

500 See also Zonaras, Loeb edition, page 211. 501 Chilver 1979, 137. Tacitus (Hist. 1.87.1) also has Otho assign Praetorian soldiers to watch their commanders. 502 The fact that it was Fabius Valens who ordered the troops to return to Rome would suggest that the Praetorians got no further than him, while the senators were sent on to Vitellius (Damon 2003, 250). Heubner (1963, 156) suggests that the Praetorians would not have been allowed to proceed any further north than Lugdunum. The speed of their march is impossible to determine.

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and promises. They boasted of the strength of the German legions but also offered the

Praetorians favourable terms for an agreement (Tac. Hist. 1.75.1). Tacitus’ use of the

plural, epistulas, is interesting here. Did the regular soldiers receive a different letter,

with different threats and promises, from the letters sent to the Praetorian officers, or

did each cohort of Praetorians receive their own letter? Alternatively, perhaps one letter

was sent to the Praetorian cohorts and another one for the Urban cohorts.

It is difficult to imagine that the returning Praetorians did not disclose the

existence of these letters to Otho. To keep their presence a secret was tantamount to

treason. If Otho were informed of their existence, would he have allowed them to be

viewed by any of the Praetorians? Moreover, even if Otho did allow the letters to be

read out to the soldiers, how would this have been achieved? Would they have been

read out at a mass meeting of the Guard, or in individual cohorts or centuries? The

whole process was fraught with difficulties. If the information contained in the letters

did indeed reach the Praetorians, one would imagine that it was spread largely by word

of mouth from soldier to soldier, beginning with the Praetorians who had actually

carried the letters to Rome, the ones who knew of the existence of the letters and their

contents. Still, whatever information was disseminated to the Praetorians, they seem to

have been unmoved by this combination of intimidation and assurances, and Tacitus

(Hist. 1.75.1) tells us that they maintained their loyalty for Otho. This is not surprising;

the Praetorians appear to have had no reason for disloyalty at this early stage and no

reason to desert a benefactor they knew for an uncertain one.503

Letters may not have been the only items that the Praetorians returning from the

north were given. Kraay suggests that the Praetorians may have been in receipt of some

coins designed for the purposes of subverting the loyalty of the Praetorians to Otho.

Moreover, at this stage,

the German armies must have seemed to pose a somewhat distant and vague threat.

504

The coins belong to a series referred to as the “Military” group of anonymous

denarii.505 There are four combinations, which occur most frequently, but the coins

most relevant to this discussion are506

:

503 Kraay 1952, 83. 504 Kraay 1952, 78, 81 – 6. 505 RIC2, 190; B.M. Coins Rom. Emp. Vol 1, 305, pl. 51. 19 – 23. “Irregular combinations and hybrids with other series are recorded in RIC and BMC Emp; they are often plated and may be ancient forgeries,” (Kraay 1952, 78 n. 4). 506 For a picture of these coins and for a description of all the coins in this series see Appendix Four.

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Obverse Reverse

1. Clasped hands. Clasped hands.

FIDES EXERCITVVM FIDES PRAETORIANORVM

2. Clasped hands. Concordia standing holding branch

FIDES EXERCITVVM and cornucopiae.

CONCORDIA PRAETORIANORVM

These coins provide the only serious controversy associated with the civil war

coinages. The group consists of denarii, with one aureus.507 In general, the coins are

very crude and simple and usually of very plain character with untidy lettering.508 That

the coins were “issued by supporters of Vitellius is proved by the reuse of identical

forms of three of their five main reverse types on Vitellius’ own coinage.”509 Viewed as

a whole, the coins in this series display a strong military message, with particular

emphasis on the Fides Exercituum and the Fides and the Concordia Praetorianorum,

with the essence of this pairing of concepts designed to be an appeal for unified loyalty

to the unspecified ‘armies’ and the Praetorian cohorts in Rome.510 Mattingly suggests

that the coins clearly seem to come from one army group seeking contact with other

armies and with the Praetorians.511 As to the date and reason for the issue, Mattingly

proposes two alternative views. Firstly, that the coins were struck at Colonia

Agrippinensium (Cologne) in the autumn of AD 68, “shortly after the accession of

Galba,” or secondly, that they were struck “a little before the proclamation of Vitellius”

when Vitellius began his movement against Otho.512

On the contrary, Kraay believes that these coins were minted in southern Gaul

about March or April AD 69 and that the term fides on the coins can be seen as a call for

common loyalty, between different units, within the Roman army. “The Concordia

Hence, the army of Upper

Germany, which had proclaimed Vitellius as emperor on 1 January AD 69 and been

followed on the next day by the army of Lower Germany, was seeking the support of

the Praetorians against Galba.

507 Sutherland 1984, 200. 508 B.M. Coins, Rom. Emp. Vol 1, cxcviii. 509 Kraay 1952, 78. See also Mattingly 1952, 73 – 74; Carson 1990, 22. 510 RIC2, 201. The use of the term Concordia has been the subject of detailed research by Levick (1978, 217 – 33) and among her conclusions was the notion that Concordia was, by the end of the Julio-Claudian period (A.D. 14 – 68), frequently invoked when discordia was either present or threatened 511 Mattingly 1952, 73. 512 Mattingly 1952, 72 – 7.

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denarius was a variation upon the same theme calling upon the Praetorians to answer

the fides exercituum with a spirit of unity and with approval for the actions of the

German legions.”513 For Kraay, the fact that the Praetorians are mentioned on the coins

indicates that they were intended to be circulated in Rome and were designed to

influence the Praetorians to desert Otho and join the German armies; otherwise, the

reference to them is pointless.514 If this hypothesis was correct, then it would have been

necessary to get the coins to Rome for distribution among the Praetorians. Kraay

suggests that these returning Praetorians, who accompanied Otho’s envoys, may have

provided a possible point of distribution. To further support this possibility the coins

like the letters the Praetorians were carrying, were also nomine Germanici exercitus.515

However, as intriguing as Kraay’s suggestion is, it is difficult to show

definitively that the coinage was ever intended for circulation in Rome. Alternatively, it

is possible that the coins were issued very shortly perhaps even within a few days, of

Vitellius being hailed as imperator by the soldiers in Lower Germany. The coins,

particularly as the Fides Exercituum denarii, may have been designed to increase

support for Vitellius within the legions of Lower Germany and those based in Upper

Germany, who had originally taken their oath to the Senate and People of Rome (Tac.

Hist. 1.56.1). Vitellius and his immediate entourage in Lower Germany must have

realised that their chances for success, in a war against Galba, were limited unless they

could harness the support of the legions in Upper Germany. The last thing Vitellius and

his generals would have wanted was to find a rival emperor set up by the legions of

Upper Germany. After all, it had not been that long ago that the legions of Upper

Germany had offered to proclaim Verginius Rufus as the next emperor (Plut. Galba 6.2;

Dio 63.25.3; cf. Tac. Hist. 1.8.2.). Therefore, the importance of appealing for unity

from all the soldiers in all the legions along the German frontier was particularly

important. The importance to Vitellius of obtaining the support of all the legions in

Germany is emphasised by Tacitus (Hist. 1.56.3) when he writes that: Missi a Vitellio

ad legiones legatosque qui descivisse a Galba superiorem exercitum nuntiarent:

If Kraay’s suggestion is accurate, and assuming that the coins were distributed in Rome,

they had no affect on the Praetorians’ loyalty to Otho.

513 Kraay 1952, 78 – 86. 514 Kraay 1952, 78 – 86. 515 Kraay 1952, 83 – 4. See Tac. Hist. 1.75.1.

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proinde aut bellandum adversus desciscentis aut, si concordia et pax placeat,

faciendum imperatorem: et minore discrimine sumi principem quam quaeri.516

The failure of the coins to promote Vitellius directly can be seen as a deliberate

attempt to emphasise that it was the legions who were important here and that while the

legions from Lower Germany had made the decision to promote Vitellius their decision

was in ‘concord’ with the wishes of the legions from Upper Germany. The reference to

the Praetorians on the coins was not necessarily intended for them directly, but rather

for the soldiers in Germany, and was there to encourage the soldiers to believe that

some type of agreement existed or could be reached between the Praetorians and all the

legions of Germany.

517

Another potential source of corruption of the Praetorian Guard’s loyalty to Otho

may have been through the insidiatores sent by Vitellius to Rome (Tac. Hist. 1.75.1).

The actual mission of these men is not made clear; perhaps spying, or trying to create

support for Vitellius or even the assassination of Otho. Tacitus (Hist. 1.75.1) informs us

that the agents sent by Vitellius’ went undiscovered because they were unrecognised

among the masses of people at Rome, although this raises the question that if they went

undiscovered, can we really be certain that they were ever there? Otho also sent secret

agents to Vitellius’ army (Tac. Hist. 1.75.1) and it is highly probable that these men

were Praetorian soldiers because it would be ludicrous to send civilians, unacquainted

with the workings of the army, to infiltrate an army camp. Again, the exact intention of

these men has not been recorded. Otho’s insidiatores, however, were betrayed by their

unfamiliar appearance in a situation were everyone was acquainted with everyone else

(Tac. Hist. 1.75.1). Their fate has not been recorded.

The Praetorian mutiny

While the loyalty of the Praetorians to their emperor should be seen as a credit to them,

what seems to be important for Tacitus is to demonstrate that this devotion could

become excessive and dangerous. Tacitus also likes to take every opportunity to

highlight the indiscipline which the Praetorian soldiers could get away with under Otho.

This excessive loyalty and ill discipline is well illustrated in Tacitus’ coverage of the so-

516 “Vitellius sent men to the legions and legates to announce that the Upper army had mutinied against Galba: therefore they must either fight against the mutineers or, if they preferred harmony and peace, must take an emperor. There was less danger, he added, in accepting an emperor than in looking for one.” 517 Morgan (2006, 74) suggests that the coins may have been intended to reassure Vitellius’ own troops that the Praetorians were ready to come to an agreement with armies in Germany.

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called Prätorianeraufstand.518 There is no precise indication as to the timing of the

event, but it occurred sometime between 15 January, when Otho became emperor and

14/5 March, when Otho left Rome.519 In Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 1.80.1 – 85.3) the

event occurs towards the end of this period, while Plutarch’s account (Otho 3.3 – 8)

seems to indicate that the mutiny was much earlier in Otho’s reign.520

According to Tacitus’ account (Hist. 1.80.1 – 2): Septimam decimam cohortem e

colonia Ostiensi in urbem acciri Otho iusserat; armandae eius cura Vario Crispino

tribuno e praetorianis data.

There would

seem little doubt that some type of riot took place as Tacitus, Plutarch, Suetonius and

Dio all record the event. The accounts of Tacitus (Hist. 1.80.1 – 85.3) and Plutarch

(Otho 3.3 – 8) are the fullest, while Suetonius’ account (Otho 8.1 – 2) is very brief and

little survives of Dio’s version (64.9.2 – 3). Unfortunately, even though we have a

number of extant sources for the incident, much is left unclear.

521 In order to maximise his efficiency, Crispinus decided to

load the wagons, which belonged to the cohort, at nightfall, when the camp was quiet

and there would be less distractions. However, the time Crispinus (unknown outside

this incident) chose to carry out his assignment aroused suspicion and his motives

became the grounds for accusations against him.522

518 The most comprehensive coverage of the Praetorian mutiny can be found in Hohl 1939, 307 – 24; Heubner 1958, 339 – 53; 1963, 168 – 75; Drexler 1959, 153 – 63; Chilver 1979, 146 – 51; Murison 1993, 120 – 30.

The soldiers charged the tribunes

and centurions with treachery and claimed that slaves belonging to senators were being

armed for the purpose of attacking Otho. A section of the soldiers were ignorant of the

circumstances, while the worst of them wanted to make the disturbance an opportunity

for looting. The majority of the soldiers were ready for any action and “the natural

obedience of the better disposed was rendered ineffective by the night.” When

Crispinus attempted to quiet the soldiers, many of whom were drunk, they killed him

519 For the date of Otho’s coup see, Tac. Hist. 1.27.1; cf. Plut. Galba 24.3. For the 14 March date see, Tac. Hist.1.90.1; Suet. Otho 8.3. For the 15 March see, Acta Fratrum Arvalium: an entry inscribed later, with Vitellius’ name erroneously inserted and then, later again, partly erased. 520 Hohl (1939, 307) claims the affair was later than 1 March, because Tacitus (Hist. 1.81.2) notes that the magistrates discarded their insignia and that this could not be Otho and his brother, but Verginius and Vopiscus, who succeeded as consuls on 1 March. Heubner (1958, 339) believes that Hohl’s terminus post quem is not necessarily correct because magistratus need not mean the consuls and instead dates the event to the very beginning of Otho’s Principate. Chilver (1979, 148) suggests the third week in February. Murison (1999, 59) dates the event to the early days of March. Morgan (2006, 106, 109 and 306 n. 10) writes Tacitus may have placed the event late in his narrative in order to demonstrate to his audience that Otho’s final few weeks in Rome were full of “gloom and fear,” however, the event probably occurred just before the departure of the naval expedition in February. 521 “Otho had given orders that the Seventeenth cohort be brought from the colony of Ostia to Rome. Varius Crispinus, one of the praetorian tribunes, had been charged with equipping these troops.” 522 Varius Crispinus repeats an error made by Hordeonius Flaccus with similar results (Tac. Hist. 1.54.2).

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and the strictest of the centurions. The soldiers then jumped on horses and galloped to

Rome and to the Palace (Tac. Hist. 1.80.1 – 2).

Plutarch’s account of the outbreak of the mutiny is similar to that provided by

Tacitus, with one exception. Plutarch (Otho 3.3) indicates that Varius Crispinus’

loading of the wagons actually took place in Ostia. Tacitus is not specific on this point,

but the consensus of scholars, is that Plutarch is mistaken and Crispinus was loading the

wagons in the castra praetoria and hence the outbreak started in Rome.523 It is also

widely accepted by scholars, that the Seventeenth cohort, to which both Tacitus (Hist.

1.80.1) and Plutarch (Otho 3.3) refer, is likely to be an Urban cohort, possibly the one

that Claudius sent to Ostia to fight fires (Suet. Claud. 25.2).524 Unfortunately, neither

Tacitus nor Plutarch provide any reason for the movement of this cohort from Ostia to

Rome and consequently it has been the subject of much speculation.525

There are two other points of difference regarding the outbreak of the mutiny, in

the accounts of Tacitus and Plutarch. Firstly, Tacitus is not specific about the number

of centurions actually killed by the mutinous Praetorians. He tells us only that the

centurions who suffered at the hands of the soldiers were the severissimos. The idea

that the soldiers resented discipline and the strictest of their officers is a recurrent theme

in Tacitus’ narrative. Plutarch (Otho 3.4), however, is quite specific that the tribune

Crispinus and two centurions were killed. Considering that Plutarch and Tacitus have

used the same source for this episode, Tacitus should have been aware of the same facts

as Plutarch. Consequently, by failing to include the precise number of deaths, Tacitus

allows his readers to imagine that the death toll of murdered centurions was much

Possibly Tacitus

and Plutarch have not recorded the reason for the move because their source did not

know or simply failed to record it. Alternatively, perhaps the reason why the cohort

was being moved just did not matter, what was important was the behaviour of the

soldiers.

523 For example, Hohl 1939, 308; Heubner 1963, 169; Drexler 1959, 156, 161; Wellesley 1989, 58; Chilver 1979, 149; Shotter 1993, 151; Murison 1992, 112, 114, 1993, 121, 122, 1999, 58; Damon 2003, 261 – 5; Morgan 2006, 106; Mendell 1957, 169; contra Mench 1968, 476 – 8; Greenhalgh 1975, 61. 524 For example, Hohl 1939, 308; Durry 1968, 372; Heubner 1963, 168; Mench 1968, 478; Chilver 1979, 149; Morgan 2006, 106. 525 For example, Hohl (1939, 307 – 23) claims that the naval expedition to Narbonensis was in preparation. As all the Urban cohorts and some of the Praetorians were to take part, the seventeenth cohort was entrusted with the transport of all necessary arms from Rome. Chilver (1979, 148) suggests that it was Otho’s intention that the cohort join the military expedition against Vitellius. However, this seems unlikely because no mention of an Urban cohort appears in Tacitus’ (Hist. 2.11.1) list of forces dispatched to the Po valley. Murison (1992, 114, 1993, 128 – 9, 1999, 59) proposes that this cohort was being recalled from Ostia so they could be a partial replacement for the Praetorian cohorts who were being sent to delay Vitellius’ advance. Morgan (2006, 106) suggests that the reason for the cohort’s journey to Rome, might be because Otho wanted them to participate in a parade or review in Rome, with other units selected for the maritime expedition.

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higher than it actually may have been. Secondly, Tacitus (Hist. 1.80.1 – 2) points out

that the Praetorians involved in the outbreak were drunk and heavy with wine. This

creates an adverse image of the Praetorians behaving irrationally because they were

under the influence of alcohol. On the contrary, Plutarch does not mention anything

about drunken soldiers and his account shows the Praetorians acting in a much more

logical and controlled fashion. Tacitus of course may be correct, although how he came

about this information is difficult to fathom, but his decision to include such details

highlights the scene he has created and the type of impression of the Praetorian soldiers

he is portraying to his audience.

Suetonius (Otho 8.2) unfortunately, has a very brief and highly compressed

account of the mutiny: Placuerat per classiarios arma transferri remittique navibus; ea

cum in castris sub noctem promerentur, insidias quidam suspicati tumultum

excitaverunt; ac repente omnes nullo certo duce in Palatium cucurrerunt caedem

senatus flagitantes….526 There is no mention of the seventeenth cohort or Ostia,

possibly because they played no part in the following events and hence Suetonius

begins with the movement of weapons in the Praetorian camp, the incident which

sparked the trouble.527

When the Praetorian soldiers finally arrived at the Palace, Otho was hosting a

banquet for approximately eighty leading senators, many accompanied by their wives

(Tac. Hist. 1.81.1; Plut. Otho 3.4; cf. Dio 64.9.2). With the unexpected arrival of the

soldiers, both Otho and his guests were confused and fearful. No one knew if they had

been sent by a senator to murder Otho, or whether they were there on Otho’s orders,

although Otho must certainly have known that they were not there on his orders.

Fearing for the safety of his guests, Otho dismissed them and they quickly left the

Palace (Tac. Hist. 1.81.2; Plut. Otho 3.6). Dio (64.9.2) claims that the soldiers would

have killed all the guests if they had not moved quickly to hide themselves and

Suetonius (Otho 8.1) writes that the event almost resulted in the destruction of the

Senate. It is impossible to know what would have occurred if most of the senators had

not already taken flight when the soldiers entered the banquet room, although the

potential certainly seems to exist for many of them to have lost their lives. However,

there is no indication that any of the senators were physically attacked and injured.

526 “It had been resolved that some arms should be removed and carried back on shipboard by the marines; but as these were being taken out in the Camp towards nightfall, some suspected treachery and started a riot; then on a sudden all the soldiers hastened to the Palace without an particular leader, demanding the death of the senators.” 527 Murison 1993, 122. For Hohl (1939, 307 – 24), Suetonius’ narrative is vital and he claims that only Suetonius gives the essential clue as to what was happening.

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In response, the Praetorian Prefects were immediately sent by Otho to meet the

soldiers with the intention of dispelling their anger (Tac. Hist. 1.81.2; Plut. Otho 3.6).

Chilver suggests that Otho sent the Prefects to the Praetorian camp to calm the soldiers,

who were awaiting the results of the cavalry’s attack.528

The Prefects were clearly unable to stop the soldiers, suggesting that they had

little more authority over the troops than did the Praetorian officers in the camp. No

source, however, reports that either Prefect was injured. In addition, there is no record

of any action by the cohort on duty at the Palace when their colleagues arrived, although

it would seem that they did not try to resist their fellow soldiers and they may have

added to the numbers who stormed the banqueting room.

However, Tacitus’ account

does not specify where they were sent and bearing in mind that the immediate danger

was at the Palace, it would make sense for Otho to send the Prefects to address the

soldiers besieging the Palace, rather than those at the Guards’ camp.

529

On entering the banqueting room, the soldiers demanded to see Otho (Tac. Hist.

1.82.1; Suet. Otho 8.3). Dio (64.9.2) and Suetonius (Otho 8.2) both note that in the

process of entering the room the soldiers killed those who attempted to bar their

advance. However, Plutarch does not record any deaths and Tacitus (Hist. 1.82.1) only

reports the wounding of the Praetorian tribune Julius Martialis and Vitellius Saturninus,

a praefectus castrorum, as they tried to stop the soldiers’ advance.

530

Our two principal sources also include in their narratives, the effect that

Praetorian revolt had on the city itself. On the evening of the mutiny, Plutarch (Otho

3.5) notes that there was commotion in the city and the fear of being plundered, as the

soldiers raced to the Palace, while on the following day, according to Tacitus (Hist.

1.82.2), Rome reflected a city under siege with all private houses closed and few

respectable people out on the streets, and even the rabble was downcast. Certainly, both

Tacitus (Hist. 1.80.2) and Plutarch (Otho 3.3, 8) tell us that some of the soldiers began

If there had been

any deaths, it seems unlikely Tacitus would not have taken the opportunity to record

them. In order to bring the situation under control, Otho was forced to climb onto his

couch, so that the soldiers might be able to see him and with tears and appeals only just

succeeded in restraining them (Tac. Hist. 1.82.1; Plut. Otho 3.7). The soldiers then

returned to the Praetorian camp “neither willingly nor with guiltless hands” (Tac. Hist.

1.82.1).

528 Chilver 1979, 150. 529 Damon 2003, 265. 530 Damon (2003, 265) notes that it is somewhat unusual to have a Praetorian tribune alongside a legionary officer, but that this may be part of “Tacitus’ picture of the peculiar and pernicious mixing of military units in the period.”

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the mutiny with dishonourable purposes in mind, yet what seems to be of primary

importance to the soldiers is the safety of Otho, not the opportunity for looting. One

can image that the Praetorians may have created some problems on their journey back to

the Praetorian camp and the sight of drunken armed soldiers racing through the city

must have struck fear into the populace. However, besides these general statements,

there are no specific examples, provided by our sources, of plunder, murder or

destruction by the Praetorian soldiers.

The following day, in the Praetorian camp, the soldiers themselves were

apparently sorrowful but not repentant. The two Praetorian Prefects addressed their

companies, Licinius Proculus with severity, Plotius Firmus with moderation (Tac. Hist.

1.82.3). Their speeches ended with the statement that each soldier would receive a

payment of 5000 sesterces (Tac. Hist. 1.82.3; Plut. Otho 3.3; Dio 64.9.3). This is a

sizeable sum, representing twenty months pay for an average Praetorian soldier,531 but

is far short of the 30 000 sesterces Nymphidius promised the Praetorians to betray Nero

(Plut. Galba 2.2), and is more in keeping with the 4000 sesterces paid to the Praetorian

Guard by Tiberius for their loyalty at the time of the downfall of Sejanus in AD 32

(Suet. Tib. 48.2; Dio 58.18.2 – 3). The reason for this payment is not made clear.

However, it was probably designed to achieve a number of outcomes. The soldiers had

clearly demonstrated their devotion to Otho, albeit by disobeying their officers. Failure

to acknowledge this loyalty may have been very dangerous on Otho’s part. Galba had

failed to reward the Praetorians for saving his Principate in the face of Nymphidius’

attempted coup and he had to face the particularly appalling consequences. In addition,

as noted above, Otho does not seem to have paid a donative on his accession, therefore

he may have represented this payment, forced on him by the riot, as an instalment, with

the remaining amount to be paid at the successful conclusion of his war against

Vitellius.532

Undoubtedly, Otho’s payment to the Praetorians is open to criticism. The

Praetorians had disobeyed and murdered their own officers and threatened the lives of

senators and now Otho was rewarding such reprehensible behaviour. However, Otho

had to tread carefully. He was in a difficult situation. The Praetorians were going to be

the core of his fighting force against the army of Vitellius. If Otho displayed too much

The payment may also have been a bribe to placate the soldiers and

encourage behaviour that is more obedient.

531 For a discussion of the service conditions of Praetorian soldiers see pp 29 – 36. 532 Chilver 1979, 151. Hohl (1939, 320 - 1) writes that this payment to the Praetorians was nothing more than the delayed donative of a new emperor. Drexler (1959, 157 n. 1) disagrees with this assessment.

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displeasure with his mutinous troops, he might find them deserting him for his rival

when they had the opportunity.533

Only after the donative had been promised did Otho feel safe to enter the

Praetorian camp (Tac. Hist. 1.80.3). The Praetorian tribunes and centurions

immediately surrounded Otho and demanded to be discharged, because their present

service had become too dangerous. The soldiers were embarrassed that their behaviour

had led to such drastic action by their officers, some obedience returned to the ranks and

they demanded that the ringleaders of the mutiny should be punished (Tac. Hist.

1.82.3). Otho then addressed the assembled Praetorians (Tac. Hist. 1.82.3; Plut. Otho

3.8).

The speech, created by Tacitus, is one in which Otho can be seen trying to reach

a balance between praising the soldiers for their loyal actions and pointing out that such

disobedience was dangerous, particularly as they were heading for war, when the need

to obey superior officers without question becomes paramount (Tac. Hist. 1.83.2 –

84.4). Tacitus uses the speech to recapture his picture of the mutual dependence of

Otho and his Praetorian troops, which was illustrated at Hist. 1.37 – 8,534 and to return

to his theme of the danger of ill discipline within the army. Plutarch’s synopsis of the

speech has quite a different emphasis, especially as there is no talk of indiscipline.

Plutarch (Otho 3.8) has Otho praising the soldiers, but notes that some were intriguing

for no good purpose and these must be punished because they were bringing themselves

and Otho into disrepute. Plutarch’s synopsis is probably much closer to the actual

address Otho gave. Tacitus, it would seem, has simply used this opportunity of Otho’s

speech as part of his “sermon on discipline.”535

In both Tacitus and Plutarch, Otho singles out just two soldiers for punishment.

However, in Tacitus’ account (Hist. 1.82.3) the soldiers are seen to demand of their own

accord that the ringleaders be punished. In Plutarch (Otho 3.8) it is left to Otho to

request that his soldiers “share his resentment …and assist him in punishing them.”

Unfortunately, the names of these soldiers have not been preserved, nor do we know

what punishment they received. Tacitus and Plutarch are probably correct when they

533 Ash (2002, 31) believes that the collective identity of the Othonians, to this point, is typified by “their deep suspicion of their commanders, particular enthusiasm towards Otho, and a tendency to crave financial rewards in return for loyalty.” The first two statements would seem to be correct but the last one can be disputed. Firstly, we have no evidence to suggest that the Praetorians demanded a donative on Otho’s elevation and secondly they did not demand a reward for their actions – it was given by Otho. 534 Keitel 1991, 2781. Of this speech, Mendell (1957, 169) writes, “The speech…is constructed by Tacitus to present the picture of a weak executive appealing for support by flattery and futile encouragement to the Senate and army.” 535 Murison 1992, 114.

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acknowledge that the mutiny was the result of the actions of a handful of soldiers.

Moreover, for Otho to punish all those involved may have been injudicious on his part

and may have alienated them from him at a time when he was in desperate need of their

loyalty. Indeed, Tacitus (Hist. 2.29.3) himself claims that Valens showed “wise

moderation,” when he was forced to discipline his troops following their mutinous

behaviour. “He (Valens) was well aware that in civil wars the soldiers have more

liberty than the leaders.”

While both Tacitus (Hist. 1.80.2) and Plutarch (Otho 3.2, 8) offer their audience

an array of disreputable motives for the actions of the Praetorians, it would seem that

the Praetorian mutiny was the result of a combination of the Praetorians’ loyalty for

their emperor and the fact that the soldiers did genuinely suspect their officers and the

senatorial class of treachery (Tac. Hist. 1.80.2; Plut. Otho 3.2, 4). This image is not

new. The idea of the Praetorian soldiers distrusting their officers is one that Tacitus

(Hist. 1.36.1) introduced in the Praetorian camp after Otho’s coup and will continue

during Otho’s campaign against the Vitellian forces. Regarding the loyalty of the

senators, the sources do indicate that as a group they were not particularly enamoured

with Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.50; Dio 64.8.2 – 9.2; Plut. Otho 4.1; cf Tac. Hist. 2.52) and the

Praetorians’ fear of the senators is also well documented (Tac. Hist. 1.80.2; Plut. Otho

3.3). However, the behaviour of the Praetorians can only be excused if a genuine threat

to Otho’s life existed at this time. From our extant sources, only one potential candidate

seems to exist – Cornelius Dolabella – and even then the evidence for him being

involved in any treacherous activity is purely circumstantial, although examining what

we know of this man may be instructive.

Dolabella is not one of the leading characters in our extant sources for this

tumultuous year, yet his name comes up in the accounts of Tacitus (Hist. 1.88.1; 2.63),

Plutarch (Otho 5.1) and Suetonius (Galba 12.2). This is a rare occurrence for man who

was prevented from playing a significant role in the events of the year. Dolabella makes

his earliest appearance in Suetonius (Galba 12.2), where we are told that Galba

dismissed the Germani corporis custodes, alleging that they were more favourably

inclined toward Dolabella, near whose gardens they had their camp.

Dolabella’s name is put forward as a potential successor to Galba (Plut. Galba

23). As Dolabella was related to the emperor (Tac. Hist. 1. 88.1), it is quite feasible that

he considered himself a candidate as Galba’s heir. However, like Otho, Dolabella was

overlooked in favour of Piso. Unfortunately, our sources do not tell us how Dolabella

reacted to this news, but bearing in mind how Otho reacted, it is quite possible that

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Dolabella was also disappointed and angered. Moreover, if Piso was not to succeed

Galba, perhaps Dolabella saw himself as Galba’s legitimate heir. Possibly the dismissal

of the Germani was related to the adoption of Piso, because they were more favourably

inclined to Dolabella, than they were to the new Caesar.

Interestingly, Dolabella reappears in Tacitus’ narrative very shortly after

Tacitus’ discussion of the ‘Praetorian mutiny’ and Otho’s final plans for the war against

Vitellius. Tacitus (Hist. 1.88.1) introduces the section with the phrase per eos dies and

goes on to relate that Otho banished Dolabella to the colony of Aquinum (Aquino). The

conditions under which he was kept were lenient and no charges were brought against

him, “but he had been made prominent by his ancient name and his close relationship

with Galba” (Tac. Hist. 1.88.1). Perhaps Otho was concerned that Dolabella saw

himself as Galba’s heir and wanted him out of Rome.

Plutarch (Otho 5.1) also documents the banishment of Dolabella by Otho, but

the reason he gives for Dolabella’s exile is somewhat different from what we find in

Tacitus. Plutarch (Otho 5.1) notes that Dolabella was from a noble family, but also

claims that he “made the Praetorians suspect that he had revolutionary designs,”536

It seems rather strange that Tacitus has chosen to ignore these accusations,

against a senator, made by the Praetorians. After all, if Dolabella was innocent, Tacitus

would have an excellent example of how the Praetorian Guard were capable of

manipulating Otho to bring about the banishment of a respectable senator. However,

the Praetorians did not necessarily have to denounce Dolabella, as Plutarch suggests. It

only needed some malicious senator or tribune to allege that he had been intriguing with

the rank and file, for Otho to be concerned.

and

although Plutarch (Otho 5.1) writes that Otho sent Dolabella away “with words of

encouragement,” he also points out that Otho banished Dolabella “through fear of him

or of someone else.” Unfortunately, the identity of the “someone else” cannot even

been speculated upon. Again, was Otho simply concerned about Dolabella and his

relationship to Galba or was there something else that concerned the emperor?

After Otho’s death, Vitellius ordered the execution of Dolabella (Tac. Hist.

2.63.1). Apparently Dolabella, after hearing about Otho’s death, had returned to Rome

and because of this, he was accused by M. Plancius Varus,537

536 My thanks to Professor Bosworth for his help in translating this particular passage.

one of his most intimate

friends, of escaping from custody and “offering himself as leader to the defeated

party….” Whether Dolabella offered himself to the defeated Othonians as a leader is

537 For a discussion of Plancius Varus and the events of AD 69, see Houston 1972, 167 – 80.

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not known, but he was clearly guilty of leaving his place of banishment without

permission from Vitellius. To these charges, Tacitus (Hist. 2.63.1) tells us that Varus

added, “that Dolabella had tampered with the cohort stationed at Ostia.” The

accusations, of course, may be false, but the question that remains unanswered is

whether his interactions with the cohort at Ostia were also a recent crime or one that

went back to Otho’s reign. Considering that Tacitus (Hist. 2.63.1) tells us that

Dolabella returned to Rome, and given the fact that his death came relatively early in

Vitellius’ reign, it seems possible that this allegation could go back to Otho’s Principate

and perhaps the real reason behind Otho’s fear of Dolabella (Plut. Otho 5.1) and

Dolabella’s subsequent exile (Tac. Hist. 1.88.1; Plut. Otho 5.1). In addition, it seems

unbelievably coincidental that the cohort in Ostia is mentioned in relation to the

Praetorian mutiny as well as to a charge made against Dolabella.

Considering that the cohort at Ostia was probably in direct contact with the corn

supply, any person tampering with their loyalty was a serious threat. Did Dolabella

make treasonable contact with this cohort? It would certainly explain his exile under

Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.88.1; Plut. Otho 5.1). Even if the accusations were not proven, Otho

could not afford to take the risk of leaving Rome while Dolabella was still in the capital.

Vitellius, on becoming emperor, may have been concerned about Dolabella and his

concern was intensified when Dolabella returned to Rome without permission. Due to

Vitellius’ distance from the capital, he was uncomfortable with just sending him into

exile again, therefore he ordered his death (Tac. Hist. 2.63.1). The attempt of Tacitus,

to make Dolabella’s murder a personal matter because Dolabella had married Vitellius’

former wife Petronia, does not stand up. In his own narrative, Tacitus (Hist. 2.64.1)

claimed that Triaria, the wife of the emperor’ brother, “frightened Sabinus from any

attempt to secure a reputation of clemency at the expense of the emperor.” This implies

that Vitellius had reason to be concerned about Dolabella’s actions. Tacitus (Hist.

2.64.1) also claims that Vitellius feared as well as hated Dolabella. Tacitus has told us

why he hated him, but not why he feared him.

Otho’s decision to move the seventeenth cohort from Ostia to Rome may also

have been tied up in the allegations made against Dolabella. While perhaps not overly

concerned about the cohort’s loyalty, Otho thought it wise to move them to Rome for

the time being, arm them and then include them on his naval expedition to Gallia

Narbonensis. Members of the Praetorian Guard, aware of the allegations against

Dolabella and the cohort at Ostia, were suspicious about the sudden loading of their

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wagons with arms (Tac. Hist. 1.80.2). Consequently they believed, incorrectly, that

Otho’s life was in danger and set the ‘Praetorian mutiny’ in motion.

Whether this hypothesis is correct or not the whole event illustrates the loyalty

the Praetorians felt towards Otho. However, it would seem that Tacitus, who devotes

six chapters to the riot, was more interested in the mutiny than any of our other extant

sources and probably “worked up the story to a pitch much higher than that attained by

the common source.”538

Tacitus’ aim is abundantly clear. He uses the mutiny to

develop his theme of a Guard overwhelmingly devoted to its leader and capable of

mutinous behaviour with little provocation.

The Praetorian Guard fights for Otho

The Praetorian Guard played a crucial role in Otho’s military campaign against

Vitellius, forming the core of his forces. Consequently, they figure prominently in

Tacitus’ narrative of the various military engagements, although Tacitus rarely

concentrates on their military contribution. Rather, and quite predictably, he focuses

primarily on their alleged indiscipline, excessive loyalty to Otho and their accusations

of treachery made against their commanding officers. This focus then continues the

themes which Tacitus has been developing from the beginning of Otho’s reign.

Obviously, it is important to assess how accurately Tacitus has portrayed the Guard but

a number of other important questions are also worth considering. Did the behaviour of

the Praetorian Guard have any effect on the outcome of the various engagements or on

the overall outcome of the campaign? Is the success or failure of the Praetorian Guard,

as a military force, due to factors beyond their control, such as poor leadership or

having to face vastly superior troop numbers? In addition, the Praetorians are

frequently referred to as second-rate soldiers because of their urban lifestyle (Tac. Ann.

1.17, Hist. 2.19.1, 21.4; Plut Otho 5.5, 6.1, 9.1; Joseph. BJ 4.592) and as such, it will be

interesting to examine how well they perform as soldiers on the battlefield. For ease of

analysis, the various conflicts will be examined independently.

The Maritime Expedition

The Praetorian Guard’s first exposure to the Vitellian forces took place along the coast

of Liguria. Members of the Guard were dispatched by Otho as part of a naval

expedition, which he launched to attack Narbonese Gaul (Tac. Hist. 1.87.1, 2.12.1).

538 Chilver 1979, 148. Syme (1958, 154 n. 1) also believes that Tacitus clearly built up this incident.

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Unfortunately, besides Tacitus’ narrative, there are no other extant accounts of this

naval expedition and Tacitus’ account is vague about many of the important issues.

The exact day the fleet sailed is not known, although it can safely be assumed

that it left before Otho departed from Rome.539 An understanding of the strategy and

what it was that the expedition hoped to achieve is unclear and has been the subject of

much speculation.540 Chilver suggests that the objectives of the expedition were the

maintenance of naval supremacy, the possible capture of the naval base at Forum Iulii

(Fréjus) and control of the Riviera road from Italy to Gaul,541 while Wellesley reduces

the aim of the naval force to simply baring the coast road in Liguria.542 Morgan

dismisses the idea that the expedition was aiming to maintain naval supremacy because

Vitellius had no ships and needed none. Moreover, he also disregards the idea that the

naval force was intended to control the coastal road running down western Italy because

Valens had no need to follow this course.543 One of the more convincing explanations

put forward to explain this expedition seems to be that the small force was sent to create

a disturbance, which would draw some of Vitellius’ forces away from the main body.544

The naval expedition was made up of Praetorian Guardsmen, the Urban cohorts

and as one would expect, the fleet with its sailors and marines (Tac. Hist. 1.87.1).

Regrettably, Tacitus (Hist. 1.87.1) is not specific about the number of Praetorian cohorts

dispatched on this mission, noting only plerosque e praetorianis. We know that five

Praetorian cohorts went north with App. Annius Gallus

Alternatively, the expedition could have been a money raising exercise to fund the

campaign elsewhere (Tac. Hist. 2.13.1). Unfortunately, with no clear understanding of

what the mission hoped to achieve, it is difficult to assess how successful the

expedition, in the end, actually was.

545 and T. Vestricius Spurinna546

539 Wellesley (1971, 47; 1989, 60) and Chilver (1979, 265 – 7) date the departure of the fleet sometime from mid to late February. Murison (1993, 102 – 3) prefers a departure date in early March.

(Tac. Hist. 2.11.2) and that Otho was accompanied on his march northwards by

ceteris…praetoriis cohortibus (Tac. Hist. 2.11.3). This would seem to imply that the

540 One of the difficulty in understanding the aims of this naval expedition lies in the interpretation given to Tacitus’ clause (Hist. 1.87.1): quando Poeninae Cottiaeque Alpes et ceteri Galliarum aditus Vitellianis exercitibus claudebantur, in particular the phrase, Vitellianis exercitibus, which has been interpreted with claudebantur, as either an instrumental ablative (Chilver 1979, 155 – 6) or a dative of disadvantage (Wellesley 1971, 47. n. 56). For a discussion of this clause see, Heubner 1963, 188 – 9; Wellesley 1971, 47 n. 56; Chilver 1979, 155 – 6; Damon 2003, 281. 541 Chilver 1979, 155 – 6, 267. 542 Wellesley 1975, 60. 543 Morgan 2006, 103. 544 Henderson 1908, 77; cf. Syme 1958, 159; Murison 1992, 119; 1993, 100; Morgan 2006, 103; Ash 2007, 109. 545 See PIR2 A 653. 546 See PIR2 V 308.

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majority of the Praetorian cohorts were still available to take part in the northern

campaign and hence the number of Praetorian cohorts dispatched on this naval

expedition cannot have been significant. Tacitus’ statement (Hist. 1.87.1), that the

Praetorians were supposedly the viris et robur exercitus, does not necessarily imply that

they were the largest contingent on the expedition, but may be referring to the quality of

the soldiers.547 Morgan suggests that the Praetorians could have totalled as few as one

thousand men and might have been recruited from each cohort, rather than two or three

entire cohorts,548 or a vexillation. This number may be a conservative estimate,

especially considering their success against the Vitellian forces, but when we also

consider the success of the Praetorians in the northern campaigns, it seems unlikely that

this naval expedition could have accounted for more than fifteen hundred of the total

number of available Praetorian soldiers. Besides functioning as the expedition’s main

strength, the Praetorians were apparently also present “to advise and control the leaders

themselves” (Tac. Hist. 1.87.1). This statement is surely an example of Tacitus’

irony.549

Otho placed the expedition under the leadership of three men, while Otho’s

freedman Moschus retained overall command of the fleet (Tac. Hist. 1.87.2). Although

there is nothing to indicate he had superiority over the other appointed leaders, the most

senior officer was the tribune Aemilius Pacensis (Tac. Hist. 1.87.2). Pacensis is known

from Galba’s reign, where he was removed from his tribunate in the Urban cohorts by

the emperor (Tac. Hist. 1.20.3),

The station of the average soldier, in Tacitus’ opinion, had now advanced so

far that they found themselves in a position to dictate to and advise their leaders.

550

547 Chilver 1979, 156.

but was clearly restored to his former position by

Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.87.2). Pacensis died honourably defending Rome with the urbiciani

on the Capitoline later that same year (Tac. Hist. 3.73.2). What role Pacensis actually

played in Otho’s naval expedition is unknown, because he was apparently thrown into

chains by the rebellious soldiers (Tac. Hist. 2.12.1). While not confirmed by Tacitus,

‘the rebellious soldiers’ is probably a reference to the Praetorians. Tacitus does not

record the reason why the soldiers thought it necessary to take such measures so it is

impossible to know if their actions can be justified in any way. It would be surprising

though, if the Praetorians had reason to accuse Pacensis of disloyalty to Otho. If anyone

had reason to be loyal to the emperor, it was this man because, as noted above, it was

548 Morgan 2006, 102. Wellesley (1975, 61) also suggests that two Praetorian cohorts were part of the naval expedition. Murison (1993, 104), however, proposes that the number was more like five Praetorian cohorts. 549 See Damon 2003, 282. 550 For a discussion of Pacensis and his dismissal by Galba see pp 88 – 90.

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Otho, who had restored him to his previous rank. When Pacensis was released, or

whether his release came in time for him to take an active role in the fighting, against

the Vitellian forces, is not stated. In fact, Pacensis and our other two named leaders are

not mentioned again in the context of this expedition.

The other two commanders of the naval expedition, Antonius Novellus and T.

Suedius Clemens,551

Not only is Tacitus scornful of the abilities of the expedition leaders, but he is

exceedingly critical of the behaviour of the soldiery in the lead up to their engagement

with the Vitellian forces. Firstly, there are accusations that any settlements that they

encountered on their journey north along the west coast of Italy were subjected to

burning, looting and devastation, the type of behaviour more fitting enemy territory

(Tac. Hist. 2.12.2). Naturally, if Tacitus reports the facts accurately, he is completely

justified in his indignation. Certainly, Tacitus may have had a good source of

information for the behaviour of the Othonian troops his father-in-law – Gn. Julius

Agricola. However, because the Othonian troops were responsible for the death of

Agricola’s mother (Tac. Ag. 7.1), it makes the events surrounding her death very

personal to both Agricola and Tacitus and this personal involvement may have coloured

were both primipilares. Nothing else is known about Antonius

Novellus outside this episode. However, it would seem that his leadership skills were

somewhat inadequate. Tacitus (Hist. 2.12.1) tells us that he was unable to command

any authority over the soldiers – a strange accusation about a man who had risen to the

rank of primus pilus. Suedius Clemens, however, survived this year of upheaval and his

career flourished under Vespasian and Titus. He served as a Praetorian tribune (ILS

5942 = CIL X 1018), then as an imperial administrator in Pompeii (ILS 6438b – d = CIL

IV 791, 1059, 768) and finally, as praefectus castrorum in Egypt in AD 79/80 (CIL III

33). Clearly his association with Otho’s military campaign did not hinder his future

career. This distinguished career though, is rather at odds with his supposed

contribution to this naval expedition. Clemens apparently used his position to secure

popularity and was as “reckless towards maintaining discipline as he was eager to fight”

(Tac. Hist. 2.12.1). This portrayal of Clemens by Tacitus may of course be completely

accurate, but it does seem somewhat unusual that a man who held the post of primus

pilus and as such was an experienced soldier could have such a poor reputation.

Moreover, that he would go on to have such a successful career as an equestrian officer

under the first two Flavian emperors is difficult to reconcile with Tacitus’ opinion of

him.

551 See PIR2 687. On his career see Dobson 1978, 207 – 8.

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their objectivity when reporting and writing about the deeds and behaviour of the

Othonian troops. Undoubtedly, the Othonian troops were responsible for her death and

there is little which can be said to justify the murder of a female civilian. However, we

do not know the actual circumstances surrounding her death, or how widespread was

this type of behaviour. Agricola or Tacitus may well, and understandably, have wanted

to depict the Othonian troops in the worst possible light by exaggerating any improper

conduct. Tacitus’ desire to highlight only the worst aspects of the Othonians may have

persisted in his narrative prior to and long after his description of the maritime

expedition.

The second example of the undisciplined and murderous behaviour of Otho’s

urban troops, provided for us by Tacitus, occurs at the town of Albintimilium

(Ventimiglia). On their arrival the fleet had encountered some resistance from M.

Maturus Arrianus who was the procurator in charge of the Maritime Alps at this time

and who was determined to keep Otho’s troops out of his province. Maturus organised

some defence, but his mountaineers were unaccustomed to military life and were easily

defeated by Otho’s forces.552

However, what Tacitus (Hist. 3.42.2) fails to mention is that Maturus was a

committed Vitellian supporter and therefore an enemy of Otho. After the battle, in

which Maturus and his mountaineers were defeated, he may have initially retreated to

Albintimilium. The town had to be close enough to the scene of the battle for the

Othonian troops to head there. With Maturus still at large and Albintimilium not under

their control, the Othonian troops may have realised that they would not be able to

move safely around the region. Strategically then, Albintimilium may have been seen

as important. Moreover, Maturus’ support for Vitellius may have been what signalled

this area out for attack in the first place. If correct, it would make the actions of the city

troops seem a little less callous and a little more pragmatic. Maturus, however,

managed to survive and remained faithful to Vitellius until the last moment, when he

switched his allegiance to Vespasian (Tac. Hist. 3.42.2 – 43.2).

Although they had defeated Maturus’ forces, the

Othonian soldiers were apparently frustrated by the lack of booty obtained and their

inability to inflict severe casualties on the opposition, so that they turned their rage on

the town of Albintimilium, where they “satisfied their greed with the misfortunes of the

innocent” (Tac. Hist. 2.12.3 – 13.1). Again, if Tacitus reports these events accurately, it

is certainly difficult to condone this type of behaviour or find some way to justify it.

552 A similar picture is painted by Tacitus (Hist. 1.68.1 – 2) when the Helvetians are confronted by the forces of Caecina.

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How soon it was after Maturus’ defeat that the Vitellian forces arrived in the

area is not clear. Nor do we have any knowledge of what the Praetorians and the other

members of the expedition were doing during this time. Unfortunately, the details of

the battle between the Othonians and Vitellians are somewhat obscure; even the

Othonian battle order has been disputed.553 According to Tacitus (Hist. 2.14.2), part of

the marines occupied the high ground between the hills and the sea. Among the ranks

of the marines were intermingled peasants. Where these peasants came from is not

explained, but they were possibly recruited from the surrounding area. The Praetorian

contingent occupied the level ground between the hills and the sea (Tac. Hist. 2.14.2)

and were, therefore, at the forefront of the action. The fleet moved threateningly along

the shoreline (Tac. Hist. 2.14.2). What is interesting is the failure of Tacitus to mention

what, if any, role the Urban cohorts played in this battle. He is clear about their

involvement in the expedition at its outset (Tac. Hist. 1.87.1), yet they suddenly seem to

be absent. Possibly, they were being held in reserve on the ships, ready to join the

battle if they were needed.554 Alternatively, Tacitus may have simply been careless

with his recording of the actual battle.555

On the opposing side, were the forces that Fabius Valens dispatched when he

received news that Otho’s fleet was threatening Gallia Narbonensis (Tac. Hist. 2.14.1 –

2). This force was made up of two cohorts of Tungrian infantry, four squadrons of

cavalry and the entire ala Treverorum, the equivalent of sixteen more squadrons of

cavalry (Tac. Hist. 2.14.1). This column may have numbered around 2600

auxiliaries,

556 but a section was sent to Forum Iulii to prevent an attack on that city. As

a result, Otho’s forces ended up facing twelve squadrons of cavalry, picked infantry, a

cohort of Ligurian cavalry, a local auxiliary force and five hundred Pannonians557 (Tac.

Hist. 1.14.1), making approximately 1400 troops,558

The two sides met in battle on a small coastal plain. Tacitus’ account (Hist.

2.14.2 – 3) indicates that the Othonian forces had a convincing victory. While it is

difficult to tell exactly what occurred, it would seem that the Praetorian soldiers faced

the brunt of the fighting and there is nothing to indicate that they did not acquit

if all units were at full strength.

553 See Heubner 1963, 66 – 8; Chilver 1979, 180. 554 Morgan 2006, 105. 555 Chilver 1979, 180. 556 Wellesley 1989, 51; Morgan 2006, 105. 557 Chilver (1979, 180) raises the possibility that Tacitus has wrongly assigned these troops to the Vitellians, suggesting that they were actually destined for Otho’s Pannonian cohort in northern Italy. Cf. Ash 2007, 116. If Chilver is correct, these may be the same company of Pannonian infantry that was captured at Cremona by the auxiliary infantry that Caecina had sent on in advance (Tac. Hist. 2.17.2). 558 Twelve squadrons of cavalry (12 x c. 30 = 360) + cohort of Ligurians (c. 500) + Pannonian recruits (500) = 1360, in addition, an unspecified number of “picked infantry.”

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themselves well on the battlefield. In fact, the Praetorian infantry would have to have

faced a cavalry charge from the squadrons of the Treveri. The aim of a cavalry charge

was to persuade the infantry to retreat or break before they reached them, frightened by

their appearance and noise.559

After this defeat, the Vitellians were forced to bring up some auxiliary forces,

which may well have been stationed in Forum Iulii by this time (Tac. Hist. 2.14.1). If

the Vitellian forces had to wait for these troops to arrive, then their second encounter

with the Othonians would have been at least three days later.

However, the veteran troops did not fall back and met

the full force of this charge (Tac. Hist. 2.14.2). From Tacitus’ description (Hist. 2.14.2

– 3), it would seem that Otho’s forces were well positioned and they managed to shut

the Vitellian forces in on all sides, with the Praetorian cohorts and the sailors on the

land combining effectively with the fleet at sea. There is no hint of any of the

indiscipline or mutinous behaviour referred to earlier and the troops seem to have been

well led. As there is no mention of any new commanders, it would seem most likely

that the three men originally appointed by Otho commanded the engagement.

According to Tacitus (Hist. 2.14.4), only the advent of night ensured that the Vitellians

were not completely destroyed. If, as Tacitus reports, the Urban cohorts played no role

in the battle, the Praetorians and the marines must have fought with great determination.

560

What happened to these Praetorians after this encounter is not reported. Some

of the soldiers, as Murison suggests, may well have gone on to join Otho’s forces in

northern Italy.

At this second battle,

the Vitellians attacked the Othonian forces, which were not as vigilant as they should

have been and the Vitellians were able to break into their camp. This caused the

Othonians great distress, but eventually they managed to seize a nearby hill, from which

they counter-attacked the Vitellians. “Then there was terrible slaughter” (Tac. Hist.

2.15.1 – 2). It would seem that the fighting was much more even on the second day and

both sides suffered significant losses. However, the victory went to the Othonians (Tac.

Hist. 2.15.2, 28.1; Suet. Otho 9.2) and both side retreated, the Othonians to

Albingaunum (Albenga) and the Vitellians to Antipolis (Antibes) (Tac. Hist. 2.15.2).

The victory meant little for the overall outcome of the war, but the city troops had

acquitted themselves well against the troops stationed on the frontier.

561

559 Goldsworthy 1996, 230 – 1.

However, it would seem that at least some of the Praetorian soldiers,

perhaps the ones wounded in battle and unable to travel, remained in the area. Later in

the year, Fabius Valens fled from the port of Pisa to the coast of the Maritime Alps,

560 Murison 1993, 103; Morgan 2006, 105. 561 Murison 1993, 104.

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where Marius Maturus received him kindly. Valens intended to enter Narbonese Gaul,

but Maturus persuaded him against such action because Valerius Paulinus, the imperial

agent, was an ardent supporter of Vespasian and had bound the neighbouring

communities to him. Valerius Paulinus had also called on the veterans who had been

discharged by Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 3.42.2 – 43.1) – clearly a reference to the Praetorian

Guard. Indeed, Paulinus was himself a former Praetorian tribune, was held in high

esteem by the Praetorian soldiers (Tac. Hist. 3.43.1) and might have been personally

known to some of them from his service in Rome. He kept a garrison in Forum Iulii,

(Tac. Hist. 3.43.1), manned one would expect, at least in part, by Otho’s Praetorians.

Whether it was Otho’s intention to have some Praetorians remain in the area, is not

known. The Urban cohorts may have returned by ship to Rome, while the marines, who

had accompanied this expedition, may be the same marines that Tacitus (Hist. 2.17.2)

claims were intercepted by an advance Vitellian force between Ticinum (Pavia) and

Placentia. Tacitus’ claim (Hist. 3.43.1) that Valerius Paulinus was held in high esteem

by the Praetorian soldiers is quite at odds with the soldiers’ normal attitude to their

commanding officers, and one suspects that Valerius had committed himself to the

Flavian cause and hence to the cause of the Praetorians early on. His open commitment

to the Praetorians ensured that he received their support.

The attempted storming of Placentia

According to Tacitus’ (Hist. 2.11.2), five Praetorian cohorts marched north from Rome

with a detachment of cavalry, the legio I and two thousand gladiators. This force was

jointly commanded by Ap. Annius Gallus and T. Vestricius Spurinna and their mission

was to seize the banks of the Po (Tac. Hist. 2.11.2). At some point, these forces must

have split up, as we find Spurinna, three cohorts of Praetorians, 1000 vexillarii and a

few cavalry in the town of Placentia (Piacenza) (Tac. Hist. 2.18.1). As with the

maritime expedition, it is not long before Tacitus’ themes of mutiny and treachery

appear and the Praetorians are found making accusations against their officers and

commander. In a more general sense, Plutarch (Otho 5.3), also notes that the

commanders of Otho’s forces, including Spurinna, were unable to conduct the

campaigns as they had wanted, because the soldiers’ spirit was disorderly and arrogant

and they refused to obey their officers.

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For this particular event, Tacitus might have had access to the testimony of an

eyewitness, Spurinna himself.562 In one respect, if Tacitus received his information

about this event directly from Spurinna, we may have an accurate rendering of these

events. On the contrary, Spurinna, with or without the collaboration of Tacitus, may

have chosen to place a different emphasis on the events in an attempt to protect or

enhance his reputation.563 However, Spurinna’s testimony cannot be ascertained.

Certainly, Spurinna was on friendly terms with Pliny the Younger (Ep. 2.7.1 – 3; cf.

2.7.1 – 3, 3.1, 4.27.5) and Pliny and Tacitus were clearly known to each other (e.g.

Pliny Ep. 1.20, 2.11, 4.13, 6.9, 7.20, 8.7, 9.10), but the fact that Pliny and Spurinna were

friends, does not make Tacitus an associate of Spurinna.564

However, before analysing the events at Placentia, it would be worthwhile

briefly establishing the situation around the town, as this may help to explain the

behaviour of the Praetorian soldiers. Tacitus (Hist. 2.17.2) informs us that the entire

region between the Po and Alps was in possession of the Vitellian forces. The auxiliary

infantry, which Caecina had sent on in advance, had already arrived in the area (Tac.

Hist. 2.17.2) and had clearly been active. They had captured a company of Pannonian

infantry at Cremona and a 100 horsemen and a 1000 classici had been intercepted

somewhere between Placentia and Ticinum (Tac. Hist. 2.17.2). Is it possible that these

troops had originally been part of the naval expedition?

565

562 For example see Syme 1958, 171, 178; Chilver 1979, 183. However, as Syme suggests (1958, 683) the common source, employed by Tacitus and Plutarch may have been the one who consulted Spurinna.

The number of marines

seems high, but some Praetorian and Urban soldiers may have accompanied the

marines. Otho enrolled, as a legion, the marines that had suffered at the hand of Galba

at the Mulvian Bridge, on his entry to Rome. By this action, other marines were given

hope that they too could be transferred to the legions (Tac. Hist. 1.87.1). Not

completely surprising then, to find sailors employed as soldiers. Moreover, the distance

from Albingaunum to Ticenum is not great, c. 160 kilometres, a distance they should

have been able to cover, even if the two events are close chronologically. After the

attempted storming of Placentia, when Caecina was leaving the area, Turullius Cerialis

with a large number of marines and Julius Briganticus with a few horsemen surrendered

to him. Cerialis was a primus pilus and friend of Caecina, having served with him

previously in Germany (Tac. Hist. 2.22.3). These are probably the same marines, to

563 Wellesley 1960, 274: “The intention of the historian is clear: to stress the indiscipline of the troops in a civil war, and to record an incident in the early career of a distinguished contemporary which would show his resourcefulness and success in a difficult situation.” 564 Morgan 1997, 356 – 7. 565 Chilver (1979, 182) believes these marines are from Ravenna.

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whom Tacitus (Hist. 2.17.2) had referred earlier. After their encounter with the

Vitellian auxiliary infantry, it would seem they were either forced to surrender or

perhaps persuaded to change their allegiance to Vitellius, by Cerialis.

The success enjoyed by Vitellius’ forces, in this region, encouraged the Vitellian

troops, particularly the Batavians, to cross the stream by Placentia and in so doing

capture some scouts. A false report was spread that Caecina’s whole army was close by

(Tac. Hist. 2.17.2). Spurinna and his forces already appear to have been established at

Placentia while all this was taking place, and although Spurinna was apparently

convinced that Caecina and his main army had not yet arrived on the scene (Tac. Hist.

2.18.1), he seems to have done nothing to prevent the north bank of the Po River falling

into Vitellius’ hands. Instead, he opted to remain within the city (Tac. Hist. 2.18.1).

Nor did he send forces to aid the marines. Possibly Spurinna was ordered to remain at

Placentia, although his mission, according to Tacitus (Hist. 2.11.2), was to seize both

banks of the Po. Was it his failure to attempt to check the advance of the Vitellian

forces that led the Praetorians to develop the idea that Spurinna was betraying Otho and

that he had sent for Caecina (Tac. Hist. 2.18.2; cf. Plut. Otho 5.6)?

Although Spurinna was reluctant to move from Placentia, the Praetorians felt

differently and “in their ignorance of war” seized their standards and colours and rushed

out. Spurinna tried to restrain them but he was threatened and the centurions and

tribunes were scorned (Tac. Hist. 2.18.2; cf. Plut. Otho 5.6). While Plutarch’s coverage

(Otho 5.6) of the events in Placentia is scant, he does add an interesting anecdote.

Apparently, some of the drunken mutineers accosted Spurinna during the night and

demanded money to fund their journey to Otho. The purpose of their trip was to

denounce Spurinna himself. This story is the type of material that Tacitus seems to like.

Previously, Tacitus (Hist. 1.80.2) had been quick to point out the drunkenness of the

Praetorian soldiers in his account of the Praetorian mutiny and as we have seen he

normally takes every opportunity to highlight the Praetorians’ ill-disciplined and

insolent manner. It is, therefore, strange that this story is absent from his account.566

Faced with these mutinous Praetorians: Fit temeritatis alienate comes Spurinna,

primo coactus, mox velle simulans, quo plus auctoritatis inesset consiliis si seditio

Perhaps even Tacitus found the notion of troops demanding money from the man they

intended to denounce a little too difficult to believe.

566 Ash (2002, 32) believes that this omission by Tacitus gives the Othonians more credibility because they are depicted as sober and much more rational.

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mitesceret (Tac. Hist. 2.18.2).567 However, by nightfall and within sight of the Po,568

the Praetorians and Tacitus (Hist. 2.19.1) is specific here that it was the urban troops,

had to face the disturbing realities of campaigning and the need to make a camp, work

which was unfamiliar to them. Had these troops had no practice at making camp on

their journey from Rome? Even if they had not erected any type of defences, they

surely pitched tents for protection against the weather. If we assume that Murison’s

calculations are generally accurate, these troops left Rome c. 4 March and would have

taken until c. 23/4 March to cover the distance between Rome and Placentia,569

Tacitus (Hist. 2.19.1) tells us that the Praetorians apparently began to realise the

wisdom of remaining in Placentia and with the encouragement of their officers, they

willingly returned to the town the following day (Tac. Hist. 1.19.1 – 2). Once back at

Placentia, the soldiers strengthened the walls, added battlements and increased the

height of the towers (Tac. Hist. 2.19.2). Measures were also taken to restore discipline

(Tac. Hist. 2.19.2), although what these measures involved is not specified. Tacitus

(Hist. 2.19.2) also adds a rare tribute to the Othonian soldiers, claiming that discipline

and obedience was all the side lacked, “for there was no reason to be dissatisfied with

the soldiers’ bravery”. Tacitus records no further problems of disobedience and from

his account, it would seem that this aborted march ended the Praetorians’ mutinous

behaviour at Placentia.

giving

them plenty of practice at making camp. Were they so naïve that they did not realise

they would have to do this sort of thing again, but this time with an enemy nearby?

Unfortunately, this route march outside the walls of Placentia is not clearly

recorded by any other extant source. Plutarch (Otho 5.5 – 6) tells us that the Praetorians

– and there can be no mistake that he refers to the city troops here – refused to perform

any hard labour, preferring to cover their weakness with insolence and arrogance. The

Praetorians, while they were quite capable of carrying out the work requested of them,

were disdainful of it. When Spurinna tried to instil some discipline into his troops, he

was nearly killed. The soldiers were abusive and accused him of betraying Otho (Plut.

Otho 5.5 – 6). As with Tacitus’ account, Plutarch does not tell us what it was that

Spurinna was doing or not doing that gave the soldiers grounds for concern. While the

567 “Spurinna joined the folly that others started, at first under compulsion, later pretending that it was his wish, for he desired to have his advice possess greater weight in case the mutiny subsided.” Wellesley (1960, 276) avoids a translation which would make Tacitus seem critical of Spurinna, a commander who is treated favourably in the rest of his narrative and suggests “…accompanied a march dictated by the rashness of others.” 568 The actual direction the troops marched has been the subject of speculation. For example see Wellesley 1960, 274 – 5; Chilver 1979, 184; Morgan 2006, 114. 569 Murison 1993, 105.

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refusal of the troops to carry out the required work may refer to the same events

described by Tacitus (Hist. 2.19.1), there can be no certainty, because Tacitus (Hist.

2.19.1) does not say the soldiers refused to carry out the necessary work, but rather that:

Is labor urbano militi insolitus contundit animos.570

In addition, while Tacitus (Hist. 2.19.2) tells us that discipline was restored after

the foray outside the walls, it would seem from Plutarch’s narrative that the indiscipline

of the Praetorians actually continued until the arrival of Caecina’s forces at the gates of

Placentia. Plutarch (Otho 6.2) tells us that it was insults from the Vitellian soldiers that

brought about a rapid restoration of discipline to the Praetorians. So dismayed by the

abuse hurled at them, the Praetorians apparently threw themselves down in front of

Spurinna and begged him to command them “pleading excuse from no danger or toil”

(Plut. Otho 6.2). This seems unlikely,

Plutarch, then, may be referring to

the work of building the battlements and increasing the height of the towers mentioned

in Tacitus’ account (Hist. 2.19.2), work which would also be unfamiliar to the Rome

based cohorts.

571

While Tacitus may be harsh in dealing with the ill-discipline in the ranks of the

Praetorians, his description of Spurinna’s handling of this outbreak of disobedience is

hardly favourable to the general. What we have is a man swept along by the soldiers he

is clearly unable to control. Tacitus’ generally poor opinion of Spurinna is further

emphasised by his claim that Spurinna at first joined the march because he had no

choice, then pretended that it was his wish to join the march, because if the mutiny

but if Plutarch is correct here and discipline

was not restored until Caecina actually arrived, perhaps it was the sight of Caecina’s

army on their doorstep that brought the Praetorians to their senses rather than some

verbal abuse, which cannot have come as any great surprise. However, if the

Praetorians remained ill-disciplined right up until the time of Caecina’s arrival, it is

difficult to imagine how the work on the town’s defences mentioned by Tacitus (Hist.

2.19.2) was ever carried out. Tacitus (Hist. 2.21.4) also mentions these insults hurled

by Caecina’s forces at the Praetorians, but he does not credit these insults with

improving discipline and unlike Plutarch, Tacitus (Hist. 2.21.4) also claims that the

Praetorians were quick to assail the Vitellian soldiers with claims that they were

barbarians and foreigners. The whole scene is reminiscent of the siege of Perusia

during the civil wars of the late first century BC.

570 “The work involved was strange to the town troops and broke their spirit.” 571 For discussion on this point see Morgan 1997, 358 – 9.

154

subsided, he hoped his advice would possess greater weight with the soldiers.572

When Caecina and his forces eventually crossed the Po, Caecina tried to break

down the loyalty of the Praetorians and the other troops at Placentia with promises (Tac.

Hist. 2.20.2). How these promises were delivered to the troops is not disclosed. The

Othonian troops, however, maintained their allegiance to Otho’s cause. Having failed

to make any headway through negotiation, Caecina then attempted to storm

Placentia.

Spurinna’s reasoning is simply not sound. Furthermore, Tacitus does not credit

Spurinna with actually ending the march outside Placentia; rather it is the older soldiers,

the tribunes and centurions, who are able to restore discipline and persuade the soldiers

to return to the town.

573 His forces, it would seem, received a more than adequate response from

the Praetorians and the other soldiers protecting the city (Tac. Hist. 2.21.1 – 22.2).

Indeed, Caecina’s forces are said to have suffered considerable losses (Plut. Otho 6.2)

and in the end Caecina was forced to withdraw (Tac. Hist. 2.22.3). Clearly, the

Praetorians and their fellow soldiers carried out a very successful defence of the town

and killed or wounded many Vitellian soldiers (Tac. Hist. 2.21.1 – 4; Plut. Otho 6.2; cf.

Suetonius Otho 9.2). Tacitus does not refer to the role played by Spurinna during the

assault, possibly because Spurinna’s leadership did not impress him.574

The success of the Othonians is even more remarkable when we consider the

possible numbers on both sides. Assuming Praetorian cohorts of 500 men, Spurinna

would have had at his disposal approximately 2400 – 2700 soldiers, while if the cohorts

were milliary then the Othonian forces would number approximately 4000 men.

If Tacitus was

not impressed by Spurinna, it should, perhaps, not come as a surprise that the soldiers

were unwilling to follow his orders.

575

Caecina set out from Germany with supposedly 30 000 men (Tac. Hist. 1.61.2) and

even if we bring this figure down to the 20 000 proposed by Chilver576 or the 15 – 16

000 suggested by Murison,577

572 Morgan 1997, 355.

the Vitellian forces still outnumbered the Othonian by

four to one. Considering these figures, it is difficult to imagine that the Praetorian

cohorts did not have a nominal strength of 1000 men at this time, because the idea of

2500 Othonians holding out against a force of, at the least, 15 000 men, seems a

phenomenal achievement, let alone if Caecina’s forces were even more numerous. The

573 See Morgan (1997, 340), who asserts that Caecina’s operation was a storm not a siege. 574 Morgan 1997, 356. 575 Morgan 1997, 339 and n. 3. See also Chilver 1970/1, 104. 576 Chilver 1970/1 106 n. 3. 577 Murison 1993, 85 – 6. Cf. Morgan 1997, 339 n. 5

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military indiscipline which both Tacitus and Plutarch indicate was present in the town is

not evident in Tacitus’ narrative of the storming and in no way seems to have hampered

the defence of Placentia. No further outburst of Praetorian disobedience is noted. For a

second time, the Praetorians had proved themselves at least the equal of the soldiers

serving on the frontiers.

The battle at the locus Castorum

The mutinous behaviour of the Praetorian soldiers was not, according to Tacitus (Hist.

2.23.1), restricted to those troops under Spurinna’s command. The Praetorians also

brought charges against their commanders, Annius Gallus, C. Suetonius Paulinus578

The most insubordinate behaviour towards the senatorial generals came from the

interfectores Galbae (Tac. Hist. 2.23.5), which if taken literally should mean a handful

of Praetorian speculatores.

and

Marius Celsus. The reason for the Praetorians’ distrust of their leaders, at this point,

would seem to be that Gallus had forced his troops to stop in Bedriacum, when they

wanted to continue to march after Caecina’s forces (Tac. Hist. 2.23.2), and that Martius

Macer, although he is apparently not singled out by troops, had checked the enthusiastic

advance of his troops in pursuing some Vitellian auxiliaries (Tac. Hist. 2.23.3 – 4). As

for Paulinus and Celsus, there would seem to be no clear reason, at this stage, for the

troops to be so vehemently opposed to them, as until the battle at the locus Castorum

they had not yet been involved in any military activity – or any that Tacitus has

reported.

579

578 PIR2 S 694.

These men were being driven mad by guilt and fear (Tac.

Hist. 2.23.5), presumably over the role they played in their previous emperor’s death.

Consequently, they sought to cause chaos, at times by behaving in an openly seditious

manner and at other times with clandestine letters sent to Otho (Tac. Hist. 2.23.5). It is

difficult to envisage how these men’s inner feelings about Galba’s death found their

way into the historical record in the first place and it is even more difficult to imagine

that they suffered such remorse. However, they may well have felt considerable fear.

Unlike the rest of Otho’s army, which would probably be forgiven if Vitellius were

victorious, they, like Otho would expect to forfeit their lives. Not surprisingly then,

they paid great attention to the activities of the men, the army commanders, who would

be so important in determining the outcome of the war.

579 For an interesting discussion of this passage see Morgan (1997, 350).

156

In addition, none of the Othonian generals seem to have committed himself

openly to his cause. Unlike the Flavian general, Antonius Primus, who was quick to tie

his fortunes to those of the soldiers and eoque gravior militibus erat culpae vel gloriae

socius (Tac. Hist. 3.3), the procrastination of the Othonian generals must have given the

soldiers cause for concern.580 Moreover, as Mucianus says to Vespasian, “At the same

time they must take into account the character of their adviser. Is he ready to share the

risks involved as well as to give advice?” (Tac. Hist. 2.76.1). By such a statement,

Mucianus is linking his fate with the fate of Vespasian.581

The continual unease within the ranks of his soldiers must have been a real

concern for Otho. Did Otho believe his soldiers’ accusations? Possibly Otho did,

although he did not attempt to remove any general from his post. However, in what was

probably an attempt to appease his Praetorians and also an attempt to place someone he

trusted over the senatorial generals, Otho sent for his brother, L. Salvius Otho Titianus,

and appointed him to overall command (Tac. Hist. 2.23.5). Interestingly, Plutarch

(Otho 7.4) places this particular outburst of mutinous behaviour by the Praetorians and

the subsequent appointment of Titianus to overall command, later in his narrative

making the decision to bring in Titianus, the result of the battle at locus Castorum.

However, it seems unlikely that Titianus could have travelled from Rome (Tac. Hist.

1.90.3) to Bedriacum in the time available between the battle at locus Castorum and the

encounter near Cremona (Tac. Hist. 2.33.1). Therefore, it would seem that Plutarch is

mistaken and that Otho made the decision to send for his brother before the engagement

at locus Castorum,

The Praetorians were putting

their lives at risk for Otho, but they clearly were not convinced that their generals were

doing the same.

582

As with the previous engagements, the battle at locus Castorum was another

victory for Otho’s Praetorians (Tac. Hist. 2.24.1 – 26.2; Plut. Otho 7.3; Suet. Otho 9.2).

The actual details of the battle are difficult to ascertain, especially as there are some

major discrepancies between the accounts of Tacitus (Hist. 2.24.1 – 26.2)

as indicated in Tacitus’ narrative.

583

580 See Morgan 1992, 126; Ash 2002, 147.

and

Plutarch (Otho 7.2 – 7). However, for the purposes of this study, it is probably enough

to simply note that Caecina had arranged an ambush for the Othonians which was

betrayed to Otho’s generals, Celsus and Paulinus, who set up their own counter-ambush

(Tac. Hist. 2.24.2 – 3; Plut. Otho 7.2). Three Praetorian cohorts took part in the

581 Damon 2006, 265. 582 Chilver 1979, 189; Martin 1981, 80, 191 – 2. 583 For a discussion of Tacitus’ account of this battle see Passerini 1940, 170 – 4; Murison 1993, 107 – 10; Morgan 2006, 118 – 22.

157

engagement, as well as a thousand Praetorian and auxiliary cavalry (Tac. Hist. 2.24.3).

The Praetorian cohorts occupied the centre of Otho’s battle order, being positioned on

the causeway and in deep formation (Tac. Hist. 2.24.3). Occupying the centre of the

battle line, it would be expected that the Praetorian cohorts would have had to endure

heavy fighting and as with the two previous battles, there is nothing in Tacitus’ account

to indicate that the Praetorians were mutinous on the battlefield and did not fight with

skill and courage.

The Praetorian and auxiliary cavalry were positioned to give the Othonian side

additional weight if they were victorious or act as a reserve if Otho’s forces found

themselves in difficulty (Tac. Hist. 2.24.3). Many of the boldest of the Praetorian horse

were, however, killed because Paulinus did not give his infantry the order to engage at

the most propitious time (Tac. Hist. 2.25.2). With the exception of this incident and the

role played by Paulinus, which will be discussed below, the plan of the Othonian

generals seems to have been well executed and the battle was a success for Otho’s

soldiers (Tac. Hist. 2.24.1; Plut. Otho 7.3; Suet. Otho 9.2).

Nevertheless, once the battle was completed, the Praetorians wasted no time in

levelling more criticism at the Othonian general, Paulinus (Tac. Hist. 2.26.2) and

accusing him of treachery towards Otho (Plut. Otho 7.4; cf. Tac. Hist. 2.23.5).584

Tacitus and Plutarch report the actual role Paulinus played in the battle somewhat

differently. In Plutarch’s account (Otho 7.3), when Celsus had managed to surround the

Vitellians with his cavalry, he summoned the infantry from the Othonian camp.

However, Paullinus came to their aid too slowly and too late. If the infantry had arrived

more quickly, Plutarch (Otho 7.3) is certain that Caecina’s entire army would have been

wiped out, but Paulinus “sullied his reputation as a commander through excessive

caution.” The soldiers viewed Paulinus’ tardiness as an act of treachery toward Otho

(Plut. Otho 7.4). In Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 2.25.2), Paulinus did indeed arrive with his

infantry troops and did engage the Vitellians, but he displayed excessive caution and did

not give his troops the signal to engage at the most propitious time, having them fill up

ditches, clear fields and make provisions for defeat (Tac. Hist. 2.25.2).585

584 There were also recriminations on the Vitellian side see Morgan 1996a, 359 – 64.

This resulted

in the Othonians not being as successful in their attack as they might have been. While

the accounts are different, the basic accusation is the same: Paulinus did not do all he

could to ensure an overwhelming Othonian victory.

585 As Murison (1993, 109) notes, Tacitus’ remark compleri fossas, aperiri campum, pandi aciem iubebat (“So he kept issuing orders to fill up ditches, clear the fields, and extend the line…”) makes no sense in this context.

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Unlike Tacitus’ account (Hist. 2.25.2), Plutarch does not try to defend the

actions of Paulinus against the accusations of the Praetorian soldiers by explaining the

reasoning behind Paulinus’ decisions. Tacitus’ (Ag. 14, 16) treatment of Paulinus here

is much the same as his treatment of his rashness in the Mona campaign and the disaster

that this brought to Roman prestige in Britain, and here Tacitus chooses only to stress

the grim recovery made by Paulinus. However, in this battle, Tacitus (Hist. 2.25.2)

deliberately or not, clearly hints that Paulinus’ delay during the battle did indeed help

the Vitellian cause. Nevertheless, Tacitus has chosen to try to absolve him of any blame

in the battle and to clear his name of the charges of treachery.

The reason for Tacitus’ generally kind treatment of Paulinus might lie in the fact

that Paulinus had given Agricola, Tacitus’ father-in-law, his first military training and

used him as his personal aide (Tac. Ag. 5). Consequently, Agricola may have had a

positive memory of Paulinus and this may have been transmitted to his son-in-law.

Moreover, because Tacitus (Hist. 2.24.3) has specific information on the Othonian

battle order and can quote Paulinus directly: Timuisse se Paulinus ferebat (Hist. 2.26.2),

it can probably be assumed that Tacitus used the memoirs of Paulinus, if indeed they

existed or had received the information from Agricola. Paulinus is likely to have

favourably coloured his version of the events.586 In addition, Morgan suggests that

Tacitus believed that Paulinus was loyal and although his leadership was questionable,

he had done what he considered was the best in the circumstances and therefore

deserved a defence. “As every Roman advocate knew, the best tactic was to sweep the

lesser charge under the rug, especially if it was unanswerable (as it was in this case) and

to substitute – or to follow Paulinus in substituting – a more serious charge against

which a plausible defense could be offered.”587

Were the Praetorians then correct in their belief that Paulinus had betrayed

Otho’s cause? It is unlikely that the Othonian troops could have totally annihilated

Caecina’s forces, regardless of Paulinus’ actions. Clearly, his actions at the battle do

not prove that he was disloyal to Otho, over cautious maybe, perhaps a result of his

failure at Mona (Tac. Ag. 14), and from our evidence, the accusations of the Praetorians

would have to be dismissed. However, if Paulinus did let slip such a clear opportunity

to turn a victory into a rout, it would probably have been enough for the Praetorians to

suspect treachery and hence denounce him to Otho. Once again, Otho may not

necessarily have believed his soldiers, especially as he did not discharge Paulinus from

586 Murison 1993, 110. Chilver (1979, 192) believes that it is most unlikely that Paulinus left written records about AD 69. 587 Morgan 2006, 122, 125.

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his post, but he may still have been disappointed with the chances his generals, Gallus,

Paulinus and Macer, seem to have let slip. Alternatively, Otho may have felt that his

Praetorian soldiers were right to voice their concerns about the behaviour of his leader,

but what was Otho supposed to do about it? It seems quite likely that the Praetorians

were unwilling to accept any leader other than Otho himself.

An interesting anecdote, found only in Tacitus (Hist. 2.26.1), concerns the fate

of two brothers, fighting on opposite sides at this battle. One of the brothers, Julius

Fronto, is known from Galba’s reign, when he was removed from his tribunate in the

Vigiles by the emperor (Tac. Hist. 1.20.3), to be reinstated by Otho (Tac. Hist. 2.26.1).

The other brother was Julius Gratus, the praefectus castrorum on the Vitellian side.

Both brothers were thrown into chains by the soldiers under their command on grounds

of treachery (Tac. Hist. 2.26.2). Certainly, someone seems to have betrayed the planned

Vitellian ambush to the Othonian generals (Tac. Hist. 2.24.3; Plut. Otho 7.2), but

whether Julius Gratus was the culprit is not known. The fate of the brothers has not

been recorded.

The First Battle of Bedriacum

It is at the council of war which Otho held prior to the first battle at Bedriacum (Tac.

Hist. 2.31.2; Plut. Otho 8.) that we finally have some information about the location of

the Praetorian Prefects. The absence of Licinius Proculus and Plotius Firmus from

Tacitus’ narrative up until this point is because they had remained behind until

accompanying Otho on his journey north. The purpose of the council was supposedly

for Otho to take advice on whether his forces should engage the forces of Valens and

Caecina immediately or if they should delay the battle (Tac. Hist. 2.31.2). The manner

in which Tacitus presents the details of this council, ensures that the Praetorian Prefect,

Licinius Proculus, is portrayed in a negative light.

The Othonian generals Paulinus, Celsus and Gallus all favoured delaying any

battle with the Vitellian troops. In his account, Tacitus (Hist. 2.32.1) lays out the

reasoning, through Paulinus, behind the generals’ arguments for delay, including that

the longer they waited the more favourable the conditions would be for the Othonian

forces and the more the Vitellians would struggle with the heat, the lack of reserves and

problems of supply.588

588 Wellesley (1971, 40, 48) believes that these arguments are sound. The structure of Paulinus’ speech is mirrored by that of Antonius Primus, see Tac. Hist. 3.2.1 – 2. Morgan (2006, 126) states that Tacitus gave Paulinus the best arguments he could make, “but they are not convincing.”

These arguments are repeated in Plutarch (Otho 8.1) and

Suetonius (Otho 9.1) writes that, “no one doubted that the proper course was to protract

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the war…” Yet none of our sources indicates with any certainty that a delay would

have assured victory for the Othonians. Otho, however, was inclined to fight

immediately (Tac. Hist. 2.33.1; Plut. Otho 8.3 – 4; cf. Suet. Otho 9.1). The Praetorian

Prefect, Proculus and Otho’s brother Titianus, who were both impatient through their

inexperience of war, supported Otho (Tac. Hist. 2.33.1; Plut. Otho 8.1).

While Tacitus presents the reasons for delaying the engagement he completely

fails to discuss what reasons Otho had for rushing to engage the Vitellian forces.589

Wellesley suggests that Tacitus’ silence on the reasons for Otho forcing the battle might

be at worst a “deliberate manipulation” of the story, but most probably a combination of

lack of evidence and lack of curiosity.590 After Otho’s defeat, his policies are no longer

going to be of any interest. In addition, Paulinus, whose memoirs Tacitus might have

used, is hardly going to go into detail about the strategy that he opposed. In order to

justify his own actions, Paulinus would have passed over the arguments in favour of

immediate action and been content, as Tacitus seems to be, with the idea that Otho was

behaving in an irresponsible manner.591 If, however, Tacitus was aware of the counter

arguments, his failure to disclose them at this point in his narrative ensures that Titianus

and the Praetorian Prefect, Proculus, are portrayed as blindly following Otho and

completely naïve concerning any type of military strategy. As Tacitus (Hist. 2.33.1)

writes: neu quis obviam ire sententiae auderet, in adulationem concesserant.592

It is left to Plutarch (Otho 8.1, cf. Suet. Otho 9.1) to provide us with the

argument, which the Prefect, Proculus, and Titianus advanced for entering a decisive

battle immediately. Proculus claimed that the morale in Otho’s army was high at

present and any delay might cost them their present momentum. Any delay might also

result in the arrival on the scene of Vitellius with a reinforcement of strength and

increase of morale to spur them on (Plut. Otho 8.1; cf. Suet. Otho 9.1). Certainly,

Otho’s forces had been successful and the confidence of the Praetorians was clearly

high, and Otho would have been foolish not to consider the feelings of his soldiers

589 Otho may have been trying to avoid the situation where he would be forced to fight in circumstances dictated by the enemy. Tacitus (Hist. 2.31.2) notes that once Caecina and Valens had joined forces, they no longer hesitated “to engage with all their forces.” If the Vitellians were actively seeking battle, it may not have been possible for Otho to delay engaging with them until the factors outlined by Paulinus had chance to take effect. Moreover, Otho may have felt that the real danger existed that the Vitellian forces might cross the Po and make a rapid dash for Rome, something Otho would most certainly have wanted to avoid. Consequently, Otho considered it paramount that he takes some sort of action to stop this happening (Wellesley 1971, 41, 48 – 9; 1975, 72 – 3; Murison 1999, 63 – 4.) 590 Wellesley 1971, 40. 591 Wellesley 1971, 40. 592 “…in fact they had taken refuge in flattery to prevent anyone from daring to oppose their views.”

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before a battle.593

Plutarch (Otho 9.1 – 4) also adds that various writers had given a host of other

reasons for Otho’s haste. Of particular interest is the claim that the Praetorian soldiers

were tired of ‘real’ military service and wanted to get back to Rome as quickly as

possible. Suetonius (Otho 9.1) also indicates that the soldiers were impetuous, but he

does not distinguish between the Praetorians and the other soldiers. Considering that

Tacitus is always quick to take any opportunity to demonstrate the power that the

Praetorians had over Otho, it is rather surprising that he chose to ignore this argument.

Undoubtedly, the Praetorians were probably eager to return to Rome, but as Morgan

notes, it is not why the Praetorians wanted to fight but rather that they were eager to

engage the Vitellians, which is important.

Moreover, their enthusiasm for battle and their loyalty to Otho’s

cause is a credit to the Praetorians.

594

The other significant reason, given by Plutarch (Otho 9.3), for Otho wanting to

get the battle over quickly, is that he suspected that his generals, especially Celsus, were

trying to delay the engagement in the hope that the two armies might confer and agree

to elect a new emperor or at least leave the decision to the Senate. Plutarch seems to

think that this story is quite probable, while Tacitus (Hist. 2.37.1 – 38.2), who recounts

these rumours, probably from a common source, places them in his narrative after the

meeting and finds the whole idea manifestly impossible. However, the pairing of the

Praetorian Prefect, Proculus, with Paulinus (Tac. Hist. 2.44.1) and Titianus with Celsus

(Tac. Hist. 2.44.2) could imply that Otho had some doubts about the loyalty of his

generals by this time. Not only would Otho ensure that the inexperience of Titianus and

Proculus would be balanced with the experience of Paulinus and Celsus, but his brother

and his Praetorian Prefect would be able to keep a watchful eye on the two senators.

At the same meeting, Tacitus (Hist. 2.33.2) claims that Titianus and Proculus

also managed to persuade Otho to withdraw to Brixellum (Brescello). Plutarch (Otho

10.1), Suetonius (Otho 9.1) and Dio (64.10.2) also note that Otho retired to Brixellum,

but there is no indication in any of these parallel accounts that Otho was influenced in

his decision by any other person. However, Tacitus (Hist. 2.33.3) and Plutarch (Otho

10.1) are surely correct in noting the unsettling effect that Otho’s withdrawal had on the

remaining forces and it was a decision that was undoubtedly bad for morale.595

593 Morgan 2006, 129.

Not

only did Otho take with him a strong force of Praetorians, who might well have been

able to influence the outcome of the battle, but also more significantly, Otho’s absence

594 Morgan 2006, 129. 595 See also Zonaras 64.10.2a.

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would have adversely affected the morale of the remaining troops, particularly the

Praetorians. The Praetorians who, rightly or wrongly, distrusted their officers, were

loyal to Otho and no doubt wanted and expected Otho to fight with them. Plotius

Firmus, Otho’s other Praetorian Prefect, does not seem to have taken part in Otho’s

council of war, but he is recorded as being with Otho at Brixellum (Tac. Hist. 2.46.2).

After the withdrawal of Otho from the front, the nominal command fell to his

brother Titianus, although the Praetorian Prefect, Proculus, apparently held the real

authority. The experienced generals Celsus and Paulinus were largely ignored (Tac.

Hist. 2.39.1). Again, Tacitus (Hist. 2.33.3) reminds his readers that the soldiers

“suspected their generals.” Interestingly though, Tacitus does not distinguish between

the generals Paulinus and Celsus, and Titianus and Proculus. Either this is by now just

a stock allegation made by Tacitus against the Praetorians or the soldiers felt that the

loyalty of Titianus and Proculus was also in doubt. If the soldiers did not trust what

should have been two of Otho’s loyalist supporters, Otho’s cause was almost certainly

lost. Still there is no evidence, at this stage, to indicate that his brother or his Prefect

was disloyal. Possibly, the feelings of the soldiers towards Titianus and Proculus may

have had something to do with their inexperience rather than any disloyalty, or perhaps

the soldiers were concerned over the influence that Celsus and Paulinus might have

been able to wield over the Praetorian Prefect and Otho’s brother.596

The details of the actual battle outside Cremona are difficult to interpret and the

role the Praetorians played is impossible to reconstruct.

597

596 Morgan 2006, 128.

There was no specific battle

order, as Tacitus (Hist. 2.41.3) indicates that the Othonian troops were mixed up with

the wagons and the camp followers, when the battle began. The ground itself sounds far

from ideal and while some troops were able to find their standards, others were forced

to search theirs out (Tac. Hist. 2.41.3). Otho’s troops were clearly disorganised and

their preparedness for battle was totally inadequate. Throughout the fighting, Tacitus

(Hist. 2.42.2 – 43.1) reports that the Othonian troops put up a brave resistance, in spite

of their disordered ranks, inferior numbers and their fatigue, while Plutarch (Otho 12.3)

adds that Otho’s men were “sturdy and brave.” Surprisingly, however, later in his

narrative, Plutarch (Otho 12.6) seems to contradict himself, when he claims, “the

597 No attempt has been made to enumerate the forces available to either side at this battle. There are simply too many unknowns and far too much room for speculation. For a discussion of numbers see Passerini 1940, 200 – 10; Chilver 1970/1, 101 – 14. Ash (2007, 183) writes that Tacitus’ account of this “chaotic battle is perhaps the most controversial part of Book two.” On the battle itself see especially Passerini 1940, 178 – 248; Syme 1958 162 – 5, 677 – 82; Chilver 1970/1, 101 – 14; Murison 1993, 110 – 9; Morgan 2006, 132 – 8

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Praetorian soldiers fought more shamefully than any others. They did not even wait for

their opponents to come to close quarters, but fled through the ranks of their still

unvanquished comrades, filling them with fear and confusion.” This evaluation of the

Praetorian Guard is completely lacking from Tacitus’ account and when we consider

that Tacitus seems to take every opportunity to tell his readers about their undisciplined

and mutinous behaviour, his omission regarding their apparent cowardice is startling.

In this instance, one would have to suspect that Plutarch’s account is incorrect.598

Tacitus (Hist. 2.42.2) and Plutarch (Otho 8.3) both claim that the Othonians

were outnumbered, although the actual numbers fighting on both sides is difficult to

ascertain.

599

There is also the assertion that the Othonian generals fled long before the battle

was over (Tac. Hist. 2.43.2). Once again, Tacitus does not distinguish between the

senatorial generals, Celsus and Paulinus, and the Prefect Proculus and Otho’s brother

Titianus, therefore, if Tacitus’ claim is correct, we have to conclude that even the men

that Otho should have been able to rely on, deserted his cause when the situation

became difficult. The withdrawal of the generals from the battlefield would not have

helped the morale of the soldiers either. Considering all these adverse factors, it is not

surprising that the Othonian forces, including the Praetorians, were defeated.

If the Othonians were outnumbered or evenly matched, Otho’s decision to

take a select group of Praetorians with him to Brixellum has even more significance.

Tacitus (Hist. 2.42.2) adds fatigue to the problems that the Othonian troops had to deal

with. That the Othonian troops were tired is probably correct. They had after all

marched some distance before fighting the battle (Tac. Hist. 2.40.1; cf. Plut. Otho 11.1 -

2).

After the engagement, the Praetorians remained adamant that they had been

beaten by treachery, rather than by their enemy, and were determined to continue the

fight (Tac. Hist. 2.44.3). Suetonius (Otho 9.3) also indicates that many of the defeated

soldiers were willing to carry on the fight, although he does not specifically indicate that

these were Praetorian soldiers only. The resolution of the Praetorians is not surprising

considering they had the most to lose if Otho was defeated. Yet somewhat surprisingly,

the following day the Praetorians seem to have had a considerable change of heart and

598 Chilver (1979, 207) also finds it unbelievable that Tacitus failed to mention such cowardice, if it occurred. 599 Dio (64.10.3) claims that 40 000 men fell on both sides in the battles near Cremona. This seems somewhat exaggerated. However, if Dio is referring to the number that fell in both battles which took place near Cremona and has combined the losses of the Othonians, Vitellians, and Flavians, his numbers might be reasonably accurate. See Murison 1999, 64. For an analysis of battles in this period see, Goldsworthy 1996, 170 – 247.

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as Tacitus (Hist. 2.45.2) writes, “even the most determined” – which surely means the

Praetorians, had altered their views. There is no indication who or what had changed

the Praetorians’ mind, but possibly it was the presence of the Vitellian forces in the

vicinity (Tac. Hist. 2.44.3).

Plutarch’s account (Otho 13.2- 4) of the scenes at the camp after the battle

contains much more detail than Tacitus, but it lacks anything about the reaction of the

Praetorians. According to Plutarch (Otho 13.1; cf. Tac. Hist. 2.44.1) neither Proculus

nor Paulinus attempted to enter the camp. Gallus received the retreating troops into the

town and tried to encourage them (surely to further action). Celsus, however, managed

to talk the soldiers into surrendering. He delivered a speech to the officers, in which he

claimed that Otho himself would not want to fight on. The officers were convinced and

they in turn found that the soldiers themselves wanted peace. Even Titianus, Otho’s

brother, urged that an embassy be sent in the interests of peace. Therefore, Celsus and

Gallus were dispatched to the Vitellian generals and terms were agreed (Plut. Otho 13.1

– 4; cf. Tac. Hist. 2.45.2). Considering the almost fervent support that Tacitus tells us

Otho had from the Praetorians, their sudden willingness to surrender and join Vitellius

is difficult to fathom. Perhaps once exposed to the realities of battle many of them were

unwilling to fight on although in most cases, the Praetorians that had experienced battle

had actually been successful. Alternatively, the number of Praetorians at Bedriacum

may have been so small, in comparison to the other soldiers, that they had no choice but

to comply with the wishes of the majority.

What then can be made of the claims made by the Praetorian Guard that they

were defeated by treachery? While it is impossible to prove beyond doubt that the

generals betrayed Otho, the evidence would seem to indicate that there might be some

truth to the allegations and certainly enough circumstantial evidence to understand why

the Praetorians felt the loyalty of their commanders was suspect. If doubt can be

thrown on the loyalty of the Othonian officers and generals, it would help to excuse and

explain the Praetorians’ rebellious behaviour and their continued allegations of

treachery.

As noted previously, the earlier decisions of the Othonian generals can only

have given the Praetorians grounds for suspicion. For example, the decision of

Spurinna to remain at Placentia (Tac. Hist. 2.18.1), Martius Macer’s check on the

enthusiastic advance of his troops (Tac. Hist. 2.23.3), the caution Gallus displayed in

halting his troops at Bedriacum (Tac. Hist. 2.23.2) and Paulinus’ slow response at the

battle at locus Castorum (Tac. Hist. 2.25.2; Plut. Otho 7.3 – 4) must have made the

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Praetorians fear all was not right. Of course, the Praetorians’ recriminations do not

mean that the decisions of the generals were incorrect, but it must have seemed to the

soldiers that their generals were not doing all they could for Otho’s cause.

To add to this already heightened sense of distrust, it cannot have taken long for

the details of the pre-battle meeting to leak out. The fact that the senatorial generals had

advocated a policy in direct opposition to that of Otho (Tac. Hist. 2.32.1 – 33.3) would

have only given the Praetorians more reason to be suspicious. Even after the meeting

had been completed and Otho had made his wishes clear – that his generals were to

engage the forces of Vitellius as soon as possible – Paulinus and Celsus still found

excuses to delay the battle and it required the intervention of a Numidian messenger,

with imperative commands from Otho, for them to prosecute the battle immediately

(Tac. Hist. 2.40; Plut. Otho 11.3). The messenger may have been sent to seek Otho’s

advice regarding when to engage in battle, after the four generals had themselves been

unable to reach a decision. Again, the desire of the senatorial generals to delay the

battle may have been sound, but it was not the wish of their emperor.600

As for the battle at Bedriacum, Suetonius (Otho 9.2 – 3), is forthright in his

claims that Otho was beaten through treachery and he goes so far to say that Otho’s

soldiers were led out in the belief that they were to discuss peace terms, when a battle

was forced on them unexpectedly.

601 Suetonius (Otho 10.1) seems to have had a

reliable witness to the events, as his father, Suetonius Laetus, was an equestrian tribune

in the legio XIII, fighting on Otho’s side. Tacitus (Hist. 2.43.2) confirms the presence

of this legion at the battle. The nature of the treachery described by Suetonius would

certainly explain why the Othonians had their baggage train with them and were not in

some sort of battle formation prior to engaging the Vitellian forces. However, it is

possible that the Othonians did not intend to engage the Vitellians that day, but were

just moving closer. If this is the case, then the generals clearly failed to make adequate

preparations for the eventuality that the Vitellian forces would attempt to engage

them.602

Tacitus (Hist. 2.42.1 – 2) and Plutarch (Otho 12.1 – 2) both report a similar

happening to that described by Suetonius. Apparently, Otho’s soldiers relaxed when

600 Wellesley (1989, 76 – 7) writes that the possibility exists that Paulinus toyed with the idea of a compromise between the generals on both sides. For this to occur he would need more time and therefore he argued for delaying the engagement. 601 Murison (1992, 120 – 1) believes that the claims of treachery was probably just an excuse which was widely used by Otho’s soldiers in the north of Italy and the Danubian provinces. “They never felt defeated and so were all the more willing to try again and attempt to restore their amour proper in the latter part of 69 when the Flavian movement got under way.” Cf. Shotter 1993, 154. 602 Wellesley 1971, 50.

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they were informed that the army (Tac. Hist. 2.42.1) or the generals (Plut. Otho 12.1) of

Vitellius had deserted him. The Othonian soldiers then cheered the Vitellians and lost

their enthusiasm for the battle. Consequently, when the Vitellians charged, the

Othonian ranks were disordered (Tac. Hist. 2.42.2; Plut. Otho 12.1). How the rumour

got started is unknown. It was possibly started by Vitellian scouts or by someone on

Otho’s side, but treachery was suspected (Tac. Hist. 2.42.1; Plut. Otho 12.1). As three

of our sources mention this incident it is difficult to discount it altogether, and

regardless of where the rumour originated, it certainly seems to have had the desired

effect of upsetting some of the Othonian ranks, which is probably exactly what it was

designed to do. It is hardly surprising then, that the Praetorians suspected treachery.

Later in Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 3.2.3), the idea of deception playing a part in the defeat

at Bedriacum re-emerges when Antonius Primus argued in favour of engaging the

Vitellians immediately: Quin potius eo ipso uterentur quod Pannonicae legiones

deceptae magis quam victae resurgere in ultionem properent….603

There is also the interesting anecdote in Tacitus (Hist. 2.37.1 – 2) and Plutarch

(Otho 9.3 – 5) that the armies debated whether they should give up fighting and consult

together to elect another emperor or allow the Senate to choose one. Otho feared that

Celsus was delaying the battle in the hope that the armies would elect him (Plut. Otho

9.5). As noted earlier, Plutarch uses this story as one of the reasons why Otho, in his

war council, advocated fighting the decisive battle immediately. From Plutarch’s

narrative, it would seem that he felt that the whole scenario is feasible. Tacitus (Hist.

2.37.1 – 38.2), however, places the claim that the generals were hoping the armies

would elect a new emperor, after the council of war and from his narrative it would

seem that Tacitus finds the whole thing clearly impossible, introducing it “only to refute

it.”

Of course, these

allegations and rumours may be nothing more than the ‘fog of war.’

604 Chilver believes that it was Tacitus who altered the context of the rumour “and in

doing so made his defence of Paulinus easier than if he had made the rumour explain

the views expressed at the council.”605 However, Morgan notes that Tacitus is likely to

be correct here, because the Othonian troops were unlikely to have wanted their

emperor removed before the council of war and only the decisions taken at this time had

the ability to cause this type of discontent.606

603 “Rather let us take advantage of the fact that the Pannonian legions, which were deceived rather than defeated, are eager to rise in revenge…”

However, even after the council of war,

604 Chilver 1979, 201. Cf. Morgan 2006, 129; Ash 2007, 176. 605 Chilver 1979, 202. 606 Morgan 2006, 130.

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the Othonian soldiers still appear committed to Otho’s cause and it is difficult to

imagine them giving up on their emperor.

Furthermore, in Tacitus’ narrative, it is the general, Paulinus, who was hoping to

be chosen as the new emperor rather than Celsus. Tacitus (Hist. 2.37.1 – 2) dismisses

these allegations, by stating that Paulinus, “with his practical good sense” would never

have expected such moderation and has added that the two armies would never come to

such an agreement, because they were so different in habits and speech. Not only has

Tacitus defended Paulinus’ abilities as a general, but he is now defending his loyalty, by

claiming that he was too honourable to consider treachery,607

However, because of the Praetorians’ loyalty to Otho, it would seem that any

initiative to negotiate peace was more likely to come from the generals or the officers,

rather than the regular soldiers, and in this regard, Tacitus (Hist. 2.41.1) tells us that two

Praetorian tribunes went to visit the Vitellian commander Caecina.

although as we shall see,

Paulinus was quick enough to claim that he had done whatever he could to sabotage

Otho’s campaign, when brought before Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 2.60.1).

608 The discussions

were cut short by the approaching Othonian troops and “it remained uncertain whether

they were attempting some plot or treachery, or rather had in mind some honest

purpose” (Tac. Hist. 2.41.1). It is difficult to imagine what else they were doing,

visiting Caecina, if they had not to come to discuss some sort of settlement or announce

their intention to defect. They would hardly be there to announce their intention to

fight. While seeking peace is certainly an ‘honest purpose,’ the only person who should

have been discussing peace terms with Caecina or any other Vitellian commander was

Otho. Therefore, unless their instructions to meet with Caecina came from their

emperor, their actions were treasonous.609

The events following the battle are also worth considering in light of the

Praetorian accusations of their commanding officers. It has already been noted that the

generals apparently left the battlefield long before the battle ended (Tac. Hist. 2.43.2).

This is hardly the behaviour one would expect of loyal commanders. Where did they go

On whose behalf these two Praetorian

tribunes were acting is impossible to say, but they were surely acting with the

knowledge and support of one or more of Otho’s generals.

607 Morgan 2006, 130. 608 Wellesley (1971, 40 n. 36) agrees with Passerini’s earlier observation that these two Praetorian tribunes were from Flavius Sabinus’ force. Hardy (1890, 260) suggests that this incident may be connected with the two Praetorian cohorts which seem to be attending Vitellius shortly after the battle (Tac. Hist. 2.66). “May not the Praetorians, whom Plutarch describes as fleeing without striking a blow, be these two cohorts, which had already made their own terms?” 609 Murison (1993, 118) believes that there must have been some treacherous plotting among certain Othonian officers

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and what were they hoping to achieve? The Praetorian Prefect, Proculus, and Paulinus

apparently left the field of battle by different routes and did not even return to the camp,

(Tac. Hist. 2.44.1). They feared, according to Plutarch (Otho 13.1), retribution from the

soldiers. The soldier’s desire for retribution would hardly be surprising if these two

men had deserted before the battle was over. Unlike Proculus and Paulinus, Titianus

and Celsus returned to the camp and although Tacitus (Hist. 2.44.1 – 2) tells us that the

troops, of which the Praetorians were most likely at the forefront, were mutinous and

violent, Gallus was able to get them under control and there are no reports that any of

the generals suffered anything other than insults, making the behaviour of Paulinus and

the Prefect, Proculus, look even more suspect.

After the battle, Proculus and Paulinus seem to disappear and the next time they

turn up in Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 2.60.1) they are with Vitellius. How they ended up

there – surrender, defection or capture – is not reported. In front of Vitellius, these two

men, Tacitus (Hist. 2.60.1) claims, “…resorted to a defence which necessity rather than

honour dictated.” They claimed responsibility for the long march before the battle,

which resulted in the troops being fatigued when they had to fight, for the fact that the

baggage train was mixed up with the troops and for many other things, which were due

to chance. Vitellius responded by acquitting them of their crime of loyalty to Otho (Tac

Hist 2.60.1). Were Proculus and Paulinus lying about their actions to secure their

safety? Were they telling the truth? Alternatively, were they simply admitting their

incompetence? Vitellius certainly believed in their disloyalty to Otho, and there is

really no evidence to indicate that this was not the case.610

The defection of the Praetorian Prefect is somewhat surprising; after all, he

owed his position to Otho, although it is not unknown for a Praetorian Prefect to defect

from his emperor, Faenius Rufus, Nymphidius Sabinus and Ofonius Tigellinus are all

notable examples. Licinius Proculus disappears from our sources at this point; we have

no idea what became of him after his meeting with Vitellius. However, it would seem

unlikely that Vitellius appointed him to any type of military post and he probably never

enjoyed such a prominent position as this again. Paulinus may have hoped that his

defection from Otho to Vitellius would not harm his future career; however, this was

not the case and he does not seem to have received any further recognition from the

state.

Their actions on the day of

the battle do nothing to negate this.

611

610 Chilver 1979, 202.

611 Mendell 1957, 176.

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While the accounts of Tacitus and Plutarch differ concerning the events in the

camp after the battle of Bedriacum, neither author mentions that the Othonian generals

had received any orders that Otho wished to surrender. Nor do we hear that Otho issued

any orders to this effect from Brixellum, although clearly there should have been time

for Otho’s decision to end the war, to reach the camp at Bedriacum before the generals

set out to visit Caecina and Valens on the following day.612

Zonaras (Dio 64.10.2a) also has an interesting anecdote, claiming that when Otho

withdrew to Brixellum, his soldiers and their commanders, despising him for his

weakness, failed in their duty and being defeated, made overtures to the troops of

Vitellius. From the details we have of the actual battle, the troops hardly failed in their

duty to their emperor, but we cannot be so definite about the officers.

Interestingly, once Celsus

and Gallus were on their way to see the Vitellian generals, Plutarch (Otho 13.6) claims

that Titianus repented of his support of the embassy and ordered the more resolute

soldiers back onto the walls. This would seem to indicate that Titianus had not received

any orders from his brother about surrendering. If there were no orders and the generals

sought peace terms without Otho’s prior permission, they indeed acted treacherously.

In light of all this evidence, it seems impossible to say that the Praetorian

soldiers were simply causing trouble for their commanding officers and the possibility

that there were grounds for their accusations has to be considered. Finally, this whole

notion of the Praetorian soldiers denouncing their commanders and officers to their

emperor poses the interesting question of how we should actually view this behaviour.

While it initially seems that the Praetorian soldiers were simply ill-disciplined and

looking for any excuse to mutiny, it is worth remembering that the role of the Praetorian

Guard was to defend the life of the emperor. Under those circumstances, any member

of the Praetorians who honestly believed that Otho’s life or Principate was being

threatened, was surely obliged to bring this to the attention of their emperor.

The death of Otho

Members of the Praetorian Guard, present with Otho in Brixellum, continued their

support of their emperor even after the devastating news from Bedriacum had reached

them and Otho had made it clear that he wanted the war to end. Not surprisingly, it is

612 Wellesley (1989, 83) writes that while Otho might have been consulted, he was not. Martin (1981, 82) notes that the nobility of Otho’s decision to commit suicide would be forfeited if it was demonstrated that Otho was aware of the decision of his generals to surrender, and this may have influenced Tacitus’ decision to omit the information. However, it is quite possible that news of the surrender did not reach Otho, especially if we consider that his generals may have been reluctant to inform Otho of their decision without his authority.

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the Praetorians, led by the Prefect Plotius Firmus, who are the most zealous in their

desire to continue fighting the war. Firmus tells Otho not to fail an army which had

remained loyal and which had served him well (Tac. Hist. 2.46.2). Taking into account

the discussion of the various engagements above, the Prefect’s words are accurate.

However, the Praetorians were not the only ones who did not want Otho to give up. Dio

(64.12.1) and Plutarch (Otho 15.1 – 2) also report that Otho enjoyed the support of all

the soldiers, but Otho was not going to be swayed from his chosen path.613

Otho’s refusal to continue the fight must have struck a certain amount of fear

into the Praetorian soldiers with him. Their future was now uncertain. They could have

no idea how Vitellius was going to react to them and the prospect of their service in the

Praetorian Guard being ended must have seemed very real. Not surprisingly then, Otho

was soon disturbed by reports that the soldiers were in uproar and threatening to kill any

of those who wished to depart. Those in a hurry to depart were in all likelihood the

senators, whom Otho had brought along with him, and it is against these men that

Plutarch (Otho 17.3) notes that the soldiers’ anger was directed. Tacitus (Hist. 2.49.1)

adds that they were most violent against Verginius Rufus. Tacitus offers us no precise

reason why the soldiers were particularly upset with Verginius at this point. However,

after Otho’s funeral, Tacitus (Hist. 2.51.1) claims that violence broke out again and the

soldiers threateningly besought Verginius to accept the title of emperor. It is not

surprising that the Praetorians would be hastily searching for another candidate for

emperor. However, these disturbances seem to have been short lived and Otho was able

to deal with the situation without considerable effort (Tac. Hist. 2.49.1; Plut. Otho 17;

Suet. Otho 11.1; Dio 64.15.1a).

There is no suggestion that Otho’s death was anything other than suicide, and

the Praetorian Prefect, Plotius Firmus, along with Otho’s freedman, were the first to

discover the body (Tac. Hist. 2.49.3). The scenes at the time of and after Otho’s funeral

are probably the only time in Tacitus’ narrative that we find the historian exhibiting a

grudging respect for the behaviour of Otho and the Praetorians. The Praetorians carried

Otho’s body to his funeral pyre and apparently a number of soldiers followed Otho’s

example and committed suicide. There is nothing to suggest that the grief of the

Praetorians and the other soldiers was not genuine.614

613 The subsequent actions of Otho are well known and there is no need to repeat the details here. See Tac. Hist. 2.46.1 – 49.4; Plut. Otho 15 – 18; Suet. Otho 10.1 – 11; Dio 63.11.1 – 15.2. See also Martial (6.32.5 – 6), who has a couplet which views Otho’s suicide with admiration.

As Murison quite correctly notes,

614 For the grief of the soldiers, see Tac. Hist. 2.49.2, 51.1; Suet. Otho 12.2; Dio 63.14.1 – 3;

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it is difficult to imagine how the Otho depicted by Dio and Tacitus is capable of

inspiring such devotion in his soldiers.615

Conclusion

The change in the importance of the Praetorian Prefects begins to become noticeable in

Otho’s reign and we hear little of their relationship with Otho or their activities. This is

due to a number of different factors. Firstly, Tacitus is clearly more interested in the

relationship that existed between Otho and his Praetorian soldiers, that the relationship

between the emperor and the Praetorian Prefect. Secondly, the nature of Otho’s

Principate has ensured that much of the narrative takes place away from the Praetorian

Prefects who remain with Otho and finally, Otho had a war to contest and as such

required experienced generals to conduct his campaigns. These generals are the ones

that command the battles in which the Praetorian Guard fought and hence it is these

men that are important in determining the survival of Otho’s Principate.

However, it would seem that like previous Prefects, Otho trusted them and their

judgement. One of the Praetorian Prefects, Licinius Proculus, was placed in a position

of importance at the First Battle of Bedriacum. There is enough evidence to suggest

that Proculus may have deserted Otho at the end. If Proculus did defect he would have

to have been convinced that Vitellius would ultimately be successful and that his

chances of survival would be better if he transferred his allegiance from Otho. We do

not know what became of Proculus. The second Prefect, Plotius Firmus, seems to have

remained with Otho throughout the campaign and the sources have nothing to say on his

contribution to Otho’s war effort, although his loyalty to his emperor cannot be

questioned. If, as Chilver suggests, Firmus’ family went on to enjoy important careers,

he himself may have enjoyed a respectable future after AD 69.616

The Praetorian officers are hardly ever mentioned in Otho’s reign. It is the

activities of the Praetorian soldiers dominate Tacitus’ narrative and Tacitus portrays

them as being loyal to Otho, while at the same time mutinous and distrustful of their

generals and officers. There can be no denying that they were all of these things.

Although their mutinous behaviour is well recorded in all our extant literary sources, the

level this behaviour reached and the number of soldiers that it involved can be disputed.

What Tacitus, in particular, seems to be describing is the actions of a handful of

Praetorian soldiers, not the generally disciplined behaviour of the majority of

615 Murison 1999, 65. The behaviour of the Praetorian Guard after Otho’s funeral will be discussed in the following chapter. 616 See pp 120 – 1.

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Praetorians. Perhaps Otho had placed a number of his most loyal supporters – the

Praetorian speculatores involved in the conspiracy – with each of his generals to ensure

their loyalty to his cause. These Praetorians concerned about their future safety,

continually watched and criticised the actions and behaviour of their generals. It is the

behaviour of the handful of Praetorians which Tacitus has reported in his narrative,

rather than the disciplined behaviour of the majority of the soldiers. It must also be

considered that Tacitus may be exagerating the mutinous and ill-disciplined behaviour

of the Praetorian Guard as an excuse for the failure of the senatorial generals to

prosecute a successful campaign against the Vitellian forces.

The restricted nature of the mutinous behaviour by the Praetorian soldiers is

perhaps no better illustrated than on the field of battle. If the mutinous behaviour had

been widespread, it is difficult to believe that the Praetorians would have done so well

in the battles in which they were engaged. Moreover, while some of the Praetorians

might have created difficulties for their officers and generals, these difficulties did not

contribute to Otho’s final defeat at Bedriacum.

Having completed a careful analysis of the battles in which the Praetorians were

engaged, we can also confidently dismiss the notion, at least for this period, that the

Praetorian Guard were in some way inferior soldiers to those serving on the frontier.

They were victorious in three of the four encounters in which they took part and from

the evidence that we have there is nothing to indicate that the Praetorians did not fight at

least as well as their opponents on the battlefield. If the strategy employed at

Bedriacum was faulty, the blame lies with Otho and his generals, not the Praetorian

Guard. Their victories are indeed quite impressive, particulary at the siege of Placentia

and this victory possibly indicates that the effective of the Praetorian cohorts was more

than 500, at least for this period. Unfortunately, the lack of specific details about the

numbers involved does not allow us to form any definite conclusions.

The Praetorian soldiers are also portrayed as being distrustful of their officers.

There is probably not enough evidence to convict the senatorial generals of treason,

although there would seem to be enough circumstantial evidence to indicate that their

loyalty was suspect, particularly in their final battle near Bedriacum. Moreover, the

Praetorian soldiers knew they were risking their life to defend Otho and were obviously

commited to the cause, while the senatorial generals did not tie their fortunes to those of

Otho and the Praetorians, in the same way that Antonius and Mucianus allied

themselves to Vespasian.

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With Otho’s death, the fate of his Praetorian Prefects and the surviving

Praetorian Guardsmen now rested in the hands of the new emperor, Vitellius.

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Chapter Five

The New Praetorian Guard of Vitellius

Introduction

With the death of Otho and the accession of Vitellius, there is both change and

continuity within the role played by the Praetorian Guard. During the reign of Vitellius

the importance of the Praetorian Prefects, Publilius Sabinus, Julius Priscus and Alfenus

Varus, as related by Tacitus, is minimal and they are merely an addition to the generals

Fabius Valens and Aelius Caecina. This relegation of the role played by the Prefects

during this period of civil war, when the Praetorian cohorts are no longer the only

military force in Italy, was begun, as we have seen, under Otho, but would become even

more apparent under Vitellius.

The Praetorian Guard itself also underwent substantial change. Vitellius, on

becoming emperor, disbanded the former Othonian Praetorian Guard and created a new

Guard comprised of soldiers formerly serving on the Rhine frontier. However, Otho’s

former Praetorians continued to play an important role in the events, but gone are their

accusations of treachery against their commanders and their disobedient behaviour.

These Praetorians were no longer fighting for an emperor they had created, but were at

the mercy of new leaders and fighting for their right to regain their place in the

Praetorian Guard. They needed to prove themselves to a new master. While in Rome,

the soldiers in Vitellius’ newly formed Praetorian cohorts continued the tradition,

founded under the Julio-Claudian emperors, of the Praetorian soldiers being loyal to

their emperor, surrendering only when they had no alternative left to them.

With the death of Otho, there is another important development for this study:

the loss of Plutarch as a source with which to compare and contrast Tacitus. This is a

substantial loss and although we still have Cassius Dio and Suetonius, their often very

brief accounts of the role played by the Praetorian Guard simply does not compensate

for the loss of Plutarch. Consequently, we are now more than ever reliant on the

account of Tacitus for the role both the ex-Othonian Praetorian Guard and Vitellius’

newly constituted Guard continued to play in the events of AD 69.

The Praetorian Guard after the death of Otho

Following the suicide of Otho, Plutarch (Otho 18.3) tells us that “Pollio,” the remaining

Prefect, tried to administer the oath of allegiance to Vitellius, to the troops camped at

Brixellum, c. 30 kilometres south of Bedriacum. This Pollio is otherwise unattested and

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it would seem that Plutarch is actually referring to Plotius Firmus, the Praetorian Prefect

specifically named as being with Otho in Brixellum (Tac. Hist. 2.46.2). Plotius Firmus,

as Praetorian Prefect, would have been the most senior officer present, and although

there were also other troops at Brixellum (Tac. Hist. 2.46.2), the majority of the soldiers

seem to have been members of the Praetorian Guard (Tac. Hist. 2.33.3; Plut. Otho 10.1)

and as such were directly under the command of the Prefect. Accordingly, he would be

the officer most likely to have taken on the responsibility of administering the oath to a

new emperor. However, it would appear that Plotius’ timing was injudicious and the

Praetorians, after having witnessed the funeral of their emperor, were simply not ready

to accept Vitellius as their new commander. Instead, the Guardsmen, having first let the

senators leave Brixellum (Plut. Otho 18.3), threateningly besought Verginius Rufus to

accept the imperial office or at least act as their envoy to the Vitellian generals, Caecina

and Valens. Verginius declined both of the Praetorians’ offers and slipped away quietly

(Tac. Hist. 2.51; Plut. Otho 18.3). When the focus of their attention, Verginius, had

disappeared it would seem that this particular outburst of aggression by the Praetorians

ended peacefully.617

It is hardly unexpected that the Praetorian soldiers would look for another

candidate to continue the fight against Vitellius. They must have recognised the

potential danger that the failure of Otho’s campaign held for them. For the first time

since the death of Tiberius in AD 37, the Praetorian Guard had not played any role in

creating the new emperor and even worse, they had committed themselves to fighting

against Vitellius. At the very least, the surviving Guardsmen could expect to lose their

privileged position in Rome. Their choice of Verginius Rufus for next emperor is quite

logical. Verginius had commanded some of German legions and had been offered the

Principate by his legionaries previously. The Praetorians may have believed that if

Verginius accepted the position, it would be an outcome acceptable to all parties. The

legionaries would be pleased with the Guard’s choice and the Praetorians would, in

Verginius’ eyes, be responsible for making him emperor, ensuring their important place

in creating the emperor continued.

However, it is not surprising that Verginius did not accept either of the

Praetorians’ offers (Tac. Hist. 2.51; Plut. Otho 18.4). Verginius believed that it would

be stupidity to accept such an offer now they had been defeated and especially after he

had failed to accept the previous offer of the German legions, an offer which had been

made under much more favourable conditions (Plut. Otho 18.4). The role of envoy for

617 This effectively marks the end of the career of Verginius Rufus.

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the Praetorians also had its potential problems. Apparently, Verginius felt that the

German legionaries believed that he had “often done them violence beyond all reason”

(Plut. Otho 18.4) and consequently he must have been concerned about the reception he

would receive.

With the refusal of Verginius to act as the envoy on behalf of the Praetorians, it

was left to Rubrius Gallus618 to take the appeals of the Praetorians to the Vitellian

generals. What role Rubrius Gallus had played up until this time is not recorded. His

efforts, however, were successful and he managed to ensure that the forces at Brixellum

immediately received a pardon (Tac. Hist. 2.51; cf. Dio 64.15.2b), though it is difficult

to imagine that Caecina and Valens would have done anything other than accept the

Praetorians’ surrender. Any other response may well have resulted in a further outbreak

of hostilities. The troops serving under T. Flavius Sabinus,619

While these events were unfolding at Brixellum, the large contingent of senators

at Mutina (Modena) was, according to Tacitus (Hist. 2.52.1), in extreme danger because

of the milites stationed there. Tacitus does not specify that these soldiers were

Praetorian Guardsmen, but to identify them as such would not be an unreasonable

assumption. Firstly, the senators had travelled north from Rome with Otho, so too had a

number of cohorts of Praetorians (Tac. Hist. 1.88.1, 2.11.3, 52.1). Secondly, Otho

trusted his Praetorians, therefore they would be the logical choice to leave to oversee the

actions of the senators, and finally, Tacitus (Hist. 2.52.1) writes that the troops at

Mutina believed that the Senate was hostile to Otho. This is a claim that Tacitus (Hist.

1.80.2; cf. Plut. Otho 3.3) has made previously about the Praetorian soldiers. Therefore,

logically, there would have to be at least a small detachment of Praetorian Guardsmen at

Mutina with the senators.

the consul designate

(Tac. Hist. 1.77.2), also made it known, through him, of their adhesion to Vitellius (Tac.

Hist. 2.51). Flavius Sabinus had assumed control of these forces from Martius Macer

(Tac. Hist. 2.36.2) after an unsuccessful engagement against the forces of Vitellius. The

bulk of Sabinus’ troops appear to have been gladiators from Rome (Tac. Hist. 2.23.3,

35.1 – 2).

When the news arrived in Mutina of Otho’s defeat, the Praetorians believed the

report to be false and began to observe closely the actions of the senators. The situation

became so volatile that according to Tacitus (Hist. 2.52.1), the soldiers resorted to abuse

618 Rubrius Gallus was Nero’s commander in AD 68 (Dio 63.27.1), acted as an intermediary between Flavius Sabinus and Caecina in the autumn of AD 68 (Tac. Hist. 2.99.2) and was governor of Moesia following the death of Fonteius Agrippa in AD 70 (Joseph. BJ 7.92). See also Juv. 4.105. 619 T. Flavius Sabinus is the son of Otho’s Urban Prefect and the nephew of Vespasian.

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and insults and looked for an excuse to start a massacre. While the distrust felt by the

Praetorians towards the senators was a constant theme in Otho’s reign, it must be said

that Tacitus seems to overplay the danger the soldiers presented to the senators at this

time. As with the senators ‘under threat’ in the Praetorian mutiny, we have no reports

of any senators being killed or injured, as we can be reasonably certain that Tacitus

would have included such details in his narrative. Moreover, the senators were

apparently able to return unmolested, on their own volition, to Bononia and hold

meetings there to decide what action they should take next. They were also in a

position to be able to post men, possibly members of their personal entourage, on

different roads around Bononia to question anyone passing by about the present

situation (Tac. Hist. 2.53.2).

Even when Coenus, one of Nero’s freedmen, brought the false report that, the

Vitellian forces had been crushed and hence the fortunes of the two opposing sides had

been reversed, there still does not seem to have been the type of problems Tacitus (Hist.

2.52.1, 54.1 – 2) insinuates in his narrative. If the Praetorians had truly wanted to start a

massacre of the senators, Coenus’ report would have been the prefect opportunity. This

report, which the soldiers apparently believed (Tac. Hist. 2.54.2), made the senators’

departure from Mutina look like an abandonment of Otho’s cause. Yet we still have no

evidence for any senator suffering at the hands of the Praetorians.

It is difficult to comprehend what Coenus’ motives may have been for lying

about the situation and what advantage he stood to gain. It might, however, come down

to a simple matter of survival. As a freedman, who had served Nero and probably Otho,

Coenus may have felt that the defeat of the emperor would signal trouble for him. By

giving the Praetorian Guard and the senators a false report about Otho’s fortunes in the

battle, he had enough time to escape back to Rome (Tac. Hist. 2.54.2).

At Rome, news of Otho’s death apparently created few problems with the

soldiers remaining in the capital (Tac. Hist. 2.55.1). The exact composition of the

troops to whom Flavius Sabinus, the Urban Prefect, administered the oath of allegiance

to Vitellius is not specified. There were probably a small number of Praetorian

Guardsmen who had been left behind in the capital, the Urban cohorts who may have

returned from the maritime expedition by this time and the seven cohorts of the Vigiles.

There is no indication in Tacitus’ narrative that these troops did anything but accept

Vitellius as their new emperor, although there is really nothing that they could have

accomplished by not accepting the situation and taking the oath to their new emperor.

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Accepting Vitellius as emperor both quickly and quietly may have helped them save

their position in the Rome cohorts.

Vitellius’ Praetorian Prefects

It would appear that Vitellius did not appoint his two Praetorian Prefects, Publilius

Sabinus and Julius Priscus, until after his arrival in Rome. Publilius Sabinus owed his

promotion to the favour of Aelius Caecina, while Fabius Valens supported the

advancement of Julius Priscus (Tac. Hist. 2.92.1), and therefore the fortunes of the two

Prefects are closely linked with the destinies of their respective sponsors.620 In all

likelihood, these two men would have served with their respective supporters on the

frontiers in Germany and on the march to Rome. Unfortunately, we know little about

these two men prior to their elevation to the Praetorian Prefecture. Publilius Sabinus

had previously held the post of prefect of a cohort (Tac. Hist. 2.92.1). This was an

impressive rise through the ranks from commanding an auxiliary cohort to Praetorian

Prefect.621

At the time of his promotion to the Praetorian Prefecture, Julius Priscus was a

centurion (Tac. Hist. 2.92.1), presumably a legionary centurion, as it seems unlikely that

Vitellius would have promoted an officer from Otho’s former Praetorian Guard.

Sabinus, however, did not last long in his new position because as soon as

Vitellius heard that Caecina had defected to Vespasian’s side, he ordered Sabinus

arrested because he was an amicus of Caecina’s (Tac. Hist. 3.36.2). Whether Sabinus

would have taken Caecina’s side against Vitellius is not known, although the emperor

clearly believed this was a distinct possibility. We do not know what became of him.

622

The fact that Vitellius’ Praetorian Prefects were so closely associated with the

two Vitellian generals probably indicates that Caecina and Valens played some sort of a

role in their promotion, but the nature of that role is not certain. As a reward for their

services, Vitellius may have given each of his two generals the opportunity to

recommend one of the new Praetorian Prefects and Vitellius acted on these informal

recommendations. The appointment of these two men, supported as they were by

Priscus, as we shall see, was sent out by Vitellius to hold the Apennines against the

advancing Flavian forces (Tac. Hist. 3.55.1), however, he quickly returned to Rome

(Tac. Hist. 3.61.3) and finally committed suicide pudore magis quam necessitate (Tac.

Hist. 4.11.3).

620 Ash 2007, 356. 621 Ash 2007, 355. See also Morgan 2006, 161. 622 Chilver 1979, 253.

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Caecina and Valens, spread the hatred that existed between the generals down the chain

of command.623

After the arrest of Publilius Sabinus, Vitellius appointed Alfenus Varus

624

We hear very little of the Praetorian Prefects in Vitellius’ reign and this is not

altogether surprising. Unlike the situation under the Julio-Claudian emperors, where the

Praetorian Prefects commanded the only soldiers in Italy, making them important men

in their own right, we now have a situation where the Prefects are subordinate to the

army generals. It is Caecina and Valens on whom Vitellius relied (Tac. Hist. 2.92.1),

not his Praetorian Prefects, hence it was the actions of these two men that were

important. Whether Sabinus and Priscus were able to work together efficiently and

effectively is not known, nor is the attitude of the soldiers to their Prefects.

(Tac.

Hist. 3.36.2) to serve as Praetorian Prefect in his place. Varus was a former praefectus

castrorum (Tac. Hist. 2.29.2), who seems to have acted with good sense when he helped

to quell a mutiny which broke out in the camp after the news arrived that Otho’s fleet

had defeated the auxiliary forces dispatched by Valens. Varus was an enthusiastic

participant in the First Battle of Bedriacum, where he led the Batavian auxiliaries (Tac.

Hist. 2.43.2; Plut. Otho 12.4). After his appointment to the Prefecture, Varus was sent

with Julius Priscus, to hold the Apennines (Tac. Hist. 3.55.1) and as with Priscus, he

also abandoned his post (Tac. Hist. 3.61.3). Following the Flavian victory, Varus

“survived his own cowardice and infamy” (Tac. Hist. 4.11.3), a rather harsh phrase from

Tacitus considering what else we know of this man and his exploits for Vitellius in his

war against Otho.

The appointment of Publilius Sabinus and Julius Priscus to the Praetorian

Prefecture appears to have alienated a certain Sex. Lucilius Bassus. Vitellius had given

the command of the imperial navy to Bassus, but he was resentful that he had not been

elevated to Praetorian Prefect instead (Tac. Hist. 2.100.3). According to Tacitus (Hist.

2.100.3), Bassus’ resentment was completely unjustified because he had previously only

been a prefect of an ala, presumably on the Rhine frontier. Unfortunately, we have no

information regarding Bassus’ contribution to Vitellius’ campaign against Otho, so it is

impossible to evaluate Tacitus’ claim. However, considering that Bassus felt that he

was in line for such an important position, one has to suspect that he must have at least

contributed to Vitellius’ campaign and if his later career is anything to go by, he seems

to have been a capable leader. Bassus, after organising the fleets’ desertion of Vitellius,

623 Morgan 2006, 161. See Tac. Hist. 2.92.1 – 2. 624 PIR2 A 522.

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was arrested by Cornelius Fuscus, a Flavian supporter, and sent to Atria, where he was

set free (Tac. Hist. 3.12.3). Later, he reappears mopping up trouble in Campania for the

Flavians (Tac. Hist. 4.3.1). He was rewarded for his service with adlection to the

Senate and was made governor of Judaea in AD 71, where he took the strongholds of

Herodium (Joseph. BJ 7.163) and Machaerus (Joseph. BJ 7.164 – 209). Bassus died in

either AD 72 or 73 (Joseph. BJ 7.252).625

However, at least his betrayal of Vitellius is “tangible and familiar,” bitterness at

failure to gain a promotion he thought was justified.

626

If Vitellius hoped that Bassus’

appointment to overall command of the fleet would compensate him, he was mistaken.

Bassus was quick to betray Vitellius and may well have influenced Caecina to join the

Flavian party (Tac. Hist. 2.100.2). Tacitus (Hist. 2.101.1) tells us that the historians

who wrote under the Flavian dynasty claimed that Bassus and Caecina deserted

Vitellius because of their anxiety “for peace and devotion to the State.” It is a claim

adamantly dismissed by Tacitus (Hist. 2.101.1).

Vitellius’ Praetorian Guard

Not surprisingly Otho’s former Praetorian cohorts were a source of anxiety to Vitellius

(Tac. Hist. 2.67.1), but he made no effort to win them over to his side. This may have

been because Vitellius believed the effort would be wasted or that he felt he would

never have been able to trust the former Praetorians with his life. However, Vitellius

may also have had no desire to reconcile the Praetorians. If their places in the garrison

at Rome were to be a reward for his legionaries, the more places available, the easier it

would be for him to satisfy his soldiers’ demands.

Vitellius first encountered Otho’s defeated forces when he arrived in Lugdunum

(Lyons), after his journey from Germany (Tac. Hist. 2.59.3). There, one of his first acts

was to order the deaths of the centurions who had been the most active in their support

of Otho (Tac. Hist. 2.60.1). The loyalty of these officers reflects well on their former

emperor.627

625 See Levick 1999, 120.

Tacitus is not specific about the number of centurions actually put to death,

but does note that it was an act which more than any other was responsible for turning

the forces stationed in Illyricum against Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 2.60.1). The murder of the

centurions would appear to be a rather desperate act on the part of Vitellius and it is not

surprising that it created serious resentment towards him from the other soldiers.

626 Ash 2007, 378. 627 Ash 2007, 241.

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Vitellius may have erred when he executed the centurions, but he was sensible

enough to allow the wills of all the soldiers who died fighting for Otho to stand and for

those who died intestate, he allowed the law to take its normal course (Tac. Hist. 2.62.1;

cf. Dio 65.6.3). Many of the soldiers, whom these actions would have affected, were

likely to have been Praetorian Guardsmen and the measures may have gone some way

to satisfying the soldiers’ dependants in Rome.

However, while Vitellius was willing to allow this concession for the dead, he

did not intend to allow the surviving members of Otho’s Praetorian Guard to continue

their service in the Rome cohorts and instead decided the best course of action was to

discharge them from the army. The manner in which Vitellius actually handled the

dismissal of the former Praetorian cohorts depends on which extant account you

consult. Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 2.67.1) indicates that Vitellius dealt with Otho’s

Praetorians in a relatively conciliatory fashion, offering them a honesta missio. An

honourable discharge was considered a reward for good discipline and a satisfactory

service record. Presumably, their honourable discharge was with gratuity, although

Tacitus does not specifically note this point. Dio (55.23.1) tells us that the normal

gratuity on discharge was 5000 denarii. This was a sizable sum of money and it was

dangerous to give these defeated and dissatisfied troops such a payout; however, as

Morgan notes, not paying them anything would be even more dangerous.628 Whether

these soldiers actually received any money is not known. Initially, Otho’s former

Praetorians seem to have accepted Vitellius’ offer, as they began to hand over their

weapons629

The details regarding the discharge of the former Praetorians, provided by

Suetonius (Vit. 10.1), reveal Vitellius managing them in a much harsher fashion. There

is no mention of them being offered an honourable discharge they were simply

dismissed. Shotter notes that the normal use of exauctorare, the term used by

Suetonius, would indicate that the payments associated with an honourable discharge

were not made.

to their tribunes (Tac. Hist. 2.67.1), although under the circumstances they

probably had little choice. Presumably, if the Praetorian tribunes were collecting the

soldiers’ arms they were not among the discharged soldiers and were allowed to

continue in their present positions. The same is probably true for the majority of the

Praetorian centurions.

630

628 Morgan 2006, 155.

In addition, rather than the Praetorians agreeing to hand over their

629 At the Second Battle of Bedriacum, Antonius Primus points out to the Praetorians that their standards and arms are now in Vitellian hands (Tac. Hist. 3.24.3). 630 Shotter 1993, 177.

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weapons (Tac. Hist. 2.67.1), in Suetonius’ account (Vit. 10.1) it is Vitellius who orders

them to surrender their arms to the tribunes. The differences in the accounts may well

simply be explained by the shortness of Suetonius’ version and consequently, he has

missed some important details. Certainly, the more reasoned approach found in

Tacitus’ narrative seems much more sensible on Vitellius’ part, but that does not

necessarily mean that it is more accurate.

Tacitus (Hist. 2.66.2, 67.1) implies that the discharged Praetorians maintained

some kind of unity during the succeeding two months and might have not been properly

disarmed during this time.631

The decision of Vitellius to discharge the Praetorians was always going to be

risky, and he may have been better off trying to find a way to reconcile them without

threatening their livelihood. Having lost their future source of income it is not

surprising that the soldiers considered their previous position in the Praetorian Guard

worth fighting for and joining Vespasian’s cause would be the only avenue open to

them. Vespasian’s party certainly seems to have considered the Praetorians worth

courting, as Tacitus (Hist. 2.82.3) writes that letters were addressed to all the armies and

their commanders instructing them to try to win over the Praetorians, by holding out to

them the possibility of re-entering the army.

Considering the manner in which Vitellius dealt with

Otho’s former Praetorians, it is hardly surprising that when news of Vespasian’s revolt

became widespread, the Praetorian soldiers were happy to resume their service in the

army, becoming in Tacitus’ words (Hist. 2.67.1) the robur Flavianarum partium.

While it is impossible to put a figure on the actual number of discharged

Praetorians who resumed their service in Vespasian’s forces, the number cannot have

been insignificant, especially as Tacitus (Hist. 3.21.2) tells us that they fought under

their own standard at the Second Battle of Bedriacum. However, the above claim that

they formed the robur Flavianarum partium (Tac. Hist. 2.67.1) may be an exaggeration,

although possibly Tacitus means to imply that they were the backbone of the Flavian

armies, because they were at the head of the invasion of Italy.632

While these former Praetorians, who enlisted on the Flavian side, were no longer

officially members of the imperial Praetorian Guard, it is difficult to imagine that they

did not still view themselves as Rome’s ‘true’ Praetorians. Many of the surviving

Guardsmen may have served in the Guard for many years. In addition, they must have

631 Nicols 1987, 70. 632 Ash (2007, 262) makes the point that “depth of feeling, not just numbers can determine strength, and later references to the dismissed praetorians (Tac. Hist. 2.82.3, 96.2) suggest their strategic importance in undermining Vitellian morale.” See also Chilver 1979, 229.

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felt that right was on their side. Even though Vitellius and the German legions had not

recognised Otho as emperor, the Senate and People of Rome had officially recognised

him. The Praetorians, by fighting for Otho, were doing what they were paid to do,

defend and protect their emperor. Vitellius was the usurper.

Before examining the establishment of Vitellius’ new Praetorian Guard, one

other event is worth discussion. As Vitellius continued his journey to Rome, two

Praetorian cohorts appear somewhat unexpectedly in Augusta Taurinorum (Turin).

Present with the Praetorians was the legio XIV Gemina and the Batavian cohorts (Tac.

Hist. 2.66.2). Tacitus (Hist. 2.66.2) tells us that the Batavians and the legionaries were

long standing enemies and almost came to blows over an opifex, whom the Batavians

accused of being a thief. It was only the intervention of the two Praetorian cohorts, on

the side of the soldiers from the fourteenth legion, which prevented a bloody battle. The

intervention of the Praetorians not only inspired the legionaries with courage, but also

frightened the Batavians (Tac. Hist. 2.66.2). If Tacitus’ account (Hist. 2.66.2) is

accurate, it would seem that the Praetorians’ presence commanded a certain amount of

respect among the other troops. To ease the tension, Vitellius sent the fourteenth legion

back to Britain and the Batavian cohorts were ordered to accompany him to Rome (Tac.

Hist. 2.66.3).

Where these two Praetorian cohorts, who intervened on the side of the legio XIV,

actually came from is not clear from Tacitus’ account. Their location in Augusta

Taurinorum is a long way from both Cremona and Brixellum. In addition, there is

nothing in our extant sources to indicate that the cohorts were ordered there by Otho or

after his death by anyone else. Wellesley suggests that these two cohorts were once part

of the three Praetorian cohorts that Spurinna commanded at Placentia, later moved to a

position opposite Caecina’s bridge, and that it was their tribunes who visited Caecina

prior to the First Battle of Bedriacum. After the defeat of Otho’s forces, they may have

been moved to Augusta Taurinorum by the Vitellian generals to form an escort for

Vitellius.633

633 Wellesley 1979, 99.

This is possible, but we have no evidence to suggest that the tribunes who

visited Caecina were acting with the consent or even knowledge of the soldiers of the

cohorts. If the soldiers of these two Praetorian cohorts had agreed to betray Otho they

were certainly the exception among the Praetorian rank and file. There is also no

evidence to suggest that these two Praetorian cohorts formed any part of Vitellius’ new

Praetorian Guard, which they may well have done if they had deserted to him. Tacitus

(Hist. 2.66.3) is quite specific that the Batavian cohorts joined Vitellius’ train and the

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fourteenth legion was sent back to Britain. He does not specify what happened to the

Praetorian cohorts. Moreover, their intervention on the side of the pro-Othonian

legionaries might indicate that they still held out some loyalty to Otho.

Alternatively, the two Praetorian cohorts, along with the fourteenth legion, may

have been sent to Augusta Taurinorum, by the Vitellian generals, Caecina and Valens,

not only to meet Vitellius, but also to split up the Othonian forces, thereby diminishing

their threat.634

Once in Rome, Vitellius’ recriminations against the Praetorian Guard continued

when he ordered those claiming to have been involved in Galba’s death to be

punished.

Certainly, Tacitus (Hist. 2.67.1) tells us that the Praetorian cohorts had

been kept separated. There is also one other possibility – these two Praetorian cohorts

may have actually been Vitellian troops, rather than former Othonians. As a governor,

Vitellius would have had his own pedites and equites singulares, and when the soldiers

proclaimed him emperor, Vitellius may have formed these same men into two

Praetorian cohorts. These cohorts would have acted as his bodyguard until he arrived in

Rome, hence their presence with him at Augusta Taurinorum.

635

634 Morgan 2006, 155.

Suetonius (Vit. 10.1) writes that Vitellius ordered one hundred and twenty

members of the Praetorian Guard to be hunted down and punished. Vitellius had found

the petitions which had been written to Otho demanding a reward for the services they

offered in connection with the murder of Galba (Suet. Vit. 10.1; cf. Plut. Galba 27.5).

Suetonius is not specific about the punishment the Praetorians were to receive, but

Plutarch (Galba 27.5) confirms that the penalty to be imposed was death. Plutarch

(Galba 27.5) and Tacitus (Hist. 1.44.2) substantiate the majority of the details contained

in Suetonius’ account, although Tacitus (Hist. 1.44.2) puts the number of those hunted

down as greater than one hundred and twenty. However, there is one important

difference between the accounts. Unlike Suetonius (Vit. 10.1), Tacitus (Hist. 1.44.1)

and Plutarch (Galba 27.5) are not specific that the men who wrote the petitions were

solely members of the Praetorian Guard. It would, however, seem logical that the vast

majority of the petitioners must have come from the ranks of the Guard. The

involvement of Praetorian speculatores is well attested in Otho’s conspiracy against

Galba; while the name of Galba’s actual assassin is not certain, Praetorian soldiers had

to be among the forces that entered the Forum on that day and Praetorians were surely

635 Suetonius (Vit. 10.1), in his narrative, implies that the recriminations took place while Vitellius was still travelling to Rome however, it seems to have taken place after he reached the capital because Otho had burned any incriminating papers he had with him before his suicide (Murison 1992, 155). See Tac. Hist. 2.48.1; Suet. Otho 10.2; Dio 64.15.1a.

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involved in some way in the deaths of T. Vinius Rufinus and Galba’s heir, Piso.636

The most important development for the new Vitellian Praetorian Guard also

took place, in Rome, after Vitellius’ arrival. The capital was, according to Tacitus

(Hist. 2.93.1 – 94.3), a scene of complete disorder, with the soldiers lacking discipline

and proper military training and little or no attention being paid to their duties.

Considering the fact that there may have been up to 60 000 troops in Rome (Tac. Hist.

2.87.1; cf. Joseph. BJ 4.585 – 7) at that time, Tacitus’ assessment of the situation is

probably quite accurate. Amid all this confusion, the decision was made to enrol

sixteen Praetorian and four Urban cohorts, each with a quota of one thousand men.

Whether this order to hunt down and punish the petitioners was ever carried out is not

reported by any of our sources, although the opportunity to find the Praetorians should

have been available, particularly at the beginning of Vitellius’ reign, as many of the

surviving Praetorians may have still been under the supervision of the Vitellian forces.

637

Whether this decision and these numbers were settled on by Vitellius or whether it was

the decision of one or both of his two generals is not stated,638

Not surprisingly there may have been some competition between Valens and

Caecina for the assignment of enrolling the new Rome-based cohorts (Tac. Hist.

2.93.2). Having the officers and soldiers know who was responsible for their enrolment

in the Praetorian or Urban cohorts would only serve to enhance their popularity with the

troops. More importantly, it would have given Valens the opportunity to stack the ranks

of the Praetorian Guard with officers and soldiers previously under his command. Not

only would he be seen to be rewarding his troops, but also at the same time he would

ensure that he would have a Guard that was going to be favourably disposed towards

him. Considering the importance of the task, it is quite unbelievable that Vitellius

would allow any one other than himself to be seen as the Praetorians’ new benefactor.

The significance of the task, of forming the new Praetorian Guard, was clear to Tacitus

(Hist. 2.93.2), as he believes that it was this moment that witnessed the loyalty of

Caecina to Vitellius begin to waver. Not only had Vitellius assigned the undertaking to

Valens, which would have clearly indicated to Caecina that Valens was his preferred

general (Cf. Tac. Hist. 2.92.1), but this action also ensured that Caecina could expect

less support than Valens from the troops now based in Rome.

although the actual

organisation of the cohorts seems to have been carried out by Valens (Tac. Hist. 2.93.2).

636 For these events and the involvement of the Praetorian Guard see Chapter Three. 637 For a more detailed discussion of this passage see pp 18 – 9. 638 Morgan (2006, 162) writes that the plan may have been the work of Caecina and Valens. See also Ash 2007, 360 – 1.

186

The large increase in both the number of Rome based cohorts and possibly the

size of the effective was almost certainly due to Vitellius’ need to reward his victorious

soldiers, particularly as a donative is not recorded as being offered immediately

following the victory at Bedriacum, nor on their arrival in Rome. Service in the city

cohorts may well have been offered as an incentive before hostilities began and now in

Rome, Vitellius carried through on his promise and granted his soldiers the right to

choose in which branch of the army they wanted to serve (Tac. Hist. 2.94.1). Vitellius

or Valens would have been aware that by returning to the previous twelve Praetorian

cohorts they would simply not be able to reward as many of their soldiers as they

wanted or needed to. The reorganisation of the Praetorian and Urban cohorts should

have resulted in 20 000 soldiers now being permanently based in Rome (Tac. Hist.

2.94.1). However, it is impossible to know if this was notional only or if all the cohorts

did actually have their full complement. The whole process of enrolling these men may

also have taken considerable time.

Vitellius’ indulgence to the soldiers may initially seem excessive, but as

Murison rightly points out, before taking up his post in Lower Germany Vitellius would

have witnessed the increasing hostility of the Praetorians toward Galba and as a

consequence Vitellius tried to reward his soldiers as lavishly as possible.639

Even though Vitellius had allowed his soldiers the opportunity to serve in

whatever branch of the Roman army they desired (Tac. Hist. 2.94.1), the soldiers were

still not satisfied and demanded the punishment of three Gallic chiefs, who had fought

for C. Julius Vindex (Tac. Hist. 2.94.2). Now these soldiers may well have

encompassed more than just the newly enrolled Praetorians, but the soldiers’ demand

for the punishment of these three men is reminiscent of Otho’s Praetorians demanding

the death of Marius Celsus (Tac. Hist. 1.45.2; Plut. Galba 27.6). However, while Otho

was able to keep Celsus from falling into the hands of the soldiers, Vitellius felt that he

was unable to refuse because he is aware that he would soon be expected to pay his

soldiers a donative. By indulging his soldiers in every other way possible, Vitellius

hoped that he would have time to get the necessary finances together (Tac. Hist. 2.94.2).

Yet Tacitus’ claim (Hist. 2.94.2), that Vitellius needed time to get the money together

for his donative, is somewhat at odds with his later allegation that Vitellius had

Tacitus

(Hist. 2.94.1) strongly condemns the way in which the soldiers were reorganised,

commenting that not only was the strength of the legions and cavalry drawn off, but

also the castrorum decus was shaken.

639 Murison 1999, 76.

187

managed to squander 900 million sesterces, a figure supported by Dio (64.3.2).

Vitellius clearly had access to some financial reserves.

Certainly, no extant source records a payment of a donative to his newly formed

Praetorian Guard. However, Tacitus (Hist. 4.36.1) does indicate that Vitellius had

indeed despatched a donative, at some time, to the soldiers still serving on the frontier.

If the soldiers on the frontier received a donative, it seems unlikely that the members of

his Praetorian Guard were not likewise rewarded, although Vitellius’ Praetorians may

have perceived their new positions in the Rome cohorts as their reward in place of a

regular donative.

The Second Battle of Bedriacum

When Vitellius finally became alarmed about the approaching Flavian forces, he

ordered his two generals, Caecina and Valens, to prepare for war (Tac. Hist. 2. 99.1).

Vitellius’ newly formed Praetorian Guard were not part of the expedition force,

remaining instead in Rome (Tac. Hist. 2.100.1) and consequently did not participate in

the Second Battle of Bedriacum (Tac. Hist. 3.16.1 – 33.2). However, when Fabius

Valens on his march north heard about the defection of Lucilius Bassus and the fleet of

Ravenna to the Flavian faction, some of his advisors wanted him to summon the

Praetorian cohorts from Rome (Tac. Hist. 3.40.2). Valens apparently wasted valuable

time, but he did eventually write to Vitellius requesting help and in response Vitellius

sent him three cohorts and a squadron of cavalry from Britain. (Tac. Hist. 3.40.2 –

41.1.). The identity of these three cohorts is not known. Wellesley argues that these

three cohorts were “the vastly inferior and potentially disloyal urban cohorts,”640 while

Morgan suggests that the three cohorts were drawn from the auxiliary forces still in

Rome at that time.641

While Vitellius’ Praetorians were absent from the Second Battle of Bedriacum,

members of Otho’s former Praetorian Guard were certainly present (Tac. Hist. 3.21.2).

Unfortunately, Tacitus does not provide us with any information on the number of

former Praetorian Guardsmen who went on to re-enlist on the Flavian side and who

found themselves fighting under the command of Antonius Primus. The number of

This does seem the most likely scenario, as it more probable that

the Urban cohorts remained in Rome. They were certainly not Praetorian cohorts as

these can be accounted for later in Tacitus’ narrative (Hist. 3.55.1 – 2).

640 Wellesley 1972, 133. 641 Morgan 2006, 232. Wellesley (1981, 174) also feels that these three cohorts may well have been auxiliary units.

188

Praetorians was enough for them to be mentioned as an independent body on the

battlefield and to be able to fight under their own vexillum (Tac. Hist. 3.21.2).

The Second Battle of Bedriacum lasted throughout the 24 October and continued

until sometime after dawn on 25 October (Tac. Hist. 3.16.1 – 33.2). From Tacitus’

narrative it is quite possible to draw a relatively clear plan of the battle, but information

on the activities of the ex-Praetorians is relatively slight. In the Flavian battle line, the

Praetorians were positioned next to the third Legion, which Tacitus (Hist. 3.21.2) tells

us was distributed amongst dense thickets. The Praetorians may have initially been held

in reserve, as Tacitus (Hist. 3.23.1) writes that Antonius Primus brought them up at

some point to strengthen a wavering line. At first the ex-Othonian Praetorian soldiers

managed to drive back the enemy, but were eventually driven back themselves because

of the Vitellian artillery (Tac. Hist. 3.23.1 – 2). While these details regarding the role of

the Praetorians in this engagement are meagre, there is nothing to indicate that the

Praetorians did not fight as well as any other army group.642 The fact that they were

driven back does not seem to be due to any lack of soldierly ability, rather it was due to

an enormous ballista, which belonged to the fifteenth legion and was creating

considerable damage to the Flavian line (Tac. Hist. 3.23.2). This powerful piece of

artillery was only stopped by the bravery of two soldiers, who concealed their identity

by borrowing shields from fallen enemy soldiers and managed to get close enough to

cut its ropes and springs (Tac. Hist. 3.23.2; Dio 65.14.2). Whether these two soldiers

were former Othonian Praetorians is impossible to tell.643

Just before dawn and while the battle was still in progress, Antonius Primus took

the opportunity to address his troops (Tac. Hist. 3.24.1 – 3), although considering the

time and circumstances of this speech, it is difficult to imagine how many of the

soldiers would have been in a position to hear a word Antonius had to say. Some

soldiers he urged on with praise and encouragement, while with others he used shame

and reproaches (Tac. Hist. 3.24.1 – 2). The Praetorian soldiers fell into the latter

category. According to Tacitus (Hist. 3.24.3), Primus indignantly said to them:

Vos,…nisi vincitis, pagani, quis alius imperator, quae castra alia excipient? Illic signa

armaque vestra sunt, et mors victis; nam ignominiam consumpsistis.

644

642 Dio (65.11.3 – 14.4) has a description of the Second Battle of Cremona; however, his account adds no further information regarding the role played by the ex-Praetorian Guardsmen.

The purpose of

643 Wellesley (1972, 108 and 1979, 148) and Murison (1999, 106) are convinced that the two soldiers were ex-Othonian Praetorians. 644 “As for you, clowns that you are, if you do not win today, what other general or other camp will take you in? Yonder are your standards and your arms, and, if defeated, death; for dishonour you have exhausted.”

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the speech is clear; he is trying to encourage the Praetorians to fight even harder.645

Whether these were the actual words used by Primus to address Otho’s former

Praetorians will never be known. However, there can be no denying that these words

would not be out of place if they were entirely constructed by Tacitus.646 Tacitus would

have known that only a new emperor would be able to reinstate these Praetorians into

the Guard and to have the opportunity of reinstatement would require the defeat of the

Vitellians. If they failed, after betraying Galba for Otho and failing for Otho against

Vitellius, they would not be in a position to expect any favours from Vespasian.647

In the engagement that followed Primus’ address and the storming of Cremona

by the troops of Vespasian, there is no further specific mention of the Praetorian

soldiers, although their continuing involvement need not be doubted. It would also

seem likely that the Praetorians took an active part in the suffering inflicted on the

people of Cremona after the town had fallen to Primus and his troops. Indeed, Josephus

(BJ 4.642) notes that Antonius allowed his soldiers to pillage Cremona and even though

Dio (65.15.2) tells us that it was the Vitellian troops who were the worst offenders; his

account is entirely at variance with Tacitus’ version of events and seems highly

unlikely.

648

The mobilisation of Vitellius’ Praetorian Cohorts

The Praetorian cohorts649

645 Damon 2006, 259.

established by Vitellius, and at Rome during the fighting at

Bedriacum, were finally mobilised when Vitellius realised that Antonius Primus and his

army were approaching the capital (Tac. Hist. 3.54.1). Tacitus (Hist. 3.55.1) reports

that Vitellius ordered his two Praetorian Prefects, Julius Priscus and Alfenus Varus

(Publilius Sabinus had already been moved from his post by this time) to block the

passes of the Apennines with fourteen Praetorian cohorts and all the cavalry. A legion

of marines followed later. Tacitus (Hist. 3.55.1) claims that these men would have been

equal to the task of taking the offensive, if a better commander had led them. The

movement of fourteen cohorts effectively left two Praetorian cohorts behind in the

646 Ash (2002, 159) notes that Primus’ address to his troops outside Cremona recall the methods of idealized commanders such as Caesar (BAfr. 81), who used different techniques in order to motivate his veteran soldiers and the new recruits. 647 Wellesley 1972, 110. 648 For an discussion on who was to blame for Cremona’s destruction see Morgan 1996b 389 – 403. 649 Tacitus is often vague about the nature of the term cohors, and it becomes difficult to know for certain whether he is referring to auxiliary cohorts or the Praetorian cohorts of Vitellius. Wellesley (1981, 175), however, in what seems an accurate understanding, claims that unqualified cohors is to be read as Praetorian if the context suggests it.

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capital and Vitellius placed them under the command of his brother, L. Vitellius, for the

defence of Rome (Tac. Hist. 3.55.2).

Unfortunately for the Vitellian cause, the two Prefects and their fourteen

Praetorian cohorts do not seem to have made particularly good progress and by the time

Vitellius joined them, they had only marched some 72 miles north up the Via Flaminia

and had stopped at Mevania (Bevagna)650 (Tac. Hist. 3.55.3). Not only had the progress

of the Praetorian cohorts to Mevania been slow, but also the failure of the two Prefects

to go further than Mevania and secure the Apennine passes at Furlo and Scheggia

suggests poor leadership on their part651

Moreover, Tacitus definitely seems to think that the Vitellian Praetorians were

more than equal to the task (Tac. Hist. 3.55.1), particularly as it is almost certain that the

Praetorians outnumbered the forces available to Antonius Primus

and as Tacitus (Hist. 3.55.3, 56.3) indicates, of

Vitellius.

652

Vitellius had initially chosen to stay behind in Rome rather than accompany his

Praetorians north, even though the troops were demanding his presence (Tac. Hist.

3.55.3). Eventually, however, Vitellius did heed the demands of his soldiers and joined

them in camp at Mevania (Tac. Hist. 3.55.3), although he did not stay with his

Praetorians for long. While Vitellius was encamped at Mevania, he heard of the

defection of the fleet at Misenum on the Bay of Naples and in response he returned to

Rome without leaving any specific orders for his Praetorian cohorts to cross the

Apennines and attack the advancing Flavian forces (Tac. Hist. 3.56.2 – 3). Instead,

Vitellius split up his force, dispatching six cohorts along with 500 cavalry under the

command of his brother, L. Vitellius, to Campania, to put down the mutiny at Misenum

(Tac. Hist. 3.58.1). There is no indication in Tacitus’ narrative that these six cohorts

were actually Praetorian cohorts, but considering the composition of the force that left

Rome, fourteen Praetorian cohorts (and Tacitus is specific here) and all the cavalry,

and the Flavian

forces had had to deal with exhaustion brought on by severe winter storms while

crossing the Apennines (Hist. 3.59.2). Indeed, the advancing Flavian forces were

uncertain as to what to do when they believed the passes were being guarded (Tac. Hist.

3.50.3). However, whether a successful defence of the Apennine passes at this time

would have resulted in overall victory for the Vitellian armies cannot be speculated

upon.

650 Mevania lies about 5 miles from the point where the Via Flaminia comes out from the foothills of the Apennines (Morgan 2006, 232). 651 Ashby and Fell, 1921, 129; Wellesley 1972, 153. 652 Wellesley 1979, 156.

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with a legion of marines following later (Tac. Hist. 3.55.1), it seems unlikely that they

were not Praetorian cohorts.653

Tacitus does not mention how the soldiers felt about Vitellius retiring to Rome,

but his retreat from the front line is reminiscent of Otho’s withdrawal to Brixellum (Tac.

Hist. 2.33.2; cf. Plut. Otho 10.1; Suet. Otho 9.1; Dio 64.10.2). Otho’s forces were

disturbed by this event (Tac. Hist. 2.33.3; Plut. Otho 10.1) and in all likelihood,

Vitellius’ forces were probably concerned by their emperor’s actions. It may well have

had the same effect on the soldiers, namely increasing the favourable feeling toward the

Flavian faction, as his “timid retreat” had on other sectors of society (Tac. Hist. 3.59.1).

One other Praetorian cohort returned to Rome with

Vitellius (cf. Tac. Hist. 3.78.2), bringing the total number of Praetorian cohorts billeted

in the capital to three. Vitellius allowed the forces, presumably at least some of the

remaining Praetorian cohorts with the Praetorian Prefects, to fall back to Narnia (Tac.

Hist. 3.58.1).

The march to Rome

After successfully crossing the undefended Apennines, the Flavian forces rested in

Carsulae (Casigliano), just 10 Roman miles from the Praetorian soldiers of Vitellius

based at Narnia (Tac. Hist. 3.60.1). There is no mention of the composition of these

forces, but it can be assumed that any of the former Othonian Praetorians who had

survived the Second Battle at Bedriacum were present in Carsulae. It would be foolish

to leave them behind. Firstly, Antonius Primus needed all the troops he could muster

for his assault on Rome and secondly, the ex-Praetorians would have been able to

supply their commander with important intelligence. Otho’s ex-Praetorians would have

been familiar with the terrain around Rome and more importantly with the topography

of the capital itself.

Within a few days of Primus’ arrival at Carsulae, the Vitellian cohorts at Narnia

also learnt that the legions had caught up with the advance force and were now also at

Carsulae (Tac. Hist. 3.61.1). Tacitus does not specify whether these Vitellian cohorts

were his new Praetorians or some other unit. However, one has to suspect that some of

these ‘Vitellian cohorts’ must have been from Vitellius’ Praetorian Guard. The

response of Vitellius’ forces to the news that the legions had also arrived in Carsulae

was far from what Vitellius might have expected.

653 Modern scholars support the idea that the six cohorts were indeed Praetorian, see Wellesley 1972, 155; Morgan 2006, 234.

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The Praetorian Prefects abandoned the camp and returned to Rome (Tac. Hist.

3.61.3). What role, if any, the Prefects took in the fight against the Flavian forces is not

known. They are not mentioned again in Tacitus’ narrative in relation to the battle on

the Capitoline hill or in the battle for Rome. They do, however, reappear after

Mucianus had arrived in Rome and Tacitus (Hist. 4.11.3) informs us that Julius Priscus

committed suicide, an act that was “prompted by shame rather than necessity,” while

Alfenus Varus survived his own cowardice and disgrace. If Tacitus (Hist. 3.61.3) is

correct and the two Prefects did indeed return to Vitellius, it seems rather surprising that

Vitellius took no action against them. They had abandoned the scene of the battle

without their emperor’s orders, yet Vitellius did not punish them for treason. Perhaps,

rather than returning to Rome, the two Prefects actually surrendered to Antonius Primus

at Mevania or Narnia. This would explain their survival at the hands of Vitellius and

the fact that the Flavian faction did not punish them.

Tacitus, however, saves his most severe criticism and rhetoric for the behaviour

of the officers. Again, whether these were the new Praetorian officers is not specified

by Tacitus, but arguably some must have been from the seven Praetorian cohorts

remaining in the area. Tacitus (Hist. 3.61.1) writes that the officers, rather than

encouraging the soldiers to stand and fight, actually encouraged them to desert and that

they rivalled “one another in handing over their centuries and squadrons as a gift to the

victors and a security for their own reward later.” Later, Tacitus (Hist. 3.61.3) adds:

Nec ulla apud Vitellianos flagitii poena, et praemiis defectorum versa fides ac reliquum

perfidiae certamen. Crebra transfugia tribunorum centurionumque.654

Undoubtedly, the Praetorian officers did encourage the soldiers to give up even

before a battle started, did go over to the Flavian faction, and were probably rewarded

for their desertion. However, Tacitus’ account of the events here seems to reflect his

own moral and ethical views and he does not seem to have considered the situation on

the ground. The tribunes and the centurions may well have realised that defeating the

Flavian forces was going to be exceptionally difficult, even if they were initially

successful in dealing with the forces of Antonius Primus. Vitellius’ forces were

hemmed in, as Tacitus (Hist. 3.60.2) notes, between Tarracina and Narnia; there could

have been little hope of ultimate victory. In addition, their emperor and the Praetorian

Prefects had hardly demonstrated strong and determined leadership. By abandoning the

camp, Vitellius indicated to his officers and soldiers that he was not willing to fight with

654 “With the Vitellians there was no punishment for cowardice; those who went over to the Flavians received the rewards of their treachery; the only rivalry left was in perfidy. Among the tribunes and centurions desertions were frequent.”

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them and their Prefects had abandoned them at the first sign of trouble. Faced with

these facts the officers may have judged treachery, under these conditions, something of

a virtue. Their actions probably saved the lives of thousands of soldiers.

While the officers were quick to surrender, Tacitus (Hist. 3.61.3) tells us that the

soldiers of Vitellius’ Praetorians remained steadfastly loyal. As Ash correctly notes, the

lower the rank the more loyalty they showed.655 However, and unsurprisingly, the

soldiers’ loyalty was rapidly extinguished when the Praetorian Prefects, Priscus and

Alfenus, abandoned the camp and headed for Rome (Tac. Hist. 3.61.3). Tacitus (Hist.

3.61.3) writes: donec Priscus et Alfenus desertis castris ad Vitellium regressi pudore

proditionis cunctos exsolverent.656

The surrender of Vitellius’ Praetorians and other forces was carried out with

honour (Tac. Hist. 3.63.1) and was accepted by Antonius. Antonius ordered half their

number to remain at Narnia, while the other cohorts were ordered to Interamna (Tac.

Hist. 3.63.1). With the threat from these seven newly formed Vitellian Praetorians

extinguished, the road to Rome was open to Antonius and his army, including the

remaining ex-Othonian Guardsmen.

These are harsh words from Tacitus and seem a

rather unsympathetic assessment of the actions of the soldiers.

The Praetorian Guard and the war in Campania

According to Tacitus (Hist. 3.57.1), it was Claudius Flaventinus, a centurion previously

dishonourably discharged by Galba, who had instigated rebellion in the fleet at

Misenum. While there is nothing specific to indicate that Flaventinus had previously

served in one of the cohorts based in Rome, it might be the case, especially as Galba

discharged a number of other officers from the Praetorian and Urban cohorts (Tac. Hist.

1.20.3). Flaventinus, with the use of letters, possibly forged, from Vespasian, promised

the marines rewards if they changed sides and supported the Flavians. His revolt was

quickly joined by the commander of the fleet, Claudius Apollinaris, and Apinius Tiro,

an ex-praetor based at Minturnae. These men encouraged the municipal towns of

Campania to action (Tac. Hist. 3.57.1 – 2).

Vitellius’ initial response to the defection of the fleet was to dispatch Claudius

Julianus,657

655 Ash 2002, 51.

the previous commander of the fleet at Misenum, to reconcile the mutinous

troops. To help Julianus, Vitellius gave him one of the Urban cohorts and the gladiators

656 “until now Priscus and Alfenus by abandoning the camp and returning to Vitellius set them all free from any shame of treachery.” 657 Pliny (HN 37.45) writes that Claudius Julianus was in charge of a display of gladiators given by Nero

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that were presently under his command. However, Julianus’ loyalty to Vitellius was

weak, and it did not take long for him to abandon Vitellius’ cause and join with the

rebel forces. Presumably the forces under Julianus’ command, the Urban Cohorts and

the gladiators, also defected. The combined forces then occupied the town of Tarracina

(Tac. Hist. 3.57.2).

Once Vitellius had received news of Julianus’ defection, he dispatched six

cohorts and five hundred cavalry to Campania under the command of his brother, L.

Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 3.57.1). As previously noted, there is no specific indication in

Tacitus’ narrative that these cohorts were actually Vitellius’ Praetorians, but this seems

to be the case. L. Vitellius and his six cohorts managed to blockade Tarracina, with its

force of gladiators and marines (Tac. Hist. 3.76.1). At this point, Tacitus makes no

mention of the Urban cohort which had accompanied Claudius Julianus from Rome, but

Morgan is surely correct in his suggestion that this was because they had already left

Tarracina a few days earlier with Apinius Tiro. Otherwise it is difficult to imagine Tiro

could have generated the level of unpopularity in Campania described by Tacitus (Hist.

3.76.2) unless he was accompanied by an armed force, which in this case was the Urban

cohort.658

What ensued was a “massacre” of the supporters of Vespasian, by Vitellius’

Praetorians. Apollinaris, the commander of the fleet, escaped with six Liburnian

galleys, but the remainder of the ships were captured. Julianus was taken captive and

executed by L. Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 3.77.2 – 3). Vitellius’ Praetorians had had a

military success.

659

Once Tarracina had been taken, L. Vitellius sent word of his victory to his

brother and asked him whether he should return to Rome or press on to other rebellious

towns in Campania (Tac. Hist. 3.76.3), possibly to pursue Tiro and the renegade Urban

cohort. Vitellius was slow in responding and the failure of Vitellius to order his brother

and the victorious Praetorian cohorts back to Rome was in Tacitus’ opinion (Hist.

3.76.4), a crucial mistake on the emperor’s part. Indeed six extra cohorts, in Rome, at

the time when the Flavian forces arrived in the city, may well have made a significant

However, this is not altogether surprising. If the six Praetorian

cohorts were at full strength, then the gladiators and marines occupying Tarracina

would have faced a force of approximately 6000 former German legionaries and 500

cavalry. The chance of them holding Tarracina, in the face of such strong opposition,

was always going to be slim.

658 Morgan 1992, 127 – 8. 659 Dio (64.16.2) confirms the basic details, that Vitellius sent his brother to Tarracina and occupied it.

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difference to the outcome of the battle for Rome. What became of these six Vitellian

Praetorian cohorts is not known. However, as L. Vitellius came to terms with the

Flavian forces sent after him (Dio 65.22.1), it seems likely that Vitellius’ Praetorians

also surrendered to the Flavian commanders.

The battle on the Capitol

While Vitellius’ Praetorian cohorts were surrendering to the forces of Antonius, Flavius

Sabinus, Vespasian’s elder brother and Urban Prefect, was being urged to claim “his

share of victory and glory” (Tac. Hist. 3.64.1). The primores civitatis – and Tacitus

does not supply any names at this point, although he may have known some of them

personally – apparently said to Sabinus, “You have…your own military force in the city

cohorts, and the cohorts of the police…” (Tac. Hist. 3.64.1). Sabinus, however, was not

interested in fighting and tried to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Vitellius (Tac.

Hist. 3.65.1 – 2 .

What is interesting here is not necessarily Sabinus’ refusal to fight, but if the

statement made by the primores civitates is correct and not just an invention of Tacitus,

it would indicate that Sabinus could rely on the support of the Urban cohorts.

Consequently, this would mean that the majority of the soldiers serving in the Urban

cohorts at this time must have been serving in that position under Nero and Otho,

otherwise, they would not necessarily be loyal to Sabinus. On the contrary, if the

majority of the soldiers in the Urban cohorts were recruited from the German legions, as

Tacitus (Hist. 2.92.1) seems to indicate, one would have expected them to be loyal to

Vitellius. Furthermore, it would seem unlikely that Sabinus would have had time, or the

opportunity, to corrupt the loyalty of the former German legionaries. As also noted

previously, the Urban cohort that was dispatched by Vitellius to Campania seems to

have gone along with their leader Julianus in defecting to the Flavian party without any

hesitation (Tac. Hist. 3.57.2) again, an indication that the Urban cohorts were not

primarily new recruits from the German legions. This may explain what happened to

the Urban cohorts once they had successfully engaged the Vitellian forces in Narbonese

Gaul. Unlike their Praetorian counterparts (Tac. Hist. 3.43.1), they may well have

returned to Rome with Aemilius Pacensis, whom we know died on the Capitol fighting

with Sabinus (Tac. Hist. 3.73.2). Vitellius chose not to disband them entirely, as he had

the Praetorians.660

660 Scholars over the years have expressed many views on the reason the Urban cohorts constituted a force that Flavius Sabinus could rely upon. See Chilver (1979, 255) for a summary. Nicols (1987, 162)

196

When word reached Vitellius that the Praetorian cohorts based at Narnia had

surrendered to the Flavian forces, he seems to have lost all hope of reversing the

situation and came down from the Palace in mourning clothes with the intention of

abdicating (Tac. Hist. 3.67.1 – 68.2; cf Suet. Vit. 15.2). At an assembly, called by

Vitellius and inter suos milites possibly some of these soldiers were members of his

Praetorian cohorts he said that he was going to withdraw for the sake of peace and his

country. However, it would seem that his sui milites and the people of Rome were not

going to allow this to happen and they blocked all the paths, with the exception of the

one that returned Vitellius to the Palace.

While Vitellius’ abdication may have been stopped, the rumour had already

spread that this was his chosen course of action. In response to this belief, the first

stated action of Flavius Sabinus was to write to the tribunes of the cohorts “to hold the

troops in check.” Whether these tribunes are from the Praetorian Guard, the Urban

cohorts or the Vigiles is not specified by Tacitus. A meeting of the leading senators, the

majority of the equites and omnis miles urbanus et vigiles, was also held in Sabinus’

house (Tac. Hist. 3.69.1; cf Dio 65.17.1). The Praetorian Guard are noticeably absent,

but this is not particularly surprising; they were probably considered still loyal to

Vitellius. While Sabinus probably did hold some sort of meeting at his house, the

suggestion that the meeting was attended by omnis…miles urbanus et vigiles (Tac. Hist.

3.69.1) is improbable. Sabinus’ house would simply not have accommodated so many

men. One can probably safely assume that Tacitus means here that it was the tribunes

and possibly centurions of the Urban cohorts and Vigiles that were present.661

At some point Sabinus left his house with his armed retinue, although who

constituted this armed retinue is not stated. Sabinus was met at the Fundanus, by the

promptissimi Vitellianorum (Tac. Hist. 3.69.2; cf. Dio 65.17.2), of whom some at least

must have been members of the Vitellian Praetorian cohorts. A small conflict ensued

which the Vitellian forces appear to have won.

While

the meeting at Sabinus’ house was under way, Tacitus (Hist. 3.69.1) notes that the

German cohorts were making threats. This is surely a reference by Tacitus to the three

Vitellian Praetorian cohorts still in Rome, but instead of calling them Praetorians,

Tacitus resorts to referring to them as German legionaries.

Uncertain of what to do next, Sabinus eventually chose to occupy the citadel on

the Capitoline (Tac. Hist. 3.69.3; cf. Dio 65.17.2; Suet. Vit. 15.3). Accompanying and Freis (1967, 38) both suggest that Vitellius did not disband the Urban cohorts, but increased the effective. 661 Wellesley 1981, 173 – 4.

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Sabinus was a mixed body of soldiers (Tac. Hist. 3.69.3; cf. Dio 65.17.2), some senators

and equites. This miscellaneous body of troops probably included some members of the

Urban cohorts and Vigiles, but their exact composition or numbers is not disclosed by

Tacitus, if he himself, or his source, actually knew. What ensued was a two-day siege

of the Capitoline Hill.662

Tacitus (Hist. 3.69) tells us that on the first day of the siege the Vitellian forces

were so careless in their duties that Sabinus was able to call his owns sons and his

nephew Domitian onto the Capitoline to join him. Moreover, Sabinus was also able to

get a message out to the Flavian forces to request help, and could possibly have escaped

himself if he had chosen to (Tac. Hist. 3.69.4). Tacitus (Hist. 3.69.4) does not describe

the forces besieging Sabinus as Praetorians, so their involvement in the siege, cannot be

certain, but it seems likely that at least some Vitellius’ Praetorians took part. Lazy and

incompetent the Vitellian soldiers may well have been, but the fact remains that Sabinus

and his followers did not escape. Why? Of course, they may have decided to stay and

wait for rescue from the Flavian forces or perhaps they were experiencing the same

problems as the Vitellians, mis-reading the situation because of the downpour of winter

rain (Tac. Hist. 3.69.4). Alternatively, the watch set up by the Vitellians may have

allowed small numbers of people to pass, but it was efficient enough to ensure that the

majority of Sabinus’ supporters were incapable of escape. This may explain why

Sabinus made the seemingly inexplicable decision to bring his sons and Vespasian’s

younger son, Domitian, onto the Capitoline, where their lives would be in danger.

Sabinus was hoping that the presence of Domitian would ensure that the Flavian forces

would hurry to his rescue.

663

Among the body of soldiers who accompanied Sabinus was a primipilaris,

Cornelius Martialis. We know nothing else about this man, but it would be reasonable

to assume that he was serving in an Urban cohort at this time. On the morning of the

second day of the siege, Cornelius Martialis was charged with the task of delivering

Vitellius a message from Sabinus. Martialis completed his assigned task but was forced

to leave Vitellius by a secret part of the Palace, in case the soldiers attacked and killed

him as a “mediator of a peace which they detested” (Tac. Hist. 3.70.4). This statement

may be correct, but many of Vitellius’ soldiers may also have viewed Martialis, and not

662 Whether Tacitus is describing the Capitolium proper, or the arx, is debatable. In favour of the Capitolium see Wellesley 1981, 166 – 89; contra see Wiseman 1978, 163 – 78. See also Scott 1984, 109 – 10. 663 Wellesley (1981, 172) notes that the accusation that Flavius Sabinus could have escaped from the Capitoline Hill that night may also be propaganda put about by the faction of Antonius Primus in an attempt to free him from accusations that he was to slow to relieve the siege.

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without reason, as a traitor to their emperor. Martialis, however, did manage to return

unharmed to the Capitol (Tac. Hist. 3.71.1). Either the watch set by the Vitellian

soldiers was no better in the daytime and Martialis was able to elude the soldiers, or the

Vitellians allowed him to pass unmolested because he carried a message to Sabinus

from their emperor.

Very shortly after Martialis’ return, the Vitellian forces began to besiege the

Capitol (Tac. Hist. 3.71.1; cf. Dio 65.17.3). Again, Tacitus does not state the

composition of this force, although the involvement of the cohorts of the Vitellian

Praetorian Guard remaining in Rome seems probable. Who ordered this attack is also

not recorded, but it does not seem to have been ordered by Vitellius, particularly as it

was not necessarily in his best interest at this late stage. Possibly, the Vitellian soldiers

had been fired up by their encounter with the Flavian general, Petilius Cerialis, that

morning664

The siege ended in disaster for Sabinus and his supporters. The gates of the

Capitoline citadel were burnt down, as was the Capitol, in what Tacitus describes as the

“saddest and most shameful crime that the Roman state had ever suffered since its

foundation” (Tac. Hist. 3.71.1 - 72.1). The Vitellian soldiers, probably including some

Praetorians, handled the storming of the Capitol well and they lacked neither “skill nor

courage in the midst of danger” (Tac. Hist. 3.73.1). No doubt, properly trained soldiers,

as were the majority of the Vitellian troops in Rome, were better able to cope with the

situation than the rather mixed group of Flavian supporters. These soldiers were

probably the same Vitellian troops who just the previous night, according to Tacitus

(Hist. 3.69.4), were lazy and incapable of keeping a proper watch. It seems unlikely

that they could fit both descriptions, lazy and incapable, and skilled and courageous,

simultaneously.

and in their fury took it upon themselves to end the siege.

Tacitus provides us with the names of four men who died fighting on the Flavian

side, including the above mentioned primus pilus, Cornelius Martialis, the former

commander of the Maritime expedition, Aemilius Pacensis,665

664 Wellesley (1981, 168) provides a well thought out timeline on the events from the capitulation of the Vitellian troops at Narnia, to the execution of Vitellius.

and two previously

unknown men Casperius Niger and Didius Scaeva. Sabinus survived the siege but was

arrested and taken before Vitellius where the soldiers and the “lowest plebeians”

demanded his punishment. Vitellius tried to appeal to the troops in an attempt to save

Sabinus, but they forced him to withdraw and ran Sabinus through (Tac. Hist. 3.74.2).

The scene is again reminiscent of Otho trying to save Marius Celsus from the wrath of

665 For further discussion of Aemilius Pacensis see pp 89 – 90 and 141.

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his Praetorian Guard, only in that instance Otho had enough control over the Praetorians

to save Celsus.

The Praetorian Guard and the battle for Rome

On the morning of the same day as the Vitellian soldiers attacked Flavius Sabinus on

the Capitol, a force under the control of the Flavian general, Q. Petillius Cerialis

Caesius Rufus,666

The lack of knowledge of the streets helped to ensure that Cerialis and his

cavalry were defeated in the encounter (Tac. Hist. 3.79.2). However, besides the lack of

knowledge of the city layout, Cerialis’ forces, according to Tacitus (Hist. 3.79.2), also

contained troops who had only recently surrendered at Narnia and who were not willing

to commit themselves to either side. Their lack of commitment is hardly surprising and

the decision to include them in the force seems highly irregular. The whole skirmish

was a disaster for Cerialis and his forces were beaten. It may have been Cerialis’ attack,

which enraged the soldiers and led to the storming of Flavius Sabinus on the Capitol.

clashed with the Vitelliani on the outskirts of Rome. Tacitus does not

specify the involvement of Vitellius’ Praetorians, but it is difficult to believe that they

did not play an important part in the fighting. Cerialis had been sent on in advance with

1000 cavalry with the intention of entering Rome by the Via Salaria (Tac. Hist. 3.78.3).

The battle took place in the city among the buildings, gardens and winding streets. The

area in which the fighting took place was not known to the forces commanded by

Cerialis, but was familiar to Vitellius’ soldiers (Tac. Hist. 3.79.2). This problem,

encountered by Cerialis, clearly indicates the important role the ex-Othonian Praetorians

would play in guiding the forces, under the command of Antonius, through the streets of

Rome. In street warfare, knowledge of the back alleys, short cuts and dead ends would

be paramount.

It was the following day, after this somewhat inauspicious start, that Otho’s

former Praetorians finally came face to face with their replacements. Antonius and the

Flavian forces had travelled south along the Via Flaminia to Rubra Saxa, arriving

sometime during the night of 19 or 20 December.667

666 Both Tacitus (Hist. 3.59.2) and Dio (65.18.1) connect Cerialis, by marriage, to Vespasian.

There is no specific mention of the

ex-Othonian Praetorians, but as has been noted previously, it would be in the streets and

alleys of Rome where the former Praetorian Guardsmen would be of most use to their

commander. It was at Rubra Saxa that Antonius heard of the fate of Sabinus (Tac. Hist.

3.79.1). On receipt of the news, the soldiers were eager to move straight on to Rome,

667 Wellesley 1981, 168.

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but Antonius managed to persuade them to camp by the Mulvian Bridge and enter

Rome the following day (Tac. Hist. 3.82.1). Undoubtedly, the ex-Praetorians were

among these impatient soldiers. Rome was their home, and clearly, they would have

been eager to see family and friends again and take possession of what was once their

barracks.

Tacitus (Hist. 3.82.2; cf Dio 65.19.2) tells us that Antonius Primus divided his

forces and they advanced in three columns. The first column continued their present

course along the Via Flaminia, the second force turned to the right of the Via Flaminia

and moved along the east bank of the Tiber until it reached the Aurelian Gate. This

route gave the access to the Campus Martius, and the third column turned to the left and

moved through the depression between the Picinian and Quirinal hills towards the

Gardens of Sallust and the Praetorian camp, by the Salarian Way.668

There were a number of skirmishes between the Flavian forces and Vitellius’

Praetorians in sight of the city walls and, although the outcomes of each encounter

varied, it was the better led Flavians that were often more successful (Tac. Hist. 3.82.2).

There were also skirmishes near the gardens of Sallust and in the Campus Martius.

While the Vitellian soldiers were beaten, more often than not, they did not give up

easily (Tac. Hist. 3.82.3; cf. Dio 65.19.1 – 3).

Tacitus does not

provide us with a break down of the composition of these three columns so we have no

indication in which column the ex-Praetorians proceeded. However, it would be

reasonable to assume that the Othonian Praetorians may well have been divided up

between the three columns, in order to provide each column with topographical

information about the city.

It is at this point that the absence of the six Praetorian cohorts, in Campania,

must have become acutely obvious. Vitellius may have been slow to act in recalling

these troops or possibly he may have wanted the force to remain in Campania. If things

went badly in Rome, Vitellius would then have an armed force outside the city, to

which he could escape if necessary. Certainly, our sources indicate that Vitellius

considered this option (Tac. Hist. 3.84.4; Dio 65.20.1; Suet. Vit. 16).

The greatest problem to be overcome, however, was in storming the Praetorian

camp, which Tacitus (Hist. 3.84.1) tells us the bravest of the Praetorians of Vitellius

defended “as their last hope.” One can imagine that as the battles were lost throughout

the city, more and more of the Vitellian Praetorians, and the others troops in general,

would retreat to the relative safety of its walls. However, it is not surprising to find that

668 See Morgan 2006, 251 and Wellesley 1975, 198.

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the old Praetorian cohorts were particularly determined to overwhelm the camp. Being

able to retake their former home would make up for all the hardships they had suffered

in the various battles in which they had been engaged (Tac. Hist. 3.84.2). Tacitus

reports, in indirect speech, that the soldiers apparently cried out – We have given back

the city to the Senate and the Roman people…we have restored the temples to the gods.

The soldier’s glory is in his camp: that is his native city, that his penates. If the camp is

not at once recovered, we must spend the night under arms (Tac. Hist. 3.84). Now this

speech is surely an invention of Tacitus, and how important the former Praetorians

considered the notion of returning the city to the Senate and the people is highly

debatable, but the strong feelings expressed, regarding the affection and familiarity the

soldiers felt for their camp, are probably quite correct. A similar sentiment is expressed

by the Syrian legions serving under Mucianus. When Mucianus announced that

Vitellius planned to transfer the Syrian legions to Germany and vice versa, the soldiers

were upset because they had friends and family in Syria (Tac. Hist. 2.80.3). In addition,

in AD 14, Percennius complained that even upon discharge, soldiers could be dragged

adhuc diversas in terras, by an unwelcome grant of substandard land in another country

(Tac. Ann. 1.17). Some soldiers clearly associated strongly with the region, in which

they had served. However, it would seem that the former German legionaries, recently

turned Praetorian Guardsmen, were not about to give up the castra praetoria so easily.

Tacitus (Hist. 3.84.1 – 3) describes a furious battle, where it would seem that the

majority of the Vitellian Praetorians, defending the camp, lost their lives.669

When the castra praetoria had finally fallen to the Flavian forces and the battle

for Rome was effectively over, the search was on to locate Vitellius. It was a certain

Julius Placidus, who finally discovered him wandering aimlessly about the palace.

Julius Placidus is described as a tribune of a cohort. By this time, Placidus could have

been a tribune in any one of a number of different cohorts. At no point, from Vitellius’

arrest to his execution on the Gemonian steps, does Antonius seem to have been

consulted about Vitellius’ fate, or if he was, it is not reported by Tacitus (Hist. 3.84.1 –

85.3). It was the soldiers, Praetorian or otherwise, who seem to have decided his end

(Tac. Hist. 3.85). The last ‘official’ action of the soldiers, on this day, was to escort

Vespasian’s son Domitian to his ancestral home. It is possible that a number of these

soldiers were members of Otho’s former Praetorian cohorts. After an absence of just

over eight months, they were back in Rome.

669 Josephus (BJ 4.646) claims that in the battle on the Capitol and in the battle from Rome, the dead numbered at least 50 000. This seems like an exageration.

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Conclusion

Vitellius’ brief reign was one of turmoil and change for the Praetorian Guard. The

waning importance of the Praetorian Prefects first evident in Otho’s reign becomes

particularly evident in the reign of Vitellius. It was Caecina and Valens who had

prosecuted the successful campaign against Otho, they commanded the victorious

armies and therefore it is on these two men that Vitellius’ Principate relies. Not

surprisingly, the Praetorian Prefects are closely linked to these two men and are simply

extensions of the two army commanders. While there is no direct evidence one suspects

that it is Caecina and Valens that shared Vitellius’ confidence and enjoyed the support

of the new Praetorian soldiers, rather than the Prefects. The Prefects were simply less

important than they had been under the Julio-Claudian period.

The men who had served in the Guard of Nero, Galba and Otho were discharged

by Vitellius after their defeat at the First Battle of Bedriacum. They, however, did

continue to play an important role in the events of this turbulent year, when they

unsurprisingly joined the Flavian faction. The actual number of troops this involved is

impossible to estimate and while their presence may not have decided the eventual

outcome of the war between Vespasian and Vitellius, they were undoubtedly an

important part of the Flavian war effort and Tacitus is correct in noting their continual

involvement in the events of the year.

Vitellius’ new Praetorian Guard was recruited from former German legionaries.

Their position in the Guard must have been a reward for their services to Vitellius.

These soldiers were formed into sixteen cohorts each with an effective of 1000 men.

Like other soldiers in the Praetorian Guard, they appear loyal to their emperor to the

end. Again their loyalty is not surprising, Vitellius had made them Praetorians, if he

was overthrown, their position in the Guard would be under threat. However, for the

soldiers outside Rome, Vitellius’ withdrawal from the battlefield and the desertion of

their Praetorian Prefects and officers proved to be too much for the Praetorian soldiers

and they surrendered to the forces of Antonius.

There is little information about the activities and motivations of the Praetorian

officers, either Vitellian or former Othonian, but the officers who surrendered to

Antonius, while acting treacherously towards Vitellius, undoubtedly saved thousands of

lives.

While the forces of Vespasian had been successful, they now faced the

enormous task of not only satisfying the demands of the former Othonian Praetorian

Guard, but also of finding a way of dealing satisfactorily with the large numbers of

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surviving Vitellian Praetorians and perhaps rewarding the soldiers who had fought on

their side. It is this reformation and restructuring of the Praetorian Guard, under the

Flavians, which will be discussed in the final chapter.

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Chapter Six

The Praetorian Guard Under Vespasian

Introduction

Vespasian did not arrive in Rome until somewhere between September and November

AD 70,670

The first Praetorian Prefect of Vespasian’s Principate, Arrius Varus, was

appointed by the Flavian general, Antonius Primus. Varus, however, did not last long

in the position and on Mucianus’ arrival in Rome was removed and replaced by M.

Arrecinus Clemens, who was closely connected to the family of Vespasian. At some

time after Vespasian’s arrival in Rome, the emperor took the unusual step of making his

son, Titus, Praetorian Prefect. It was the first time that a member of the imperial family

had served in this position.

consequently the reorganisation of the Praetorian Guard was handled, at least

initially, by Vespasian’s representatives in Rome, particularly C. Licinius Mucianus.

Mucianus had the wishes of a considerable number of soldiers to consider. Firstly, the

ex-Othonian Praetorian Guard having joined and fought for the Flavian cause,

undoubtedly expected to be reinstated into their old positions. Secondly, the Vitellian

Praetorians might want to retain their place in the Guard, rather than return to the

German frontier, and finally, how many of the victorious Flavian troops viewed service

in the Praetorian Guard, as a reward for their contribution to Vespasian’s war effort?

Mucianus, and later Vespasian, had a difficult task to reconcile the various groups of

soldiers and create a unified Praetorian Guard on which the new emperor could rely.

Unfortunately, the loss of Tacitus’ narrative from early AD 70 has resulted in us

having little information on the activities of the Praetorian Guard under Vespasian.

Vespasian’s Praetorian Prefects

Arrius Varus

Shortly after the death of Vitellius, Antonius Primus, promoted Arrius Varus to the

position of sole Praetorian Prefect (Tac. Hist. 4.2.1). This is a very unusual occurance

for anyone other than the emperor to appoint a Praetorian Prefect. However, while

Varus occupied this important political and military position, according to Tacitus (Hist.

4.2.1) Antonius continued to exercise the “supreme authority.” This is not surprising, as

Antonius, from the very beginning of the campaign, had tied his fortunes to those of the

670 Morgan 2006, 258. The exact date is not certain.

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soldiers (Tac. Hist. 3.3) and he was the commander who had led the Flavian troops to

victory. Consequently, Primus undoubtedly commanded more loyalty than any other

officer or commander in Rome at this time. The support that he enjoyed from the

soldiers gave him the real power at Rome to which Tacitus alludes.

Arrius Varus is a particularly interesting character and has a somewhat

chequered military career. In AD 55, Varus was despatched by the general Cn.

Domitius Corbulo as praefectus cohortis to Vologaeses of Parthia, in order to claim

hostages (Tac. Ann. 13.9). Varus’ military service under Corbulo and his subsequent

successes in Armenia increased his fame (Tac. Hist. 3.6.1). Nero promoted Varus to the

prestigious rank of primus pilus of legio III Gallica. However, this promotion was won

as a “reward of shame,” because Varus, in a secret conference with Nero, had

denounced the character of Corbulo (Tac. Hist. 3.6.1). What role Varus’ private

conversation with Nero actually played in Corbulo’s final downfall (Dio 63.17.5) is not

known, but his testimony against the general cannot have helped Corbulo’s position, nor

does it seem that his betrayal of this man was quickly forgotten. While his promotion to

primus pilus delighted Varus, Tacitus (Hist. 3.6.1) informs us that it would eventually

prove to be his ruin, a point to which we will return. Moreover, the fact that Varus was

able to hold secret talks with Nero clearly indicates that the two men were on good

terms. Whether Varus had ever served in the Praetorian Guard is not known, but if

Varus had served in Rome, it may explain how Varus and Nero became acquainted in

the first instance. Alternatively, Varus might have been sent as an envoy by Corbulo to

Nero.

In AD 69, Varus seems to have still been serving with the legio III Gallica, as

Tacitus (Hist. 4.39.4) describes this legion as Varus’ own force. Varus quickly threw

his support behind the Flavian faction and he appears, from the outset of the Flavian

campaign, to act as Antonius’ lieutenant. Certainly, Tacitus (Hist. 3.6.2) has them

working together in Aquileia and the adjacent districts early on in the war. This close

co-operation between Varus and Primus continues in the attack on the Vitellian forces at

Forum Alieni (Legnago) (Tac. Hist. 3.6.3).

In the Second Battle of Bedriacum, Tacitus (Hist. 3.16.1 – 2) claims that it was

Varus’ impetuosity that led to the outbreak of hostilities. A small number of Vitellian

troops was advancing towards the Flavians and while Antonius was considering what

action to take, Varus, in his eagerness to do something important, moved against the

oncoming Vitellians with the boldest of the cavalry. This advance was not what

Antonius wanted, but he acted quickly and came to Varus’ aid and Varus and his

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cavalry retreated. Dio (64.11.4), in what remains of his account of the outbreak of the

Second Battle of Bedriacum, does not put the blame on any one particular person or one

particular side, although the description of how the battle began is similar to that of

Tacitus. For Dio (64.11.4) the commencement of the battle was simply a hazard of war,

something that often happens “when two forces are encamped opposite each other.”

In addition, the close working relationship between Antonius and Varus is

indicated by the number of times they are referred to together, by Tacitus. When

Mucianus wrote complaining about the speed with which the Flavian forces were being

advanced, he wrote to “Primus and Varus” (Tac. Hist. 3.52.2) and when the various

Flavian officers replied to Mucianus, they put the haste of “Primus and Varus” in an

unfavourable light (Tac. Hist. 3.52.3). It was also “Antonius and Varus” who sent

frequent messages to Vitellius, offering him a safe and comfortable retirement if he

willingly handed himself and his children over to Vespasian (Tac. Hist. 3.63.2), and

when appealing to Flavius Sabinus, the leading citizens begged him not to “yield in

glory to Antonius and Varus” (Tac. Hist. 3.64.1).

Considering the role that Varus had played at the side of Antonius throughout

the Flavian advance to Rome, his elevation to the Praetorian Prefecture by this Flavian

general can come as no surprise. Although the whole concept of a man other than the

emperor appointing a Praetorian Prefect is very surprising. In addition, Varus may well

have ingratiated himself with the former Othonian Praetorians during their march to

Rome, in much the same way that Otho had done on Galba’s journey from Spain (Tac.

Hist. 1.23.1). Their support for his promotion to Praetorian Prefect would only have

helped his cause. Varus was not only rewarded by his elevation to Prefect of the

Praetorian Guard, but he was also voted praetorian insignia671

The power and authority that Varus, as Prefect, enjoyed along with Antonius

lasted only briefly, being broken by the arrival of Mucianus in Rome (Tac. Hist. 4.11.1).

by the Senate (Tac. Hist.

4.4.2), no doubt at the insistence of Antonius. (Cornelius Fuscus, who went on to be

Praetorian Prefect under Domitian (Suet. Dom. 6.1; cf. Dio 67.6.5), was also honoured

by the Senate at this time (Tac. Hist. 4.4.2)).

However, Mucianus was wise enough to act with a degree of caution around Antonius

and the new Praetorian Prefect. He recognised that Antonius had won honour with his

recent victories and had considerable popularity with the troops (Tac. Hist. 4.39.3,

80.1). The people of Rome, apparently, also favoured the two men because neither of

them had killed any man except on the field of battle (Tac. Hist. 4.39.3). Yet why the

671 For a discussion of Praetorian Prefects receiving consular/praetorian insignia see p 64.

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people felt this way is difficult to understand, because these two men had been unable to

control the troops that had rampaged through the streets of Rome causing such anguish

and misfortune, that the citizens longed to have the soldiers of Otho and Vitellius back,

or so Tacitus (Hist. 4.1.1) claims. Therefore, before he could tackle the power of these

two men, Mucianus knew that he had to sever the link between Varus and Antonius and

the troops most loyal to them. Hence, Mucianus ordered the legio VII, which was

passionately devoted to Antonius, back to its winter quarters672

There was little opportunity for Varus to demonstrate whether he would have

made an effective Praetorian Prefect, as somewhat inevitably he was eventually

removed from his position by Mucianus (Tac. Hist. 4.68.2). His dismissal from the post

took place before the arrival of Vespasian in Rome and prior to the planned departure of

Mucianus for the war in Gaul. According to Tacitus (Hist. 4.11.1, 39.3, 68.1, 80.1),

there had been considerable dissension between Mucianus and Antonius. With

Mucianus intending to leave Rome for the troubled German frontier, he would

understandably not be comfortable with Varus, one of Antonius’ men, holding such an

important position as Praetorian Prefect and as a consequence in charge of the

Praetorian Guard (Tac. Hist. 4.68.2). Quite logically, Mucianus would want to replace

Varus as Praetorian Prefect, in an attempt to weaken Antonius’ power.

and the legio III, which

Tacitus (Hist. 4.39.4) describes as Varus’ own force, back to Syria. The movement of

these legions probably took place in early spring, as Tacitus (Hist. 4.3.1) tells us that the

third legion wintered in Capua.

673

Moreover, there may have been a much more personal reason for Mucianus

wanting to dismiss Varus from this post. Varus, as noted previously, had acted

treacherously towards Corbulo (Tac. Hist. 3.6.1) and this may not have sat well with

Mucianus, who seems to have served as legatus legionis under Corbulo c. AD 58.

674

From that position, he was probably promoted direct to the office of legatus Augusti pro

praetore of Lycia-Pamphylia, possibly on the recommendation of Corbulo.675

672 Josephus (BJ 4.633) has Primus in charge of the third legion from Moesia at the commencement of his march to Rome, but he was actually in command of the seventh Galbiana (Tac. Hist. 2.86.1) in Pannonia, not Moesia, but he was joined by the legions from Moesia, including the third Gallica.

Mucianus would be rightly upset at the death of Corbulo. He was an extremely well

connected patronus and his death could have damaged Mucianus’ chance of further

673 Chilver and Townend 1985, 24. 674 Syme 1958, 790; Vervaet 2003,445. See Pliny HN 5.83 675 Syme 1958, 790; Vervaet 2003, 445. See ILS 8816.

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promotion.676 While the soldiers of legio III seem not to have been aware of Varus’

treachery to Corbulo, Mucianus, on the contrary, may well have known the truth,677

In addition, Mucianus may well have received advice or orders from Vespasian,

prior to his departure from the East, as to whom Vespasian wanted to see installed as

Praetorian Prefect. That Mucianus did not discuss the issue with Vespasian seems

unlikely.

so

Mucianus might not have wanted to see Varus occupying such an important position.

678 Again, Mucianus acted with great prudence in dealing with this matter.

Simply removing Varus from his position as Praetorian Prefect would possibly have

been more dangerous than allowing him to retain it, as Varus may have used his

influence with the soldiers to stir up trouble. As Levick rightly notes, Antonius and

Varus could not win a fight against Mucianus, but they had sizeable forces on which

they could count.679

While Mucianus removed Varus from his position as Praetorian Prefect, he tried

to compensate Varus for this loss by placing him in charge of the grain supply

(praefectura annonnae) (Tac. Hist. 4.68.2). Unfortunately, Tacitus does not report how

Varus took the news of his new position, so his reaction can only be speculated upon.

This move may well have been seen by Varus as a demotion, as it certainly was at this

period. The Praetorian Prefecture was, at this time, second only in importance to the

Prefecture of Egypt. Nero’s Prefect, Faenius Rufus, had been in charge of the corn

supply (Tac. Ann. 13.22) prior to his elevation to the Praetorian Prefecture (Tac. Ann.

14.51). However, the move to the command of the grain supply could also have been

viewed by Varus as more of a sideways redeployment and the care of the corn supply

was a considerable responsibility given the upheaval of the last twelve months.

If trouble had broken out between Mucianus and Antonius, not

only would it have delayed Mucianus’ departure for the German frontier, but also the

consequences for the Flavian faction in Rome might have been quite undesirable.

680

676 Vervaet 2003, 458. It is also worth remembering that Mucianus reached the suffect consulship when Corbulo was still alive, c. AD 64. See Syme 1958, 790. For the epigraphic evidence see Eck 1975, 324 – 44.

Therefore, Varus may have been quite willing to undertake such an important role. We

have no idea for how long he held the post for or how effectively he administered his

tasks. Tacitus (Hist. 3.6.1) alludes to the imminent death of Varus, and possibly his

677 Vervaet 2003, 451. The pride that the III Gallica seem to have taken in serving under Corbulo is illustrated in AD 69, when Antonius Primus encourages the troops of the III legion by reminding them, “… of their ancient glory as well as of their later achievements, of their victory over the Parthians when Mark Antony was their leader, over the Armenians when Corbulo commanded, and of their recent defeat of the Sarmatians.” 678 Jones 1984, 84. 679 Levick 1999, 81. 680 Chilver and Townend 1985, 75.

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final downfall came at the hands of Domitia Longina, the daughter of none other than

Corbulo and from AD 70, the wife of Vespasian’s son, Domitian.681

M. Arrecinus Clemens

In dismissing Varus from his position as Praetorian Prefect, Mucianus also had to

consider the feelings of Domitian in this matter, as Tacitus (Hist. 4.68.2) tells us that

Domitian was favourably inclined to Varus. Why Domitian favoured Varus is not

explained, but Varus’ reputation as a soldier may well have been impressive to a young

man like Domitian and he must have been aware of the role that Varus played in

bringing his father to power. Therefore, according to Tacitus (Hist. 4.68.2), in order to

console Domitian, Mucianus appointed M. Arrecinus Clemens,682

That Clemens was beloved by Domitian (Tac. Hist. 4.68.2), however, may well

be correct and Clemens was certainly a logical choice, regardless of how the decision

was reached. Clemens was closely connected to the Flavian family. Titus’ first wife,

Arrecina Tertulla,

a man beloved by

Vespasian’s youngest son (Tac. Hist. 4.68.2; cf. Suet. Dom. 11.1), as the new Praetorian

Prefect. However, how significant the wishes of Domitian were to Mucianus’ decision

seems debatable. As already noted, it would be unusual if Vespasian and Mucianus had

not already discussed who would serve as Praetorian Prefect prior to Vespasian’s arrival

in Rome. Moreover, this portrayal of Domitian as acting beyond his station at this time

is cultivated by our ancient sources (Tac. Hist. 4.2.1, 51.1 – 52.1; Dio 66.2.3). Thus this

representation of Mucianus, as seeking to keep Domitian happy with his choice of a

replacement for Varus, may not be entirely accurate.

683 was his sister and may have been the mother of Titus’ daughter

Julia.684 Townend also suggests that another sister of Clemens, who remains

unrecorded, was married to T. Flavius Sabinus, Vespasian’s nephew, who was consul in

both AD 69 and 72.685 Mucianus, apparently, also dwelt on the consideration that

because Clemens’ father, of the same name, M. Arrecinus Clemens686

681 See CIL IX 3418, 3432, 3438, 3469; ILS 9518.

had also held the

post of Praetorian Prefect, with distinction, under the emperor Gaius (Tac. Hist. 4.68.2;

Suet. Titus 4.2), he would be popular with the soldiers. This may be accurate, but very

few of Otho’s former Praetorians, if any, would have served under his father.

682 See PIR2 A 1072. For his early career see AE 1976 200. 683 See PIR2 A 1074. 684 Jones and Develin 1976, 79. See also Jones 1972, 320 – 1; Syme 1988b, 614. Suetonius (Tit. 4.2) attributes Julia to Titus’ second wife, Marcia Furnilla. 685 Townend 1961c, 56 – 7. 686 See PIR2 A 1073.

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Rogers proposes that the appointment of Clemens was designed to disarm

Domitian and his potential supporter, Varus.687

Of further interest is the fact that Clemens was of senatorial rank (Tac. Hist.

4.68.2). All other Prefects that we know of were originally from the equestrian order, as

was Clemens’ father (Suet. Titus 4.2). However, a Praetorian Prefect could certainly be

consular. Sejanus retained his command of the Praetorian Guard after being promoted

to consular rank.

Yet, according to Tacitus’ narrative

(Hist. 4.39.3, 68.2, 80.1), Mucianus’ principal concern was Antonius and his supporters,

not Domitian and a desire to diminish his influence and control. By removing Varus

from the Prefecture, Mucianus effectively removed any influence that Antonius may

have exercised over the Praetorian Guard through Varus.

688 When Clemens’ family had been elevated to the senatorial order is

not known, although Clemens was likely to have been the first in his family to enter the

Senate. Jones suggests that Clemens gained senatorial rank towards the end of AD 69

and that this elevation occurred at Berytus.689

How long Clemens actually served as Praetorian Prefect is difficult to establish.

We know that sometime after Titus’ arrival in Rome in AD 71 he assumed the role as

the commander of the Praetorian Guard (Suet. Titus 6.1), and we know that Clemens

was suffect consul in AD 73,

690 so presumably he was replaced as Prefect before this

time. The usual assumption is that Titus took on the role as Prefect in AD 71, but it

may well have been in AD 72, after the time of Clemens’ designation to the consulship

and hence his retirement from the Praetorian Prefecture, although it should be noted that

we cannot be certain that Titus was indeed Clemens’ direct successor.691 There is no

indication as to how Clemens took his dismissal from this important post, although it is

possible that he was well aware that his position as Praetorian Prefect was only

temporary, until Titus arrived in Rome from the Jewish War. However, one would

imagine that his consulship would have gone some of the way to making up for any

disappointment he may have felt at losing his position as Praetorian Prefect,692

How effective Clemens was as Prefect remains unknown. His removal from the

Praetorian Prefecture certainly did not indicate a sign of disfavour with Vespasian, as

Clemens continued to have a successful career. As noted above, Clemens went on to

especially if he had only just reached senatorial rank.

687 Rogers 1980, 91. 688 Talbert 1984, 160. 689 Jones 1984, 106 n. 48. 690 Degrassi 1952, 21. 691 Jones 1984, 89. 692 Rogers 1980, 91.

211

hold a suffect consulship in AD 73 and was suffect consul again in AD 85 (AE 1947 40)

during the reign of Domitian.693 During the intervening twelve years he governed

Hispania citerioris (AE 1947, 40), probably in the early years of Domitian’s Principate.

Clemens also seems to have served as Urban Prefect, even though the inscription which

attests his governorship of Spain indicates that he was Urban Praetor.694 He was

possibly appointed Urban Prefect shortly after his suffect consulship of AD 85. With

Domitian planning his Dacian campaign in AD 86 and planning to take his Praetorian

Prefect, Cornelius Fuscus, with him, he would need to leave someone that he could rely

on in Rome. Through his long association with the Flavian family and his previous

loyal service, Clemens would have seemed ideal for the post. Considering this rather

distinguished career, we must assume that he fulfilled his obligations as Praetorian

Prefect satisfactorily.695

However, perhaps while serving as Urban Prefect, Clemens managed to alienate

Domitian. In Suetonius’ account of Domitian’s life, Clemens appears as the second of

three examples of the emperor’s cruelty and severity. Suetonius’ passage (Dom. 11.1)

implies that Clemens received the death penalty from Domitian, but this is not

necessarily the case and Clemens may well have been banished instead.

696

Titus

The promotion of Titus to Praetorian Prefect (Suet. Titus 6.1) is a highly unusual event.

It was the first time that a member of the imperial family, much less the heir to the

Principate, had served as Prefect, and undoubtedly the soldiers of the Praetorian Guard

must have seen such a move as a compliment to them. The emperor’s son and the next

Roman emperor was their commander. Having Titus serve as Prefect also indicates that

Vespasian and his supporters recognised the importance of the Praetorian Guard.

Considering the role they had played in the downfall of Nero and Galba, this is not

surprising.697

693 See Syme (1958, 638) where the evidence is outlined and discussed.

Such a high profile Prefect could only have helped to ensure the Guards’

loyalty to Vespasian, something that was particularly important when we consider the

highly disparate make up of the Praetorian Guard at this time. When the time came, it

would also make Titus’ accession much smoother. There would be no more Othos

waiting in the wings.

694 For a discussion regarding this point, see Jones and Develin 1976, 80 – 2. See also Syme 1988, 614. 695 Jones and Develin 1976, 82; Jones 1984, 85. 696 Jones and Develin 1976, 83. 697 Jones 1984, 84.

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Crook argues that Titus actually demanded that Vespasian remove Clemens

from his position as Praetorian Prefect and that he allow him to serve as Prefect instead.

Titus wanted the position as Prefect because he was hoping to counter the power held

by Mucianus at this time. Titus believed that the removal of Clemens, as one of

Mucianus’ men, would help swing the balance of power in his favour.698 This is an

interesting proposition, but is not supported by the ancient sources. Moreover, with

Titus’ position as virtual co-emperor reinforced by his grant of tribunicia potestas and

his joint censorship with his father (Suet. Titus 6), Titus surely only needed to ensure

that the position of Praetorian Prefect was occupied by a man whom he trusted

implicitly and, as Crook himself notes, there was surely no lack of equites who were

loyal and competent enough to hold the position.699

Traditionally, it had been assumed that Titus did not have a colleague in the

Praetorian Prefecture.

Moreover, as will be discussed

below, there may have been another reason for Titus’ appointment to this position.

700 However, this assessment may not be accurate and the

possibility that he was joint Prefect has to be considered. From the time of Titus’

arrival in Rome, according to Suetonius (Titus. 6.1): …neque destitit participem atque

etiam tutorem imperii agrere.701 Suetonius’ use of the word tutor probably alludes to

Titus’ role as Praetorian Prefect, but not only did he have the obligation to watch over

his father, he also shared the burden of his father’s work as emperor. Titus was consul

for seven years during his father’s reign702 and he took it upon himself to discharge

almost all of the other duties, such as personally dictating letters, writing edicts in the

emperor’s name and even reading Vespasian’s speeches in the Senate, replacing the

quaestor (Suet. Titus 6.1; cf. Dio 65.10.6). Consequently, Titus would have had a

considerable workload. If you have to add to this the responsibilities of a Praetorian

Prefect, without the assistance of a colleague, the burden would have been considerable

and one would expect that some section under his care would suffer. Vespasian would

not want that area to be the Praetorian Guard; hence a colleague for Titus would seem

quite reasonable.703

698 Crook 1951, 165 – 6.

One man who has already been identified as a possible candidate is

699 Crook 1951, 165. 700 For example Passerini 1939, 288; Durry 1968, 377; Crook 1951, 164. 701 “…he never ceased to act as the emperor’s partner and even as his protector.” 702 In AD 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77 and 79. 703 For the importance of having a Praetorian Prefect without too many duties see Dio (52.24.5).

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Ti. Julius Alexander.704

Alexander was been born into a distinguished Jewish family from the city of

Alexandria, and during the reign of Claudius seems to have entered imperial service.

The possibility that he shared the Praetorian Prefecture with

Titus is worth considering.

705

His early career is not clear, but he was procurator of Judaea from AD 46 – 48 (Joseph.

BJ 20.100). During the next fifteen years, he disappears from our sources, but it seems

that he was acquiring military experience at an unknown post. He then served as

military advisor to Corbulo in AD 63, holding such an important position that Tacitus

(Ann. 15. 28.3) names him as inlustris eques Romanus minister bello datus. In AD 66

he was promoted to Prefect of Egypt (Joseph. BJ 2.309). Alexander, as Praefectus

Aegypti, played a particularly important role in Vespasian’s elevation. Tacitus (Hist.

2.79.1) and Suetonius (Vesp. 6.3) both report that it was Alexander who was the first

man to have his troops swear allegiance to Vespasian. After Vespasian’s successful bid

for the throne, Alexander served as Titus’ praefectus castrorum during the siege of

Jerusalem (Joseph. BJ 6.237). When Titus returned to Rome, we cannot be certain what

happened to Alexander, as no extant source records his movements. Turner, however,

argues convincingly that Alexander returned to Rome with Titus and went on to be his

colleague in the Praetorian Prefecture.706

For his presence in Rome after the war in Judaea, Turner cites three pieces of

evidence. Firstly, a reference in Juvenal (Sat. 1.131), which mentions an unnamed

‘Egyptian and arabarch,’ for which no other candidate but Alexander has been

suggested. Secondly, Turner believes there is a difference in tone, when referring to

Alexander, between Josephus’ works, the Antiquitates and the Bellum Iudiacum. In the

Jewish War there is nothing derogatory about Alexander, but in the later book, which

was published in approximately AD 93/4, there appears an offensive remark about

Alexander.

707

704 Turner 1954, 54 – 64. Followed by Waters 1963. 212; Nicols 1978, 111 – 112; Jones 1984, 85. The idea that Ti. Julius Alexander was Titus’ joint Praetorian Prefect is regarded with scepticism by Syme (1958, 509 n. 6). See PIR2 I 139.

Presumably then, when Josephus was writing the Jewish War, Alexander

was still present in Rome and in a position of some influence with the Flavians, and

Josephus had to treat him with respect. Finally, it is generally accepted that the Ti.

Iulius Alexander Iulianus, who is referred to in the Arval Acts of AD 118 (CIL VI 32

705 For a comprehensive description of the life and career of Alexander, see Turner 1954, 54 – 64. 706 Turner 1954, 61 – 4. Turner’s arguments are accepted by Nicols 1978, 112 and Rogers 1980, 90 707. “…he did not persevere in his ancestral religion” (Jos. AJ 19.329). How derogatory this statement is, can be considered debatable.

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374), is the same person as Dio’s (68. 30.2) “Julius Alexander,” who was the son or

grandson of our Prefect of Egypt.708

As to Alexander as Titus’ colleague in the Praetorian Prefecture, Turner puts

forward two principal arguments. Firstly, he cites an epicrisis certificate, which he

dates to between AD 70 and 130. Turner’s interpretation of this scrap of papyrus is that

after his Egyptian Prefecture, Alexander was appointed to the position of Guard Prefect

in Rome.

709 Secondly, Turner noted that the reversal in the importance of the

appointments of Praetorian Prefect with that of the Prefecture of Egypt occurred about

this time.710 Certainly, this seems an accurate assessment as in the reigns of Claudius

and Nero we have evidence that this was still the case. The Praetorian Prefect L. Lusius

Geta (Tac. Ann. 11.31, 33, 12.42) went on to serve as the Prefect of Egypt. However, in

the Flavian dynasty, there are three men, L. Laberius Maximus,711 T. Petronius

Secundus and L. Julius Ursus,712 who all held the position of Prefect of Egypt before

commanding the Praetorian Guard.713 The appointment of Alexander to the Praetorian

Prefecture may well have “reversed the priority of the two prefectures.”714

The appointment of a man of Alexander’s origins, background and non-Roman

education to a position such as Praetorian Prefect would be particularly unusual.

However, Alexander had proved loyal to Vespasian and the province he was

administering was the cornerstone of Vespasian’s strategy. While the idea of holding

up the grain supply to Rome and starving Vitellius out of office was never needed, it

would have been of vital importance if Vitellius had been able to hold the Apennine

passes and create something of a stalemate. Undoubtedly, Vespasian wanted to reward

Alexander, as he did for so many other loyal supporters, but exactly how to do this

might have caused a dilemma. A promotion to the Senate could have been out of the

question, but appointment as joint Praetorian Prefect may well have been perfectly

acceptable to Alexander and would not have upset the senatorial nobility. To ensure

This

argument is intriguing and can be developed further.

708 Turner 1954, 63. 709 Turner (1954, 61) writes that in this certificate “Alexander is alluded to as Τιβερίου Ίουλίου Άλεξάνδρου του ηγεμο[νεύσαντ]ος, γενομένου καί έπάρχου πραι[τωρίου]. References in documents to former officials are frequently made by the past participle and the use of ηγεμονεύσαντος is quite reguar. The following phrase beginning γενομένου adds a second office filled by Alexander, and the postponed καί makes it clear that it is a subsequent office. The plain meaning of the phrase is that after the Egyptian prefecture, Alexander was appointed prefect of the praetorian guard in Rome. See P. Hibeh 215. For the text of this papyrus see McCrum and Woodhead 1966, number, 329. 710 Turner 1954, 63 – 4. See also Brunt 1975, 124. 711 See Pflaum 1960, n. 43. 712 PIR2 I 630. See also Syme 1980, 66 713 See Brunt 1975, 142 – 4. 714 Turner 1954, 64.

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that the soldiers accepted Alexander, Titus was made his colleague. The appointment of

Titus, the emperor’s son, would have consoled the Praetorian soldiers, who may have

felt somewhat aggrieved at having an Egyptian Jew as their Prefect. Moreover,

Alexander and Titus had proved that they were capable of working together in the past

and Vespasian would have had two men, as Praetorian Prefects, whom he could trust

completely. Having a colleague would have ensured that Titus, while probably the

senior partner in the Prefecture, would have been freed from the routine work of a

Praetorian Prefect and hence free to help his father in the day to day running of the

Empire.

Now assuming that Alexander was the joint Praetorian Prefect with Titus, the

question remains as to whether they shared the Prefecture for the entirety of Vespasian’s

reign. If they were joint Prefects for Vespasian’s entire reign, did Alexander continue

as Praetorian Prefect in the reign of Titus? Our extant literary sources certainly do not

provide us with any alternatives until we hear of Cornelius Fuscus (Dio 67.6.5; Suet.

Dom. 6.1) and Laberius Maximus715

as Praetorian Prefects under Domitian.

Titus as Praetorian Prefect

Suetonius (Titus 6.1) records that in his position as Praetorian Prefect Titus conducted

himself in a “somewhat arrogant and tyrannical fashion.” If he suspected anyone, Titus

would secretly send members of the Praetorian Guard to the “various theatres and

camps,” to demand their punishment. This statement would imply that it was not only

members of the civilian population that Titus kept a close watch on, but also military

personnel. However, while his behaviour as Prefect may have been unpopular with the

Roman nobility, his role was, after all, to protect his father’s life.

As Praetorian Prefect, there can be little doubt that Titus would have been

involved in the banishment and eventual execution of Helvidius Priscus. The nature of

the problem between Helvidius and Vespasian is far from clear, although it would

appear that the discord between the two men began very early in Vespasian’s reign

(Tac. Hist. 4.4.3) and continued unabated until Helvidius’ exile.716

715 P. Berol. 8334. The papyrus is a letter from Domitian inviting Laberius Maximus, Prefect of Egypt to become the colleague of Fuscus, replacing Julius Ursus who had been transferred to the Senate. See Syme (1958, 635 – 6; 1980, 66).

It would have to be

conceded that the threat posed by Helvidius should be considered relatively minor and it

716 Suetonius (Vesp. 15.1) notes that Helvidius refused to acknowledge Vespasian as emperor and constantly heckled him. The scholiast on Juvenal (5.36) states that Helvidius behaved as if he lived in a free state. While Dio (66.12.2) writes that Helvidius inveighed against βασιλεία and praised δημοκρατία, was unruly by nature and incited the mob to revolution.

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is unlikely that the physical wellbeing of Vespasian or his dynasty was ever under threat

from him. However, if an incident highlighted in Dio has been recorded accurately,

Helvidius may well have been opposing the designation of Titus as Vespasian’s

successor. Dio (66.12.1) tells us that at a meeting of the Senate, Helvidius was reviling

Vespasian and consequently Vespasian, overcome with emotion, left the Senate saying

that, “My successor shall be my son or no one at all.” If this account is accurate,

Helvidius may well have been striking at the heart of the Flavian dynasty. How much

time passed between this incident and Helvidius’ eventual exile and death is

uncertain.717 Suetonius (Vesp. 15.1) states that Vespasian banished him and later

ordered his death, although the emperor apparently reconsidered and would have saved

Helvidius had a false report not indicated that he was already dead. Birley speculates

that this false report was the work of Titus,718 who claimed to be an excellent forger

(Suet. Titus 3.2).719

The only other senators that we are aware of, with whom Titus definitely had

dealings in his role of Praetorian Prefect, were A. Alienus Caecina and T. Clodius

Eprius Marcellus. Both men were accused of conspiracy in Vespasian’s reign. The

details about this alleged conspiracy are contained in the accounts of Dio and Suetonius

and the accounts are similar. Suetonius (Titus 6.2) tells us that a signed copy of a

speech which Caecina had written and had intended to deliver to the soldiers,

presumably the Praetorian Guard, was found in his possession. Suetonius does not

specify the contents of the letter, but from the circumstances one can assume that the

speech was intended to corrupt the loyalty of the Praetorians. Dio (65.10.3) does not

mention the letter but Caecina’s involvement with the soldiers is stated. After

discovering this letter, Titus invited Caecina to dinner and before he had left the dining

room he ordered him to be stabbed (Suet. Titus 6.2; Dio 65.16.3). The whole incident is

difficult to fathom and what Caecina possibly hoped to achieve impossible to assess.

However, Dio’s passage on the incident leaves little doubt that his source, at least, was

This would make Titus directly responsible for the death of

Helvidius. Of course, Vespasian may well have changed his mind, but the story of a

false report also has the effect of removing the blame for Helvidius’ death from

Vespasian, which may well have been its intention. It would seem more likely that

Vespasian instructed Titus, as Praetorian Prefect, to eliminate a man who was opposed

to the rule of the Flavians and who threatened the stability, if not the actual survival, of

the dynasty.

717 See also Epictetus (Diss. 1.2.13 – 24). Syme (1958, 212) dates Helvidius’ death to AD 74. 718 Birley 1975, 152 n. 53. 719 For other possible instances of Titus’ activities as a forger see Suet. Vesp. 6.4, Tit. 6.2, Dom. 2.3.

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convinced of his guilt,720 while Suetonius notes that not only did Caecina pose a danger

to Titus, but also that Titus had secured his own future safety by ending Caecina’s life.

If their guilt was beyond doubt, then as Praetorian Prefect, Titus, did the duty that was

required of him. It was probably Titus’ conduct, of ending Caecina’s life in the manner

he did without a trial that understandably created considerable bad feeling towards him

(Suet. Titus 6.2). However, if Caecina was put on trial, he might have made disruptive

allegations; after all he was an associate of the Flavians and might have known more

than most. Crook argues that Caecina was not the sort of man that made a

revolutionary,721 but surely anyone could be a revolutionary given the right

circumstances. Moreover, the fact that Caecina had previously been instrumental in

obtaining support from the soldiers in Germany for Vitellius should be remembered,

and Tacitus (Hist. 1.53.1) comments that Caecina: sermone, erecto incessu, studia

militum inlexerat. 722

Dio (65.16.3), in his outline of this alleged conspiracy against Vespasian, adds

the name of Marcellus to that of Caecina. Unlike Caecina, however, Marcellus actually

stood trial in the Senate and was condemned. With the judgement made, Marcellus cut

his own throat with a razor (Dio 65.16.4), in an act reminiscent of Nero’s former

Praetorian Prefect, Tigellinus (Tac. Hist. 1.72.3). As with Caecina, there is no

indication in Dio’s narrative that Marcellus may have been innocent of the charge. He

was found guilty by his peers and as a consequence committed suicide.

This conspiracy has been viewed by Crook as an extension of the rivalry which

existed between Mucianus and Titus and which has been alluded to in the discussion

regarding Titus’ appointment as Praetorian Prefect. According to Crook, by AD 79 the

feud was centred on Titus’ succession. Titus feared that his opponents might be in

some way able to prevent his succession; therefore, he struck first and eliminated the

opposition. Consequently, there was no conspiracy.723 However, firstly as we have

already seen, this view is directly opposed to the information provided for us by

Suetonius (Tit. 6.2) and Dio (65.16.3), in which both authors indicate that Titus’ action,

was justified. To argue that the conspiracy had no basis requires dismissing the only

ancient evidence we have for the event.724

720 Crook (1951, 168 – 9) believes that the alleged conspiracy is at best a suspicious tale. Rogers (1980, 93) notes that there is “nothing in the sources which would indicate that it was not a genuine threat to the regime.”

Moreover, Vespasian would have been

721 Crook 1951, 170 722 “…had won over the support of the soldiers by his clever speech and dignified carriage.” 723 Crook 1951, 170 – 1. 724 Rogers 1980, 94. Jones (1984, 91 – 3) is also convinced that the conspiracy was real

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aware of any opposition that existed; now whether that opposition was directed at Titus

personally or the Flavian party in general, is not necessarily important; either way it

threatened the survival of the dynasty. Therefore, it may well have been Vespasian who

instructed Titus to take the measures that he did. If Titus was acting on instructions

from his emperor to eliminate a threat, even if only a perceived one, he was carrying out

the duties of the Praetorian Prefect.

Vespasian’s Praetorian Guard

Tacitus (Hist. 2.82.2) records Mucianus offering a moderate donative to his troops

shortly after Vespasian has been hailed as emperor in the East. The donative was

moderate and even “Vespasian did not offer more for civil war than others did in time of

peace.” Presumably, this donative was promised and perhaps given to the soldiers

before they left the East for Rome. In the surviving books of the Historiae, there is no

record of any other donatives given by the Flavian faction.

Dio (65.22.2), however, records that a very modest donative of 100 sesterces

was given to the soldiers shortly after the death of Vitellius, when Mucianus presented

Domitian to the soldiers.725

A second donative is recorded by Dio (66.10.1a) and is distributed by Vespasian

when he eventually arrives in Rome. Vespasian bestowed this “gift” on the soldiers and

the populace and it sounds very much like Vespasian’s accession donative. By this

time, one would expect that the reorganisation of the Praetorian Guard was well under

way, and all the soldiers now serving in Rome, whether ex-Othonian Praetorians,

Vitellius’ German legionaries or any new Flavian Praetorians, would receive this gift.

To do otherwise would be injudicious and dangerous on the part of Vespasian, who

undoubtedly, after witnessing the events of AD 69, was acutely aware of the importance

of the Praetorian Guard.

Whether this donative was restricted to the soldiers who

had served on the Flavian side or distributed more widely is not stated, nor is there any

indication that the soldiers in the provinces received this monetary reward.

Nevertheless, given the timing and circumstances of the donative, it would seem likely

that it was restricted to the soldiers who had fought with Antonius and travelled to

Rome with Mucianus, to reward their success.

725 Nicols (1978, 129) prefers the 300 sesterces of Augustus’ will. Campbell (1984, 169) suggests that this donative may simply have been a gesture of good will until Vespasian had amassed enough cash to pay the full amount of the donative. Watson (1969, 110 n. 317), however, believes that the real accession donative is referred to by Dio (66.10.1a), in which Vespasian’s action on his arrival in Rome are described. However, no sum is given. Josephus’ (BJ 4.654) does not mention a donative at the time that Mucianus introduced Domitian.

219

It is possible that Dio is mistaken and that only one donative was distributed, but

considering the actual timing of the two donatives, it is quite possible that there were

indeed two distributions, one given for the victorious forces, the second when

Vespasian entered Rome. Interestingly, Suetonius (Vesp. 8.2) indicates that Vespasian

was slow in paying the victorious soldiers even their legitima praemia. What exactly

Suetonius means by this phrase is questionable. However, Suetonius may be referring

to the donative which was promised in the East and mentioned by Tacitus (Hist. 2.82.2).

A financial donative may not have been the only thing on the minds of the

soldiers in Rome at that time. Many soldiers were probably more concerned about their

chance of being reinstated or retaining their position in, the Praetorian Guard. Tacitus

(Hist. 4.46.1) writes that a mutiny almost broke out among the troops. Otho’s former

Praetorians, whom Vitellius had dismissed, but who had rejoined the Civil War on the

side of Vespasian (Tac. Hist. 2.67.1, 4.46.1), were now demanding to be reinstated in

the Praetorian Guard (Tac. Hist. 4.46.1). Their request is certainly not unreasonable and

it seems that it was the reward that they had been offered when their services were being

courted by the Flavian commanders (Tac. Hist. 2.82.3). The subsequent career of T.

Suedius Clemens, discussed above, indicates that Vespasian did indeed honour his

promise to reinstate the veteres cohortes of Otho.726

Exactly how many men we are talking about here is almost impossible to assess.

From the previous chapter we know that there were enough of them present at the

Second Battle of Bedriacum for Tacitus to mention them as a separate force and for

them to have fought under their own banners (Tac. Hist. 3.21.2). Therefore, the

numbers cannot have been insignificant, and may have numbered in the several

thousands. How many of these soldiers died at Cremona or in the battle for Rome is

also impossible to assess. We also know that there were former Othonian Praetorians

still in southern Gaul, when the Vitellian general Fabius Valens made for there, after

suffering a setback in Italy (Tac. Hist. 3.42.2 – 43.1). Had these former Othonian

Praetorians made their way back to Rome? If they were already in the capital, these

soldiers must have increased the numbers of the ex-Guardsmen demanding

reinstatement.

Besides Otho’s former Praetorians there were also the legionaries, who had been

selected with the same hope of serving the Praetorian Guard and who were now

demanding the pay promised them. These men were also creating a disturbance (Tac.

Hist. 4.46.1). While Tacitus does not make it clear precisely which legionaries he is

726 Nicols 1987, 161,

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referring to, one would assume that Antonius, Mucianus or Vespasian, or all three

commanders, must have promised some of their legionaries service in the Praetorian

Guard, or at least the stipendia of the Guardsmen once they had defeated the Vitellian

faction. Clearly, they had received neither and were now demanding their reward (Cf.

Suet. Vesp. 8.2). One would suspect that the arrival of Vespasian in Rome would only

add to this body of troops, as it is unlikely that Vespasian travelled from Judaea to

Rome without his own escort of soldiers. To add to Mucianus’ problems was the

substantial number of Praetorians enrolled by Vitellius, whom it would be difficult to

remove from their new post without bloodshed, or so Tacitus (Hist. 4.46.1) claims.

These men might have constituted a large group of soldiers, although even reasonable

estimates of the numbers involved are difficult to speculate upon.

This large and disparate body of soldiers would require sensitive handling to

prevent the outbreak of violence. To simply discharge these Vitellian Praetorians, as

Vitellius had discharged Otho’s Praetorians, would be particularly dangerous, as would

completely disregarding the wishes of those soldiers who had supported the Flavian

cause. Mucianus, and later Vespasian, would want to try to create a unified Praetorian

Guard which was loyal to their new emperor. It was a difficult and volatile situation,

but it would appear that Mucianus handled it well.

When Mucianus entered the Praetorian camp he separated the victorious troops

from the defeated soldiers. The victors were formed up, under their insignia and with

their arms (Tac. Hist. 4.46.2). This show of force was designed to frighten the Vitellian

soldiers, whom Mucianus had brought out practically naked and without arms (Tac.

Hist. 4.46.2). He then ordered the Vitellians to separate into their own armies, in order

that all the soldiers from Germany would be standing together and so on. At the

realisation of their predicament, the Vitellian soldiers were paralyzed by fear. This

division was especially disconcerting for the soldiers from Germany. By separating

them off from the other soldiers, the former Praetorians expected that they would be

killed (Tac. Hist. 4.46.3). This was not an unrealistic fear. They had after all been

Vitellius’ principal supporters. Mucianus probably intended to give these soldiers the

impression that it was well within his capabilities to kill them if he so chose. This

would make his eventual benevolence seem all the more significant. When the soldiers

had begged sufficiently for their life, and the cheers of the victorious troops were added

to the tears of the defeated, Mucianus ended their unnecessary panic and addressed them

as “soldiers bound by the same oath” and “soldiers of the same emperor.” The day

ended to the satisfaction of all the troops (Tac. Hist. 4.46.3 – 4). Tacitus’ account of the

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day’s events is extremely and deliberately dramatic and it can hardly have gone as

easily as Tacitus would have us believe. However, Mucianus, probably over the course

of several months, rather than one meeting, with his deft handling of the situation had

begun the process of moulding a body of soldiers united under the same emperor.

Mucianus’ next problem concerned finances (Tac. Hist. 4.46.4, 47.1). To retain

so many soldiers would cost a sizeable amount of money, so he had to find a suitable

way to reduce the total number of troops without creating unnecessary hostility. One

would imagine that Mucianus’ concern here was not to just to reduce the number of

soldiers per se, as the vast majority had been serving in the Roman army previously, but

the cost associated with maintaining so many soldiers on the salary of a Praetorian

Guardsmen. The first attempt to decrease the number of soldiers was by Domitian, a

few days after the initial meeting. Domitian addressed the troops and offered the

soldiers land. The soldiers, however, treated these offers with contempt and demanded

to be reinstated in the army and paid (Tac. Hist. 4.46.4). Presumably, the branch of the

army they wanted to enter or re-enter was the Praetorian Guard. However, gone were

the repentant soldiers of a few days previously. The soldiers still resorted to appeals, as

they had done in the earlier meeting, but this time their appeal “admitted no denial.”

Igitur in praetorium accepti (Tac. Hist. 4.46.4). As a consequence of these actions,

Rome probably had more Praetorian Guardsmen now than at any previous time in the

history of the Empire. The willingness of Vespasian to admit former Vitellian

legionaries into the Praetorian Guard indicates that he was comfortable with his

position, not concerned with the former Vitellian soldiers, nor was he worried about the

reaction of his own army personnel to this move.727

However, Mucianus and Vespasian, after the latter’s arrival in Rome, were still

determined to bring the number of soldiers in the Praetorian Guard down, if only

because of financial considerations. Consequently, Mucianus began a slow honourable

discharge of any of the Praetorian Guardsmen whose age and length of service

warranted it (Tac. Hist. 4.46.4). There could be no complaints about this from the

soldiers as it was in line with their normal service conditions. Moreover, ex-legionaries

transferred into the Guard may have found that they did not have to serve out their full

twenty years of service, but were discharged in line with their new status as Praetorian

Guardsmen, therefore after only sixteen years. In other cases, soldiers in whom some

fault could be discerned were also dismissed, but this was done on a gradual basis (Tac.

Hist. 4.46.4) and hence avoided any hostility from the soldiers towards the new dynasty.

727 Chilver 1957, 35.

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How long the whole process took until the Praetorian cohorts resembled their pre civil

war size is impossible to determine. It may well have taken many months and possibly

years to accomplish, although by AD 76 an inscription (CIL XVI 21 = ILS 1993)

records nine Praetorian cohorts. As far as we can establish, the whole process was

carried out without incident.

Interestingly, we find that, as with Vitellius’ dismissal of Otho’s Praetorians,

Suetonius’ account (Vesp. 7.2) of the reorganisation of the Praetorian Guard portrays a

rather different picture from the one found in Tacitus. Tacitus has the Flavian generals

sensibly handling the soldiers, while Suetonius tells us that no special measures were

taken and Vespasian not only discharged many of the soldiers, but also punished many.

While Suetonius is probably correct that Vespasian did discharge many soliders and

probably punished some, Tacitus’ more detailed version of the events would seem to be

more accurate.

The issuing of Praetorian discharge diplomas may also have begun under

Vespasian.728 Arnaud-Lindet argues that at the end of the civil wars, Vespasian had a

sizeable Praetorian Guard, whose numbers had been increased by contingents from the

provincial armies. It would be difficult to simply demote all of these men back to the

legions and perhaps the auxilia, after they had experienced service in the Praetorian and

Urban cohorts at Rome. Nor could they just demobilise them, as this would put them

on a similar level to soldiers discharged without honesto missio. The creation of a large

body of disaffected soldiers might well have been a threat to the new administration.

(as Otho’s discharged Praetorians had been in the reign of Vitellius). Vespasian’s

solution was to give military diplomas to those men whom he did not want to continue

in service. By issuing them with a diploma, the emperor attested that they had bravely

and loyally done their duty and as such received a grant of marriage, with a woman of

peregrina status, with any offspring of the union considered Roman citizens. Soldiers,

who had originated in or served in various provinces and as a consequence had formed

unions with non-Roman women, would find this an acceptable alternative.729

As Roxan comments, the evidence certainly seems to support this hypothesis.

Firstly, the number of Praetorian diplomas from the first century AD is extraordinarily

limited, with only four such diplomas in existence. All four of these diplomas belong to

the early Flavian period.

730

728 For a discussion of discharge diplomas see pp 34 – 5.

Moreover, in all four diplomas, the men either originated

729 Arnaud-Lindet 1977, 282 – 309. 730 Roxan 1993, 69, 1981, 265 – 6. CIL XVI 25 is probably from AD 71/2, CIL XVI 18 and RMD 1 probably date from AD 73 and CIL XVI 21 belongs to AD 76 (Roxan 1993, 69).

223

outside Italy or, from the location, in which the diplomas were found, had settled

outside Italy after completing their military service.731 The first soldier, from Spain

(CIL XVI 25), might have served in Galba’s Praetorian Guard, while the second man

(RMD 1), although of unknown origin, may have been part of Vitellius’ Praetorians, as

he settled at Augst on the Upper Rhine. The third soldier (CIL XVI 18) originated in

and then returned to Pannonia and the fourth man (CIL XVI 21), while Italian in origin,

retired to Moesia, which may indicate that he had served in one of the Danubian

legions. This man had possibly formed a relationship with a woman from these parts

and wanted to return to the area on discharge.732

After this batch of Flavian diplomas, there are only five more which can be

attributed to the pre-Severan period, and from the reign of Severus until the last

example of a military diploma from AD 306 there are twenty-three examples. Roxan

concludes that after this period of civil war the only men who received Praetorian

diplomas were soldiers who intended to retire to places where they were likely to meet

and marry women of peregrina status. Praetorian soldiers, who lived in Rome would

not need to prove their status, nor would they have the same opportunity to marry non-

Roman women.

733

While Tacitus (Hist. 4.6.4) writes that the soldiers were scornful of the offer of

land made by Domitian, it would certainly seem that some soldiers accepted or were

forced to accept this offer. Vespasian, it would seem, settled Praetorians and legionary

veterans from Upper Germany and Britain in his home town of Reate.

The arguments of both Arnaud-Lindet and Roxan are sound and are

well supported by the surviving evidence.

734

Unfortunately, we know very little about the activities of the Praetorian Prefects,

officers or soldiers under the reign of Vespasian, with the exception of a few snippets of

information from Suetonius and Dio. Vespasian, apparently gave up the custom of

searching those who came on their morning calls (Suet. Vesp. 12). This compulsory

searching of morning callers was a practice that Claudius may well have begun during

his reign (Suet. Claud. 35.1), although we cannot be certain if the practice had

continued into the reign of Nero and during the short reigns of the emperors in AD 69.

In addition, although the doors of the Palace were left open all day, Vespasian decided

not to station any Guards on them (Dio 65.10.5). While these measures seem to

indicate a loosening of the tight check that the Praetorian Guard usually kept on their

731 Roxan 1981, 270. 732 See Arnaud-Lindet 1977, 282 – 309; Roxan 1981, 270. 733 Roxan 1981, 273. 734 Campbell 1996, 82; ILS 2460 = McCrum and Woodhead 1961, n. 378

224

emperor, we can be relatively sure that this newfound freedom of access to the emperor

was done more for show than anything else. Vespasian and his son, Titus, the

Praetorian Prefect, had simply found a more discreet way of managing Vespasian’s

security. In addition, the act of leaving the Palace doors open and unguarded may have

been possible because Vespasian rarely resided there, preferring to live in the Gardens

of Sallust (Dio 66.10.4).

Conclusion

The accession of Vespasian at the end of AD 69 brought about a necessary

reorganisation of the Praetorian Guard. Initially, however, the position of the Praetorian

Prefect continued to be subordinate to that of the powerful army commanders. It was

Antonius Primus, because of his success in defeating Vitellius and the support he

enjoyed from the soldiers in Rome that ensured that he held the type of authority usually

associated with a Praetorian Prefect. Antonius chose a Praetorian Prefect primarily

loyal to him, as a reward for his services. With the arrival of Mucianus, Antonius’

Prefect was removed and another appointed. However, one would suspect that the

appointment of Clemens did not alter the importance of the Prefect. Mucianus was now

the most influential army commander in Rome and he enjoyed the support of the

soldiers. The Prefect was surely his subordinate. The Praetorian Prefects would not

have resumed their previous position of importance until all soldiers surplus to

requirements were removed from Rome. When the Praetorian Prefect commanded the

only armed body in Rome and when the emperor relied on them for protection and

advice, their importance in Roman political life would naturally return. For Vespasian

this process was probably aided by the appointment of his son to the Praetorian

Prefecture. The first time that the heir apparent had served as the commander of the

Praetorian Guard.

The size of the Praetorian Guard had increased greatly over AD 69 and measures

needed to be taken to bring this number down to a manageable level. At first Mucianus,

and then Vespasian, seem to have handled the situation sensibly and successfully

brought the Praetorian cohorts back to their original number of nine, although the whole

process may have taken a number of years. The fact that we hear so little about the

Praetorian soldiers during the reign of Vespasian is partly due, no doubt, to the loss of

Tacitus’ narrative. However, it seems unlikely that if there had been a major outbreak

of indiscipline or mutinous behaviour in the Praetorian camp or a conspiracy involving

a Praetorian officer, that one of our other surviving literary sources would have

225

mentioned it. Consequently, it would have to be assumed that the Praetorian Guard,

after the turmoil of the period after Nero’s death, returned to their loyal service under

the first Flavian emperor.

While we have no direct evidence to explain the Praetorians’ return to loyal

service under Vespasian, a number of factors can be advanced that would seem to be

important. Firstly, Vespasian, as a capable army general, probably enjoyed the respect

of the Praetorian soldiers. Secondly, by appointing his son Titus as Praetorian Prefect,

Vespasian demonstrated to the soldiers of the Guard the high esteem in which he held

them. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Vespasian fulfilled his obligation to the

soldiers. Certainly, some soldiers were discharged and no doubt some were punished,

but the whole process of reforming the Guard was handled in an astute and intelligent

manner. Moreover, one can assume that Vespasian met his financial obligations to his

Praetorians, both in terms of regular pay and praemia militium. Gone were the days of

financial insecurity present under Nero and all the dangers this presented. With a loyal

Praetorian Prefect and a generally contented Guard, the opportunity to undermine their

loyalty to the ruling emperor was drastically reduced. Finally, the effects of the civil

war would have played their part in restoring discipline and loyalty. Many of the

soldiers were undeniably relieved to have survived the year and to either once again be

serving in the Praetorian Guard or to be experiencing life in the Guard for the first time.

226

Conclusion

A number of important conclusions can be drawn. Firstly and fundamentally, it is clear

the Praetorian Guard played a crucial and often central role in many of the major events.

In the Historiae, Tacitus clearly recognises their importance and as such has frequently

recorded the actions and reactions of the Prefects, the officers and the soldiers of the

Guard, often in detail. The role the Praetorian Guard played in the reigns of Nero,

Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian varied considerably. The contribution to each

reign is considerable, though not necessarily always positive, and their actions often

helped to determine the course of events throughout the period.

In AD 68 it is the actions of the Praetorian Prefects, Tigellinus and Nymphidius,

in defecting and persuading the Praetorian soldiers to follow suit, which was a key

factor in Nero’s decision to commit suicide. If the Praetorian Prefects had maintained

their loyalty to their emperor, Nero would surely have held onto hope and life and

Galba’s bid for the throne would surely have turned out very differently. The Senate

would not have been unable to proclaim Nero a public enemy but with the steadfast

support of the Guard and the powerful German legions returning to their previous

allegiance to Nero, Galba would have had little chance of success. The Praetorian

Guard was the decisive factor.

Otho ended Galba’s reign in a conspiracy in which his most important

supporters were a group of Praetorian speculatores. These men helped to organise, gain

support for and carry through the plot. A prospective emperor needed the support of the

Praetorians, therefore if Otho had been unable to gain the support of the Guard and they

had maintained their loyalty to Galba, it is unlikely that he would have been successful.

The Praetorian Guard brought Otho to power.

In Otho’s reign, the Praetorian Guard formed his most loyal supporters, both on

and off the battleground. While Otho had access to other armies, the Praetorian Guard

fought bravely for him and were successful in a number of encounters. That was by no

means expected. It is axiomatic that the frontier armies were hardened by conditions,

active service and frequent warfare; the Praetorians were quartered in a city and seldom

went to war. Their final defeat at the First Battle of Bedriacum was not due to the

inadequacies of the Guard as soldiers and they maintained their loyalty to Otho to the

end.

Vitellius made no effort to reconcile the surviving Praetorian Guardsmen and

they were dismissed from service. However, by joining the Flavian faction and fighting

227

for Vespasian, they continued to play a significant role in determining events. Vitellius

instituted a completely new Praetorian Guard, drawn from his own German legionaries.

These were the men employed by Vitellius to defend Rome against the advancing

Flavian forces. However, many of these new Guardsmen were not called on to fight as

the officers in charge of many of cohorts surrendered to the Flavian forces outside the

city. On the other hand, in the battle for Rome, the ex-Othonian Praetorians and several

cohorts of the new Vitellian Guard fought a bloody battle through the streets of the

capital and into the castra praetoria itself. While the eventual Flavian victory cannot be

credited solely to the ex-Othonian Praetorian Guard, they certainly played their part in

Vespasian’s success. The overall importance of the Praetorian Guard in the events of

the year cannot be denied.

The importance of the men who hold the Praetorian Prefecture changed

considerably over the course of the year and is evident in Tacitus’ narrative. In the

reign of Galba, the new Praetorian Prefect, Cornelius Laco was given a prominent role

in the events of the reign, but by the time of Vitellius’ Principate, the Praetorian Prefects

are little more than names and Tacitus spends little time discussing them or their

actions. Even in the early period of Vespasian’s reign, the Praetorian Prefects do not

receive the same interest from Tacitus, as Laco had. This change is not because Tacitus

lost interest in the men who occupied this position, or because he had so many other

events to narrate, although undoubtedly these factors played their part. Rather the

change in the importance of the Praetorian Prefect was a historical reality. The three

factors that gave the Prefects their important position was destroyed during a period of

civil war. Firstly, the emperor, usually reliant on the Prefect’s for his physical safety

now needed the support offered by the powerful army generals. Secondly, it was these

army generals that are now found at the emperor’s side, not the Praetorian Prefects.

Thirdly, the Prefects were no longer in command of the only armed force in Italy and

finally, with the emperor himself taking the field, he was present with his Guard on

many occasions.

A return to the previous situation when the Praetorian Prefect was an important

individual probably did not come about until Titus had taken over the Praetorian

Prefecture and all the soldiers, with the exception of the Praetorian Guard, had either

been discharged or returned to their provinces. At this time, the Praetorian Prefect

would again be the commander of the only soldiers in Italy and hence his importance in

the life of the emperor and in the politics at Rome would return.

228

However, while the office of Praetorian Prefect was clearly overshadowed by

other army commanders in the year AD 68- 9, in the coming years the Praetorian

Prefecture went on to become one of the most important offices in the Empire. The

Praetorian Prefect and the role that he played became so indispensable to the emperor

that the position continued even after the Guard had been abolished in AD 312. This

period of civil war highlighted the need to have loyal and competent men who

commanded the respect of the Praetorian soldiers. Nero was deserted by his Praetorian

Prefects, when he needed their loyalty more than ever. Galba’s Prefect Laco was inept

and as a consequence failed to uncover Otho’s plot. One of Otho’s Prefects appears to

have deserted their emperor and Vitellius’ Prefects abandoned the battlefield when the

Flavian forces advanced. Consequently, the role played by the Praetorian Prefects in

AD 68 – 9 demonstrated more clearly than ever before the crucial place this man held in

the imperial administration.

While the importance of the Praetorian Prefects declined during this year,

unsurprisingly the importance of the Praetorian soldiers increased. Again, this is clear

from Tacitus’ narrative, an accurate reflection of the historical reality of the situation.

In periods of civil war, efforts are constantly being made to retain or suborn the loyalty

of the soldiers. Moreover, the emperors needed these men to fight their battles, battles

that were not being fought against a foreign enemy but against another Roman army.

Whatever the divisions or ambitions of the aristocracy in competing for power, there

was little such motivation amongst the ranks. Adherence to one general or would-be

emperor rather than another was often a matter of accident or where the soldiers found

himself. Consequently, the soldiers often found themselves in a position of power.

This is perhaps no better illustrated by Tacitus than in his narrative of the reign of Otho.

While Tacitus seems to have overstated the power the Praetorian soldiers enjoyed and

exercised in Otho’s brief reign, their wishes did have to be considered by the emperor.

The trend continued in the reign of Vitellius and Vespasian. Vitellius had to create a

much-enlarged Praetorian Guard in order to meet the wishes of many of his soldiers.

Even Mucianus was forced to accept into the Praetorian Guard, many more soldiers than

he wanted. Disillusioned soldiers could be a prime target for other potential usurpers.

The payment of financial rewards in influencing the actions of the Praetorian

soldiers is an important factor, but does not appear to be the sole determinant.

Certainly, the soldiers chose to desert Nero because of the promise of an extraordinarily

large donative and their decision might well have been influenced by Nero’s lack of

financial resources at the time and the threat this posed to the regular salary and

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discharge benefits of the Praetorians. Still that cannot have been the only factor. A

century of loyalty to the dynasty was not to be swept away so easily. The increasingly

unsuitable conduct of Nero himself and his alienation of many sectors of society

including as far away as Gaul and the Rhine armies, was also important.

The promised but unpaid donative was a crucial factor in Galba’s downfall.

While Otho worked hard to win the Praetorians’ support, what was much more

important was Galba’s relationship with his soldiers. By failing to pay the Praetorians

any of the promised donative, Galba had created a disillusioned and angry group of

soldiers. However, again that was not the only factor – the harsh disciplinarian and the

bloody treatment of some troops was surely significant. These soldiers obviously

agreed to support Otho, but considering the anger and the lack of respect they felt

towards Galba, any other senator might have been able to gain their co-operation

instead. Therefore, it was Galba’s treatment of the Praetorian Guard which decided his

fate and in the end brought Otho to power.

After Galba’s assassination the importance of financial incentives seems to

decline still further. If Otho promised the Praetorians a reward for their services, there

is no evidence, but still the soldiers fought bravely for him. Vitellius, it would seem,

also offered the soldiers little financial incentive, but probably offered his soldiers

service in the Praetorian Guard as an inducement in order to secure their loyalty.

Vespasian’s donatives were also small and restrained and service in the Praetorian

Guard may well have been offered as a reward.

Naturally, service in Rome would not appeal to all soldiers serving in the

provinces. Some soldiers would have developed strong ties to the local community and

preferred to continue to serve in their province. Indeed, that is precisely what Tacitus

(Hist. 2.80.3) tells us in a different but contemporary context. The famous speech he

puts in the mouth of Mucianus to the citizens of Antioch includes the claim – perhaps

partially truthful – that the Rhine legions were to be transferred by Vitellius to the East

as a reward and simultaneously he played on the reluctance of the Eastern armies to be

separated from the communities with which they were embedded. However, service in

the Praetorian Guard was undoubtedly coveted by many of the soldiers serving on the

frontiers. This is particularly evident with Vitellius’ need to substantially increase the

number of Praetorian cohorts, if not also the effective and Mucianus’ problems in

dealing with the soldiers after the Flavian victory. Not only did the soldiers serving on

the frontier covet the attractive service conditions of the Praetorian Guard, but this

jealousy clearly resulted in hostility towards the Guard. No doubt the soldiers on the

230

frontier viewed the function they performed in the army as important as the role played

by the Praetorian Guard. Tacitus (Ann. 1.17) through the words he puts in the mouth of

Percennius, clearly emphasises the soldiers’ discontent. However, while this jealousy

and hostility toward the Praetorian Guard probably simmered relatively harmlessly

below the surface most of the time, it could, given a leader who was able to exploit their

feelings, lead to civil war. It is not difficult to imagine an army general appealing to the

inequity of the service conditions and finding a sympathetic hearing.

The idea that the Praetorian soldiers were ‘soft’ and spent all their days in idle

luxury is unsustainable on the evidence of this period. The Praetorian Guard, according

to Tacitus, took part in four battles. Their fighting ability in these battles is not

questioned by our ancient sources and they seem to have acquitted themselves at least as

well as the supposedly battle-hardened troops from the rugged German frontier. The

old Guard fought on the winning side on three of the four occasions. In the only defeat

they suffered, there were so many adverse factors stacked against them that it is hardly

surprising that they succumbed to the Vitellians.

We cannot know for certain why the Praetorian Guard were so successful in

their engagements against frontier forces. However, we have to assume that they must

have been basically fit and strong. It would seem logical that only the healthiest young

men would be recruited for the Guard in the first instance. This does not mean that they

were necessarily healthy in the modern sense, but healthy in respect to their own time.

In addition, they must have been well drilled and familiar with battle formations, tactics

and military equipment. Their daily routine clearly included such training. Again, even

if it was not necessary on a regular basis, the emperors would want a Guard that not

only looked impressive but could put on imposing displays of military prowess. The

Praetorian Guard must also have been well motivated and determined. In the battles

they fought they usually had the most to lose.

By the end of AD 69 the Praetorian Guard must have been almost

unrecognisable from the Guard that had defected from Nero around eighteen months

earlier. In mid AD 68, the Praetorians were a largely homogenous group of soldiers,

with a shared geographical origin and service history and similar military experiences.

However, by the end of AD 69 what we have is an highly disparate group of soldiers

drawn from a number of diverse army groups. We cannot know how many of the

Nero’s former Praetorians lived through the year, but some certainly did. Then there

were the soldiers who had previously served on the Rhine frontier. These men

undoubtedly had different geographical and possibly social backgrounds from Nero’s

231

former Guardsmen. To these men we can add the soldiers who came from the Danube

frontier with Antonius Primus and from the East with Mucianus and Vespasian. This

mixing of so many varied army groups would have resulted in a Guard unrecognisable

from that of Nero’s time. Over the course of the subsequent generation, this

heterogeneity would slowly have disappeared. Not only would the new Praetorians

assimilate with their new surroundings, but new recruits from the traditional recruiting

grounds would gradually come to outnumber those who had originally come from the

Rhine, the Danube and the East.

Tacitus’ portrayal of the Praetorian Guard in the events of AD 69 would have to

be considered generally accurate and if we were to level any criticism against Tacitus’

account of the Guard, it would be that he has a tendency to augment a number of the

negative aspects in an attempt to illustrate the scene he is trying to create. This is

evident throughout the Historiae. In Galba’s reign Tacitus may well have played on the

animosity between Laco and Vinius to illustrate how Galba suffered because his

advisors could not agree. Tacitus’ description of a mutinous Guard on the verge of

anarchy during Otho’s time in Rome is certainly overstated and not supported by the

evidence. Undoubtedly, the Praetorians did create problems for their officers; the

impression that we have from Tacitus that this behaviour is widespread is again not,

however, supported by the evidence. If we put aside Tacitus’ tendency to over-

emphasize some of the negative aspects related to the Praetorian Guard, his portrayal is

quite credible. The behaviour Tacitus attributes to all sectors of the Praetorian Guard is

usually believable. Tacitus also seems to have accurately captured many of the

emotions and motivations of the average Praetorian soldiers, even when he did not

approve of their behaviour.

Finally, we may return to the issue of motivation. The warfare of AD 69 was

often bitter and bloody; casualties were substantial and there was widespread

destruction in southern Gaul, northern Italy, Campania and Rome itself. The wars gave

rise to the revolt of Julius Civilis on the Rhine and certainly delayed the suppression of

the Jewish revolt in Judaea. Yet this was not a war of keenly felt ideologies. The

leading supporters of Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian were supporting the man…

or opposing his opponent. Indeed, it was not even the man per se but the office. Had

the circumstances been slightly different it could easily have been Vespasian

supplanting Galba in Rome, Otho commanding on the Rhine and Vitellius suppressing

the Jewish revolt. Or even Mucianus asserting the primacy of his position and gaining

the support of Vespasian. The troops and even many of the officers supported one man

232

rather than another for no better reasons than that they were stationed in Rome or Mainz

or Antioch. This was not a contest between Optimates and Populares, but of competing

aristocrats seeking sole power and offering no platform that might appeal to the troops.

Yet the wars were fought bitterly with a striking animosity between different army

groups within the overall Roman army.

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Appendix One

Inscriptions

AE 1978 286:

A(ulo) Virgio L(ucii) f(ilio) Marso,| prim(o) pil(o) leg(ionis) III

Gallicae | iterum, praef(ecto) cast(orum) Aegy(pti), | praef(ecto)

fabr(um), tr(ibuno) mil(itum) in praet(orio) | diui Aug(usti) et

Ti(berii) Caesaris Aug(usti),| cohort(ium) XI et IIII praetoriar(um),

IIIIuir(o) quinq(uennali), delato hon|ore ab dec(urionibus) et popul(o)

in col(onia) Troad(ensium) | Aug(usta) et Marru(u)io, testamento|

dedit uicalibus Anninis imagin(es) | Caesarum argentias (sic) quinque|

et sestertia X milia, | uicales Anninis honor(is) | causa.

CIL V 7003 = ILS 2701

C. Gavio L. f. | Stel. Silváno | [p]rimipílári leg. VIII Aug., |

[t]ribuno coh. II vigilum, | [t]ribuno coh. XIII urban., | [tr]ibuno coh. XII

praetor., | [d]ónis donato a divo Claud. | belló Britannico | [to]rquibus

armillis phaleris | corona áureá, | [p]atrono colon., d. [d].

CIL III 1438 = ILS 9199

…Antonio M. f. Fab. | Nasoni | [7 le]g. III Cyrenaicae, |

[7 le]g. XIII Geminae | [honorat]o albata decursione ab imp., | [cen-

sitori?] civitatis Colaphianorum, |[primo] pilo leg. XIII Gem., trib.

leg. I Italic., | [trib. coh.] IIII vigilum, trib. coh. XV urba[n.,] | [trib.

coh.] XI urban., trib. coh. IX prae[t.,] | [donato] ab imperator[e Nerone

co]ron. | [valla]ri cornona au[rea] vexillis | duob]us has[stis puris] duo-

bus, | [praep. ab i]m[p. Othone leg]g. XIV Gem., | [trib. coh.] I praet.

234

AE 1939, 55

diuo

Vespasian[o]

Aug.

Antonia

It. f. Pacata et

Priscilla

ex testamento Antoni Tauri pp. p. a.

Birley (1988, 281) has interpreted the text as follows:

diuo

Vespasian[o]

Aug[usto]

Antoniae T(iti) f(iliae) Pacata et

Priscilla

ex testamento Antoni Tauri p(rimi)p(ilaris) pa[tris]

AE 1947, 40.

[M.A]rrecinus M(arci) f(ilius) Cam(ilia)

[Clemen]s cos IIpraet(or) urb(anus)

[leg.Aug. p]ro praet. Provinc(iae)

[Hispani]ae [ci]terioris p(ecunia) s(ua) f(ecit)

235

Appendix Two

The castra praetoria

The castra praetoria was constructed c. AD 21 – 23 at the instigation of the

Praetorian Prefect, L. Aelius Seianus (Sejanus) (Tac. Ann. 4.2.1), for the purpose of

housing the soldiers of the Praetorian Guard. The castra praetoria was also to become

the home of the evocati, the Urban cohorts and the statores (Durry 1968, 51).

According to Dio (57.19.7), the decision to build the Praetorian camp was an attempt to

promote efficiency and to inspire the population with fear because the soldiers of the

Praetorian Guard were altogether in one camp. In addition, Tacitus (Ann. 4.2) claims

that Sejanus wanted all the Praetorians together so that their visible numbers and

strength would intimidate the population. Historians have continued to follow our

ancient sources in assigning these ulterior motives to Sejanus (e.g. Durry 1968, 45).

However, the reasons given by Sejanus and quoted for us by Tacitus (Ann. 4.2): that the

concentration of the Praetorian Guard into a single location would help to solve the

problems of discipline and be more efficient, seem quite reasonable and probably

provide the real motives behind the construction of the camp. With the soldiers billeted

throughout the city it must have been almost impossible to maintain discipline and to

ensure that troops received their orders as efficiently as possible.

Unfortunately, our knowledge of the castra praetoria is only fragmentary and

excavation of the site has been very limited. These limited excavations have, however,

revealed that the camp changed very little in its 300 year history (Richmond 1927, 13).

The castra praetoria was situated on the Viminal Hill between the via Tiburtina and the

via Nomentana in the extreme north-east corner of Rome, beyond the pomerium and

about 500 meters east of the agger (Nash 1981, 221; cf. Pliny HN 3.67; Suet. Ner. 48.2).

It was positioned on one of the highest points around Rome (approximately 59 – 60

meters above sea level) and as a result enjoyed commanding views over both the city

and the roads leading to the east and the north-east (Platner & Ashby 1963, 106). The

camp itself was a broad rectangle with rounded corners approximately 440 meters by

380 meters and covered 16.72 hectares (Richmond 1927, 12; Platner & Ashby 1963,

106). The longer axis, the cardo maximus ran nearly on a north-south axis.

The Tiberian walls were 4.75 meters high with battlements and a turreted gate in

each side (Platner & Ashby 1963 106; Nash 1981, 221; cf. Tac. Hist. 3.84; Herodian

7.11.12). These walls were at least one meter lower than the usual height of walls of

this kind, while the gates seem to be a combination of a triumphal arch with crenulated

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towers (Richmond 1927, 13). The porta decumana (east) and the porta principalis

dextra (north) are still visible, although they have been walled up. There would have

been at least sixteen towers but for the sake of symmetry, that number is more likely to

have been twenty. The walls were made of concrete and faced with either dark red or

pink bricks (Richmond 1927, 13; Durry 1968, 45). There was no ditch system that is

usually associated with Roman forts, its place being taken by a road (Richmond 1927,

13). The cross of the main streets through the camp was regular on the long axis,

“…but displaced to the north-west on the short axis by some 30 meters” (Richardson

1992, 78). In front of the camp, between the camp and old Servian Wall, in the

direction of Rome, was a substantial area of space used as a parade and exercise ground

and known as the campus cohortium praetorianarum et urbanarum (Tac. Ann. 12.36;

Herodian 2.13.3; Dio 57.24.5, 74.1).

Unfortunately, the internal arrangements of the camp are very poorly understood

and as early as 1927 Richmond (1927, 14) noted that a satisfactory knowledge of the

interior was now unobtainable. Nonetheless, we do know that inside the thickness of

the walls were rows of vaulted chambers or contubernia presumably occupied by

soldiers, some of which on the north and east walls are still visible (Platner & Ashby

1963, 106). They were 3 meters high x 3.6 meters wide of opus reticulatum and lined

with stucco (Durry 1968, 47; Caronna 1993, 252 – 253). If these chambers were

present in the entire perimeter it has been estimated that there would have been around

340 of them (Durry 1968, 53). Above these chambers ran a paved rampart for the

guards (Platner & Ashby 1963, 106; Richardson 1992, 78). These contubernia were

most likely built into the fortress walls to provide extra accommodation (Richmond

1927, 14).

Barrack blocks probably dominated the majority of the interior space of the

castra and we know that at least some of these were two storeys (Bull. Comm. Arch.

1878, 178). Texts do not say whether the Praetorian Prefects lived in the camp,

although one would have to assume that they were located within the city itself. The

tribunes and centurions, however, are likely to have made the camp their home (Durry

1968, 53). No structures which can be identified as principia, praetorium, hospital or

baths have been found (Bingham 1998, App. 3; cf. Joseph. AJ 18.228). Bingham (1998,

App. 3) has explained that the absence of these typically large buildings is not

surprising because the camp was situated so close to Rome. However, it is difficult to

imagine that sick or injured Praetorians did not have their own hospital, even if it was

just a small building devoted to recuperation. Furthermore, it seems quite unlikely that

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the Praetorians did not have their own bath building. Certainly, there was no bath

building near the camp (Durry 1968, 53).

We know from literary and epigraphic sources that a number of buildings were

present in the camp. There was a Shrine of the Standards (Herodian 4.4.5, 5.8.5-7) as

would be expected, and a Shrine to Mars (CIL VI 2256 = ILS 2090), an altar to Fortuna

Restitutrix (NS 1888 391; CIL VI 30 876) which was erected in Caracalla’s time and

was set up by the tribune of the VI cohort in a mosaic paved bathroom of some of the

officers quarters. There was also an armentarium (Tac. Hist. 1.38.3; 1.80.1; CIL VI 999

= ILS 333; 2725 = ILS 2034) and a tribunal (Tac. Hist. 1.36.1). The aqua Iulia Tepula

carried water into the camp and the inscriptions on numerous lead pipes indicate the

care that was taken by successive emperors to ensure that the castra praetoria had a

steady supply of water (CIL XV 7237 – 44; ILS 8697 – 99).

The Praetorian camp is represented on an aureus issued by Claudius in AD 41 –

2, apparently in gratitude to the Praetorian Guard for acclaiming him emperor following

the assassination of Gaius (BMC RE 1 Claudius No. 5, 20, 21, 23 – 25, 37, 38). This

particular reverse gives us quite an accurate view of the castra praetoria. Reality has

had to be altered somewhat by the die makers, but all the important features are in their

proper places. It appears as a low curving fortification wall in which there are two

arched entrances crowned by five battlements above which appears an enthroned

divinity. Richardson (1992, 78) questions if this crowned divinity is Jupiter. Davison

(1974, 27) prefers to see the figure as Claudius, while Durry (1968, 50) describes this

figure as Mars. The inscription on the obverse reads IMPER(atore) RECEPT(o) and

refers to the acceptance of Claudius by the Praetorians as the Roman emperor.

The camp remained virtually unchanged until Aurelian incorporated the castra

praetoria into his fortifications around Rome. Aurelian’s walls joined the castra at the

north-west corner and near the middle of the south side (Platner & Ashby 1963, 107;

Nash 1981, 221; Richardson 1992, 78). The height of the walls was also increased by a

further 2.5 – 3 meters, while the soil was dug away at the foundations of the walls to a

depth of 2.3 meters (Durry 1968, 49; Platner & Ashby 1963, 107; Nash 1981, 221;

Richardson 1992, 78). The original Tiberian wall can be distinguished from the wall of

Aurelian by the difference in the brickwork and by the outline of the battlements

(Platner & Ashby 1963, 107). The gates on the north and east side were walled up;

work which may have been carried out under Maxentius (Platner & Ashby 1963, 107).

Constantine disbanded the Praetorian Guard and dismantled their camp by

destroying the west wall after they had supported his rival Maxentius at the battle of

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Mulvian Bridge (Zosimus 2.17.2; Aur. Vict. Caes. 40.25). However, by AD 312 the

Praetorian Guard had become a rather outdated institution anyway, particularly as the

emperor was continually absent from Rome.

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Appendix Three

Nero’s Praetorian Prefects Ofonius Tigellinus

Much of our information about the early years of Tigellinus’ life is found in the ancient

scholia to Juvenal 1.155. How much trust we can place in this information is however,

difficult to assess. Based on a study of the passages relating to Tigellinus and the other

scholia found on the text of Juvenal, Townend’s belief is that the source of the

information for the scholiasts was possibly the historian Cluvius Rufus, or at least a

historian whose work covered the reign of Nero and the early years of Vespasian’s

Principate (Townend 1961a, 231; 1972, 381). Assuming that Rufus was the source of

the information on Tigellinus, we need to consider how reliable he was as a historian.

Unfortunately, this is almost impossible to assess because so little about his Historiae

has survived. Brief passages regarding Rufus can be found in Tacitus (Ann. 13.20, 14.2)

and Plutarch (Otho 3.2, Roman Questions 107) and an anecdote about Cluvius Rufus

can be found in a letter by the Younger Pliny (Ep. 9.19.5) regarding Verginius Rufus.

Townend, when assessing the results of his studies, concludes that Rufus was a

“sensational and polemical writer,” who was “less scrupulous for sober truth than the

Elder Pliny,” and that his work was a “chronique scandaleuse,” which was largely

based on his access to the secrets of the imperial court (Townend 1964b, 470; 1961b,

338; 1964a, 346).

However, as Wiseman notes, just because a work seems scandalous does not

mean that the reports are without substance; after all the Julio-Claudian family was not

known for its impeccable behaviour (Wiseman 1991, 115). Furthermore, Rufus must

have been acquainted with Tigellinus on a personal basis for a number of years. He had

been consul suffectus (Suet. Ner. 21.2; Joseph. AJ 19.91 – 2) and was a conspicuous

member of Nero’s court, accompanying the emperor, along with Tigellinus, on his

sojourn to Greece (Dio 63.11.2, 12.3, 13.1, 14.3). If any historian were in a position to

write about Tigellinus’ earlier life, it should have been Rufus. “Cluvius was well placed

to know the facts,” (Wiseman 1991, 115). Nevertheless, this does not mean that Rufus

accurately or honestly recorded the information known to him. For example, he may

have set out to portray Tigellinus in an unfavourable light by misrepresenting his

intentions or his character. Therefore, the information from the scholia, on Tigellinus’

life, needs to be viewed with these limitations and arguments in mind.

According to the scholion (Juv. 1.155), Ophonius Tigellinus, patre

Agr<ig>entino Scyllaceum relegato iuvenis egens, verumadmodum pulcher... It is not

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known when Tigellinus came to Rome, or by which means he entered into the upper

classes. However, because he was brought up in the company of Gaius’ sisters

(Ferguson 1987, 229), one can only assume that Tigellinus’ father must have come into

some money or acquired friends in high places for his son to find himself in the

company of the imperial women (Griffin 1987, 103). Tigellinus was exiled in AD 39

by the emperor Gaius, on a charge of adultery with the emperor’s sisters, Agrippina

(Dio 59.23.9) and possibly Iulia Livilla (Schol. Juv. 1.155). During his exile, Tigellinus

lived in Achaea and supported himself by fishing. Claudius allowed him to return from

exile, as long as he kept out of his sight. At some point, Tigellinus moved to southern

Italy to breed horses for chariot racing (Schol. Juv. 1.155).

How Tigellinus came to be on friendly terms with Nero is not clear, although it

seems most likely that his earlier involvement with Agrippina (Dio 59.23.9), Nero’s

mother, which dated back to at least AD 39, may hold the key to how they first met and

how he later became part of Nero’s court (Roper 1979, 347).

C. Nymphidius Sabinus

According to Tacitus (Ann.15.72), Nymphidius like Tigellinus, was of humble

birth. There seems little doubt about Nymphidius’ maternity. He himself

acknowledged that he was the son of a freedwoman, known as Nymphidia (Plut. Galba

9.2 – 3, 14.3; Tac. Ann. 15.72). Nymphidia was the daughter of C. Julius Callistus, who

had been an imperial secretary under both Gaius and Claudius (Tac. Ann. 11.29, 38.4;

Dio 60.30.6b, 33.3a). Undoubtedly, Callistus’ influence would have assisted

Nymphidius in his early career (1 Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 57). Nymphidia was

apparently a woman of loose morals who had prostituted herself among the emperor’s

slaves and freedmen (Tac. Ann. 15.72). Regarding Nymphidius’ paternity, however,

there seems to be some uncertainty. Nymphidius claimed that the emperor Gaius was

his father (Tac. Ann. 15.72) or he was at least not averse to having it said (Plut. Galba

9.1). Tacitus (Ann. 15.72) does not confirm or dismiss outright Nymphidius’ claim,

noting that Gaius’ sexual appetite extended to such women and that Nymphidius shared

his height and his lowering brow with Gaius. However, Plutarch (Galba 9.2), while he

maintains that it is quite feasible that Gaius had been intimate with Nymphidia, believes

that the relationship between them took place after Nymphidius’ birth, circa AD 30

(Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 39). Instead, Plutarch writes “it was believed” that

Nymphidius was the son of Martianus, a famous gladiator, to whom Nymphidius’

resemblance was thought to favour a connection. In Juvenal’s sixth satire (78 – 113) we

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read that many other women from much higher classes than Nymphidia also admired

gladiators. Tacitus makes no mention of Martianus.

There is clearly no certainty regarding Nymphidius’ paternity and this may

explain why both Tacitus and Plutarch have chosen to emphasise the humble origins of

his maternal side. Perhaps, however, their emphasis on Nymphidius’ maternity is not

due to any uncertainty, but due to the fact that Nymphidius’ real father had risen to a

position of some influence within the imperial court. A parallel case is that of the father

of Claudius Etruscus, who rose from slave status under Tiberius to be head of the

imperial financial administration and under Vespasian acquired equestrian status with

senatorial connections. Of all the imperial freedmen, he was one of the most influential,

important and wealthy.735

735 Weaver 1965, 145; 1967, 17. The sources are Statius Silvae 1.5.65, 3.3; Martial 6.83, 7.40.

This does not mean, of course, that Nymphidius’ father was

necessarily as influential as the father of Claudius Etruscus, but he may have performed

his duties well and acquired wealth and influence with the emperor(s). Consequently,

Nymphidius’ origins may not necessarily have been quite what the sources would have

us believe and in order to emphasise Nymphidius’ humble origins they have been forced

to focus primarily on his maternal side.

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Appendix Four

The coup of Nymphidius Sabinus

While Galba was receiving the news from his freedman Icelus that the Praetorian

Guard, the Senate and People had proclaimed him emperor (Plut. Galba 7.1 – 2), Nero’s

former Praetorian Prefect, Nymphidius, was back in Rome apparently “forcing the

entire control of affairs into his own hands, not slowly and little by little, but all at once”

(Plut. Galba 8.1). Throughout the four chapters Plutarch (Galba 8 – 9, 13 – 14) devotes

to Nymphidius, the biographer portrays him as an ambitious and scheming individual,

who initially aimed to become sole Prefect for life (Plut. Galba 8.2), but quickly

decided to go further and sieze the Principate for himself (Plut. Galba 8.1, 9.1, 3).

Many modern scholars have followed Plutarch’s assessment of Nymphidius and his

motives (e.g. Durry 1968, 370; Rudich 1993, 234 – 8; Champlin 2003, 7; Morgan 2006,

39 – 40). Yet is this an accurate assessment of Nymphidius and of what he was actually

doing in the days and weeks after Nero’s death? Undoubtedly, the dual facts that Nero

appointed Nymphidius as his Praetorian Prefect and that he was the colleague of the

infamous Tigellinus has coloured attitudes to him. However, it should be remembered

that we have scant information regarding the character of Nymphidius prior to these

events described by Plutarch. Tacitus (Ann. 15.72) was probably going to provide a

character sketch of Nymphidius, on what was his first appearance in the Annales, but

that has been lost.

Nymphidius and the sources

Plutarch (Galba 8 – 9, 13 – 14) is the only extant source that deals with Nymphidius’

attempted coup against Galba in any detail – c. 1500 words in the English translation;

other literary sources are brief or obscure or both. Tacitus (Hist. 1.5.2), because the

events fall outside his chronological framework, reduced the event to its bare minimum:

Nymphidius sought the throne but failed. Dio (64.2.3) makes a vague and confusing

reference to Nymphidius, claiming that Galba was ill-spoken of because he allowed

other men to do wrong or alternatively was ignorant of what was going on. Due to

Galba’s weak character, Nymphidius and (Fonteius) Capito “quite lost their heads.” For

their foolish behaviour Galba punished them. Finally, Suetonius (Galba 11.1) simply

states that Galba did not resume wearing his toga until those who were plotting against

him, Nymphidius Sabinus, Fonteius Capito and Clodius Macer had been overthrown.

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Therefore, we are almost completely reliant on Plutarch’s narrative for Nymphidius’

actions after Nero’s death and hence his account requires careful analysis.

Although Plutarch’s narrative contains many important details about

Nymphidius, it contains little information regarding the chronology of the actual events.

There is only one incident which can be utilised to establish any sort of time line.

Nymphidius, probably in the days immediately after Nero’s death, sent his friend

Gellianus to meet Galba. After meeting with Galba, Gellianus had enough time to

return to Rome and report back to Nymphidius before the Prefects’ death (Plut. Galba

13.1). This would indicate that the events must have unfolded over a four to six week

period. However, this assumes that Gellianus left Rome promptly after Nero’s death

and returned to Rome immediately after meeting with Galba, which seems the most

likely scenario. However, we have no idea of how Gellianus travelled, how long the

journey took or how long he remained in the emperor’s company.

The situation in Rome after Nero’s death

Before commencing an analysis of what Plutarch actually wrote about Nymphidius, it is

vital to consider the circumstances that surrounded the Prefect in the weeks following

Nero’s death. Understanding his position may help to perceive his actions in a more

accurate light, because Nymphidius, like other people in power, will not necessarily

have been driven soley by his ambition, but also by the situation – often changing – in

which he found himself. It will be useful, too, to recollect what the role of the

Praetorian Prefecture had become by AD 68.

Nero was dead, the dynasty at an end and all in tumultuous circumstances. The

new emperor was in Spain, at least 1500 kilometres overland from the capital, about

two months travel. Consequently, there would have been a power vacuum at Rome.

Not dissimilar to the power vacuum that was created in the long pause between Otho’s

death in mid April AD 69 and Vitellius’ arrival in Rome around the end of June in the

same year. Only in this instance nobody in the city took control (Morgan 2006, 145).

Moreover, there must have been continuing uncertainly about what course of action

Verginius Rufus and the Rhine legions would take; a key factor in view of Galba’s

limited military resources in Spain. The situation in Rome must have been tense. The

Praetorian Prefect, perhaps more than anyone else could not simply remain inactive.

The Prefecture itself had evolved swiftly from its inception under Augustus. Although

officially commander of the Guard, the nature of that position and the character of the

men selected rapidly transformed them into highly trusted confidants with some control

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over access to the emperor and control over what he heard. Though none had matched

Sejanus, the Prefects under Nero had considerable scope to exercise power – and to be

seen as powerful individuals far beyond their nominal role as commander of the

household troops. In short, with Nero dead and Nymphidius having played a key role in

driving him to suicide, he more than anyone else in Rome would have been expected to

play a key role in the events that followed. In that respect Nymphidius had two areas in

which to act. In Rome he was the dominant force; he was now – by default – the

Prefect, with all that that entailed in terms of obligation and responsibility, of the new

(absent) emperor. The second of these is important, as Nymphidius would be expected

to report to and act for Galba, an emperor who had not appointed him and to whom he

was unlikely to be known since Galba was an old aristocrat, far older and had been in

Spain for over seven years.

Nymphidius must make choices and he must act; passivity was not an option.

Much could happen in the interval between news being sent to Galba and receiving

instructions. In a highly unstable situation the opportunity existed for an ambitious

senator to corrupt the loyalty of the Praetorian Guard and bring Galba’s reign to a very

premature end. Indeed, even after Galba’s arrival in Rome, Tacitus (Hist. 1.6.2)

claimed that there was abundant fuel for a revolution in the city; the soldiers favoured

no one particular individual, but they were ready for anyone who had the courage. How

much more so in the power vacuum between Nero’s death and the arrival of Galba and

with other threats unfolding in Africa and the Rhineland. Nymphidius was almost

certainly the only man in the city able to prevent this happening and maintain the status

quo, as it were. Therefore, there must have been pressure placed on Nymphidius, by

Galba’s supporters and possibly many other senators, to at least gather the reins of some

powers into his hands, while the highly unstable situation unfolded. Arguably this was

his ‘job,’ as Prefect.

Sole Praetorian Prefect for life?

There can be no denying that Nymphidius, besides taking care of Galba’s interests, had

to consider his own future. He had betrayed the man who had promoted him to the

Praetorian Prefecture, risking not only his position, but if Galba’s uprising had failed,

his life. Faenius Rufus, his immediate predecessor, had lost his life when his role in the

failed Pisonian conspiracy was uncovered (Tac. Ann. 15.66, 68.1). In addition,

Nymphidius’ role in bringing Galba to power was crucial. By promising each

Praetorian Guardsmen the enormous donative of 7500 denarii he managed to persuade

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the soldiers to desert Nero and support Galba (Tac. Hist. 1.5.2; Plut. Galba 2.1 – 2;

Suet. Galba 16.1; Dio 64.3.3). The stakes were high and Nymphidius would have

expected to be rewarded by Galba for his services, much as the soldiers expected they

would receive the promised donative (Tac. Hist. 1.5.1; Plut. Galba 18.2; Suet. Galba

15.1). To retain his position as Praetorian Prefect would seem a completely realistic

expectation on Nymphidius’ part. It was possibly the only position that he believed

would have guaranteed his future safety.

Plutarch (Galba 8.2), however, claims that Nymphidius went even further and

instigated many of the soldiers to declare that a deputation should be sent to Galba

which would demand that he be made sole Prefect for life. The position of sole Prefect

for life might have been Nymphidius’ price for the services that he had rendered to

Galba’s cause. Indeed, it may well have been the price Nymphidius negotiated with

Galba’s supporters before he would agree to attempt to bring the Praetorians around to

desert Nero and support Galba. If Nymphidius made the position of sole Praetorian

Prefect for life, his reward for his services, it would have been an extraordinary demand

but it was made in extraordinary circumstances for an extraordinary service.

No more is heard about this deputation in Plutarch or elsewhere. Therefore, we

cannot know, if the soldiers ever completed their task, if the deputation ever left Rome,

if Galba ever received the proposal – or assuming that Galba did receive the proposal –

how he responded. Considering the extraordinary nature of Nymphidius’ request it

seems somewhat odd that Plutarch does not follow up on the outcome of the deputation,

especially Galba’s specific response, if indeed there was one. Moreover, if Nymphidius

was the scheming and ambitious man portrayed by Plutarch, why did he not simply

order a deputation be sent to Galba? He had the power and the resources to carry out

such a task; did he really need to place his request via the soldiers? Certainly,

Nymphidius may have been trying to avoid responsibility for the request and by having

the troops take the iniative, Nymphidius may have hoped that the request would have

more influence with Galba. However, if Nymphidius himself presented his request to

Galba there would be no reason why he could not tell his emperor that the request was

widely supported by the Praetorian Guard. Bearing these points in mind, one cannot

help wondering if Nymphidius did indeed make such a request in the first place.

Rudich (1993, 236) suggests that it was the failure of Nymphidius, to secure the

position of Praetorian Prefect from Galba that led him onto the path of revolution.

However, at no time does Plutarch indicate what the future held for Nymphidius. Galba

may not have intended to retain Nymphidius as his Praetorian Prefect but would he

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really have informed Nymphidius, or led him to believe that this was his intention,

before he even arrived in the city? It is difficult to believe that when so far from Rome

he would deliberately upset the man who had authority over the Praetorian Guard.

Nevertheless, Galba certainly made some unusual decisions in his consulship,

particularly his refusal to pay the soldiers any donative at all, although it is difficult to

believe that when so far from Rome he would deliberately upset the man who had

authority over the Praetorian Guard.

Later – although how much later is impossible to tell – Gellianus, whom

Nymphidius had sent to be a “sort of spy” on Galba, informed him that Cornelius Laco

had been appointed Praetorian Prefect and that Vinius was all-powerful with Galba.

This news apparently disturbed Nymphidius, as well it might – he had received a

colleague and not been informed about it directly by Galba. He called together all the

officers of the army, presumably the Praetorian tribunes and centurions (Plut. Galba

13.2). One would assume that Nymphidius’ concern would primarily have been with

Laco’s appointment as Praetorian Prefect, but instead Nymphidius told the officers that

Galba, although well meaning, was no longer following his own counsel and was being

badly directed by Laco and Vinius. In response Nymphidus wanted a deputation to be

sent from the camp to Galba (Plut. Galba 13.2) ‘advising’ him that if he would remove

only these two men (Laco and Vinius) from his retinue he would find that he would be

more welcomed and accepted on his arrival in Rome (Plut. Galba 13.1 – 2).

Was Nymphidius ‘advice’ to Galba a veiled threat on the part of the Praetorian

Prefect? Nymphidius may well have been upset about Laco being appointed Prefect,

but the concern that Plutarch has him express here is for Galba’s reception in the capital,

although by implication he is criticizing his new colleague, Laco. To what extent is

Plutarch expressing the concern felt by senators over Galba’s chose of advisers,

particulary Vinius, rather than concern on Nymphidius’ part alone? Any number of

senators may have seen themselves as more qualified than Vinius and Laco to offer the

new emperor advice and counsel. The choice of senators to make up a delegation to

Vespasian in AD 70 resulted in heated debate in the Senate between Helvidius Priscus

and Eprius Marcellus (Tac. Hist. 4.6). Furthermore, Vinius did have a poor reputation

even before he left Rome for his posting in Spain (Tac. Hist. 1.48.2 – 4; Plut. Galba

12.1 – 3) and both Laco and Vinius proved to be very unpopular with many sections of

society during Galba’s reign (Tac. Hist. 1.6.1, 12.3; Suet. Galba 14.2 – 16.2; Dio

64.2.3; Plut. Galba 17.1). They are also portrayed as having considerable influence

over the new emperor (Plut. Galba 11.2, 17.3, 18.1; Tac. Hist. 1.13.1). In hindsight,

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Nymphidius’ ‘advice’ if that is where the advice actually came from was not unwise.

“Ironically, if Nymphidius’ advice to dismiss them (Vinius and Laco) had been taken,

Galba might have enjoyed a longer reign” (Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 61).

This deputation, however, does not seem to have ever been dispatched, because

the Praetorian officers were uncomfortable with the idea of dictating to an aged emperor

what friends he should keep (Plut. Galba 13.3). Presumably, these were the same

officers who had recently betrayed Nero. As with the previous delegation, if

Nymphidius wanted a deputation sent from the camp he only had to order one to be

dispatched. Either he was displaying an unusual form of democracy by allowing the

officers to make the final decision or he had no authority over his own officers. Both

alternatives seem unlikely and again one has to question if Nymphidius ever made this

request or if Nymphidius was acting for someone else altogether. We may ask, too,

why Nymphidius chose to send, or try to send, soldiers. Why not encourage a senatorial

deputation? The latter would have been more favourably received by the conservative

Galba; the former would have likely been viewed as threatening and impudent.

Nymphidius and Galba

Regarding Nymphidius’ attitude to his new emperor, Plutarch (Galba 8.1) writes that

Nymphidius believed that Galba was an old man, who needed to be carried to Rome in a

litter. These facts are hardly disputed. Galba, as Plutarch (Galba 8.1) himself confirms

was in his seventy third year, (cf. Tac. Hist. 1.49.2; Suet. Nero. 40.5, Galba 4.1, 23; Dio

64.6.52), he did need to be carried to Rome (Plut. Galba 20.3) and his age was the

subject of discussion and derision to other besides the Praetorian Prefect (Tac. Hist.

1.5.2, 6.1, 7.3; Plut. Galba 16.4, 19.1; Suet. Galba 12.3; Dio 64.3.4). The soldiers

compare the age and appearance of the Vitellian commanders Fabius Valens and

Caecina Alienus (Tac. Hist. 1.52.3, 53.1, 66.2), while the estimation of Hordeonius

Flaccus, in the eyes of the soldiers also suffers because of his age and infirmity (Tac.

Hist. 1.9.1). One has to wonder though how Nymphidius’ thoughts on the abilities or

otherwise of Galba found their way into the historical record in the first instance and

why if Nymphidius thought Galba so incapable of ruling did he agree to support him

thereby risking his life in the process? Additionally, in the aforementioned meeting

with his Praetorian officers, Plutarch (Galba 13.2) has Nymphidius describe Galba as

well meaning and moderate, but failing to follow his own counsel (cf. Dio 64.2.1). This

does not imply disrespect on Nymphidius’ part.

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Nymphidius’ dealings and correspondence with the emperor do not have any

sinister overtones. As mentioned previously, Plutarch (Galba 13.1) claimed that

Nymphidius sent his friend Gellianus to Galba in order to act as a “sort of spy.”

However, was Gellianus undertaking anything different from that of any number of

other envoys that must have been despatched to Galba at this time? How many other

senators dispatched letters of congratulations carried by their slaves or freedmen to the

new emperor? In a world of limited and delayed news, trusted couriers and envoys

would surely always be intended to gather news and insights.

Nymphidius also dispatched “an abundance of royal furniture and service” from

Nero’s palace to Galba. On one level, Nymphidius’ actions may be viewed as merely

solicitous of the new emperor’s comfort; more politically, however, it was surely

intended to cement Galba’s position of successor and heir of the Julio-Claudians by

providing him with some of their imperial trappings. Presumably he hoped that Galba

would view his action favourably. Plutarch’s narrative is not critical of Nymphidius’

actions here. However, when he entertained Galba refused to use the furniture, not

because Nymphidius had sent it, but rather because Galba believed that using the

furniture would open him up to criticism. He wanted to demonstrate that he was a man

“averse to vulgar luxury” (Plut. Galba 11.1). Perhaps rejected, too, for different

political reasons – an unwillingness to be seen to step to easily into the paraphernalia of

a discredited dynasty. Nevertheless, Galba’s mind was changed by the arguments of

Vinius (Plut. Galba 11.1) demonstrating his persuasive influence over the emperor.

The other recorded correspondence Nymphidius sent to Galba, were according

to Plutarch (Galba 13.3), intended to alarm him. If Plutarch has recorded the contents

of these messages accurately they may have indeed been intended to alarm Galba.

However, were they designed to manipulate him into making Nymphidius Praetorian

Prefect for life as a trusted pair of hands in a crisis? Or at least encourage Galba to

speed up his journey to Rome, so that he could be exposed to Nymphidius’ personal

influence (Morgan 2006, 40).

Two of the three problems highlighted by Nymphidius can be viewed as a

genuine cause for concern and in all likelihood Nymphidius himself was apprehensive

about the issues that he was writing about. The fact that Galba paid no heed to

Nymphidius’ messages may not have been because he had no confidence in

Nymphidius’ reports as Plutarch (Galba 13.4) claimed, but because he understood the

situation better than Nymphidius or simply had no concern for the problems set out by

the Prefect.

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For example, Nymphidius wrote to Galba about the disquiet throughout Rome

because L. Clodius Macer (cf. PIR2 C 1170; RIC 1, 193 – 5) was holding back the

African grain supply (Plut. Galba 13.3). If the food supply to Rome were threatened,

Nymphidius would have been aware that there was a potential for problems in the

capital. Is there any surprise then that this message can be viewed as alarmist?

Moreover, as Morgan (2000, 485) has argued there maybe any number of ways to

explain Galba’s lack of concern about this report. Galba had served as proconsul of

Africa in the first half of Claudius reign (Plut. Galba 3.2; Suet. Galba 7.1, 8.1) and as a

result may have concluded that Macer’s actions would end up being more damaging to

the legate than to himself, as the private individuals involved in the grain trade would

have stood to lose substantial sums of money. Alternatively, Galba may have believed

that Macer would not have been able to create a shortage serious enough to warrant

alarm, because the blockade was unlikely to cover all the harbours from which grain

could be shipped. However, it is most probable that Galba was simply indifferent to the

potential suffering of the Roman people and the problems this could cause for

Nymphidius (Morgan 2000, 483 – 5). Therefore, Galba’s disinterest in Nymphidius’

report about a grain shortage was not necessarily due to his lack of confidence in the

Praetorian Prefect.

Nymphidius also wrote to Galba claiming that the legions in Germany were

mutinous (Plut.Galba 13.3) in what would have to be considered an accurate description

of what was going on along the Rhine frontier around this time (Tac. Hist. 1.8 – 9).

Indeed, Plutarch (Galba 10.1) himself claimed that Verginius Rufus gave Galba cause

for anxiety. Galba, however, probably had more up to date information than

Nymphidius and may have already met with Verginius and organised his replacement

by the time the Prefect’s message arrived (Plut. Galba 10.3; Dio 63.29.5 – 6).

Consequently, he could afford to disregard Nymphidius’ correspondence. Finally, there

was Nymphidius’ report that the forces in Syria and Judaea were also mutinous. From

Tacitus’ account (Hist. 1.10.1 – 3) it would appear that the East was initially peaceful.

However, we cannot know what information Nymphidius may have been receiving at

this time and it is worth remembering that Tacitus (Hist. 1.89) claims: Nero muntiis

magis et rumoribus quam armis depulsus…. The situation in the provinces must have

been particularly difficult to assess with any accuracy. Therefore, was Nymphidius,

with these three messages, attempting to alarm and thereby manipulate Galba, as

Plutarch insinuates, or was he supplying his emperor with what he considered important

information – then simply doing what was expected of him?

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Nymphidius and the Senate

In respect to Nymphidius’ dealing with the Senate, there is little to indicate that

Nymphidius was behaving like a man intent on seizing imperial power. Nymphidius

gave receptions to ex consuls and men who had held high command (Plut. Galba 8.2),

but was he courting senatorial favour for his own ends or was he merely playing his part

as Prefect in building up support for Galba? After all, Plutarch (Galba 8.2) adds that he

affixed the name of Galba to the invitations. Concern for the respectability of Galba’s

Principate may also have been Nymphidius’ motive when he ordered the resignation of

his co Prefect, Tigellinus (Plut. Galba 8.2). Tigellinus had been a particulary unpopular

member of Nero’s court and there were to be calls for his death later in Galba’s reign

(Tac. Hist. 1.72.1; Plut. Galba 17.2), with the demands of the Roman people only

quelled by an edict issued by the emperor ( Plut. Galba 17.4; Suet. Galba 15.2).

Nymphidius may have felt, and probably rightly so, that Galba’s court would have more

propriety and credibility without the presence of Tigellinus.

The Senate, according to Plutarch (Galba 8.3) did much to enhance

Nymphidius’ prestige and power. They gave him the title of benefactor, they were

assembling daily at his door and most significantly, they allowed him the privilege of

initiating and confirming all their decrees. A highly unusual set of privileges for a

Praetorian Prefect, reminiscent of Sejanus after Tiberius had retired to Capri (Tac. Ann.

6.8; Suet. Tib. 65; Dio 58.2.7), but what did this actually mean for Nymphidius?

Praetorian Prefects were of equestrian rank and therefore not permitted to sit in the

Senate. For a person of non-senatorial rank to be promoted to the Senate required

adlection by the emperor, acting either as censor or with some form of censorial powers

(Bosworth 1980, 269). Therefore, it would seem that what Plutarch means is that

Nymphidius was requested to suggest to the consuls what measures he thought they

should put forward and that any senatus consulta were laid before him for his approval

(Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 55).

This was an extraordinary position for a Praetorian Prefect to find himself in – a

virtual regent acting for the absent emperor. Nevertheless, at no time does Plutarch

indicate that Nymphidius demanded or even requested any of these honours or

responsibilities, rather they were initiated by members of the Senate. This does not rule

out the possibility that Nymphidius applied pressure to members of the senate to ensure

that he was involved in all their decision-making, but this is not what is stated in

Plutarch’s narrative. What were the Senate’s motives here? Were they acting out of

fear of the Praetorian Prefect? If so, this fear may have been unjustified as we hear of

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no senator suffering in anyway at the hands of Nymphidius. Indeed, Tacitus (Hist.

1.4.3) even asserts: Sed patres laeti, usurpata statim libertate licentius ut erga

principem novum et absentem. (“The senators rejoiced and immediately made full use

of their liberty, as was natural, for they had to do with a new emperor who was still

absent.”) Possibly the Senate wanted nothing more than to keep the wheels of

government moving and by ensuring that someone in a position of power, which

Nymphidius was, could exercise some authority there would be less threat to Galba’s

position. Finally, there is the simple fact that the Senate had long become accustomed

to seeking prior approval for its actions and ratification of its acts. In the absence of

Galba himself, or of an appointed regent, they inevitable turned to the man they

perceived to be effectively playing that role. All this attention from the Senate

apparently raised Nymphidius to an even higher pitch of boldness and those who paid

court to him began to be filled with jealousy and fear (Plut. Galba 8.3). Was

Nymphidius actually becoming more audacious or was this simply the perception that

his new role presented? Given the privileges the Praetorian Prefect was enjoying,

senators may well have been jealous.

At one point Plutarch (Galba 8.4 – 5) claims that Nymphidius considered

moving against the consuls but changed his mind when they begged for forgiveness.

The consuls had sent decrees of the Senate to Galba, but instead of using Nymphidius’

seal and the Praetorian soldiers to carry the decrees, they had put their own seal on them

and had given them to public slaves to carry (Plut. Galba 8.4). This caused Nymphidius

great distress. Plutarch does not explain his attitude. Nymphidius may have been more

concerned with issues of security and speed. The Praetorian speculatores were the

usual message carriers; they were experienced and could probably cover the distance in

greater safety and with greater speed. However, there is a more obvious explanation:

the independent action of the consuls and Senate, though probably anodyne in content,

implied independence of the Prefect and that he was not the sole arbiter of Galba’s

interests in Rome. They were by-passing his authority (Little and Ehrhardt 1994, 56).

One further point worth considering here; Suetonius (Ner. 43.2) and Pliny (Pan. 57.2)

have both claimed that Nero deposed the consuls before the end of their term, yet they

seem to have returned to their previous office and were active. Nymphidius clearly did

nothing to prevent them resuming their former position.

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Nymphidius, the soldiers and the people

Nymphidius’ confidence in being able to seize imperial power was according to

Plutarch (Galba 8.1), due to his good relationship with the soldiers in the city, who we

are told were well disposed to him. Surely, one of the pre requisites of a Praetorian

Prefect was that he was able to command respect, if nothing else, from the soldiers of

the Guard. Indeed, Tacitus (Hist. 1.6.1, 24) condemns Galba’s choice of Prefect,

Cornelius Laco, because his ability to understand and handle the Praetorian soldiers was

completely inadequate. In contrast, Plutarch (Galba 8.1) adds, that not only was the

Guard well disposed towards Nymphidius but they now saw him as their benefactor

because of the donative he promised, while Galba was their debtor. This may well have

been true. Nymphidius was involved in promising the Praetorian Guard an

unprecedented donative to desert Nero and after such an undertaking Nymphidius’

stocks should have gone up in the eyes of the average soldier. We should consider,

however, the damage done by Nymphidius’ failure to make good on any of the

promised donative, a point to which we will return. Galba only became their debtor

because he failed to attempt to pay even a fraction of the reward that the soldiers

believed they were owed.

Nymphidius is also portrayed as working hard to gratify the urban mob,

allowing the lynching of some of Nero’s followers (Plut. Galba 8.5). On his list

Plutarch included the gladiator, T. Claudius Spiculus (cf. CIL VI 8803 = ILS 1730; Suet.

Nero 30.2, 47.3; Plut. Galba 8.6), one of Nero’s informers, Aponius, and many other

innocent men. Unfortunately, while Plutarch can state the name of a gladiator and an

informer he cannot give us the name of a single innocent person who suffered under

Nymphidius even though the situation supposedly became so bad that Junius Mauricus,

one of Rome’s leading men, believed that they would soon be looking for another Nero

(Plut. Galba 8.5). Yet Mauricus himself does not seem to have opposed the punishment

of informers. In AD 70 he asked Domitian to authorise the Senate to learn from the

imperial archives who had laid accusations against whom (Tac. Hist. 4.40.4).

Regarding Spiculus and Aponius, Nymphidius – if indeed it was his decision to

allow them to be murdered – possibly acted for reasons other than gratifying the people.

An inscription (CIL VI 8803 = ILS 1730) records that Spiculus was a decurion in the

Germani corporis custodes. Little is known about the role played by this German

bodyguard in the downfall of Nero, but it is logical to assume that Nymphidius and

Galba’s supporters in Rome would want to ensure that the commander of any armed

force within the city was someone they could trust. Spiculus enjoyed a particularly

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prominent position in Nero’s court (Suet. Nero 30.2) and seems to have retained his

loyalty to Nero until the very end (Speidel 1994, 29). It was Spiculus that Nero called

for in his final hours (Suet. Ner. 47.3). Therefore, his loyalty to Nero and his position in

the Germani may well have rendered him untrustworthy to the new administration. The

obvious course of action for Nymphidius was to ensure his removal. We have no more

information on Aponius, however, the fact that Plutarch described him as an informer

may provide some clue to his fate. Many other ‘bad’ members of Nero’s court

including Helius, Polycleitus, Petinus, Patrobius (Plut. Galba 17.2), Narcissus and

Locusta (Dio 64. 3.41) were also put to death by Galba once he arrived in the capital.

Considering this list of Nero’s other favourites, Nymphidius’ actions in only doing

away with Spiculus and Aponius may be considered quite restrained.

If the report is accurate, Nymphidius’ association with Nero’s favourite, Sporus

(Plut. Galba ), does him no credit at all. Again, however, there may be another

explanation for Nymphidius’ actions here, although the evidence is poor. Dio

Chrysostom (Or. 21.9) asserts, somewhat obscurely that Nero’s mistreatment of Sporus

led to his downfall. He writes that Sporus was so angry with Nero that “he disclosed

the emperor’s designs to his retinue; and so they revolted from him and compelled him

to make away with himself as best he could.” The passage seems to be talking only of

Nero’s final hours; the truth about which (he goes on to claim) remains unknown.

Unfortunately, what Nero’s plans were and whether his actions then or his general

treatment angered ‘the eunuch,’ are unclear (Champlin 2003, 146 – 7; cf. Griffin 1984,

186; Walter 1976, 249 – 51). It is highly speculative but if Sporus had betrayed Nero it

may explain Nymphidius’ involvement with him. Perhaps Nymphidius was offering

him some form of protection. However, even if Sporus had nothing to do with Nero’s

final demise, Nymphidius’ involvement with him does not indicate that he aspired to the

succession of the empire, merely that his judgement was poor in this respect.

The coup of Nymphidius

Thus far there is no convincing evidence to indicate that Nymphidius was doing any

more than trying to keep the situation in Rome under control. Yet Plutarch (Galba 9.3)

is convinced that “he aspired to the succession in the empire” and that when Galba

placed no confidence in his reports, “he determined not to wait before making his

attempt” (Galba 13.4). Did Galba’s failure to confirm Nymphidius as Praetorian

Prefect push him into making a bid for the Principate? Unfortunately, we do not know

what Galba’s plans were for Nymphidius. Even his appointment of Cornelius Laco as

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Praetorian Prefect (Plut. Galba 13.1) in no way indicates what the future held for

Nymphidius. Indeed, Galba may have considered Laco as a replacement for Tigellinus.

Considering, that there is simply not enough evidence from Nymphidius’ behaviour to

indicate that he was aiming for the succession or that he was planning a conspiracy, one

has to ask if he was not manipulated or tricked into taking a course of action that he

would not have otherwise considered. It can be conjectured that someone who did not

wish to see Galba as Emperor wanted Nymphidius to seize the Empire from Galba, set

up Nymphidius as Emperor and later when the opportunity arose Nymphidius co-

conspirators would in turn do away with the Praetorian Prefect (Rudich 1993, 237).

Alternatively, Nymphidius did not intend to seize the throne for himself but was

working on behalf of another senator, who intended to replace Galba. It is even

possible that the Prefect and his friends were framed, either by those at Rome who were

looking to ingratiate themselves with Galba or those accompanying Galba on his

journey who had no wish to tolerate potential rivals (CAH2 263 – 4).

If we assume that an anti-Galban faction approached Nymphidius seeking his

support it may not have taken much effort to persuade Nymphidius that what he was

doing was in the best interests of the Roman state. Galba was ridiculed by many (Plut.

Galba 13.4), and as previously noted his age was the subject of much derision among

many sectors of Roman society. There are also the issues of Galba’s unpopular advisers

(Suet. Galba 14.2), the fear that Galba might not in fact pay the donative that had been

promised in his name (Plut. Galba 18.2; Suet. Galba 16.1), the dissatisfaction coming

from the German frontier (Suet. Galba 16.2; Plut. Galba 18.3; Dio 64.4.1) and Galba’s

reputation for cruelty and avarice (Tac. Hist. 1.5.2; Suet. Galba 12.1). If Nymphidius

was led to believe that Galba would be highly unpopular, he may have been convinced

to act. The fact that Galba’s Principate was unpopular (Tac. Hist. 1.7.2 – 3; Plut Galba

15.2 – 4, 16.1; Suet. Galba 13, 14.1; Aur. Vict. de Caes. 6) only confirms the possibility

that this type of argument may have been used to persuade Nymphidius to betray Galba.

Unfortunately, Nymphidius’ co-conspirators are poorly documented. Plutarch

has recorded the names of three men, Mithridates of Pontus, Clodius Celsus of Antioch

and Cingonius Varro, who had some connection to Nymphidius. Cingonius Varro

(PIR2 C 736), an ex-consul, was by far the most important of Nymphidius’ named

supporters and was put to death as a consequence of his friendship with the Praetorian

Prefect (Tac. Hist. 1.6.1; Plut. Galba 15). Varro was apparently the author of a speech

Nymphidius intended to deliver to the Praetorians when making his bid to become

emperor (Plut. Galba 14.4). He is known from Tacitus’ Annales (14.45) and the

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infamous murder of the Urban Prefect, Pedanius Secundus, who died at the hands of his

own slave in AD 61. During the ensuing debate in the Senate, regarding the punishment

of the entire slave household, Varro expressed the opinion that even the freedmen

present in Pedanius’ residence should be deported from Italy. Considering that Tacitus

believed his opinion worth mentioning indicates that he was a senator of some note,

perhaps the type of man that may have been able to influence Nymphidius into

embarking on his dangerous course of action.

Mithridates of Pontus was the son of Aspurgus. In AD 41, Claudius bestowed

on him the small dependant kingdom of the Bosporus (Dio 60.8). Five years later

Mithridates was removed from his throne and replaced by his older brother, Cotys (Tac.

Ann. 12.15). After unsuccessfully attempting to regain his kingdom by force,

Mithridates threw himself on the mercy of Eunones, who negotiated a satisfactory

settlement on his behalf with Claudius and in time Mithridates was conveyed to Rome

(Tac. Ann. 12.15). Nymphidius might have been responsible for keeping Mithridates

under surveillance while he was a ‘prisoner’ in Rome and consequently may explain

how the two men came to be known to each other. Mithridates was particularly

prominent in scoffing at Galba (Plut. Galba 15.1) claiming that when the Roman people

saw him they “would regard all the days in which he had borne the title Caesar as a

disgrace to them” (Plut. Galba 13.4). How many others filled Nymphidius with the idea

that Galba would be an unpopular emperor? Did they also add that Nymphidius, as a

prime supporter of Galba’s, might suffer because of Galba’s unpopularity? Like Varro,

Mithridates was put to death for his role in betraying Galba (Plut. Galba 15.1).

Clodius Celsus of Antioch is otherwise unattested outside this event. Plutarch

(Galba 13.4) describes him as having good sense, and well-disposed and faithful to

Nymphidius. He may have been one of the few who offered Nymphidius some sensible

advice when he maintained that there was “not a single precinct in Rome would give

Nymphidius the title of Caesar” (Plut. Galba 13.4).

The idea that Nymphidius may not have been the prime mover in the coup

attempt is indicated in Plutarch’s narrative (Galba 14.1), where he states that, “It was

decided” to take Nymphidius into the camp about midnight and proclaim him emperor.

Clearly, the decision concerning when and how to act was not in Nymphidius’ hands.

However, earlier on that same evening the Praetorian’s leading tribune, Antonius

Honoratus, delivered to the soldiers under his command a speech in which he managed

to convince the soldiers to stay loyal to Galba. Honoratus’ speech shares similarities

with the speech made by the Praetorian tribune, Subrius Flavus, when the Pisonian

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conspiracy was uncovered (Tac. Ann. 15.67). Both speeches emphasise that Nero had

brought the disloyalty on himself by his criminal actions; they highlight Nero’s murder

of his mother and wife and the feelings of shame at Nero’s public displays as a musician

and actor (Tac. Ann. 15.67; Plut. Galba 14.2). Honoratus, added that even with all these

faults the soldiers would never have consented to abandon Nero if they had not been

persuaded by Nymphidius that Nero had abandoned them first (Plut. Galba 14.2 – 3).

Honoratus may well have added the influence of the enormous donative promised by

Nymphidius. However, the impression this would have painted of the Praetorian

soldier’s may not have gone down well with his audience.

This section of Honoratus’ speech, as with the speech of Flavus, which criticizes

Nero’s behaviour seems to reflect largely upper class values (Suet. Ner. 19.3; Dio

63.22.4 – 6). Whether the soldiers of the Praetorian Guard mirrored these values is

difficult to ascertain. Our extant sources would seem to indicate that the average soldier

found nothing wrong with Nero’s behaviour. For example, Suetonius (Ner. 21.1) writes

that at one time the soldiers on duty seconded an appeal from the public, to hear Nero

sing. Dio (63.10.1 – 3) also notes that the Praetorians approved of his theatrical

endeavours in Greece and were happy for Nero to continue with his public

performances because the more performances he gave, the more money they received.

Indeed many of the troops may well have admired the emperor’s showmanship and

were not upset by his performances in the theatre (Talbert 1977, 74 – 5).

Nevertheless, there may well have been an element within the Guard who found

this type of behaviour distasteful, particularly those Praetorians recruited from rural

Italy. Champlin (2003, 63) when discussing the attitude of the Roman people towards

Nero’s theatrical endeavours writes: “Despite the moral strictures of the authors who

report Nero’s actions, the social context must be seen as an ambiguous one, and public

attitudes as deeply ambivalent. Many of his people surely disapproved of their

emperor’s games and the damage done to his imperial dignity, but many more just as

surely applauded him.” This statement can probably be equally applied to the soldiers

of the Praetorian Guard. However, in Honoratus’ speech, what may well have appealed

more to the soldiers than references to Nero’s behaviour was his claim that the blame

for Nero’s death lay with Nymphidius and his actions deserved to be punished. By

ridding themselves of Nymphidius, they could avenge Nero’s death. This may have

relieved some of the guilt that the average soldier seems to have felt over their betrayal

of Nero (Tac. Hist. 1.5.2).

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In addition, what effect did the failure of Nymphidius to pay at least part of the

promised donative have on the soldiers’ attitude towards their Prefect? Many of the

soldiers may well have been losing their patience with Nymphidius over the continued

deferral of the donative that he had promised them. How many of the Praetorian

soldiers had incurred debts thinking they were soon to receive an enormous payout?

Financially, it is quite possible that many of the Praetorian soldiers were struggling.

They had betrayed what had been their usually reliable source of income for

Nymphidius’ empty promises. It is not surprising that Honoratus was able to get them

to turn on their Prefect.

Nymphidius’ actions on the evening he went to the Praetorian camp, as recorded

by Plutarch (Galba 14.4), are somewhat confusing. “But now loud shouts arose, and

Nymphidius, either because he was convinced, as some say, that the soldiers were

already calling him, or because he was anxious to win over betimes the element that was

still unruly and mutinous, came up in a glare of lights…” This passage raises some

interesting points. Firstly, if Nymphidius believed that the soldiers were already calling

for him, the attempted coup must have been widely known and therefore not

surprisingly it was uncovered. Secondly, what does Plutarch mean by the unruly and

mutinous element? One would have thought that the more unruly and mutinous the

soldiers, the more likely they would have been to go along with Nymphidius’ coup,

particularly if their mutinous attitude was directed against Galba. Nymphidius should

not have to work too hard to win them over to another cause and indeed these would

have been the first soldiers that Nymphidius would have looked to for support.

When Nymphidius arrived at the camp, he was carrying in his hand a speech

written for him by Cingonius Varro, which he intended to deliver to the troops (Plut.

Galba 14.4). This speech was never delivered, so we do not even have Plutarch’s

version of what Nymphidius was going to say. We cannot even be certain that such a

speech ever existed or that on that evening Nymphidius was even at the castra praetoria

to seek the support of soldiers for his or someone else’s usurpation of Galba. The gates

of the camp were closed to him and many men were under arms around the walls.

Nymphidius was struck with fear and when he heard the Guard cry out that they

acknowledged Galba as their Emperor, he joined them. The soldiers allowed him then

to enter the camp and once inside they attacked and murdered him (Plut. Galba 14.3 –

6). Was Galba aware of the events unfolding in Rome? It is possible, Dio (64.2.3) and

Suetonius (Galba 11) indicate that Galba was responsible for ordering Nymphidius’

258

death. However, in our most detailed account of the events, Galba is only made aware

of the death of Nymphidius after the fact (Plut. Galba 15.1).

Conclusion

From a close analysis of Plutarch’s narrative, there is not sufficient evidence to indicate

that Nymphidius planned to have himself installed as the next Roman emperor. What

seems most likely is that Nymphidius was approached by an anti-Galban faction and

persuaded to change his allegiance from Galba to another senator, perhaps Cingonius

Varro. Nymphidius never intended, as Plutarch implies, to seize the Principate for

himself. When Galba’s supporters in Rome uncovered the details about the coup

attempt, they acted quickly to secure the allegiance of the Praetorian officers and moved

against the most important member of the group, the Praetorian Prefect. Without

Nymphidius and the Praetorian Guard any planned coup attempt against Galba would

fail. While the coup attempt was not Nymphidius’ idea, the ones behind the attempt

were only too willing to allow him to bear the responsibility.

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Appendix Five

“Military class of anonymous denarii.”

Obverse : Clasped hands. FIDES EXERCITVVM

Reverse: Concordia standing holding branch and cornucopiae. CONCORDIA

PRAETORIANORVM

Obverse: Clasped hands. FIDES EXERCITVVM

Reverse: Clasped hands. FIDES PRAETORIANORVM

260

Of obverse character:

1. Bust of Jupiter, diademed, in mantle, l.: palm. I.O. MAX. CAPITOLINVS

2. Bust of Vesta, veiled, draped, l.: torch. VESTA P. R. QVIRITIVM

Of reverse character:

3. Jupiter seated in temple. I. O. MAX CAPITOLINVS.

4. Vesta seated l. holding patera and torch. VESTA P. R. QVIRITIUM

5. Clasped hands. FIDES EXERCITVVM

6. Clasped hands. FIDES PRAETORIANORUM

7. Concordia standing l. holding branch and cornucopiae. CONCORDIA

PRAETORIANORVM.

The following combinations have been recorded: 5-7, 2-5, 5-6, 2-3, 1-4, (Mattingly

1952, 72).

261

Bibliography

Ancient Sources – Editions, Translations and Commentaries

Ash, R., 2007. Tacitus. Histories Book II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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