The Russian War on Drugs

Orlova The Russian “War on Drugs” 23

Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 56, no. 1, January/February 2009, pp. 23–34.© 2009 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2009 $9.50 + 0.00.DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216560103

The Russian “War on Drugs”A Kinder, Gentler Approach?Alexandra V. Orlova

ALEXANDRA V. ORLOVA is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Ryerson University in Toronto, Canada.

Despite statements acknowledging the importance of treatment and rehabilitation, Russia still deals with its drug problem as a law enforcement matter.

AMONG the many problems the Russian Federation has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union in

1991 is the rising problem of illicit drugs. While president, Vladimir Putin called the rapid spread of illicit drugs through all of Russia’s regions “a national crisis of stag-gering proportions,” and presented the issue as a national security threat requiring an immediate governmental re-sponse.1 This article examines the drug situation in Russia both before and after the major reforms undertaken by the government in 2003—in particular, the creation of the Federal Drug Control Agency (FSKN) and amendments to the drug-related provisions of the Criminal Code. While these reforms seemed to signal a fundamental shift in state drug-control policy, in practice law-enforcement bodies have continued to harass users and minor dealers rather than focus on harm reduction and rehabilitation.

Drug Market and Drug-Control Policies (1991–2003)Illicit drugs were not a serious social problem in the Soviet era. Russia was not involved in international drug traffi cking, and both the supply of and the demand for illegal drugs were very limited. The segments of the population that consumed illicit substances primarily relied on homemade and homegrown drugs.2 While the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–89) created a new class of (predominantly) heroin users—Army veterans returning from Afghanistan—Afghan-based drug supply networks had yet to penetrate Russian society.3

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a decade of political, economic, and social turbulence.

24 Problems of Post-Communism January/February 2009

This confusion, as well as the opening up of the former Soviet borders, also brought a signifi cant increase in the proportion of drugs traffi cked from other countries.4 For example, in 1992 only 30 percent of all drugs seized in Russia came from other countries, while in 1999 the pro-portion had risen to between 60 percent and 80 percent.5 A signifi cant share of these foreign drugs came from Central Asia and Afghanistan, a trend that continues to the present day. Police corruption further boosted the supply network as local dealers (and in some instances even users) paid offi cers protection money to avoid being arrested.6

In addition to changes in the supply structure of the Russian drug market, the 1990s also saw an increase in the demand for illicit drugs. Intravenous drug use, especially heroin, became more widespread.7 While the use of canna-bis still dominated, “Drug use, including intravenous drug use, seem[ed] to involve youth from all social classes and ethnic groups.”8 According to a 2002 study of the Russian Central Region, 63.4 percent of convictions under §228 of the Criminal Code (the section dealing with drug offenses) were people under thirty years of age.9 Drug use offered the poor an escape, however illusory, from the desperate socio-economic circumstances of the 1990s. For the well-to-do, it represented a means to imitate the West at a time when Western socio-cultural trends, including drug use, held great attraction for Russian youth (this trend was eventually eclipsed by nationalist sentiments).10

Many offi cial reports from Russian law-enforcement offi cials, as well as some academics, during these years claimed that organized-crime entities, integrated into large international drug cartels, had come to dominate the drug market.11 According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), more than “4,000 criminal gangs . . . are dealing drugs in Russia,” of whom more than 1,000 display “apparent signs of organized criminal groups.”12 Other studies undertaken in the 1990s, however, provided evidence suggesting that the structure of the Russian drug market was quite fl uid.13 Both high-level and low-level drug traffi cking existed in Russia, with organized-crime groups cooperating with local military personnel, police, border guards, and customs service offi cials as well as other international organized-crime groups.14 The drug market also included many small-time independent deal-ers, as well as people who had no prior dealing experi-ence but were simply trying to supplement their meager incomes.15 Hence, no one source monopolized the Russian drug market.16

It is diffi cult to precisely judge the extent of organized criminal entities in the Russian drug market. The MVD’s claim that 1,600 criminal groups were involved in drug

traffi cking in Russia has to be questioned on defi nitional grounds.17 The Russian Criminal Code provides a very vague defi nition of “organized crime” in §35.18 Prosecu-tors have to prove that a criminal group is either “stable” (§35(3)) or “cohesive” (§35(4)) in order to secure a conviction. Due to the vagueness of these terms, it was possible for law-enforcement offi cers to present a picture of organized-crime involvement that did not necessarily correspond with reality, as “a drug transaction between the buyer and the seller or even the common purchase of illegal drugs by two users were considered suffi cient to prove the existence of [an organized] group.”19 In some cases, a person would be convicted as a member of an organized-crime group even when the quantity of seized drugs was minor and the defendant’s accomplices re-mained unknown.20

In addition to emphasizing the organized-crime dimen-sion of the Russian drug market, authorities emphasized the ethnic component. Both the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the MVD focused on the prevalence of drug dealers of Georgian, Dagestani, Armenian, Uzbek, Ka-zakh, or Kyrgyz origin.21 They claimed that this ethnic involvement in drug dealing made it harder for law en-forcement to penetrate drug-distribution networks.22

The role of ethnicities in the Russian drug market should not be overestimated. Admittedly, many ethnic minorities—as well as members of the mainstream Rus-sian population—were involved in producing and selling illicit substances, in large measure due to the desperate economic situation in the 1990s and the need to turn to the illicit economy to survive because of an inability to obtain work or residence permits in Russia.23 However, the inordinate focus on non-Russian dealers stemmed in part from their visibility and pandered to the wider prejudices of the Russian population toward people from the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Despite the offi cial rhetoric, and various governmental programs at the federal and regional levels that were sup-posed to tackle the issue of narcotics in a comprehensive manner, Russian policy was primarily directed at users, who bore the brunt of law-enforcement measures.24 For instance, “On average . . . between 1990 and 1998, more than 77 percent of all registered drug offenses involved the mere possession of very small drug quantities without the purpose of sale.”25 The purchase or simple possession of drugs without intent to sell was governed by §228(1) of the Russian Criminal Code. Under this section, prosecu-tion was only supposed to occur if the purchase or pos-session of illegal drugs was on a “large scale.” However, the Permanent Committee on Drug Control of the Rus-


sian Ministry of Health quantifi ed “large scale” at such low amounts that it virtually guaranteed the unimpeded prosecution of all users, with a possible penalty of up to three years in jail. The defi nitions of “large scale” for various psychoactive substances were modifi ed several times.26 For example, in 1997, “large scale” constituted 0.1 gram of opium and any amount of heroin. In 1998, however, “large scale” for heroin was lowered to 0.005 gram on the recommendation of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor’s Offi ce. Some other examples of “large scale” include hashish (0.1 g), dried marijuana (0.1 g), and LSD (0.0001 g). These “large amounts” were signifi cantly below a user’s typical single dose. However, the chair of the Permanent Committee claimed that the amounts defi ned as “large scale” were based not only on medical criteria but also on the social dangerousness of various drugs.27 The component of “social dangerousness” was extended not only to drugs but also to drug users, who were regarded by the public and the authorities alike as threatening the stability of Russian society and, hence, were increasingly criminalized.28

Fearing such attitudes and harsh legal consequences, users avoided contact with governmental agencies, in-cluding state treatment centers.29 In any case, treatment methods in these underfunded and understaffed centers were primarily based on “cold turkey” withdrawal, since substitution treatment was and continues to be illegal, further limiting the attractiveness of state clinics to inject-ing drug users.30 Circumventing the state’s monopoly on treating drug-addicted individuals,31 private clinics started to offer rehabilitative rather than treatment services. Such private clinics had higher success rates but were expen-sive (some cost as much as $4,000–$5,000 a month) and unattainable for most drug-addicted individuals and their families.32

Various comprehensive federal and regional govern-mental anti-drug programs developed in the 1990s also failed to affect the drug situation. These programs existed mostly on paper, and monies allocated to the regions under them frequently never made it to the local level.33 Moreover, the actions of the federal and regional agen-cies responsible for dealing with the drug problem were disjointed, lacked coordination, and suffered from a lack of professionalism.

The philosophy as well as the major goals of Russia’s anti-drug policies did not change with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, they continued to concentrate on eliminating drug traffi c and consumption through repres-sion and coercion.34 Moreover, given the grave economic situation after the collapse, the Russian public resented

governmental resources going to help drug addicts, who were not regarded as deserving any aid.35 Thus, both law-enforcement agents and the general population supported “get tough” strategies targeting drug users and dealers rather than prevention, treatment, or harm-reduction methods.

Given the overwhelming focus on drug users and the predominance of law-enforcement methods in dealing with the drug problem in the 1990s and early 2000s, the com-prehensive reform package introduced in 2003 seemed a welcome change. Two elements of this reform process—the creation of the FSKN and the amendments to the Criminal Code pertaining to users—are particularly noteworthy.

Federal Drug Control Agency The Federal Drug Control Agency (FSKN) was created on July 1, 2003, and Viktor Cherkesov, a former high-ranking KGB offi cer and close political ally and friend of Presi-dent Putin, was appointed chair.36 The FSKN has a staff of approximately 40,000 people, with regional branches throughout Russia.37 According to Putin himself, the cre-ation of the agency signaled a shift in Russia’s anti-drug policy away from concentrating on prosecuting users to punishing dealers, dismantling organized criminal entities involved in drug traffi cking, and combating drug-money laundering.38 In essence, the FSKN was supposed to serve a coordinating function in the battle against drugs.39

Cherkesov told Ekho Moskvy radio that the agency had been created in part because of the high levels of corrup-tion in the agencies previously tasked with combating drug crime—the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), the Federal Se-curity Service (FSB), and the Federal Customs Service.40 He indicated that because of the close linkage among drugs, trans-national organized crime, terrorism, and cor-ruption, the FSKN plays a key role in Russian society.41 In 2006, he asserted that the agency was successfully ex-ecuting its mandate to fi ght organized drug traffi cking. “In 2003, the law-enforcement authorities discovered 8,600 group drug crimes, in 2004—11,000, in 2005—12,800, and from January to August of 2006—already 9,700 or-ganized drug crimes.” Similarly, in terms of drug money laundering, “in 2002–2003 there was only one case of drug money laundering, in 2004 alone the FSKN discovered 314 cases of drug money laundering, in 2005—1,441, and for the fi rst eight months of 2006—1,332.” 42

Despite its claims of success, and its rhetoric of con-centrating on high-level dealers and organized crime, the FSKN quickly became entangled in a number of embar-rassing incidents. For example, in late 2003 and early


2004, FSKN agents arrested several veterinarians who were subsequently charged with traffi cking in narcotics. A typical case involved a veterinarian receiving a phone call regarding an animal needing surgery. When the vet-erinarian arrived at the designated location and prepared to give the animal an injection of ketamine, a common narcotic used for anesthesia in Russia, he was detained by the undercover agents who had made the phone call in the fi rst place. Even though ketamine is widely used as an anesthetic in animal surgery, it was not included on the list of drugs allowed for use in veterinary practice.43 In total, the FSKN initiated twenty-one ketamine cases. On September 3, 2004, ketamine was fi nally added to the veterinary formulary.44 Later, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russia, in its resolution of June 15, 2006, stated that traffi cking does not include the injection of drugs by veterinarians to animals in accordance with proper medical practice.45 Eventually, most of the vet cases fell apart.

Although Cherkesov claimed that the ketamine situ-ation was unfortunate, and that FSKN is primarily con-cerned with battling organized forms of drug crime rather than prosecuting individual minor violators, critics have accused the agency of using repressive methods.46 Its key strategies seem to be prosecution and imprisonment. In fact, Cherkesov and other senior FSKN offi cials have unequivocally denied that there is any benefi t to certain harm-reduction policies that have proven successful in fi ghting heroin addiction, such as methadone-substitution therapy.47 According to Cherkesov, “There is no evidence of the effectiveness of methadone therapy for heroin us-ers” and such programs only “aid in users developing other harmful dependencies.”48 In another interview he said, “Any talk of legalization of ‘soft’ drugs is promoted by the drug lobby” and that “all drugs are harmful and all of them eventually kill people.”49 In fact, both Putin and Cherkesov have stated that legalization of certain soft drugs would directly contravene Russia’s obligations under various international conventions.50 The FSKN’s focus on prosecution and imprisonment (rather than treat-ment and prevention) as the means to solve Russia’s drug problem is not surprising, given Cherkesov’s “close ties to the ‘power’ ministries and to Putin personally [and lack of] any specialized expertise in drug-related work,”51 and that the majority of the 40,000-member staff was drawn primarily from law-enforcement agencies like the MVD or the now-defunct tax police.52

Although the FSKN claims that it focuses on stop-ping drug-related organized crime, many of its cases involve very small groups of people, sometimes even

families or individuals in dire economic circumstances.53 According to a senior offi cial of the Moscow branch of the agency, “One of the most signifi cant cases [in 2007] constituted disbanding of an organized criminal group that was composed of a wife, a husband, and a wife’s father that were traffi cking drugs by mail.”54 The FSKN frequently emphasizes the ethnicity of those detained on drug charges. For instance, according to an agency analy-sis of the available statistics, “The Russian drug market is in large measure controlled by ethnically organized criminal groups.”55 Both illegal and legal migration from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, primarily Central Asia, the North Caucasus, and nearby Afghanistan, is claimed to affect Russia’s drug situation in a major way.56

The work of the FSKN is further hampered by in-fi ghting among the security forces that are also partly responsible for combating Russia’s drug problem.57 Many in the MVD and the Federal Customs Service believed that the new agency was encroaching upon their spheres of infl uence, since they already had structures in place to deal with drug traffi cking.58 The infi ghting came to a head when several drug-enforcement offi cers from the FSKN were arrested on October 1, 2007, and accused of ordering illegal wiretaps and accepting bribes from private fi rms in exchange for offi cial protection. The drug-enforcement agents claimed, in turn, that the arrests were “revenge by the FSB for [the agents’] investigation into purported smuggling rings linked to the agency [i.e., the FSB].”59 In an interview with Kommersant, Cherkesov echoed this charge, maintaining that the arrests of the drug-enforcement offi cers revealed a bitter confl ict among the country’s special services and appeared to be retaliation by the FSB.60 Some outside observers viewed these arrests as an attempt to reduce Cherkesov’s infl uence on Putin before the 2008 presidential elections.61 Finally, Putin himself waded into the confl ict, criticizing Cherkesov for talking publicly about the dispute. He stated, “It is wrong to bring these kinds of problems to the media,” and denied any infi ghting.62 However, one day after reprimanding Cherkesov, Putin appointed him to head a new state committee to fi ght illegal drugs, possibly in an effort to display Putin’s neutrality in the ongoing confl ict among the security agencies.63

FSKN statements regarding its “successful” struggle against drug-related organized crime have to be examined critically. Moreover, the desire to retain their political and business infl uences prompts various security agen-cies, including the FSKN, to continually justify their raison d’être.64 In other words, in order to justify its


existence, the FSKN paints a picture of drug crime that may not correspond with reality.65 Furthermore, linking drug crime to trans-national organized crime and inter-national terrorism and presenting the drug problem as a “national security threat” makes it possible to sustain the appropriate level of “moral panic” needed to justify greater resource allocations to the FSKN and to justify its expansive mandate. 66

Criminal Code Reforms: Purposes and PracticeThe 2003 amendments to the Criminal Code were sup-posed to shift the emphasis of law enforcement from users to dealers and traffi ckers.67 Section 228 of the Criminal Code was amended so that criminal responsibility for possession of narcotics without intent to engage in traf-fi cking would only arise if the accused possessed “large” (§228(1)) or “especially large” (§228(2)) quantities of narcotics. These amounts were to be determined by the Ministry of Health, FSKN, and the Interior Ministry according to the minimum average dose for each drug. A “large” amount would be in excess of ten minimum average doses and an “especially large” amount would be more than fi fty minimum average doses.68

Perhaps not surprisingly, the minimum average dose amounts initially proposed were set extremely low. For example, the minimum average dose of heroin was set at 0.0001 gram—much lower than the 0.1–0.2 gram mini-mum average for a heroin user. In essence, the agencies set the minimum doses low enough to defeat the relatively liberal spirit of the Criminal Code amendments and enable them to continue the practice of prosecuting and crimi-nalizing users found in possession of minute quantities of drugs.69 This way both the MVD and the FSKN could claim success in the war on drugs.70 The announcement of the minimum average doses sparked protests from academics, as well as from the Ministry of Justice, the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, and the Presidential Justice Commission.71 Efforts to develop more realistic minimum average doses were undertaken in consultation with criminologists, narcologists, and lawyers, taking into account studies of actual user prac-tices.72 The new table of minimum average doses entered into force on May 12, 2004.73 The minimum average dose of heroin in the new table was raised to 0.1 gram, instead of the previous 0.0001 gram. Hence, for criminal liability to attach, the user must be found to be in possession of at least 1 gram of heroin for a “large” amount and at least 5 grams for an “especially large” amount.

Cherkesov publicly supported the new policy of not prosecuting users and instead focusing on dealers. He stated that the amendments to the Criminal Code were “the correct course of action to pursue.”74 However, de-spite his public pronouncements, other members of his agency as well as members of the MVD and the Pros-ecutor General’s Offi ce set out to undermine the spirit of the amendments. They claimed that the Criminal Code amendments did not eliminate the potential dangers associated with drug users, such as spreading disease and committing violent crimes, and insisted that users should not be able to avoid punishment.75 FSKN offi cers lobbied members of the State Duma, Russian Orthodox Church leaders, as well as the public, collecting 200,000 signatures in favor of continuing to prosecute users.76 They claimed that criminal elements were behind the amendments, in order to complicate efforts to battle the spread of drugs.77 After extensive FSKN lobbying, fur-ther amendments to the Criminal Code in February 2006 re-instituted the policy of basing “large” and “especially large” quantities on absolute amounts rather than on mini-mum average doses.78 The result was that the concepts of “large” and “especially large” amounts, while not as restrictive as in the 1990s, were much more restrictive than the amounts set under the minimum average doses regime. For example, under the 2006 amendments, the “large” dose of heroin was set at 0.5 gram and “espe-cially large” dose at 2.5 grams (contrast this with the 1.0- and 5.0-gram levels, respectively, under the 2003 amendments). Several justifi cations were advanced for the 2006 amendments. Advocates maintained that it was diffi cult to calculate minimum average doses because of the confl icting medical, social, and legal criteria, that minimum average dose is an appropriate concept regarding licit drugs but inappropriate in the context of illicit drugs, and fi nally, that it is diffi cult to determine and compare the impact of different types of drugs upon individuals and, hence, to calculate their dangerousness in minimum average doses.79 Overall, the 2006 amend-ments represented a step backward from treating users as victims rather than perpetrators.80

The New Federal Anti-Drug ProgramThe amended §228 of the Criminal Code and subsequent FSKN activities reveal the mainly punitive approach of the 2003 drug reforms.81 The focus on law enforcement has not yielded the desired results, however, as even the Russian government has acknowledged. The 2005–2009 federal anti-drug program, for example, notes, “Decades


of past practices mainly centered on law-enforcement methods in combating the drug problem have proven inef-fective. Despite the large number of individuals convicted for drug offenses (approximately 100,000 a year) and the increase in funds directed to law-enforcement agencies, the drug situation in the country has not improved.”82 It recommends a series of comprehensive measures, includ-ing projects aimed at prevention, treatment, and rehabilita-tion.83 Despite the participation of non-law-enforcement agencies, such as the Ministry of Health and Social Devel-opment, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Sports, Tourism, and Youth, and the Ministry of Telecommunications, it is clear from reviewing the list of activities under this program that the FSKN, the MVD, the FSB, the Ministry of Defense, and the Federal Customs Service will be responsible for bulk of the projects.84 For example, the FSKN, which devel-oped the program and serves as the coordinating agency, is supposed to conduct educational conferences aimed at prevention, create an on-line consultation service di-rected at preventing drug use and promoting treatment, create governmental research centers to study issues of prevention, liaise with non-governmental organizations, and even create computer games and movies aimed at reducing drug use.85 Moreover, despite governmental rhetoric trumpeting prevention, treatment, and rehabilita-tion in the anti-drug program, most of the federal funds for anti-drug efforts still go to law-enforcement agencies rather than to fi nancing preventative measures.86 Under the program law-enforcement agencies are scheduled to receive more than 60 percent of federal funding, with the largest share going to the FSKN.87 The perpetuation of the predominantly punitive approach in the federal anti-drug program is not surprising, as it has been practiced for decades and past practices are often diffi cult to break, especially if they involve shifting funds and priorities.

Did the Reforms Work?Russian authorities present the country’s drug problem in an unsophisticated way. Drugs of various categories are lumped together, and all users are labeled addicts and therefore socially dangerous.88 Such labeling is extremely harmful, as it further isolates users and addicts from society and promotes already negative public attitudes toward those who use drugs, making it hard for recover-ing addicts to integrate back into the community.89 The offi cial drug discourse is “moralistic, medicalized, and criminalizing,” and the consequences of drug use are presented as a threat to the security of the nation.90 One

of the key impediments to prevention and rehabilitation is the requirement, arising from the state’s monopoly on drug treatment, that addicts who seek assistance offi cially register as “drug dependent,” which exposes them to discrimination and harassment.91 Users and their relatives rarely seek help from state institutions to avoid the stigma attached to registration.92 Moreover, individuals with drug problems do not want to seek treatment in state facilities because of the prison-like conditions in the clinics and the treatment based on complete abstinence.93 Furthermore, referral to a state clinic may mean that an individual can be deported for having no valid immigration status. Meanwhile, the role of the non-governmental sector in assisting addicts is rather limited. While private clinics have higher success rates for rehabilitation, they operate in a precarious legal “gray zone,” because they are not authorized to provide treatment under the 1998 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances law, and managers frequently must bribe the authorities to close their eyes to the clinics’ activities. 94

Users and minor dealers, not organized criminal enti-ties, continue to be the primary targets of state anti-drug measures.95 These individuals populate offi cial drug statis-tics, despite FSKN rhetoric regarding its anti-organized-crime drug efforts.96 Frequently, police detain drug users to fulfi ll their arrest quotas, and drug-enforcement agents have been known to actively entrap users into committing offenses for the purposes of statistical manipulation.97 Moreover, drug cases are notorious for procedural viola-tions by the MVD and the FSKN.98 For example, searches are conducted without requisite search warrants.99 In some cases, criminal proceedings are not opened because of corruption in the agencies responsible for drug control, while in other instances, several separate cases will be opened against the same individual (or group of individu-als) to infl ate statistical data.100 Moreover, police offi cers themselves often sell drugs and take bribes not to launch criminal investigations.101

More broadly, the drug situation in Russia continues to negatively affect the country’s demographics and the future of its economy.102 Intravenous drug use is increasing among the younger population: The number of adolescents who suffer from drug abuse has increased by 14.8 percent since the late 1990s. Currently about “two-thirds of the narcotics abusers [are] between the ages of eighteen and thirty.”103 The increase in drug use has contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Eighty percent of the people infected with HIV/AIDS are intravenous drug users.104 While those infected at the beginning of the AIDS epidemic in Russia were predominantly male, more


and more females are becoming infected through either intravenous drug use or sexual intercourse with infected partners.105 Of 415,000 people infected with AIDS in Russia today, 135,000 (32 percent) are women.106 Most of these women are young (between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine), and around 5,000 found out that they were infected while undergoing blood tests as part of prenatal care.107 The cost to the state of the drug problem is substantial: more than 1 billion rubles per year to treat drug-addicted individuals in state clinics.108 Despite this fi nancial expenditure, most drug-addicted individuals refuse to utilize state facilities for treatment, and of those admitted for treatment, the success rates tend to be quite low.109 In addition to the devastating impact of drug traf-fi cking and drug use on the country’s demographics and economy, the number of drug-related offenses has also risen, especially among those under the age of thirty, further costing the state. 110

Russia’s anti-drug efforts to date “lack conceptual clarity, exhibit no clear sense of direction or priorities, and rely more on bombastic rhetoric than substantive ef-forts to achieve their professed goals.”111 They have done little to mitigate the grave economic, demographic, and criminological impact of the drug situation. Nevertheless, repressive measures remain the preferred method in the federal agencies responsible for dealing with the drug problem, regardless of presidential pronouncements that prosecutions alone are not the solution.

A Distinctly Russian Approach? Russia’s anti-drug policies and the rhetoric surrounding its war on drugs are certainly not unique. Putin called the drug problem “a national crisis of staggering proportions,” and it has been presented as a national security threat. Similarly, the United States regards drugs as a security issue, emphasizing the links between the drug trade and international terrorism and trans-national organized crime.112 Drugs are defi ned as threatening the very es-sence of U.S. society, necessitating more militarized law enforcement, tougher sentences, and greater rates of im-prisonment.113 However, as in Russia, “The vast majority of those being arrested and convicted of drug violations in the United States are simply users or small-time dealers rather than high-level criminal kingpins.”114

In essence, both the United States and Russia have turned the war on drugs into a war on drug users, with emphasis on prevention, prohibition, and punishment, rather than rehabilitation.115 In both countries, most of the fi nancial resources allocated to battling drugs go to

criminal justice agencies.116 This criminal justice–oriented approach leads to the marginalization of users, presenting them as a threat to their families and to society at large and retarding their reintegration into the community.117 For the most part, blame is placed on the individual rather than certain social structures. In other words, the war on drugs avoids a structural analysis of the problem and instead “pathologizes individuals.” The drug addict becomes the enemy, the threatening “other,” who is waiting to destroy freedom, democracy, and the nation’s way of life. Tough anti-drug measures, frequently directed against users, are justifi ed as necessary in order to protect the core values of the country. 118

This user-centric approach also criminalizes large sec-tions of the population, especially ethnic minorities and the poor. Drug-enforcement agents in both countries are under pressure to show results in the war on drugs, caus-ing them to target already disadvantaged segments of the population, such as poor urban blacks in the United States and legal and illegal immigrants from Central Asia and the North Caucasus in Russia.119 The dramatic rise in U.S. incarceration rates, for example, can be directly traced to the war on drugs and associated sentencing practices, not to changes in the level or nature of crime itself. 120

While the spread of HIV infections has forced a prag-matic shift in the drug policies of some countries away from simple criminalization toward harm-reduction policies,121 both the United States and Russia continue to emphasize prosecution and imprisonment. While many front-line workers, such as police offi cers, prosecutors, and judges, as well as academics, criticize the “war-centered” drug-control strategy and call for a change in policy,122 both Moscow and Washington continue to be quite critical of harm-reduction policies.123 In Russia, FSKN head Cherkesov has voiced very negative attitudes toward methadone and needle-exchange programs.124 Similarly in the United States, President George H.W. Bush stated that the United States cannot “allow our con-cern for AIDS to undermine our determination to win the war on drugs” and that “there is no getting around the fact that distributing needles facilitates drug use and undercuts the credibility of society’s message that using drugs is il-legal and morally wrong.”125 President Bill Clinton’s drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey, remarked, “The problem isn’t dirty needles; it’s injection of illegal drugs.”126 While campaigning for president in fall 2000, George W. Bush told the AIDS Foundation of Chicago:

I do not favor needle-exchange programs and other so-called “harm reduction” strategies to combat drug use. I support a comprehensive mix of prevention, education,


treatment, law enforcement, and supply interdiction to curb drug use and promote a healthy, drug-free America, not misguided efforts to weaken drug laws . . . needle exchange programs signal nothing but abdication, that these dangers are here to stay.127

He remained true to his word after his election. In 2001 Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson said that the Bush administration had no plans to permit federal funding of needle-exchange programs.128 As these statements show, “getting tough” on users and dealers remains the national strategy in both countries, notwithstanding the lack of visible success in stemming rising HIV rates.129

The emphasis on criminal justice measures and the refusal to discuss alternative strategies in the war on drugs is frequently justifi ed in both the United States and Russia by referring to their international obliga-tions under various anti-drug instruments, in particular the 1988 UN Convention Against the Illicit Traffi c in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.130 How-ever, despite the strongly prohibitive language of these international instruments,131 some countries that favor a shift to less harsh measures manage to present their case not as a departure from the standards set by the conventions but as a broader elaboration of the standards. For example,

De facto legalization [of cannabis] can be achieved by keeping the possession of drugs for personal consumption a criminal offence as required by the 1988 Convention, but without fl outing the letter of the Convention. Means of doing this may involve an adjustment to the penal-ties that are deemed appropriate, such as a fi ne, police caution, an unrecorded reprimand or counseling; or the drugs concerned may be reclassifi ed into different legal categories where different penalties apply. This does not mean that possession has been legalized and it allows the continued, possibly more forceful prosecution of traffi ck-ing or production.132

Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are experimenting with this type of non-enforcement. The Dutch have adopted a pragmatic approach to their drug problem, based on harm reduction and social integration of users.133 Similarly, the UK’s drug-control strategy fo-cuses more on harm minimization and “deemphasizing action in relation to drug users who consume cannabis or other drugs relatively unproblematically.”134 Hence, the language of the conventions to which Russia is a party is not an insurmountable impediment to developing anti-drug strategies that do not center around prohibition and imprisonment.

Conclusion Russians must begin to ask hard questions about the ef-fectiveness of traditional law-enforcement methods as a way to prevent drug abuse.135 Currently, however, there is very little political will to fundamentally rethink the government’s approach to the drug problem. Despite presidential pronouncements regarding the importance of treatment and rehabilitation,136 the drug problem is still primarily approached from a law-enforcement per-spective, and the importance of harm-reduction policies as well as the important role that non-state actors could play is disregarded. Moreover, resolving the drug problem may not be the main reason behind declarations of tough measures against drugs.137 Various political agendas are often pursued under the guise of the war on drugs. Some politicians use anti-drug rhetoric to win favor with their constituents, because public attitudes toward drug addicts remain quite harsh.138 Anti-immigration policies can be advanced under the banner of drug control if ethnic-minority immigrants are presented as responsible for Rus-sia’s crime problems. The Kremlin may also be using the war-cry of combating drugs to reassert its infl uence in the former Soviet states, subsuming this social problem into a broader security agenda when dealing with its neigh-bors.139 Ultimately, Russia’s approach to its war on drugs satisfi es many different agendas and is unlikely to change in the near future. After all, the problem with conceptual wars is that there is no timetable, little accountability, and unfulfi lled promises of ultimate victory.140

Notes1. Quoted in Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, “The Eurasian

Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” Problems of Post-Communism 53, no. 4 (2006): 15.

2. Vladimir B. Poznyak, Vadim E. Pelipas, Anatoliy N. Vievski, and L. Miroshnichenko, “Illicit Drug Use and Its Health Consequences in Belarus, Russian Federation, and Ukraine: Impact of Transition,” European Addiction Research 8 (2002): 185.

3. Tamara Makarenko, “Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 6, no. 3 (2002).

4. B.P. Tselinskii, “Sovremennaia narkosituatsiia v Rossii: Tendentsii i perspektivy” (Current Drug Situation in Russia: Tendencies and Prospects), Organizovannaia prestupnost i korruptsia 4 (2003): 21.

5. Ibid.; K. Khachatourian, “Kriminologicheskaia kharakteristika nezakon-nogo obotota narkotikov v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1999 godu” (Criminological Characteristics of the Illegal Drug Traffi c in the Russian Federation in 1999), Voprosy narkologii 1 (2000): 13–19.

6. Letizia Paoli, “The Development of an Illegal Market: Drug Con-sumption and Trade in Post-Soviet Russia,” British Journal of Criminology 42 (2002): 27.

7. Tselinskii, “Sovremennaia narkosituatsiia v Rossii,” p. 21.

8. Paoli, “Development of an Illegal Market,” p. 23.

9. Abdula G. Museibov, “Regionalnye praktiki po preduprezhdeniu neza-konnogo oborota narkotikov” (Regional Practices Aimed at Preventing Illegal Drug Traffi c), Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 7 (2003): 127.


10. Letizia Paoli, “The Price of Freedom: Illegal Drug Markets and Poli-cies in Post-Soviet Russia,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582 (2002): 170–71.

11. Museibov, “Regionalnye praktiki po preduprezhdeniu nezakonnogo oborota narkotikov,” p. 126; Letizia Paoli, “Drug Traffi cking in Russia: A Form of Organized Crime?” Journal of Drug Issues 31, no. 4 (2001): 1008.

12. Quoted in John M. Kramer, “Drug Abuse in Russia. Emerging Pan-demic or Overhyped Diversion?” Problems of Post-Communism 50, no. 6 (2003): 18.

13. Paoli, “Price of Freedom,” p. 174; UN Offi ce on Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Annual Field Report 2000: Russia (New York: UNODCCP, 2001).

14. Louise Shelley, “The Drug Trade in Contemporary Russia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2006): 16, 18.


16. Shelley, “Drug Trade in Contemporary Russia,” p. 17.

17. Paoli, “Development of an Illegal Market,” p. 32.

18. Alexandra V. Orlova and James W. Moore, “ ‘Umbrellas’ or ‘Build-ing Blocks’? Defi ning International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in International Law,” Houston Journal of International Law 27, no. 2 (2005): 294.

19. Paoli, “Drug Traffi cking in Russia,” p. 1014.

20. Ibid., p. 1015.

21. Ibid., p. 1023.


23. Paoli, “Drug Traffi cking in Russia,” pp. 1023–24; Vladimir Paramonov and Aleksei Strokov, “Raspad SSSR i ego posledstviia dlia Uzbekistana: Ekonomika i sotsialnaia sfera” (The Consequences of the Fall of the USSR for Uzbekistan’s Economic and Social Spheres), Confl ict Studies Research Centre, Central Asian Series, April 2006, 06/11(R).

24. L.I. Romanova, “Antinarkoticheskie programmy dolzhny byt effek-tivnymi” (Anti-Drug Programs Must Be Effective), Rossiiskii uridicheskii zhurnal 3 (2006): 103; Museibov, “Regionalnye praktiki po preduprezhdeniu nezakonnogo oborota narkotikov,” p. 128.

25. Paoli, “Price of Freedom,” p. 176.

26. V. Voronin, “Opredelit zakonom krupnyi razmer narkoticheskikh sredstv” (The Law Needs to Set the Meaning of Large Amounts of Narcotic Substances), Rossiiskaia ustitsiia 2 (2003): 43.

27. E.A. Babayan, Billuten verhovnogo suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Bulletin of the Russian Supreme Court) 10 (1998): 14–17.

28. Voronin, “Opredelit zakonom krupnyi razmer narkoticheskikh sredstv,” p. 43.

29. Poznyak et al., “Illicit Drug Use and Its Health Consequences,” p. 187.

30. Federal Law on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, No. 3-FZ, January 8, 1998, §31.

31. Ibid., §55(2).

32. Poznyak et al., “Illicit Drug Use and Its Health Consequences,” p. 187.

33. Romanova, “Antinarkoticheskie programmy dolzhny byt effektivnymi,” 105.

34. R.A. Aleksandrov, “Stanovlenie i razvitie ugolovno-pravovogo pro-tivodeistviia nezakonnomu oborotu narkotikov v SSSR v 20–30-e gody XX veka” (Establishment and Development of the Criminal-Legal Opposition to the Illicit Traffi c in Narcotics in the USSR During the 1920s and 1930s), Istoriia gosudarstva i prava 6 (2007): 17–19; Paoli, “Price of Freedom,” p. 175.

35. Romanova, “Antinarkoticheskie programmy dolzhny byt effektivnymi,” p. 108.

36. The offi cial resolution creating the agency was published in Rossiiskaya gazeta (June 11, 2003): 9.

37. Kramer, “Drug Abuse in Russia,” p. 20.

38. Internet Conference of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin (July 6, 2006), www.narkotiki.ru.

39. D.S. Novikov, “Problemmy profi laktiki narkomanii” (Problems of Addiction Prevention), in Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii Kaliningradskogo Uridicheskogo Institute MVD Rosii. Teoriia i praktika pra-vookhranitelnoi deiatelnosti (Conference Materials of the Kaliningrad MVD Law Institute, entitled “Theory and Practice of Law Enforcement Activities”) (Kaliningrad, 2006), p. 157.

40. Viktor Cherkesov, “Strana otoshla ot kriticheskogo poroga” (The Country Has Moved Away from a Critical Mark), Nezavisimaya gazeta (No-vember 20, 2006).

41. Viktor Cherkesov, “Glavnoi prichinoi usugubleniia narkoobstanovki stali vneshnie prichiny” (External Forces Play the Main Role in the Worsen-ing of the Drug Situation), interview on Echo Moskvy Radio (July 1, 2004), www.narkotiki.ru.

42. Zasedanie pravitelstvennoi komissii po protivodeistviu zloupotreble-niu narkoticheskimi sredstvami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu (Session of the Governmental Commission on Preventing Illicit Drug Use and Traffi cking), September 18, 2006, www.narkotiki.ru.

43. Semeyon Gorelik, “Sbyval narkotik putem inektsii koshke” (Drug Traf-fi cking by Way of an Injection to a Cat), February 2, 2004, www.utro.ru.

44. “Pravitelstvo RF uzakonilo ispolzovanie ketamina v veterinarii” (Gov-ernment Legalized the Use of Ketamine in Veterinary Practice), September 6, 2004, www.newsru.com.

45. “Verhovnyi Sud postavil tochku v ‘ketaminovykh’ delakh” (Supreme Court Reached a Conclusion in the Ketamine Process), July 14, 2006, www.regnum.ru.

46. Viktor Cherkesov, “Kak sdelat borbu s narkotikami effektovnoi?” (How to Make the Anti-Drug Struggle Effective?), interview on Echo Moskvy Radio (November 30, 2006), www.narkotiki.ru.

47. “Stenogramma internet-konferentsii s nachalnikom upravleniia mezh-vedomstvennogo vzaimodeistviia v sfere profi laktiki FSKN RF Aleksandrom Sergeevichem Yanevskim” (Record of the Internet Conference with the Head of the Addiction Prevention Division of the FSKN, Alexander Sergeevich Yanevskii), February 22, 2007, www.narkotiki.ru; Poznyak et al., “Illicit Drug Use and Its Health Consequences,” p. 188; Marisa L. Maskas, “Traffi cking Drugs: Afghanistan’s Role in Russia’s Current Drug Epidemic,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 13 (2005): 174–75.

48. Cherkesov, “Glavnoi prichinoi usugubleniia narkoobstanovki stali vneshnie prichiny.”

49. Cherkesov, “Strana otoshla ot kriticheskogo poroga.”

50. Putin Internet Conference.

51. Olga Krychtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Inside the Putin Court: A Research Note,” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 7 (2005): 1065–75.


53. “Desiat mesiatsev odnogo goda” (Ten Months of One Year), Chelovek i zakon 12 (2005); R.A. Aleksandrov, “Vzaimosviaz narkobiznesa i natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossii” (Connection Between the Drug Business and Russia’s National Security), Rossiiskii sledovatel (Russian Inspector) 2 (2006): 55; Cherkesov, “Kak sdelat borbu s narkotikami effektovnoi?”

54. Aleksandr Birin, “S nachala 2007 goda v Moskve vyiavleno pochti 1200 prestuplenii v sfere nezakonnogo oborota narkotikov” (From the Beginning of 2007 There Have Been 1200 Crimes Committed in Moscow Connected with Drug Traffi cking), www.narkotiki.ru.

55. “Federalnaia Sluzhba po Narkokontrolu informituet” (The FSKN Informs), November 16, 2007, www.narkotiki.ru.

56. Cherkesov, “Glavnoi prichinoi usugubleniia narkoobstanovki stali vneshnie prichiny”; idem, “Kak sdelat borbu s narkotikami effektovnoi?”; A.E. Kudrov, “Osobennosti prokurorskogo nadzora za deiatelnostu pravookhran-itelnykh organov pri rassledovanii prestuplenii v sfere nezakonnogo oborota narkotikov” (The Specifi cs of Prosecutor Supervision over Actions of Law Enforcers in Investigations of Crimes Connected with Drug Traffi cking), in Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii Kaliningradskogo Uridicheskogo Institute MVD Rosii, p. 82.

58. David Nowak, “5 Drug Offi cers Found Guilty of Assaulting Transport Cops,” Moscow Times (October 16, 2007): 3.

59. Francesca Mereu, “Drug Cop’s Arrest Under Appeal,” Moscow Times (October 17, 2007): 3.


60. Viktor Cherkesov, “Nelzia dopustit, chtoby voiny prevratilis v tor-govtsev” (Preventing Turning Warriors into Traders), Kommersant (October 9, 2007).

61. “FSB vziala v oborot narkotiki” (FSB Clamped Down on Drugs), Kommersant (October 4, 2007).

62. “Prezident ne sognul svoi ‘liniu’ ” (President Did Not Depart from His View), Kommersant (October 19, 2007).

63. Francesca Mereu and Kevin O’Flynn, “In Turf War, Putin Scolds Ally and Gives Him a Job,” Moscow Times (October 22, 2007): 1; Ukaz Prezidenta RF (Presidential Decree) “O dopolnitelnykh merakh po protivodeistviu neza-konnomu oborotu narkoticheskikh sredstv, psikhotropnykh veschestv i ikh prekursorov” (On Additional Measures to Combat Illicit Traffi c in Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors), October 20, 2007.

64. Under Putin, control of the “commanding heights” of the Russian economy was transferred from the oligarchs to individuals in the security services; see Daniel Treisman, “Putin’s Silovarchs,” Orbis 51, no. 1 (2007): 146. While oligarchs actually “owned billion-dollar properties outright,” indi-viduals from the “power ministries” “mostly just control companies through positions in management or on supervisory boards.” Dmitry Medvedev’s succession to the presidency and Putin’s shift to the prime minister’s offi ce has created a sense of instability in the security agencies and fears that they might lose political power and infl uence and, hence, control over their busi-nesses (both legal and semi-legitimate; see Pavel K. Baev, “Infi ghting Among Putin’s Siloviki Escalates to a ‘Clan War,’ ” Eurasia Daily Monitor (October 11, 2007); Francesca Mereu, “Security Infi ghting All About Money,” Moscow Times (October 29, 2007): 1.

65. I.I. Ibragimov, “Borba s nezakonnym oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv—Delo vsego rossiiskogo obschestva” (Combating the Illicit Traffi ck-ing of Drugs Is a Matter for the Whole Russian Society), Pravo i obrazovanie 2 (2007): 175.

66. R.A. Aleksandrov, “Vzaimosviaz narkobiznesa i natsionalnoi bezopas-nosti Rossii” (Connection Between Drug Business and Russia’s National Security), Rossiiskii sledovatel 2 (2006): 55; E.A. Stepanova, “Narkotiki i terrorizm” (Drugs and Terrorism), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 8 (2006).

67. See Federal Law No. 162-FZ “On Additions and Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,” December 8, 2003; “S 12 Marta kazhdyi potrebitel narkotikov v Rossii mozhet byt avtomaticheski priravnen k narkobaronu” (Commencing March 12 Every Russian User Can Be Automati-cally Equated with a Drug Traffi cker), March 3, 2004, www.regnum.ru.

68. §228, no. 2; A.I. Chuchaev, Postateinyi kommentarii k ugolovnomu kodeksu Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Section by Section Commentary to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) (Moscow, 2004), pp. 512, 516; users would be liable for up to three years deprivation of liberty for possession of a “large” quantity of narcotics and from three to ten years deprivation of liberty for possession of an “especially large” quantity of narcotics; see §§228(1) and (2); “Komissiia po pravam Cheloveka pri prezidente RF obratilas k premeru s prosboi podderzhat priniatie realnykh razmerov razovykh doz narkotikov” (Presidential Human Rights Commission Asked the Prime Minister to Sup-port the Enactment of Realistic Measurements of Single Use Doses of Drugs), March 11, 2004, www.regnum.ru.

69. “Komissiia po pravam Cheloveka pri prezidente RF obratilas k premeru s prosboi podderzhat priniatie realnykh razmerov razovykh doz narkotikov.”

70. “S 12 Marta kazhdyi potrebitel narkotikov v Rossii mozhet byt av-tomaticheski priravnen k narkobaronu.”

71. “Grazhdanskii kontrol: Gosnarkokontrol na ‘trope voiny’?” (FSKN Is on the “War Path”?), Prava cheloveka v Rossii (October 16, 2007).

72. Olga Bobrova, “Deputaty nervno kuriat” (Deputies Are Nervously Smoking), Novaya gazeta (September 15, 2005); “Krupnyi i osobo krupnyi razmer narkoticheskikh i psikhotropnykh veschestv budut ischisliat v fi zio-logicheski obosnovannykh razovykh dozakh” (Large and Especially Large Amounts of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Will Be Calculated Taking Account of Physiologically Reasonable Single Use Doses), Regnum News Agency, May 12, 2004, www.regnum.ru.

73. Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii N. 231, “Ob utverzh-denii razmerov srednikh razovykh doz narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veschetsv dlia tselei statei 228, 228.1 and 229 UK RF” (Instruction of the Federal Government No. 231, “Confi rmation of the Minimum Average Doses

of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances for Sections 228, 228.1 and 229 of the Criminal Code), May 12, 2004.

74. Cherkesov, “Glavnoi prichinoi usugubleniia narkoobstanovki stali vneshnie prichiny.” It is not surprising that Cherkesov, in his public statements, spoke in favor of the amendments, because the policy of putting the emphasis on dealers instead of users came from Putin himself. Putin, in his 2005 State of the Union address, stated, “The problem of drugs cannot be solved by prohibition alone,” quoted in “Ischeznet li iz ugolovnogo kodeksa poniatie srednei razovoi dozy narkotikov?” (Will the Criterion of Minimum Average Dose Disappear from the Criminal Code?), Regnum News Agency, April 28, 2005, www.regnum.ru.

75. I. Rezonov, “Organizatsiia i soderzhanie narkopritonov: Vyiavlenie i raskrytie” (Organization and Direction of Drug Dens: Investigation and Disclo-sure), Zakonnost 4 (2006): 27; E.N. Pashkova, “Sistema mer preduprezhdeniia prestuplenii, sovershaemykh na pochve narkomanii. Mesto i rol v nei sredstv administrativno-pravovogo vozdeistviia” (The System of Measures Directed at Prevention of Drug Crimes. The Place and Role of Legal-Administrative Measures), Chelovek: Prestuplenie i nakazanie 2–3 (2006): 80–81.

76. Bobrova, “Deputaty nervno kuriat”; “Ischeznet li iz ugolovnogo kodeksa poniatie srednei razovoi dozy narkotikov?”

77. “Postanovlenie pravitelstva RF o srednikh razovykh dozakh narkot-icheskikh sredstv protolknulo lobbi prestupnogo mira” (The Instruction of the Federal Government Dealing with the Amounts of Minimum Average Doses of Drugs Was Sponsored by the Criminal Lobby), Federal Agency of the Press and Mass Communications, November 17, 2004, www.narkotiki.ru; Vyacheslav N. Kurchenko, “Novatsii v sudebnoi praktike po delam o nezakonnom oborote narkotikov” (Innovations in Court Practice Dealing with Drug Traffi cking Cases), Ugolovnyi protsess 10 (2006): 3.

78. Postanovlenie Pravitelstva N. 76 (Governmental Instruction No. 76), February 7, 2006.

79. “Gosduma gotova otkazatsia ot poniatiia ‘srednikh razovykh doz’ narkotikov” (State Duma Is Ready to Abandon Minimum Average Doses), Regnum News Agency, September 21, 2005, www.regnum.ru.

80. I.M. Kleimenov and D.U. Artemov, “Strategii protivodeistviia nezakon-nomu oborotu narkotikov” (Strategies Aimed at Combating Illicit Drug Traffi c), Rossiiskaia ustitsia 2 (2007): 63.

81. Yevgenii I. Tsymbala, “Pravovoe regulirovanie okazaniia narkolog-icheskoi pomoskhi: Problemy i puti ikh resheniia” (Legal Regulation of Provi-sion of Aid to Drug Dependent Individuals. Problems and Their Resolutions), Federal Agency of the Press and Mass Communications, December 23, 2005, www.narkotiki.ru.

82. Federalnaia tselevaia programma “Kompleksnye mery protivodeistviia zloupotrebleniu narkotikami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu na 2005–2009 gody” (Federal Program Titled “Comprehensive Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Use and Drug Traffi c for 2005–2009”), Postanovlenie N. 561 (Instruction No. 561), September 13, 2005, www.narkotiki.ru/jrussia_5991.html.

83. See Perechen meropriiatii po realizatsii federalnoi tselevoi pro-grammy “Kompleksnye mery protivodeistviia zloupotrebleniu narkotikami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu na 2005–2009 gody” (List of Events Directed at the Realization of the Federal Program Titled “Comprehensive Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Use and Drug Traffi c for 2005–2009”), www.narkotiki.ru/tabs/fcp2005pril2.html.

84. Even these non-law-enforcement bodies frequently display support for the law-enforcement approach. For example, in a 2005 interview, the minister of education and science expressed his support for some forms of mandatory drug testing for students; see “Internet press-konferentsiia ministra obrazovaniia i nauki R.F. Fursenko” (Internet Press Conference of Minister of Education and Science R.F. Fursenko), September 26, 2005, www.mon.gov.ru/press/news/1680; see also Perechen meropriiatii po realizatsii federalnoi tselevoi programmy “Kompleksnye mery protivodeistviia zloupotrebleniu narkotikami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu na 2005–2009 gody.”

85. Ibid. 86. Federalnaia tselevaia programma “Kompleksnye mery protivodeist-

viia zloupotrebleniu narkotikami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu na 2005–2009 gody”; L.V. Gotchina, “Organizatsiia antinarkoticheskoi raboty v otsenkakh spetsialistov silovykh struktur (Nekotorye aspekty)” (Organization of Anti-Drug Work as Seen by Law Enforcement Specialists [Selected Aspects]), Pravo i obrazovanie 3 (2006): 150–51.

87. Raspredelenie assignovanii po gosudarstvennym zakazchikam federal-


noi tselevoi programmy “Kompleksnye mery protivodeistviia zloupotrebleniu narkotikami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu na 2005–2009 gody” (Division of Responsibilities Between Governmental Entities in Connection with the Federal Program Titled “Comprehensive Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Use and Drug Traffi c for 2005–2009”), www.narkotiki.ru/tabs/fcp2005pril4.html.


89. Elena Omelchenko, “ ‘You Can Tell by the Way They Talk’: Analysing the Language Young People in Russia Use to Talk About Drugs,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 22, no. 1 (2006): 59.

90. Ibid., pp. 55, 61.

91. Maskas, “Traffi cking Drugs,” p. 156.

92. V.I Starodubov and A.I. Tatarkin, eds., Vliianie narkomanii na sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie obschestva (Infl uence of Drug Addiction on the Socio-Economic Development of Society) (Moscow and Ekaterinburg, 2006), pp. 266–67.

93. Tom Parfi tt, “Vladimir Mendelevich: Fighting for Drug Substitution Treatment,” Lancet 368 (2006): 279.

94. Kramer, “Drug Abuse in Russia.”

95. Maskas, “Traffi cking Drugs,” p. 155; A. Zuev, “Protivodeistvie neza-konnomu oborotu narkotikov v Moskve” (Combating Illicit Traffi c of Drugs in Moscow), Zakonnost 9 (2004): 43; Vyacheslav N. Kurchenko, “Ogranichenie provokatsii ot deistvii pri presechenii prestuplenii” (Limiting Provocations in Actions Directed at Crime Suppression), Zakonnost 1 (2004): 12.

96. Zuev, “Protivodeistvie nezakonnomu oborotu narkotikov v Moskve,” p. 43; N.A. Sartaeva, “Narkotism: Sotsialno-Pravovoi aspekt” (Narcotization: Socio-Legal Aspects), Gosudarstvo i pravo 2 (2003): 121.

97. Maskas, “Traffi cking Drugs,” p. 176; Kurchenko, “Ogranichenie provokatsii ot deistvii pri presechenii prestuplenii,” p. 10. For example, drug-enforcement offi cers will have user A contact user B and ask for help in obtain-ing drugs. User A pays user B with money provided by the offi cers. When user B gives user A the drugs, user B is arrested and charged with traffi cking. See Mikhail A. Fomin, “Provokatsiia sbyta narkoticheskikh sredstv, psikhotropnykh veschestv ili ikh analogov” (Provocation of Selling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Derivatives), Ugolovnyi protsess 5 (2007): 55.

98. V. Manchinskii, “Obedinenie usilii v borbe s narkoprestupno-stu” (Uniting of Forces in the Struggle Against Drug Crime), Zakonnost 5 (2006): 5; A.G. Kharatishvilli, “Pravovye i kriminalisticheskie problemy vyiavleniia kontrabandy narkotikov” (Legal and Criminological Problems of Detecting Drug Smuggling), Chernye dyry v rossiiskom zakonodatelstve 3 (2006): 114.

99. H.I. Mussakaev, “Organizatsiia raboty prokuratury po nadzoru za ispolneniem zakonov Federalnoi Sluzhboi po Kontrolu za oborotom narko-tikov” (Organizing the Work of the Prosecution in Supervising How the FSKN Complies with [Anti-Drug] Laws), Chernye dyry v rossiiskom zakonodatelstve 4 (2006): 371.

100. Kurchenko, “Novatsii v sudebnoi praktike po delam o nezakonnom oborote narkotikov, ” p. 6; V. Manchinskii, “Obedinenie usilii v borbe s narkoprestupnostu” (Uniting of Forces in the Struggle Against Drug Crime), Zakonnost 5 (2006): 4.

101. Maskas, “Traffi cking Drugs,” p. 163; D.V. Ivanov, “Preduprezhdenie prestuplenii v sfere oborota narkotikov, soverchaemykh sotrudnikami organiv vnutrennikh del” (Preventing Drug Crimes Committed by Law Enforcers), Pravo i politika 6 (2004): 48.

102. Shelley, “Drug Trade in Contemporary Russia,” 20.103. E.M. Shcherbakova, “The Narcotics Invasion in Russia: What the

Statistics Say,” Sociological Research 44, no. 5 (2005): 54.104. Shelley, “Drug Trade in Contemporary Russia,” p. 20.105. Shcherbakova, “Narcotics Invasion in Russia,” p. 54; Blaine Stothard,

Olga Romanova, and Larissa Ivanova, “Recent Developments in HIV/AIDS Prevention for Russian Adolescents,” Sex Education 7, no. 2 (2007): 175.

106. “The New Face of an Epidemic,” Moscow Times (May 21, 2008). These are the offi cial fi gures; the real number of people infected with HIV is probably much higher; see Paul Webster, “HIV/AIDS Explosion in Russia Triggers Research Boom,” Lancet 361 (2003): 2132.

107. “New Face of an Epidemic.”

108. Federalnaia tselevaia programma “Kompleksnye mery protivodeist-

viia zloupotrebleniu narkotikami i ikh nezakonnomu oborotu na 2005–2009 gody.”

109. Stothard, Romanova, and Ivanova, “Recent Developments in HIV/AIDS Prevention,” p. 179.

110. Shcherbakova, “Narcotics Invasion in Russia,” pp. 55, 58.


112. Cornell and Swanstrom, “Eurasian Drug Trade,” p. 10; Alexandra Guaqueta, “Change and Continuity in U.S.-Colombian Relations and the War Against Drugs,” Journal of Drug Issues 1 (2005): 42.

113. For example, the intensifi cation of the war on drugs in the United States resulted in the “normalization of many surveillance technologies”; see David R. Bewley-Taylor, “U.S. Concept Wars, Civil Liberties and the Technologies of Fortifi cation,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 43 (2005): 84; Kyle Grayson, “Discourse, Identity, and the U.S. ‘War on Drugs’,” in Critical Refl ections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, ed. M. E. Beare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2003), pp. 145–48, 153.

114. Ibid., p. 145.

115. Julian Buchanan and Lee Young, “The War on Drugs—A War on Drug Users?” Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy 7, no. 4 (2000): 410.

116. Eric D. Lock, Jeffrey M. Timberlake, and Kenneth A. Rasinski, “Battle Fatigue: Is Public Support Waning for ‘War’-Centered Drug Control Strate-gies?” Crime and Delinquency 48, no. 3 (2002): 382.

117. Ibid., p. 416.

118. William N. Elwood, “Declaring War on the Home Front: Metaphor, Presidents, and the War on Drugs,” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 10, no. 2 (1995): 96–97.

119. Lawrence D. Bobo and Victor Thompson, “Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System,” Social Research 73, no. 2 (2006): 447, 451; R. Shenin and G. Suleimanova, “Narkobiznes—Globalnaia problemma XXI veka” (Drug Business—Global Problem of the Twenty-fi rst Century), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 6 (2006): 55.

120. Elwood, “Declaring War on the Home Front,” pp. 104, 107; Buchanan and Young, “War on Drugs,” p. 410.

121. Buchanan and Young, “War on Drugs,” p. 411.

122. Lock, Timberlake, and Rasinski, “Battle Fatigue,” p. 381; Gotchina, “Organizatsiia antinarkoticheskoi raboty v otsenkakh spetsialistov silovykh struktur,” p. 148; Eva Bertram and Kenneth Sharpe, “War Ends, Drugs Win,” Nation (January 6, 1997): 12.

123. Catherine Carstairs, “The Stages of the International Drug Control System” Drug and Alcohol Review 24 (2005): 62.

124. Cherkesov, “Glavnoi prichinoi usugubleniia narkoobstanovki stali vneshnie prichiny.”

125. Quoted in Bertram and Sharpe, “War Ends, Drugs Win,” p. 13.126. Ibid.127. George W. Bush to the AIDS Foundation of Chicago (fall 2000), www.

dogwoodcenter.org/ban/10ban.html. 128. See ibid. The harm caused by licit substances such as alcohol and

tobacco is frequently neglected in offi cial pronouncements; see Buchanan and Young, “War on Drugs,” p. 413.

129. Poznyak et al., “Illicit Drug Use and Its Health Consequences,” p. 186; Dan Baum, “The War on Drugs, 12 Years Later,” American Bar Association Journal (March 1993): 71.

130. The text of the convention is available at www.ukcia.org/pollaw/lawlibrary/conventionagainstillicittraffi c1988.html; Cindy S.J. Fazey, “The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme: Politics, Policies and Prospect for Change,” International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003): 160.

131. The primary emphasis of the 1988 convention is on law-enforcement measures rather than treatment and rehabilitative measures; see M. Hasan, “Problemy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva po borbe s narkotikami” (Problems of International Cooperation in the Struggle Against Drugs), Pravo i politika 8 (2006): 135.

132. Fazey, “Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations


International Drug Control Programme,” p. 161.

133. C.W. Maris, “The Disasters of War: American Repression Versus Dutch Tolerance in Drug Policy,” Journal of Drug Issues 29, no. 3 (1999): 498.

134. Nicholas Dorn, “UK Policing Drug Traffi ckers and Users: Policy Implementation in the Context of National Law, European Traditions, Inter-national Drug Conventions, and Security After 2001,” Journal of Drug Issues 3 (2004): 533.

135. Gotchina, “Organizatsiia antinarkoticheskoi raboty v otsenkakh spetsialistov silovykh struktur,” p. 148.


137. Elwood, “Declaring War on the Home Front,” p. 110.

138. Omelchenko, “ ‘You Can Tell by the Way They Talk’,” p. 61; Kramer, “Drug Abuse in Russia,” p. 16.

139. Zh.T. Seralinov and S.V. Bataev, “Problemy mezhdunarodno-pravo-vogo regulirovaniia borby s nezakonnym oborotom narkotikov” (Problems of International Legal Regulation of the Struggle Against Drug Traffi cking), Politseiskoe Pravo 4 (2006): 93–98. Many other topics were subsumed into the U.S. drug policy in Colombia (e.g., institution building, justice sector reform). See Guaqueta, “Change and Continuity in U.S.-Colombian Relations,” p. 36.

140. Elwood, “Declaring War on the Home Front,” p. 101.

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The Russian War on Drugs