THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM AND AFTER:

The United Kingdom on the path to quasi-federalism?

Presentation by Alan TrenchDalhousie University, Halifax

22 October 2014

Getting to the referendum • A 2007 manifesto commitment for the SNP – qualified

in their 2011 manifesto (‘introduce a bill’) – but politically inevitable with their majority

• ‘Legal, clear, (fair) and decisive’ v. ‘made in Scotland’ • Terms agreed October 2012 – the ‘Edinburgh

agreement’– Conferred powers on Scottish Parliament to call referendum – One poll, one question (no ‘third option’) – By end of December 2014 – Regulation by (UK) Electoral Commission – incl advice on

question – The Scottish Parliament franchise (residential qualification –

no expat voting) but 16/17 year olds able to vote – Simple majority

The question – first attempt First attempt in 2010 draft referendum bill involved

two questions: 1. The Scottish Parliament should have its financial powers and

responsibilities extended as recommended by the Commission on Scottish Devolution.Do you agree with this proposal? [Yes/no]

2. The Scottish Government proposes that, in addition to the extension of the powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament set out in Proposal 1, the Parliament’s powers should also be extended to enable independence to be achieved.Do you agree with this proposal? [Yes/no]

The question as approved by Electoral Commission

Should Scotland be an independent country?[Yes/no]

Not much room for ambiguity • But no mention of being ‘outside’ or separate

from the United Kingdom • Or of statehood (since Scotland is a ‘country’,

even within the United Kingdom

Constitutional Preferences In Scotland, 1997-2010

Who ought to have the most say over how Scotland is run? (%)

Who has the most say over how Scotland is run? (%)

Referendum strategies: Yes side• The SNP did well in 2007 and 2011 by splitting a vote

for the party from a vote for independence: – its constitutional position was its least popular policy

• Expanding the ‘Overton window’ of what people could conceive

• And moving from ‘could’ to ‘should’ to ‘must’ • Target of traditionally Labour, (ex) working class voters • Grassroots strategy: local meetings and engagement – Lots of ‘ginger groups’ – Women for Yes, Business for Yes,

etc– Relationship between Yes Scotland, the SNP and ‘Radical

Independence’ movement

Referendum strategies: No side• Divided campaign: ‘Better Together’ coalition of three

parties, animosity between them • Initial determination to draw clear distinction between

‘Union’ and ‘separation’ – ‘excluded middle’ strategy– Inherent in a Yes/No choice between two options, neither of

which was what voters most wanted – Reluctance to talk positively especially about ‘more powers’– Negative strategy was one thing they could agree on

• Problems with grass roots organisation – Danger for Labour activists of working alongside Tories – Bureaucracy/top heavy

• Ended up with mediatised campaign • ‘More powers’ offers appeared late in the day, therefore

seemed reluctant, half-hearted, made under pressure

Role of UK Government • Largely played the game ‘straight’ (Michael Moore’s

influence?) • Respecting mandate for referendum • ‘Scotland Analysis’ programme: informing debate

about status quo and its advantages (and what would be lost with Yes vote)

• No ‘pre-negotiation’ of independence • But did take sterling currency union off the table • No preparation for Yes vote

Key events in the campaign• Theatre of the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’, October 2012 • Passage of Referendum bill, mid-2013, passed

November 2013 • Scotland’s Future white paper, published November

2013 • Chancellor’s announcement on currency union,

February 2014 • TV debates between campaign leaders (A Salmond and

A Darling) – 5 and 25 August• Poll: 18 September 2014

The result

Turnout: 84.59 per cent (and boosted by late registrations)

Yes 2,001,926 55.3%

No 1,617,989 44.7%

Where they voted

Who voted Yes Yes voters were: • More male than female • More in age groups 25-34 (and majority in 34-44, 44-54) – older

voters were strongly No • SNP, Labour, or Lib Dem voters – not Conservatives

– But 10% of SNP voters voted No! • More likely to have decided how to vote in closing stages of

campaign – No voters more likely to have decided a year ago • Yes voters influenced by the NHS, disenchantment with

Westminster politics • No voters influenced by keeping the pound, pensions, defence • Yes voters 3 points happier to tell people how they voted than

No voters • Yes voters much more likely to think issue only resolved for 5

years – No voters for much longer

How No won • The referendum was No’s to lose. They came quite close

to doing so. • Pushing the ‘negative side’ of independence appears to

have swung undecided voters their way as well as consolidating core vote.

• Also benefitted from ‘quiet Nos’ who didn’t want to talk about it (note late polls all gave No 53%, were 2 points out)

• No positive story: the positive one of ‘more devolution’ came in late, in way that made it easy to doubt credibility

• Had little answer to the late Yes surge, built on long-term grassroots ground-work, and different ideas about the sort of society Scotland should be

How Yes lost• Yes did well in the (ex-) industrial West of Scotland

(Glasgow and surroundings), but not well enough – Yes did poorly in the SNP heartland areas of NE Scotland

• Yes voters were ‘traditional Labour’ types, many disenchanted, many with little stake in status quo (no mortgages, savings, pensions) – Campaign lines about the welfare state particularly resonant

with these voters – Many keen to say ‘I’m not a nationalist but I’m voting Yes’

• BUT Yes fell into trap of believing their own energy, activity and ‘mood’ were enough – deceived much of commentariat as well

• Also believed 4-point lead in private polling just before the poll

‘More devolution’ • Greater self-government within UK clear preference of

plurality (often majority) of Scottish voters in run-up to referendum

• Always unclear what that meant in terms of powers: Scottish Govt already responsible for c. 65% of public spending in Scotland

• But focus on taxation and welfare – C. 60 per cent of voters thought these should be devolved –

around same levels as health and education – SG funded by block grant from Westminster, minimal tax

powers – No welfare competence – including spending power

‘Devo Max’• What the SNP was really seeking? – Set out most clearly in Scottish Govt 2009 white paper Your

Scotland Your Choice• Devolution of all non-sovereign functions: everything

but defence, foreign affairs, currency and macro-economy

• Implies full fiscal autonomy: Scottish Parliament respon-sible for setting and collecting all taxes in/for Scotland – End to UK welfare state – Tax competition?

• What sort of a Union is one Scotland largely opts out of?

- Immigration? - Business & financial regulation?

- EU matters? - Pensions?

Delivering ‘more devolution’• First steps through Calman Commission (2009) and

Scotland Act 2012 – Devolution of 10 points of personal income tax, same rate on

all three bands (‘fiscal accountability’ – not about autonomy)– Due to take effect April 2016 – Plus two land taxes, on transactions and waste disposals to

landfill – from April 2015 – No welfare devolution, minor changes to other functions

• ‘Devo Plus’ (linked to Reform Scotland) • Institute for Public Policy Research’s ‘Devo More’

project • 3 party commissions: Lib Dem reported Oct 2012,

Labour interim report April 2013, final March 2014, Conservatives May 2014

The key Devo More proposals• Intended to be union-reinforcing, not destabilising, and

to work for Wales and N Ireland too if they wish • Aim also to eliminate blame-shifting to Westminster • Taxation:

– Devolve all personal income tax – Assign 10 points (of 20) of VAT – Alcohol and tobacco duties? – Employers’ National Insurance contributions?? (payroll tax)

• Welfare: – Devolve Housing Benefit (problems with Universal Credit – Attendance Allowance (overlap with personal social services) – Operation of Work Programme (active labour market

programme: but not out-of-work benefits) – Power to supplement UK-level welfare (spending power)

‘More devolution’ and the parties• Lib Dems: – Devolve all personal income tax save personal allowance – Assign corporation tax revenues – No welfare devolution

• Labour– Increase devolution of income tax from 10 to 15 points – Upward but not downward differential increases of top rates – Preserve Barnett formula – Devolve Housing Benefit, Attendance Allowance, operation of

Work Programme • Conservatives – Devolve all personal income tax save personal allowance – Assign proportion of VAT revenues – Devolve HB, AA, power to supplement UK-level welfare

What happens next? Scottish politics I

A bright future for the SNP • Did well in 2007 and 2011 despite unpopularity of

independence. – Success through valence politics verging on catch-all party

• Yes campaign connected to a large number of voters traditionally hostile to SNP. – Independence now more popular than SNP – was other way

round. • Huge membership surge post-referendum – Much energy came from outside SNP – Radical

Independence/Commonweal movement

What happens next? Scottish politics II

• SNP can now reposition itself as broad party of the (centre) left – Though that will weaken its appeal to centre and right – How much to the left? Impact of new members

• Still most impressive party of government • But must find a compelling constitutional position – Devo max arguments might have appeal especially if more-

devo promises aren’t delivered Lib Dems: • Likely to lose votes but not many Westminster seats – What happens when those voters look for a new party?

• And already down to core vote for Holyrood

What happens next? Scottish politics III

Not good for Scottish Labour • Already weak in membership (c. 15,000), organisation,

ideas, leadership • Convoluted, complicated and limited more-devo

platform (‘devo nano’) • Now likely to lose large numbers of votes to SNP • Weakening it at both Westminster and Holyrood – And GB-Labour depends on S-Lab to bolster its Westminster

position; what happens if it goes down to 25 Scottish MPs (from 40)?

What happens next? Scottish politics IV

Better outlook for Conservatives • Strongest and most coherent more-devo programme • Effective leadership • Possibility of becoming strongest pro-Union party if

Labour collapse? – But how to attract centrist votes? ‘Unionists’ (protestants)

did that when religion was a major cleavage. It now isn’t. • Willing to move to centre ground? • How could Tories form/enter government? Alliances

with both Labour and SNP very problematic.

What happens next? Constitutional processes and debates Step 1: the Smith Commission • Membership from 5 main parties in Scottish Parliament • To come up with ‘heads of agreement’ by end November for

more devolution • Draft clauses by 25 January 2015 • Inclusion in 2015 UK General Election manifestoes (electoral

mandate), bill from new government • The first time ever that all parties have been engaged in the

same process with the same remit • What position/role will SNP play? • Scottish Parliament will need to consent to any bill. When?

How will it vote?

What happens next? Constitutional processes II

Step 2: Cabinet committee on devolution • Despite name, concerned with ‘English votes for English

laws’ at Westminster • Announced by Cameron as part of post-devolution

package on more powers for Scotland • Supposed to work to same timescale as ‘more powers’

(but needs to deliver actual change by April 2015 – not just draft clauses – to handicap a possible Labour govt)

• A Conservative issue opposed by Labour, limited support from Lib Dems

• Intended for ‘English lobby’ on Tory back benches, and to outflank UKIP

What happens next? Constitutional processes III

Step 2: Cabinet committee on devolution cont’d • But English are unhappy and something needs to be done • EVEL not straightforward technically (what’s an ‘English

law’? Financial implications given how Barnett works?) • And governability issues if there are different majorities in

England and Great Britain as a whole • There are essentially two variants of EVEL

– ‘Soft’: English MPs only voting, at certain stages – e.g. committee or report stage

– ‘Hard’: English MPs only voting on all stages of legislation relating only to England – including 2nd and 3rd reading

• Both Conservative policy (Clarke Democracy Task Force) and McKay Commission recommended ‘soft’ version.

What happens next? Constitutional processes IV

Step 3: Wales bill • Currently before Parliament • Measure of fiscal devolution for Wales, like Scotland

Act 2012 • Controversy over lockstep, to be removed in Lords

Cttee stage• Question of what happens to Silk Commission Part 2

recommendations – notably devolution of policing, energy schemes

What happens next? Constitutional processes V

Step 4: Northern Ireland• Recognition of past/flags/parades: lack of progress

through Haass. • Rows over welfare reform • Corporation tax devolution – still under debate Step 5: A constitutional convention • Long advocated by Welsh First Minister and other Welsh

interests, Commons PCR Cttee • Now adopted by UK-level Labour • Problematic: remit, timescale, composition, mandate? • At best could be stalling tactic; at worst, break up in

disarray

A sort-of federal future for the UK?• For Scotland and Wales, the ‘self-rule’ side of a federal

system is conceivable and not that far off • For N Ireland, it’s harder because of the consociational

elements of the Belfast Agreement, and role of UK and Irish Govts in assuring that

• England is a major obstacle to any moves toward federalism – Symmetrical regionalism has no popular support – But England is so big as a whole it would distort, perhaps

destroy any federal system • The ‘shared rule’ side is even more difficult: – Lords reform has to be a key part – And also implies changes to role of the Commons, the UK

Cabinet and civil service that have been avoided so far

Some conclusions • The UK has plunged itself into a new era of

constitutional mega-politics • The problems are made worse by – General disenchantment with Westminster – The way Scottish politics is changing: high levels of

debate, engagement and expectation – The relative unfamiliarity with constitutional politics

of Westminster politicians – Their unstrategic approach: both in sense of being

concerned with short-term tactics and party advantage

– And failure to take a UK-wide view

Some conclusions II• Cameron has made this messier and more complex by

putting England, and EVEL, on the table as well – Blatantly party-political, in way most of UK Govt

devolution/ referendum policy under the Coalition has not been

– Antagonism between Labour & Conservatives makes any deal very hard to achieve

• The ‘Scottish issue’ is likely to come back – particularly if there is a referendum on EU membership – Dream scenario for SNP: England votes against,

Scotland votes for, SNP in govt and holds referendum to leave one Union in order to stay in the other

Read more on the Devolution Matters blog:

http://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/