The Roots of Senegal’s Tolerant Sociopolitical Order

Nikhita MendisMES1997A: Islam and Human Rights

The Roots of Senegal’s Tolerant Sociopolitical Order:Does Senegal’s tolerant social order stem from inherent qualities of Sufism or is it

a product of historical accidents and a particular Senegalese social framework?

Senegal has never been ruled by military regimes and constantly ranks

above all but two European Union nations in The Religion and State Codebook, which

measures “discrimination and restrictions against religions” (Diouf 2013) Polity, an

attempt by Ted Gurr to rank democracy using a twenty-one-point scale running from -10

to 10 gave Senegal a score of +8, the third highest score possible, in both 2000 and 2004.

Although these rankings do not verify the political stability of Senegal, they provide

some insight into its stable political order and tolerance relative to other Muslim majority

nations.

The relationship between Senegal’s Sufi majority and its political

authorities has proven conducive to a stable political atmosphere. This paper will

evaluate the role of historical context; particularly secular social structures and

organizations related to Sufism in accommodating Senegalese political life on a

grassroots level. The goal of this paper is to analyze to what extent Senegalese political

stability lies in the tolerance and diversity inherent to Sufism or whether Senegalese

stability stems from accidental historical instances that merged with Sufism and secular

institutions to create a tolerant atmosphere. In order to evaluate the latter, this paper will

explore the pre-Sufi framework of Senegalese society that allowed it to interpret Sufism

in a tolerant manner.

The subjectivity of Islamic texts themselves may be potentially conducive

to ideologies such as human rights and tolerance, regardless of whether the latter are

universal or Western constructions. Sufism, the religious mystical interpretation of Islam

emphasizes diversity and rejects the Shariah as the final source of social existence.

1


Sufism is more than a “mystical” form of Islam, for it has an imperative religious

element and aims for “personal engagement with the Divine” (Chittick 2009). According

to Junayd, the great Sufi of Baghdad, “water takes its color from the color of its

container” (Chittick 1989). This statement can be inferred to reflect the diverse and

contextually dependent nature of Sufism, potentially conducive to tolerance. Early Sufi,

Sarraj, explained Sufi diversity by highlighting the Prophet’s belief that “The

divergences between [Muslim] scholars are a source of mercy” (Chittick 1989). Tenth-

eleventh century Sufi writers emphasized differences in Sufi Brotherhoods to illustrate

the richness of the Sufi experience.

Pre-Sufi Senegal

The early struggle between West African empires to keep their historical

traditions during the spread of Islam provides insight into the history of tolerance in

Senegal. The kingdoms of Gao, located primarily in the middle of Niger, and Takrur had

significant influence on the spread of religion in Western African lands such as modern

day Ghana, Mali and Senegal (Houtsma 1987). The kings of Gao and Takrur set the

examples of two diverging approaches to religious assimilation. Gao promoted a

“symbiotic relationship between Islam and the traditional religion” (Martin 2012), while

Takrur followed a “militant Islam, which aimed for the imposition of the new religion in

all its vigorousness, forcing the subjects to adopt Islam” and “waging the holy war

against infidels” (Martin 2012). According to Wendy Kasinec, the “compromising

attitude, as represented by Gao, was more typical of Islam in West Africa until the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (Kasinec 2002).

2


The Ghanan kingdom at the time encompassed parts of Senegal, Mauritania

and Mali. The Ghanan kings too adopted a Gao approach and refused to submit under

foreign Islamization. Islam became a divisive factor in African relations and a potential

source of internal crisis. Islamized kings were forced to balance between the influential

Sufi minorities in their kingdoms and the pagan majority. They thus adopted a “middle

position between Islam and traditional religion” (O’Brien 1990) Alternatively, the kings

were also interested in attracting Muslim traders and therefore permitted the practice of

Islam unless it impeded the traditional political structure. Both parties preferred to live

apart, although the king “employed literate Muslims in his courts as interpreters, in the

treasury and whenever a knowledge of writing could be of use” (O’Brien 1990).

The Kingdom of Ghana also “literally sat on a gold mine” (Levtzion 2002).

allowing it flourishing trade relations and subsequent socioeconomic and political

stability. As a result, “foreigners touted Ghanan kings as the richest men in the world”

(Levtzion 2000). Strategic governing along with a maximization of resources developed

a political system that largely overlooked ethnic and religious distinctions between

people in favor of prosperous trade. As evident, Senegal’s geographic location and

resources along with its strategic policymakers cultivated a society with different

priorities from much of Islamic Africa. Modern Senegal’s tolerance and diversity can

thus be viewed as a product of Senegal’s history of compromise between different

politico-cultural factions. These historic-societal underpinnings were able to extract the

tolerant aspects of Sufism and establish a politically stable state.

3


Muedini: Sufism’s inherent tolerance

According to Muedini, Sufism’s emphasis on love of mankind stems from a

principle of tawhid: “oneness of being” (Muedini 2010) – a concept potentially

conducive to tolerance and diversity. Muedini interprets this as the belief that all

individuals are “mirrors of God” (Muedini 2010), which should necessitate mutual

respect for others’ rights. Sufism’s apparent emphasis on a perceived essence of religion

as opposed to its physical manifestation through tradition and custom may create

loopholes for human rights reconciliation. The very notion of tawhid itself, however, has

been used in Wahhabism to emphasize the existence of a single God and not the concept

of God in every created entity. This interpretation furthers discrepancy and impedes

tolerance. Therefore the fact that Sufism specifically emphasizes Islamic concepts such

as tawhid does not necessitate a single tolerance-oriented interpretation and application

of these terms. According to famous Sufi al-Ghazali, “the dhimmi must hang his head

while the official/hits the dhimmi on the protuberant bone behind his ear” (Emon 2012).

Subsequently, the fact that Sufism’s primary emphasis is on an assumed essence of Islam

invites inconsistency and conflict that can either breach religio-ethnic boundaries or

further division. Sufism’s unique patterns of historical development, however, have

allowed it to embrace context, adapt to modern circumstances and disregard past

prescriptions such as that detailed by al-Ghazali. Sufism’s adaptability may be rooted in

tawhid and its respect for all individuals. This, however, brings up the question of whom

exactly ‘all individuals’ refers to and who is encompassed within the universe of equal

respect.

4


Smith and Stepan: Political stability as a product of history

Although spiritual Sufism may not fully explain Senegalese tolerance, the

religious institutions and approaches that emerged from the Sufi sect play a large role.

The successful spread of Sufism is largely based on its cultural syncretism and ability to

merge with other cultures, as exemplified by the influence of the Gao kingdom when

Sufism initially merged with local traditions. This ability to merge at the grassroots level

has proved conducive to Senegalese tolerance. Instead of imposing esoteric, external

religio-political structures on a local population, Sufism appeals to an emotional common

ground through which the two cultures can merge organically. Alfred Stepan explicitly

states that the “claim that the type of Sufism in Senegal in itself is a full explanation for

Senegal’s tolerance and peace must be dismissed” (Stepan 2012), considering the fact

that two of three major Sufi brotherhoods were involved in jihad campaigns during the

nineteenth century. In 1854, Umar Tal, the leader of the Tijaniyya, attacked traditional

African kings who he considered pagan along with secular French colonists who he

considered a threat to Islam (Stepan 2012). Stepan stresses the need to recognize that

even within Sufism there have been “moments of jihad, moments of accommodation and

moments of respect” (Stepan 2012).

As exemplified by alternate, violent applications of Sufism, Senegal’s

political stability does not completely stem from Sufism’s inherent tolerance, but from a

set of accidental historical incidents that cultivated a culture open to diversity. Islam is

multivocal and its teachings can be used to construe both intolerant practices and tolerant

practices. Cultural and social factors influence the manner in which Islam is interpreted,

for Senegalese “religious and political leaders chose to emphasize the parts of the Qur’an

that urge tolerance as a response to diversity” (Diouf 2013). In an interview with Stepan,

5


Abdou Diouf, the former president of Senegal, said that “cutting off hands or stoning is

triply delegitimized in Senegal, first, by traditional pre-Sufi customs, second, by

contemporary Senegalese Sufi political theologies, and third and very important, by the

secular state’s legal codes” (Stepan 2012). This idea of Senegalese Sufism, a blend of

culture and politics mobilized through religious institutions and authority, contributes to

the “rituals of respect,” tolerance and unity in Senegalese society.

Although Sufism is based on an individual and independent relationship

with the divine, the physical manifestation of Sufism is structurally organized into

Tariqas and led by a central authority known as the Sheikh. The Sheikh, is thought to

“embody absolute power and authority over moral and practical spheres of the

individual’s existence” (Diouf 2013) He thus becomes a “cultural broker who adapts

elements of the Islamic tradition to the practical situations created by modern society,

simultaneously updating Islamic traditions and Islamizing modernity” (Beck 2008),

assuming there is one type of modernity and forcing submissive taalibes to regard the

Sheikhs interpretation as the single true interpretation. Furthermore, the role of the

Sheikh in Sufism varies between Sufi Brotherhoods. In some orders, the “top-down”

approach of the Sheikh is “central” to the development of the individual, undermining

individual discretion.

Buehler argues that the originally religiously didactic roles of Sufi Sheikhs

often evolved into sociopolitical legitimacy, thus creating a phenomenon that can be

considered “Islamized politics” (Beck 2008). Islamized politics in Senegal fostered a

clientalist democracy in which the authority of the Sheikhs was used to encourage

taalibes (members of the community) to vote for effective political leaders. The resulting

clientalist democracy formed by Senegalese “Islamized politics” (Beck 2008) stems from

6


a complex relationship between Sufism as a structurally secular institution and various

secular forces, including those that are a product of accidental historical context,

religious institutionalization and intimate social relations.

French colonialism and laicite played a significant role in Senegalese

history. Stepan argues that, “External democracy is more effective if it has been invited

by major domestic actors” (Diouf 2013), alluding to Senegal’s tolerant Sufi and pre-Sufi

roots and acceptance of French values. He believes that when invited by a local

governing body, “the chances that democracy as an institution and human rights as a

value will be rejected as “alien” and a “foreign imposition” will be diminished” (Diouf

2013). Stepan thus advocates for “multiple modernities and “multiple secularisms,” that

are a product of a country’s historical circumstances. This argument touches on the East-

West dichotomy without Orientalizing the Eastern “other,” for it notes accidental

historical patterns as the source of different values as opposed to inherent, irreconcilable

differences in humanity.

Stepan infers that the political stability in Senegal is determined by a

historic practice he names “rituals of respect” (Stepan 2012), of which there is horizontal

respect between mutually competitive religious organizations and vertical respect

between the French secular and Senegalese Sufis in a syncretic immersion of the two

cultures. He describes the relation between toleration and religion through the term “twin

tolerations” (Stepan 2012), the “minimal degree of toleration that democracy needs from

religion and the minimal degree of tolerance that religion needs from the state for the

polity to be democratic” (Stepan 2012). Stepan argues that the minimal degree of

toleration that religion needs from democracy is beyond the right to worship and

encompasses the ability for religious institutions to assert their values publicly and

7


support political organizations given their support is not “constitutional” or part of the

state’s official legal system.

Senegalese democracy is primarily reflected in its ethnic and religious

tolerance. 47 percent of Senegalese consider themselves “only Senegalese” as opposed to

identifying with a specific ethnic group. In a survey conducted to identify the cause of

such affiliation, the majority of responses attributed good relations to horizontal cultural

relations of society such as “joking” (25 percent) and “hospitability” (32 percent) and not

to “vertical, top-down explanations involving state policies” (Stepan 2012). In creating

an atmosphere conducive to “twin tolerations” and “rituals of respect,” both Etienne

Smith and Alfred Stepan investigate the bottom-up concept of “joking relationships.”

According to Stepan, the Tukolors (ancestors of Takrur) practiced “joking relationships”

with the Serer population, thus developing a relationship of “joking kin” (Stepan 2012).

Both Stepan and Smith stress the need to recognize bottom-up, “soft” analysis in

dissecting the overlap between Sufism, the inclusive Senegalese ethnicity and sens de

l’Etat (meaning of state)” that makes Sufism conducive to a “tolerant Senegalese political

culture,” thus acknowledging the role of secular forces such as intimate social relations,

that stem from a history of “joking relations” in serving a larger national narrative (Diouf

2013).

Etienne Smith describes the Senegalese model of tolerance through three

interacting spheres: the modern state (colonial and postcolonial), the religious sphere

(including the Christian minority) and the cultural sphere of the patrias (Senegalese

terroirs and precolonial polities) (Diouf 2013). He argues that the relationship between

the modern state and the other two spheres is governed by a principle of “proportional

equidistance” (Diouf 2013). His principle attempts to combine “respect by principle,” a

8


cultural notion of respect discussed by Stepan’s “principled distance” in which increase

in privileges for majority would necessitate simultaneous privileges for minorities, with

an awareness of the “different weights of the different communities” (Diouf 2013). Smith

takes Stepan’s approach a step further by acknowledging the varying importance and

subsequent respect demanded by particular communities, which in itself creates an

implicit hierarchy. Smith discusses institutionalized Sufi religion in Senegal as a

socialization framework used to unite people and foster community, through, for

example, “massive attendance to religious festivals” (Diouf 2013), emphasizing the role

of ritual as opposed to faith in building tolerance. He explores the nature of these ethnic

and religious distinctions and emphasizes the role of bottom-up sociability and feelings

of kinship in mitigating these distinctions and increasing tolerance.

According to Smith’s surveys, in Muslim-predominant Dakar, 68 percent of

the Catholic minority has Muslim kin and 100 percent has Muslim friends. Although this

can be considered expected due to the Muslim majority, 72 percent of Muslims also have

Catholic friends (Diouf 2013). His survey, however, features religion as a larger social

divider than ethnicity in terms of marriage – predominantly due to religiously variant

marital customs and similar practicalities. A survey on “tolerance of others as neighbors”

(Diouf 2013) yielded an 87.1 percent acceptance rate of “peoples from other ethnic

groups or races,” 84.2 percent for “foreign workers and immigrants” and 78.3 percent for

“people from another religious group.”

Etienne Smith too, recognizes the “relative silence” about ethnicity

specifically in traditionally Senegalese literature, stemming from Senegal’s pre-Sufi

history of tolerance and cultural immersion. According to Smith, the high level of ethnic

tolerance represents a kinship ideology underscored by light, “joking” relations. He infers

9


that it is not necessarily the positive or the negative relations of joking that foster mutual

awareness, but the constant reciprocity, whether hostile or amicable. He asserts that

“joking relations” act as a symbol of the barriers between groups and serve as a means to

cross them through constant awareness of the other culture or religion. Smith states that

tolerance does not need to be viewed in the “abstract liberal vocabulary of human rights”

(Diouf 2013), but can emerge from more bottom-up not necessarily secular or religious

modes such as “acknowledging the other” in “creating a symbolically contested, but

ultimately common, space” (Diouf 2013). As evident, Smith views both religion and

joking kinship interethnic relations as “convenient tools available in daily life to create

social connections” (Diouf 2013) and foster a bottom-up sense of toleration, emphasizing

the active role of individuals in fostering and maintaining Senegalese tolerance.

Although both Stepan and Smith emphasize the need for a grassroots

approach to cultivating tolerance, both authors also discuss the roles of specific top-down

impositions in promoting bottom-up social relations. According to Smith, the habit of

marriage alliances between Senegalese religious leaders displays respect and

“normalizes” relations through such public and routinized relations. Political leadership

in Senegal is also ethnically and religiously diverse. President Senghor was a Catholic

and had Muslim sisters, while Presidents Diouf and Wade, both Muslims, married

Catholics. All three presidents often used “joking kinship” to express their ethnic

diversity. Senghor’s presidency laid several foundations of Senegalese political and

religious tolerance. Post-Senghor, in a survey conducted by Smith, 71 percent of

participants vouched for a president from a minority, while 48.8 percent accepted a

female president, 38.8 percent supported a president who did not speak Wolof and 7

percent a president who did not speak French.

10


The fact that the Senegalese population involved in the survey was less

accepting about language highlights the potential practical considerations involved in

such a decision. Language was used as a colonial method of unification, and therefore to

speak the language would effectively cater to contemporary Senegalese society. Ethnic

distinctions, however, created arbitrary barriers perhaps less relevant to political efficacy

and stability as displayed through Senghor’s successful presidency. Smith describes

Senghor’s political thought as “combining reason with faith, as well as combining

centralized Jacobin nationalism with the cultural celebration of local patrias and their

moral communities, in short, unity with diversity” (Diouf 2013). The different

institutions described in this statement largely overlap, for moral communities are shaped

by secular and religious thought while religion is a combination of faith and institution.

Although Senegal’s political climate was and is conducive to tolerance, it

does not completely separate religion from state, although the two coexist and influence

each other. Senghor criticized French laicite, which promotes a dichotomy of politics and

religion, but was able to reconcile his Christian faith with socialist ideology used by the

British Labour party who “started and ended their political acts with prayers” (Diouf

2013). This statement not only refers to faith itself but also to a ritualized practice of

beginning and ending political acts with prayer. Senghor believed “faith and ethics were

to complement discursive reason” (Diouf 2013). The discursive nature of Senghor’s

reason promotes the constantly aware social dialogue that reinforced Senegalese

relationships. Senghor’s political thought also heavily emphasized the concept of nation

as the “common will to live together” (Stepan 2012) and deemphasized ethnic and

religious distinctions. Senghor believed in “uniting the virtues of the patrias” by

“choosing among them those, which by reason of the climate, history or race, have a

11


common denominator, or those who have a universal value” (Diouf 2013), thus

acknowledging both historical context and a universal essence, two potentially

conflicting approaches.

Although Senghor stressed unity, he condemned homogenization for he

believed “richness stems from the complementarity of the diverse patrias and their

persons” (Diouf 2013). Post-colonial Senegal followed – to an extent – French politics in

secularizing the state and banning Muslim courts. The new Senegalese constitution,

however, differed from the French in its value of multiculturalism, evident the 1978

decision that established six national languages. Senghor’s policies also deviated from

laicite due to his belief in “the educational task of religions and the key role they play in

humanizing society” (Stepan 2012) emphasizing the influence of religion as a secular

institution although not necessarily as opposed to a spiritual faith, for according to

Senghor religious faith played a key role in cultivating moral foundations that could then

be used to “educate” and “humanize” society. Unlike France, Senegal was born a laic

state that did not have to liberate itself from religious fundamentalism. Therefore, from

Senghor’s period to the present, political elites have promoted relations with religious

institutions. Simultaneously, Senghor’s policies did not alienate the dominant group for

he acknowledged numerical majorities in government representation. His state

maintained favor with ethnic and religious majorities, although not at the expense at the

minorities for the two aren’t necessarily contradictory.

The fact that Senegal was created as a religiously tolerant laicite state can

be credited to Sufi syncretism and the Senegalese community’s willingness to

compromise with colonial French culture. Furthermore, Senegal was the only African

colony in which the French used “assimilationist tactics” (Diouf 1998) allowing elite

12


Senegalese citizenship and political power in exchange for embracing French culture.

Trading privileges for cultural assimilation aided in culturally reconciling Senegalese

elites and secular French politics. This mutual reciprocity between the Senegalese and

French culture laid the foundations of a relatively tolerant state. The Senegalese

population, however, had varied reactions to collaboration between elite Senegalese

Tariqas and Sheikhs and the French. These diverse reactions stemmed from both a

history of collaboration with foreign powers for the sake of economic and social

prosperity and the rise of reactionary anti-colonial Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia (Diouf

1998).

The Sufi Tariqas were structured as institutionalized dynasties that

conferred significant power to the Caliph-General. When Atou Diagne, a non-blood

Mouridiyya member, tried to claim Mourid superiority, his organization was banned. The

hierarchical and dynastic structural features of the Tariqas insinuate heavy politicization

within Sufi institution itself. According to Sufi theology, “submission to a spiritual

guide” is critical, thus fostering a deep sense of trust between the Tariqas and the

taalibes. Due to the religious authority and legitimacy of the Tariqas, the Senegalese

population was inclined to trust the Sufi orders with both religious and political concerns.

Muslim reform movements opposing colonialism, however, reacted angrily and

condemned the Tariqas as hypocrites. It is this very same trust in the Tariqas (marabouts)

that fostered the relationship between religion and state through the use of the ‘ndigel’

(Beck 2008).

During and after the French colonial period, the ‘ndigel’ (a command or

order) giving taalibes religious advice and instructing them in their religious lives,

evolved into an act of political instruction. Often marabouts, namely the Tijaniyya and

13


Mouridiyya, would either form their own political parties or back existing parties by

offering ndigels without claiming official political affiliation. The ndigel was first

politicized after the initial leaders of the marabouts passed away and new religious

leaders and new party leaders began to collaborate to preserve common interests around

1946 (Mbacke 2005). Furthermore, with the acquisition of voting rights in the

countryside, many religious figures and institutions began to reconsider their role in the

distribution of state power. The emergence of rural taalibe voters caused President

Senghor to approach the Tijaniyya, Mouridiyya and Qadairriya Caliphs who had a

prominent say in the rural areas in an attempt to unite urban and rural Senegal. By the

1950s, all major Sufi marabouts invested to some extent in political relations for the sake

of survival (Mbacke 2005). The acceptance and complicity between the two sides was

exacerbated by what Loimeier defines as the echange de services (exchange of services)

between Tariqa and taalibe.

In the post-independence era, religio-political “factions” of Tariqas

emerged primarily dedicated to involvement in politics (Beck 2008). Furthermore, not all

Sheikhs were totally “loyal” to the ndigel of the Caliph, and established their own religio-

political factions, thus undermining the solidarity of the marabout. The fragmentation of

the Tariqa gave rise to two types of ndigels; the central and peripheral. The central ndigel

is apolitical and stems from the Caliph-General, while the peripheral ndigel is political

and geared toward the interests of a particularly political Sheikh. With the Caliph-

General also choosing political alliances, conflicts rose within marabouts. In 2012, when

the Mouridiyya Calpih-General refused to support the incumbent candidate Abdoulaye

Wade, Sheikh Bethio Thioune chose to anyway, exacerbating the taalibes loss of faith in

the Mouridiyya marabout and increasing desire for democracy. Taalibes who had been

14


conditioned by Senghor’s (1960-1980) desire to leave religion beyond the realm of

politics developed reactionary attitudes to political ndigel (Diouf 2013). During this era,

Mourid taalibes did not respond to their Calpih-General’s ndigel. Mourid Sheikh Modou

Kara’s ndigel to vote for Abdou was not heeded by the taalibe population and eventually

political affiliation caused deterioration in both the political and religious legitimacy of

the marabouts and disenchantment of the taalibes (Mbacke 2005).

Over time, Islamic marabouts created a distinctly Senegalese type of

“Islamized politics,” in which the power of religious authorities was used to legitimize

political actors. Islamized politics presupposes that the religious leader’s power stems

primarily from the faith of his followers, capitalizing on a secular, very human result of

the Sufi Sheikh-taalibe relationship. When the taalibe loses faith in Calpih-General, his

power diminishes and he no longer holds political weight. Therefore, the relationship

between marabouts and political authority in Senegal has manifested on a grassroots,

taalibe-decreed level as one representative of the Senegalese population’s opposition to

excessive overlap between state and religion.

Senegal’s politically stable atmosphere can be credited to a combination of

Sufism as a faith and as an institution along with various secular and cultural roots that

stem from Senegal’s pre-Sufi atmosphere and relationships with French colonialists.

Senegal’s political stability may be a unique and accidental product of a combination of

Sufism’s willingness to merge with existing cultures and specific incidents in Senegal’s

history and hence cannot be generalized to suit all Muslim majority nations. Furthermore,

the type of tolerance evident in Senegal is specific to its history of ethnic and religious

diversity. Although both Senegalese men and women have a high literacy rate, only 48.8

percent of Senegalese felt ready to accept a woman president, a mere 10 percent

15


difference from the population’s acceptance of a president who does not speak Wolof

(38.8 percent) – the language of the largest ethnic majority in Senegal. The latter may be

a ‘practical’ concern, however the reluctance for a woman president segregates a large

section of the Senegalese population. Alternatively, the Senegalese population may

consider a woman president also detrimental to practicality and efficacy, implying

inherent discrimination against particular segments of society. Tolerance in Senegal is

therefore largely limited to the ethnic and religious realms. Senegal’s political stability is

thus commendable in light of the influence radical Islamic institutions have on the state

in the contemporary, post-colonial era. Tolerance as a concept, however, may not be

completely innate in either Sufism or Senegalese society; it is instead a product of

historical accidents and actions that have allowed Senegal to embrace specific ethnic and

religious minorities.

Works Cited

Beck, Linda J. Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in

Senegal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

16


Chittick, William C. The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-ʻArabi's Metaphysics of

Imagination. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Chittick, William. Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World.

Diouf, Mamadou. "The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the

Originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century

Globalization Project." Development and Change 29, no. 4 (1998): 671-96.

doi:10.1111/1467-7660.00095.

Diouf, Mamadou. Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal. New York: Columbia

University Press, 2013.

Emon, Anver M. Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: "dhimmis" and Others in the

Empire of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Houtsma, M. Th. E.J. Brill's First Encyclopedia of Islam, 1913-1936.

Kasinec, Wendy F., and Michael A. Polushin. Expanding Empires: Cultural Interaction

and Exchange in World Societies from Ancient to Early Modern times.

Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002.

Levtzion, Nehemia, and Randall Lee Pouwels. The History of Islam in Africa. Athens:

Ohio University Press, 2000.

Martin, Guy. African Political Thought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Mbacké, Khadim, and John O. Hunwick. Sufism and Religious Brotherhoods in Senegal.

Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005.

Muedini, Fait A. "Examining Islam and Human Rights from the Perspective of Sufism."

Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 7, no. 1 (2010). doi:10.2202/1554-

4419.1172.

17


O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise, Nehemia Levtzion, and Humphrey J. Fisher. "Rural and Urban

Islam in West Africa." Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 60,

no. 1 (1990): 172. doi:10.2307/1160449.

Stepan, Alfred. "Rituals of Respect: Sufis and Secularists in Senegal in Comparative

Perspective." Comparative Politics 44, no. 4 (2012): 379-401.

doi:10.5129/001041512801282960.

18

Documents

The Roots of Senegal’s Tolerant Sociopolitical Order