The Second Lebanon War - Strategic Perspectives

The Second Lebanon War:Strategic Perspectives

InstituteforNationalSecurityStudies

TheInstituteforNationalSecurityStudies(INSS),incorporatingtheJaffeeCenterforStrategicStudiesatTelAvivUniversity,wasfoundedin2006.

The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is, first, to conduct basic research thatmeets thehighest academic standards onmattersrelatedtoIsrael’snationalsecurityaswellasMiddleEastregionalandinternationalsecurityaffairs.Second,theInstitute aimstocontributetothepublicdebateandgovernmentaldeliberationofissuesthatare–orshouldbe–atthetopofIsrael’snationalsecurityagenda.

INSSseeks to address the strategiccommunity in Israel andabroad,Israelipolicymakers,andopinion-makers,andthegeneralpublic.

INSSpublishesresearchthatitdeemsworthyofpublicattention,whileitmaintainsastrictpolicyofnon-partisanshiponissuesofpublicpolicy.Theopinionsexpressedinthispublicationaretheauthors’alone,anddonotnecessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff,ortheorganizationandindividualsthatsupportitsresearch.

The Second Lebanon War:Strategic Perspectives

Edited byShlomo Brom and Meir Elran

מלחמת לבנון השנייה:השלכות אסטרטגיות

עורכים:שלמה ברום ומאיר אלרן

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Contents

Introduction 7

Part I: Israeli Dimensions

Chapter1: Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerilla OrganizationShlomoBrom 13

Chapter2: The Decision Making Process in IsraelGioraEiland 25

Chapter3: Deterrence and its LimitationsYairEvron 35

Chapter4: A Test of Rival Strategies: Two Ships Passing in the NightGiora Romm 49

Chapter5: The Military Campaign in LebanonGabrielSiboni 61

Chapter6: Intelligence in the War: Observations and InsightsAharonZe’eviFarkash 77

Chapter7: Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon WarYehudaBenMeir 87

Chapter8: The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon WarMeirElran 103

Part II: Regional Dimensions

Chapter9: “Divine Victory” and Earthly Failures: Was the War Really a Victory for Hizbollah? YoramSchweitzer 123

Chapter10:The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the WarEyalZisser 135

Chapter11: After the War: Iranian Power and its LimitationsDavidMenashri 151

Chapter12:July-August Heat: The Israeli-Palestinian ArenaAnatKurz 163

Chapter13:The Regional Setting: Statehood vs. AnarchyAsherSusser 175

Chapter14:Regional Implications: From Radicalism to ReformYossiKuperwasser 187

Chapter15:The Impact of the War on Arab Security ConceptsEphraimKam 197

Chapter16:The International Dimension: Why So Few Constraints on Israel?MarkA.Heller 209

Appendices

1: Shab’a FarmsAmosGilboa 215

2: Observations on Hizbollah WeaponryYiftahShapir 223

3: UN Security Council Resolution 1701, August 11, 2006 233

Contributors 238

Introduction

The Second Lebanon War embodied a type of military confrontationdifferentfromthemanyotherclashesthatIsraelhasengagedinsinceitsestablishment.Thisconfrontationbelongstothecategoryofasymmetricalwars involving rival entities endowed with inherently different andunbalancedattributes.Inthe2006Lebanonwar,Israel,asovereignstatewithastrong,organizedmilitary,facedHizbollah,asub-stateorganizationthat operated from within a failed state while controlling a relativelysmallguerillaforce.Sizenotwithstanding,theforceboastedconsiderablemilitary abilities and was well deployed for this type of confrontation.Hizbollah presented Israel with a stiff challenge that, built on years ofpainstaking preparation and close Iranian support, displayed a strategicconceptthatmaximizeditsabilitiesandcompensatedforitsweaknessesinthefaceofastrongerrival.Althoughinthiskindofconfrontationitisdifficult to identify victor or victory definitively, it is clear that in view of theexpectations,theperceptioninIsrael,theArabworld,andtheglobalcommunityisthatHizbollahscoredprominentandtangibleachievements,whileIsraelemergedfromtheconfrontationbruisedanddisappointed.

Beyond the military aspect, the war between Israel and Hizbollahreflected a number of strategic processes essential to understanding the general regionalpicture: the strengtheningof Islamic radicalismand itsevolutionintoanactiveanti-statusquopower;theweakeningoftheArabstates;thegrowthofnon-stateactorsthatexploittheweaknessofthestatesystem; and the difficulties faced by the international community, led by theUnitedStates,incopingwiththeseprocesses.

Among the Israeli public, the Second Lebanon War was grasped asaneventwithcrisisproportions,and thewarand its resultsarestill thesubjectofintensepublicdebate.Fundamentalquestionsrevolvearoundtheweaknessesofhighleveldecisionmakingexposedinthewar,civil-military

� I Introduction

relations,theroleoftheIDFinIsraelisociety,thetransformationofthehome front into a battlefield, and Israel’s approach to regional processes. Israel’smanagementofthewar,bothonamilitaryandapoliticallevel,hasyet to be judged definitively by the final report of the Winograd Commission, thegovernment-appointedinvestigativecommitteemandatedtostudythe2006 conflict. The Commission is due to release its full report by the end of 2007, yet the findings that have been published thus far, particularly in the commission’spartialreportreleasedinApril,shedincriminatinglightonvariousaspectsofIsrael’sconduct.Thisperspectiveissharedbyanumberofbooksonthewar.

The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives explores variousdimensions to the confrontation initiated by Israel on July 12, 2006 inresponse to Hizbollah provocation.The war received an unprecedentedamountofmediaexposureinrealtime,largelybecausethemediahascometoassumeastrategicroleinmoderndaywars.Thepresentcollectionofessays,however,adoptsadifferentstancefromothercoverageandoffersastrategicoverviewofthewar.Itprovidesananalyticalandconceptualviewofthewar,onthebasisofwhichrelevantconclusionscanbedrawnonthenationallevel.Theessayscompiledheredelveintodifferentaspectsof thewar: itsbackground, its implications,and the lessons thatcanbeinferred.Theessaysdonottelltheactualstoryofthewar.Theyare,rather,anacademicattempttoexplaintherationalesandforcesunderlyingthisviolent clash, with a clear focus on the strategic perspective. Significantly, someoftheessayspublishedherepositconclusionsandperspectivesthatdonottallyentirelywiththepartylineassessmentsofvariousaspectsofthewar.

Part I of this collection examines internal Israeli perspectives andcomprisesthreesetsofessays.Theopeningsetstudiesstrategicdimensionsthatunderlaythewar.ShlomoBromviewsthewarasamodelofalimitedconfrontationwithanon-stateactoroperatingfromwithinafailedstate,and notes the ensuing difficulty in defining – and achieving – political and militaryobjectivesinthistypeofconfrontation.Intheessaythatfollows,GioraEilandlooksatthedecisionmakingsysteminIsraelandsuggestshow inadequate civil-military relations and lapses in the inter-echelondynamicsledtofailuresinthewaythewarwaswaged.YairEvronthenoffersanin-depthanalysisoftheimpactofthewaronIsraelideterrence

Introduction I �

anddrawsunorthodoxconclusionsthatdepartfromthepopulartendencyto extract hasty, conventional assessments from a military campaigninvolvingIsrael.

ThesecondsetofessaysdwellsonmilitaryaspectsofthewarfromtheIsraelistandpoint.GioraRommexaminessomeoftheleadingoperationalapproaches in Israel that impacted on how the war started and theircontribution to the achievements and failures of the war. His principalargumentisthatthewarrevealedadversarieswithrivalstrategiesthatdidnotintersectduringthewar.Inhisessay,GabrielSibonifocusesonanareathatbecameamaintargetofcriticismduringthewar–theIDF’sgroundforces and their performance against Hizbollah.Aharon Ze’evi FarkashthenlooksattheroleofIsraeliintelligenceduringthewaronastrategicand tactical level, and claims significant achievements in the former area, which contrast with deficiencies in the latter.

Inthiswar,thecivilianfrontplayedacentralrole,andthethirdsetofessaysaddressesthisarena.YehudaBenMeirpresentsthedevelopmentofpublicopinionduringthewar,itsimpactontheprogressofthewar,anditsattitudesafterthewar.MeirElranexaminesthecivilianfront,whichwasHizbollah’sprincipaltargetofthewar,anddrawssystem-wideconclusions,bothwithregardtotherobustnessoftheIsraelipublicandtheperformanceofthehomefrontdefensesystems.

Part IIof thiscollectionexamines regionalandglobalaspectsof thewar. The first set of essays in this section includes four essays about main regional actors that took part directly or indirectly in the confrontationand were affected by it and its ramifications. Yoram Schweitzer analyzes Hizbollah’sbalancesheetandsuggeststhatitspost-warminuscolumnisquiteextensive.InhisessayEyalZisserexaminesthewarinthecontextoflong term processes in Syria and Lebanon, and considers the ramifications of thewar forLebanonandSyria in their interactionwith Israel.DavidMensharianalyzestheroleplayedbyIraninthewaraspartoftheprocesswhereby Iran has become a dominant actor in the region. Finally,AnatKurzcontendsthatthedevelopmentsintheIsraeli-Palestinianweredrivenbytheirownindependentdynamic,andwerenotafunctionofthewarinLebanon.

Thesecondsetofessays in thissectionaddresses thewider regionalimplications of the war, which far exceeded the states that participated

10 I Introduction

directlyintheconfrontation.AsherSussersketchesapanoramicpictureoftheMiddleEast,andplacesthewarinthewidercontextoftheprevailingregional trends. Yossi Kuperwasser ties the war to the problematicquestionoftheArabstateasaresponsiblepoliticalelement.EphraimKamassesses the possible impact of the war on theArab security doctrinesanddifferentiatesbetweenthepublicperceptionsofthewarontheArabstreet,andtheimpactofthewarontheArabdefenseestablishmentsandthe ensuing conduct of the Arab states. The final essay of Part II, by Mark Heller,analyzestheinvolvementoftheinternationalcommunityinthewarandtherelativefreedomofactionitgrantedIsraelduringtheweeksoftheconfrontation.

Three appendices complete the collection of essays. The first, written by Amos Gilboa, tells the fascinating story of Shab’a Farms, cast byHizbollah as a main reason for the continued conflict with Israel. In the second appendix,Yiftah Shapir reviews the rocketry and other weaponsystemsusedbyHizbollahinthewarthatprovedthemaincomponentofitsoperationalcapability.ThethirdappendixisSecurityCouncilresolution1701,whichwasadoptedattheendofthewar.

Most of the essays presented here were written by members of theresearchstaffoftheInstituteforNationalSecurityStudies(INSS);otherswerewrittenbyleadingacademicexperts.INSSengagesinpracticalandtheoretical research on strategic issues, aiming to contribute to Israel’spublicdebateandoffer recommendationsforpolicymakers.Predictably,then, thispublicationbearsasimilarnature: itcombinesanalysesof thewar’sstrategicissueswithinsightsthatcanserveasabasisfordiscussionandfuturethinkingontheprocessesthataretakingshapeinIsraelandtheregion–andIsrael’sroleintheselatterprocesses.ThisideaisbasedontheassumptionthatasintheSecondLebanonWar,inthefuturetoo,Israelandits policies will play a crucial role in defining the contours, topography, andreliefoftheregionalmap.

Part I

Israeli Dimensions

Chapter I

Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerilla Organization

Shlomo Brom

The discrepancy between expectations and reality led to the strongsense of disappointment and frustration that was evident in the Israelipublic following the war in Lebanon.At the start of the war there wasan expectation,nurturedby thepolitical leadership, that the IDFwoulddefeatHizbollahandrescuethehostages;theaimofdisarmingHizbollahwaspresentedasa realisticobjective.1Theexpectationsoutlinedby theIsraelileadershipweresharedbypartiesintheWest,particularlytheUSadministration, which viewed the war both as an opportunity to settleaccountswithoneofthepartiespositionedonthe“axisofevil”andasabattleinthewaroninternationalterror.However,thewarcontinuedforoveronemonth,anduptothelastdayofthewarHizbollahcontinuedtolaunchalargenumberofrocketstowardspopulationcentersinthenorthofIsrael.Moreover,attheendofthewaritwasclearthattheorganizationwas still standing and would not be disarmed, certainly not as a directresultofthewar.TheensuingsenseofdissatisfactioninIsraelandotherinterestedpartiesrangedfromageneralundercurrentofmalaisetopublicexpressionsofdisappointment.2

Yet in a sense, the disappointment was inherently misplaced, as itseems that the expectations and the post-war reactions resulted from abasicmisunderstandingofthespecialnatureofthewartheIDFwagedinLebanon:alimitedwarofastateagainstanon-stateactoroperatingfromtheterritoryofafailedstatethatdoesnotcontrolitsownterritory.Thenon-stateplayerfoughtasaguerillaforce,thoughinsomeareasitpossessed

14 I Shlomo Brom

state-like capabilities, acquired from supporting states. For example,Hizbollahhadvariouskindsofguidedmissiles:anti-tank,anti-aircraft,andland-to-seamissilesaswellasassaultUAVs,andhadtheabilitytostrikedeepinIsrael’shomefront. InrecentyearsIsraelhasalreadyfacedthismodelofstrugglewithnon-stateactors,albeitinlesspressingconditions,in its confrontationwith thePalestinians.Thismodelwasappliedmoredramaticallyandextensively in theSecondLebanonWar,andofferedabetterunderstandingofitspotentialimplications.Suchanunderstandingmay help formulate a realistic definition of war objectives, and achieve betterpreparationforaconfrontationofthissortandimprovedmanagementofthewar.Asaresult,futuregapsbetweenexpectationsandrealitymaybenarrowed,therebydiminishingtheforeignpolicyanddomesticpoliticalramifications of such gaps.

Fighting a Guerilla Organization

Hizbollah operated its military power in Lebanon as a guerilla forceembeddedwithinacivilianpopulation,anditusedthelocalpopulationasahumanshield.Hizbollah’scommandpositionswereestablishedinbunkersbuilt underneath residential buildings in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut.The localandregionalheadquarterswere likewise located inresidentialbuildingsintownsandvillagesinsouthernLebanon,andlargequantitiesofweapons,includingshortrangerockets,weredispersedinvillagesandtownsinthearea.HizbollahalsoutilizedthetopographyandvegetationcoverofsouthernLebanontobuildasystemofbunkersandtunnelswhereitstoredmunitions,labeled“naturereserves”bytheIDF.

Itisveryimportantthataguerillaforcepreserveasupportivecivilianenvironmentas itsmainasset. It is importantprimarily fromapoliticalviewpoint insofaras themilitaryforceservesapoliticalmovement– inthis case, Hizbollah, which has defined political objectives. However, theimportancealsostemsfromthemilitaryviewpoint,assupportofthepopulationprovidesitwithfreedomofaction,orinanimageusedbyMaoTse-tung: these are the waters in which the fish (i.e., the guerilla force) swim.3

Hizbollah’soperationalprincipleasaguerillaforceisalsobasedonitsawarenessofthesuperiorityofIsrael’smilitaryforce,anditsunderstanding

Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerilla Organization I 15

thatinanydirectconfrontationitwilleventuallybedefeated.Thus,whenitencounters a stronger enemy, it disperses and finds cover within a civilian populationorinanaturalenvironmenttoallowittore-emergeandstrikeatitsenemyundermoreconvenientconditions.Theguerillaforceisnotmeanttodefeatthestatemilitaryforce.Itsaimistosurviveandcontinuestriking its enemy at painful points, thereby generating a perception offailure by the enemy. This is achieved by various methods, includingintelligentuseofthemedia.

In warfare with a guerilla foe, traditional concepts relating toconventional wars between state armies lose their original significance. Of major importance is the perception of concepts such as victory anddefeat.Inclassicalwarsdefeatinganenemydoesnotmeanthephysicaldestructionofallitsmilitaryforce,orevenmostofit.Defeatofarivalisachieved when the enemy loses its will to fight because it has arrived at the conclusion that it will not gain anything from continuing to fight and the price it will pay for fighting will increase. In a war between states, this kindof victory is achievedbydestroying themilitary assets of theenemy through firepower and by maneuvering to bring the enemy to a positionwherebyitrealizesitisunabletocontinue,orbyexactingahighprice from the enemy. The costs can be reflected in occupying territory or damagingstrategicassets,forexample,nationalinfrastructure.

However, it is particularly difficult using only military means to bring a guerilla force to the point where it loses its will to fight, and it is clearly impossibletoachievethisthroughashortmilitarycampaign.Thisisevenmoreproblematicwhentheguerillaforcedoesnotoperatefromtheterritoryof the state against which it is fighting, but uses the territory of a failed state asaplatformforcarryingoutattacksonaneighboringstate.Ontheonehand,theforcecannotbepushedintodecisivebattlesthatwouldresultinits losing its ability to operate and continue inflicting damage in sensitive areas,anditwillprefertovanishintothecivilianenvironmentwhereitcanconsolidateandpreserveitsstrength.Ontheotherhand,theguerillaforcedoesnothavetheresponsibilityofastate,andthusdamagingthestate’sstrategicinfrastructuredoesnotcausetheorganizationtoloseitswilltofight. It is the state, helpless against the guerilla force and unable to restrain it, that suffers from these strikes. Inflicting damage on state assets can oftenevenhelptheguerillaorganizationgainmoresupportfromthepublic

16 I Shlomo Brom

by creating the image that the rival military is incapable of contendingwith it, and as an alternative it inflicts damage on an innocent civilian population.Suchanargument,ifacceptedbythepopulationthatsuffersthe damage, can even serve as further leverage for achieving politicalpowerandpopularsupport.

Nor does seizing territory bring about a loss of will to fight. Here too, conquering territory often increases a will to fight, as the war then becomes a struggle against the occupying force and a fight for national liberation. A goodexampleofthisistheAmericaninterventioninIraq:Iraq’smilitaryforcewasdefeatedwithrelativeeasebytheUSmilitary,butwhenthewarbecameawarofliberationfromaforeignoccupier,theIraqiinsurgencywasabletowageandsustaineffectiveguerillawarfareagainstthelargeandpowerfulAmericanarmedforces.4Inthissituation,contendingwitha guerilla force requires a long term presence in the occupied territoryanddemandsahighpriceof theoccupier in termsof image,aswellascasualtiesandmilitaryandpoliticalresources.Insuchcasestoo,adecisiveendisattained,ifatall,notthroughpuremilitarymeansbutmainlythroughnon-militarymeansdesignedtosevertheguerillaforcefromitssupportivecivilian host environment. It is no wonder, therefore, that in Iraq too– whose sectarian society, divided into rival communities, is similar tothat of Lebanon – the US has invested significant efforts in reconstruction effortsandactionsonapoliticallevelalongsidethemilitaryeffort.

ModerntechnologycanaffordadvancedarmedforcessuchastheIDFtheabilitytodefeatregularenemymilitarieswithrelativelyfewcasualties.Ontheotherhand,italsoprovidestheguerillaforce–andparticularlyifitenjoysextensivesupportfrompatronstatesthatprovideitwithfunding,arms, and training – with an ability to strike at its adversary in painfulplaces. This is primarily reflected in portable weapon systems, such as advanced anti-tank arms that can be used effectively against moderntanks,androcketsthatofferthepossibilityofhittingpopulatedareasfromsignificant ranges. Since technology offers the ability to operate also at lowsignature,guerillaunitsareable toavoiddirectconfrontationswiththeregulararmy,whichlimitstheirvulnerabilitytotheenemy’ssuperiortechnologicalabilities.


Formulating Objectives

The conclusion here is that in a war such as the short campaign inLebanon,itwaswrongfromtheoutsettoadopttheunrealisticobjectiveofdefeatingHizbollahbydestroyingitsmilitarycapabilityanddisarmingit.TherealisticobjectiveoftheshorttermconfrontationshouldhavebeentocontainHizbollah,inotherwordstocreateasituationinwhichitsabilityto harm Israel would be significantly reduced. From the start, it should havebeenrecognizedthatatissuewasaguerillaforceactingfromwithinaneighboringfailedstate.Engaginginawarofthisnatureisverymuchlike treating a chronic ailment that cannot be cured definitively, though manyofthesymptomscanbetreated.Asituationcanbereachedwherebythepatientcarriesonasusualhopingthatinthelongterm,acurefortheailmentwillbefound–inthecontextathand,primarilyifandwhenthepoliticalsituationchanges.

Inmanycases,thesuppressionofguerillaorganizationsisaresultofpoliticalprocessesthataddresstherootcausesoftheiractivity.Therefore,inthelongterm,warsagainstguerillaorganizationsaredesignedtoallowandevenhelpthedevelopmentofpoliticalprocessesthatwilladdresstheroot causes. There is a connection between the definition of appropriate objectives in the short term and the long term objective. Containing a guerilla organizationgeneratesasituationinwhichtheorganizationmaygradually understand that it is unable to achieve its objectives throughmilitary means, as its rival can accommodate and adjust to them. Thisrecognitionoccasionallyleadstoasearchforotherwaystocontendwiththe problems that generated the military action in the first place.

InthecaseofHizbollahtherootcausesthatenableittooperateareontheonehand,theweaknessofLebanonasastateduetothesectarianstructureandtheresultingpoliticalsystem,andontheotherhandtheexploitationofthisweaknessbycountrieswithadifferentagendathanLebanon’sthatoperateforcesinLebanonthatservetheirparticularinterests.Beforethewar,theLebanesepoliticalsystemwasundergoingaprocessthataimedtoreformthepoliticalsystemanderadicateinterventionbyforeigncountries.InconductingthewarIsraelshouldhavesetouttoencourageratherthandisturbthecontinueddevelopmentofthisprocess,whichwasapositiveoneasfarasitsowninterestswereconcerned.

1� I Shlomo Brom

One approach to achieving this objective was to avoid directconfrontationwithHizbollahinLebanonwhiletryingtopunishthestatesthatcultivatetheorganizationthroughmilitarymeansorpoliticalmeans,oracombinationofthetwo.ThoughIsraelhasdonethisinthepast,theIsraeligovernment this timeoptedagainst thisalternative,notbelievingitwouldbeadequate,duetotheapparentlimitedabilityofBasharAsad’sregime to influence Hizbollah after the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. It is alsopossible that Israel didnotwant to expand thewar.Bashar’s willingness to take risks, as reflected in part by his policy of tauntingtheUnitedStates,suggeststhattheexertionofeffectivepressureonhimrequiresextensivemilitaryaction,withclear risksofescalation.Afterthispossibilitywasrejected,theonlyalternativesleftwererefrainingfromaresponseoradirectconfrontationwithHizbollah.

DuetothecomplexityofthecampaigninLebanon,itwaspossibletoadvanceIsrael’sinterestsonlybyacombinationofmilitaryandpoliticalmeansandnotbymilitaryforceonly.Thiscombinationinvolvespayingapriceasthepoliticalmeansgenerallyimposerestrictionsonexercisingmilitaryforceand,occasionally, themilitaryforceoperates inamannerthatdoesnotseemoptimalduetopoliticalconstraints.

Accordingtothisapproach,itappearsthattheshorttermobjectiveofcontainingHizbollahcouldbetranslatedintothreesecondaryobjectives:rehabilitatingIsrael’sdeterrencevis-à-visHizbollah;limitingHizbollah’sabilitytodeployinsouthernLebanonandoperateagainstIsraelfromthere;andlimitingitsabilitytobuildupamilitaryforceanywhereinLebanonbyimposingrestrictionsontheprovisionofarmamentsfromthesupportingcountries.Israelcouldtrytoachievethethreeobjectivesthroughmilitarymeans, by inflicting a heavy blow on Hizbollah’s forces and exacting a heavy price from it and from the public that supports it, by occupyingsouthern Lebanon and driving Hizbollah out of the region, and also byimposinganongoingblockadeonLebanonandactingforcefullyagainstanyattempt to smugglearms into thecountry.ThepuremilitaryoptionwouldclearlyexactfromIsraelaveryhighcostincasualties,image,andrenewed entanglement in Lebanon. Hizbollah’s use of civilian shieldsmade it very difficult to strike it directly and increased the chance of causingextensivecollateraldamage,whichwouldharmthelegitimacyofIsrael’soperation.Takingover southernLebanon,particularly ridding it

Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerilla Organization I 1�

ofHizbollah,demandsextensive forces,much time,andahighnumberofcasualties.However,thiswasnottheonlyormainproblem.TheIDFwouldhavehadtocontinuecontrollingtheoccupiedterritoryinordertopreventHizbollahfromre-establishingitselfthere.ThismeansthatIsraelwouldhave,onceagain,founditselfinasituationofanoccupyingforcecontrollingahostilepopulationover time,without anend in sight.TheoptionofforcefullypreventingarmssmugglingintoLebanonalsoinvolvesserious difficulties. It is questionable whether it can be implemented by a military force operating from a distance due to the long land bordersbetweenLebanonandSyria.IsraelcertainlycouldnotmaintainagroundpresencealongthesebordersasthiswouldinvolveoccupyingLebanoninits entirety.The international communitywouldnothavepermittedanylong termblockadeofLebanon, a theoretical impossibilityprovenafterthewar.

Theobjectivethatcouldhavebeenachieved–evenpartially–bypurelymilitarymeansandinacampaignsuchastheonethattookplaceinLebanonwasrestoringdeterrence.InthisregardthereisnobetterproofthanthatprovidedbyHizbollah’sleader,Nasrallah,himself,whoadmittedthathadheknownthatkidnappingthesoldierswouldleadtosuchawarhewouldnot haveordered theoperation.5However, this statement acknowledgesoneof themainproblemsofdeterrence,namely, the tendencytofailureduetomiscalculationoftheenemy.Ifrestoringdeterrencewastheonlyobjective, the war could have ended after the first three days of aerial attacks, which inflicted the thrust of the damage on Hizbollah. However, evenafterdeterrencewasrestoreditislikelythatHizbollahwouldagaintesttheboundariesofIsraelideterrencebygradualescalationofitsoperations,aprocessevervulnerabletomistakenassessmentsandcalculations.Onlytheachievementoftheothertwoobjectives,limitingthearmedpresenceofHizbollah in the south and restricting the flow of arms to it, could generate amorerobustmechanismforcontainingtheorganization.

The conclusion is that the objectives that would lead to effectivecontainmentofaHizbollahthatislessvulnerabletocalculatedmistakescould only have been achieved, and even then likely not entirely, bycombiningpoliticalandmilitarymeans,inotherwordsbymotivatingtheLebanesegovernmentandtheinternationalcommunitytotakeactionthatwouldlimitHizbollahovertimeandstrengthenthecentralgovernmentin

20 I Shlomo Brom

Lebanon.SuchactivityincludesthedeploymentoftheLebanesearmyandasupportinginternationalforceinsouthernLebanon,sothattheycontrolthe region and prevent the armed presence of Hizbollah there, togetherwithinternationalsupervisionofLebanon’sborders.Ifthishadbeentheobjectivethemilitarystepswouldhavebeendesignedtoservethepoliticalobjectiveofgalvanizing theLebanesegovernmentand the internationalcommunity,andeverymilitaryoperationwouldbeaddressedinviewoftheimpactontheachievementofthisobjective.

The Need for Political Intervention

ThemainproblemwithconductingthewarinLebanonderivedfromsettingunrealisticobjectivesattheoutsetandcreatingtheillusionthattheywereachievablebymilitarymeansandatalowprice;hencethedecisiontousemainly the air force, which incurs a low casualty rate, and use it to inflict heavy damage on Hizbollah. The first phase of the war was successful inmilitaryterms,butitwasnotclearwhatmechanism,accordingtothethinkingoftheIsraelipoliticalandmilitaryleadership,wassupposedtotranslate thesemilitaryachievements into theambitiousgoals set at thestartof thewar.Was it the thinking thatHizbollahwould succumbandagreetodisarm?Or,possibly,thattheLebanesegovernmentwoulddecidetodisarmHizbollahfollowingthesuccessofthisoperation?Ifso,theseconsiderations were unrealistic; the first because it should have been clear that at the end of the aerial combat, even if Hizbollah sustained heavydamage, the organization would still be on its feet and have the abilitytohitIsrael,particularlythroughshortrangerockets.Second,itwasnotrealisticbecauseofLebanon’sweaknessasasovereignstate.

During the war it gradually became clear to the Israeli leadershipthat more modest – but attainable – goals should be adopted, and thatthe way to achieve them was through the international community andthe Lebanese government. The delay in defining these objectives led to asituationinwhichthewarcontinuedforanother threeweeksafter thefirst phase, without any clear logic how to translate the political aims to militaryobjectives,andtoformulatemilitaryactionthatwouldensuretheattainmentofthemilitaryobjectivesinthemosteffectivewayandatthelowestcost.6


There was misunderstanding in Israel also with regard to the significance oftime.HadIsraeladoptedtheapproachofashortcampaignbasedmainlyontheairforce,withitsobjectivetospurtheinternationalcommunityandLebanontocreateasituationinwhichNasrallahwouldbeboundtoacceptrestrictingdictates,theinitialbasicconceptofthecampaignwouldhavebeenlogical.Itwouldhavebeenpossibletoassumethattheaircampaignwouldachievetheseresults.ItwouldhavebeenlogicaltoassessthatthemainthreatofHizbollahinsuchasituationwasitsabilitytohitcitiesdeepinsideIsraelandthusitwasimportanttoneutralizethisthreat.ThiscouldhavebeenachievedbytheIDF,whichinfactdidsosuccessfully.7Whilein thisscenarioHizbollahwouldhavemaintained itsability to launchalargenumberofshortrangerocketsattargetsinnorthernIsrael,duetotheexpected short duration of the fighting inherent in this approach one could assumethattheIsraelihomefrontwouldhavebeencapableofwithstandingthissortofdisruptionof routine life.Theprolongedcontinuationof thewarchangedthebasicparametersofthesituation.Astatecannottolerateasituationinwhichtheeverydaylifeofitspopulationisdisruptedsobadlyinsuchawideareaandforsolong.IntheabsenceofanothersolutionforstoppingtheshortrangerocketlaunchesitwastobeexpectedthatIsraelwouldbedrawnintoattemptstooccupyterritoryeventhoughitwasclearthatthisdoesnotservethemainandrealisticobjectivesofthewar.Thecontradictionbetweenunderstandingthatgroundoperationsarecostlybutcontributeonlylittletoachievingthewarobjectives,andthepressuretoput a stop to the rocket fire is probably one of the reasons why the ground operationswerepartialanddisjointed,performedhesitantly,andseeminglyasiftheIDFwasdraggedintothemunwittingly.

As to the long term objective of promoting political processes forneutralizingHizbollah insideLebanonwith thehelpof the internationalcommunity, it seems that amilitary campaigncouldhelp, givencertainconditions: first, when it demonstrates to the Lebanese public the heavy priceexactedonce itentrusts its fateanditsdecisionmakingpowers toHizbollah,anorganizationthatalsoservesforeigninterests.Thesecondcondition is when a campaign does not generate a situation wherebythe Lebanese public embraces Hizbollah as the only power capable ofprotecting it from Israeli aggression. The third condition is when thecampaignultimatelylimitsHizbollah’sabilitytoact.

22 I Shlomo Brom

Inorder toachieve theobjectivesof thewar, itwas important in thelongtermthatLebanonpaythepriceasastatewithoutIsraelexceedingthe rulesof international lawand thewarnorms,andwithout the resultbeing prolonged occupation of Lebanese territory that would enableHizbollahtopresentitselfasamovementresistingforeignoccupation.ItseemsthatIsraelmanagedtocomplywiththeseconditions,albeitperhapsunintentionally.The price paid by Lebanon was generally an incidentalresult of military considerations relating to an effort to inflict direct damage onHizbollah,andnottheresultofplanningthatsoughttoexactareasonablepricefromLebanonwithoutexceedingtheaboveconditions.Examplesofthis are the strikes on Lebanon’s transportation infrastructure that weredesignedtolimitthetransferofsuppliesandreinforcementstoHizbollah,thedamagecausedtotheDahiyadistrictofBeirut,whichwasdesignedtohit theHizbollahheadquarters,and themassiveexpulsionofpopulationfromsouthernLebanon,designedtoseparatethecivilianpopulationfromHizbollahandtofacilitateengagingitinwar.

Itis,therefore,highlylikelythateventuallytherealisticobjectiveswereachievedbytheendofthewar,althoughthepartialandbelatedunderstandingoftheseobjectivesapparentlyprolongedthewarunnecessarily,8wherebyafter the first week it was conducted indecisively and with superfluous casualties.AttherootoftheproblemwasalackofunderstandingofthespecialnatureofthewarwiththeHizbollahorganizationandverypartialadjustmenttothechangethatoccurredinthenatureofthewarsinwhichIsraelmaybeinvolvedinthecurrentera.Thischangeislargelytheresultof Israel’s success in achieving conventional military supremacy overthe regular armiesof theneighboringArab states.Asa replacement forconventionalregularmilitariesIsrael’senemiesarelookingforasymmetricalsolutions, and guerilla warfare is one the effective answers to Israel’smilitary superiority. There is particular difficulty with contending with a guerillaforceoperatingfromtheterritoryofafailedstatewhileitenjoysthesupportofforeignstates.ThissituationisnotrareintheMiddleEast,andIsraelmayinthefuturehavetofacesimilarsituationsintheLebaneseandotherarenas.InthisrespectthewarinLebanonwasawake-upcalltoIsraeltodevelopthestrategy,militarydoctrine,andforcesneededtodealwithsuchscenarios.


A major lesson learned from the war in Lebanon is that because ofthe importance of the perception of reality and expectations in wars ofthis type, it is not only the decisions taken that are important but alsotheway they arepresented to thepublic. Itmaybe assumed that a notinconsiderablenumberofpartiesintheIsraeliadministrationunderstoodthatdefeatingHizbollahisnotarealisticwarobjectiveandthatapoliticalexitstrategyisrequiredtoachievetherealisticobjectives.9Nonetheless,theIsraelileadershipchosetopresentthedefeatofHizbollahasarealisticandattainableobjective,whetheritbelievedthiswaspossibleoritthoughtthatthiswastherightwaytoenlistthepublic’ssupport.Thediscrepancythat emerged between the expectations and the reality became a majorinfluence on the development of the campaign. It generated public and mediapressureonthedecisionmakers,whointurnwerepushedtowardproblematicdecisionsduringthecourseofthewar,particularlywithregardtoallaspectsofthegroundoperations.

Notes1. AlufBennandAkivaEldar,“LookingfortheEndgame,”Haaretz,October1,2006.2. See Charles Krauthammer, “Israel’s Lost Moment,” Washington Post, August 4,

2006.3. MaoTse-tung,On Guerrilla Warfare,inMaoistDocumentationProject(2000);Mao

Tse-tungReferenceArchive(marxists.org)2000,http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm.

4. See,forexample,detailsofthedeteriorationofthesecuritysituationinIraqintheperiodicreportoftheUSDefenseDepartmentsubmittedtoCongress,publishedonSeptember1,2006:Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section9010).

5. Yoav Stern, “No Kidnap had I Known Extent of IDF Response, Says Nasrallah,”Haaretz,August28,2006.

6. This was mainly reflected in the numerous ground movements chosen for particular reasonsthatweredetachedfromtheplanningandwidercontext.Anexampleofthisis the decision to take Bint Jbail, deemed significant as the place where Nasrallah had made his “spider web address.” See Amos Harel, “Senior General Staff Officer: The BattleOccurredEarlierthanwe’dPlanned,”Haaretz,August27,2006.

7. Ze’evSchiff,“TheRocketFire:NoChangeinStrategy,”Haaretz,August7,2006.8. See,forexample,adescriptionofthedevelopmentoftheunderstandingofthenature

ofthecampaignbyBennandEldar,“LookingfortheEndgame.”9. BennandEldar,“LookingfortheEndgame.”

Chapter 2

The Decision Making Process in Israel

Giora Eiland

Introduction

The Lebanon War exposed, and not for the first time, severe deficiencies in matters concerned with strategic decision making in Israel, specifically, theconductof thepolitical echelonand the relationshipof thepoliticalleadershipwiththemilitary.Unlikeothermattersandcontrarytopopularopinion, the ability to change the situation and correct these flaws is not conditional on any political price or confrontation with the defenseestablishment. Nor will changing the situation incur an economic ororganizational expense. If this is true, then why does the flawed situation continue? This essay focuses on defining the problem and describing its manifestationsintheSecondLebanonWar,andconcludeswithaproposalonwhatcanbedone.

Defining the Problem

Therearetworeasonsfortheweaknessofthedecisionmakingframeworkin Israel. The first is connected with Israel’s political structure and the secondstemsfromtheprominentabsenceofanorderedsystem.

Israel’selectoralsystemandthemannerinwhichgovernmentsaresetupand then fallcreateapermanent stateofpoliticaluncertainty. InmytwoyearsservingasheadoftheNationalSecurityCouncilduringPrimeMinister Ariel Sharon’s term of office, I can point to a mere three weeks inwhichthecoalitionwasstableandtheviabilityofthegovernmentwasassured.Withinthiskindofreality,aprimeministerspendsmostofhistime

26 I Giora Eiland

tryingtoensurehispoliticalsurvival.Wecanvisualizetheprimeministeras a person not only required to make the most important and difficult ofdecisions,butforceddosowhilebalancingonalog.Clearlymostofhisattentionisfocusedontryingnottofall.Moreover,theministerswhoaresupposedtobehelpingtheprimeministerarealsohisrivals,whetherclosetrivalswhoaremembersofhisparty,oropenrivalswhoareheadsofcompetingparties.Thisphenomenoninducestheprimeministertoadoptthreemodesofconduct:

• Discretion,whichleadsnotonlytocompartmentalization,butalsotoforgoinganyattempttoconductbusinesslikedeliberationsforfearofleaks.

• Preferring considerations of loyalty over other considerations. Forspecific discussions or important political tasks the prime minister will preferanindividualwhoseloyalty(politicalorpersonal)heviewsasbeyondquestionoversomeoneelsewhoisclearlymoreprofessionallyqualified and proficient.

• Preferringthatobligatoryformaldiscussions,governmentalmeetingsforexample,dealonlywithlessimportantissuesorwithmattersthatguarantee broad agreement.This way a semblance of governmentalregularityispreservedwhilealmostallpoliticalriskisavoided.Evenundertheserestrictionsdictatedbythepoliticalstructure,however,

itispossibletoworkdifferently.NahumBarneanoted,correctly,

Whenalltheseallegations[againstthepoliticalsystem]werevoicedafter the Second Lebanon War, they contained no small measureof presumptuousness. Throughout the war Olmert enjoyed totalfreedomofaction:hishandswerenottiedbycoalitionpartners.Theright wing opposition in the Knesset backed him. Public opinionwasbehindhim.Allofthedecisionsreachedwerehisown.Olmertwaslackingfornopowerduringthewar,butrathertheoppositewaslacking:someonewithknowledgeandexperiencewhocouldwarnhimofrashanduntimelydecisions.1

The absence of a proper administrative system in the office of the prime minister manifested itself in two dimensions: the lack of staffand the absence of appropriate processes. Who constitutes the primeminister’s staff? Seemingly it is the government itself. Ministers are in

The Decision Making Process in Israel I 27

chargeofparticularareas,andallbearsharedresponsibility.Inasimplisticanalogytoamilitarybody,onecouldarguethattheprimeministeristhe“commander,” the minister of health is the “medical officer,” the minister of education is the “education officer,” and so on. But clearly this is not the situation.Rather,inthesameanalogy,itwouldbemoreprecisetolikentheprimeministertoadivisioncommanderandhisministerstobrigadecommanders,eachinchargeofaparticularsector.True,theyaregenerallycommitted to the “division” (the government), but surely they do notconstitute the commander’s “staff officers.”

Who,therefore,constitutestheprimeminister’sstaff?Ontheonehand,theprimeministerhasnostaffatall,yetontheother,hehastwopartialstaffs,bothofwhicharehandicapped.One“staff”iscomposedoftheprimeminister’s personal aides, three or four officials in charge of particular areas:amilitarysecretary,apoliticaladvisor,anintelligenceexpert,andoccasionally an additional person, for example, the head of a political-securitybranchunderPrimeMinisterEhudBarak,orDovWeisglass,who,without any formal title or office, advised Prime Minister Sharon on major politicalmatters.

Theadvantageofthisstaffisthatitsmembersareclosetotheprimeminister, from a physical standpoint and also as full partners in hisdeliberations.Thedrawback is that this staff is smaller than abattalionstaff (an operations officer also has operations sergeants). There is no way that three or four individuals, qualified as they might be, can constitute thestrategicheadquartersoftheIsraeligovernment.ThepaceofeventsinIsraelandthecountry’sconstantstateofpoliticaldeliriumcreateasituationinwhichtheprimeministerneedstheseindividualsurgentlyseveraltimeseachday.Theybecomehis“emissaries,”surelyunabletosimultaneouslyconductmethodicalstaffwork.

Thesecond“staff”istheNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC).Itsadvantageliesinitsrelativesizeanditsabilitytoconductmethodicalprocesses.Thedrawback is the inadequateconnectionbetween theNSCand theprimeminister.Moreover,betweenthesetwopartialstaffs,advisorsontheonehandandtheNSContheother,thereisnotenoughcoordination–certainlynoarrangementthatdetermineswhichpersonisinchargeofwhat.Forthatmatter,itwouldbeamistaketothinkitispossibletosplitstaffworkintotwoparts,oneentityinchargeofroutinemattersandtheotherinchargeof

2� I Giora Eiland

workingoninfrastructure.Itwouldalsobemistakentothinkitispossibletodivideuptheworksothatonebodyproducespositionpapersandtheotherisinchargeoftheirimplementation.

Thelackofaviablestaffleadstoasituationwherebasicprocessesarenotconducted.Thereisnoprocedurefortimelysituationassessments.Thenatureofstrategicchangesisthattheyoccurwithinacumulativeprocess.Whenthereisnosysteminplaceforaperiodicmethodicalexaminationof fundamental assumptions, a dangerous opportunity for surprises iscreated.Inaddition,thereisnoprocedureforthesuitablepreparationofdeliberationswiththeprimeminister.Inthebestcase,therightdiscussionisheldwiththerightpeople,andisfocusedontherightissue.Butbeyondthetechnicalconveningofthemeeting,whoistheprimeminister’spersoninchargeofstaffworkpriortothediscussion?Whoconductsapreliminarydiscussionthatcanhelptomaximizethemaindeliberations?Whopreparesalternativesandthencheckstheimplicationsofeach?Theanswerinmostcasesis...noone!TheinstanceswheretheNSChasinitiatedandinsistedonspearheadinganissuearefarmoretheexceptionthantherule.

AgoodexampleofthisconcernsthevillageofRajar.Attheendof2005aworkingmeetingwasheldbetweentheprimeministerandtheheadoftheGeneralSecurityServices(GSS).Duetothesecurityprobleminthevillage(whosenorthernsection,accordingtotheBlueLine,isinLebanonanditssouthernsectioninIsrael),theGSSrecommendedthatIsraelerectawallbetweenthevillage’stwosections.Notonlydidtheprimeministeragree;hewasangryithadn’tyetbeendone,ashehaddecidedonthismeasuretwomonthsprior.Butwhoknewaboutthis?Whowassupposedtomakesurethatothersalsoknew?Whowasresponsibleforimplementation?Bychance,theissuecametotheattentionoftheNSCanditwasdeterminedthaterectingawallinthemiddleofthevillagewouldhavefarreachingimplications. In the legal area, for example, it turned out it would benecessarytochangetheGolanHeightsLawandenactanew“evacuation-compensation”lawor,alternatively,changeIsrael’scitizenshiplaw.Thusstaffworkproved,tothesecuritysystemsaswell,thaterectingawallinthemiddleofthevillagewouldnotbethecorrectaction.Thisisanexampleoftheexceptionthatprovestherule.Andtheruleistherearenorules.

The Decision Making Process in Israel I 2�

Implications

Fouroutcomesresultfromthislackofanappropriatestaffandtheabsenceofmethodologicalsystems.TheycanbeillustratedwiththeexperienceoftheSecondLebanonWar.

The first lapse concerns the lack of alternatives. In the government meetingheldonJuly12,2006,immediatelyafternewsofthekidnappingoftwoIsraelisoldiersbyHizbollah,theIDFpresenteditsrecommendations.Governmentministerswereplacedinasituationwheretheyhadonlytwooptions: either approve or reject the military’s proposal. Non-approvalmeantnotdoinganything,somethingwhichonthatdaywasperceivedasimpossible.Theoutcomewasclear.

Whatshouldhavehappenedatthediscussion?Arepresentativeofthegovernmentstaff–amythicalposition,inIsrael’scurrentreality–shouldhavepresentedthegovernmentwithatleastthreealternatives,namely:

• AnairforceretaliatoryactionaimedatchoiceHizbollahtargets(longrangemissileswhoselocationswerewellknown)andattheLebaneseinfrastructure.Thisactionwouldlast24-48hoursandthenconcludebecause the international communityandHizbollahwouldask for aceasefire. This limited action would neither bring back the kidnapped soldiers nor destroy Hizbollah, but it would punish the aggressor,strengthen deterrence, and probably make it more difficult for the organizationtoactinthefuture.

• A limited war with more numerous objectives, including dealing asevereblowtoHizbollah’smilitarycapability,particularly its rocketlaunchingcapability.Anactionsuchasthisobligesanextensivegroundoperationlastingseveralweeks.

• Astrategicdecisiononalimitedwar,butpostponementofactionuntilalateropportunity,thusallowingthearmyseveralmonthstoprepare.

Ofcoursetherewerenosuchdeliberationsoveralternatives,sincetherewasnoonetoinitiateorpreparethem.

The second lapse concerns the ignoring of reality. The correctmanagementofanybusinessororganizationobligatessetproceduresthatareindependentofisolatedlarge,one-timeevents.Whensuchprocedures,including their review process, are not maintained, the organization/businessfunctionsinasituationwherebyonlycrisesarerespondedto.If

30 I Giora Eiland

thisholdstrueforabusiness,thenitiscertainlyvalidforastate.WhenthegovernmentconvenedatthatsamemeetingonJuly12followingthekidnapping,notoneministerincludingtheprimeministerhadanynotionof the IDF’s level of preparedness.This situation could still have beentoleratedifthegovernmenthadastaffbranchwellversedinthesubject;butnosuchbranchexistsandconsequentlytherewerenoroutineproceduresthatregularlyexaminedtheIDF’slevelofpreparedness.

In March 2003, the IDF finalized its newest multi-year plan (the “Kela” plan).Constructionoftheplanwasbasedpartlyontwoeventsthattranspireda short time earlier. The first was Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002,wheretheIDFreoccupiedthecitiesoftheWestBankandplacedtheMuqatacompoundinRamallahundersiege;despitegravereports(oftheJenin“massacre”andthecollapseofthePalestinianAuthority),theArabworldremainedindifferent.TheconclusionwasthattheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict, severe and crisis-ridden as it might be, does not factor into the Arab states’deliberationsastolaunchingawaragainstIsrael,eitherindividuallyorjointly.ThesecondeventwasthewarinIraqandwithitcamethesensethataslongasthereisastrongAmericanpresenceintheregion,noArabstatewillwanttowagewaragainstIsrael.

The general conclusion was that since there is no entity in theArabworld interested at present in a war with Israel (including Hizbollah!),thenawarthatwoulderuptbetweenIsraelandoneofitsneighborswouldresultfromoneoftwosituations:eithersubsequenttoastrategicchange(achangeofregimeinoneoftheneighboringstates,anAmericanexodusfromIraq,orachangeofsimilarmagnitude),orawarlaunchedbyIsrael.

CommontobothsituationsisthatIsraelwouldhavestrategicwarningofatleastseveralmonths.ThispointbecamecriticalwhentheaverageyearlydefensebudgetstoodataboutNIS2.5billionlessthantheKelaplan’sbasebudget.Inthissituationthemilitaryrightlydecideditwouldbecorrectthatrisk-takingbemainly in theareaofwarpreparedness (inventory levels,technical competence, training levels). Since this area, unlike others, isgiventochangesandimprovementwithinseveralmonthsfromtheissueof awarning, everyonewas convinced that enough lead timewouldbeavailable.Itcanthereforebesaidthatthegovernment’sJuly12decisiontogotowar“surprised”thearmy,asdecisionmakerswerenaturallyunawareoftheabove.


Thethirdimplicationinvolvesthedivisionofresponsibility.Evenwhenthegovernmentconvenesattherighttime,discussestherightissue,andreaches the right decision, “someone” is still needed to translate thosedecisionsintorealactionsanddecidewhodoeswhat.Considerthehomefront, for example. Who held ministerial responsibility for the homefront?Thegovernmentcouldostensiblydecideononeofthreereasonablealternatives:

• TheMinistryoftheInterior:sincethemainonusfordealingwiththehomefront ison theregionalcouncilsand theseareunder theaegisoftheMinistryoftheInterior,itisnaturalfortheministerofthetheinterior to manage this area, with additional functions added to hisauthorities,includingcommandofthehomefront.

• TheMinistryofInternalSecurity:thisisdoublylogical.Wearedealingwith a true problem of internal security (missiles fired on the home front);moreoverthepoliceforce,whichisthemainexecutingbodyinthiscase,isalreadysubjecttotheministerofinternalsecurity.

• The Ministry of Defense: the logic behind this alterative is that theministryhasastaffbody(“Melah”–IsraelEmergencyEconomy),hasalargeorganizationalapparatus,andisinchargeoftheHomeFrontCommand.Eachofthesealternativesisfarpreferabletowhatactuallyensued,where

noonewasassignedresponsibility.Inthiskindofsituationresponsibilitygoestotheprimeminister.Thisresultsinabigdelayinthecommencementofaction,withagreatdealoftimeelapsinguntilthedirectorgeneraloftheprime minister’s office realizes that in the absence of any other responsible party he is responsible. A further outcome is inefficiency. The prime minister’s office, in contrast with the other three alternatives, is not built toserveasanexecutivebody.Whydoesall thishappen?Becausethereisnostaffbody tomake recommendationson thenecessarydivisionofresponsibility.

The fourth lapseconcernsplanning.Strategic initiatives,whether forwarorpoliticalmoves,demandplanning.Correctplanningmustoccurinfive stages:1. Ananalysisofassumptions,whichinfactisadescriptionofreality.

Ifweskipthisstagewecreateahazardoustendencytoworkunder

32 I Giora Eiland

hiddenanduncheckedassumptions,someofwhichare liable tobefundamentallywrong.

2. AnanalysisofIsrael’sinterestsandwhatitwantstoachieve;settingpriorities.

3. Ananalysisofthecomprehensivemapofinterests;thisstageisvitalwhenmultipleplayersareinvolved.IntheLebanonarenatherewereseveral interested and influential players.

4. Defining the required achievement: what is realistically achievable in lightoftheabove.Whatisrequired,whatispossible,andhowmuchinterfaceisthere?

5. Tactics: what must be done; what should be announced (and whatnot),andinwhatorder?

Agovernmentinitsentiretycannotmanagesuchaprocedure.Suchaprocedurerequiresastaffbody.Whennosuchbodyexists,actionusuallybeginsat the laststage(andin thiscontext,consider thedisengagementandconvergenceplans).

What Must Be Done

An analysis of the present situation and a depiction of its inherentweaknesseswere submitted toPrimeMinisterSharon.Tohis credit, heagreedtolistentoverytoughlanguageinanextremelylimitedforum.Buttheprimeminister,even ifconvinced,wasnot readyforchange. ItwashopedthatPrimeMinisterEhudOlmertwouldbemorereceptivetoanewpath,butunfortunatelythiswasnotso.Olmertdidindeedmakeachange,yetonewhosecorrectnessishighlyinquestion.OferShelahwrote:

[The NSC] will ultimately and officially become a long range planningbody,anIsraelicodenamefortheproductionofpaperwork,whichwillbehandedovertotheheadofstaffforreview–inthesmall amount of time left to him from working with governmentministries....ItisnotanexaggerationtosaythattransferringtheCouncil to Jerusalem would only save transportation costs to its final and inevitable destination – the paper shredder in the boss’s office... Moreimportantisthefactthatinadomainthatneededrealchange,OlmertandTurbowitzoptedforcosmetics.2


What is trulyneeded is a change that is relatively easy to effect butwhosecontributionwouldbeimmense.Theprimeministermustorganizehis office and decision making apparatus in this way: choose an individual heconsiderstrustworthyinpoliticalandsecuritymatters,puttingtwelveemployees at his or her disposal. This new body would be called thepolitical-security staff. All of the existing functionaries, first and foremost theNSC,wouldbecancelled; therolesofpoliticaladvisor to theprimeministerandofthemilitarysecretarywouldbecancelledasindependentpositions. From this moment forward, this new staff would be the solebody responsible for political-security activity in the prime minister’soffice, the government, and the security cabinet. If any deliberation is held but not properly prepared, the head of staff is responsible; if adeliberationispreparedproperlyanddecisionsaremade,theheadofstaffisresponsiblefortranslatingtheseintooperativestepsandfollowingupontheirimplementation.

This head of staff will be required to conduct timely situationassessments; officially formulate Israel’s position on matters in his purview; superviseandapprovevariousactionsoftheIDF,MinistryofDefense,theMossad,theForeignMinistry,andsoon(naturallyincorrectproportions).He will have to prepare a yearly plan for cabinet discussions, conductpreparatorydiscussions,andbethesolepartythatpresentsalternativestothegovernment.

Inthiswayaproperdialoguewillbecreatedbetweenthepoliticalandmilitaryechelons.It isunwisetobegindraftingthestructureandnatureofsuchadialogueonlyupontheoutbreakofacrisis,whenhighlyurgentmeetingsarerequired.Butmostimportantly,thisstaffwillberesponsibleforinitiatingorexaminingvariouspoliticaloptions,notonlyinrealtimewhenaresponsetoaneventisdemanded,butpriortothattime.Itisclearthatinordertoperformhisjobfaithfully,theheadofthepolitical-securitystaffmustworkcloselywiththeprimeminister,beapartnerinhismeetingswithforeignleaders,andbehismainemissaryformeetingswithforeignelements. For the head of staff to successfully carry out his duties, his field ofactivitymustbefocusedanddirected,asiscustomaryinothercountries.Thissimplechangedoesnotrequireanypoliticalcompromises,nordoesitinvolveasupplementtothebudget(actuallytheoppositeistrue).And,as

34 I Giora Eiland

opposedtowhatiscommonlythought,itwouldnotleadtoaconfrontationwithsecurityforces.

The sole difficulty is a difficulty of culture, and here is the main question: can the prime minister of Israel – any prime minister – admit that hisknowledgeandexperiencearelimited,andthatheneedstoinstitutionalizeashareoftheprocessesandsetupanorderedworkingmethod?

Notes1. Yediot Ahronot,September18,2006.2. Yediot Ahronot,May15,2006.

Chapter 3

Deterrence and its Limitations

Yair Evron

Longtermeffectsofthe2006warinLebanoncannotyetbedetermined.International,Arab,andIsraeliobserverswerequicktomakepredictionsabout the future of Israeli deterrence, but these appear to be quitepremature.Whatcanalreadybedone,however, is toapplypartsof theanalyticalframeworkofdeterrencetheorytothecurrentsituation,andonthisbasisassessthedeterrenceequationbetweenIsraelanditsadversaries,inparticularHizbollah,beforeandafterthewar,andconsiderthepossibleoutcomesofthewarintheseterms.

The Meaning of Deterrence

Deterrenceisahighlycomplexprocesscomprisingthethreattouseforcetodetertheopponent(the“challenger”)whoaimstochangethestatusquofrom resorting to violence. Deterrence threats are of two modes: first, an obstructingmeasuretodenythechallengeritsgoals,i.e.,defeatingitsarmedchallenge(deterrencebydenial);second,apunitivemeasure,i.e.,punishingits assets, including civilian targets, beyond the battlefield (deterrence bypunishment).However, thesuccessofdeterrenceiscontingentonanintermixtureofpolitical,strategic,andpsychologicalfactors.Thegreatertherelativedenial/punitivecapabilityofthedeterrer,i.e.,militaryadvantage,themoreeffectivearethedeterrentthreats.Ontheotherhand,thegreaterthefrustrationofthechallengerwiththepoliticalreality,thegreaterisitswillingness to challenge the statusquo. Inaddition, there is the resolvefactor,inotherwords,thereadinessofthedeterrertoexerciseitsthreats.The latter dimension is difficult to pinpoint and has complex ramifications.

36 I Yair Evron

Demonstrationsofresolvemightestablishthe“reputation”ofthedeterrerand strengthen deterrence.At the same time, as extensive studies haveshowed, “reputation” does not in all circumstances necessarily enhancetheeffectivenessofdeterrence.1Moreover,demonstrationsofresolvebytheuseofmilitaryforcemightleadtoescalationratherthandeterrence.

Deterrencethreatscanbecommunicatedinvariousways:declarations;“silent” moves, for example the movement of military forces; andoccasionally even limited military action whose purpose is to deter amoreextensivewarthatmightbeinitiatedbythechallenger.Conversely,whiledeterrencefocusesondissuadingtheopponentfrommilitaryaction,compellence threats aim at effecting the challenger’s submission to thecompeller’sdemands.Inthissense,compellence(or“coercion,”tosome)has an offensive nature and its success requires the leveling of significant pressure on the opponent. Deterrence threats achieve their goals moreeasilythancoercivethreats.

Overall,deterrenceistoacertainextentanelusiveposture.Thereareno exact and well-defined formulas for assessing the strength of a deterrent posture. The ultimate proof of deterrence success is when an explicitdeterrent threat has caused the challenger to abandon a specific decision to initiatehostilities.Yeteventhen,thereasonsforsuchadecisionmightbemulti-faceted.

Deterrence is not the ultimate factor in conflict management: it is one strategy among several designed to stabilize conflict relations. It occupies thecentergroundbetweenappeasementandconcessionsontheonehand,anddeliberatemilitaryescalationontheother.Moreover,itisnotasubstituteforpolitical accords. Its role is to stabilize themilitary relationsduringconflict, and provide support for a political agreement when conditions are ripeforitsevolution.

Israeli Deterrence Against State and Non-State Actors

DuetoitsclearmilitaryadvantageandthepeaceagreementsithaswithEgyptandJordan,andcoupledwiththelackofabasicstateinterestamongtheotherArabstates–withthepossibleexceptionofSyria–inanarmedconflict with Israel, since the mid 1970s Israel has enjoyed an effective

Deterrence and its Limitations I 37

andstabledeterrenceagainstall-outorevenlimitedwarvis-à-visalltheregionalstates.

Deterrencecangenerallybeeffective–allelsebeingequal–whenthechallenger is a statewith a formaldecisionmaking center that controlsthestate’selementsofarmedpower.Deterrenceagainstsub-stateactorsismuchmorecomplicated.Whenthesub-stateactor(guerrillaorterroristorganization)actsagainstthewillofthegovernmentfromwhoseterritoryit operates, military retaliation against the state can push it to imposerestrictionsonthesub-stateactor.Thisisaformofthirdpartydeterrencethatoccurred several times in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, primarily inregardtofedayeenoperationsfromJordanduringthe1950sandagaininthelate1960s,andsubsequentlyfromLebanon.2IsraeliretaliationledtoJordanianactionsagainstthefedayeen,butlargelyfailedinthecaseofLebanonbecauseoftheweaknessofitsgovernment.Successofretaliationasathirdpartydeterrencemechanismdependsonthedomesticstrengthofthegovernment.

Deterrencecanalsobeachievedagainstsub-stateelementsthatoperateinside a state or in no-man’s land. Thus, for example, the deterrenceequation with the Palestinians has been affected by two main factors:the level of political goals the Palestinians expect to achieve, and theirconsequent level of frustration in the absence of political progress andheightened Israeli military activity. The more intense this frustration,the higher the likelihood is that deterrence would fail. Conversely, theharsh Israeli response to terror and guerilla activity during the intifada,which caused extensive and cumulative damage to Palestinian society,contributed to the acceptance of the hudna (or tahdiya) in early 2005and the overall low level of violent activity since then by the variousPalestinianorganizations,primarilyFatahandHamas.Atthesametime,theacceptanceof thehudnawasalsopredicated(at leaston thepartofthe Palestinian Authority) on the assumption that the political processwouldberenewed.Thus,thetwofactorsinterface,andintheabsenceofpoliticalprogress,itislikelythatPalestinianviolencewouldrecur.StrongIsraelmilitaryreactionsarenecessarytosignalthehighcostsinvolvedinviolence,therebystrengtheningdeterrence.

It ispossibletocreatea limiteddeterrencebalancebetweenstatesorbetween a state and a sub-state actor that is not related to the entire conflict

3� I Yair Evron

but is confined to specific aspects within it. Such balances at times require “reinforcement,”eitherbymeansofpolitical settlementsor through theuseoflimitedforce.

The Israeli-Hizbollah Deterrence Equation

In May 2000 Israeli forces (along with forces of the South LebaneseArmy)withdrewfromsouthernLebanon.Thiswithdrawalwasrecognizedofficially by the UN and enjoyed the support of the international community, including theLebanesegovernment.Nonetheless,Hizbollahsprang intoaction after the withdrawal and launched its first attack on Mount Dov, andthereafterlaunchedassaultseveryfewmonthsfromtheeasternsector.Over time these attacks became something of a regular ritual: opening fire onIsraelipositionsand(ingeneral)avoidingattackingciviliansettlements.The IDF responded by firing on Hizbollah positions and for the most part, theclasheswereofshortduration.

It seems that this mode of behavior generated a set of rules of thegame for thenorth.These servedHizbollah’saims insideLebanonand,apparently,theyalsoservedtheinterestsofSyriaandIran.WhiletheywereinconvenientforIsrael,theydidnotdisruptcivilianlifeinthenorthofthecountry.Rather,civilianlifeinthenorthwasrehabilitatedafteryearsofdisturbances and the economy there flourished. Against this backdrop, there wasnothingtobegainedbyreactingwithmajorescalationtoHizbollahprovocations. Moreover, from 2005 there were initial inklings that thepolitical system inLebanonwouldchange for thebetter, andespeciallywiththewithdrawalofSyrianforces,therewassomebasisofhopeforamodification of Hizbollah’s autonomous military standing.

Inpractice,theserulesofthegameweretheresultofamutualmini-deterrence balance. Israel deterred Hizbollah from resuming extensivestrikes on civilian populations, while Hizbollah deterred Israel fromlaunching a general assault aimed at destroying the organization. Thismutual deterrence was based on the reciprocal punitive military threatontheonehandandsocio-politicalelementsontheother.Hizbollahwasawareofthecoststhatwouldbebornebyitspoliticalconstituency–theLebaneseingeneral,butparticularlytheShiites–ifitbreachedtherules

Deterrence and its Limitations I 3�

of the game. For Israel, it was beneficial to avoid being dragged into wider actionthatwoulddisruptlifeinitsnorthernregion.

Thus, despite Hizbollah’s being a sub-state actor, deterrence threatscouldstillbeleveledagainstit.TheparadoxisthatbecauseHizbollahhasbecomeanactivepoliticalplayerinLebanonthatislookingtoincreaseitspoliticalpower,itisdrivenintwooppositedirections:withinthedomesticLebanesepoliticalarenaitisconstantlyforcedtodemonstrateitsuniqueabilitytoactasa“shield”againstIsrael,andthereforehashadtoresorttoitsrepertoireofviolentprovocations.Conversely,itsroleasaLebaneseplayerhasforcedittoguardagainstsparkingalarge-scaleIsraelioffensive.

In its July12actionHizbollahdidnotcompletelybreak the rulesofthe game, but it did significantly breach them. It shot at civilian targets (whichithaddonepreviouslybutonamorelimitedscale).Itoperatedintheborder’swesternsector,andalongawiderarea.Finally,itcarriedoutthekidnapping,aprovocationithadbeenunabletostagesincetheOctober2000abductions.ThecombinationofallthesefactorsultimatelyviolatedIsrael’s deterrence threshold and prompted the heavy Israeli reaction.SinceHizbollahapparentlybelievedthatithadnotviolatedtherulesofthegame,itdidnotanticipateamassiveIsraeliresponse.

Soliddeterrencepostureisbasedultimatelyontherelationshipbetweenthepoliticalintereststobedefended,andtheintensityofmilitaryresponseexercised in case deterrence fails. Usually, responses to violations ofdeterrencethresholdsshouldberoughlyproportionatetothedamagecausedbytheviolations.However,attimes,restorationofdeterrencethresholds,especially in mini-deterrence relationships, requires a disproportionateresponse.Thisisprimarilythecasewhenrepeatedlimitedchallengesareinitiatedbythechallenger,hopingthatthesewouldbeultimately“accepted”bythedeterrerandgraduallyfosternewrulesofthegame.InJuly2006,the extent of the Israeli response would necessarily be disproportionateregarding the specific provocation of Hizbollah.

At the same time, however, in order to restore and maintain the specific deterrence balance towards Hizbollah, it was sufficient to mount an intensive butlimitedmilitaryoperation.ThedestructionoftheHizbollaharsenaloflongandmediumrangemissilesattheverybeginningofthecampaign,anuncharacteristicallyheavyresponse,woulditselfhaveservedthepurposeofrestoringIsrael’sdeterrenceandcreatinganewbalanceofdeterrence

40 I Yair Evron

vis-à-vis Hizbollah. Moreover, the destruction of the Dahiya quarter insouthBeirut–thecenterofHizbollah’sheadquartersandtheresidenceofmanyofitsoperativesandsupporters–certainlyservedasamajorsignalof Israel’s ability and resolve to punish the organization, thus furtherstrengtheningIsrael’sdeterrencevis-à-visHizbollah.Thecontinuationofthecampaignbeyondthatpointwasnotnecessaryfordeterrencepurposes.The definition of the war’s objectives that called for a change in the internal politicalorderofLebanon,namely,enforcingthedismantlingofHizbollahasamilitaryorganizationanddeployingtheLebanesearmyinthesouth,while justified in international legal terms (specifically, implementation of UN resolution 1559) and reflective of a real desire of a large portion of the Lebanesepolity,wentbeyondtherestorationofasolidandstablebalanceofdeterrence.

Overall, the wide scale Israeli response appears to have indeedstrengthenedIsraelideterrenceagainstHizbollah–seenpreciselyfromthedeclarationsbyHizbollah leaderswhoadmitted theydidnot expect theIsraeliharshresponse;otherwise,theywouldnothaveauthorizedtheJuly12operation.Ontheotherhand,duringthecampaignHizbollahsucceededindemonstratingitsabilitytocontinueharassingtheIsraelipopulationinthenorthwith its short range rockets.ThispresumablywouldconstrainIsraelfromlaunchingmassiveoperationsagainstHizbollahintheabsenceofthelatter’sprovocations.ThereisnodoubtthatIsraelcouldconductalargescaleoperationagainstHizbollah,withduepreparations(includingpropertrainingoftheassignedgroundforces)andadvanceplanning.Israelwasrighttoavoiditduringthelastcampaignbecauseoftheburdenofalongandcostlycounterinsurgencycampaign,butitmightoptforitwereHizbollahtoprovokeit.

The New Israel-Hizbollah Balance of Deterrence

The radical escalation contained in the Israeli response to the July 12operation both shocked Hizbollah and demonstrated that consistentviolationsofIsraelideterrencethresholdswouldnotbetolerated.Moreover,through its air bombardment of Lebanon, Israel inflicted extensive damage onthecivilianinfrastructureofHizbollahinBeirutandsouthernLebanon.This punishment apparently caused Hizbollah considerable political


damageinLebanon,evidentinthevariousstatementsofNasrallahhimselfand Hizbollah’s intensive efforts to compensate members of the Shiitecommunitythatsufferedmostfromthecampaign.OneoftheinterestingimplicationsofHizbollah’sacknowledgmentthatitdidnotexpectIsraelto respond so forcefully is theorganization’s explicit recognitionof thesaidrulesof thegameandtheexistingbalanceofdeterrencebefore thewar.Itonlyhopedtoreapasmuchgainpoliticallyandstrategicallywhileoperatingfromwithinthegeneralframeworkoftheserules–andat thesametimewhilegnawingawayatthem.

AfterthewarHizbollahleaderstalkedaboutdefeatingtheIsraeliarmyforthe first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But an analysis of the campaignleadstoadifferentconclusion.Duringthecampaign,Hizbollahfighters demonstrated skill and determination in their encounters with Israeli forces,buttheIsraeliarmydidnotinfact–becauseofpoliticalandmilitaryconsiderations – even begin to tap its complete arsenal of capabilities.WhileitispossibletodestroyaguerrillaorganizationasHizbollah,thiswouldrequirealongandcostlycounterinsurgencycampaign,whichwouldexactaheavypriceof thecivilianpopulation. Israel learned that lessonin its longstay inLebanonandhadnodesire to try it again, especiallywhennovitalnationalsecurityinterestswereinvolved.ThisinfactwasthemainreasonwhyIsraelhesitatedinitsstrategicdecisiontoemploygroundforcesinthecampaignandpenetratedeeplyintoLebanon.Notethatthisrational calculation created the contradiction between the definition of one oftheobjectivesofthewar,i.e.,“disarmamentofHizbollah,”whichwasunattainableunlessIsraelbecamefullyimmersedinalongandthanklessgroundoperation, something that Israelwasunderstandably reluctant todo,andtheactuallymilitaryoperationsconductedduringthecampaign.

ThecautiousmodeofbehaviorHizbollahadoptedattheendofhostilitiesanditsostensiblereadiness toacceptUNresolution1701, includingthetwoimportantclausesonstationingtheLebanesearmyinthesouthanddeployingtheUNpeacekeepingforce,pointtoHizbollah’sunderstandingthat provoking Israel in the way it did over the previous six years wascounterproductive.Sincethewar, theorganizationhasdirectedmuchofitsactivity to thedomestic-politicalsceneinsideLebanon.Ithassoughttofrustratethegovernment’sattempttoimplementresolution1701,andassuch,avoiditsdisarmament.BykeepingitsarmsHizbollahwouldbe

42 I Yair Evron

able to maintain its special position within Lebanon.At the same time,Hizbollah has sought to change the Lebanese political system, therebyearning greater power for the Shiite community and its allies. It is tooearlytoconcludewhetherHizbollahanditsallieswillbeabletomodifytheLebanesepoliticalsystemandacquireastrongerposition.ItappearslikelythatsomecompromisewillbereachedthatwouldallowHizbollahanditsalliessomepoliticalgainsbutdenythemtheiroverallobjectives.Paradoxically, precisely by becoming more involved in the struggle tochange the Lebanese political system, Hizbollah would also be moreconstrained by the Lebanese body polity (notwithstanding its factionalnature) from provoking further escalation with Israel. It is importantto note in this context that though according to different estimates theShiacommunityinLebanoncomprises30-40percentof thepopulation,it is itself divided, and the alliance with part of the Christian sector isopportunistic and fluid. Consequently, Hizbollah will find no partners in tryingtoimposeitspolitical-ideologicalprinciplesinsideLebanonorformapoliticalcoalitionseekingtochallengeIsraelmilitarilyagain.

Deterrence against Syria

Israeli deterrence against theArab regional states has been stable sincethe1970s thanks to thecombinationof thebalanceofpolitical interestsandthebalanceofmilitarypower.Indeed,overtheyears,thecoincidenceof political interests, and even some convergence of interests, has beengradually enhanced. The main exception has been Syria, with whichseveralattemptstoreachapeaceaccordhavefailedduetothepositionsofbothIsraelandSyria.

AbriefreviewofSyria’sstrategicbehaviorsince1973,whenitinitiatedwaralongwithEgypt,demonstratesitsacuteawarenessofthepoliticalandmilitaryfactorsinitsenvironment.AlthoughSyriaconsidersthereturnoftheGolanHeightstoSyriansovereigntyasacentralobjectiveofitsforeignpolicy,ithascorrectlyassessedthatpoliticallyandmilitarilythelikelihoodofitsreturnbyforceisnil.Moreover,SyriawasreadytocooperatetacitlywithIsraelinLebanoninthe1970s,hasbeencarefulsincethe1970snottoviolatetheGolanHeightsagreement,andinthe1982warinLebanonlimited itself to a defensive posture, fighting only to protect its position in


theBeqaaandthelinktoBeirut.Later,itwasreadytoparticipateinthecultivation of the “rules of engagement” with Israel in Lebanon duringthe 1980s.3 Finally, during the 2006 campaign in Lebanon, it was verycarefulnottoprovideIsraelwithanypretexttoattackit(notthattheIsraelileadership was seriously considering it in any event). This consistentpatternofbehaviorhasdemonstratedthecontinuedSyrianawarenessofthestrategicenvironmentinwhichitoperates.

ButhastheLebanesecampaignaffectedtheSyrianleaders’perceptionsconcerning its geo-strategic context? This is a difficult question, and there isnosolidmethodologytorelyon.Theultimateanswerwillcomeonlyinthefuture,butarationalanalysisofthefactorsaffectingSyria’sbehaviormightprovidesomeclues.

An assessment of the military dimension of the Lebanese campaigncould yield some of the following conclusions: first, the campaign was not againstaregulararmybutwasaversionofacounterinsurgencyoperationcoupled with limited tactical encounters with Hizbollah fighters operating as regular army units. In many of these encounters these fighters demonstrated high proficiency and courage. However, these brief encounters are very different from major campaigns conducted by regular armies in whichlargeunitsrelyonthecombinationofarmor,airforce,andartillery,andin which firepower, made up increasingly of various precision systems, is involved.ThelatterispreciselythetypeofcampaignthatwouldtakeplacewereSyriatoinitiatehostilitiesagainstIsraelontheGolanHeights.WhathappenedinLebanonisthereforehardlyanexampleofwhatmighthappeninanIsraeli-Syriancampaign.

After the war the Israeli military was severely criticized on severalgrounds(andinsideIsraelprobablymoreso thanbyoutsideobservers).Severaldimensionsofthearmy’soperationshavebeenanalyzedindepthbymany official teams composed of retired Israeli officers, and some of them producedhighlycriticalassessmentsoftheconductofthegroundforces.Itcanbeassumedthatmanyofthemilitary’sproblemsthatsurfacedduringthecampaignwillbecorrected,suchasimprovingtraining,refurbishingsupplies,andinstitutingvariousorganizationalchanges.Whatalsoemergedwas that the army did not properly prepare itself for the campaign and“slipped”intoit(somethingthatcertainlycanberemediedbeforefuturemilitary confrontations takeplace).However, all theseproblemscannot

44 I Yair Evron

hide the basic picture of continued significant Israeli superiority vis-à-vis theSyrianforces.

Inamajorcampaignthatinvolvesallbranchesofthemilitary,Israel’soverwhelmingairforcesuperioritywouldhaveadecisiveimpactonthebattlefield. As the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated, in a campaignbetweenregulararmiestheroleofamodernairforceiscriticaland decisive. The Revolution in Military Affairs that is increasinglyshaping the battlefield affords Israel a clear advantage over all the armies intheregionandcertainlyvis-à-vistheSyrianforces.

InLebanontheIsraeliairforceyetagaindemonstrateditscapabilities.In theabsenceof anydefenseagainst it, its test laynot in its ability tosuppress its opponent’s air defenses and air assets (that did not exist)but in its ability to strike at targets with high accuracy and deliver ahighvolumeofordnance.This itdemonstratedeffectively. Its failure topreempt the launchingof thevariousmissilesandrocketsagainst Israelwasnotsurprisingandinfactwastobeexpected.Thus,aSyrianrationalassessmentoftheresultsofamajorencounterwithIsraelcouldleadonlytothesameconclusionsthatdirectedSyrianstrategicbehaviorinthepastandwhichhavebeenenumeratedbefore.

Beyondthat,theSyrianregimeisisolatedintheArabworld.Itsabilityto mobilizeArab political support before involving itself in a militaryadventurewithIsraelisverylimited.ItcanexpectIraniansupport,butthiswouldencounterconsiderablelogisticalproblemsandcouldthereforebelimitedonlytotransferofsuppliesandthelike.ThesituationmightchangewereIrantoacquireanuclearweaponscapability,asituationthatliesinthefutureandisbeyondthescopeofthisdiscussion.

Finally,thepersistentSyrianeffortstoengageIsraeldiplomaticallyanditsrepeatedproposalstoopenpeacenegotiationsbetweenthetwocountriesdonotsignalachangeinSyria’sassessmentofthestrategicenvironment.WhileitistruethattheintensityoftheSyrianpeacesignalsarepartlytheresult of current international and regional difficulties, they also indicate Syria’sinterestinachangetoitsstatusintheMiddleEast,anditsrealizationthatthereturnoftheGolanHeightstoSyriansovereigntycancomeaboutonlythroughpeacefulnegotiations.


Related Deterrence Considerations: The Palestinians and Beyond

ThesuccessofIsraelideterrenceagainstPalestinianviolencehasdependedonthelevelofPalestinianpoliticalaspirations(andconversely,frustration)ontheonehand,andthelevelofIsraelimilitaryactivityontheother.Athirdcritical factor is theexistenceofaPalestiniancentralpoliticalauthoritythatisabletoimposeitswilloverthevariousarmedmilitiasoperatingintheGazaStripandtoalesserdegreeintheWestBank.WhathaschangedsincetheparliamentaryelectionsthatbroughtHamastopower,alongwiththegradualdeteriorationinPalestiniansocialandpoliticalcoherence,hasbeentheinabilityofthetwopartiestosettletheirdifferencesandcreatea stable center of decision making that could impose its control on allthe armed organizations. In its absence it is difficult to apply an efficient deterrent posture vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Only a significant political change in Israeli-Palestinian relations coupled with the formation of aneffectivedecisionmakingcenter couldcreateaconstructivecontext fortheapplicationofeffectivedeterrence. In themeantime,bothFatahandHamasappear tobe interested,eachfor itsownreasons, inmaintaininga ceasefire with Israel, and Hanas is capable of enforcing it in the Gaza Strip,whichitcontrolseffecively.Fortheshortterm,therefore,alimitedceasefire is possible if Israel so chooses. However, the more chaotic the situation in the Palestinian territories becomes, the more likely is theerosion of the ceasefire. Similarly, in the absence of political movement andtheabsenceofacentralstrongPalestinianauthority,Israelideterrencewouldultimatelyweaken.

It has been argued that Hizbollah’s success in launching its rocketarsenalagainstIsraelprovidesanexamplethatwouldencouragePalestinianextremiststoimitatethesametactics.ThismightsuggesttheweakeningofIsrael’sdeterrence,anditisapparentthatHamasiscurrentlyinvestinganeffortinbuildingupitsshortrangerocketcapability.Whetheritwoulduseitisprimarilyapoliticalconsideration.Overall,Palestinianstrategistsshould consider two additional lessons that could be drawn from theLebanon campaign: first, the Israeli air force (and artillery) was able to cause extensive destruction to Lebanon, and secondly, the internationalcommunitywasreadytotoleratethisIsraeliretaliation.Thepotentialcosts

46 I Yair Evron

tothePalestinianscouldbeasharshifnotmoresoweretheytolaunchanextensivecampaignofmissilesattacks.Inaddition,alreadyinthepastIsraelprovedthatinthefaceofseverePalestinianprovocations,itwouldultimatelyresorttoextrememeasures.

Regarding the greater region, Israeli deterrence against initiation ofwars by regional states has been stable since the 1970s. Given that thepolitical dimension has such an impact on the success of deterrence,recentdevelopmentshavecombinedtofurthersolidifythestabilityofthedeterrence equation. The increased prominence of Iran and its possiblenuclearizationhascreatedadditionalconverginginterestsbetweenEgypt,SaudiArabia,Jordan,andIsrael.Basedonthispoliticalbackground,the“language”ofinteractionbetweenIsraelandtheseArabstatesisalready–andshouldbecomeevenmore–politicalandlessbasedonthemodeofdeterrence.

Finally, the Lebanese campaign left the Israeli public and politicalelite with deep feelings of frustration and a very critical view of theperformanceofthearmy.Thecriticismofvariousaspectsofthemilitaryactivitypresentedbymanyof theprofessionalmilitary teamsappointedbythechiefofstaffaddedconsiderablytotheoveralldistrustofboththepoliticalandmilitaryleadership.AllthisaffectedtheinternalpublicdebateinIsraelaboutdeterrence,andtherefrain ofboththemediaandmanyinthepublicdebateisthatIsrael’sdeterrencehasbeenconsiderablydamaged.Butdeterrenceisnotaquantitythatcanbemeasuredexactly,certainlynotbythedeterrer.IsraelideterrenceisbasednotonIsraeliself-criticism,buton the constant factors of political interests of the challengers, coupledwith thebasic fundamentalsofmilitarypower.ThosehavenotchangedasaresultofthecampaigninLebanon.Andtotheextentthatdeterrencedependsondemonstrationsofresolve(thoughusuallythisfactorisofmuchlessercentralitythanthatoftheotherfactors),thequickIsraelireadinesstopunishLebanonextensivelyanditsnotbeingcensoredbytheinternationalcommunityonlyservedtosignalresolve.

Thereis,however,adangerintheloosepublicdiscussionofdeterrence.Traditionally, Israeli strategic thinking overemphasized demonstrationsof resolveby theuseofmilitaryforceasnecessary tostrengthenfuturedeterrence.Therefore,anotionmightdevelopthatinordertostrengthendeterrence Israel has to demonstrate its real military capabilities. This


combines with doomsday prophecies about various Iranian-Hizbollah–Syrian plans for future aggression against Israel. Thus, the (il)logic ofpreventivewarmight joinmistakenperceptionsabout Israelideterrenceandleadtounnecessaryescalation.

Notes1. See, for example, Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1996), and Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1991).

2. SimilaroperationsfromEgyptinthe1950sweresanctionedbythegovernment.3. Onthe1970sand1980stacitand/orindirectIsraeli-SyrianunderstandingsseeYair

Evron,War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1987).

Chapter 4

A Test of Rival Strategies: Two Ships Passing in the Night

Giora Romm

ThepurposeofthisessayistoanalyzeseveralprominentmilitaryaspectsofthewarinLebanonandderivethemainlessonsfromthem.Theessaydoesnotdealinhistoricalexplanationsofwhatcausedanyparticularinstanceofmilitary thinking or any specific achievement. Rather, the analysis points to fourmainconclusions:theimportanceofclearexpressionatthecommandleveltoreducethebattlefog;thephenomenonofmilitaryblindnesswithrespecttotheroleplayedbyshortrangerockets(Katyushas)intheoverallmilitary campaign; the alarmingperformanceof theground forces; andthe critical importance of an exit strategy and identification of the war’s optimalendpointfromtheveryoutsetofthewar.

The War and its Goals

The2006LebanonwarbeganonJuly12andcontinued for thirty-threedays.Theeventbeganasamilitaryoperationdesignedtolastonedayorafewdays.Asmattersdraggedonandbecamemorecomplicated,morevigorous terms were used to describe the fighting. Several months after the campaign, the government officially recognized it as a “war.”

This was a war in which the political leadership tried to define political goals before the war and in the opening days of the fighting, something thatdidnotoccurinmostofIsrael’swars.Thisattemptwasunsuccessful,however.Whatappeared tobe thepoliticalgoalschanged in thecourse

50 I Giora Romm

of the fighting, at least judging by speeches made by the senior political leadership during the conflict.

The Israel Defense Forces was the entity that proposed the list ofpoliticalgoalstothegovernment.ThefollowingobjectiveswerepresentedtotheprimeministerandthecabinetonthenightofJuly12:1. TodistanceHizbollahfromtheborderwithIsrael.2. To strike a significant blow against Hizbollah’s military capability

and status, and thereby put an end to terrorism originating fromLebanon.

3. To strengthen the deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah and the entireregion.

4. Tocorrect theprevailingsysteminLebanon,basedonaneffectiveenforcement mechanism that is supported by internationalinvolvement(thiswaslaterchangedto“havetheLebanesegovernmentuse the Lebanese army to impose its sovereignty over its entireterritory”).

5. To foster auspicious conditions for freeing the kidnapped IDFsoldiers.

6. ToaccomplishtheseendswhilekeepingSyriaoutofthewar.These goals were dictated by the definition of the “strategic purpose” as

presentedbytheIDF.Theconceptof“strategicpurpose”wasaddedtotheIDFlexiconinrecentyearsandisdesignedtobeaplatformproposedbythemilitarytothepoliticalleadership(becausethepoliticalleadershiphaslong refrained from defining goals to the army), from which the campaign’s goalsaretobederived.Thesegoalsshouldguideallgovernmentagencies,not just themilitary.NotablyabsentfromthestrategicpurposewasanyreferencetoIsrael’shomefront.

Definition of the goals changed during the fighting, in an effort to adapt themtotheemergingsituation.Moreimportantly,however,statementsbypolitical figures, and sometimes also by senior military officers, employed careless and populist language. These statements created expectationsamong thepublic thatdidnotmatch thediscoursebetween themilitaryand the civilian leadership. In addition, the goals ignored one of thefundamentals of Israel’s security doctrine: any war initiated by Israelshould have a defined and short timetable.

A Test of Rival Strategies: Two Ships Passing in the Night I 51

The political goals were translated into a list of missions for theoperationalheadquarters.Theseamountedtoextensivestrikesbytheairforce against Hizbollah deep within Lebanon while isolating LebanonfromSyria, togetherwith a seriesofgroundoperations in theNorthernCommand’stheaterthatwouldnotdragtheIDFintoimplementingitsentiregroundoperationsplanforsouthernLebanon.Alongtimepassedbeforethe prevention of short range Katyusha rocket fire appeared on the list of operationalgoals.Thistaskwasaddedtothelistofgoalsatalaterstageofthe fighting, after the military command fully realized its significance.

Whatalltheseformulationshadincommon,fromthosemadebythetacticalcommandleveltothosebythepoliticalleadership,wasthelackofsimplicityandtransparencynecessarytomakeintentionsclear.Theformerculture of structured communications – verification that both parties, thosegivingcommandsandthosereceivingthem,understandthingsthesame way, and the definition of achievable and measured missions – was abandoned.

Enemy Facts and Figures

HizbollahbegantoestablishitselfasamilitarypowerinLebanonin1985.The hope that Israel’s retreat from Lebanon in May 2000 would divertHizbollahfromthemilitarycoursetothepoliticalspherewasnotrealized.Hizbollah indeed entered the political arena, but it also continued tostrengthenitselfmilitarily.ThewithdrawalofSyrianforcesfromLebanoninearly2005wasa turningpoint forHizbollah. It appears that the fullsignificance of the change in the internal balance of power in Lebanon was not appreciated in Israel. Neither the significance of the absence of Syrian powerasaleverforIsraelipressureonLebanon–andwhennecessaryonHizbollah–norHizbollah’sconceptofitsroleinthenewbalanceofpowerwasfullycomprehended.

Hizbollah’smilitaryorganizationdiffersfromtheotherArabmilitaryforces in the area. It has the structure,organization, andcapabilityof aregulararmy,thelogicofaterroristorganization,andthemodusoperandiofaguerillagroup.Hizbollah’spowerrestedprimarilyonthefollowinglargeanddiversethree-prongedrocketarray:

52 I Giora Romm

1. Aunitoflongrangerocketswitharangeof200kilometers,deployedbetweenBeirutandtheAwaliRiver.TheserocketscamefromIran.

2. A unit of medium range rockets with a range of 100 kilometersdeployedsouthoftheAwali.TheserocketscamefromSyria.

3. AunitofshortrangeKatyusharocketswitharangeof7-20kilometers,andsomerocketswitharangeof40kilometers.Thirteenthousandrockets of this type were deployed in southern Lebanon near theborderwithIsrael.

Inaddition,HizbollahwasabletolauncharmedunmannedGPS-guidedaerialvehicles(UAVs)–theAbabil.

Hizbollah had several thousand fighters trained in guerilla warfare, and wasequippedwithadvancedanti-tankmissiles.Itpreparedabroadsystemof bunkers and pits for the protection of its fighters. An effective and high redundancycommunicationssystemwasalsobuilt,varyingfromlandlinecommunicationstoindividualbeepers.Althoughthesystemwasrepeatedlyattacked,partofitsurvivedtotheendofthewar,enablingHizbollahtomaintaincontrolofitsrocketsystem.

IDF Facts and Figures

TheIDFenteredthewarfromwhatwasoverallaroutinesituation.Theimmediate operational units at its disposal were the air force and theNorthernCommand.

During the fighting, the air force operated at almost full capacity. It succeeded in accomplishing most of the goals assigned to it.The airforce put its “Mishkal Sguli” (”Specific Weight”) plan into operation on the night of July 13. Within thirty-five minutes, the vast majority of Hizbollah’sarrayoflongrangerocketsandalargeportionofthemediumrange rocket launchers were destroyed. In the course of the fighting, the air forcedestroyedallthemediumrangelaunchersfromwhichrocketswereactuallylaunched(table1).

Inaddition,theairforcecarriedoutthefollowingmissions:1. LimitedattacksonLebanesegroundtargetsandattacksonHizbollah

targets–theseattackswereintendedtoaffectHizbollah’sabilitytocontinue and renew the fighting. The effectiveness of these attacks is unclear.


2. It demolished theDahiyaneighborhood inBeirut, a closedquarterused by Hizbollah as both a residence and an operational controlarea.

3. ItinterceptedandshotdowntheAbabilUAVsthatHizbollahlaunchedtowardsIsrael.

4. During the fighting, together with other IDF units operating various radar devices, the air force created a system for detecting rocketlaunchingsinordertoprovideadvancewarningtothehomefront.

5. During the war, it executed approximately 120 rescue missions,nearlyhalfoftheminenemyterritory.Threehundredsixtywoundedsoldierswererescuedinthesemissions.ItalsoparachutedsuppliestoIDF fighting units.

6. In the later stages of the fighting, the air force began operations against Katyushadeployment.Theeffectivenessoftheseattackswaslimited,and this activity did not alter the rate of Katyusha fire against Israel.

Toattaintheseachievements,theairforceconsumedalargequantityofresources:

1. The total number of sorties during the fighting was only slightly fewer thanintheYomKippurWar.

Table 1.SuccessinMissionstoDestroytheVariousRockets

Type Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Quantity Result

122-mm Katyusha

7-40 7 13,000 Most of the rockets and launchers were not destroyed.

220-mm, 302-mm, Fadjr 5, 3

45-70 50-175 about 1,000

Most of the launchers were destroyed: half in the first attack wave, and half in search and destroy missions. Launchers from which rockets were launched were destroyed.

Zelzal 2 200 400-600 dozens The vast majority was destroyed in the early days of the fighting. Not a single missile was launched.

54 I Giora Romm

2. The total number of attack missions flown during the fighting was greaterthanintheYomKippurWar.

3. The total number of combat helicopter missions flown was double the number flown in the first Lebanon war, Operation Accountability, and OperationGrapesofWrathcombined.

4. The air force depleted its supply of certain types of armaments,resultinginaneedforimmediatestocksfromoverseas.

Themarginaleffectivenessof theairforcecombatmissionsdeclinedsteeply as the fighting progressed, mostly because of the unlikely ratio of thenumberoftargetswithanyvaluewhatsoever(whichdroppedsharply)totheforcesavailabletoandoperatedbydesignersoftheaerialcombat.

The Northern Command began the fighting with the Galil Division. PermissiontocalluponedivisionwasgrantedonJuly13.Sixtythousandreservists were called up during the fighting, a force equivalent to four divisions.

The following principal stages occurred in the ground fighting:1. A limited ground operation along the border aimed at destroying

Hizbollah’s infrastructure therebeganonJuly18.Touse theIDF’sterminology,thesewere“fence-hugging”operationsdesignedtodealwith Hizbollah’s low trajectory firepower.

2. ActionbyindividualbrigadesinMarouna-RasandBintJbailbeganonJuly22.

3. Ground operations were expanded on July 29 in order to create asecurityzone.

4. OperationChangeofDirection8,carriedoutfromAugust1toAugust10,sawbrigadeteamsseizestrategicallycommandingterritoryandattackterrorists.

5. TwohelicopterlandingsneartheLitaniRivertookplaceonAugust12and13inordertogivetheIDFcontrolofthisregion.

6. RegularandreserveinfantryandarmoredforcesenteredtheKatyushazone during the fighting. They fought several battles, whose effect on theoveralloperationalgoalswasmarginal.

During the ground fighting, Israel’s artillery fired over 180,000 shells andhundredsofMLRSrocketsattheKatyushazone.Thereisnoindicationthat this ongoing artillery fire achieved any substantial achievements; it clearlydidnotaffecttherateofKatyushalaunchings.


In general, the system that should have laid out the general staff’soperational plans for the forces’ operating commands had difficulty doing so,whichcreatedalargeandgrowinggapbetweenthegeneralstaffandtheNorthernCommand.Thegeneralstaffwasperceivedashesitant,whiletheNorthernCommandwasperceivedaslackinginperformancecapability.The result was an overall negative result in the ground fighting.

Despitepartialsuccesses,whoselongtermeffect isunclear,boththecivilianandthemilitaryleadershipsappearedincapableofleadingaclearand decisive military conflict. In addition to inadequate professional capability,oneofthereasonsforthiswastheleadership’soverreactiontoeveryincidentinwhichthegroundforcessufferedlosses,evenwhenthesewere separate from the operational campaign itself (in the Kfar Giladiincident,forexample,wheretwelvereservistsnotyetengagedincombatwere killed by rocket fire).

Inpreviouswars, the IDFchief of staff devotedmost of his time tohandlingproblematicpointsonthebattlefronts,inordertobothovercomedifficulties and spot strategic possibilities (as did Moshe Dayan in the Sinai CampaignandDavidElazarintheYomKippurWar).Thesameistrueinforeignarmies.ThiswasthegreatnessofNapoleon,MacArthur,Rommel,andothers.Inhisabsence,thecommander’sstaffremainedbehindandwasentrustedwithmanagingthewar.InthecampaigninLebanon,itappearedthat the chief of staff did not apply enough personal influence to solve theproblemofweaknessintheNorthernCommand’sgroundoperations,including drastic replacements of commanding officers, even though he visitedtheNorthernCommandalmosteveryday.

A Test of the Enemies’ Strategies

ThestrategiesemployedbytheIDFandHizbollahevolvedoverthethirty-three days of the conflict. The core of these strategies was the respective concepts thathaddevelopedover theprevioussixyears,but thesewereadaptedonaconstantbasisinresponsetotheparticularwaythatmattersunfolded.

TheIDF’sstrategydividedLebanonintothetheatersofresponsibilityoftheNorthernCommandandtheairforce.

56 I Giora Romm

1. Southern Lebanon – the region between the Litani River and theIsraeli-Lebaneseborder–wasalreadyintheoperativejurisdictionofthe Northern Command before the war. As the fighting went on, the NorthernCommandwasresponsibleforasmallerarea.

2. Theair forceboreoperational responsibility forallotherLebaneseterritory.

Along with the geographical division was an incomplete division oftasks.Heretoo,alackofclarityinconductingthewarwastheresult.Intheairforce’ssphereofresponsibility,i.e.,theentireareaofLebanonexceptfor thesouth,aclearattackstrategywasused.TheNorthernCommandexerted its influence in the phase directed towards pushing Hizbollah away from the area near the Israeli border. Beyond this, there were nosignificant plans at that stage for dealing with the Katyushas or for any otherobjective.

Hizbollah’sassets(“targets”fromanIsraeliperspective)canbeplottedon two-dimensional axes that rank them according to “signature”1 and“exposure time”2 (figure 1). The lower the signature and the shorter the exposure time, the less possible it is to deal with a target from the air.While the vast majority of targets can be dealt with from the air, shortrangeKatyushasmustbedealtwithprimarilythroughgroundoperations.

Figure 1.TargetsandMeansofAttack

Bridges

Power stations

Airfields

Residential buildings

Supplies

conveyed

by truck

from Syria

Katyusha

Range

Zelzal

Underground targets Intelligence

No intelligence

Rockets

Sign

atur

e

Exposure timeGround solution preferred

Aer

ial s

olut

ion

pref

erre

d


TheIDF’sreluctancetoconductgroundoperationsinsouthernLebanongoes back many years. It reflects a belief that the threat (Katyusha fire against civilians)doesnotjustifytheprice(thelivesofcombatsoldiers),whichmeansthatthesolutionforthisoperationalproblemistobefoundelsewhere.This belief greatly affected the readiness to enter a ground conflict and the way that IDF forces operated. It was assumed that heavy pressure andsubstantialachievementintheairforce’stheaterofresponsibilitywouldalsoneutralizethethreatofshortrangemissilesfromsouthernLebanon.TheIDF’sassumptionthattheachievementsinnorthernLebanonwouldprevent the launchingofKatyushas fromsouthernLebanonwasprovenhighlymistaken:Hizbollahlaunched100-200KatyushasperdayagainstIsraeli communities (figure 2).

Only late in the conflict did the IDF comprehend the significance of its failure to stop the flow of Katyushas. The military leadership apparently felt thatitwasundernotimepressure;thepoliticalleadershipwasresponsibleforthisfeeling,althoughtimeisafactoronlypartiallysubjecttoIsrael’sinfluence, if at all. Furthermore, the feeling of having all the time in the worldmayhavebeenconvenientforthepoliticalleadership,butitworkedagainsttheoperationalcommand.Themilitaryleadershipcanbestachieveits objectives when it has a definite, fairly rigid time framework.

Figure 2. NumberofKatyushaRocketsFiredduringtheWar

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

13/0

715

/07

17/0

719

/07

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723

/07

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727

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731

/07

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804

/08

06/0

808

/08

10/0

812

/08

5� I Giora Romm

The IDF also failed to comprehend the Israeli public.The IDF mayhave evaluated the Katyusha phenomenon according to the number ofcivilian casualties. Indeed, in comparison with casualties from terroristactions,suchassuicidebombings,civilianlossesinthewarwerefew.Itthereforeseemedtothedecisionmakersthatitwaspossibletolivewiththe Katyusha fire for an extended period. At a certain point in the war, however, and at least in part as a function of the ongoing rocket fire, the public’s sense of accomplishment changed to a feeling of uncertaintyregardingthecampaign.Thisaffectedthedegreeofpublicsupportforthegovernment with respect to the continuation of the fighting. Towards the end of the war, the fact that the Katyusha fire would be the criterion for determiningwhowonthecampaignwasfullyunderstood.Theexpandedgroundoperationsweredesignedtodealwiththisbombardment,butwereofnoavail.

Hizbollah’s strategy developed in response to Israel’s measures. Itstrovetoexploititsremainingmilitaryassetsinanoperationalsituation.TheresultsoftheIsraelAirForce’sattacksagainstHizbollahtargetsintheearlydaysofthewarwereagreatshocktotheorganization’sleadership.Hizbollahhadnoactivetools(asopposedtopassivetools)fordealingwiththeairforce’soperationinmostofLebanon’sterritory.

Hizbollah realized that the great hour of its Katyusha rockets hadcome,whichwastranslatedintothebombardmentofIsraelicommunitiesin northern Israel and Haifa (due to the latter’s greater strategic valuein Israel’s perception). In contrast to the initial concept of Hizbollah’sKatyushasystemasrandom(onbothtimeandgeographicaxes)manuallyoperated launchings, the system was organized and well prepared for firing inaregularmilitaryformat.Manyofthelaunchingsiteswereplannedandcalculated in advance. Some of the sites were camouflaged and concealed to varying degrees, making it possible to use the launching equipmentrepeatedly.Hizbollahgroundforcesdefendedthelaunchingarea,helpedbyreinforcedpositionsandbunkerspreparedinadvance.Anti-tankmissilesandpitswereusedextensively.HizbollahalsodevelopedarapidresponsecapabilitytoIDFactivity,basedoneavesdroppingonIDFcommunications.ThisgavethemtheupperhandinmanyoftheclashesbetweenIDFandHizbollahgroundunits.

A Test of Rival Strategies: Two Ships Passing in the Night I 5�

The way that the war was conducted reflected two strategies with practicallynointersectingpoints.TheIDF’sstrategywasbasedprimarilyonairsuperiority,whileHizbollah’sstrategyutilized thehighdegreeofimpregnability of its short range rocket system. During most of the fighting, both sides refrained from any attempt to challenge the other’s strategy.HavingnoalternativeHizbollahrefrainedfromdefendingitsassetsinthenorth, except for thedefenseof its seniorcommandsystemand systemofoperationalcontrol.TheIDF,ontheotherhand,deliberatelyrefrainedfrom stopping the Katyusha fire with ground forces, due to both the error in evaluating the operational significance of the bombardment and concern abouta landentanglement.TheIDFthusfounditselfexecutingaseriesof ground operations designed for other operational purposes. Utilizinga sophisticated theory of warfare to attack the Katyusha system wasattempted,butitwastoolittleandtoolate.Groundwarfare,whenittookplace,occurredtoagreatextentaccordingtorulesdictatedbyHizbollah.ThisgreatlyreducedtheIDF’srelativeadvantageasanarmycapableofoperatingverylargeandpowerfulstructures.TheIDFdemonstratedalowlevel ofmilitary capability in thegroundbattles–both inplanning theobjective and in leadership to achieve the defined objective.

Asaresult,thewarwaswagedmostofthetimelikeafootballgamebetweentwoteamsplayingagainsteachotherasiftheywereonseparateplaying fields, or like two ships passing each other in the night.

Conclusion

Theprincipallessonsofthewarareasfollows:

• Thepoliticalgoalsofthewar,andevenmoresotheoperativemilitarygoals,shouldbeformulatedinclearlanguagenotsubjecttodifferentinterpretations.Thisallowsevaluatingthedegreetowhichthegoalscanbeaccomplished.ThiswasnotthecasewiththewarinLebanon.ThefactthatwarsintheMiddleEastareultimatelyalsousedtoadvancethepoliticalgoalsoftheinternationalforcesoperatingintheregionshouldbetakenintoaccountinformulatingpoliticalgoals.

• A serious error occurred in understanding the significance of Hizbollah’s Katyusha system, and in evaluating theway itwasoperated and itsresults.Inconsequence,theIDFdelayeditsresponsetotheproblem,

60 I Giora Romm

enabling Hizbollah to assume the appearance of a force whoseoperational capabilities were preserved up until the ceasefire.

• ThegroundcampaignrevealedseriousproblemsinthelevelofplanningandexecutionbyIDFgroundforces.Itappearsthattheproblemwasnot confined to technical aspects; it concerned fundamental aspects on whichaneffectivemilitaryforceshouldbebased.Althoughthewarwasalimitedone,itexposedthefactthattherearetwoarmedforcesintheIDF:theairforceandthegroundforces.Anattempttoexplainthegapbetweenthetwoforcessolelyinbudgetarytermswillnothelprestorethegroundforcestotheirrequiredperformancelevel.

• The political and strategic consequences of the continuation of fighting beyond the first week were not completely understood. Likewise, the decisiveimportanceofanexitstrategydesignedtoidentifythepointof optimal achievement was not grasped. The political leadershipsurrenderedtoafeelingthat“theworldisonourside,”andwasblindtotheIDF’sclumsyoperationalperformance.Followingthewar,anatmosphereoffeverishhasteprevailedindrawing

conclusionsrelatedtobasicconcepts inIsrael’ssecuritydoctrine.Theselessonsconcernmatterssuchas theexpectedchange in thecharacterofthe threat to Israel, the attempt to quantify Israel’s deterrent power, thechangeinbuildingtheIDF’spower,andsoon.Nonetheless,crystallizedopinions and the concretemeasures tobebasedon themshouldnot bederivedprematurely.

Notes1. Signature–informationintheformofvariouswavelengthsemittedbyeveryobject

thatmakesitpossibletotrackit.2. Operational exposure time – the span of time during which it is possible to hit a

target.

Chater 5

The Military Campaign in Lebanon

Gabriel Siboni

Introduction

The war in Lebanon exposed significant deficiencies in the IDF’s level of preparednessforawidescalemilitaryconfrontation.Thesewereparticularlynoticeable in view of the IDF’s ongoing impressive ability to confrontPalestinian terror. The discrepancy in the IDF’s performance regardingthesetwodifferentoperationalchallenges–combatingPalestinianterrorand fighting the Hizbollah organization in Lebanon – raises numerous questions with regard to the way the forces are operated and justifies an examination of all the components that comprise the IDF system. NoteshouldalsobetakenoftheimpactofprocesseslaunchedintheIDFatthestartofDanHalutz’stermaschiefofstaff,withregardtoallaspectsofthe IDF’scommandandcontrolconceptsandorganizationof the IDF’sheadquarters.

ThisessayexaminestheIDF’sperformanceinthewarontwolevels:force operation and the functioning concept of the General Staff. Thisinvolvesscrutinizingthebasiccomponentsateachlevelandunderstandingtheir impact on the IDF’s performance in the war. Focusing on this specific dimensionofthewar,theessaydoesnotlookatnavalcombat,intelligence,homefrontoperations,orlogisticsat thegeneralstaff level.Nordoesitaddress theplanning andobjectivesof theoperations.Thesehavebeenanalyzedseparatelyinotheressaysinthiscollection.

62 I Gabriel Siboni

Hizbollah’s Force Operation

ThefollowinganalysisofHizbollah’sforceoperationinthewaragainsttheIDF is based on the organization’s actual performance on the battlefield. This analysis draws only slightly from intelligence material or prioranalysis of the organization’s principles of force operation. Hizbollah’suseofforceincorporatedanumberofelements:

• Standoff firepower was the organization’s principal means, wherebyrockets with different ranges were deployed in a number of areas.Thepositionof the launchersvariedaccording to the rocket ranges.ShortrangerocketswerelaunchedprimarilyfromtheareasouthoftheLitaniRiver.MediumrangerocketswerelaunchedfromtheTyreareaandfromnorthoftheLitani,andsomeattemptsweremadetolaunchrockets from an area even further north. Hizbollah likewise tried tooperateanumberofarmedunmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs),withoutsuccess. The organization’s other standoff fire effort included firing surface-to-seamissilesonIsraelinavyvessels.ThemainobjectiveofHizbollah’s rocket forcewas to strikeat civilian targets in Israel, inordertocauseasmanycasualtiesaspossibleanddisruptcivilianlife.Ingeneral,thelauncheswereexecutedinanorganizedmanner,basedonpreplannedoperational plans and apparentlyongood centralizedcontrol.This mode of operation continued throughout the war, thusreflecting Hizbollah’s ability to maintain high level command and control during the fighting.

• Wearing down the IDF forces: the aim of Hizbollah’s close battleefforts was to cause as many IDF casualties as possible. Hizbollahmade an extensive use of anti-tank missiles and mortar fire, along with preparedobstacles,boobytraps,andmines.Therewasalmostnouseofmaneuver-based fighting other than localized reinforcement of forces inahandfulofbattles.ThedrivingideawastodisrupttheoperationsofIDFforcesandwearthemdown.Inpractice,theorganizationdidnot fight to keep territory, and in this context it operated like a typical guerilla force. It deployed in previously prepared fighting posts. The anti-tank and mortar fire used was based on prior analysis of the terrain, anditwasdirectedtowardsanticipatedroutesofapproachoftheIDFtroops.Thesystemofobstacles,whichincludedlandminesandbooby

The Military Campaign in Lebanon I 63

traps,wasalsopreparedbasedonthisanalysisoftheterrainandoftheIDF’sexpectedapproachroutes.Inmostcases“counterattacks”1werenotlaunchedagainsttheIDFforces.AnextensionofthiseffortwasaHizbollah effort to engage the IDF aircraft; however the flight profile of the Israel Air Force’s fixed wing aircraft rendered the standoff fire against theaircraft ineffective.Thiswasnot thecasewith regard toengagement of helicopters and in fact, one heavy combat transporthelicopterwasshotdown.One can summarize by saying that Hizbollah’s force operation was

basedontwoprincipalefforts.Theseeffortstookplaceintheareaofthefrontlineand in thesecondary linearea that spreadnorthwardup to theLitaniRiver,andindeeperareaswheretheorganization’slogistics,training,andcommandinfrastructurewasdeployed.TheIDF’soperationsagainstHizbollah developed gradually. Only towards the end of the fighting was theIDFcalledontoprovideacomprehensiveresponsetothefullrangeofHizbollahthreatsandinparticulartostoprocketlaunchesagainstIsrael.

IDF Force Operation

A range of IDF operational abilities was utilized during the fighting in Lebanon. This included the use of air assets, land firepower and maneuvers, navalforces,andspecialforces,aswellasuseofpsychologicalwarfare;Home Front Command rescue forces; and finally, other support capabilities, suchasintelligenceandlogistics.Thisessayexaminestheuseofairassets,landforces,andspecialforces.

Use of the Airpower

The air force operated in two different theaters: first, the air force was givencommandauthorityover theareastretchingfromtheLitaniRivernorthward(thedeeptheaterofoperations).Inthesecondtheater,southoftheLitani, theair forcewas tasked tosupport theNorthernCommand’soperations and was controlled by the Command’s command post. Thatincluded independent air missions serving the Northern Command’soperations,aswellasclosesupportforthegroundforces.

Thedeeptheaterofoperations,namely,themissionsandobjectivesthatweretobeachievednorthoftheLitaniRiverincluded:

64 I Gabriel Siboni

• Striking the rocket launch capability.AirforceattackswereaimedatdamagingHizbollah’slaunchingcapabilities.Naturallymostlymediumandlongerrangerocketweredeployedinthisarenaandtheattacksonthemwerevery successful.The short range rocketsdeployed in thecloserareas,however,posedadifferentchallengebecauseoftheirlowsignatureandgreatnumber,andtheachievementsintheattacksagainstthem were insignificant. Some medium range rockets were launched from the area of Tyre that falls under the Northern Command’sresponsibility.Nevertheless, the air forcewasgiven the authority tooperateindependentlyagainstthemanddidsosuccessfully.

• Destroying Hizbollah’s organizational and operational infrastruc-tures. From the first day of the fighting the air force tried to impair Hizbollah’s organizational and operational infrastructures deep inthisarena.Controlcenters,communicationssystems,andtheDahiyaquarter that hosted the Hizballah HQ indeed were hit and sufferedsignificant damage; apparently the greatest damages were inflicted on Hizbollah’sorganizationalinfrastructuresandintheDahiyaquarter.

• Isolating the war arena. The air force operated to isolate the fighting arenabyhittingtheLebanesetransportationinfrastructure,whichlikelycontributedtotheoverallpressureontheLebanesegovernment.

• Damaging national Lebanese infrastructures. TheairforcewaslimitedindamagingLebanon’snational infrastructuresdue toagovernmentconstraint imposed from the outset of the fighting.

Command of the Deep Theater of Operations

This is probably the first time the air force was given overall authority for ageographicaltheater.Inordertoapplythisauthoritytheairforcehadtoimplementafullcommandandcontrolcycle.Thisincludedalltherelevantprocesses involved, from receipt of the orders from the chief of staff,throughoperationalplanning,issuingcommandordersandsub-missions,controlling the implementation by the forces, and finally, reviewing achievementoftheobjectivesandthemissions.Aspartofthisprocess,thetheatercommandhadtooptimizeforceoperationbyidentifyingthebestcompositionof theforceforachievingthemissions.This is theessenceofintegratedforceoperation.Duringthewartheairforceappearstohavestruggled to implement this authority fully, and thus in effect operated


more as a firepower and targets contractor. This may be the result of the operationalcultureoftheairforceandthemannerinwhichhistoricallyitperceivesitsroleinwarfare.Developingtheairforce’scapabilitytoserveas an effective central command in a geographical operational combattheater requires its internalizing the different needs and processes andits implementing all the components of force buildup: training officers, developingdoctrine,exercises,organization,anddevelopmentofweaponsystems.Giventhechallengesoffuturewars,wherebytheairforcewillbecalledontocarryoutsimilarmissions,includingcommandresponsibilityfor other theaters ofwar, itwill be required to generate such a processasquicklyaspossibleinordertoenhancetheeffectivenessofitstheatercommand.

Air Force Support to the Northern Command Operations

Theair forcedeployedacontrol facilityat theNorthernCommandHQtocontrolairpoweroperationsinthecommand’stheateraccordingtoitstaskingandpriorities.InpracticethelinkbetweenthiscontrolfacilityandtheNorthernCommandHQfailedtooperateeffectively.Inaddition,theairstrikesagainsttheshortrangerocketsystemwereunsuccessful,mainlyduetothefactthattherocketlaunchesdidnothaveanadequatesignaturethatenabledtheairforcetocompleteattackcycles.2

The close air support proved inadequate. It was designed to enablecommanders in the battlefield to direct attack helicopters and attack aircraft against specific targets, according to the battle needs and in real time. The useof air assets in theNorthernCommand theater failed to achieve itsgoals. It seems that the ability to use close air support has declined inrecentyears,largelyduetothedegenerationoftheliaisonsystemthatwasestablishedinthepastbetweentheairforceandthegroundforces.Theairsupportsystemhasforallintentsandpurposesbeenterminated.

Ground Forces Operation

FourdivisionsoperatedintheNorthernCommandduringthewar.Theywere assembled incrementally during the course of the fighting, and were usedinamajorscaleoperationonlyinthelastdaysofthewar.TheNorthernCommandoperatedthesedivisionsfortwomainefforts:

66 I Gabriel Siboni

• Frontline effort – At the beginning of the fighting the division that was already deployed along the borderline was given responsibilityfor all operations along the borderline. As the fighting developed the borderlinewasdividedbetweentwodivisionsandeventuallyathirddivisionwasdeployedalongthemosteasternpartoftheborder.

• Deepmaneuveringeffort–Thiswasexercisedonlyduringthelastdaysofthewarandbyonereservedivision.ThisdeepeffortwasdesignedtodealmoreeffectivelywithHizbollah’sshortrangerocketry.

Variousinsightscanbederivedfromthegroundoperations:

• Lack of professionalism – During the fighting with Hizbollah, inadequateprofessionalismoftheforcesandcommandersinsomeofthecombatunitswasobserved.Thiswasthecaseforregularaswellasreserveunits.PriortothewarmostoftheregularforceswereengagedincombatingPalestinianterror.WhentheyweretransferredtoLebanon,they were unfit to conduct combined forces battles integrating infantry, armored, engineering, artillery forces, and other support forces. Insome instances, the units lacked both the skills and the necessaryorganic weapon systems required for this type of fighting. Under these circumstancesunitsfoundthemselvestryingtoadjustrapidly–oftensuccessfully – while engaged in fighting. The professionalism of the reservetroopswasnotbetterbutfordifferentreasons.Itresultedfromayears-longprocessduringwhichthearmyreserveswereneglected.The education and training of the officers were shown to be ineffective. Thelackofpracticaltrainingduringreservedutywasevident,aswasthelackofcohesionoftheunits,whichhadadetrimentaleffectontheiroperationalcapability.

• Combinedforceswarfare–Thisisafundamentalelementofgroundbased fighting. Its nature stems from the combat force’s ability to utilize thefullrangeofcombatcapabilities:armor,infantry,reconnaissance,intelligence, engineering, artillery, standoff fire, electronic warfare, attack helicopters, and fighter bombers, as well as use of combat transporthelicopterfordeepoperationsintheenemy’srearandalongthe flanks. All these are supported by appropriate command and control abilities.The IDF’s combat approach requires an integrationofallabilitiesinordertocreatethebestmixforengagingincombatwithinvariousarenas,toallowtheachievementoftheforce’smilitary


objectives.Neglectingtheuseofsomeofthesebasicelementsresultsindysfunctionofthecombinedforceandimpactsontheforce’sabilitytocompleteitsmissions.InthewarinLebanontwomainphenomenaemerged.The first was command. Command of the battles in Lebanon was

implemented by division commanders who had forces of various sizesunder their command. Most of the commanders did not have the skillsandtrainingneededtooperateacombinedforceprofessionally.Alackofknowledgeinoperatingtankandinfantryunitswasevident,andinsomecasesengineeringforceswerenotdirectedaccordingtotheIDF’sdoctrine.The artillery forces fired mostly on pre-planned targets and provided only inadequate close support for the ground forces.The available logisticalsystems were used only partially by the commanders, and this createdsupply problems and sometimes required some units to exit the battlefield toobtainsupplies.Thelackofprofessionalismofsomeofthecommandersinconductingcombinedforcesbattlesultimatelyledtosituationsinwhichunitsdidnotcarryouttheirmissions.ThisisacriticallapsethattheIDFmustcorrectquickly.

The second phenomenon was dysfunction of basic elements in thecombined force battle. The field commanders were not solely responsible for the inadequacy in operating the full combined force. For example:one of the most important tools of the fighting force is the capability to usecloseaerialsupport.Theessenceofsuchsupportistheabilityofthecommander to enlist aerial fire against targets that were not pre-planned, inresponsetoachangingoperationalsituation.Inpractice,theairforceapproachedthissubjectcompletelydifferentlyandinterpretedtheconceptofcloseairsupportasanotherversionofattacksongivengroundtargets.Anotherexampleofthefailuretousecombinedassetswasthelackofuseofcombattransporthelicoptersfortransportofgroundforcesotherthenspecialoperations.Thismeansthatanimportantmaneuveringcomponentwasnotused.Inpractice,theentiretransporthelicopterunitwassetasidetoservetheneedsofspecialoperationsdeepinsideLebanon,anddidnotatallsupportthedivision’smaneuveringneeds.

• Simplicity of the operational plans – The ability to formulate anoperational plan that is clear and simple is a basic component ofmilitary art. Simplicity is a valuable element in a unit’s ability to

6� I Gabriel Siboni

understandandultimately carryout itsmission effectively. Inmanycases and particularly among the regular force units, unclear orderswere issued that were not based on formal IDF doctrine and werewordedinunclearterminology.TheoriginofthislapseliesinthinkingthatbecamecommonintheIDFthat thereisa“magicaloperationalsolution,”whichoncefoundandrealizedisboundtoleadtovictory.Themainideawastotargettheenemy’sconsciousnessinwaysthatwillmake it possible to avoid direct engagement of the enemy in difficult battles. Military history, however, has repeatedly shown that battlesare actual physical occurrences, and ultimately do not take place intheenemy’sconsciousness.In thisLebanesewar theaterandagainstthisenemy,onehastoachieverealresultssuchasoccupyingterritory,killing enemy fighters, blocking axes of movement, and so on.

• Frequentchangesintheoperationalplans–Thisphenomenonoccurredtoo frequentlyamong theground forces.Changesarepartof theartof battle, yet their frequencyoften affects the capabilityof carryingoutamission.InthewarinLebanonnumerouschangesweremade,both in the definition of missions and in the composition of the forces. These changes generated continual confusion at subordinate levels,whichhadadetrimentaleffectontheunits’abilitiestoconductbattleseffectively and ultimately impacted negatively on their ability to fulfill themissions.Onecanassumethatthisphenomenonwasadirectresultof the lack of professionalism of some of the officers who while trying to achieve the “optimum” operational plan were not aware of theconfusion caused by frequent changes that impairs execution of themission.

• Continuity of fighting – An important principle of war, it entails maintaining ongoing contact with and engagement of the enemyto prevent the latter from recovering, regrouping, and improving itssituation. During the fighting in Lebanon this principle was noticeably absentfromthethinkingofcommanders,resultinginintervalsinthefighting and boosting the ability of the Hizbollah fighters to regroup and act against the IDF forces. The common explanation that thisphenomenon is an offshoot of years of combating Palestinian terrorin which the principle of avoidance of losses was a major priorityprovidesonly apartial answer, as someof the reserveunits didnot

The Military Campaign in Lebanon I 6�

put this principle of war into practice despite not being involved infighting Palestinian terror in recent years. One has to assume that thisphenomenonwaspartofthebroaderlackofprofessionalismandtraining.Theseinsightsrelatemainlytothedifferenthigherechelonsofcommand.

Inmostcasesinthelowerregimentalandcompanylevelsagoodlevelofcombat performance was demonstrated.The conclusion is that the IDFshouldprincipallyfocusonbrigadeanddivisioncommandlevelsinordertotracethesourcesofthesenegativephenomenaandtoformulateaplanfor improving command proficiency. In addition, the reserve forces require upgrading.Theseforcesarehighlymotivated.Theirmotivationmustbemaintained but they should be also allowed to have sufficient training, takingintoaccountthespecialneedsoftheseciviliansoldiers.Special Forces Operations

Special operations are a significant tool available to military command, i.e.,usingasmallforceinordertostriketheenemydeepinitsrear.Thisissometimesaclandestineoperation,aimedatachievinganintelligencegatheringobjective,andsometimesitisanoisyraid.Usingspecialforcesdeepinenemyterritoryisrequiredonvariouslevelsinaccordancewithoperational needs. It requires adequate professional skills, both of theoperationalforceandofthecommandingHQ.

The use of IDF special forces in Lebanon occurred mainly in thestrategicdepthof theenemyterritory,andlessintheareasclosertothebattlefront. After the war broke out a post of coordinator for specialoperationswascreatedintheOperationsBranchoftheGeneralStaffforthis purpose.The special operations activity in the Northern Commandtheatersectorwasscarceand thiswasapparentlya resultof the lackofproficiency of the territorial command in carrying out special operations while simultaneously managing fighting in the front. The strategic special operationscannotreplacetheonesthatthecommandhastoimplementtosupportitsoperationalneeds.

Special operations deep in enemy territory are highly effective inoperational terms.Realizing theirpotential requiresenhancementof thecommand capability. In this context the IDF has to examine two mainaspects:

70 I Gabriel Siboni

• The need to establish an operational command for special operations, under the authority of the chief of staff.Thiscommandwilloperatein addition to the existing eight operation commands of the IDF. Itwillbeabletoenhancethechiefofstaffcontroloftheseoperationsaswell as the flexibility of use of the special forces. The command has toberesponsibleforbuildupofspecialforcescapabilitiesaswellascommandingtheminwartime.

• Enhancing the capability of the regional command to carry out special operations.Thisrequiresdevelopmentofdoctrine,organization,andtraining.

The IDF Functional Structure Concept

PriortothewaranewapproachtothewaytheIDFoperateswasformulated.ItdeterminedthedivisionofauthorityintheGeneralStaffaswellasthesystemofcommandandcontrolbythechiefofstaffovertheeightdifferentcommands(regionalandfunctional). Italsostipulated theresponsibilityforforceoperationandforcebuildupofthedifferentorganizations.

The war in Lebanon brought several issues to light that should beexamined. The first addresses the division of the theater of war into several operational theaters (regional and functional). In theyearspriortothedevelopmentofthisnewconcept, therewasatendencytoadheretoanapproachbasedontheideaoftheoperationaltheaterasthecentralelementinthemanagementofwar.Theunderlyingideareferstotwobasicelements: the first is that the operational theater incorporates all the fighting components of one’s forces against all the fighting components of the enemyinthesametheater.Thus,thisapproachholdsthatthereisan“ideal”division into operational theaters that satisfies the above requirements. The secondrelatestothecommandofthetheater–thisapproachdeterminesthatcommandoftheoperationaltheaterhastobegivento“anoperator”whoistheonlypartycapableofcoordinatingallmilitaryactivityinthetheater,andhealonehasthecapabilitytoformulateasystemicapproachtoconductingthecampaign(intheIDF,thisapproachiscalled“thesystemicidea”).Thebasicassumptionofthisapproachisthatbecauseofthisonlythechiefofstaffisabletoexerciseactualcommandofthefulloperational


theater,asonlyheperceivesthefullsystemicpictureandthustheiscapableofcommandingalltheIDF’soperationaltheaters.

Thenewconceptofcommandandcontroldeterminedthatthechiefofstaff is defined as the commander of the war theater, delegating operational authority to thedifferentoperational theater commanders, thusdividingthe theater of war into several operational theaters. Defining these areas of authorityrequiresthechiefofstafftodeterminethefollowingcomponentsforeachoperationaltheater:

• Authority–thechiefofstaffdeterminestheidentityofthecommanderwho is to be given the authority for undertaking the missions of aparticularoperationaltheater.

• Mission–thechiefofstaffassignsmissionstoeachcommander.

• Resources–thechiefofstaffallocatesresourcestoeachoperationaltheaterbasedonhisconstraintsandontheoperationalrequirementsforrealizingthemissions.

• Planning and execution constraints and guidelines–thechiefofstaffdeterminestheplanningandexecutionconstraintsforeachcommanderas he sees fit.

Realization of the Concept in the War in Lebanon

TheareasofauthorityintheLebanonwarweredeterminedinaccordancewiththistheoreticalapproach,startingwiththe war theater.Thechiefofstaff,as thewar theatercommander,consideredhimself thecommanderof all the IDF’s fighting arenas (north, center, south, air, sea, intelligence, homefront,andlogistics)andasthefunctionrequired,hewastoseethefullpictureofthewarandtovaryingdegreesthepictureunfoldingineacharena.

Astotheoperationaltheaters,thechiefofstafforderedadivisionintoanumberofoperationaltheaters,asfollows:thesouthernoperationaltheater– of the Southern Command, conducting the fighting with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and safeguarding the borders with Egypt and Jordan;thecentraloperationaltheater–conductingtheCentralCommand’sbattleagainst Palestinian terror in the West Bank. The northern operationaltheater was split between the Northern Command, which was givenresponsibilityovertheareasouthoftheLitaniRiver;theairforce,whichwasgivenresponsibilityovertheareanorthof theLitani;andthenavy,

72 I Gabriel Siboni

which was given the responsibility to conduct naval warfare, impose anavalblockade,andexecuteothermissionsinthenavalarenaoppositetheLebanonshoreline.

The extent to which the basic principles of this approach wereimplementedmaybeanalyzedasfollows:

• Missions – The orders issued by the General Staff had to define clearly the missions to be achieved in each operational theater. Generallymissions were well defined.

• Resources –Examinationoftheallocationofresourcestothemissionsand constraints leads to the conclusion that there was no lack ofresources. Inorder toexamine thesuitabilityof the resources to themissionsonecanconductamentalexercisecomparing themissionsandtheresourcesavailabletotheIDFCommandsinthe2006LebanonwarversusthemissionsandresourcesavailabletotheseCommandsinpreviouswars,forexampleintheYomKippurWar.WithoutengagingincomplexbookkeepingexercisesonecandeterminethattheextentoftheresourcesavailabletotheCommandswasadequate.

• Authority – The question here is whether the chief of staff defined the areasofauthorityamongthevariousheadquartersclearlyanddidnotleave some undefined areas. The delegation of authority in the northern front bydividing the area into twooperational theaters– controlledby the air force and the Northern Command – can be consideredsatisfactory.3

• Planning and execution constraints and guidelines –Toalargeextentthese reflect the chief of staff’s perception of the specific operational effort.Thedegree towhich theseguidelineswere issuedclearlyandin accordancewith theCommandhierarchy shouldbeexamined. Inmany cases during the war in Lebanon orders included great detailon planning, implementation, guidelines, and constraints. The chiefofstaffhascompletefreedomandinmanycasesevenanobligationto define planning implementation and guidelines constraints. These definitions, as detailed as they may be, are only a basis for operational planningandshouldnotbeusedasanexcuse for faultyoperationalplanning.TheextenttowhichtheIDF’soperationaleffectivenessincreasedasa

resultofthesenewconceptsshouldbeevaluated.Itseemsthattransferring


responsibilityforoperatingforcesdeepinenemyterritorytotheairforceensured the required focus on this type of mission. On the other hand,itisquestionablewhethertheairforcesucceededineffectivelyrealizingitsauthorityoverthisoperationaltheater.Theairforceoperatedovertheyearsasatargetscontractororastheexecuterofanaerialcampaign(suchasdestroying theairports in theSixDayWar,ordestroying themissilebatteries in Lebanon during the first Lebanon war). Prior to the 2006 warinLebanontheairforcehadneverundertakenanoperationaltheatercommand.Initialexaminationindicatesthattheairforcehasyettorealizethiskindofcommandresponsibilityeffectively.AstotheperformanceoftheNorthernCommandheadquarters,whichhadtoexerciseitsauthorityand operate land, air, and sea efforts, as well as special operations,examinationsindicatethattheCommandhadtroublewithencompassingalltheeffortsandsynchronizingthemintoatangibleandcompleteeffort.Realizationofthenewapproachrequiredorganizationandtraining.Thesewerelacking,mainlybecausetheadoptionofthenewconcepttookplaceashorttimebeforethewarandthechangeprocesswassupposedtotakeseveralyears.

Conclusion

In order to allow improvement of the IDF’s preparedness for futureconfrontations, it seems thatmore focus shouldbegiven to the area ofgroundwarfare,whichhasacriticalimpactontheoperationaleffectivenessoftheIDFasawhole.Inadditiontotheconclusionsdrawnabove,otherbasicunderstandingscanbederived,including:

• Hizbollah’s performance. Hizbollah’s operations against the IDF,focused on trying to inflict as many casualties as possible, were based on using pre-prepared fixed posts. This is probably one of the first timesthatsuchascattereddefensivetacticwasusedinadecentralizedmethodical manner. In most cases the organization’s fighting force did not carry out operational maneuvers and in most cases, whenIDF troops came into direct contact with Hizbollah fighters, the IDF gained the upper hand. The effectiveness of the use of anti-tankweaponsbyHizbollahwasnotunusualcomparedtowhatcouldhavebeen expected. The IDF’s armored forces can contend with such

74 I Gabriel Siboni

weaponssuccessfully,byimplementingtheircurrentweaponsystemsand doctrine. In addition, the underground fortifications and bunkers systemsaremostlyeffectiveagainstapproachingforcesmaneuveringinkillingzones.SwiftpenetrationintotheseHizbollahpostsanddirectcloserangeengagementoftheenemyexposestheweaknessofthesedeployments.Effortsshouldbemadetodeveloptacticsthatutilizethisweakness.

• Coordinating force buildup by the General Staff.TheIDF’slongtermforce buildup processes had enormous impact on the preparednessof the fighting forces. Such processes do not only relate to the IDF’s weaponsystemsprocurement,thoughthisgenerallygrabsmostofthepublic’s attention due to its budgetary implications. Force buildup,however,includesadditionalcomponentsofnolessimportance,suchas:commandersselectionprocedures, training,and thedevelopmentof proper doctrines. The military’s branches and headquarters withauthority for force buildup have to examine the lessons of the fighting in Lebanonandimplementthemthroughanintegratedandcomprehensiveprocess. For example, the findings about the inadequate coordination betweentheairforceandgroundforcesinthecombinedforcesbattleandincloseairsupportdemandsthoroughinterventionbytheGeneralStaffinordertorectifyitbymakingthenecessaryintegrationamongthedifferentservicesandbranches.Itmustre-constructtheinterfacelinesamongthedifferentheadquartersresponsibleforbuildupprocessestoenableeachtotakeintoaccounttheneedsoftheothers.

• Force buildup of the army (ground forces).Thenegativephenomenaobservedinthearmyduringthewarresultedfromprocessesthattookplace over many years, for example, the lack of professionalism ofsome of the forces in conducting combined force battles. Thus, theIDFingeneralandthearmyheadquartersinparticularmustexaminethoroughlythehistoryoftheseprocessesandthereasonswhytheytookplace,andthentrytoofferwaystosolvetherootproblems.Anotherkeyarea that requires attention relates to theprocessesof selection,training,education,andinstructionofthecommanders.

• The effectiveness of the independent ground forces headquarters.This shouldbeexamined inviewof the fact that thenumberof thearmy divisions has significantly decreased over the last decade, while


the resources for the ground forces headquarters has increased.Theinterfacebetweentheregionalcommandsthatactuallycommandthesefighting forces and the ground forces’ headquarters that are responsible for the buildup of the force should be improved in order to betterpreparethedivisions’readinessforcombat.Theresultsofthedifferentbattlesinthiswarshowedthatthereisnocorrelationbetweenthesizeofthegroundforces’headquartersandtheoperationaleffectivenessofthe fighting combat units.

• Special forces.Theuseofspecial forces in thewar inLebanonwasnot comprehensive enough. Their use in the deep fighting theater north oftheLitaniRiveraswellasinHizbollah’sstrategicrearwerehighlyeffective. However, the use of special operations by the NorthernCommandandevenbythedivisionallevelwasinadequate.TheIDFmusttrytoimproveitspreparednessfortheuseoftheseforcesatalllevels,boththroughtheestablishmentofadedicatedheadquartersforthespecialforcesandthroughimprovementofregionalanddivisioncommandscapabilitiestoimplementspecialoperations.

• The time dimension. In this war the time dimension comprisedan important parameter. The messages conveyed by the politicalleadership to theIDFindicated that Israelenjoyed legitimacyfor itsmilitaryoperation,andthereforetheIDFhadnopoliticaltimelimitforrealizingtheoperationalobjectives.ThismessagepenetratedthroughIDFcommandechelonsandharmedtheforces’abilitytoexecutetheirmissionseffectivelyandvigorouslybasedonthenotionthatoneshouldnotputtheforcesatrisktoattainanobjectivethatmightbeachievedlaterwith fewercasualties. It shouldbe remembered that shorteningthe duration of the fighting is an operational need of the fighting force. Theerosionofthetimeconstraintsledeventuallytoadeclineintheoperationaleffectivenessoftheforces.DespitethefactthatthepoliticalleadershipallowedtheIDFageneroustimeframe,theIDF’sforceshadtounderstandthatthatitwasincumbentonthemtooperatevigorously,aimtoachievetheirmissionsasquicklyaspossible,andshortenthedurationofthewar.Observersofthewarmayhaveasenseoffrustrationemanatingfrom

thetensionbetweenthegeneralpositivepoliticalandstrategicresultsofthewarandthepoorperformanceofsomeoftheIDF’sforces.IntheinterestofmaintainingasenseofproportionitshouldberememberedthattheIDF

76 I Gabriel Siboni

operatedseveralparallelefforts:aerialoperations,navalactivity,specialoperations, psychological warfare, and army operations. The first four werehighlyeffectiveincarryingouttheirmissions.Mostofthelessonsofwaranalyzedaboverelatetothegroundforcesoperations,andinfactmuchimprovement is requiredin thisarea.Alongside theproblemsandfailuresdescribedinthisessayonecandeterminethat thewarachievedaconsiderablenumberofstrategicandpoliticalobjectives,andthatisinfactthesupremetestofamilitaryforceinawar.Thecomingyearswillbeabletodemonstratewhethertheseachievementsarerobustenoughbyprovidingananswertothemainquestions:Werethepoliticalobjectivesdetermined by the government eventually achieved? And, was Israel’sstrategicpositionultimatelyimproved?

Notes1. According to military doctrine, a counterattack is an offensive response of the

defending force that carries out an attacking maneuver outside its fixed positions. The use of standoff fire is not considered a counterattack.

2. An attack cycle is defined as a process of identifying the target, attacking the target, andexaminingtheresultsoftheattack.

3. Appointingthedeputychiefofstaffasthechiefofstaff’srepresentativeatNorthernCommand, even though this appointment is not defined in the command and control concept,didnothaveanyeffectontheauthorityoftheheadoftheCommandoverutilization of the forces in the northern campaign arena. It seems that the difficulty with thisappointmentderivesfromasenseoflackoffaithconveyedbychiefofstafftotheCommand leader, and this filtered down through the ranks.

Chapter 6

Intelligence in the War: Observations and Insights

Aharon Ze’evi Farkash

InJuly2006,afterthreefailedkidnappingattempts,HizbollahsucceededinkidnappingtwoIsraelisoldiersandkillingeightothers.ThissuccessfuloperationbytheLebaneseorganizationcameontheheelsofthekidnappingofthesoldierGiladShalitbythePalestiniansneartheGazaStripborder.These provocations, together with the IDF’s withdrawal from LebanoninMay2000,lentthenecessarylegitimacytotheIDF’sresponse,whichdevelopedintotheSecondLebanonWar.

ThefollowingessayprobestheroleofMilitaryIntelligence,oneoftheelements that had a substantive influence on the war, beginning with the situationassessmentasitwaspresentedtothecabinet,includingtheprimeminister,priortothekidnappinginJuly2006.

The Hizbollah Profile

Military Intelligence’s organizational profile of Hizbollah, which was borne out in the 2006 war, was composed over several years. It reflects several formative influences, including the events of May 2000, when the IDFwithdrewfromsouthernLebanon.Thislandmarkeventwasfollowedbyfouradditionalprocessesofstrategicimportancethatimpactedontheorganization,itsaims,anditsmodusoperandi:

• ThedeathofHafezal-AsadandtherisetopowerofhissonBashar,whoopenedthedoorsoftheAlawicommunityinSyriatotheIranian-Shiitedawa.

7� I Aharon Ze’evi Farkash

• TheoutbreakofthesecondPalestinianintifadainSeptember2000.

• DevelopmentsintheIslamicSunna,includingthespecialstatusofal-QaedaandtheSeptember2001terroristattacksintheUnitedStates.

• Critical developments in Iran regarding the infrastructure for themilitary nuclear program: first, the transition stage of converting lead metal to gas, and the stage of enriching uranium to produce fissile materialthatisessentialforproducinganuclearbomb.Secondwastheannouncement that the long range surface-to-surface missile system– the Shehab 3 – was operational and placed under the supervisionof the Revolutionary Guards. Third, there was growing significant involvementbyIran,viaSyriaandHizbollah,inPalestinianterror.ThisallowedIrantoimplementanewdefenseconcept,wherebyPalestinianterrorandHizbollah’stacticalabilitiesplayedamajorroleindeterringIsraelfromactingagainsttheIraniannuclearprogram.Hizbollah’s increased power, which reflected the interests of the

organization itself as well as Iranian and Syrian policies, saw theestablishmentofamilitarysystemreadyfortheasymmetricalwarsofthetwenty-first century. A major component of the organization’s military abilitiesisthemulti-stratarocketarray,builtwithSyrianandIranianshortrangeweaponsofabout30kmto40km,mediumrangearmsofabout50kmto110km,andweaponscapableoflongrangestrikesof200kmormore.

Atthetimeofthewar,thegeographicdeploymentoftherocketarraywasasfollows:

• TheoperationalcorewasintheareaofNabatiyahandsouthoftheLitaniRiver, where there were short range rockets and camouflaged “nature reserves” that hid advanced anti-tank weapons; where fortifications werebuiltandexplosiveswerelaid;andwherealogisticalsystemforongoingcombatwasprepared.

• Theoperationaldepth,whichincludedthemediumrangerockets,suchastheFadjr3,Fadjr5,220mmrockets,and302mmrockets;thisarraywasprotectedbyshoulder-launchedmissiles,probablySA-18missilesandotheranti-aircraftweapons.

• Longrangerockets,includingZelzalrockets,aswellasaccurateAbabilunmannedaircraftwitharangeofabout250km.

Intelligence in the War: Observations and Insights I 7�

This deployment was supported by an accurate and advancedintelligence system that was significantly upgraded in 2004-5 and provided theorganizationwithasharpintelligencepictureoftheIDFanditsdesigns.Moreover, theorganizationwasbuilt onadualoperational approachofcentralizationanddecentralization.Decentralizedsynchronizedoperationwas made possible by a good understanding among Hizbollah’s fighters of theorganization’s targets, objectives, andoperational logic.Thecontrolpositionswereequippedwithtoplevelintelligenceandcommunicationsmeans,andthis,togetherwithamobilecommunicationsfacility–includingmotorcycles – offered the force operational flexibility. The organization wasthusabletochoosewhentosurfaceandwhentodisappearintheurbanandruralsurroundingsthatwerepreparedinadvance.Organizedtrainingof soldiers occurred over time in areas where surveillance was difficult, particularlyintheBaalbekValley,andspecialtrainingwasconductedinSyriaandIran.Thisspecialtrainingwassupplementedbytheestablishmentofadvancedprofessionaldeploymentsmannedbythosesteepedincombatexperience,preparedforengagementwiththeIDF.

Intelligence’s Assessment before the War

Overtimeandwithspecialintelligencegatheringefforts,IsraeliintelligencedecodedHizbollahandwasabletodeciphertheorganization’sphilosophy,aswellasitsoperationallogicandpolicy.MilitaryIntelligencealsoprovidedtheIDF,includingtheairforce,withaccurateintelligenceimportantforcombat. Numerous covert operations undertaken in recent years helpedIsraelfoiltheorganization’saggression.Theseoperationscomplementedsignificant developments taking place in Lebanon, including the resignation and assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, Security Council resolution1559,andSyria’swithdrawalfromLebanon.

Withhindsightandbasedonwhatwasdiscoveredafterthewar,itseemsthattheIDF’sintelligencecorpspreparedwellforthewarwithHizbollahinallmattersrelatedtounderstandingtheorganization,itsdeploymentinthe field, and its mode of operation. Moreover, in late 2005, Intelligence presentedaspecialupdatetotheGeneralStaffandtheministerofdefense– and sent a letter toPrimeMinisterSharon–painting the intelligencepictureasithaddevelopedinLebanonandSyriaduringthesecondhalf

�0 I Aharon Ze’evi Farkash

of 2005, with an updated assessment regarding 2006. It included thefollowing:

• Iranisdeterminedtomaintainitsnuclearweaponsprogram.

• ArmsthatposeathreattoIsraelarebeingamassedinLebanon,Syria,andIran,andtherearerocketsinthePalestinianAuthority.Thissubjectwasarecurringfeatureofintelligencereportsfrom2003onward.

• Due to pressure exerted on Syria and Lebanon, the likelihood thatstrategic arms and standoff fire would be used increased. The high possibilityofescalationintheformofaHizbollahandSyrianinitiative,due to their leaders’ political status and the operational measures attheirdisposal,wasstressed.

• In conclusion, it was noted that the possibility of escalation on the northern border would increase during 2006.TheimplicationsofthisintelligenceassessmentforIDFforcebuildup

and operation highlighted three relevant points. The first was the need to improve the IDF’s response to standoff fire, especially rockets, a need that was emphasized regularly in Military Intelligence’s recommendations.Second was the need to prepare for possible escalation on the northernborderandstrengthenthedeterrentforceagainstHizbollah,includingtheorganization’skidnappingattempts.Third,theincreaseintheasymmetricthreatobligedIsraeltoprovideasolutionbymeansofweaponry,anupdatedandrevisedcombatdoctrine,newstandingdirectivesforemergencyandcrisissituations,updatedoperationalorders,andpreparationsforthehomefront.Particularemphasiswasgiventothepreparednessrequiredforthepotential use of standoff fire in 2006 by Hizbollah as well as by others.

InthisspecialintelligenceassessmentMilitaryIntelligenceprovidedthedecisionmakerswiththerelevantnationalintelligence,andevenprovidedastrategic warningaboutwhattoexpectin2006,amessageextraordinaryinandofitself.(AparalleltothisoccurredinthediscussionsofApril2002duringOperationDefensiveShield,whenHizbollahattemptedtodragtheIDFintoanadditionalbattlefrontontopoftheexistingPalestinianfront.)Thiswarningpromptedtheaccurateintelligencepreparationsrequiredforcombat,both for theair forceand thegroundforces.Targets for theairforcewereselectedandconveyedtothesquadronlevel,auxiliarymeanswerepreparedforthegroundforcesatthedivisionallevel,andasystemwas devised that would ensure updates and availability as required for

Intelligence in the War: Observations and Insights I �1

emergency situations. These preparations were carried out by NorthernCommand in conjunction with the field intelligence of the ground forces commandandMilitaryIntelligence.

Inaddition,IntelligencetookpainsinalldiscussionstopointoutthatitwasunabletoprovidethecombatforceswithaccurateintelligenceregardingtheexactlocationofHizbollah’sshortrangerockets.ItwasexplainedthatanymeasuretodealwiththeshortrangerocketswouldhavetobebasedontheunderstandingthatMilitaryIntelligencecouldnotprovideprecise,detailed intelligence on the rocket sites – even though specific information wasgivenaboutthe“naturereserves”andtheirlocations.Atthesametime,itisimportanttonotetheairforce’simpressiveachievementatthestartofthe fighting, which was based on the targets provided by Intelligence as to themediumandlongrangerockets,communicationsandcontrolcenters,storagesites,andotherimportanttargets.

From2003stepsweretakentoensurethatintelligence,includingthemostsensitiveinformation,waspassedon,distributed,andassimilatedbythecombatforces,andwasthereafterupdatedregularly;hencetheintenseeffortsexpendedtoprepareandupdate thedatabase,so thatshouldwarbreakoutonlyrecentchangeswouldhavetobeinserted.Thelastforecastdatabasewasupdatedtothesummerof2005.Inanycase,theargumentsvoiced during and after the fighting regarding the lack of accurate and updated intelligence indicate a serious flaw that requires examination and correction.Theremustnotbeasituationwhereintelligenceexistsbutisnotdisseminatedtotheforces.Thematterdemandsin-depthexaminationatthelevelsoftheNorthernCommand,theFieldIntelligenceCorps,thegroundforcescommand,andtherelevantsectionsofMilitaryIntelligence.

Intelligence Insights

Thefollowingaretheprincipalinsightsonintelligencedrawnfromareviewof the fighting in Lebanon, particularly its successes and difficulties:

• Participation in decision making processes. The intelligence corpsmustbeinvolvedindeliberationsat theGeneralStaffwiththechiefofstaff,aswellaswiththeministerofdefenseandtheprimeministerwith regard to theanticipatedcombat, its targets, and itsobjectives.Intelligence’s understanding of the enemy allows it to analyze the


opportunities and risks of a campaign or war, and this analysisshould provide the country’s leaders with an understanding of whattoexpectfromthesaidcampaignorwar.Intelligenceshouldpresentthe implicationsof the IDFplanvis-à-vis the impacton the enemy,anditsviewoftheplan’sobjectivesandtheirrealization:thisshouldensurethatthecampaignorwarobjectivesarerealisticintermsoftheenemy’scapabilitiesandpreparedness.Thisprocessmustrespecttheindependenceoftheintelligencecorps,whichallowsittoconveytheintelligencepictureanditsimplicationstotheGeneralStaffasitbestunderstands,aswellastotheministerofdefense,securitycabinet,andprimeministerfortheirsituationassessments.

• Intelligence assessment independence.Giventhecurrentstructureofthe intelligence community in Israel, there is particular importancein ensuring the freedom of opinion of the head of Intelligence, hisfreedomtoconvey it to thegovernmentand theprimeminister,and–a lesson learnedfromtheYomKippurWar– theability toappearinfrontofthemediaandexpresshisopinionopenlytothepublicatlarge.Thisapproachdoesnot limit the responsibilityof thechiefofstaffforcarryingoutsituationassessmentsandformulatinghisstance.Intelligencemustbe ready topresent the intelligence information tothe leaders professionally and without extraneous considerations,as a kind of medical specialist about the enemy and adversary.TheheadofIntelligenceshouldnaturallyalsofollowthisapproachinhisinteractionwiththeheadoftheresearchdivision,whoisresponsibleforformulatingtheintelligenceassessmentandmaintainshisprofessionalindependence.Thismethodensures thatall thedecisionmakersandcommanderscanobtain the intelligencepictureandassessment theyrequireforformulatingadecision.

• Amassing and implementing information about the enemy. Part ofthe intelligence information should be processed together with theIDF commanders and the political leaders. It is not sufficient just to convey the information and updates. Intelligence should learn whattheparticularleaderrequires:whatheknowsandwhichinformationis relevant for formulating correct decisions. Implementing thisinformationiscritical,bothforthecombatforcesandforthecountry’sleaders. It is important to find ways of conveying the threat and building


modelstotrainthecombatforces.Suchasystemwasestablished,forexample,atoneoftheIDF’strainingbasesforreservetroopsinordertodemonstratethecomplexityofHizbollah’s“naturereserves”andtopractice the special fighting elements expected in the field.

• Structure and organization. Special attention must be directed totheproblemofconveying intelligence to thecombat forces,and theimplications of subordinating the field intelligence corps to the ground forces command. Has this measure proven itself, or has it damagedIntelligence’s ability to relay information to the field? It is clear that computerizingintelligencereportingasfarasthebrigadelevel,asisdone in Intelligence, requires assistance from elements outside theintelligencecorps,toenableongoingupdatestotheforcesthroughdigitalmeansrather thantheoldmanualmethods.Inanycase,Intelligencemustberesponsibleforthegroundintelligenceatalllevels,fromtheGeneralStaffleveltothecombatforces.Itisnotrighttodividethisresponsibilitybetweentwounitsandtwocommanders.

• Work processes. Constant attention is required to improve theorganizationanditsworkprocessesinordertoensureongoingrenewal,pluralism,andenhancedabilitiestodiagnosethesurroundingreality.Theseprocessesarethebasisfortheworkplanandforsecuringthesourcesneededtounderstandthecomplexrealityoftheasymmetricalwar. Integration is the foundation of intelligence work, and it mustoccurbothamongthevariousgatheringsystemsandbetweenthemandresearch. Thanks to these work processes Intelligence has significantly improved its capabilities in dealing with Hizbollah: cultivating newsources, enhancing accessibility to the organization and to Lebanoningeneral,and improving theabilityof research toprovide relevantintelligence information to all levels. Nevertheless, the multi-yearplanfordevelopingintelligencesourcesonHizbollah,formulatedin2004,wasonlypartiallyimplementedduetotheshortageofresourcesallocatedtoIntelligence.Nowitisimportanttoupdatethemulti-yearplanandtoensuretheprovisionofmoreresourcestoimprovetheabilitytoaddressHizbollah,Palestinianterror,andterrorfromal-Qaeda.

• Intelligence warfare, central in an era of asymmetrical war. Thisareahasevolvedgreatlyinrecentyears,anditsimportanceincreasesparticularly when it is difficult to legitimize an overt operation by the


IDFandthestateinmainareasofnationalsecurity.Intheasymmetricalstruggle against military and terror organizations it is imperative toadapttherulesofthegameofademocraticcountry–withoutharmingitslegalrighttodefenditself–toconductcovertwarfaresuccessfully.This involves improving theabilitiesof the IDFand its intelligencecorpstoactcovertlyandlegallytoachieveimportantobjectivesforthecountryandtheIDF.Theseabilitiesaremeanttoinstillfearintotherelevantorganizations,forcethemtocontinuallychangetheirbehavior,andaboveall,boostIsrael’sdeterrentcapability.

• The cognitive struggle/psychological warfare,anareathathasdevelopedsignificantly in the era of electronic communications, the internet, thewide rangeof communicationsnetworks, and the importanceofrelayinginformation.Theimpactontheenemy’sstateofmindrequiressynchronizedactiononanationallevel,utilizingIntelligence’sexpertiseagainsttheenemy.Activityinthisarearequiresstudyinganddrawingconclusionsinordertosustainongoingimprovement.

• Field security against increasing transparency. One must be awarethatIsrael,includingtheIDF,hasbecome“transparent”toitsenemiesandrivals.Thisarearequiresconstantattentioninordertoensurethatareas that are sensitive to Intelligence and security remain confidential. Transparencyisaresultoftheabilitytoacquiresatelliteimagesfromcommercialsources,fromimprovementsinforecastingandelectronicintelligenceabilities,and toagreatextent from theopenmediaanditsmodusoperandi in thedemocraticworld and in Israel.Theclearandunambiguousmessageinthisareais thatIsrael is transparenttoitsadversaries,enemies,andofcourse its friends.This transparencyincursaheavycostinhumanlives,duetotheenemy’sabilitytousegatheredintelligenceinrealtimeandtobereadyfortheIDF’smovesbeforetheyhappen.

• Censorship.Exposure in themediaand the inclusionof reporters inwar rooms has caused severe and unnecessary damage. Importantinformation was relayed to the enemy during the fighting and enabled it toharmIsrael.HereIsrael’sbehaviorhasdamageditsdeterrentability.Assuch,itisimportantatthenationalleveltoformulateacensorshippolicyinasymmetricalwars,andtobuildacontrolandenforcementmechanismthatwillensurepolicyimplementation.


• Intelligence’s outside linksareparticularlyimportantinviewofglobalthreats,suchastheproliferationofnuclearweaponsandtheescalationofinternationalterror.ItishardforIsraeltocontendwithglobalthreatsalone,andwithoutcooperationwithforeignintelligenceorganizationsitwouldbehardtoobtainrelevantdataforcombatingthesethreats.Itisimportanttoformulatecoalitionsforsuccessfulinternationalaction,basedonaccurateandupdated intelligence submitted to theworld’sdecision makers. Only international intelligence and political anddefensecooperationcanenableIsrael todealwith theglobal threatssuccessfully. In these areas it is best to maintain a low profile on Israel’s actions,withoutreducingoperationaldecisiveness.Theinsightspresentedabovecanhelpanalyzethewarandunderstand

thewayinwhichitwasrunand,inparticular,examinetheeffectivenessand impact of intelligence. When the professional investigations arecompleteditwillbepossibletooutlinetheproblemsandhowtheywereaddressed, and todrawconclusions required forcorrectplanningof thenextwar.Warisanationaleffortthatinvolvestestingnumeroussystems:political,military,thehomefront,intelligence,foreignpolicy,andsoon.As such, the investigations must be integrated, and not remain verticalandprofessional.Inthemodernworldmostareasareintegratedandtheirimpact on the enemy and adversary is cumulative.Thus, the lessons tobe learnedmustproducecumulative results that improve Israel’sabilitytocopewith futureconfrontations.The intelligence lessons,aswith theconclusionsoftheairforce,groundforces,homefront,andtheIDFasawhole,andthoselearnedbythedecisionmakersmustallbeintegratedinordertoensurethatIsrael’spotentialisrealizedandthatsuccessisachievedinallfuturechallenges.

Conclusion

TogetherwiththeworkoftheinvestigativecommissionappointedbythegovernmentandtheinvestigationsconductedbytheIDF,it is importanttocarryout anup-to-date intelligenceassessment thatwill examine theimplications of the war and its ramifications on the circles around us: Hizbollah,Lebanon,Syria,Iran,andthePalestinianAuthority,aswellasthecountrieswithwhichIsraelhaspeaceagreements:EgyptandJordan.


Conclusionsarebeingdrawnintheregion,andincertaincases,statesandorganizationsmaychangetheirpoliciesandoperationsconcepts.Updatedand professional intelligence assessments will allow better definition of thepreferredthreat–theconcretethreattobeselectedfromallthethreatsforwhichasuitablesolutionhastobedevised–andtoestablishthebasisneeded for defining the preferred scenario. This process is essential for the GeneralStaffsituationassessmentandforformulatinganupdatedmulti-yearworkplanfromwhichitwillbepossibletoproduceannualworkplans.ThisisthecorrectprocessthatwillleadtoallocationofresourcesrequiredfortheIDFandcorrectpreparationforthechallengesofthefuture.InthisregardMilitaryIntelligenceneedsshouldalsobeupdatedandincorporatedintotheworkplansoftheGSSandtheMossad,fromtheperspectiveoftheIDF’sneedsandnationalobjectives.DiscussionregardingtheallocationofnationalresourcesforintelligenceservicesmusttakeplaceattheleveloftheprimeministerinordertoensurethatIntelligence’sworkisprogrammedinaccordancewithnationalcriteria.

Chapter 7

Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War

Yehuda Ben Meir

No war in Israel’s war-filled history was accompanied by such extensive publicopinionpollingaswastheSecondLebanonWar.Indeed,morethanbyobjectivecriteria,thecoursethatthewartookwasdeterminedtoalargedegreebytheperceptionsofthepubliconbothsides.Perceptionsdonotnecessarily reflect reality, but they have a power of their own. This essay, devoted to Israeli public opinion during and after the war, deals solelywithperceptions.CloselyintertwinedwiththisphenomenonisthefactthatIsraelimediacoverageofthiswarwasallpervasiveandunprecedentedinextent. For the first time in Israel’s history, the IDF published on a daily basisthenumberofsoldierskilledinactiononthatday.Themediagaveextensivecoveragetothecasualties,coveragethatincludedthenameofeachsoldierkilled inaction,hispicture, interviewswithhis familyandfriends,thetimeandplaceofhisfuneral,andinmanyinstances,coverageofthefuneralitself.Especiallywhenthenumberofcasualtieswashigh,atleastbyIsraelistandards,coverageofthecasualtiesovershadowedthatofthe actual events on the battlefield. The particular media coverage in Israel hadamajoreffectonthedevelopmentofpublicopinionsurroundingtheSecondLebanonWar.

Theaimofthischapteristodescribetheevolutioninpublicopinionduringandafter thewar,aswellas toattempt tounderstandthefactorsunderlyingthechangesinpublicopinion.Itwillattempttoassessthefutureramifications of public opinion with regard to the war – both in Israel and intheregionasawhole.

�� I Yehuda Ben Meir

Inordertoappreciateandproperlyevaluatetheevolution,causes,andconsequences of Israeli public opinion during and after the fighting, one mustunderstandtheinternalpoliticalcontextofthiswar.Thewarbrokeoutameretwomonthsaftertheformationofanewgovernment,pursuanttothegeneralelectionsofMarch28,2006.Thenewgovernmentrepresentedfarmorethanaformalchangeingovernment–itmarkedtheendoftheSharonera, inauguratedanewera in Israelipolitics,andbrought to theforefront a completely fresh and untried national leadership. The newprimeminister,EhudOlmert,hadbeenactingprimeministersinceJanuary4,2006andhadservedasdeputyprimeministersince2003.Althoughhehadservedinmanygovernmentsandwasaveteranpolitician,hehadlittleifanyexperienceindailydefenseandsecuritymatters.Thenewdefenseminister,AmirPeretz,hadnoexperiencewhatsoeverindefenseandforeignaffairs.Notonlyhadheneverservedasaministerinthegovernment;hehadneverevenbeenamemberoftheKnessetForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee. The new foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, had also not beenpreviously involved in foreign affairs in any significant way.

As iscustomary in Israel, the formationof thenewgovernmentwasassociatedwithunsavorypoliticalnegotiations,andthusintheweeksafterits formation thegovernmentdidnotenjoyahighdegreeofpopularity.Thejobapprovalratingsfortheprimeministerwerearound40percent,and those for thenewanduntrieddefenseministerwereespecially low–inthemid-20s.1AmajorityofIsraelishadgravedoubtsastowhetherMr.Peretz was indeed fit to be minister of defense. Towards the end of June 2006,only32percentratedhisperformanceasdefenseministeras“good”vs.62percentwhorateditas“notgood.”2TheunfavorableopinionofthegovernmentwasaggravatedbytheeventsinGazaandtheincreaseintheQassamrocketattacksagainst Israel,especiallyat thecityofAshkelon,and theabductionofan Israeli soldieron June25,2006 led toanevenfurtherdecline inpublic support for thegovernment.At the same time,supportfortheprimeminister’sconvergenceplanalsodecreased,andbythebeginningofJuly2006,amajorityofIsraelisopposedit.3

Overall, the prevailing public mood was low and pessimistic. Thesentiment in Israel was that the difficult disengagement from Gaza had notproduced thedesired results –by the endof June2006, 50percentof Israelis viewed the disengagement as a mistake vs. 46 percent who

Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War I ��

saiditwasacorrectmove.4Thenewgovernmentwasconsideredweak,inexperienced,and indecisive,andIsraelwasperceived tohave lost theinitiativeandtobelosingitsdeterrence.TheHizbollahattackonJuly12,2006,whichresultedintwokidnappedsoldersandeightotherskilledinaction,cameontheheels(twoandahalfweekslater)oftheHamasattackfromGazawhereoneIsraelisoldierwaskidnappedandtwootherswerekilled.Asfaraspublicopinionwasconcerned,anon-decisiveresponsebytheIsraeligovernmenttotheHizbollahattackwouldhavehaddisastrousconsequences.

It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which domestic factors influenced the government’s response to the attack, although one can assume thattheyplayedan important role. In anyevent,withinhoursof theattack,theIsraeligovernmentdecidedonadramaticresponseandunanimouslyapproved the proposal of the prime minister and defense minister for amajormilitaryactionagainstHizbollah inLebanon.Themilitaryaction–ultimatelycalleda“war”–commencedthenightofJuly12,2006andincludedairattacksonBeirutInternationalAirport,whichremainedclosedfor the duration of the war; on all known Hizbollah long-range missilesites;andonotherHizbollahtargetsfromtheIsraeliborderinthesouthtotheSyrianborderintheBeqaavalleyinthenorth.

TheIsraelibodypoliticiscomposedofJewsandArabs.ThebreakdownbetweenthesetwogroupsfortheoverallIsraelipopulationisapproximately79percent Jews and21percentArabs.However,when speakingof the“adult Israeli population,” i.e., those eighteen years old and above, thebreakdownforthetwogroupsis85percentJewsand15percentArabs.Innormalcircumstances,evenconsiderabledifferencesbetweentheJewishandArabcommunitiesonanygivenissuewillaffecttheoverallresultbyonly3-5percent.Thus,if50percentoftheadultJewishpopulationand80percentoftheadultArabpopulationsupportagivenposition(asmayhavebeenthecase,atcertaintimes,regardingdisengagement)–theresultoftheoverallIsraelisamplewouldbe54.5percent.Insuchsituations,itisreasonabletorelatetotheIsraelisampleasawhole.Thestory,however,isquite different in a situation where we find diametrically opposed attitudes andopinionsbetweenJewsandArabsandnearunanimitywithineachgroup.Thus,if95percentofIsraeliJewsbelievethatthewaragainstHizbollahisjustified but only 10 percent of Israeli Arabs are of that opinion, the result

�0 I Yehuda Ben Meir

for all Israelis would be 82.5 percent. In effect, however, this latter figure is meaningless and is no more than a statistical artifact. It represents aweightedaverageoftwototallydifferentcommunitiesasfarasthisissueis concerned and has little significance, if any. Under these circumstances, onemustrelateseparatelytotheJewishandArabcommunities.

Infact,antitheticalopinionswerethecasewithregardtotheSecondLebanon War. From the very first days of the war, the diametrically opposed positions among Israeli Jews and Arabs became clear to the pollsters.ThisclearsplitbetweenJewsandArabsisanimportantphenomenoninitself,andonenegativeresultofthewarwasadeepeningoftheschismbetween theJewishmajorityand theArabminority in Israel.Adetaileddiscussionofthisissueisbeyondthescopeofthisstudy,andcitedhereisthepublicopiniondatafortheJewishpopulationofIsrael.RegardingtheJewish public, studies did not find any significant differences between the northernresidents,i.e.,thosewhowereunderKatuysharocketattacksforthedurationofthewarandtheircounterpartselsewhereinthecountry.

Fromtheoutset,themilitarycampaignenjoyedtheneartotalsupportoftheJewishpopulation,andtherewasalmostnodissentoverthegovernment’sdecisiontogotowar.TheJewishoppositionintheKnessetdeclareditsfullsupportforthegovernmentandcommitteditselftosupportthegovernmentas long as the fighting continued. The ten Arab members of the Knesset weretheonlyonestovoteagainstthestatementoftheprimeministeronJuly17,2006ontheinitiationofhostilitiesinLebanonagainstHizbollah.ManykeypersonalitiesoftheIsraelileftevenwentonrecordpubliclyinsupportof thewar.Thebasisof this Israeli consensuswas the fact thatbothattacks(Hamas,June25,2006andHizbollah,July12,2006)wereunprovoked,werecarriedoutonsovereignandundisputedIsraeliterritory,and originated from areas from which Israel had previously withdrawnunilaterally.HizbollahwasseenasadangerousterroristorganizationandasthelongarmofIran,bothofwhichwerecommittedtothedestructionofIsrael.

InhisaddresstotheKnessetandthenationonJuly17,2006,PrimeMinisterOlmertsaidthattherecomesatimeinthelifeofanationwhenitsaysinonevoice,“enoughisenough.”Andindeed,nothingcanbettercapturethemoodofIsraelonJuly12,2006thanthesentimentthat“enoughisenough.”ADahafpolltakenonJuly17,2006,lessthanaweekafterthe

Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War I �1

war began, found that 86 percent of the Israeli adult population justified “theIDFoperationinLebanonagainstHizbollah,”whileonly14percentclaimed it was a mistake. Fifty-eight percent were in favor of fighting “until Hizbollahwouldbewipedout”and23percent“untilHizbollahwouldbedistanced from the border,” vs. only 17 percent who supported a ceasefire and negotiations. Eighty-seven percent of the sample were satisfied with “theperformanceoftheIDFinthewar.”5 A poll taken by the Rafi Smith ResearchInstituteonthesamedayfound75percentsupportforcontinuingmilitaryactionagainstHizbollahvs.only10percentwhofavoredenteringintonegotiationswithHizbollahandLebanon.6

Concurrent with the almost unanimous support of the war was adramaticimprovementintheapprovalratingsofboththeprimeministerandthedefenseminister.TheresultsfrombothDahafandTelesekerpollsareshownintable1.GiventhefactthatthenumbersinbothpollswerefortheoverallIsraeliadultpopulation,onecansafelyassumethatthenumbersfor the Jewishpopulationwerehigherbybetween5 and10percentagepoints.

Table 1. PMandDMPerformance,1weekintothewar

Satisfied with the prime minister’s performance in the war

Satisfied with the defense minister’s performance in the war

Dahaf,7

July 17, 2006 7�% 72%

Teleseker,�

July 18, 2006 7�% 61%

InitialciviliancasualtiesfromHizbollahrocketattacksaswellasinitialarmy casualties from the ground fighting in southern Lebanon did not change the overall picture of massive support for the war, the IDF, thegovernment,andtheprimeministeranddefenseminister.Twoweeksintothewar,thenumbersremainedsteady.ResultsfromtwoTelesekerpollsofIsraelisandfromaDahafpollfortheJewishpopulationareshownintable2.AnextensivesurveyundertakenbytheTamiSteinmetzResearchCenteronJuly31andAugust1,2006revealedsimilarresultsandalsopointed


outthehugedifferencesbetweentheIsraeliJewishandArabcommunities.Ninety-three percent of the Jews justified the war in Lebanon, as compared with only 17 percent among the Arabs; 91 percent of the Jews justified the airattacksonLebanonandsupportedcontinuedattacksby theair forcevs.only6percentoftheArabs(where79percentclaimedthattheattackswere unjustified). Eighty-seven percent of the Jewish sample evaluated the combatabilityoftheIDFfavorablyand78percentratedtheinformationgivenbytheIDFas“reliable”or“highlyreliable”vs.only32percentoftheArabs.Seventy-ninepercentoftheJewssupportedthecontinuationofthe fighting until Israel’s objectives were achieved vs. only 7 percent of the Arabswhosupportedthisposition.9Resultsaresummarizedintable3.

Table 2.WarObjectivesandPerformanceLevels,after2-3weeks

Justified Israel’s and the IDF’s response in Lebanon

Continue the fighting until Hizbollah is distanced from border

Satisfied with prime minister’s performance

Satisfied with defense minister’s performance

Satisfied with IDF’sperformance

Satisfied with political echelon’s performance

Teleseker,July 26, 200610

�5% �2% 77% 60%

Dahaf,July 27 200611

�2%

34% and “until

Hizbollah is destroyed”:

55%

�2% 71% �0%

Teleseker,July 30-31, 200612

�5% 74%

Table 3.WarObjectives,byEthnicBreakdown

Justified the war in Lebanon

Justified the air attack on Lebanon

Approved of the combat ability of the IDF

Information given by the IDF is reliable / highly reliable

Support the continuation of fighting until Israel’s objectives are achieved

Jews �3% �1% �7% 7�% 7�%

Arabs 17% 6% 32% 7%

Source: TamiSteinmetzSurvey,July31andAugust1,2006


Thishighlyfavorablepicturebegantochangeduringthelastweekofthe war, and by the end of the war polls reflected a dramatic turnaround. Rarely does one see such far-reaching and dramatic changes in publicopinion in so short a time (ten days to two weeks). By the end of the first weekinAugust,therewereclearsignsofadisenchantmentoftheIsraelipublicwiththeresultsofthewar,accompaniedbyadecreaseinsupportfortheIDFandespeciallyforthepoliticalleadership(althoughsomeofthedatawasconfusingandcontradictory).

ADialoguepolltakenonAugust9-10,2006foundthatonly20percentoftheoverallIsraelisamplefeltthat“Israelhadwonthewar”;30percentfelt that “Israel had not won the war”; and 43 percent said that “thereisnowinnerandno loser.”Theapproval ratings for theprimeministeranddefenseministerreturnedtowhattheyhadbeenbeforethewar–48percent were satisfied with the performance of the prime minister vs. 40 percent who were dissatisfied, while only 37 percent were satisfied with the defense minister’s performance vs. 51 percent who were dissatisfied. Fifty-threepercentsaidthatiftherehadbeenleaderswithmilitaryandsecurityexperienceat thehelm,thewarwouldhavebeenrunbetter.Althoughaclear majority – 59 percent – were satisfied with the performance of the IDF, this was much lower than the numbers recorded in the first stages of the war. Interestingly, only 47 percent of the sample was satisfied with the performanceof the IDFChiefofStaff,Lt.Gen.DanHalutz.13ADahafpolltakenatthesametimeshowedsomewhatdifferentresults,althoughitalsorepresentedadecreaseinmanyparameters.Thepollfoundthat40percentoftheJewishpopulationbelievedthat“Israelwillwin,”13percentthat“Israelwilllose,”and42percentthat“therewillbeadraw.”Eighty-sevenpercentcontinuedtojustifythewar(75percentoftheoverallIsraelisample)and94percentbelievedintheabilityoftheIDFtodefendIsrael.Ontheotherhand,only52percentratedtheIDF’scombatperformanceinLebanonas“good,”vs.41percentwhorateditas“notgood,”and17percentsaidthattheirfaithintheIDFhadbeenshakenasaresultofthewarinLebanon.Inthispoll,approvalratingsforthepoliticalandmilitaryleadershipremainedhigh–73percentforOlmert,64percentforPeretz,and74percentforChiefofStaffHalutz.14Theresultsaresummarizedintable4.


Table 4. PerceptionsoftheWarandPerformanceLevels,towardstheendofthewar

Israel had won the war

Israel had not won the war

No winner, no loser

Satisfied with perform-ance of PM

Not satisfied with perform-ance of PM

Satisfied with perform-ance of DM

Not satisfied with perform-ance of DM

Satisfied with perform-ance of IDF

Satisfied with perform-ance of IDF’s chief of staff

Dialogue,August 9-10, 2006

20% 30% 43% 4�% 40% 37% 51% 5�% 47%

Dahaf,August 11, 2006

40% 13% 42% 73% 64% 52% 74%

In theearlymorninghoursofAugust12,2006(Israel time), theUNSecurityCounciladoptedresolution1701,which,interalia,calledforanimmediate cessation of hostilities. On August 14, 2006, a ceasefire came into effect – a ceasefire that was scrupulously adhered to by all parties –andwithittheSecondLebanonWarcametoanend.Thedisenchantmentwith the results of the war, which had surfaced in the final days of the war, now turned into an avalanche of frustration, dissatisfaction, anddisappointment,andwithadramaticeffectonpublicopinion.Apolltakenon August 13, 2006 by the Rafi Smith Research Institute found that 58 percentof Israeliswereof theopinion that Israelachievedonlyasmallpart,ifany,ofitsobjectives(comparedtoonly16percentwhoheldthatopinionelevendayspreviously),whereasonly3percentsaid thatIsraelachieved all or nearly all of its objectives (compared to 32 percent thepreviousweek).Fifty-twopercentsaidthatthearmydidnotsucceed,vs.44percentwhobelievedthatthearmyhadsucceeded.Acluetooneofthecausesbehindthesenumberscanbefoundinthefactthatonly6percentbelievedthatresolution1701achievedmostofIsrael’sobjectives.Sixty-twopercentdidnotapproveofthewaytheprimeministerconductedthewar, and 65 percent were dissatisfied with the performance of the defense ministerduringthewar.Forty-ninepercentvs.44percentapprovedofthechiefofstaff’sperformance.15


Subsequent polls confirmed this picture of serious erosion in public confidence in the IDF and in the political leadership. Table 5 summarizes theresultsofaDahafpollandTelesekerpolloftheJewishpopulation–both taken one day after the ceasefire went into effect. This negative picture didnotchangeinthedaysandweeksfollowingtheendofthewar.AseriesofpollstakentowardstheendofAugustallshowedadramaticdecreaseinpublicsupportforthetwomaincoalitionpartners–Kadima(theprimeminister’sparty)andLabor(thedefenseminister’sparty).16ADahafpolltaken towards the end of August found a total loss of public confidence in thegovernmentandinthepoliticalandmilitaryleadership.Thenumbersare astounding.Results from thispoll for the Jewish sample are shownin table 6.A survey conducted by theTami Steinmetz Research Centeron September 4-5, 2006 confirmed the decrease in public confidence for almostallnationalinstitutions,includingtheIDF–althoughinabsoluteterms, the IDF still received the highest rating. Contrary to the findings inthepast,only31percentbelievedthattheunilateralwithdrawalfromsouthernLebanoninMay2000“servedIsrael’ssecurityinterests”while51percentbelievedthat“itdidnotservethoseinterests.”17

It is hard to put one’s finger on the exact turning point during the war with regard to public opinion. It is also quite difficult at this stage to determine whatwere theactualcausesbehind thedramaticshift inpublicopiniontowardstheendofthewarandinitsaftermath.AstudyconductedbytheCohenInstituteforPublicOpinionResearchatTelAvivUniversityfoundadecreaseintheapprovalratingofthegovernment’sperformancemainlyas a function of the number of casualties. The first drop was recorded on July27,2006, thedayafter thebattle atBint Jbail,where the IDF losteightsoldiersandfailedtotakethevillage–fromcloseto80percentto60percent,althoughwithinthreedaysitreboundedtothe80percentlevel.AsecondseriousdropwasrecordedonAugust9,2006,onedayaftertwelvereservesoldierswerekilledbyaKatyusharocketatKibbutzKfarGiladiinnorthernIsrael,closetotheLebaneseborder,andthreecivilianswerekilledthateveningbyarocketattackinHaifa.Fromthispoint,theapprovalratings continued to drop until the end of the war, with a significant drop recorded on August 11, 2006, the day after fifteen reserve soldiers were killedinthegroundwarfareinsouthernLebanon.18


Tab

le 5

. Per

cept

ions

of

the

War

and

Per

form

ance

Lev

els,

att

hee

ndo

fth

ew

ar

Isra

el h

ad w

on

the

war

Hiz

bolla

h ha

d w

on th

e w

arNe

ither

side

w

onSu

ppor

t es

tabl

ishm

ent

of n

atio

nal

inqu

iry

com

mis

sion

Israe

l sho

uld

not h

ave a

gree

d to

ceas

efire

wi

thou

t rel

ease

of

kidn

appe

d so

ldie

rs

Olm

ert -

pe

rfor

man

cePe

retz

- pe

rfor

man

ceH

alut

z -

perf

orm

ance

Dah

af,

Augu

st 1

5,

2006

1�30

%30

%36

%6�

%70

%47

% -

good

51%

- no

t goo

d36

% -

good

63%

- no

t goo

d4�

% -

good

47%

- no

t goo

d

Tele

seke

r,Au

gust

15,

20

0620

1�%

15%

66%

67%

53%

supp

ort

cont

inui

ng th

e fig

htin

g

40%

app

rove

d2�

% a

ppro

ved

44%

- go

od52

% -

not g

ood

Gove

rnm

ent -

pe

rfor

man

ceSe

nior

IDF

office

rs

- per

form

ance

Sold

iers

and

co

mm

ande

rs -

perf

orm

ance

Call

for r

esig

natio

n of

PM

Call

for r

esig

natio

n of

DM

IDF

over

all

perf

orm

ance

Dah

af,

Augu

st 1

5, 2

006

14%

- go

od�4

% -

not g

ood

61%

- go

od32

% -

not g

ood

�4%

- go

od2%

- no

t goo

d57

%42

%

Tele

seke

r,Au

gust

15,

200

6�1

% -

satis

fied

1�%

- di

ssat

isfied

Tab

le 6

. Jew

ish

Publ

icP

erce

ptio

nso

fPe

rfor

man

ceL

evel

s,tw

ow

eeks

aft

erth

ew

ar

Resi

gnat

ion

of P

MPe

rfor

man

ce

of P

MRe

sign

atio

n of

DM

Perf

orm

ance

of

DM

Olm

ert fi

t to

be P

MPe

retz

fit t

o be

DM

Resi

gnat

ion

of C

hief

of

Staff

Perf

orm

ance

of

Chi

ef o

f St

aff d

urin

g th

e w

ar

Dep

ende

d on

the

abili

ty

of th

e ID

F to

de

fend

Isra

elD

ahaf

, 21

Augu

st 2

5,

2006

63%

74%

- no

t go

od26

% -

good

74%

7�%

- no

t go

od20

% -

good

11%

3%54

%63

% -

not

good

35%

- go

od�2

%


On the basis of the available data, the following list of causes maycollectively explain the dramatic shift in public opinion and the deepfrustration of the Israeli public with the results of the Second LebanonWar:1. Exaggerated expectations caused by the political and military

leadership.Buoyedbytheinitialsuccess,bothintheaircampaignandinthediplomaticarena,Israel’sleaders,especiallytheprimeministeranddefenseminister,setgoalsthatwereunattainable(includingthedemiseofHizbollah,destructionoftheentireHizbollahinfrastructure,freeingofthekidnappedsoldiers,andadramaticchangeinthefaceoftheMiddleEast).Itwasvis-à-vistheseobjectivesthattheIsraelipublicevaluatedtheresultsofthewar.

2. TheinabilityofIsraeltostoporevendecreasethevolumeofHizbollahrocket attacks against cities, towns, and communities throughoutthenorthofIsrael.Neversince the1948WarofIndependencehadIsrael’s home front faced such a sustained attack.The governmentunderestimatedthecumulativeeffectof150rocketsadaythroughoutthe north of Israel for thirty-three days.The home front showed agreatdealof resilienceandwaswilling tosuffer therocketattacksforagivenperiod.ButtheIsraelipublicwasnotreadytoacceptthefactthatafterthirty-threedaysofairandgroundwarfare,theIDFwasunabletomakeevenadentinHizbollah’scapacitytoattackIsrael’sciviliancenters.

3. The number of casualties and the extensive coverage given to thecasualtiesbytheIsraelimedia,andparticularlytheelectronicmedia.This was the first war in which the IDF gave daily information on its casualties.Whentherewerelimitedachievementsonthegroundandtheaircampaignhadmoreor less run itscourse, the Israelipublicbecame obsessed with the casualties and with the media coverageofthecasualties,whichbecameamajorsourceofdemoralization.Itremainsanopenquestionwhetherademocraticcountrywithafreeandopen society can for any lengthy period continue to wage a difficult war,withoutincurringformativenegativeapprovalratingswithinthepublic.Interestingly,closeto50percentoftheIsraelipublicwereoftheopinionthattheIsraelimediaharmedthemoraleofthetroopsatthefrontandtheciviliansathome.22

�� I Yehuda Ben Meir

4. Thelackofpreparednessofthehomefront.ThegovernmentfailedtoprepareadequatelyforasituationwhereoveronemillionIsraeliswouldbeforcedtospendmanyhourseachdayforoveramonthinshelters and closed rooms. In many communities, the state of theshelterswasshamefulandthegovernmentneverevendiscussedthepossibilityofselectiveevacuationof themosthard-hit towns,suchas Kiryat Shmona. The government did not succeed in properlycoordinating the efforts of the various civil defense agencies. Theones who suffered most from this gross neglect were the weakersegments of the population – the elderly, the sick, single-parentfamilies,thepoor,andthedisadvantaged.Seventy-sixpercentoftheJewishpopulationratedthegovernment’streatmentoftheresidentsofthenorthas“notgood.”23TheeffectofthisgrossmismanagementwassimilartothepoliticalrepercussionsenduredbyPresidentBushfollowingHurricaneKatrinaofAugust2005.

5. The bitter complaints of the reserve soldiers returning from battle.Thiscertainlywasoneofthemostdamagingfactorsintermsofpublicopinion.The IDF mobilized close to 50,000 soldiers, all of whomwere released within days of the ceasefire. Unlike the standing army or conscripts, these soldier-civilians have no qualms or constraintswhatsoeverinventingtheirfrustrationaboutineptitudeinthearmyand the conduct of the campaign. The reserve soldiers, includinghigh-ranking officers, told grim tales of glaring mismanagement, confusion,andgravemistakesintheconductofthegroundwarfare.Thereservistscomplainedbitterlyoflackofproperequipment,lackofproper and updated intelligence, insufficient training, serious failures inthelogisticalsupport,andcontradictoryorders.WhilemanyoftheselapsesareendemictoarmiesandoccurredinallofIsrael’spreviouswars, in thecontextof inadequatemilitaryachievements, they takeon greater significance. Had Israel succeeded in killing Nasrallah and seriously limiting theKatyushaattacks, the Israelpublicmayhavebeenmuchmoreforgivingregardingtheselapses.Asitwas,however,thisfactor,takentogetherwithalltheothercauseslistedabove,hadadisastrousandperhapslong-lastingeffectonpublicopinion.

Finally, there are the long range effects of the war on Israeli publicopinion, and specifically on what remains the central issue – the Israeli-

Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War I ��

Palestinian conflict. It is of course still too early to assess fully the impact ofthewaronthebasicattitudesoftheIsraelipublic.MoretimeanddataarenecessarytounderstandthelastingeffectsofthewaronIsraelipublicopinion and the future course of events. For example, many observersbelieve that Israeli public opinion has taken a sharp turn to the right.Althoughthereisconsiderabledatatosupportthiscontention,itmayverywellbeprematureandshouldnotbeviewedasaforegoneorpermanentconclusion. There is reason to believe that the true picture is far morecomplexandthatpublicopinion,asfarashardcoreissuesareconcerned,is in a state of flux and formation.

Mostofthedataregardingashifttotherightisintherealmofpartypolitics.Almostallofthesurveysshowacontinueddropintheapprovalratingsoftheprimeministeranddefenseministeraswellasasharpdecreaseinsupportfortheirrespectiveparties,KadimaandLabor.ADialoguepolltakenonSeptember19,2006foundthattheapprovalratingsoftheprimeminister and the defense minister had plummeted to 22 percent and 14percent, respectively, vs. 48 percent and 37 percent, respectively in thepreviouspoll ofAugust 11,2006. If electionswere tobeheld, thepollfound a sharp and significant increase in the strength of the two main right wingparties(19seats)attheexpenseofKadimaandLabor.24ADahafpolloftheJewishpopulationtakenafewdayslaterrecordedalmostidenticalresults.25 It should be noted, however, that with time, the polls becameless one-sided and less conclusive. A Rafi Smith Institute poll conducted towardstheendofSeptember2006foundamajorshiftinsupportamongJewishvotersawayfromKadimaandLabor–thoughnottotherightwingparties, rather to the “undecided” and “not voting” categories. Close tohalfofthosepolled(48percent)refusedtosayforwhichpartytheywouldvote.26 Such a large floating vote is highly unusual in Israel and points to a confused electorate.ATeleseker poll, taken at almost the same time,found that under certain circumstances, Kadima would hold its own inanelection,andtheresultswouldbeveryclosebetweentherightandthecenter-leftblocs.27

Asfarasthecoreissuesareconcerned,thesituationisevenmorecomplex.Theshift to the right ismanifestmainly in thedemiseofunilateralism.DisillusionmentwiththedisengagementfromGaza,whichexistedbeforethewar,28 became even stronger after the war. A Rafi Smith Institute poll

100 I Yehuda Ben Meir

ofIsraelistakenonSeptember17-18,2006foundthat55percent“todayopposetheGazapullout”vs.only38percentwho“todaysupporttheGazapullout.”29IntheTelesekerpollattheendofSeptember,2006,thesamepercentage–55percentofIsraelis–saidthatthedisengagementwas“amistake,”vs.40percentwhosawthedecisionas“acorrectone.”30Thesameholds truefor theconvergenceplan.Support forconvergencewasdownevenpriortothewar.31Bytheendofthewar,supportforOlmert’sconvergence plan had all but vanished, and the prime minister himselfstatedpubliclythatplanwasatthistimenolongeronthepublicagenda.The Teleseker poll found that 60 percent viewed the prime minister’sdecisionnot to implementtheconvergenceplanas“acorrectdecision,”vs.only20percentwhoviewedthisas“amistake.”32

Unilateralism,however,isnottheonlygameintown.ThereareindicationsthatmoreandmoreIsraelisarecomingaroundtoviewnegotiationswiththePalestiniansastheonlyviablealternativetounilateralism.TheIsraelipublic remains acutely aware of the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinianconflict and of the need to find a solution, although the nature of such a solutionremainsunclear.SinceOsloin1993andthroughoutall theupsand downs of the ensuing years, including the most difficult periods of the secondintifada,Israeliscontinuedtosupporttheprincipleofnegotiationswith thePalestinians.True,after theHamaselectoralvictoryofJanuary2006therewasasolidandstrongmajorityagainstnegotiationswithHamas,apositionsharedbytheIsraeligovernmentandnearlytheentirepoliticalestablishment.At the same time, it seems that Israeli public opinion iscontinuingtosearchforpossibleavenuesofnegotiation.

TheDialoguepollofSeptember19,2006foundtheIsraelisampleevenlyspliton thequestion,“ShouldIsraelconductnegotiationswithaHamasandFatahunitygovernment”:45percentinfavor,46percentopposed,and9percentundecided.33TheDahafpollattheendofAugustfoundsimilarresults,with41percentoftheIsraelipopulationsupportingnegotiationswithAbuMazanandHamas.34ApollconductedbytheHarryS.TrumanInstituteattheHebrewUniversityonSeptember10-19,2006foundthat67 percent of the overall Israeli sample supported negotiations with aPalestiniannationalunitygovernment“ifneededtoreachacompromiseagreement.”Fifty-sixpercentofIsraelissupportedand43percentopposedtalkswithaHamasgovernment“ifneededinordertoreachacompromise

Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War I 101

agreementwiththePalestinians”(inJune2006,only48percentsupportednegotiationswithaHamasgovernmentundersimilarcircumstances).35

Thus while the war apparently soured Israelis on unilateralism, itdid not affect their desire to search for some form of resolution to theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. It may even have increased their readiness for negotiations with the PalestinianAuthority. In general, one can saythat Israelis have become more threat-oriented and manifest a growingpreoccupation with security threats (especially from Iran).At the sametime,theoverallmoodremainspositiveandoptimistic.

One final point should be made, regarding international forces. Since thetimewhenUNSecretary-GeneralUThantsummarilyremovedtheUNforcesfromSinaiandGazaontheeveoftheSixDayWar,Israelishavehadverylittlefaith in internationalpeacekeepingforces.Thissentimentwas exacerbated by the negative experience with UNIFIL and by thefailure of the European monitors at the Rafah crossing. Success of theinternationalforceinsouthernLebanoninimplementingresolution1701may have interesting consequences for Israeli public opinion and opennewpossibilities.TheIsraelipublicwillbecarefullywatchingtheconductof this force andespecially thebehaviorof theEuropeancontingent. IfFrenchandItaliansoldiersdemonstrateareadiness toengageHizbollahand open fire if necessary, Israeli public opinion might be ready to entertain theideaofstationingsuchforcesinPalestinianareas.AlreadyintheTamiSteinmetz Research Center study at the beginning of September 2006,51percentoftheIsraelissupportedtheadoptionofaninternationalforcesolution for the conflict with the Palestinians and expressed readiness for anIDFwithdrawaluponthestationingofsuchaforce.36

Notes1. TelesekerPollpublishedinMaariv,July5,2005.2. DahafPollpublishedinYediot Ahronot,June30,2006,Supplement,pp.12-13.3. Ibid;andTamiSteinmetzResearchCenterPollinHaaretz,July10,2006.4. Ibid.5. Yediot Ahronot,July18,2006,p.5.6. YnetService,July18,2006.7. Seefootnote5.8. Maariv,July19,2006.9. Haaretz,August9,2006,SectionB,p2.

102 I Yehuda Ben Meir

10. Maariv,July27,2006,p.9.11. Yediot Ahronot,July28,2006,p.3.12. Maariv,August1,2006,p.2.13. Haaretz,August11,2006,p.9.14. Yediot Ahronot,August11,2006,Supplement,p.9.15. Globes,August14,2006;YnetService,August14,2006.16. Jerusalem Post,August25,2006,pp.3,21.17. Haaretz,September12,2006,SectionB,p.3.18. Shavitetal.,“PerceptionandOpinionof thePublicRegarding theFighting in the

North,”Public Opinion12,August2006,TheB.I.andLucilleCohenInstituteforPublicOpinionResearch.

19. Yediot Ahronot,August16,2006,p.3.20. Maariv,August16,2006,p.4.21. Yediot Ahronot,August25,2006,Supplement,pp.1,6-9.22. Haaretz,August31,2006,p.2.23. Seefootnote14.24. Haaretz,September21,2006,pp.1,7.25. Yediot Ahronot,September22,2006,Supplement,pp.10-11.26. Jerusalem Post,September29,2006,pp.1,9.27. Maariv,October1,2006,Supplement,pp.16-17.28. Seefootnote4.29. Jerusalem Post,September22,2006,p.1.30. Seefootnote27.31. Seefootnote3.32. Seefootnote27.33. Seefootnote24.34. Seefootnote21.35. Haaretz,September27,2006,p.12.36. Seefootnote17.

Chapter �

The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War

Meir Elran

Introduction

TheSecondLebanonWarwaswagedsimultaneouslyontwofronts: themilitaryfrontinsouthernLebanon,whereIDFforcesfoughtinHizbollahstrongholds,andthecivilianfrontsdeepinsideLebanonandIsrael,whereciviliansservedascombattargetsforbothsides.Thisrepresentedanewheight in the trend that has been emerging for some time, whereby thefocus of the fighting in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict transfers from a directclashbetweenarmedforcestoamixedpattern,inwhichtheroleofciviliansonbothsidesisincreasinglycentral.Theassumptionunderlyingthis trend is that in an asymmetrical war, in which one of the sides ismilitarilyinferiortotheother,strikingagainstthecivilianfronthasamajorimpactonthebalanceofpower.Thefactthatthisapproachwasembracedbytheweak,inthiscaseHizbollah,isself-understood.Havingnochanceof defeating the clearly stronger side, it could only turn to exertingpressureonthecivilianfront,theonethathasbeenperceivedastheweaklink.Interestingly,thestrongersidetoo,inthiscaseIsrael,hasfollowedsuit,suggestingthatmilitarypressureonciviliantargetsisacceptedasanimportantstrategiclever.

It seems that both sides’ assumptions regarding the benefits of using military means against civilian populations and infrastructures arequestionable.1 The heavy damage inflicted by Israel on the Lebanese home frontdidnotbringtheLebanesecitizens,andcertainlynottheShiites,tosever their ties toHizbollah,nordid themassivestrikesagainst Israel’shomefrontbearoutNasrallah’s“spiderweb” theory. Israeli societydid

104 I Meir Elran

notcollapseunderthebarrageofrocketsthatfelldailyonthetownsandvillagesinthenorthofIsrael.

ThisessaywilllookattheIsraeliaspectofthecivilianfrontandwillfocusontwomainquestions:(a)howdidIsraelisocietywithstandtheongoingintenseHizbollahattacksduringthewar?TowhatdegreedidIsraelisocietydisplayresilience,andwhatenabled it towithstand theblowsas itdid?(b) To what extent was the home front prepared to deal with the difficult experienceoftheHizbollahrocketbarrages,andinparticular,whatlessonsshouldbelearnedfromtheexperienceofJuly-August2006,assumingthatin the future Israel’s enemies – in the first, second, and third circles – might welloptforshortorlongrange,conventionalornon-conventionalrocketsormissilesagainstthehomefrontasapreferredtarget.

The Resilience of Israel’s Home Front

During the thirty-three days of fighting, Hizbollah fired nearly 4,000 rockets(anaverageof120aday)towardspopulationcentersinnorthernIsrael.While only901 – less than a quarter – hit populated areas, theyachievedsubstantive results: thirty-ninecivilianswerekilled; thousandswere injured, most (about 2,200) suffering from shock and anxiety andabout100sufferingfromsevereormedium-levelinjuries;andsome12,000buildings were damaged, most suffering limited damage. These figures showonlypartofthepicture.Onecanaddthehundredsofthousandsofpeople who left their homes for all or part of the war, under very difficult conditions, the emotional distress experienced by people in the northbecause of the sirens, rocket landings, and actual strikes,2 the financial damagesustainedbyindividualsandbusinesses,andtheoveralleconomicburdentothecountry,estimatedatapproximatelyNIS30billion.3

The configuration of Hizbollah’s force buildup, with the massive support from Syria and Iran, reflected the true perception of the organization and itsleaders.TheyunderstoodthattheycouldnotstanduptotheIsraeliwarmachineinadirect,all-outconfrontation.Rather,extensiveandcontinuousstrikesonthehomefrontwouldpossiblyachievethestrategicbalancebyupsetting thesocial fabric in Israel.Thiswasdesigned toexertpoliticalpressureonthegovernment,whichinturnmightdiminishitsdeterminationtoconfronttheenemyinmilitaryandpoliticalterms.Supportingevidence

The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War I 105

of this approach can be found in Nasrallah’s speech of May 26, 2000,followingIsrael’swithdrawalfromLebanon,inwhichhedescribedIsraelisociety to be as flimsy as a “spider web.”4Inotherwords,itwasperceivedtobefarweakerthanitlooked,andhence,heavystrikesagainstitwouldperhapsyieldthedesiredbalance.

Isthisreallythecase?Theanswerisnotclearanddependsonthepointof view, be it Israel’s or Hizbollah’s. One may assume that Hizbollahemergedfromthewarwithapositiveviewoftheresults,evenifitdidnotfullyrealizeitsexpectations.OntheIsraeliside,thequestionofnationalresilience,ortherobustnessoftheIsraelipublic,isacomplexissuethatis difficult to assess.5Thenotionofnationalresilienceisbasedonasetofconceptstakenfromthedisciplineofpsychology,whichexaminereactionsof the individual, the community, and society as a whole to traumaticevents.Amajorcriterionwouldbethedegreeandspeedthatnormalliferesumes following a trauma. The assumption is that the more resilientindividual, community, or public will respond significantly to the severity ofthetraumaticevents,butwillreturntoitsnormalpatternoflifewithinashort space of time. Alternately, a low level of resilience may be defined in caseswherebythegroup,community,orentiresocietyreactsinanextrememanner to traumatic challenges and finds it hard to return to routine life evenafteraconsiderableperiodoftime.

TheIsraelipublicassociatesnationalresiliencewithothervalues,suchas the extent of cohesiveness and solidarity of society; the consensusregarding themain issuesatagiven time; thedegreeofsupport for thegovernmentanditspolicies,particularlyduringatimeofcrisis;supportfornationalsymbols,suchas theIDF;andthewaytheIsraelieconomyfunctions.

The overall picture that emerges with regard to the resilience of thehomefrontduringthewar ismixed.Ontheonehand, themostdistinctdimensionwasthefactthatmanycivilianslefttheirhomesforallormostofthewar.Figuresontheextentofthephenomenon,thoughincompleteandnotreliable,indicatethataround120,000ofabout200,000residentslivingclosetotheconfrontationlinelefttheirhomes,6about17,000ofthe24,000inhabitantsofKiryatShmonaevacuatedtheirtown,7andasimilarproportion left other urban centers. Even if in fact the figures were lower, assuggestedbyasurveypublishedonSeptember20,8itisstillclearthat

106 I Meir Elran

there was a widespread pattern reflecting the war’s impact on the home front.Twoobservationsarerelevanthere:

• ThetraditionalIsraeliviewconsideredcivilianswholefttheirhomesas“deserters” reflecting a fundamentally negative approach, namely, a lack ofrootsandpossiblyevennon-compliancewithnationalexpectations.Overtheyearsthetraditionalperceptionhasfadedandbeenreplaced,at least inpart,by the recognition that leaving isanormal reaction,an appropriate, reasonable response to genuine threats in a time ofdistress.ShlomoBreznitz clearly expressed the current approachbysayingthat“onemustbeverycarefulwhensayingthatpeoplemustnotevacuate…Idon’tconsiderthisrunningaway.Ifsomeonelivesinaregionthat isunder threat…that isoneofmostrationalcoursesofaction.Thereshouldnotbeanysocialsanctionassociatedwith it. Itshouldnotbecriticized.Onthecontrary,itshouldbeencouraged.”9

• Mostofthosewholefttheirhomesdidsoontheirowninitiativeandattheirownexpense.Thestate–intentionally–didnotactinthisregarduntiltheendofthewar.Thiswasaverysensitiveissuefromtheoutset,bothindomesticpoliticaltermsandintermsoftheprojectednationalimage as viewedby the enemy.According to the Knesset’sForeignAffairsandDefersesubcommitteeonthehomefront,10noevacuationprocedure–suchasapprovedbythegovernmentinNovember2001,whereby civilians are to be evacuated when “damage is inflicted on civilians by a missile attack” – was implemented. It was only onAugust 7 that a limited “refreshing” plan was put together by theprime minister’s office for some of those living in bomb shelters in northernsettlements.Thiswasashorttermevacuationofseveraltensofthousandsofresidents,withgenerousassistancefromNGOs.Themessagewas clear: thegovernment avoided setting apolicyon thiscomplex matter, and in fact left the decision to the citizens and theimplementationtoNGOs.Residents of the north returned to their homes as soon as the rocket fire

endedand resumed their normaldaily routine.11Aconsiderablenumberofevacueesreturnedtoworkalreadyduringthewar,evenwhenabsencewaspermitted (andpaid for).A fortnight after theendof thehostilitiesthe schoolyear startedasusual, includingat all thirty-four schools thatsustaineddamage.PriortotheautumnJewishholidayseason,sixweeks


aftertheendofthewar,internaltourisminthenorthhadlargelyrecovered.This distinct phenomenon of full and rapid resumption of normal life,particularlybytheresidentsofthenorth,indicatesahighdegreeofpublicresilience.Thisissupportedbyotherevidenceofnormalization,includingthe limited willingness of the public to be involved in political protestagainstthegovernment.ThismightsuggestthatformostIsraelis,oncethewarendeditwastimetogetbacktonormallife,soonerratherthanlater.

The resilience of Israeli society at the time was also reflected by public opinionpollsduring thewar.Full analysis is addressedbyYehudaBenMeirinhisarticleinthiscollectionofessays;thepictureissummarizedintable1.

Table 1. PublicOpinionduringandaftertheWar

Date Survey by

War justified

Satisfied with the prime minister

Satisfied with the defense minister

Satisfied with the IDF

Rely on the IDF

Public Mood

July 6 Maariv 43% 2�%

July 1� Yediot �6% 7�% 72% �7%

July 1� Maariv 7�% 61%

July 25 Maariv �5% 77% 60%

July 2� Yediot �2% 74% 64% �0%

August 1 Tami Steinmetz �3% �7%

2/3 good,1/3 not good

August 3 Globes 71% 62% 65% feel secure

August 11 Yediot66% 5�% 4�% �0%

55% not good,

45% goodAugust 11 Haaretz 4�% 37% 5�%

August 16 Maariv 40% 2�% �1%

August 16 Yediot 47% 36% 61% �4%

August 25 Yediot 26% 20%

September 21

Haaretz 22% 14%

10� I Meir Elran

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the figures:

• Throughoutthewar,almostuntiltheveryend,theIsraelipublicvoicedits opinion, in consistently high percentages, that the war againstHizbollah was justified. According to the findings of a survey carried outattheendofJulybytheTamiSteinmetzCenterforPeaceResearchatTelAvivUniversity,afewweeksintothewaronly5percentofthoseasked felt the war was unjustified. Ninety-one percent justified the air force attacks on Lebanon, even if they inflicted damage on civilian infrastructuresandsufferingonthecivilianpopulationthere.12

• Thedegreeofconsensus isconnected to the relativelyhigh levelofnationalresilienceasperceivedbythepublic.AsurveyconductedbytheTamiSteinmetzCenterinthethirdweekofthewarindicatedthat88percentoftherespondentsthoughtthatIsraelisocietywaswithstandingtheburdenofthewarwellorverywell,andonly9percentconsideredthe resilience as poor or very poor. Fifty-five percent estimated the nationalmoodatthetimeofthesurveyasgoodorverygood,comparedwith41percentwhosaiditwasbadorverybad.Thoseconductingthesurvey noted that from the beginning of the war, there was a significant riseinnationalmorale.

• While the fighting continued, most of the Israeli public demonstrated a highlevelofsupportforthegovernmentandtheIDF,comparedwiththeperiodbeforethewar.Towardstheendofthewarandparticularlyonceitended,therewasaclearchangeinpublicopinionandasharpdownturn in support and satisfaction with the political and militaryleaderships. A survey conducted by the Dahaf Institute in mid-November2006andpublishedinYediot Ahronotfoundthat71percentofthoseaskedfeltthatthechiefofstaffshouldresign(comparedwith55percentwhowereofthisopinioninlateSeptember)and72percentfeltsimilarlyabouttheministerofdefense.

• Despite the decline in political support, including the clear drop insupport for the chief of staff, the public maintained confidence in the IDF,notwithstandingveryseverecriticismofthearmy’sperformance,includingfromwithinthearmy.Thisdiscrepancywasalsodemonstratedin a Dahaf Institute survey whose results were published in Yediot AhronotonAugust16,immediatelyaftertheendofthewar,accordingto which 94 percent (!) of the public felt that the IDF soldiers and

The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War I 10�

their commanders had conducted themselves well during the fighting. Afollow-upsurveyconductedbytheTamiSteinmetzCenterinearlySeptember indicates a significant decline in the public’s estimation of the IDF’sperformance.Onascaleof1-100theIDFreceivedaratingof63,comparedwith81in2001,althoughthisisstillfarhigherthantheratingoftheSupremeCourt(48)andtheIsraeligovernment(28).AccordingtotheDahafsurveyfromNovember,78percentofinterviewees“relyonthearmytoprotectIsrael,”comparedwith22percentwho“donotrely” on the IDF. These figures reveal once again the unique position enjoyedbytheIDFinIsraelisocietyandthesupportivefeelingsofthepublic,evenwhenharshcriticismisexpressedagainstit.DespitetheoperationalfailuresduringthewartheIDFremainedavaluednationalsymbol.

• Most of the indexes indicate only small discrepancies between theresponseof residentsof thenorthof Israeland those living inotherpartsofthecountry.These figures shed light on Israeli’s national resilience during the war.

They indicate wide agreement on the objectives of the war and significant backing for thepolitical leadership.Thisconsensus is also indicatedbythe public’s willingness to suffer the rocket attacks and sustain the fighting throughout the period. It explains the high response of reserve soldierstomobilizationorders.Thefactthatthisconsensusdeclinedtowardstheend of the war and practically vanished after the war can reflect the rapid resumptionofnormallifeandthefamiliarandgenerallydivisivedebatesinIsraelisociety,andthepublic’sprogressingfromasenseofobligationtothecollectivenotionsintimesofneed.

Whatarethepossibleexplanationsofthispublicrallyingandstrengthduringthewar?13First,itispossiblethatthepublicunderstoodatanearlystagethatindeedtherewasarealthreatthatmustbeaddressed,butthatitwas rather limited in terms of the damage it could inflict. The perception of the war as justified is a central factor. The fact that Hizbollah took the first step and kidnapped two soldiers, which hit a raw Israeli nerve (shortly afterthekidnappingofthesoldierGiladShalitontheGazaborder),andthentargetedciviliansinitsattacks,helpedtoportrayitclearlyasaterrororganization,anactivememberofthe“axisofevil,”whichcanonlybeobstructed by standing firm against it.

110 I Meir Elran

TheseexplanationspromptthebasicassumptionthatnationalresiliencetoexternalthreatsisapermanentcharacteristicofIsraelisociety.Contrarytotheclaimsofmany,Israelisocietyiscapableofabsorbingheavyblowsbyitsenemies.Perhapsitisnottakenforgrantedasmuchnowasitwasin thepast,when Israeli societywas thought tobe ready to rally roundforthesakeofthecollective.However,thisattributeisstillanimportantelement of strength and reflects a high degree of balanced normalcy, much ofwhichistheabilitytoaddressthreatsintherightproportions,notalwaysnecessarilyasexistentialthreatsinanychallengethatemerges.14

Theseencouragingattributesofnational resiliencedonoteclipse theseveresocialproblemsthatcametolightduringthe2006war.Ithighlighteddeepdivisions and seriousproblems that have existed in Israeli societyfor some time. Particularly prominent are the feelings of estrangement,coupledwiththeseveresocialandeconomicgapsthatexistbetweenthecenterofthecountryandtheperiphery,15betweendisadvantagedgroupsand those who are better off, and between Jews andArabs (despite theassumption,whichwaslargelydispelled,thatasHizbollahmissilesdonotdifferentiatebetweenJewsandArabs,therearegroundstoexpectunityinthefaceofacommonenemy).16Thereisnothingnewhere,norwasthereanyexacerbationoftheseissuesduringorfollowingthewar.Thewardidnot change much, if at all, and probably will not change these familiarfeaturesofIsraelisociety.

Deployment of the Home Front

If the picture of Israeli national resilience during the war indicates adegreeofoptimism,thepicturethatemergesofhomefrontpreparednessisdisappointing,particularlytheperformanceofthegovernmentagencies.Many have defined it in harsh terms of neglect and abandonment; or to borrowfromtheimageryofthestatecomptroller,aneclipseofgovernmentalfunction.17

Theessenceoftheproblemlieswiththequestionofresponsibilityforthecivilianfrontintimeofwar.InIsraelthereisnostateentitywiththeresponsibilitytolead,integrate,coordinate,setlongtermpolicy,andbuildthe required systems for the home front. There is no one body to define priorities and allocate funds, ensure implementation, and generate and


supervisetherequiredchangesaccordingtotheevolvingcircumstances.The legislature seemingly took care of this matter in the 1951 CivilianProtectionLawthatset“themeansnecessary towithstandanyattack…on the civilian population.” The law established “the Civilian Defense,whichwas supposed toorganize andmanage the civilianhome front…[and] coordinate the actions of the government ministries, the localauthorities, and private facilities.”18 The Home Front Command, whichwas established inFebruary1992 following the1991GulfWar, legallyassumedthoseresponsibilities.However,thescopeofresponsibilityandareasofoperationgrantedtotheCivilianDefenseintheearly1950sarenolongerrelevant.Inthe2006wartheissuesathandwerefarmorecomplexandsensitive:itwasnecessarytocareforhundredsofthousandsofcivilianswholefttheirhomes;totendtothosewhostayedbehindandspentweeksindilapidatedbombshelters;tosupplyfoodandhealth,psychological,andsocialservices;tofurnishreliabletimelyinformation;andtoprovidemanyother necessary services required by civilians in stress. These are difficult issues with social and economic ramifications and to a great extent moral, ethical,andpoliticalimplications.TheHomeFrontCommand,asabranchoftheIDF,cannotandshouldnotberesponsiblefortheseoverwhelmingtasks.

As opposed to the clear definitions of the responsibilities of the IDF for defense of the state against the enemy, the responsibilities for theCivilian Defense in the wider sense is not defined at all. In addition to theIsraelipoliceforce(whichinaccordancewithagovernmentdecisionfrom1974isresponsibleforinternalsecurity)andtheIDF’sHomeFrontCommand,governmentministries(Welfare,Health,Education,Finance,and Internal Security) also function, each in its own field, along with many otherorganizations,suchasMagenDavidAdom(theIsraeliRedCross),the fire departments, the Emergency Economy system (”Melah”),19andthemunicipalities.Thelocalauthorities,atleastthestrongeramongthem,haveinrecentyearsgraduallyassumedmoreresponsibilityforthewellbeingoftheirresidents,includinginemergencysituations.20Theperformanceandsuccessof themunicipal authoritiesduring thewarwashighlyvariableand depended on their strength, efficiency, and leadership. This caused major discrepancies between stronger and weaker municipalities.21 Insome cases the government intervened directly by appointing senior

112 I Meir Elran

representatives to run the local authorities. However, this was far fromsufficient to cover population needs, particularly in towns where large numbersofdisadvantagedciviliansorpeoplewith specialneeds stayedbehind. Concomitantly, public NGOs and numerous philanthropicorganizationsworkedtirelessly.Asaresult,inanygivenareatherewerenumerous official – state and municipal – organizations working alongside unofficial bodies, often without adequate coordination between them, to producehighlyvariableresults.

The issue of responsibility is not an isolated one. It reflects the deep-rooted and long-establisheddefense concept in Israel,which ismilitaryandoffensiveinnature,andassignstotheIDFthenearlyexclusiveroleinconfrontationswiththeenemy.Thebasicassumptionhasbeenthatduetoitssmallsizeandtheconcentrationofitspopulationinlimitedareas,Israel,inallscenariosandasquicklyaspossible,shouldtransferthecombatareatoenemyterritory.Theoffensiveapproachwasconsistentlyviewedasthebasisofdefense.Theproblemwiththisone-dimensionalapproachwasexposed in theSecondLebanonWar.22Tobesure, thiswasnot thefirst time the home front was exposed to continuous attacks: in the War ofIndependence,the1991GulfWar,andthesecondintifadathecivilianfrontconstitutedamajortarget.However,in2006thescope,persistence,and damage of the attacks were unprecedented.The assumption is thatsuch a scenario might well materialize in future conflicts, possibly even to agreaterdegree.

Assuch,protectingthehomefrontrequiresreexaminationofthebasicassumptionsandprioritiesof Israel’snationalsecurityconcept.Defenseofthehomefront,inallitsaspects,mustconstituteacentralcomponentofthedefensedoctrine,withallthatthisentailsintermsofthenecessaryinvestment and deployment. This does not just refer to technologicalsolutions,suchasdefensesystemsagainstrocketsandmissiles.Assumingthere is no comprehensive defense against high trajectory weaponslaunchedinaconcentratedmannerandovertime,anupdatedapproachanddeploymentofthenationalsystemsdealingwiththecivilianpopulationisessential.

Ithasbeensuggestedthattheconductofthegovernmentduringthewarwasalsoaproductofthephilosophythatthegovernmentshouldintervenelessinitscitizens’affairsandshouldallowpublicandprivateorganizations


totakeitsplace.Indeed,theweakeningofthewelfarestateconceptandpractice in Israel and the privatization of public services, prevalent ineducation,welfare, health, andother sectors,was largely applied to thecivilian front in timeofwar. Inessence, thegovernmentabdicated,andencouraged the non-profit and charity organizations to take its place.23Thisphilanthropic activitygeneratedwidespread solidarity among the Israelipublicwiththeresidentsofthenorth.However,lookingatthisissueinawiderperspective,therearegroundstoquestionthehugeroleoftheNGOsvis-à-vistheproblematicinvolvementofthestatesystems.

Anotherpossiblereasonforthedisappointingpicturethatemergedinrelationtothesystem’shandlingofthecivilianfrontstemsfromthefactthatfromtheoutsetpolicymakerswerenotsurewhethertherewas,infact,awarthatwouldpersistforoveramonth.24ForIsrael,theconfrontationbeganas a response to thekidnappingof the soldiers anddeveloped inanunplanned fashion.25Thegovernment didnot declare a state ofwar,with the ensuing legal, practical, and budgetary aspects, and sufficed with declaring“aspecialhomefrontsituation”inthenorth.Oneofthepracticalramifications was that the Emergency Economy system was not activated, despitethefactthattogetherwiththeAbsorptionandDeceasedAuthority(”Pesah”)itisdesignedtodealwithproblemsarisingfromanemergencysituation.26 The decision not to activate it reflects the decision makers’ passivestateofmindwithregardtodeploymentofthehomefront.

Theconclusiontobedrawnfromthisisclear:thecivilianfrontinthenorthandthosechargedwithprotectingitandaddressingitsneedswerenotpreparedorreadyforthewar.However,thesituationthatemergedshouldnothavecomeasasurprise.Aspecialreportissuedbythestatecomptrollerin2001,whichextensivelyreviewedthecomponentsofthecivilianfrontin thenorth,concluded:“Thesettlementsonthe‘confrontationline’arenot sufficiently protected in accordance with their needs.”27Verylittlewasdonetocorrectthesituationinthesixyearsthatfollowedthiscritique.

Conclusion

The two primary issues addressed in this essay are closely intertwined.National resilience is a central factor in the ability of Israeli society towithstandthechallengesthatconfrontitintimeofwar.Nationalresilience

114 I Meir Elran

is contingent on thepublic’s sense that its government is doingwhat itpossiblycantoprovideitwithareasonablelevelofindividualsecurityandrespondsappropriatelytoitsneedsinemergencysituations.IntheSecondLebanonWartheIsraelipublicdemonstratedreasonablecapacitytostandup to the Hizbollah attack, despite the failure of the central and localgovernmentstoattendtotheneedsofthecivilpopulationduringthewar.Thereisnoguaranteethatthiswilloccurinthefuture.Therefore,anewapproachmustbeadoptedvis-à-visciviliansecurityasanintegralpartofIsrael’sdefensedoctrine.28TheassumptionmustbethatIsrael’senemies,thePalestinians,Arabstates,and Iran,presentlypossessandwill in thefutureacquiremoreadvancedmilitarymeansthatwillposeaconsiderablethreat to the Israeli home front. In any confrontation in the future it isreasonabletoassumethatthecivilianpopulationwillbeapreferredtargetfor inflicting ongoing, continuous, and extensive damage. Compared with thecurrent situation, inwhich thedepthof thecivilianhome frontwaslimitedprimarilytoHaifaandnorthwards,inthefutureitispossiblethatallcentersofpopulation,ormanyofthem,willsimultaneouslybewithinstriking range of rockets or missiles. In such a situation, people whosetownsorvillagesarethreatenedwillnothaveanywheretogo.Withoutasignificant change in civilian defense and deployment of the home front, the next round may generate far more difficult situations than those of the lastconfrontation.Insuchcircumstancestherewillbespecialimportanceattached tomore than justprotectionofcivilians’ livesorproperty.Thequestion of national resilience and the ability of the Israeli public towithstand the traumasover timewillbe farmoreacuteandmighthaveseriousstrategicimplications.Thisscenariorequiresanentirelydifferentapproach and deployment, one that will generate a reasonable militarydefensesystemagainstrocketsandmissiles,andwillconsiderablyupgradethesystemofpublicbombsheltersandprovideasuitableresponsetotheneedsoftheindividual,thecommunity,andthepublic.Thelackofsuitablepreparation may have a considerable detrimental effect on the Israelipublic’srobustnessduringanall-outprotractedattackonthehomefront.

Within the framework of an updated concept it is imperative that anationalsystembeestablishedforthedefenseofthehomefront.Severalpointsareinorderhere:


• The “National Authority for the Home Front” must be establishedsooner than later. Itcannotandshouldnotbeapartof theMinistryofDefense(aswasrecentlydecided)ortheIDF.Itshouldbecivilianinnature,anditsresponsibilitiesandstatusshouldbedeterminedbylegislation.Itshouldberesponsibleforstrategicandoperativeplanning,for formulatinga civiliandefenseconcept, for setting standards andimplementingthemovertimethroughthedifferentagencies,andforsupervision,allocations,andcoordination.

• Theoperationalaspectsofthesystemshouldbecarriedoutbythelocalauthorities.Somearecapableandalreadypreparedforthisresponsibility.Otherswillbeabletopreparethemselves,certainlyiftheyaregivenaproperframeworkandiftheappropriatefundingisprovided.Therearemanymunicipalitiesthatrequiredirectandextensivehelp,possiblyoveralengthoftime.Thereisnowaythiscanbeavoided,despitetheexpected difficulties. There is no genuine alternative to the municipal systemasameansofprovidingthecivilianpopulationwiththeneededhelpintimeofwar.

• TheNGOsshouldalsoplayanimportantroleincaringforcivilianneedsinsituationsofdistressandemergencies.Theyshouldbeincorporatedintothesystemsatthemunicipallevelinadvance,inaccordancewiththepolicies and standardsdeterminedby thegovernment.However,theguidinglinemustbethatthestateandthelocalauthoritieshavetheresponsibilityandauthority,whiletheNGOsshouldactassupportiveelements.Israel’s ability to improvise will be a major characteristic in future

confrontations as well. However, improvisation by itself cannot suffice toprovidesuitablesolutionsforthehugechallengesthatthehomefrontwillconfront.Afullsystem-widesolutionisrequiredinordertolimittheexpectedrisksandtoprovidethecivilianswiththemeanstokeepuptheirresilienceintimesofwar.

Notes1. Lt.Col.Nurit,“EnforcementfromtheAir–TheLessonsofHistory,”Maarachot408

(August2006).2. According to figures compiled by Prof. Mooli Lahad from Tel Hai Academic College

and quoted in Yediot Ahronot onAugust 16, 2006, 16,000 children – 35 percent

116 I Meir Elran

of those who stayed in the north during the attacks – suffered from difficulties in concentration, nightmares, and increased bouts of crying. About 6,000 childrencontinued to experience severe anxieties following thewar. In July2006,NATAL(anNGOthatdealswithvictimsof trauma)receivedaround5,000telephonecallsforhelp,doublethenumberofcallsreceivedthroughoutthepreviousyear(Haaretz,August 14, 2006). See also a special report by Yitzhak Gilat on initial findings on calls toERAN(EmotionalFirstAidbyTelephone)duringthewarinLebanon,publishedontheassociation’swebsite,www.eran.org.il.

3. Sever Plotzker, Yediot Ahronot,August 24, 2006, quotes Dr.Yaakov Sheinin whoestimatedtheproductionlossduringthewarataroundNIS9billion,thedamagetotourismfromabroadatclosetoNIS6billion,damagecausedtopropertyinthenorthatsomeNIS8billion,anddirectmilitarycostsduringthewaratapproximatelyNIS7billion.This,hesaid,representsalossof2percentgrowthovertwoyears.AccordingtoThe Marker,August22,2006,theMinistryofFinanceestimateddirectandindirectdamagetothehomefrontduringthewarataroundNIS6billion,includingatransferofNIS2billiontothedefensebudgetandanotherNIS3billionthatwasallocatedtolocalauthoritiesandgovernmentministriesduringthewar.

4. Theexactquotationis,“OurbrothersinPalestine:IwanttotellyouinGod’snamethatIsrael,whichhasnuclearweaponsandthestrongestairforceintheregion,isasweakasaspiderweb.”

5. The issue of national resilience – its definitions and pertinent methodologies – has beenexaminedinanumberofpapersandpublications.See,forexample,MeirElran,Israel’s National Resilience: The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society,TelAviv:JaffeeCenterforStrategicStudies,Memorandumno.81,January2006.

6. See the briefing by the director general of the prime minister’s office, Haaretz,August10,2006.

7. Yediot Ahronot,August9,2006.SeealsothearticlebyDanielBenSimon,Haaretz,August11,2006,inwhichheclaimsthatKiryatShmonahadneverexperiencedanevacuationonsuchascale,evenduringpreviousclashes.

8. AsurveyconductedbytheTaubCenterforSocialPolicyStudiesinIsrael,publishedinseveralpublications,includingThe MarkeronSeptember20,2006,indicatesthat85percentofmaleresidentsofthenorthdidnotleavetheirhomesand9percentleftforonlyafewdays.About66percentofthewomendidnotleaveand13percentleftforashortperiod.Around90percentofArabinhabitantsdidnotleavetheirtownsandvillages,comparedwith66percentofJewishresidents.Therewerealsodifferencesinlevelsofincome:77percentofthosewhoreportedhavingalowincomestayedintheirtowns,comparedwith60percentofresidentswithhighincomes.

9. InterviewwithShaharIlan,Haaretz,July20,2006.Prof.BreznitzisapsychologistwhospecializesinstresssituationsandisalsoamemberofKnesset.

10. Yediot Ahronot,August22,2006.11. According to Yediot Ahronot, August 22, 2006, retail commerce resumed in full

throughout the country two days after the ceasefire. The credit card business turnover


onAugust16was8percenthigherthanbeforethewar.Therewasalsoa42percentincreaseinshoppinginthenorthinthedaysafterthewar.

12. SurveysofTamiSteinmetzCenterforPeaceResearchatTelAvivUniversity,July-August2006.SeefulldetailsinHaaretz,August9andSeptember12,2006,andontheCenter’swebsite.

13. SeearticlebyProf.BaruchNevo,deanoftheSafedAcademicCollege,“WeStoodUpWell,”Haaretz,August27,2006.

14. Evidenceof thiscanbefound in the Israelieconomy,whichmanaged tomaintainrelative stability during the war. Eighty-five percent of industrial plants in the north remainedfullyorpartiallyoperational,andaboutthreequartersoftheiremployeesattendedworkeveryday.SeetheeditorialinHaaretzfromAugust9,2006.Additionalevidence can be found in the figures relating to the level of faith of Israeli consumers inAugust2006publishedinGlobes, which determined that the confidence index rose threepoints(to83points)inAugustafteraonepointdropinJulyandatwopointrise in June.The increasewasmostlygeneratedbycontinued improvement in theassessmentoftheeconomyandanevaluationofthesituationoftheindividualforthefollowingsixmonths.

15. There was a prominent attitude that peripheral sections of society contribute tonationalsecurity,while“theTelAvivbubble”relievesitselfofrallyingroundforthegoodofthecountry.See,forexample,theremarkbyMaj.Gen.ElazarStern,headofIDFHumanResources,onGaleiTzahalradioandquotedbyGlobesonAugust16,2006:“ImakecondolencevisitsmainlytokibbutzimandJewishsettlementsintheterritories.Idon’tgettoTelAvivmuch…therehasbeennobereavementthereandtherewon’tbe…oneshouldcommendimmigrantsfromtheformerSovietrepublicsand Ethiopia, who make up a higher proportion of the bereaved families.” ThisarousedawaveofresponseinthemediathatdwelledmuchonwhatittermedasthegrudgeandsuspicionfeltbyresidentsoftheoutlyingareasofthecountrytowardsthecomplacentresidentsofTelAviv.SeealsotheMaarivweekendmagazine,August11,2006,andAviramaGolaninHaaretz,August23,2006.

16. See a surveyconductedby theMadaal-Carmel–ArabCenter forAppliedSocialResearch, one week after the ceasefire began. The main findings of the survey, published in a number of publications including the Ynet website onAugust 29,2006,indicatedthat:32percentoftheArabpopulationofIsraelbelievedthatIsraelwas responsible for the outbreak of war, 75 percent felt that the IDF’s operationsinLebanonwereakintowarcrimes,52percentthoughtthatIsraelmainlytriedtoachieveAmericanobjectives in thewar,32percentclaimed that thewarcausedadeteriorationinrelationsbetweenArabsandJews,twothirdsexpressedthefeelingthat the country did not helpArab citizens in the north as much as Jews, and 69percentthoughtthatthereasonforthehighnumberofArabfatalities(onethirdofthetotal)wasduetheshortageofbombsheltersinArabtowns.AnothersurveyconductedbytheDahafInstitutefortheKnessettelevisionchannel(Maariv,August25,2006)revealedthat27percentofArabintervieweesrepliedthattheysupportedIsraelduring

11� I Meir Elran

thewarandwantedittowin,36percentdidnotsupporteitherside,and18percentsaidtheysupportedHizbollah.

17. Initialreportissuedbythesubcommitteeinvestigatingthereadinessofthehomefrontfor emergency situations for theKnessetForeignAffairs andDefenseCommittee,September 12, 2006. The subcommittee, headed by MK Ami Ayalon, defined the government’shandlingofthehomefrontas“leadershipfailure.”SeealsotheseriesofarticlesbyRutiSinaiandothersinHaaretzontheroleofthehomefrontintheSecondLebanon War; an article by Daniel Ben Simon, “Betrayal of the State,” HaaretzSeptember4,2006,andremarksassociatedwiththeheadoftheGSS(Haaretz,August24,2006,basedonChannel2),accordingtowhich“duringthewarthegovernmentsystemscollapsedcompletely…thenorthwas clearly abandoned.” In an extensiveMaagarMohotsurvey,conductedamongresidentsofnorthernIsraelandpublishedin Haaretz on September 12, 2006, Israelis gave the government’s performance aratingof2.1onascaleof1-5.For thegovernmentactionsduring thewarsee thegovernment services and information portal at www.gov.il, in the file “Returning to Routine.”

18. LawBook71,March1951.The law thatestablished theCivilianDefenseSystemdefined a long list of responsibilities in times of war and stipulated that it would be undertheaegisoftheministerofdefense.

19. TheIsraelEmergencyEconomyisaninter-ministerialbodyestablishedbytheIsraeligovernmentin1955andisresponsiblefor thepreparationofessentialelementsoftheeconomyinemergencysituationsinordertoavoid,asfaraspossible,disruptionsanddamagetothecivilianeconomyinwartimeandtoallowcivilianpopulationstomaintainasnormalalifestyleaspossible.TheIsraelEmergencyEconomydoesnothandlematters relating to civiliandefense–bomb shelters, protectivekits, rescueoperationsandguidelinesonhowtobehaveduringemergencysituations–topicsthatareundertheaegisoftheHomeFrontCommand.TheIsraelEmergencyEconomywas not activated during the Second Lebanon War, “as the government decidedtoestablishacommandandcontrolentity,under thedirectorgeneralof theprimeminister’s office, and there is no need for duplication.” This was conveyed from the defense minister’s office to the subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and DefenseCommittee,whichexamined the issueof the readinessof thehome frontduringthewar.Seewww.nfc.co.il,fromAugust24,2006.

20. AsbackgroundtoexaminingthisissueseeNahumBenElia,“TheFourthGeneration:NewLocalGovernmentinIsrael,”FloersheimerInstituteforPolicyStudies,2004.Muchwaswritteninthedailymediaontheconductofsomelocalauthoritiesduringthe war.The criticism of the minister of the interior, who is responsible for localgovernment, was particularly fierce. He claimed in the Knesset’s Interior Committee: “I discovered serious flaws in certain towns…I was told that many of the municipal management – the elected figures and also the executive officers – had fled,” Haaretz,August29,2006. InSafed,sevenoutof350municipalworkersstayed todo theirjobs.

The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War I 11�

21. On theIDFinvestigation into theHomeFrontCommand,seeHaaretz,October3,2006. The main flaw that emerged: despite the drills, the Command did not foresee thevacuumthatformedbecauseoftheweaknessoftheauthoritiesinthenorth.Thereare107authorities in thearea that sustaineddamage;mostworkedwellbut somealmost did not operate at all. In Safed a problem was identified and the Command sent hundredsofsoldierstodistributefoodtobombshelters.

22. See,forexample,AviBitzor,“TheCivilianHomeFrontasaCrucialFront,”Omediawebsite,August2006;YossiMelman,Haaretz,August24,2006.

23. ThenorthernprecinctoftheIsraelipolicewasparticularlyeffectiveinitsactivities.See,forexample,OferPetersburg,Yediot Ahronot,August11,2006.

24. TheheadoftheDoctrineandDevelopmentdepartmentoftheHomeFrontCommandwasquotedinHaaretzonAugust11,2006assayingthattheactualrocketattacksdidnotsurprisethearmybuttheydidnotforeseepeoplesittinginbombsheltersforamonth.“Wehadlong-termplans,butwedidnotconsidersuchalongtime.”

25. ChiefofStaffDanHalutzsaidinaninterviewtoYediot AhronotonOctober1,2006,that:“thatevening(July12)wedidnotyetknowwewereembarkingonawarwithHizbollah.”

26. With regard to evacuation of towns in emergency situations, there is governmentdecision985fromNovember11,2001, thatdetermines, interalia, that“theIsraeligovernmentisauthorizedtodeclare‘evacuationtime’andtherebyissueadirectiveordering the evacuation of residents (up to 25,000) and take them to absorptionfacilities…evacuationofmore than25,000residents requiresadeclarationby thegovernmentof‘anemergencysituation’or‘totalwar.’”

27. The state comptroller’s report, September 2001, no. 52a, on the preparedness ofsettlementsinthenorthfollowingtheIDF’swithdrawalfromLebanon.

28. DanMeridor,whoheadedthecommitteechargedin2006withformulatingadefenseconceptforIsrael,wasquotedinMaarivonAugust31,2006,assaying:“Thelastwarwasanewtypeofwar.Anewcornerstoneneedstobeestablished,inadditiontothecomponentsofdeterrence,earlywarning,andvictory.Wemust…takecareofdefenseof thehomefront.”Hewasalsoquoted inan interviewwithHaaretz,onOctober3, 2006: “There is the security triad comprising deterrence (how to prevent war),warning(howtoknow,intime,thatwarwillbreakout),anddecision(howtowinthewar).Inthenewera,thetriadbecomesatetrad,becauseitisaugmentedbytheaspectofcivildefense.Thisisacampaignthatthearmyisnotconducting.”

Part II

International Dimensions

Chapter �

“Divine Victory” and Earthly Failures: Was the War Really a Victory for Hizbollah?

Yoram Schweitzer

TheSecondLebanonWar,theviolentclashbetweenIsraelandHizbollahofJuly-August2006,endedindecisivelyandleftIsraelandHizbollahtolick their wounds and draw respective relevant conclusions. While theIsraeli public acquired anuneasy sense of despondency and resorted tointrospectiveself-castigationas towhyIsraelwasunable toachieve thequickanddecisivevictorythatmanyexpected,membersoftheHizbollahorganization and its supporters reveled in their joy, with mass victorygatheringsheldinSyriaandLebanon.1

Hizbollah’s victory celebrations flaunted the organization’s ability to inflict continuous damage deep inside Israel and bring routine life in northern Israel to a standstill; kill Israeli civilians and soldiers; andmaintain the ability to continue fighting, despite Israel’s massive attack on its activists and infrastructures.Yet as with other guerilla and terrororganizationsaroundtheworld,Hizbollahhasinpartearnedanimageofvictory due to the difficulty in identifying the victors in confrontations that takeplacebetweenstatesandsub-stateorganizations.2

ThisessaytakesacriticalviewoftheclaimbyHizbollahanditssupportersthatitwonthewar,citesitsachievementsandfailures,andexaminesthemin the context of its specific identity: a multi-faceted organization operating fromafailedstatewiththesupportofpatronstates.ThearticledoesnotexaminethecontributionofIsrael’sfailingstoHizbollah’sachievements,significant though they were.

124 I Yoram Schweitzer

Hizbollah: A Multifaceted Proxy Organization

Hizbollah’s ability to survive an asymmetrical conflict with Israel derives fromitsuniquenature,unmatchedbyotherterrorandguerillaorganizationsintheworld:amultifacetedorganizationoperatinginafailedstatefromwithinacivilianpopulation,whileenjoyingintensivesupportfrompatronstates.Establishedin1982byLebaneseShiiteswiththehelpoftheIranianRevolutionaryGuards,Hizbollahhasfromtheoutsetbeeninvolvedinawiderangeofareas,principallywelfare,culture,andreligiousactivities.However,mostofitsfamecamefromshowcaseterrorattackscarriedoutbyitsmembersintheeighties,particularlysuicideattacksonforeignforcesand kidnappings ofWestern civilians visiting Lebanon.3 Hizbollah laterexpandedandupgradeditsarmedoperations:itextendeditsinfrastructureandoperationsbeyondLebanon’sborders,anditprogressedfromasmalllocal armed militia to an organized hierarchical political and militaryorganization that specializes in guerilla warfare and terror activities. Itisledbytheorganization’ssecretary-generalandsupportedbytheShuraCouncil,whichservesasamanagingentityandformofgovernmentfortheorganization.Since1992thesecretary-generalhasbeenHassanNasrallah,whoenjoysconsiderablepersonalprestige.

Inside Lebanon, the organization worked to consolidate its civilianinfrastructureandincreaseditsinvolvementinthemunicipalandpoliticalspheres.Since1992ithasbeenrepresentedintheparliament,andithasbeenrepresentedintheLebanesegovernmentsince2005.Thishasaffordedtheorganizationastrongdomesticsocial-politicalbasethatitreliesonintimesofcrisisanddistress.Inthemilitarysphere,Hizbollahhasupgradedits capabilities, and with the help of its patrons, has trained hundredsof people in various methods of warfare, including terror and guerillaactivities. It boasts an organized fighting force with regular organic units andreserveforcesdividedinto“commands”ledbylocalheadswhoanswerto themilitaryorganizationalhead. In2006Hizbollah’s “chiefof staff”wasImadMughniyah,amemberoftheShuraCouncil,whorosethroughtheranksoftheorganization’ssecretterrorfacilitiesintheeightiesuntilheattainedhispositionasheadofthemilitarypyramid.Israel’swithdrawalfromLebanoninMay2000ledtoafurtherupgradeoftheorganization’smilitarycapabilities,inpartduetotheabsenceofIsraeli–oranyother,

”Divine Victory” and Earthly Failures I 125

forthatmatter–supervisionofitsactivities.Italsohelpedtocultivatetheorganization’simageasasuccessful“resistancemovement.”Atthesametime,HizbollahlostmuchofitslegitimacyformaintainingitsarmedmilitiainLebanonandcontinuingitsmilitaryactivitiesagainstIsrael,whichwasrecognizedinternationallyforitsfullwithdrawalfromLebanon.

Inthe2006war,Israelthusfounditselfcontendingwithanadversarythatitcastasaterrororganization,butwhichinpracticewasmorelikeatrained,well-equipped,andskilledforceoperatedbytwocountries–IranandSyria.IranhasviewedHizbollahasaproxysinceitwasestablished.Irantrainedandarmedtheorganizationovermanyyears,sothatitcouldfunctionasitspromotionalforceinthestruggleagainstitsadversaries.ForIran,Hizbollah’s importanceas adeterrent factorhas even increased inrecentyears,particularlyinviewofitspotentialconfrontationwithIsraeloraWesterncoalitionoverthenuclearissue.

Along with Iran’s backing of Hizbollah, Syria’s support of theorganization has been significantly heightened in recent years. In terms of itsmilitarysuppliestotheorganization,Syriacompareswith–andevenexceeds–Iran’slongtermsupport.SinceBasharAsadbecamepresidentofSyriatherehasbeenachangeintherelationsbetweentheSyrianrulerandHizbollah.WhileduringthedaysofAsadSr.itwasclearwhothepatronwas, in Bashar’s time Syria is largely dependent on the military abilityanddeterrenceofHizbollahascoverforitsstrategicinferioritytoIsrael–and inviewof the threatsagainstSyria fromtheUnitedStates.SyriahasallowedHizbollah touse its territory for transferringweapons fromIran to Lebanon, and allowed Hizbollah fighters to fly from the Damascus airporttotakepartintrainingandmeetingsinIran.IthasalsobecomeacentralpartyinHizbollah’sarmamentwithadvancedmissiles,whichwerea significant factor in Israel’s losses during the last war.

ThereisnodoubtthatthearmamentstransferredtoHizbollah,intheform of Katyusha rockets and short, medium, and long range rockets,anti-tank missiles, intelligence and counter-intelligence equipment, andother sophisticated measures far exceed the level of routine equipmentandtraininggenerallyusedbyterrorandguerillaorganizationsaroundtheworld.Thesehadatellingeffectontheresultsofthewarinthenorth,andcontributedgreatlytotheorganization’sachievements.


The Combat Arena and the Lack of Symmetrical Restraint

The fact that Israel met a serious challenge in Hizbollah did not ensueonlyfromtheorganization’smilitarycapabilityorthetraining,discipline,anddedicationdisplayedby its operatives. It alsodidnot result fromasweepingIsraeliintelligencefailureastothelocationoftheorganization’sheadquarters,thequalityandquantityofequipmentatitsdisposal,oranunderstandingofitscombatmethods.Itseemsthatoneofthemainfactorsthat prevented Israel from demonstrating its clear military advantageagainstHizbollahstemmedfromthecivilianenvironmentfromwhichitfought,andthelackofsymmetricalconstraintsastoattackingcivilians.Israel imposed restraints on itself as to attacking civilian targets, butthere were no such constraints for Hizbollah, which acted according tothe familiar “philosophy” of terror organizations that target civilians. ItlaunchedthousandsofrocketstowardIsraelwiththeintentionofhittingclearciviliantargetsandwithaviewtokillingIsraelis indiscriminately,even when it was aware that Israel’s response might cause casualtiesamongtheLebanesepopulation.Hizbollahtookadvantageoftheciviliansurroundings toconceal itselfandstoredweapons inpeople’shomes. Itfired rockets from or near inhabited civilian areas, assuming that Israel would take every precaution not to hurt civilians.While Israel bombedspecific locations used as rocket launch areas after the inhabitants were cautioned to leave the area, Hizbollah exploited the instances in whichcivilianswerehurtforpropagandapurposes,suchasthecaseofKafrKana(July30,2006),4inordertosullyIsrael’snameandpresentitasanaggressorwith few of the fighting morals required of a democratic state.5ThefactthatHizbollahoperatedfromafailedstate,wherethecentralgovernmentcould not or did not have sufficient political will to impose its authority overtheinsurgentorganization,allowedittoignorethedamagecausedtothecivilianandeconomicinfrastructureofLebanon.

Hizbollah’s Achievements in the War in Lebanon

Hizbollah’sapparentmainachievementwasinsurvivingtheconfrontationwiththeIDFandinmanagingtoengageIsraelforthirty-threedaysandinflict continuous damage deep inside Israel’s sovereign territory up to the last day of the fighting, without Israel’s military actions forcing it to


surrender or seriously damaging its motivation or fighting ability. This achievement earned Hizbollah the legitimacy to claim to its supportersthatithadwontheconfrontation.ThiswasevenmorepronouncedinviewoftheresultsofpreviousclashesbetweentheregulararmiesofArabstatesagainst Israel, which generally ended with clear and significant military achievementsbyIsrael.Morethananythingelse,thefactthattheIsraelimilitary was unable to stop or greatly curtail Hizbollah’s firing of short rangerocketsatIsraelitownsbothsymbolizedtheorganization’ssuccessandaccentuatedIsrael’sfailure.ThiswasnaturallynotedasanachievementbyHizbollah.ThefactthatHizbollahleaders,particularlyNasrallah,andthe senior officials of the organization in Beirut and the command areas in the fighting arena were not hurt, despite the attack being specifically directedtowardsthem,alsoaddedtotheorganization’ssenseofvictory,asexpressedbyitsspokesmenandprojectedbyal-Manar,itsbroadcastingstation.

Similarly, al-Manar’s ability to continue to broadcast to the worldthroughout the fighting, notwithstanding Israeli air strikes at its offices, anditssuccessfulabilitytoconveytheorganization’sviewbothofthewarand its results were also Hizbollah achievements.The al-Manar stationundoubtedly constituted a central factor in establishing the myth of thevictorious organization in the eyes of theArab and Muslim public. Inaddition, the station’s broadcasts were cited extensively in the Westernmedia,andcontributedtothepositiveexposureandsuccessfulimageoftheorganization.

In the course of the war, Nasrallah – at least to his supporters andadmirers – enhanced his image as a fighting Muslim leader (mujahid)who goes beyond the narrow borders of Lebanon and once again leadshis organization in a successful battle against a superiorWestern army,in this case, Israel.The victory that in their mind was achieved due totheir spirit and determination brought the organization widespreadsupportandadmiration in theIslamicworld(occasionally incontrast tothepositionoftheIslamicgovernments)initsstruggleagainstIsrael,andinwhat itpresents aspartof anall-out campaignof theWesternworldagainst Islam.6 Hizbollah succeeding in thwarting efforts to disarm it,and it retained hundreds of well-equipped fighting personnel, thousands ofshort range rockets,andpossiblyevensomemediumand longrange

12� I Yoram Schweitzer

missiles.Israeliexpertsbelievethatshortlyaftertheendofthewar,Syriaresumeddeliveringsuppliesofequipment thatHizbollahlostduringthefighting.7TherewerealsoreportsthattheIranianshadresumedprovisionofequipmentandweaponstoHizbollahviatheDamascusairport,anditappearsthatHizbollahhasessentiallyrecoveredtothelevelofarmsithadbeforetheoutbreakofthehostilities.8

AnotherachievementbyHizbollah,albeitlimited,isthatduringmostofthe fighting it managed to mitigate the criticism and even generate the image ofpopularLebanesesupport,mainlythroughhighlightingdeclarationsofsupportandsolidarityexpressedbyLebaneseleaders,principallyPresidentLahoud,oneofthestrongsupportersofthepro-SyriacampinLebanon.Atleastinhisview,theorganizationsucceededinretainingitsdeterrentabilitytowardsIsrael,asitmanagedtomaintainitsmembers’presenceinLebanon,includinginthesouth,andtheirarmsandequipmentwerenotdestroyed.Itspersonnelbegantoreturntothesouthofthecountrydespitethe instructions to keep a low profile. Israel has also continued to behave cautiouslytowardHizbollah,evidencedbythefactthatIsraeldidnotharmNasrallah when he made his first public appearance in Lebanon following thestartofthehostilitiesandgaveavictoryaddressatamassgatheringinBeirutinmid-September.9Nasrallah,forhispart,hascontinuedtoexercisecaution,hascontinuedtolimithispublicappearances,andhasaddressedhissupporterssurroundedbyprotectivemeansorintapedbroadcasts.

Hizbollah’s Failures in the War in Lebanon

Hizbollah’smostprominentfailureinthewarwasitsleaders’underestimationofIsrael’sreactiontothekidnappingofthesoldiersandtherocketattacksonnorthernIsraelitowns.Nasrallahhimselfadmittedthismistakeattheend of the war, a miscalculation that resulted in the extensive fighting. NasrallahdidnotexpectanIsraeliresponseofthisnatureordegree,nordidhechoosethecampaign’stiming.10

This mistake cracked the image of Nasrallah as a considered andpragmaticpoliticalleader.ManyintheWestandtheArabworldhadhopedthatthemilitantandvenomouscontentofhisspeechesnotwithstanding,Nasrallah would join or at least not foil efforts to resolve the Israeli-Lebanese confrontation through political channels. Yet during the fighting hisfacadeofalwaystellingthetruthwasseriouslypunctured.Evenmore

”Divine Victory” and Earthly Failures I 12�

critical,theimagethatheexpresslyhelpedcreateofonewithadeepsenseof Israeli society was damaged once his understanding was ultimatelyrevealed to be limited. Specifically, Nasrallah failed in his inadequate assessmentofIsraeliresilience.DespitehisclaimsofhavinganintimateunderstandingofIsraelisociety,whichhecomparedtoa“spiderweb,”i.e.,aweaksocietythatisexpectedtosnapunderpressure,helearnedthathehaderredinhisforecastoftheIsraelihomefront’sresilience,whichturnedouttobemorerobustthanheanticipated.11

Hizbollahmanagedto inciteaSunniArabcoalitionagainst itanditsIranianpatron.ThiscoalitionincludedEgypt,SaudiArabia,andJordan,whichfeartheincreasingpoweroftheShiites.TomanyintheArabworld,Hizbollah’s conduct in Lebanon accentuated the danger they face as aresultofwhatKingAbdullahofJordanhascalled“theShiitecrescent,”emergingfromtheShiitemajorityinIranandIraq.Asaresult,leadersintheArabandMuslimworldmarkedHizbollahasadangerousenemyinadevelopingconfrontationbetweenShiaandSunna,andnotonlyasalocalforce inLebanon thatengages Israel inbattleandperforceenjoysArabsupport.HizbollahwasalsoconsideredbymanyWesternleaderstobeanextremeelementservingforeignintereststhatcouldsparkaregionalwardueitspatrons’intentionsoradventurousness.

In the internal Lebanese arena tensions between Hizbollah and theotherforcesthereheightenedgreatly,andthereinliesthemaindangertoHizbollah’sfuture.Immediatelyfollowingthewar,Hizbollahwassubjectedto fierce criticism of the disastrous escapade into which it dragged Lebanon, despite its having been previously warned regarding an independentpolicy that ignores thepolicyof thesovereigngovernment.12Therewasalso disappointment with Nasrallah’s failure to conduct negotiationswithIsraeloverthereleaseofall theArabprisonersinIsraeli jails.ThePalestinians,itseems,werenoteagertoacceptNasrallah’spatronage,andconductednegotiationswithIsraelseparatelyfromHizbollah.InthepastNasrallah has proudly displayed his ability to negotiate indirectly withIsraelandachieveresults,yetitappearedthatanyachievementfromthewarwouldbelimitedandnotincludePalestinians.Moreover,itislikelythatHizbollahwastedprematurelythestrategicdeterrencemeansgiventoitbyIran–itsmediumrangeandlongrangemissiles–andexposedthepotentialdamagetoIsraelanditsalliesthatcanbecausedbyshortrange


rocketsinawaythatenablesthemtotakeprecautionarymeasures.Thesemissileswereapparentlydesigned,atleastfromIran’spointofview,toactasanadvancestrategic facilityshould therebeaconfrontationbetweenIsraelortheUnitedStatesovertheIraniannuclearissue.13Hizbollahalsoexposedtheexplosives-ladenUAVsatitsdisposalasasecretweapontobeusedtocausedamagedeepinsideIsrael.TheUAVsfailedtocarryouttheirmissionafter theIsraeliairforceinterceptedthem–animpressiveachievementforIsraelcomparedwithHizbollah’soperationalfailure.

Hizbollah and the Challenges of the Future

It is thus evident that Hizbollah scored both impressive achievementsandnotable failures, though theseareoftenappraiseddifferentlyby therespective sides. The balance between its successes and failures willbecomeclearerwithtime,butthevalidityofthestrongclaimsofvictorybyHizbollahanditssupportersshould,atleast,raisequestionmarks.

Itisclearthatthepost-warrealitypresentstheorganizationwithcomplexchallengesintheinternalsocio-politicaldomaininLebanon,aswellasinthemilitaryrealm.Attheepicenteroftheinternalsocio-politicalarenainLebanon,Hizbollahwillwant toconvert its achievements intoconcretepoliticalassetsandlimit thedamageincurredbyits failuresasmuchaspossible. First and foremost, the organization will strive to maintain itsuniquethoughcontroversialstandingwithinLebanon.Tothisend,itmustworktowardsstrengtheningthesupportoftheShiitepopulation,whichisthebasisofitspowerandsupportinLebanon.Nasrallah,whostrivestochangethetraditionalgovernmentalstructureinLebanonandgaincontrolof the state based on Shiite majority, first needs the backing of most of themembersofhisownethniccommunity.NasrallahknowsthatdespitetheexpressionofsupportfortheorganizationandthesolidaritydisplayedbytheShiitestowardstheorganization,theShiitepopulationinsouthernLebanon, Beirut, and the Lebanese Valley (Beqaa) – which paid theheaviestpriceofthewar–expectstoreceivesuitablecompensationforitssuffering.Hizbollahwillhavetomeettheseexpectations,inpartperhapsthrough increased political power. Furthermore, not all members of theShiitecommunitysupportHizbollah.14Thus,Hizbollah’smainefforthasfocusedonrehabilitatingShiiteareasandcompensatingtheirresidents.Itssuccessinrepairingthedestructioncausedduringthewaranditsvictory


over the Lebanese government for the title of “the great rehabilitator”willhelptheorganizationconsolidateitsstandingastheleadingpolitical,economic,andsocialelementintheShiitecommunity,andwillimpactonitspoliticalfutureinLebanon.

AnothermorecomplexchallengeintheinternalLebanesearenawithwhich the organization will have to contend is its ability to improverelationswithrivalethniccommunities,particularlytheSunnis,Christians,andDruze.Itwillbecompelledtomaneuverbetweenthemsothatitcanmoderate their fierce and growing criticism of Hizbollah, due to the price that Lebanon as a whole paid for the July 12 kidnapping of the Israelisoldiers.InthisareaNasrallahhasattemptedtochangethepoliticalbalanceofpower in favorof theShiitecommunity,which representsagrowingpercentageoftheLebanesepopulationbuthasnotearnedcommensuratepoliticalachievements.Nasrallah isaiming tochange this situationasameans of enhancing his influence on political life in Lebanon.

On themilitary level theorganizationworkedquickly to rehabilitateitsunits that sustainedheavycasualties andequipment losses, to renewitsstrategicabilities,particularlymediumandlongrangemissiles,andtoconsolidatetheunitsthatoperatetheshortrangemissiles,whichprovedto be the organization’s most efficient weapon. It appears that both the organizationanditspatrons,IranandparticularlySyria,intendtocontinuecultivating–eachforitsownreasons–Hizbollah’smilitarypower,andtorestore itsdeterrencecapability towardsIsrael.Nasrallah’saddress inSeptember2006suggestedthatheplannedtoenhancetheorganization’ssituationbeyond its pre-war state, particularly inhis arsenalof rockets.Subsequent statements suggested success.15 Nasrallah has also madeclearhisintentiontopreserve–andevenenhance–theoptionofhittingthe Israeli home front, while the organization increases its deterrentcapabilityagainst Israelwith thesupportof itspatrons,primarilySyria.ThedeploymentoftheLebanesearmyinthesouthofthecountryandofareinforcedmultinationalforceinaccordancewithresolution1701,whichconstituteanachievementforIsraelandathornintheorganization’sside,mayencroachonHizbollah’sfreedomofmovement,thoughitisdoubtfulifinthelongtermtheywillsucceedinpreventingitsreorganizationandupgrade of its military capabilities. Complicating Hizbollah’s situationfurtherarestrengthenedglobaljihadforces,whichareapteithertolaunch


attacksagainstIsraelindependently,withnocoordinationorassentofrivalforces,ortoengageHizbollahitselfinaviolentcompetitionforpowerinLebanon that is not at all connected to the conflict with Israel.

Inviewofthepossibilitythattheorganization’spotentialformaneuverincarryingoutmilitaryactivitieshasdecreased,atleastintheshortandmid-term,itmaylookforalternativechannelsofaction,theprincipalonesbeingenhancedoperationofindependentandPalestinianterrornetworksagainst Israel. Thus far, the organization has not paid any price for itsactivesupportofPalestinianterroractivitiesagainstIsraelthataccordingto Israeli security officials comprise a significant part of all attacks on Israelinrecentyears.16AnotheroptionavailabletoHizbollahisrelianceon theoperational infrastructure itmaintains in arenasoutsideLebanonfor carrying out attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. Hizbollahmanagesthisinfrastructurethroughitssecretchannels,andalsoexploitsitslinkswithforeignIslamicterrorgroupsthatprovideassistanceinreturnfor theaid that it and Iranhavegiven themover theyears.Thisoptionof terror activities in the international arena,however,may turnout forHizbollahanditspatronstobeadouble-edgedswordbecauseofthegeneralatmosphereofintoleranceofinternationalterror,andthusthisoptionwilllikelybetappedonlyindirestraits,ifatall.

Conclusion

At the end of the fighting it seemed that the clash between Israel and Hizbollah wastemporarilysuspendedbutnotover.Despitefailures in themilitarycampaign,IsraelcantakesatisfactioninthefactthatHizbollahpositionsonitsnorthernborderweredestroyedanditsarmedandentrenchedpersonnelwerenolongerinprominentandprovocativepositionsalongtheborder.TheLebanesearmydeployedforces in thesouth, therebyimplementingUNresolutions1559and1701,andareinforcedmultinationalforcehasbeenstationedinLebanonneartheborder.Ontheotherhand,Israel’sfaithintheseforces’abilitytorestrainHizbollahandpreventitfromreturningitspersonneltovillagesinthesouthandrearmingitselfishighlylimited.

Hizbollahcanboastthattheheavylossesitsustaineddidnotpreventitfrom continuing to fight and strike at Israel, and in its view, it emerged from thewarasthevictor.Eventhoughitwasforcedtoagreetodeploymentof theLebanesearmy in thesouthof thecountryand thepresenceofa


reinforcedmultinationalforceinLebanon,towhichitobjectedbeforethewar,itconsidersthisatacticalconstraintandnotalimitationthatcannotbeovercomeifitdecidestorenewtheconfrontationwithIsrael.HizbollahclaimsthatitsdeterrencecapabilityagainstIsraelhasnotbeendamagedandmayevenhaveincreased,asIsraeldiscoveredthatinordertodefeatHizbollah it would have to pay a heavy price for any damage inflicted on the organization in the future. Accordingly, Hizbollah feels it has sufficient roominwhichtomaneuverandexploitthelackofadecisiveconclusiontothe war, and thereby resort to military power in the future as it sees fit.

Thus in the post-confrontation reality, there is limited reciprocaldeterrence between Israel and Hizbollah. This is based on the sides’understanding thata renewalof thehostilitiesnowor in thenear futureis liable todemandofbothpartiesahighandundesirableprice,on theinternalnationallevelandinternationallevel.Israelwillstrivetoensurethat Hizbollah is neutralized as an effective force next to its northernborder, and will endeavor to limit its rearmament, despite its sense ofthedubioussuccessofthisgoal.Atthesametime,IsraelwilltrythroughitspartnersintheinternationalcommunitytohelpbolsterthepragmaticcampinLebanon,whichisinterestedinlesseningHizbollah’smilitaryandpolitical strength and subordinating it to the sovereignty of the state. Itseemsthat inthisarena, thenatureof theorganization’sactivitywillbedeterminedwithorwithoutforce.

Hizbollahhasoppositeaspirations.Itwilltrytoexpanditspoliticalandmilitarymaneuveringability inLebanon,whileexploiting theweaknessand internal divide inside Lebanon to try to take control of Lebanonthroughpoliticalmeans andbyvirtueof its uniquemilitaryposition. Itfeelsthatitsimageasapowerfulforce,itsdetermination,andthehelpitreceives from itscloserandmoredistantpatronsmayhelp it realize itspoliticalgoals.NasrallahhasloftyaimsanditmaybeassumedthathewilleventuallystrivetochangethehistoricsystemofgovernmentinLebanon,which grants preference to Christian and Sunni parties in the country’sleadership. It is possible that Nasrallah will ask for the senior positionin thecountry’s leadership,althoughin themeanwhilehemaymakedowith anchoring himself on the political axis and acquiring major influence oncentralissuesthatdeterminepolicyinLebanon’sinternal,foreign,andsecurityaffairs.


At this stage it is unclear if the reciprocal deterrence will suffice to prevent another military clash in the near future that – or so it seems–neither side is interested in.However,oneof theclearestconclusionstobedrawnfromthe2006waris thateventsofa localizedandtacticalnatureandinaccurateassessmentsbybothsidesmaycausethesituationtodeterioratewithinashorttimeintoanotherroundofviolence,evenifthesidesdonotwishit.

Notes1. MichaelSlacker,“LebanonThrongHailsHezbollahChiefWhoCallsMilitiaStronger,”

New York Times,September23,2006;NRG,“TheLebanesePublic:HizbollahWon,”August23,2006.

2. Yoram Schweitzer, “Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Blurring the Definition ofVictor,”Tel Aviv Notes,August6,2006.

3. ShaulShay,Terror in the Name of the Imam(Herzliya:TheInterdisciplinaryCenter,2001).

4. AliWakkadandHananGreenberg,“Lebanon:DozensKilled inBombingonKafrKana.”Ynet,July30,2006.

5. MartinAsser,“QanaMakesGrimHistoryAgain,”BBCNews,July31,2006.6. ItamarAkhbari,“TheLebanesePublic:HizbollahWon,”NRG,August23,2006.7. ItamarEichner,“SmugglingfromSyriatoHizbollahhasResumed,”Yediot Ahronot,

October6,2006.8. YoavStern,“TimeMagazine:HizballahhasRe-accumulatedHalftheWeaponryIt

UsedDuringtheWar,”Haaretz,November26,2006.9. NasrallahinavictoryaddressinBeirutthatwasbroadcastbyal-JazeeraonSeptember

22,2006,www.memritv.org,clip2282.10. ItamarAkhbari, “WeWereSurprisedby theScaleof the IsraeliResponse,”NRG,

August26,2006.11. MeirElran,“TheCivilianFrontintheSecondLebanonWar,”inThe Second Lebanon

War: Strategic Perspectives,eds.ShlomoBromandMeirElran(TelAviv:InstituteforNationalSecurityStudies,2007).

12. Yoav Stern, “Nasrallah Declared to Hundreds of Thousands: We Have 20,000Missiles,”Haaretz,September25,2006.

13. FromalecturebyMaj.Gen.(res.)AharonZe’eviFarkashataseminarattheJaffeeCenterforStrategicStudies,September20,2006.

14. MEMRI,“Intra-Shi’iteCriticism:HizbullahDidn’tAsktheShi’itesabouttheWar,”Special DispatchSeries, No. 1266, August25,2006.

15. “Nasrallah:EveryPointinIsraelisinRange,”Ynet,July23,2007.16. “HezbollahIncreasesInvolvementinIsrael,”Middle East Newsline7,no.14,January

11,2005.

Chapter 10

The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War

Eyal Zisser

Introduction

Immediately with the announcement of the ceasefire and the end of the fighting between Israel and the Hizbollah organization, both sides – as well asthosewhohadobservedfromthesidelines–hurriedtoclaimvictory.Hizbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hizbollah’svictoryinthewarwasanhistoricevent,andpossiblyanhistoricturningpoint in the Arab-Israeli conflict.1SyrianpresidentBasharAsad,whohadnotinvolvedhiscountrydirectlyinthewaryetdidnotdisguisehissupportof Hizbollah or conceal the fact that he provided the organization witharms and other means of warfare during the fighting, quickly assumed a victoryoverIsraelforhimselfandforSyria.2TheLebanesegovernment,ledbyPrimeMinisterFouadSiniora,alsodeclaredavictoryforLebanonand all Lebanese, and not just for Hizbollah.3 On the other side of thedivide,victorywasannouncedbyIsraeliprimeministerEhudOlmert,andtheclaimwasechoedenthusiasticallybyIsrael’sally,USpresidentGeorgeBush.4

It seems that those who rushed to revel in their ostensible victorieschosetoignoreboththegoldenruleofpoliticsandthecourseofLebanesehistoryoverthelastthousandyears,accordingtowhichallthestrugglesandevenwarsthathaveoccurredintheregion–andmorerecently,inthestateitself–haveendedwithallthoseinvolvedlosingout.Putotherwise,astheLebanesesayinghasit,“warsinLebanonendwithoutvictorsand

136 I Eyal Zisser

withoutvanquished,”meaningthatallsidesarecompletelyexhaustedandadmitthatthewardidnotreapanygainsforanyofthem.Atbest,eachsidecanconsoleitselfwiththeknowledgethatatleasttheothersidedidnotachieveitsobjective.ThissituationisofcourseaninevitableresultoftherealityoflifeinLebanon,amulti-ethnicstatecharacterizedbydivisionand conflict on a religious and communal basis and even more so, on a familybasis.Itisastateinwhichnoethnicgroupandcertainlynooutsideforce intervening in the country’s affairs has the ability to achieve anyrealvictory.5TheonlypartythatwascapableofrecognizingthisfactwasHassanNasrallahhimself,whoadmittedinaninterviewshortlyaftertheendofthehostilitiesandafterdeclaringhimselfthevictorthathewouldnot have issued anorder to kidnap the Israeli soldiers hadheknown itwouldleadtoall-outwarwithIsrael.6

However,asmoretimeelapsessincetheendofthewarandthedustofbattlesettles,theoutcomeofthewarisbecomingclearer,asisthestateofrealityinpost-warLebanon.ItappearsthatHizbollahwashithardduringthewar,buttheorganizationwasnotbrokenorovercome,atleastmilitarily.Thus, the damage it sustained required the organization to invest greateffortinrehabilitatingitsmilitaryinfrastructure,anditsorganizationalandcivilianinfrastructuresevenmoreso.ThismeantithadtomaintainquietalongtheborderwithIsraelandwithinLebanonitself;thisdidnotmeantheorganizationwasabouttoundergoarealchange,andcertainlynotastrategicchangeinitspolicyorinanyaspectsofitslongtermobjectives.Foritspart,theLebanesegovernmentcameoutofthewarstrengthenedandsoughttoimposeitssovereigntyovertheentirecountryandbecomeaneffectiveforce,includingvis-à-visHizbollah.Nonetheless,noachievementof the Lebanese government and the forces behind it is sufficient to change therealityinLebanon.Attheendoftheday,thefundamentalproblemthatLebanon faces is not Israel, and not even the ongoing conflict between IsraelandHizbollah.Thefundamentalproblemistheethnicdynamicinthecountry,ormoreprecisely,thechallengeandthethreatpresentedtodaybytheShiitecommunity–whichisboththelargestcommunalgroupinLebanonandaccountsfornearly40percentofthepopulation,ifnotmore– to members of the country’s other communal groups.7 These groups,theMaronites,Sunnis,andDruze,actuallyjoinedforcesinordertoblockthe Shiite community and Hizbollah, its public representative. The so-

The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War I 137

called Cedar Revolution, which took place in Lebanon in the spring of2005andledtotheestablishmentofthecurrentLebanesegovernment,canbeseenasanattemptofthemembersofthesecommunitiestomaintainthe socioeconomic and political status quo that existed in Lebanon formanyyearsandthat,interalia,marginalizedtheShiites.8Thus,thedangerpresentedbyHizbollahisgreat,evenafterthewar,particularlybecauseitistheauthenticrepresentativeofmanyShiiteswhofeelthattheLebanesepolitical establishment systematically discriminates against the Shiitesor at the very least does not grant them key positions and resources inproportiontotheirpercentageofthepopulation.

Inthisregard,“thestruggleoverLebanon,”namely,overthecountry’sfuture and over control of the country, did not end with the ceasefire between Israel andHizbollah,but in factonly started. In thisbattle themainplayersaresupportersofthestatusquoinLebanon,backedbytheWest,whoarepittedagainstHizbollahsupporters,whoenjoySyrianandIraniansupport.Hizbollahisconductingthebattlethroughpoliticalmeans,basedontheincreasingdemographicweightoftheShiitecommunityinLebanon. However, one day this group is likely to employ aggressivemeasurestopromoteitsstandinganditslongtermobjectivesinLebanon.

With regard toSyria,BasharAsad appears to believe that Hizbollahemerged the victor at the end of the hostilities in Lebanon. He hoped,therefore,tousethisvictorytoenhancehisstandingbothonthedomesticandinternationalstages.OnemayassumethatBasharislookingtoresumealeadingroleinLebanon,toplayaregionalandeveninternationalrole,andultimatelytoadvanceapoliticalprocessandpossiblyadialoguewithIsrael,butfromapositionofstrengthandpower.However,inthemonthssincetheendofthewar,Asadhasseenthathishopesarenoteasilyrealized.HehasremainedoutsidetheLebanesearena,andisrejectedbymostofthe international community and by most of theArab world, includinghis formerallies,Egypt andSaudiArabia.Allhehas left is the Iranianembrace,whichforSyriamayturnout tobeabearhug.Theattemptedterror attack on theAmerican embassy in Damascus in mid-September2006wasareminderforBasharofhisdomesticproblemsandmoresoofthefragilestandingofhisregime,9achallengehewillstruggletoconfrontby flaunting the ostensible achievements and victories of Hizbollah in Lebanon.

13� I Eyal Zisser

From the Cedar Revolution to the Second Lebanon War

The2006warbetweenIsraelandLebanonwasakindofnightmarecometrueformanyLebanese,abadscenariotheyhaddreadedandwarnedofinrecentyears.Itwasfearedthatattheendoftheday,thewarmightreturnthecountrytothedaysofthebloodycivilwarwagedbetween1975and1989,afterwhichLebanonarosephoenix-likeoutoftheruins.In1989theTa’ifagreementwassignedinSaudiArabiaandbothendedthewarandlaunchedalongprocessofrehabilitationandrebuildingoftheLebanesestate.10 Ironically, the war between Israel and Hizbollah broke out justwhenitappearedthatrehabilitationwasproceedingwell,andthatLebanonwas standing more firmly on its own two feet than ever before. This was dramatizedbytheCedarRevolutioninBeirutinthespringof2005,whichwasperceivedastheclimaxoftherehabilitationandrebuildingunderwayinLebanonsincetheendofthecivilwar,andpossiblyadramatichistoricturningpointinthecountry’sannals.

TheCedarRevolutionwas a response to the assassinationof formerLebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri on the morning of February 14, 2005intheheartofBeirut.Hariri’sdeathstunnedtheLebanesepeople.After all, more than any other Lebanese politician Hariri had been identified with the rehabilitation and rebuilding of the second Lebanese republic,theTa’ifrepublic.11ManyinsideandoutsideLebanonhadnodoubtthatbehindtheHaririassassinationlurkedtheSyrianregime,ledbyPresidentBasharAsad,andtheSyrian-alliedLebanesegovernment,ledbyPresidentEmileLahoud.TherewasanoutcryforSyriatowithdrawfromLebanon,andforLahoud,alongwithhissupportersandSyrianloyalistsholdingkeypositionsintheLebanesegovernment,toresign.SyriawashardpressedtowithstandthemountingpressureinLebanonforittoleavethecountry,particularlysincethispressurewasbackedbytheinternationalcommunity,ledbytheUnitedStatesandFrance.OnMarch5,2005,theSyrianpresidentdulyannouncedthewithdrawalofSyrianforcesfromLebanesesoil.Thus,SyrianinterventioninLebanon–involvementthatbeganinthe1970sandpeakedinthe1990s,whenDamascusessentiallyranthecountry–cametoanend,atleastforthetimebeing.12

ThewithdrawalandpossiblytheexpulsionoftheSyriansfromLebanondidnotendthestormyeventsinthespringof2005,andtheywerefollowed

The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War I 13�

byanolessdramaticpoliticalturnaround.IntheparliamentaryelectionsofMay-June2005,aboutamonthafterthewithdrawaloftheSyrianforces,theoppositiontothepoliticalleadershipgainedasweepingvictory.Theopposition was led by Rafiq al-Hariri’s son, Sa’ad al-Din al-Hariri, who wasjoinedbyLebaneseDruzeleaderWalidJumblattandseveralleadingfigures from the Christian Maronite camp. Following the elections a new Lebanesegovernmentwasestablished,ledbyFouadSiniora,whoisclosetotheyoungerHariri.Thenewgovernmentadoptedapro-Western,anti-Syrianstance.13

TheturnaroundinLebanonatthebeginningof2005wasthecumulativeresult of three factors: first, Syria’s weakness, i.e., the weakness of its young andinexperiencedpresidentBasharAsad,obvioustoeveryoneinsideandoutsideSyria;second,frustrationandangerinLebanondirectedtowardsSyria, which escalated after the Hariri assassination; and finally and most importantly,sharedAmerican-FrenchinterestinsettlinganaccountwithSyriaandforcingittoenditsinvolvementinLebanon.Thecombinationofall thesefactors turnedout tobecritical,aseachinandof itselfwasnot enough to bring about the dramatic events that took place in the first months of 2005. However, more than anything, this revolution reflected the emergenceofawidepublicconsensusinLebanonlookingtorehabilitatethecountryandreturnittothepathithadpursuedpriortotheoutbreakofcivilwarin1975.

The joy inLebanonwasshort lived.Evenbefore theeruptionof theconfrontation between Israel and Hizbollah in the summer 2006, thesupporters of the Cedar Revolution realized that the reality in Lebanonremainedascomplexasbefore.

First,theelectionstotheLebaneseparliamentinMay-June2005yieldedgainsfor theHizbollahorganization,aswellasforotherforceswithananti-Westernoutlookthatwerelookingforoppositeresultstothosesoughtby Sa’ad al-Din al-Hariri, Jumblatt, and their Cedar Revolution allies.These forces hadpublic presence, standing, andpoliticalweight on theLebanesestreetingeneralor,inthecaseofHizbollah,ontheShiitestreet.Hizbollah’sstrengthenedstandingwithintheShiitecommunityinLebanonhasallowedit inrecentyears toadvancethe“IslamicLebanon”option,i.e., turningLebanon intoan Islamic republic, even throughdemocraticelections.This would be achieved by virtue of the demographic reality

140 I Eyal Zisser

intoday’sLebanon,giventhattheShiitesaccountforalmosthalfofthecountry’spopulation.14

Second,thepoliticalforcesbehindtheCedarRevolutionwerefarfroma homogenous group and could certainly not be perceived as an actual“reformistcamp.”Theseforcesessentiallycoalescedtopreservethebasicprinciplesof theLebanesepoliticalsystem,evenif inanewframeworkor under new auspices – Washington instead of Damascus. These arerepresentativesofrespectedfamilies,membersofallcommunitiesthathadoverseen political, social, and financial aspects of life in Lebanon since thecountrywasestablished,andevenbefore.TheyhadcometotheendoftheirtetherwiththeSyriansbutwerestillinterestedinpreservingtheirstatusand,mostimportant,theirprivileges.

Lebanon after the War

The structural weakness of Lebanon, even after the Cedar Revolution,came to the fore in July 2006 when the clash between Hizbollah andIsraeleruptedinthewakeofthekidnappingoftwoIsraelisoldiersbytheorganization’s fighters. The destruction and ruin that the fighting brought on Lebanon,andparticularly,thecommunal,social,andpoliticaltensionsthatemergedduringandafterthewar,reviveddoubtsastoLebanon’sabilitytobecomeastableandstrongcountrywithademocraticopensystemandasuccessful and prosperous economy. The results of the war inflicted heavy damageontheLebaneseeconomy,estimatedattensofbillionsofdollars,andaccordingtoLebaneseprimeministerFouadSiniora,thewarsetbackthe country’s economy almost fifteen years.15

At the same time, Lebanon noted some gains from the war. First,Lebanesewereencouragedbythecohesiondisplayedbymanyelementsofsociety–Maronites,Sunnis,Druze,andevenShiites–andtheirdesiretomaintaincoexistenceatallcosts,regardlessoftheirdifferencesofopinionandthetensionsthatcametothefore.Thus,theatmosphereinLebanonduringandafterthewarwasnotoneofimpendingcivilwar,andtherewasnosenseofadrivetodissolvetheLebanesestate.Onthecontrary,therewasawill topreserveand strengthen it.Second,onecannot ignore thefactthattheLebanesegovernmentcameoutofthewarwithanimprovedstatusthankstotheintelligentmanagementofPrimeMinisterSiniora,who


wasunquestionablyoneofthewar’sfewwinners.Histearfulappearanceat the meeting ofArab foreign ministers, during which he vehementlyrejectedaccusations–particularlyfromSyria–thatLebanonhadturneditsbackontheArabworld16broughthimsupportandrecognitionfrommanyinside and outside Lebanon. His reinforcement constituted a bolsteringof the Cedar Revolution coalition, notwithstanding its structural andintrinsicweakness.Third,Syriadidnotsucceed,eitherduringorafterthewar,inresumingitsleadershippositioninthedomesticLebanesearena.Thesettlement thatbrought thehostilitiesbetween IsraelandHizbollahtoanendwasformulatedwithoutitsinputandearnedwideinternationalsupport,whichhasdeterredSyriafromattemptingtopunctureit.Fourth,the international community reaffirmed its commitment and even its willingnesstohelptheLebanesegovernmentenforceitssovereigntyoverthecountry.Thisinternationalsupport,whichappearedtodeclineinrecentyears,comprisedanimportantadditiontothedeterminationshownbytheLebanesegovernmenttofaceuptoitschallenges,bothinsideandoutsidethecountry.

Hizbollah and the Lebanese Shiites: The Balance Sheet

Attheendoftheday,aprimaryfactorintheLebaneseequationwasandremains the Hizbollah organization. True, Hizbollah was not overcomeanditsmilitarystrengthwasnotbroken,asmanyinIsraelhadhopedatthebeginningofthewar,butthereisnodoubtthattheorganizationsustainedseriousdamageandwilltakealongtimetorehabilitateitself.

InIsrael,Nasrallahislargelyperceivedthroughanarrowprismastheleader of a terrorist militia with several thousand fighters and with over 15,000rockets.Thosewho lookatNasrallah through thatnarrowprismwould probably conclude that as Nasrallah continued firing rockets into Israel until the last day of the fighting, he can be seen as the victor in the confrontation.

However,Nasrallahisnotonlytheleaderofanarmedmilitia.Hehimselfdoesnotseehisorganizationassuch,andinfact,sincebeingappointedleader of the organization in 1992 he has dedicated his efforts towardsturninghisorganizationintosomethingelseentirely.AsofJuly11,2006,Nasrallahwastheleaderofapoliticalandsocialpartywithdeeprootsin

142 I Eyal Zisser

theLebaneseShiitecommunity.Thepartyhadfourteenrepresentativesintheparliament,over4,000representativesinlocalcouncilsinthecountry’sShiitevillagesandtowns,aneducationsystemwithdozensofschoolswitharound 100,000 students, a health system with dozens of hospitals andclinicscaringforhalfamillionpeopleayear,abankingsystem,marketingchains, and even pension funds and insurance companies.17 Nasrallahdevotedmuchofhisenergiesinthelastdecadetobuildingupthisparty,orempire,asitwere.Heviewedthecreationofsuchanempireashislife’swork,whichwouldtakehimfar,possiblyeventoacontestoverthecontrolofLebanon.

These Hizbollah achievements in recent years, which apparentlyaccumulatedwithincreasingscopeandintensitysinceIsrael’swithdrawalfromsouthernLebanoninMay2000,gavetheorganizationanditsleaderthe confidence they needed to embark on a battle for Lebanon. This wasastruggledesignedtochangetherealityinLebanonandenabletheorganization to assume control of the country via democratic electionsor cross-ethnic consent based primarily on changing the political orderinLebanon in favorof theShiitecommunity.Afterall,membersof theShiite community, most of whom support Hizbollah, comprise close tohalftheLebanesepopulation,althoughtheymakeuponlyonequarteroftheparliament–theresultofthecommunalpoliticalsysteminLebanon.Itisnosurprisethatinrecentyears,HassanNasrallahhasfrequentlycalledfor democratic elections tobeheld inLebanon,whichhehopedwouldgivehimandhisorganizationpoliticalpowerinLebanon.Alternatively,heaskedforachangeinthestatusquobetweentheethnicgroupsinthecountry,includingthroughdialogueandagreement.18

Israel damaged Nasrallah’s efforts badly, and only those who havewitnessedthedestructionandruininLebanoncancomprehendjusthowseverelythewaraffectedtheShiitesingeneralandHizbollahanditsleaderinparticular.Oneoutof every twoShiites living inLebanonbecamearefugeeduringthewar,andmostoftheShiitecommunityreturnedtotheirhomesinvillagesinsouthernLebanonortheShiitequartersofsouthBeirutto find they had lost their homes and their possessions.19

Inessence, theseShiiteshavenochoicebuttogatheraroundHassanNasrallah’s flag. There is no one else in Lebanon who cares about them, not the UN or the international community, and not even the Lebanese


government whose leaders are focused on the interests of the Sunni,Maronite,andDruzecommunities,whichbarelysufferedinthewar.ThisisthenatureandcharacteroftheLebanesesysteminwhicheachcommunitycaresforitselfandisapatheticanduncaringtowardstheothersectors.Assuch,themembersoftheShiitecommunitycontinuetosupportNasrallah.However, the damage inflicted on the Shiites clearly reduced Nasrallah’s room for maneuver, as evidenced by his admission at the beginning ofSeptember,whichundoubtedlywasaimedathissupporters,thathedidnotcorrectlyanticipateIsrael’sresponsetothekidnapping.20

HassanNasrallah, therefore,needs timeandmostlyaperiodofquietto rehabilitate his life’s project and repair his organization’s civilianinfrastructure.Thefactthatheisstillentrenchedinabunkerorinahideoutapartment and is in fear of his life severely hampers him and makes itdifficult for him to resume his operations and restore his organization’s statusinLebanon.Attheendoftheday,hispublicappearanceswerelikeoxygen forhim.Now that oxygenpipelinehasbeen cut off becauseofIsrael’sthreatthatitwillharmhimifheleaveshishidingplace.Asaresult,Nasrallahhimselfdeclaredrepeatedlythathewasseekingquietandwouldstrictly honor the ceasefire.21

ButNasrallah,ormorepreciselytheShiitesinLebanon,arenotgoinganywhere.HizbollahwillcontinuetooccupytheregiontothenorthoftheIsraeli border, and even if it maintains a low profile in the near future it will aimtorebuilditsstrength,rehabilitateitsforce,andreturntoitspositionofJuly11,2006.Moreover,withinafewyearstheShiitecommunitywillbecometheclearmajority inLebanonandthen theShiiteswilldemandtheirdue–afairerdivisionofpower,andpossiblyevencontrol.

Precisely because the Shiites will become the largest community inLebanonwithina fewyears, thepowerstrugglebetweenHizbollahandtheAmalmovementforcontrolofthesectorisoftheutmostimportance.Surveysconducted inLebanonshortlyafter theendof thewar indicateextensive support of up to 65-70 percent among Shiites for HizbollahunderNasrallah’sleadership.However,thesesurveysalsoshowthatthehardcoreoftheorganization’ssupporterscomprisesnomorethan25-30percentofthecommunity.22ThismeansthatmostofthemembersoftheShiitecommunityarenotnecessarilyinNasrallah’spocket,andtheymightwell transfer theirallegiance fromHizbollah toAmal if the latteroffers

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themthesamehopeforthefuturethatHizbollahcurrentlyembodies.TheAmalmovementisasecularmovementthatbelievesintheintegrationoftheShiitesinLebaneselife,whileHizbollahrepresentsaradicaloutlookimportedtoLebanonfromIran.ThoughtheeconomicaidthatIranprovidedHizbollahallowedtheorganizationtobecomealeadingforcewithintheLebanese Shiite community, this does not mean that an internal Shiiteconflict between Amal and Hizbollah for the soul of the Shiite community hasbeenaverted.

Thiswill probably constitute theprincipal challenge facingLebanonandLebanese society. Inotherwords, theway inwhichLebanon– thecountry, society, and the various communities – approaches the Shiitecommunity,whetheritsupportsthecommunityandintegratesitmorefullyintheLebanesesystem,willdeterminethedirectionthecommunitytakes.ThequestionremainsiftheShiiteswillcontinuetoadheretocoexistencewith theother ethnicgroups,orwhether theypursue an aggressive andevenviolentstruggleinordertoachieveadecisive,controllingposition.

Syria under Bashar’s Leadership: Between War and Peace

AnotherquestionthathasemergedinthewakeofthewariswhereSyriaisheading.Indeed,whileduringthewarmanyintheArabworlddidnothesitate to express their reservations over the Hizbollah organization,BasharAsadwasquicktoalignhimselfwiththeorganization’sinterests,considerations,andpolicies,andevenitspoliticalandstrategicinclination,whichisidenticaltothatofIran.

ImmediatelyafterthewarBasharAsadannouncedthatheviewedtheresult of thehostilities as an important and even anhistoricvictory fortheorganization.Moreover,hedidnotconcealhisviewthatSyriashouldconsideradoptingHizbollah’sstrategyofterrorandguerillawarfareagainstIsrael,whicheventuallyforcedittowithdrawunilaterallyfromsouthernLebanoninMay2000.OnanumberofoccasionsBasharevenremarkedthathewasunderincreasingpressurefromtheSyrianpublictodesistfromthe “sit back and do nothing” policy that Syria adopted with regard toIsraelontheGolanHeightsfrontoverthelastdecades,andtoheatupthefront.23 Bashar apparently believes that just as Hizbollah’s rocket arraydeterredIsraelforseveralyearsfromtakingactionagainstHizbollahand


then inflicted serious damage when the war erupted – and in effect led to Israel’sfailureinthewar–aSyrianrocketarraywouldalsodeterIsraelfromattackingSyriashouldDamascusdecidetoactagainstIsraelontheGolanHeightsfront.InaseriesofspeechesandinterviewsBasharAsadthusheldagunofsortstoIsrael’sheadandattemptedtoputitinapositionofno choice– to renew thepeaceprocesswithSyria and sign apeacetreatythatincludesanIsraeliwithdrawalfromtheGolanHeightsuptotheshoresoftheSeaofGalilee,oralternativelytoriskopeninganewfrontontheGolanHeights,alongthelinesoftheIsrael-HizbollahdynamicinLebanon.

ItisnoteworthythatNasrallah,whointhepasthasoftendemonstratedfargreaterpoliticalintelligencethanBashar,preferredtoremaininhidingand even instructed his men to honor the ceasefire with Israel in southern Lebanon.Incontrast,Bashar,whounlikeNasrallahdidnotexperiencethefullweightofIsrael’smight,wasquicktodelivervictoryaddressesandeventhreatenedIsraelwithanattackitifitdidnotacceptSyria’snewproposaltoenterapeaceprocessbasedonitsterms,ifnotoutrightdictates.

Bashar’s threats, which began soon after the war and which seemedlikeafunctionofhisperceptionofthewar,shouldbetakenseriously.Atthesametime,SyriaisnotonlypartoftheproblemonIsrael’snorthernborder, but is also part of the solution. Even in his most fiery speeches BasharrepeatedlynotedthatSyria,incontrasttoHizbollahandIran,wasinterestedinrenewingthepoliticalprocessintheregionandthatSyria’sultimateobjectivewasnotthedestructionofIsraelbutapeacetreatywithit.AsBasharhastakenpainstopointout,itwouldbepreferablefortheGolanHeights tobegivenback inpeace,as theadversariesengaged inwarpayaheavypricethatwouldbebesttoavoid,ifpossible.24Moreover,in the attack on theAmerican embassy in Damascus in mid-September2006carriedoutbysupportersofal-Qaeda,Basharonceagainwitnessedthefragilityofhisregime.Attheendoftheday,theseMuslimsextremistsviewBasharandhisregimeasanenemythatmustbefought.25Mostofthe Syrian population belongs to the Sunni community, home to theseextremists, who in the name of religion seek to fight against the secular Alawiregime(aswellasagainstShiites).Bashar’sproblem,therefore,isnotonlytheUSandIsraelbutalsothedomesticrealityinsideSyria.Atthesame,thereisnothingnewinAsad’speacerhetoric:sinceherosetopower

146 I Eyal Zisser

hehastakenalmosteveryopportunitytodeclarethatpeaceisthepreferredoption,aslongasSyria’sconditionsweremet.Inthisregard,itappearsthat thewardidnotchangeBashar’sbasicapproach to the Israeli-Arabconflict, an approach inspired by the heritage of his late father, Hafez Asad, whopursuedthepeaceprocesswithIsraelintheearlynineties.

Eitherway,Bashar’spredicament,butespeciallyhispeaceprotestations,convinced no one in Jerusalem on the need to open peace negotiationswithhim,partlybecause thesedeclarationswereaccompaniedbydeedsdiametricallyopposedtotherhetoricitself–providingadvancedweaponstoHizbollahduringthewarinLebanonandenhancingitsstrategicpactwithIran.EventheUS,theobjectofsomeofBashar’sconciliatoryrhetoric,remainedskepticalregardingtheSyrianpresident,whomitconsidersanadventurousandunreliableleaderwhoboundhisfatewithHizbollahandIran.26ItseemsthatBashar’sformeralliesintheArabworld,mainlyEgyptandSaudiArabia,believethatSyria’salliancewithIran,whichwilllikelylastaslongastheIslamicregimeinTehransurvives,haslongmovedfromapactofinterestsbasedonnarrowpoliticalconsiderationstoanintimatestrategicpactthatcarriesitsownweight.TheSaudiforeignminister,Saudal-Faisal,alludedtothiswhenhecriticizedthe“countriesthatoperateinoppositiontopan-Arabicinterests,”andthatareleading“tothelossoftheArabidentityintheArabarena.”27

IspeacewithSyriaanIsraeliinterest?Fewwouldsuggestotherwise.Peace with Syria could bring quiet to the northern front, and most ofall, block Iran’s entry to this region whereby it finances and equips the PalestinianterrororganizationsandHizbollah.Thishasspecialimportancegiven Iran’s nuclear pursuits. However, from here to achieving a peacetreatybetween Israel andSyria there is a long road to travel. It is hardtoimaginethatBashar,whocurrentlybelievesthatheisinapositionofstrength, will be willing to start negotiations with Israel without beingguaranteedinadvancethathewillrepossesstheGolanHeights.Bashar,like his father, does not consider confidence building moves that would helptheIsraelileadershipmusterpublicsupportforapeaceprocesswithSyria.Assuch, itwouldbepossible to talk toBasharaboutclosing theDamascus offices of the terror organizations only after a positive settlement onthereturnoftheGolanisreached.TheIsraeligovernmentisalsonotinterestedindiscussingandsettlingtheGolanissuenow.Peacetalkswith


Syriaareliabletoarousedomesticcriticismandshortenanygovernment’sterm of office. Thus, due to short term internal political interests, the Israeli government chose to defer discussing a long term strategic interest forIsrael.Finally,PresidentBush,acrucialpartnerinanyfutureIsraeli-Syriandialogue,stillviewsSyriaaspartofthe“axisofevil,”astatethatshouldberesisted,notnegotiatedwith.AllthisamountstoalongroadonthewaytoIsraeli-Syrianpeace.

Conclusion

The “open war,” as defined by Hizbollah general secretary Nasrallah,28whichwaswagedforoveramonthbetweenIsraelandHizbollahaccentuatedamajorpartofthedilemmasthatIsrael,Syria,Lebanon,andevenHizbollahhaveconfrontedinrecentyears.Amongthem,ithighlightedthedilemmafacedbyIsraeloverhowtorespondtothethreatposedbyHizbollah.Atthesametime,HizbollahhasbeensaddledwiththedilemmaofwhatitspolicyandmodeofoperationshouldbewithintheinternalLebanesearenaandvis-à-visIsrael.

Itappears that thewardidnotbringanyrealchange to thestatusofLebanonandtheregion.ItweakenedHizbollahbutdidnotshatteritspowerordefeatit.ItstrengthenedtheLebanesegovernmentbutnotinamannerthatallowedittotakeonHizbollahfullforce.ItenhancedtheprovocativeapproachthatBasharadoptedtowardsIsraelandeventowardstheUnitedStates in recent years, but did not bring him to completely forsake thepolitical policy of conciliation adopted by his father over fifteen years ago. TheregionalrealityalongIsrael’snorthernborderwill,therefore,continueto be based on a triad of forces comprising first of all the Hizbollah organization – weaker than before, but still an element of considerableweightinLebanon,byvirtueofitsbeingtheauthenticrepresentativeoftheShiitecommunity.Therearealsotwoimportantcorollaries,acoalitionofLebaneseforcesbackedbyinternationalsupportthatisstrivingtocontaintheHizbollahorganizationandtheSyrians,andSyria,ledbyBasharAsad,whichiscaughtbetweenthe“axisofevil,”towhichitiscurrentlyassigned,and potential affiliation with a moderate axis in the Arab world. All the while,inthebackground,areIran,Israel,andtheUnitedStatesthatinany

14� I Eyal Zisser

casearepreoccupiedwithotherchallenges,fromthePalestinianissue,toIraq,andtheIraniannuclearthreat.

Notes1. ForthedeclarationofvictorybyHassanNasrallah,seeal-ManarTV,August20,

2006.2. For Bashar Asad’s speech, Sana (Syrian Arab News Agency), August 15, 2006,

Tishrin(Damascus),August16,2006.SeealsoaninterviewgivenbyBasharAsadtotheAbuDhabiTVchannel,August23,2006,andal-Thawra(Damascus),August24,2006.

3. SeeLebaneseNewsAgency,August29,2006.4. Haaretz,August28,2006;Reuters,August22,2006.5. For background literature about Lebanon, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History

of Lebanon (NewYork: Caravan Books, 1977);A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered(London:I.B.Tauris,1988).

6. Interview of Hassan Nasrallah with the Lebanese TV channel NTV, August 27,2006.

7. For more on the Shiite community and Hizbollah organization, seeAhmad NizarHamzeh,In the Path of Hizballah(SyracuseUniversityPress,2004);JudithPalmerHarik,Hezbollah, the Changing Face of Terrorism(London:I.B.Tauris,2004);EyalZisser, “The Return of the Hizballah,”MEQ 9, no. 4 (2002): 3-12. See also HalaJaber, Hezbollah, Born with a Vengeance (NewYork: Columbia University Press,1997);AmalSaad-Ghorayeb,Hizbullah: Politics and Religion(London:PlutoPress,2002);VadaSharara,Dulet Al-Hezbollah, Libnan - Mujtama Islami(Beirut,1996);see alsoNa’imQasim,Hizbollah: Alminhaj, Altajruba, Almustakbal (Beirut:DaarAl-Hadi,2002[Arabic]);EitanAzani,“TheHezbollahMovement–FromRevolutionandPan-IslamismtoPragmatismandLebanonism,”PhDthesis(HebrewUniversity,2005[Hebrew]).

8. FormoreontheCedarRevolution,seeEyalZisser:“Lebanon–followingtheCedarRevolution–BetweenContinuityandChange,”Orient(forthcoming).

9. Reuters,September12,2006;al-Hayat(London),September13,2006.10. FormoreontheTa’ifagreement,seeWilliamHarris,Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars,

and Global Extensions(Princeton,NewJersey:MarkusWeinerPublishers,1997),pp.235-322.

11. See also on Rafiq al-Hariri, his official web site www.rhariri.com. See also Middle East Intelligence (Washington),http://www.meib.org/articles/0107_ld1.htm.On theassassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, see al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), February 15, 16, 21,2005.

12. ForBasharAsad’sspeech,seeTishrin(Damascus),March6,2005.13. FortheresultsoftheLebaneseparliamentaryelectionsseeal-Safir(Beirut),May29,

30,2005;LebaneseNewsAgency,June5,2005,al-Mustaqbal(Beirut),June6,2005,al-Nahar(Beirut),June6,2005,RadioBeirut,June6,2005.

The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War I 14�

14. FormoreaboutHizbollah’ssupportofSyria,seeal-Manartelevision,March8,2005;al-Intiqad(Beirut)March9,2005.

15. SeeLebaneseNewsAgency,August29,2006;AP,August31,2006.16. ForSiniora’scomments,seeSILB,August6,2006.17. SeeQasim,Hizbollah;Azani,“TheHezbollahMovement.”18. See,forexample,aninterviewgivenbyHassanNasrallahtotheKuwaitinewspaper

al-Ra’y al A’am,December27,2004.Seealsoal-Safir(Beirut),March8,2005.19. See al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), August 12, 2006; AFP (French news agency),

August19,2006.20. SeeNTVtelevisionchannel,August27,2006.21. SeeinterviewswithHassanNasrallahtotheal-Jazeeratelevisionstation,September

12,2006andtoal-Safir(Beirut),September5,2006.22. Seeal-Nahar(Beirut),August7,August11,2006.23. SeeBasharAsad’saddress,Tishrin (Damascus), August 15, 2006; clarifications of

Syrian information minister, Damascus Radio, September 5, 2006; Syrian DeputyForeignMinister,al-Thawra(Damascus),September3,2006.

24. SeeinterviewwithBasharAsadtoAbuDhabitelevision,August23,2006,andal-Thawra(Damascus),August24,2006.

25. SeeSana(SyrianArabNewsAgency),September12,2006.26. ForadiscussionoftheUSpolicyonBasharAsad,see:http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/

Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2006/09/news-round-up-2-september-2006.htm.27. Forcommentsby theSaudi foreignminister, seeSaudiNewsAgency,August26,

2006.28. SeeHassanNasrallah’saddress,al-ManarTV,July14,2006.

Chapter 11

After the Lebanon War: Iranian Power and its Limitations

David Menashri1

Given the time that has elapsed since the ceasefire ended the Second Lebanon War,afullexaminationofthewar’seffectsonbothsidesandontheentireregionremainsachallenge.However,itisclearthattheprocessesthatledtothewar,thewaythewarwasconducted,andthewar’sresultswillhavealastingimpactontheregionandbeyond.Whileitisquestionableifthereis a “new Middle East,” it is possible that we are witnessing significant changessuchthatthecurrentMiddleEastisdifferentinmanywaysfromtheoneweknewbefore.Iranalreadylookslikearegionalpoweranditsleadership position has strengthened since the wars in the Persian GulfandtheFertileCrescent.Fortheirpart,theheadsoftheIslamicregimeinTehranaretalkingasifIranisalreadyaglobalpowerratherthanagrowingregionalforce.ThisessaywillexaminethewaytheSecondLebanonWarhasapparentlycontributedtoIran’sstandingandpoliciesascanbeseenintheperiodfollowingthewar.

Over the last three decades Lebanon has become a battleground forvarious foreign forces, including: the Palestinians, who established astronghold there after the 1967 war; Syria, which introduced its forcestherein1975;andIsrael,whichlaunchedseveralcampaignsinLebanon(particularlyafter1982). In the2006war, Irangained fromHizbollah’srole,withthecostlargelypaidin“Lebanesecurrency.”TheUnitedStates,Europe, and Arab states anxiously followed the war’s developments,concerned about the forces behind Hizbollah, especially Iran. Each has

152 I David Menashri

subsequently considered what policy would best further its respectiveinterests.

LebanonisofparticularconsequenceforIran,andTehranhasacleardesiretomaintainaShiitestrongholdinsouthernLebanon,closetoIsrael’sborders.ThroughHizbollah,LebanonprovidesIranwithaspearheadfordisseminating the revolutionarymessage, amodelof successful Islamicactivity,andameansofreinforcingitsregionalandinternationalposition.ThePalestinianissue,includingJerusalem,isacentralelementinIslamicsolidarity,andIran’sactiveinvolvementinthearena–withinmovementssuch as Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad – is important to it, bothin conceptual and practical terms. The Islamic Revolution, which hasretreated from so many of the fundamental principles in its ideologicalmanifesto,isstrugglingtodemonstratesuccessinitsmainaims:improvingthe situation of Iranian society and proving that its ethos offers a curefortheillsofmodernsociety.“Success”inLebanon,however,ismuch-neededevidenceoftherevolution’simportance,vis-à-visdomesticpublicopinion,theIslamicworld,andtheworldatlarge.Intermsoftheinitialidea of “exporting the revolution,” Hizbollah is the flagship pioneer and the most prominent success story thus far, if not the only significant one. Iranisdeterminedtomaintainthisasset.

IranhassolidlinkswiththeShiitesinLebanon,datingbackfromlongbeforetherevolutionin1979.RevolutionaryIranhassupportedHizbollahsince its inception in 1982, and has lent it moral, ideological, political,and financial backing, in addition to providing it with military support, includingtrainingandweapons.WhiletheIslamicregimeinIranhasbeenforcedtoadoptapragmaticapproachforthebettermanagementofaffairsofstateinagrowingnumberofareas,inLebanon,Hizbollah,freeoftheresponsibilities of executive office, can continue maintaining a higher levelofideologicalpuritythaneventheIslamicregimeinIran.TehranisproudofitssupportofHizbollah,whichrecognizesthespiritualauthorityof Iran’s supreme leader (AyatollahAli Khamanei) as expressed in theHizbollahideologyandinthepicturesoftheayatollahregularlyheldbyprotesters and displayed in the offices of the movement’s leaders.

AnumberofdevelopmentsreinforcedIran’sregionalstandingbeforethe war, and have bolstered it even further since.These enhancements,

After the War: Iranian Power and its Limitations I 153

however,nowsharethestagewithcertainchallengesthatarosefollowingthewar.

Advances for Iran

Extremism reinforced in Iran.Thewarbrokeoutwhiletheconservativesin Iran were gaining strength. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was electedpresident in July 2005 following Mohammad Khatami’s two terms aspresident(1997-2005),duringwhichhestrove,albeitwithlittlesuccess,to implement a relativelypragmaticpolicy.Ahmadinejadhaspursued afar more extreme line.The pragmatic approach that started in the mid-nineties,whosemostnotablesuccessesweretheelectionsofKhatamiaspresident, thevictoryin themunicipalelections(1999),andthereform-supportingMajlis(parliament)of2000,begantoregressatthestartofthethirdmillennium.Followingtheadvancesofthemid-late1990s,acrusadebeganagainstthereformersinIran.TheextremistpatternincreasedwiththeoutbreakofthesecondPalestinianintifada(September2000)andtheeventsofSeptember11,2001.TheUnitedStatespolicyintheregion,andPresident Bush’s inclusion of Iran on the “axis of evil” (January 2002)led to furtherescalation in Iran.Although Irangainedappreciably fromthe“thegreatSatan,”astheUSisknowninrevolutionaryjargon,initsremovaloftheTalibanregimeinAfghanistan(2002)andthetopplingofSaddamHusseininIraq(2003),Irandidnotexpressanygratitudeforthese“services”anddidnotseriouslyconsidermoderatingitsposition(evenifthereweresomevoicesthatfavoredtheseideasatsomepoints).

SincethentheconservativeelementsinIranianpoliticshavebecomestronger.In2003theconservativeswonaclearvictoryinthelocalelections(afterthevictoryofthereformistsin1999),in2004theywonbyalargemarginintheMajliselections(unlikethe2000elections),andoneyearlaterAhmadinejad,themostextremeofthepresidentialcandidates,waselected.Soon after his election Ahmadinejad enhanced his international profile and becamearenownedworldleaderwhoworkedtoconsolidatehisagenda.Anumberofdevelopmentsworkedinhisfavor.Domesticfactorsincludedtheincreaseintheoilprices;theweakeningofpragmaticgroups;andhissuccessinunitingthepublicontheissueoftheIraniannuclearprogram,whichisviewedasanationalinterest.Outsidethecountry,Iran’sposition


wasstrengthenedbySaddam’sdownfall,theUnitedStates’complicationsinIraq, thegrowingpowerofShiitecommunitiesintheregion,andthepoliticalvacuumleftbytheArabstatesinIraqandotherplacesaswell.

Iran’s spearheading a clash of civilizations. Lebanon inauspiciouslybecame a microcosm of a far more extensive struggle – a clash ofcivilizationsontwoparallellevels:WesterncultureversusIslamundertheaegisofIran;andwithintheIslamicworld,theSunnimajorityversustheemergingShiitecommunity,whichIranenvisioneditselfleading.Placingitself at the forefront of Islamist struggles is a clear ideological choice,aimedatbolsteringIran’spositionintheregionalandglobalarenas.ThisisalsoastrategicdecisionoftheIslamicregime,andIranappearsdeterminedtofurtherit.

Decline of Arab stature in the Middle East arena.TheArabworldhaschanged and has reacted passively to momentous events in the region(in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian arena). This recurring pattern ofbehavior has had a significant impact on what is often called “the Arab Middle East.”The emerging alternative is in fact the superiority of thenon-Arab elements in the region, especially Iran, Turkey, and Israel.Alongside the weakening of theArab power, repression of theTaliban,andthecollapseoftheBaathregimeofSaddamHusseinonbothsidesofitsborders,IranwasboostedbyconsolidationofitspositioninthePersianGulf. The withdrawal of Israel (2000) and Syria (2005) from LebanonpresentedanextensivepotentialareaforactivityintheFertileCrescent.ThegrowingpopularityofHizbollahleaderSheikhHassanNasrallahandofAhmadinejadamongvarioussectorsof thepublic inArabstatesalsoemphasizes the gap between the public and the leaders of certainArabstates.Hizbollah’sstalwartperformanceduringtheSecondLebanonWarprovides inspiration for radical movements in the moderateArab statesand bolsters the importance of Iran, which defines itself as “the academy of the Islamic revolution.” Iran is happy to fill the vacuum left by Arab states,andthispatternisapparentlyprogressinguninterrupted,unlessrealchange occurs in the policies of theArab states, principally Egypt andSaudiArabia.

Strengthening the Shiite standing in the Islamic theater.Thisemergingpattern changes somewhat the internal Islamic balance between theSunni majority and Shiite minority (which even according to generous


assessmentsrepresentslessthan15percentofMuslims).True,theShiiteworld is far from homogenous, and there are significant differences between IraqiShiitesandIranianShiites.Forexample,theseniorreligiousclericinIraq,AyatollahAliSistani,himselfofIranianorigin,challengessomeofthebasicprinciplesintheteachingsofAyatollahRuhollahKhomeini,includingtheprincipleof“ruleofthejurisconsult”;duringtheIran-IraqWartheShiitesinIraqgenerallyremainedfaithfultotheircountry,justastheArabsinIranremainedloyaltoIranwhentheIraqitroopsinvadedIranin1980.Infact,eveninIranianIthna-AshriShia,thereareconsiderableideological differences between the various senior religious leaders.Atthe beginning of the revolution a senior religious figure, Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari,wasplacedunderhousearrest,aswasAyatollahHusseinAliMontazerimorerecently.ItisalsoclearthatSunniIslampredominatesthroughout the Islamic world as well as in the Middle East, and Sunnileaders will fight to ensure that their views represent the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the rise in the Shiite standing constitutes a significant change in theMiddleEast.Other than Iran (whichhasa largeShiitemajority),Iraq is the first Arab country where the Shiites (who account for about 60 percentofthepopulation)arenowingovernment,whileinLebanontheShiites are currently the largest religious minority (rapidly approachinghalf of thepopulationofLebanon).The inferior standingof theShiites(socially,economically,andpolitically)andtheirproxiesnowlookslikepart of the distant past. The Shiite banner, flaunted by Iran and spanning theareafromIraqtoLebanon(withimportantShiitepocketsintheGulfemirates,andwithIran’sstrategicallySyriaunderBaathleadership),isanadditionalsourceofIran’ssenseofstrength,aswellasamatterofconcernforSunniArabstates.

Iran’s senior status in Lebanon. Iran has exerted its influence in Lebanon foralongtime,anditspositiontherewasenhancedbythewithdrawalofIsrael and Syria from Lebanon. It was further bolstered by Hizbollah’s“victory” in the war with Israel, although the definition of victory or defeat inthiskindofwarislargelycontingentontheapproachoftheindividualparty and on public consciousness. In many respects it is difficult to view theresultsofthewarasavictoryforHizbollah(orforIran).Theheavylosses suffered by Hizbollah, the damage inflicted on its military and organizational infrastructure,andthefact thatNasrallahwasforcedinto


hidingfollowingthewardonotindicatevictoryintheconventionalsense.However, thepublicperceptionofvictoryintheArabworldpropagatedbyHizbollahandIran(andSyria),incontrastwiththegloomandthesoulsearchinginIsrael,fueledthesensethatHizbollah’sapproachisthewaytocontainIsraelandtheenemiesofIslambothintheregionandelsewhere.Iranclearlyhas thecopyrightonHizbollah’ssteadfastresistanceanditsrevolutionarythinking,andithasnotdisguiseditsdelight.

Progress on the nuclear front.Thisisundoubtedlythemostimportantissue for Iran,which thus farhasshownnodesireatall to retreat fromitsnuclearprogram.ThewarinIraqhasonlyincreasedIran’smotivationtomaintain its programand it is striving to followNorthKorea’s lead,and not to expose itself to invasion, like Iraq. The difficulties the US has encounteredinIraqsincetheoccupation,thefactthatno“smokinggun”was found there, the eclipsed aim to “export” democracy to Iraq, thenumerousproblemsconfrontingtheUSinapplyingitspolicythere,andthe fierce internal debate contribute to Iran’s initiatives and its sense of strength.TheincreaseinoilpriceshasreinforcedthesenseofsecurityandpretensionsoftheIslamicleadership,andthefactthatothercountriesintheregionhaveanuclearcapabilityhasfurtherencourageditsaspirationsto join theelitenuclearclub.The inconsistency in theWesternpositionessentially allows Iran to continue with its program while standing firm against theWest. China and Russia are not entirely supportive of strictsanctions on Iran, and the European position is not definitive. Even public opinion in the United States does not support significant measures against Iran,andcertainlynotbeforethediplomaticchannelhasbeenexhausted.

Finally, the successful art of Iranian diplomacy.Iranhasrichexperienceinforeignpolicy,morethananyothercountryintheregion.Sincethe1979revolutionthereligiousleadershavedisplayedgreatsophistication.Theyhavesuccessfullyimplementedapolicydesignedtodividetheopposingcamp,usingdoubleentendresandoccasionallyintentionally–andovertly–misleadingtheworld.Theyhavefullyexploitedtheparticularinterestsofthevariousactors(suchasChinaandRussia)inordertobuytime,improvetheirregionalposition,andcontinuewiththeirnuclearprogram.TheyhavebothshutthedoorinthefaceoftheWestandatthesametimeopenedawindow.Theirresponsestotheproposalsmadetothemhavebeenneithercategorical rejections nor full-fledged endorsements. They veer between


“yes,but”and“no,however”andleavetheUSanditsalliesponderingtheviabilityofsolvingtheIraniannuclearproblemthroughdiplomaticmeans.Fornow,thenuclearprogramclockcontinuesticking,anditisworkinginIran’sfavor.

Challenges to Iran

These advances are not insignificant achievements. However, even with theseachievements,Iranisexposedtoquiteafewchallenges,andsomehavealsobeenexacerbatedinthewakeofthewarinLebanon.Moreover,whileIran’sgainspre-datedthewarandwereforthemostpartunrelatedtoit,thechallengesarelargelyadirectresultofthewar.Inthisrespect,thewardamagedIranianinterestsnolessthanitadvancedthem.

Domesticpublicdiscontenthasincreased,particularlyduetoeconomicdifficulties and diminished civil liberties, and there are also complaints over assistance provided to distant movements, in other words, identification withradicalmovementsattheexpenseofdomesticinvestment.Therearea significant number of Iranians who in the past have criticized support of radical movements outside the country, both for ideological reasonsand on pragmatic and economic grounds. Iran’s clear identification with movements such as Hamas and Hizbollah is seen by many to damageIran’s image. Others have complained about the financial aid given to these movements,whichimpingesonIran’sdomesticbudget.DuringthewarafamousPersianproverbwasoftenheard:“Ifthelanternisneededathome,donatingittothemosqueisharam[forbidden]”—i.e.,evenifsupportingHizbollahisaholycause,“one’sownpoor”shouldstillbetakencareoffirst.

Lebanon’s rehabilitation, particularly in southern Lebanon and partsof Beirut, is another issue.When the dust of the war settled, Lebanesecitizenscouldseetheextentofthedestruction.Plainly,manyblamedIran.IfIranprovidesgenerousassistance,questionswillberaisedinsideIran(wheresomeareashavenotyetbeenfullyrehabilitatedfollowingthelongIran-Iraq War). If Iran does not provide significant aid it will be held even moreaccountablebytheLebanese,atleastthenon-Shiitesegmentsofthepopulation.Theriseinoilpricesalsohasitsdrawbacks.Thepublicmayonedaydemandtoknowwhereallthemoneythatthestateearnedfrom

15� I David Menashri

therisingpriceofoilhasgone(thepriceofoilhasincreasedthreefoldinthe last five years). History, of course, does not repeat itself, but the lessons tobelearnedfromitshouldnotbeignoredeither.Followingthe1973warthere was a sharp rise in oil prices, increasing Iran’s income significantly, and the Islamic Revolution erupted only five years later. Given the surge in oilrevenue,probingquestionsarealreadysurfacinginthiscontext.

On the international front, the world became more aware of thechallengesposedbyIslamicradicalismfueledbyIran,andevenEuropenowseemsmoreawarethatthechallengespresentedbyIranarenotinitsinterest.FollowingthewartherewasconcerninIranthatpressureonitwouldincrease(thiswasthecasewiththeSecurityCouncilresolutionofJuly 31 that for the first time threatened to impose sanctions on Iran if it did notchangeitsnuclearpolicy).Eveniftheseconcernshavedissipatedforthewhile,theimpressionsofthewar,alongwithIran’snuclearprogram,the rise of political Islam on “theArab street,” and the rise of IslamicextremisminEuropeancapitalsarenowbeingfeltinEurope

TensionbetweenIranand itsneighbors isalso increasingagainst thebackdropofIran’spolicyinIraq,inLebanon,andonthePalestinianissue,the strengthening of Shiite Islam, and the nuclear challenge. Followingthe war, Sunni religious leaders made extreme statements against thePersian-Shiites.Itishardtobelievethatthisisatemporarydevelopment.Itseemstorunevendeeperthanwhatappearsonthesurface.LeadersoftheArabstatesarealsofeelingthepressure,bothfromIranandfromradicalelementsinthevariousArabcountries.

ThepossibilityofapeaceinitiativebetweenIsraelandSyriamayalsoconfrontIranwithaconsiderablechallenge.MuchtoIran’sundisguiseddispleasure,SyriaengagedinnegotiationswithIsraeladecadeago,andthePalestinianspursuedadiplomaticcourseoftheirownwithevengreaterintensity.AlthoughHamasiscurrentlyingovernment,ifandwhenthereisachangeinthePalestinianAuthorityorinHamas’spolicypreferences,orifapeaceinitiativedevelopsbetweenIsraelandthePalestiniansorbetweenIsraelandSyria,Iranmayfaceafarmorerigorouschallenge.

ThemostseriousfactorforIran isPresidentBush’sdetermination tosuppressthe“axisofevil.”AlthoughthemajoritygainedbytheDemocratsin both houses of Congress in the 2006 elections has weakened Bush’sposition,andwhilehehasalsoleftanopeningfordialoguewiththeIranian

After the War: Iranian Power and its Limitations I 15�

leaders,viewedfromTehranPresidentBushstillappearscapableoftakingsternactionagainstthem.

Iranheralds thewarasavictory, andmayhavehad itsown interestinincreasingtensiononIsrael’sborderspriortotheJuly15G-8summit,wherethemainissuewasIran’snuclearprogram.Ontheotherhand,itdoesnotseemthatIranwasinterestedinanIsraelireactionofsuchintensity,and the results of the fighting inflicted a heavy blow on its power bases in LebanonlongbeforeIranwasinterestedinsuchanescalation.

TheseunderlyingfactorshelpexplaintheunusualamountoftimegiventoIsraelbytheUnitedStatesandEurope(and,indirectly,moderateArabstates as well) to fight Hizbollah before calling for a ceasefire. At least for theUnitedStates, theSecondLebanonWarwas justonephaseofabroaderwaragainstIslamicradicalism,withIranastheprimarycountrysupportingit.IsraelviewedtheSecondLebanonWarasitswar,butalsobelievedthatthebroadercontextoftheIranianchallenge,principallythenuclear issue, shouldbeaddressedby theUnitedStatesand itsWesternallies,andnotbyIsrael.

Potential Sources of Change

The United States, European countries, China, and Russia.Intheperiodsince the ceasefire, it does not look like the world is ready to confront Iran.Inpractice,eventheUnitedStateshassenthintsofgoodwilltowardsIran,forexamplebyallowingformerPresidentKhatamitovisittheUnitedStates, and as reflected in President Bush’s measured words in his address to theUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyinSeptember.TheBaker-HamiltonreportonIraq(releasedonDecember6,2006)furtheredthistrend.WestEuropeancountriestoodonotseemoverlyenthusiasticaboutconfrontingIran,andRussiaandChinahavealsopubliclyexpressedmoremoderatepositionstowardsTehran.Nevertheless,thereisstillconcerninIranaboutatoughresponsefromtheUnitedStates,whetherdesignedtostrikeatIranortoextricateitselffromtheIraqimorass.

Severalstepstakensincelatein2006pressuredIranfurther.TheSecurityCouncilresolutiontoimposesanctionsonIran,approvedunanimouslybyall fifteen members, sent a stern message to Iran. Also, in December US forcesarrestedtwoIraniansinIraq(twootherswithdiplomaticimmunity


werereleased).InJanuary2007,theUnitedStatesannouncedthedispatchofadditionalforcestoIraq,andonJanuary11UStroopsraidedIraniantargetsin theKurdish townof Irbil.As such, the “American solution” appearspossiblebasedontwocontradictorybutapparentlycomplementarytrends:an initiative for dialogue to find an agreed solution, and drastic US action, preferablywithasupportingcoalition.ItisuncertainwhetheranAmericaninitiativefordialoguewillproducemeaningfulresults.However,withoutit the US will have more difficulty implementing a more decisive policy, certainlyintermsofChinaandRussia,butalsowithregardtoEuropeancountriesandpossiblyeveninthecontextofUSpublicopinion.

Arab states. A potentially important means of motivating a processof change would be an Arab-Israeli dialogue on the Palestinian issue.Galvanizing negotiations through moderate Arab regimes may providea suitable solution for radicalization generated by Iran and the Islamicmovements.ThisisachallengethatfacesIsraelanditsArabneighbors.Althoughtheresultsofthewarmakeitevenhardertoadvancealongthisroute,clearlytheprogresswiththepeaceprocessbetweenIsraelandthePalestinians or with the Syrians (and certainly with both) may weakenIran’spositioninthearena.

A change of direction in Iran. Ultimately,thereisthepossibilityofchangewithin Iran itself. One possibility would be the present administrationagreeingtochangeitspolicy,whichdoesnotlooklikelygiventhecurrentpoliticalrealityinIran,althoughitisnotentirelyimpossible;andanotherpossibilitywouldbeinternalchangethatforcesthegovernmenttoembraceadifferentpolicy.

Inthelastcentury,theIranianpublichasdemonstratedahighdegreeofpolitical involvement andgenerated considerable change.Thepubliccontinuestobealertandinvolved.TheresultsoftheDecember15,2006elections to local municipalities and the Assembly of Experts reflect a considerablelevelofdiscontentwiththepresident’spolicies(andindeed,his rivals scored some noticeable gains). Even if it is difficult to discern a fundamentalchangeinthepoliticalarenaemanatingfromtheseelections,they express displeasure with domestic politics, though still withinthe narrow confines of the struggle between the movements inside the governmentestablishment.Moreimportantly,inthetwentiethcenturyIranwentthroughtwolargepopularuprisings(theconstitutionalrevolutionof


1906,whosecentenarywasmarkedlastyear)andtheIslamicRevolution,interspersed by the popular movement of Prime Minister MohammadMosaddeq (1951-53). Even after the Islamic Revolution, the youthmovements,women’sorganizations,press,cinemaindustry,andextensiveuseoftheinternetamazetheforeignobserver.Overthelasttwenty-eightyears the Islamic regimehas resisted themovements thathaveopposedit,both fromwithinandoutside the regime.Does the futureofferotherpossibilities?Itishardtoforecast.

ItappearsasiftwoprocessesaretakingplaceinIransimultaneously:aprocessofpolicychangeandpossiblyeveninternalchange,andaprocessofobtaininganuclearcapability.Intheviewofthefreeworld,itwouldbebetter if Iran did not realize the nuclear option first, although reality does notnecessarilysupportthispreference.

Although the neo-conservatives are currently in government in Iran,it seems that the fight over revolutionary Iran’s path has not yet been ultimately decided. Popular movements are difficult to foresee; as one Israelisongexplains,“suddenly,amangetsupinthemorningandfeelsheisanation,andstartstomoveforward.”Researchersofthepastareunabletoforeseetheroutethepublicwillchoose.Ifandwhenthepublicimposesits will, its position will not be contingent on the degree of reversionto Islam or Iran’s influence in Lebanon, rather mainly on the extent to which the revolutionary regime satisfies the expectations that fueled the revolution’searlydays–thepromiseofabetterlifeandgreaterfreedomfortheIranianpeople,andproofthattheirslogan“Islamisthesolution”actuallyprovidesaresponsetothecitizen’sexpectations.

AhmadinejadmadegenerousRobinHood-stylepromisesthathewouldtakefromtherichandgivegenerouslytothepoor,andheinstillednewhopethathisapproachoffersasolutiontotheproblemsofthemodernera.The burden of proof now rests on him, and the battlefield is the Iranian domestic arena. This is not an easy task, and its achievement (or lackof achievement) embodies the main possibility for significant change in Iranianpolicy.

Note1. For a detailed discussion on the domestic developments and Iran’s regional

policyintheirwiderhistoricalperspective,seemyPost-Revolutionary Politics


in Iran: Religion, Society and Power (London: Frank Cass, 2000). For Iran’sregionalpolicyseemyrecentarticle“Iran’sRegionalPolicy:BetweenRadicalismandPragmatism,”Journal of International Affairs60,no.2(2007):153-67.

Chapter 12

July-August Heat: The Israeli-Palestinian Arena

Anat Kurz

TheescalationintheIsraeli-PalestinianconfrontationthatcoincidedwiththewarbetweenIsraelandHizbollahheightenedtheperceivedthreattoIsrael inherent in the regional context, and inparticular, the associationbetweenthearenaspoweredbyIslamicforces.Indeed,forseveralweeksIsrael was involved in direct confrontations both with the LebaneseHizbollahandwithPalestinianmilitantfactions.Prominentamongthemwere those that viewed the struggle against Israel as part of the drivetoward regional Islamatization. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding thechronologicalcoincidence,theescalationintheIsraeli-Palestinianarenainthesummerof2006wasaseparateevent,propelledbyitsownparticularcircumstances.1

On the Eve of the War

WhenthewarbrokeoutbetweenIsraelandHizbollah,theIsraeli-Palestinianarena was already engulfed in a process of escalation. Qassam rocket fire fromtheGazaStriponthewesternNegev,ongoingsincetheIDFwithdrewfrom Gaza inAugust 2005, had increased with the Hamas movement’svictoryinthe2006electionsforthePalestinianLegislativeCouncil(PLC).Factions that had established independent organizational frameworks,operationalabilities, andpolitical agendasduring the intifadacontinuedtheirviolentcampaigninordertoembarrasstheHamasgovernmentandbring about an escalation in the confrontation. Israeli security forces

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responded to the Qassam fire, terrorist attacks, and attempted assaults with pursuits of activists in the West Bank and Gaza, with artillery fire, and with aerialandnavalattacksonrocket-launchingareasintheGazaStrip.

At the same time, Palestinian bipolar institutional tension increasedbetweenHamas,whichcontrolledthegovernmentandthePLC,andthepresidency,heldbyMahmoudAbbas.The frictionparalyzed the abilityofthePalestinianAuthority(PA)tofunction,andthepoliticalstagnationcappedanypotentialinterestwithinbothHamasandFatahtocontainthearmed factions.The inter-organizational tension and the lack of centralcontrol were also reflected in sporadic clashes between members of variousorganizations,particularlyFatahandHamas.ThesedevelopmentsunfoldedagainstthebackdropofaneconomiccrisisthatworsenedduetothesanctionsimposedbyIsrael,theEuropeanUnion,andtheUnitedStatesagainst the PA in the wake of Hamas’s electoral victory.The sanctionswereintendedeithertoencourageHamastochangethebasicguidelinesofitsgovernmentor,alternatively,tobringaboutitsdownfall.Inaneffortto boost the economic situation, lifting the closure was a key objectiveof the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails who in what became knownas “the prisoners’ document” proposed a basis for the government andthepresidency to formanationalunitygovernment.OnJune24,2006,underpublicpressuretoendorsetheprisoners’proposal,HamasandFatahleadershipsannouncedagreementonprinciplesforestablishingacoalition.2However,theescalationthateruptedimmediatelythereafterintheIsraeli-PalestiniansphereblockedthepossibilityoftranslatingthisagreementintoanyrehabilitationofthePalestinianpoliticalsystem.

On June 25 the IDF intensified its operations in the Gaza Strip following the infiltration into Israel near Kerem Shalom of operatives from the Army ofIslam,aHamas-alignedfaction,andtheirkidnappingofIsraelisoldierGiladShalit.Operation“ShalitDromi”(SouthernShalit)wasdesignedtogeneratepublicpressureontheHamasgovernmenttoworkforhisreleaseand contain the rocket fire. On July 2, following the intensified rocket fire andthecontinuedcrisisinthewakeofthekidnapping,theIDF’soperationin theStripwas expanded. In the secondphaseof theoperation, called“GishmeiKayitz”(summerrains),groundforcesentered theGazaStripand, backed by airpower, concentrated on destroying Hamas’s civilian

July-August Heat: The Israeli-Palestinian Arena I 165

institutionsandthemilitaryinfrastructuresbelongingtoHamasandothermilitantfactions.

Following the upsurge in the crisis Hizbollah leader Sheikh HassanNasrallahdeclaredthatreleasingthesoldierwithoutobtainingsomethinginreturnwouldconstituteafailureandablowtothousandsofPalestinianprisoners.OnJuly13, thedayafter twoIsraelisoldierswerekidnappedbyHizbollahonthenorthernborder–theclimaxofaseriesofincidentsthatledtotheoutbreakofwarbetweenIsraelandHizbollah–NasrallahlinkedthetwokidnappingincidentstogetheranddeclaredthatheintendedtoadvancethereleaseofthethreeIsraelisoldiers“inreturnforthereleaseofArabprisoners.”3

Operation Summer Rains

Thepoliticalandmedia focuson theLebanesearenaboth in IsraelandaroundtheworldreducedinterestintheeventsthatwereunfoldinginthePalestinianarena,andhelpedtomoderatecriticismoftheduration,extent,andintensityoftheIsraelimilitarycampaignintheGazaStrip.However,the limited coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian escalation was not thedriving force behind the campaign, which was expanded significantly even beforetheoutbreakofhostilitiesinLebanon.Infact,theIsraeli-Palestinianconfrontationescalatedandfolloweditstraditionalpattern,largelydivorcedfromitsLebanesecounterpart.TheIDFmaintaineditspersistentcampaignagainstthemilitantinfrastructureintheWestBank,andactedonland,bysea,andbyairagainsttheoperationalcapabilityofarmedelementsintheStrip. Nevertheless, the Qassam rocket fire continued. In response to the continuedmilitancyandthefailuretoachievethereleaseofthekidnappedsoldier,thebordercrossingsbetweenGazaandtheoutsideworldremainedclosed – barring occasional openings for food, medical equipment, andbasicsupplies–andhencetheshortagesandeconomiccrisisintheStripintensified dramatically. Meantime, alongside military measures, Israel continued arrests of senior Hamas officials.

Confronted by the pressure, Hamas called for a ceasefire in return for anexchangeofprisonersandanendtotheIsraelimilitaryactivityintheterritories. Prime Minister Haniyeh even urged activists in the field to stop the rocket fire. However, Hamas’s political wing in Damascus and the

166 I Anat Kurz

localleadershipcloselyalignedwithitadheredtothehard-lineposition.4Moreover,itisdoubtfulwhethertheHamasgovernment,PresidentAbbas,andthePA’ssecurityforceswouldhavebeenabletoenforceapolicyofrelaxation even if it were announced.Abbas’s plan to deploy the PA’ssecurityforcesintheStripwaswithdrawnfollowingoppositionbyIslamicJihadactivists,thePopularResistanceCommittees,andthePopularFront,andexplicitthreatsbythemtoattacktheforces.

Thenumberofdead roseas theviolence,environmentaldestruction,boycott,andeconomicandhumanitariancrisiscontinuedintheterritoriesand,inparticular,theGazaStrip.TheseinturnsparkedvolatileprotestsonthePalestinianstreet,5andultimatelythefamiliargrievancesagainstIsraeljoinedtheangerpromptedbytheIDF’sactionsinLebanon.ThePalestinianprotesters highlighted the link between the Palestinian struggle and theLebanese struggle; repeated calls to Nasrallah to keep up the rocket fire on townsandcitiesinthenorthofIsraelandtoattackTelAviv;andexpressedsupportforNasrallah’sdemandthathehimselfconductnegotiationsforthereleaseofthethreekidnappedIsraelisoldiers.Criticismonthestreet,nourished by events in both the Lebanese and the Palestinian arenas,reinforced the concern in Israel, as well as among Fatah ranks and thePalestinianpublicingeneral,overthestrengtheningoftheIslamiccampandofthemilitantfactionsintheterritories.Thisconcernwasbasedoncalls in the Palestinian media to escalate the struggle, inspired by theresistancedemonstratedbyHizbollahduringthewarinLebanonandtheorganization’sprovenabilitytoattackIsrael’shomefrontoveraperiodofseveralweeksevenwhileitsforcesweresubjectedtoaconcentratedandpowerfulIsraeliattack.6TheapprehensionthatthewarinLebanonmightbecome a model for the Palestinians grew with reports of the ongoingacquisition of smuggled arms by militant groups in the territories. ThereportsunderlinedincreasedeffortstotransfertotheStripviaEgyptfunds,guns,andmunitions,aswellasanti-tankmissilesandrocketswithlongerrangesthantheimprovisedQassamrockets.7

At the same time, concern also surfaced that Israeli frustration atits evident inability to crush Hizbollah would be channeled toward theterritories.8ThisconcernexertedarestrainingeffectonthePalestinians,which explained, at least in part, the fact that anger against Israel, likesupportforpartiesthatactivelyopposedtheIDFpresenceintheStripand


theconditionspresentedbytheHamasgovernmentforsolvingthecrisis,didnottranslateintoongoingescalationofthestruggle.ThedamagethatwouldbecausedbycontinuedIsraelimilitarypressure,ontopofthedestructionthat had alreadybeen caused tooperational and civilian infrastructures,limited the militant impetus to escalate the violent provocations. Thus,in the middle ofAugust, along with approval of UN Security Councilresolution 1701, there was a sharp decline in rocket fire from the Strip.9As the rocket fire lessened, the intensity of the IDF’s counter operations subsidedaswell.

Back to the Future

TheescalationoftheIsraeli-PalestinianconfrontationfueledarenewalofPalestinian national dialogue, spurred new international efforts to bringIsraelandthePalestiniansbacktothenegotiatingtable,andremovedtheideaofaunilateralwithdrawalfromtheWestBankfromtheIsraeliagenda.The latter twodevelopmentswere reinforcedby thewarbetween IsraelandHizbollah.

TheconfrontationintheGazaStrip,whichinpartresultedfromthelossofcentralruleintheterritories,acceleratedtheprocessofdisintegrationin the Palestinian Authority. Prime Minister Haniyeh called for publicdeliberation of official dismantlement of the PA. Motivated primarily by Israel’smassarrestofHamasleaders,thecallwasadefactoadmissionoftheHamasgovernment’sfailuretoestablishlawandorder,thePA’shelplessnessindealingwithitsinternalandexternalchallenges,andrecognitionofthefactthatHamaswasabouttoloseitselectoralachievements.Attheheightof the confrontation, efforts to save thePAbycreating anationalunitygovernmentebbed.However,inviewofthedestructionoftheinstitutionalandcivilianinfrastructuresintheterritories,therewerecallsforstocktakingfromHamasaswell.10EvenKhaledMasha’almoderatedhispositionontheimmediatecrisiswithIsraelandexpressedhiswillingnessforaprisonerexchange and a mutual ceasefire.11Inaddition,thecriticismtowardsthegovernment by sectors of the public and organizations identified with Fatah, whichsubsidedduringtheescalationbetweenIsraelandthePalestinians,reemergedwithgreaterforceoncetheconfrontationhadpeaked.WideningcracksintheeconomicboycottagainstthePAallowedsporadicandpartial

16� I Anat Kurz

paymentofsalariestocivilservants,buttheamountstransferredwerenotnearlyenough tocompensate thepublicat largefor thedamageof late,ensureregularpaymentofsalaries,andthushelpreducethehumanitariancrisisintheterritories.12AtthebeginningofSeptember,ageneralstrikewas organized in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the unions affiliated withFatahtoprotestthedelayinsalarypayments.Thestrike,whichwassupportedby theFatah-controlled securityapparatusof thePA,becamesomethingofaprotestagainstHamasandovershadowedtheappealtotheinternationalcommunitytocanceltheboycottoftheHamasgovernment.Public opinion polls reinforced the impression that public support forHamaswaseroding.13

InviewofthepublicprotestandinthewakeofthreatsbyAbbasthathewoulddismantletheHamasgovernmentandcallforgeneralelectionsin the territories, the national dialogue garnered new momentum. OnSeptember11,HaniyehandAbbasyetoncemoreannouncedagreementonbasicprinciplesofaunitygovernment,basedontheprisoners’document,theArab peace initiative from March 2002, and the UN resolutions onthe Arab-Israeli conflict. Abbas for his part agreed that Haniyeh would continuetoserveasprimeminister.Representativesofthetwomovementsembarkedonongoingdiscussionsovertheallocationofportfoliosandthewordingofthejointgovernmentmanifesto.Thisprogressedintermittentlyagainst a backdrop of fierce clashes between members of Fatah and Hamas, andattacksofgovernmentministriesandgovernmentinstitutionsbyFatahmembers.ByearlyOctober2006therewasanatmosphereofimpendingcivilwarintheterritories.

TheweaknessofthePalestinianAuthorityplayedamajorroleinreducingthe prospects of regional and international efforts to renew the Israeli-Palestinianpoliticalprocess.MeasuresinthisregardemergedinthewakeofthewarinLebanonandtheescalationontheIsraeli-Palestinianfrontthat,togetherandindependently,demonstratedtheunsettlingpotentialofthedirectconfrontationbetweenIsraelandIslamicmovementssupportedbytheIranian-Syrianaxis.SecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRiceinitiatedaseriesoftalksaheadoftheregionalsummitmeetingofthemoderatestates–ledbyEgypt,Jordan,andSaudiArabia–wheretherevivaloftheIsraeli-Palestinian political process would be discussed, along with examiningwaysofdealingwiththeIraniannuclearprogram.Britishprimeminister

July-August Heat: The Israeli-Palestinian Arena I 16�

Tony Blair declared at his farewell address to the British Labor PartyconferenceonSeptember26thatheintendedtodevotethetimehehadleftin office “to furthering peace between Israel and Palestine.”14

Meanwhile the diplomatic coordination between Israel and theUnitedStatescontinuedinthebackground.Thiswasdesignedtopreventdissolutionof the international front againstHamasand inparticular tooffset the possibility that the European Union might see the manifestooftheplannedunitygovernmentasabasisforestablishingachannelofdialogue with the Hamas government. UN General Secretary Kofi Annan, in a joint statement with the Quartet foreign ministers, expressed hopethat a Palestinian unity government would reflect the principles of the Quartet.Thisstatementdidnotreiteratetheacceptedrefrain,namely,thatrecognitionof theHamasgovernmentwascontingenton its acceptanceof theQuartet’s threedemands:recognitionofIsrael,rejectionof terror,andrecognitionofpreviousagreements.15Toavoidalldoubtoverpossibleloosening of the United States’ position towards Hamas, as one mighthaveunderstoodfromtheQuartetstatement,PresidentBushemphasizedintalkswithAbbasat theWhiteHousein lateSeptemberthat theunitygovernmentwouldberecognizedonlyifitacceptedthethreeconditions.TheAmericanstancewasbolsteredbyPrimeMinisterHaniyehhimselfwhenhesaidthatthedecisionbytheQuartetconstituted“apositivestep.”However,headded thatHamaswouldnotbepartofagovernment thatwouldrecognizeIsrael.

Insuchcircumstances,allthatwasleftwastomaintainandstrengthenthepositionofPresidentAbbasasapossiblepartnerinfuturenegotiations.Israel and the United States limited their ties to the PA to contact withPresidentAbbas,thoughinactuality,theserelationsweremoresymbolicthanpractical.AbbasalsowonthebackingofJordanandSaudiArabia,which at the outbreak of the war in Lebanon fiercely criticized Hizbollah forincitingthearenaandbringingdisasteronLebanon.Egyptcontinuedits ongoing efforts to stabilize the Palestinian arena and even criticizedthepoliticalwingofHamas,particularlytheobstaclesplacedbyKhaledMasha’alontalksoverthereleaseofGiladShalit.BytheendofSeptemberrelations between Cairo and Masha’al’s office reached an open crisis.

Notably, the most significant development in the Israeli-Palestinian arenaincontextoftheSecondLebanonWarwastheremovaloftheideaof

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unilateralwithdrawal(”convergence”)frompartsoftheWestBankfromtheIsraeligovernment’sagenda.TherocketbatteriesdeployedbyHizbollahfollowing the IDFwithdrawal fromsouthernLebanondemonstrated thethreatthatwasliabletoformontheothersideofanyunilaterally-declaredborderwiththePalestinians.Theconvergenceplanwouldbeacomplexchallenge in any case due to the difficulty in controlling the border, proven bythewithdrawalfromGaza.16TheSecondLebanonWar,alongwiththeconcurrent rocket campaign from the Gaza Strip, accentuated existingsecurity concerns. During the war Prime Minister Olmert said that theIDF’s achievements in Lebanon would help advance the convergenceplan.17Infact,thecombinationofHizbollahachievementsandinadequateIDFachievementsinLebanon,togetherwiththeincreasedsecuritythreatfromtheGazaStrip,acceleratederosionofsupportforthisidea.

Yet suspending the unilateral convergence plan did not enhance thechancesofanybilateralalternative.AmajorobstacletoadvancinganIsraeli-Palestinianagreement,letalonesecuringitsimplementation,remainedtheabsenceofcentralauthorityinthePalestinianarena.However,theFatah-Hamaspowerstrugglewasfarfromexhausted.Inaddition,evenifaunitygovernment were established, it would have to endorse a conciliatoryapproach to Israel so as to become a partner in the political process. Inotherwords,HamaswouldhavetoacceptthetermssetbyIsraelandtheQuartet:recognitionofIsraelandoftheagreementssignedbyIsraelandthePalestinianstodate,andacommitmenttorejectterrorism.Foritspart,Israel insisted itwouldnotrecognizeagovernment that includedHamasmembersaslongasthemovementdidnotrecognizeIsrael’srighttoexist.

Non-recognition, however, proved to be a double-edged sword. ThepoliticalstagnationalongwiththeeconomicboycottacceleratedthelossofsupportofwhateverpoliticallegitimacythePalestinianAuthorityhadenjoyedprior to thePLCelections inJanuary2006.On theotherhand,preventing Hamas from consolidating its government and gaining apositivegovernmentalexperiencerobbedIsraelofapotentialaddressonthePalestinian side for security coordinationandpossiblyalsopoliticalunderstandings.Atthesametime,thepoliticaldividerelievedthePalestinianandIsraelileadershipsalikefromanimmediateconfrontationwithweightysecurity, ideological,anddomesticpoliticalissues.Theescalationintheconfrontationinthesummerof2006conveyedtheurgencyoftheneedto


find an exit from the morass. Yet given the internal politics on both sides, alongwiththeincreasedsecuritythreattoIsraelduetocollapseofthePA,fewifany termsremained thatwouldfacilitateacompromise.Assuch,notwithstanding suspension of the Israeli idea of convergence, and theincreasedinternationalencouragementtorenewdialogue,oncethestormabatedIsraeland thePalestinianAuthoritywere left in thesamesortofpoliticaldeadendandonthesameviolentcollisioncoursethatconfrontedthemontheeveofthewar.

Conclusion

The Israeli-Arab conflict has its own dynamic. Its expressions and patterns are not derived directly or necessarily from surrounding events. Thisfeaturewasunderscoredinthesummerof2006inlightofthewarbetweenIsraelandHizbollah.Theconfrontationwouldhaveescalatedasper thedevelopments in the Israeli-Palestinian arena that preceded the fighting betweenIsraelandHizbollah,particularly,thekidnappingofasoldierontheGazaStripborder.RegardlessoftheLebanesearena,Israel’seffortstoweakentheHamasgovernmentwouldhavecontinued,theeconomicandhumanitariancrisisintheterritorieswouldhavedeepened,thePalestinianAuthoritywouldhavecontinuedlosingitsstatusanddomesticauthority,theinter-organizationalpowerstruggleswouldhavecontinued;andongoingeffortsbymilitantelements to incite theconfrontationwouldhavebeensustained.

OnemaineffectofthewarinLebanonwasthetemporarylackofattentioninIsraelandtheworldatlargetothePalestinianarena.Forawhile,thisallowed Israel more freedom in its fight against the armed infrastructures, theHamasmovement,andtheHamasgovernment.Aclearerimpactofthewar inLebanonon theIsraeli-Palestinianarenawas theslashedsupportinIsraelfortheideaofunilateralconvergenceintheWestBank,inviewof the military arrays deployed by Hizbollah since the IDF withdrawalfromLebanon.Inaddition,aftertheendofthewar,internationaleffortstostabilizetheregionalarenathroughreturningIsraelandthePalestiniansto the negotiating table were renewed. Still, the Second Lebanon Waronlyservedtoacceleratethesedevelopments.Theirdirectcatalystswere

172 I Anat Kurz

spawnedbothprior toandduring thewar inLebanon in the immediateIsraeli-Palestiniansphere.

Notes1. The short lapse between the outbreak of the intifada in September 2000 and the

IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon the previous May was widely interpretedasevidenceoftheconnectionbetweenthePalestinianandLebanesearenas,thoughrelatingmainlytothemethodsofstruggle.TheideathatthewithdrawalfromLebanonwasseenintheterritoriesasanachievementtobeduplicatedthroughadirectstruggleagainstIsraelhasbothIsraeliandPalestinianproponents.HassanNasrallahhimselfreferredfrequentlytothelinkbetweenthearenas,whichwasactualizedinpartbythesubstantialaidgivenbyHizbollahtoPalestinianmilitantgroups.HowmuchthePalestinianslackedforinspirationtolaunchanewarmedcampaign–followingthefailed2000CampDavidsummit,yearsofastagnantdiplomaticprocess,theongoingdysfunction of the PalestinianAuthority, and years of struggle against Israel – isbeyond precise measurement, and so the question of Lebanon-inspired motivationremainsopen.

2. ThedocumentcalledfortheestablishmentofanationalunitygovernmentbasedonimplementationofdecisionsbytheArabsummitthatsupport“thePalestinianissue,”recognitionofthePLOasthesolelegitimaterepresentativeofthePalestinianpeople,and the inclusion of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the organization. It cites therightofthePalestinianpeopletofocusonthestruggleagainstIsraelintheterritoriesbeyondtheGreenLine,alongsidecontinuingpoliticalnegotiations,andtherealizationoftherightofreturnofPalestinianrefugees.Thedocument,whichhasnomentionof Israel,underlines thecall for thecreationofaPalestinianstate,withJerusalemas its capital, on land occupied since 1967.According to a public opinion surveypublishedonJune19,2006,74percentexpressedsupportfor theprinciplesof thedocument,althoughonly47percentsaidtheywouldvoteforthedocumentifitwerepresentedinareferendum.SeePalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Survey Research Unit,Pollno.20,June15-18,2006.

3. TimesOnline,July13,2006.4. RejectingthepositionoftheHamasleadershipintheterritories,whichwaswilling

to reach a separate agreement with Israel, Muhammad Nazal, Khaled Masha’al’sdeputy,echoedNasrallah’slineanddemandedthattheissueofthekidnappedsoldiersinLebanonbelinkedwiththesoldierkidnappedontheGazaStripborder.SeeAviIssacharoff and Michal Greenberg, “Hamas Senior Official Abroad: Hezbollah and HamastoCooperateontheHostages,”July26,2006,Haaretz.co.il.

5. BetweenJune25,2006and themiddleofSeptember2006,227PalestinianswerekilledintheGazaStrip(Haaretz,September13,2006).

6. AviIssacharoff,“TheLessonofthePalestinians–MoreMissiles,”August7,2006,Haaretz.co.il;Ibrahimal-Hijaa,“TheVictoryinLebanonOpenstheDoorforaThirdIntifada,”al-Rassalah,August4,2006,translatedfromMEMRI:MiddleEastMedia


ResearchInstitute,August7,2006;seealsoPalestinian Media Watch Bulletin,August12,2006,August31,2006.

7. FiguresofarmssmugglingfromGSSheadYuvalDiskin,asreportedinThe Israeli-Palestinian Conflict News,August15-31,2006,Intelligence Heritage Center, Center for Data on Intelligence and Terror.

8. “Palestinian Officials Fear Israel to Shift ‘Aggression’ From Lebanon to PA Areas” in: Dialogue: West Bank & Gaza Strip – OSC Report,August15,2006.

9. In June, 140 Qassam rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip, 191 in July, and 41 in August. That was the lowest number of rockets fired in any single month since October 2005. During September 45 rockets were fired from Gaza (The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict News,August15-31,2006,September1-14,2006),September15-30,TheIntelligenceHeritageCenter,CenterforDataonIntelligenceandTerror).

10. “Iwantustotakeagoodlookatourselvesinviewofourmistakes…wehavebecomeaccustomed to placing responsibility on others.The chaos…the pointless killings,land theft, family conflicts, what have all these to do with the occupation? …We have worn ourselves down, time after time, with mistakes for which everyone isresponsible…Thequestionis,whydidwenotmaintainGaza’sfreedom?Inthepastwehaverepeatedlysaidthatwesupporttheliberationofeveryinchofland.Nowwehavethousandsofinchesofland…and,despitethis,wehavenotmanagedtosafeguardthisvaluableassetandwehavebeguntoloseit…SincetheIsraeliwithdrawalfromGaza500Palestinianshavebeenkilledandover3,000wounded…Thisisinadditionto thedestructionof infrastructures,bridgesandelectricity stations…Couldn’tourlosseshavebeen limited ifwehadusedourbrains.”FromanarticlepublishedbytheHamasgovernmentspokesperson,Dr.JaziHamadinthePA’sbulletinal-Ayam,August27,2006,translatedfromMEMRI:MiddleEastMediaResearchInstitute.

11. Haaretz.co.il,July3,2006.12. TheStockholmCommitteeofthedonorcountriesundertooktotransfer$500million

for investment in humanitarian projects. Saudi Arabia promised to provide $250million, and the European Union offered $135 million to the PA over three years(Haaretz.co.il,September3,2006).

13. Inaddition,accordingtoapublicopinionpollconductedbytheNearEastConsultingResearchInstitute(Ramallah,August9,2006),duringtheescalationoftheIsraeli-PalestinianconfrontationandthewarinLebanon,supportforapeacetreatywithIsraelfellamongthePalestinianpublicfrom76percentinJuneto51percentinAugust.SupportrecoveredinSeptemberto64percent.Thelevelofsupport,asmeasuredinSeptember, reached 77 percent among those who identified with Fatah, and 48 percent among supporters of Hamas “A poll conducted by a-Najakh University in NablusindicatesachangeinPalestinianpoliticalstances…ifelectionswereheldtodayFatahwouldreceive35percentofthevotescomparedwith20percenttoHamas,”Ynet,September10,2006.

14. TimesOnline,September26,2006.15. ”TheQuartetwelcomestheeffortsofPalestinianPresidentMahmoudAbbastoform

agovernmentofnationalunity,inthehopethattheplatformofsuchagovernment

174 I Anat Kurz

would reflect Quartet principles and allow for early engagement.” The New York Times,September21,2006.

16. “The Convergence is Disappearing,” byAluf Benn, Haaretz.co.il, June 26, 2006;accordingtothepeaceindexofJuly3-4,2006,only46percentsaidthatdisengagementfromtheGazaStripwasapositivemeasure.

17. Haaretz,August18,2006.

Chapter 13

The Second Lebanon War: The Regional Setting

Asher Susser

The 2006 Lebanon War was not just another round of theArab-Israeliconflict. Departing from the familiar pattern of classic warfare, this was a subconventional, asymmetric war between Israel and Hizbollah,a non-state, irregular force waging a guerilla war. However, and moreimportantly,thiswasnotessentiallyanArab-Israeliwarinthetraditionalsense,ratheranindirectconfrontationbetweenIsraelandIranthroughthelatter’sShiiteproxyinLebanon–Hizbollah.Forthemostpart,withtheexceptionofSyria, theArabSunniMuslimcountriesplayed thepartofpassivebystanders.SomewhohadfoughtagainstIsraelinthepastevenhopedthatthewarwouldleadtoanIsraelivictoryovertheIran-Hizbollahalliance,whichhasalsosupportedtheIslamicrevolutionaryforcesinthearenathatthreatennumerousArabregimes.

The“newMiddleEast”ofthelastgenerationhasexperiencedprofoundhistoricalchanges,andtheSecondLebanonWarwaslargelyanexpressionof them.These include a relative weakening of theArab states and thepan-Arabsystem;therelativeempowermentofnon-ArabMiddleEasternstates; the bolstering of sub-state players in the arena; changes in thehistoricbalanceofpowerbetweentheSunnisandShiites;andachangeintheregionalperceptionofthecenterandperiphery.

176 I Asher Susser

The Weakening of the Arab States

Formanyyearstheterms“Arabworld”and“MiddleEast”wereconsideredto be interchangeable, based on the view that theArabs were the mainforcesetting the regionalagenda.This isno longer true.When inApril2003AmericanforcestookBaghdad,thegloriouscapitaloftheAbbasidCaliphateandoneofthehistoriccentersofIslamicandArabculture,Arabstatesstoodbyanddidnothing.WhenIsraelfoughtHizbollahforamonthin the summer of 2006, theArab states – with the exception of Syria,whichhelpedHizbollah–lookedonpassively.TheArabLeaguehasbeenimpotentforsometimeandhasbeenthebuttofderisioninArabpublicopinion.

AttheheightofEgyptianpresidentAbdelNasser’spower,aroundhalfacenturyago, therealitywasdifferent.NasserwastheunrivaledleaderofallArabswhenheblockedattemptsbytheWesternpowerstoestablishan anti-Soviet defense pact; when he defiantly stood up to the West andnationalized theSuezCanal in1956;andwhenhestayed inpowerfollowing“thetripartiteaggression”ofFrance,Britain,andIsrael.NasserstoodforArabunity,Arabsocialism,andanalliancewiththeSovietUnionintheColdWarastheassuredpathtomodernityandrenewedArabpower.However, Nasser was a false messiah and all collapsed in the Six DayWarofJune1967.Today,therearethosewhocompareHassanNasrallahwithAbdelNasserathispeak,yetthecomparisonisunfounded.NasrallahindeedenjoysextensivepublicsupportintheArabworld,assomeonewhostood up to Israel in a war and even inflicted substantial damage on the countryanditspopulation.YetNasrallahisnotpresidentofthelargestandmostpowerfulArabcountry,butleaderofoneethniccommunityinasmallandweakArabstatethatissupportedbyShiiteIran,withwhichmanyinthelargelySunniArabworlddonotidentifyatall.

Thecollapseofthepan-ArabunityofAbdelNasserleftanideologicalvacuum that was simultaneously filled by two contradictory processes: consolidationof the territorial stateandArabacceptanceof theexistingstate order versus a radical Islamic revival that is challenging theArabregimesandthestateorder.IntheconfrontationsbetweentheregimesandtheIslamicmovements,theArabregimeshavegenerallygainedtheupperhand.Yeteveniftheregimeshavesurvivedthischallenge,theyhavehad

The Regional Setting: Statehood vs. Anarchy I 177

lesssuccesswiththechallengesofmodernity andglobalization.ThegapsbetweentheircountriesandthecountriesoftheWesternworldcontinuedtogrow.UNreportsonthesocioeconomicstateofArabcountriesinrecentyearsdepictedapessimisticpictureof countrieswithahighpopulationgrowthratecomparedwiththeirrateofeconomicgrowth,andofcountriessubmergedinanongoingcrisis.Eventhesharpriseinoilpricesdidnothelp,andcertainlynotfortheArabcountriesthatarenotblessedwiththisnatural resource. In general, in recent decades, theArab countries haveweakened, and each has lost whatever hegemony or leadership it onceenjoyed.

Egyptofthepost-Nasserperiodhasbecomeincreasinglyinsular.Thisis reflected in the stable peace agreement with Israel and was highlighted afreshduringthe2006warinLebanon,whenPresidentMubarakexplicitlystated that Egypt did not intend to become involved in outside conflicts. Despite Egypt’s image as a leader in the Middle East, it is strugglingincreasinglytobridgethegapthatexistsbetweenimageandreality,andits ambition of yesteryear has faded significantly. Egypt is a relatively poor Third World country that is hard pressed to exert any influence on its neighbors.ThePalestiniansdonotgenerallyheedit,andFatahandHamasallowthemselvestoignoreCairo.ForsomeyearsgenocidehasbeentakingplaceintheDarfurregionofSudan.Egypthasnopartinit,anditdoesnothaveanyresponsibilityforeventstakingplacethere.Butthisalsoclearlyreflects Egypt’s new standing. Half a century ago, in the name of unity of theNileValley,EgyptclaimedSudanaspartofitsownsovereignterritory.Today, it does not have the ability, or interest, to exert influence in Sudan toputanendtothehorrorsunderwaythere.

SyriaunderBasharal-Asad isbutashadowof the regionalpower itoncewasduringtheheightofthereignofhisfather,Hafezal-Asad,whentheSovietUnionprovideditwithsuperpowerstrategicbacking.Syriaisisolated and surrounded by forces of the United States and its regionalallies,andwasalsorecentlyoustedfromLebanon.ItissupportedbyIranand enjoys significant military strength, but its army has to contend with problemsofmodernizationatatimethatthenationaleconomyisintatters.While in the past there was frequent discussion of rivalry between theSyrianandIraqiBaathregimesforhegemonyintheArabeast,todaythat

17� I Asher Susser

iscompletelyirrelevant.TheSyrianBaathisnolongersoimportant,evenwithinSyria,andtheIraqiBaathpartynolongerexistsatall.

IraqisunderAmericanoccupationandisinastateofchaos,possiblyon the brink of total disintegration. In the absence of figures like Saddam HusseinorHafezal-Asad,thereisadistinctleadershipvoidintheFertileCrescent.

SaudiArabiaisnotasrichasitoncewas,eventhoughoilpricesaresoaring,andthisisduetoaparticularlyhighpopulationgrowthrate.TheGNPinIsraelisfarhigherthaninSaudiArabia.Moreover,theSaudishaverecentlysufferedfrominsecurity,duetointernalterrorandalessintimaterelationshipwith theUnitedStates since the attackon theWorldTradeCenterinSeptember2001,inwhichmostoftheterroristswereofSaudinationality.

TheKingdomofJordan,whichwasneveraregionalpower,isindirestraits. It is under pressure from its western flank, due to the internal disorderinthePalestinianAuthorityandtheelectionstherethatbroughtHamastopowerinJanuary2006,whileontheeastthereisthechaosinIraq.ThesefactorscombinetoimbueJordanwithadeepsenseofconcernandhelplessness inviewof theseneighboringcentersof instability,andwithout having the ability to influence either.

The Relative Strengthening of the Non-Arab States

TheweakeningoftheArabstatesystemhasledtoarelativeincreaseininfluence on the regional agenda by the non-Arab countries, including outside players such as the United States and to a lesser degree theEuropean Union. The United States’ standing, diminished as long as itremainsentrenchedintheIraqimorass,clearlystillprojectstheimageandexerts the influence of a superpower.

Forthepurposesofthisanalysis,theparticularlyimportantnon-Arabcountries are Iran, Turkey, and Israel. These three countries shape theregional agenda more than all theArab states together. Iran’s increasedregional influence is evident and pervasive. The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which was the main obstacle to the increasing influence ofIran,anditsevolutionintoaShiite-dominatedcountry,haveaffordedIran the greatest level of influence in the Arab world it has ever had in the

The Regional Setting: Statehood vs. Anarchy I 17�

modernera.Themore theUnitedStatesbecomesenmeshedinIraqandthehighertheoilpricesclimb,themoreIranallowsitselftoconfronttheWest and Israel with increased confidence. This pattern is not significantly affectedbyIsrael’slimitedachievementsinthewarinLebanon.ItseemsthatIran’sdeterminationtocontinueworkingtowardsachievingnuclearweaponsandadvancingitshegemonicaspirationshasonlygrown.

Another non-Arab power that has achieved greater influence following theweakeningoftheArabcountriesisTurkey.TurkeyborderstheArabworldintheFertileCrescentasagiantcountrystretchingfromGreeceinthewestasfarasIranintheeast.ItcontrolsthewatersourcesofSyriaandIraqandhasthelargestandstrongestarmyintheMiddleEast.SinceNovember2002TurkeyhasbeencontrolledbyAKP(theJusticeandDevelopmentParty), a conservative Islamicparty that is increasingly interested in itsMuslimhinterlandintheMiddleEast.InrecentgenerationsTurkeyturneditsbackontheMiddleEastasitstrovetotakeitsplaceinEurope.NowitisrediscoveringtheMiddleEast,inpartduetodomesticpublicopinion,particularlythepublicthatbroughttherulingpartytopower.ThistrendisalsoreinforcedbythegrowingdisappointmentwithEurope,whichhasstymiedTurkey’sattemptstojointheEuropeanUnionwithendlessdelaytactics,andduetotensionwiththeUnitedStatesoverthefutureofIraq,where the continued development of the independence of the KurdishregioninnorthernIraqisnotatalltoTurkey’sliking.Itisnoexaggerationto say that Iran and Turkey have more influence over Syria and the future ofIraqthanalltheArabstatesandpossiblyeventheUnitedStates.

Third on this list of non-Arab regional powers is Israel. In military,technological,andeconomicterms,Israelisstillsuperiortoitsneighbors.Itisthoughttohaveanuclearcapability,andwhileithasapopulationlittlemorethan7million,Israel’spercapitaGNPishigherthanthepercapitaGNPofall itsneighborscombined(Egypt,Syria,Lebanon,Jordan,andthePalestinianAuthority),eventhoughtheneighboringcountrieshaveatotalpopulationofsome110millionpeople.Israel’spercapitaGNPisfarhigherthanthatofSaudiArabia,despitethelatter’soilreservesandtherecentunprecedentedhighpricesofoil.

1�0 I Asher Susser

The Rise of the Non-State Actors

Anothersideeffectof thedecline in theArabstates’power,besides therelative strengthening of the non-Arab countries, is the ascendance ofthenon-stateplayers.WhileArabcountrieshavedeterioratedintofailedstates,organizationssuchasal-Qaeda,Hamas,Hizbollah,andthegroupsrepresentedbyZarkawiandhisheirsinIraqhavegainedinstrength.ChaosinIraqhasreachedsuchproportionsthatthecountrymaybeonthebrinkofdisintegrationintoaKurdishstateinthenorth,aShiitestateinthesouth,andaSunnistatebetweentheminthecenter.ThedisintegrationofIraqmayhave destructive implications for the entire region. Jordan is concernedabout a flood of refugees from the poverty-stricken Sunni region (Iraqi oil reservesarelocatedintheKurdishnorthandShiitesouth);TurkeyfearssubversiveoperationsbyaKurdishstatewithintheKurdishcommunityineasternTurkey;andIranmaygainfromhavingasmallShiitestatethatwillbemoredependentonit thanafederativeArab-KurdishIraqistate.Hizbollah has established a pseudo state within a state in Lebanon thatwas already used to exert Iranian influence on the region, and the incipient PalestinianstateledbythefailingandcorruptPLOleadershiphasfallenintothehandsofHamas,onlytosinkdeeperintothechaosofalmosttotaldisintegration.

Changes in the Historic Balance of Power between Sunna and Shia

In the eastern part of theArab world, where the Baath regimes of IraqandSyria once competed for control overmostmatters, there is now aleadership void that is gradually being filled by Iranian influence to a degreethatisunprecedentedinthemodernera;itisbackedbyasenseofelevation and empowerment of all Shiites. The sense of self-confidence wasevident in the arrogantdeportment and speechof IranianpresidentAhmadinejadaswellasHassanNasrallah,at leastuntil theoutbreakoftheSecondLebanonWar,whoseintensity,scale,anddegreeofdestructiontookNasrallahbysurprise.AfterhundredsofyearssincethebeginningofIslam,inwhichtheShiiteswere“thedowntroddenoftheworld”whosehonorwastrampledbytheSunnis,theShiitesbecamethecontrollinggroupin Iraq, the first Arab country under Shiite control. Over the past decades

The Regional Setting: Statehood vs. Anarchy I 1�1

they have become the largest group in Lebanon, accounting for around40 percent of the population, long outstripping the Maronite and SunnicommunitiesthatwerethelargestgroupswhentheLebaneserepublicwasestablishedin1920.TheShiitemajorityinBahrainisalsoencouragedbydevelopments in Iraq,asare theShiiteminorities in theeastern regionsofSaudiArabia,wherethekingdom’smajoroilreservesarelocated.TheconcernsoftheSunniArabsoverthischangearecleartoall.

King Abdullah of Jordan defined the situation correctly back in late 2004 when he expressed his anxiety over the influence of “the Shiite crescent.”ThiswasfollowedinApril2006whenEgyptianpresidentHusniMubaraksuggestedthatmostShiiteArabsaremoreloyaltoIranthanthecountriesinwhichtheylive(and,insodoing,unwittinglycastdoubtonthecohesivenessoftheheterogeneousArabcountries).ThisShiitecrescentstretchesfromTehranthroughIraqasfarasLebanonandbeyondtothePalestinian Authority. Iran’s influence extends as far as the West Bank and Gaza where Iran and Hizbollah have operational and financial links with variousPalestinianorganizations,includingFatah,Hamas,andofcourse,IslamicJihad.

IrrespectiveofIraqandratherasaresultofthedemographicandpoliticalchangesinLebanoninthelasttwogenerations,thepositionoftheLebaneseShiite community has strengthened significantly. The largest sector in Lebanon, theShiiteswillundoubtedlybecomeamajority in thenot toodistantfuture.TheyweresupportedbythemilitantHizbollahorganization,whichgavethemadistinctadvantageoveralltheothercommunitiesthatdisarmedinaccordancewiththeTa’ifagreementin1989.Iran,withSyria’sbacking,helpedtheorganizationbuildasortofIranian“externaloutpost”toposeathreattoIsraelanddeteritwiththousandsofrocketsaimedatIsrael,fromthenorthtoasfarasTelAvivandevenfurthersouth.Iranianpatronage, demonstrated over the years by political, military, and financial aidchanneledthroughSyria,madeHizbollahavirtualstatewithinastate.This“state”notonlysportedimpressivemilitarymightbutalsoboastedanolessimpressivesocialwelfaresystemfortheShiitesinLebanon,whoseadulationprovidedHizbollahwithastrongbaseofpublicsupport.ThiswasofcrucialimportancetoenableittocontinuefortifyingitspowerbaseintheLebanesearena.


ForIranandSyria,thearmingofHizbollahanditsincreaseinpowerbolsteredtheirlineofdefense(oroffense)againstIsrael.AseniorIranianofficial said that Hizbollah was one of Iran’s “strategic security pillars.” TheShiitecrescent thusbecameaclear indicationof theerrormadebythosewhoclaimedthatIsraelhadonlywhattogainfromAmerica’swarinIraq.MajorSunniMuslimArabcountries,likeEgypt,SaudiArabia,andJordan,whicharealsoconcernedbythestrengtheningofIranandthenon-stateplayers,haveacommoninterestwithIsraeltoblocktheprogressoftheShiitecrescentandevensetitback.IsraelcertainlyexpectstheseArabcountriestodisplaydeterminationintheirbackingforLebanesepoliticalforcesrepresentedbySiniora’sgovernmentandthenon-ShiitecommunitiestocontainandrestrictthepowerofHizbollahanditssupportersinIranandSyria.

TherelativeweaknessoftheArabstatesystem,thespreadingofradicalIslam, and the strengthening of primordial sub-state groups not onlyunderminethecohesivenessofsomeArabcountries;theyalsoimpactonthe nature of inter-Arab relations. If in the past relations betweenArabstatesweredeterminedbydynasticlines(duringtheeraofmonarchies),then“progressive”andpro-Soviet republicanregimes thatopposedpro-Western “reactionary” monarchies (during the period of the Free Officers Revolution and the Cold War), today inter-state relations have becomemoreprimordialandethnic-based:SunnisversusShiitesandArabsversusnon-Arabs.

A Change in Perception of Core and Periphery

Giventhesenewparameters, theolddivisionofcenterandperipheryintheMiddleEast requires reexamination.TheArabSunnicore,ofwhichEgypt servedas thegeopoliticalepicenter, is increasinglybecoming theperiphery compared with the periphery of Iran and Turkey of the past,whicharenowturningintothegeopoliticalcoreoftheMiddleEast.Thisisrelevantparticularlywithregardtotheshiftof thecoretotheeasttoanon-Araband/ornon-Sunniepicenter inIranandinthenewIraqthat issubject increasingly to Iranian influence, like the entire Gulf region. The Gulfis,afterall,the“PersianGulf”andnotthe“ArabGulf,”astheSunniArabswouldprefertoseeit.


Challenges for Israel

In this new Middle East it is no longer the conventional ground forcesoftheregularArabarmiesthatposethemostimmediatethreattoIsrael.TherangeofthreatstoIsraelisdangerousandworrisome,butthesearenot the familiar threats that focused on the overall conventional Arabmilitary force, which has weakened in recent years. Largely due to theweaknessof theArabsystem, the traditional threatshavebeen replacedby extra-conventional threats: the sub-conventional warfare of the non-state players; the non-conventional arms race; and the ramifications of the unconventionalproblemofdemographics.

• The sub-conventional warfare of terror, guerilla activities, and warbased on rocket and missile fire from the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon,usedbynon-stateplayerssuchasHamasandHizbollah,isdifficult to overcome.

• TheIraniannuclearthreat,togetherwithitsregionalhegemonicdesign,posesanexplicitthreattoIsrael.

• The undermining of the cohesion of someArab states may lead tochaosintheFertileCrescent,resultingfromtheerosionoftheinternalunityofheterogeneoussocietiesincountriessuchasIraq,Syria,andLebanon.InthecaseofIraqthisisnolongeranassessment,butalreadyafact.

• Demographicconcernsexistontwolevels:thedomesticlevel,anissuetowhichIsraelmustrelateinordertomaintainitsidentityasthestateoftheJewishpeople;andtheregionallevel,whereitisclearthattheMiddleEastcannotsustainallofitspopulationovertimeandmillionswill continue to migrate to Europe and change its image, a processalreadyunderway.

• Israel’sinternationallegitimacyisbeingundermined.Intoday’sreality,whetherwe like itornot, it is thecountriesofWesternEurope thatdetermine the contours of international legitimacy. As an occupier,Israeldoesnotmeettheirpolitical-moralcriteria.Thus,thecontinuationofthestatusquonotonlytipsthedemographicbalanceagainstIsraelbutalsoerodesitslegitimacyasanacceptablememberofthefamilyofenlightenednations.


In Israel there is a propensity to focuson each issue separately, andgovernments tend toshift theirattentionaccording to thecircumstancesatanygiven time– itcanbeSyria, thePalestinians,Hizbollah,or Iran.One of the apparent lessons from the Second LebanonWar is that thisapproachdoesnotmeettheneedsofthedynamicreality,andresourcesandconsideration shouldbegiven simultaneously to all challenges,withouteverignoringanyoneofthem.

Ramifications of the War: Interim Assessment

Thewardidnot shape thegeneral regionalpatternsdescribedaboveorthe challenges that face Israel. To a great extent the war reflected and heightened awareness of them, across the Middle East and beyond.TherenowseemstobegreaterinternalLebanese,Arab,andinternationaldeterminationtoadoptpoliciesdesignedtoblock Iranian influence in the ShiitecrescentandtocontainHizbollah.ThedeploymentoftheLebanesearmy in the south of the country with an international force as supportisa goodindicationofthisnewphenomenon.Thiscomestogetherwithdomestic Lebanesepoliticaltrendswherebythenon-ShiiteforcesaretryingtopreventHizbollahfromrestoringtheprevioussituation,whichreadilysacrifices Lebanon on the altars of Iranian, Syrian, and Hizbollah interests. Thequestioniswhetherthisisatransientorsustainablephenomenonthatcanwithstandtheconstantpressure appliedbyIran,Syria,andHizbollah.Fornow, at least,Hizbollah is being contained inmilitary andpoliticaltermsandIran’s“externaloutpost”hasbeeneroded,afteritwasexposedprematurely and with limited efficiency. On the other hand, the position of the international community – with the possible exception of theUnitedStates–isstilloneofindecisionwithregardtoIrananditsnuclearprogram,whatwasalreadyapparentbeforethewar.Onemayassumethatthe limited success of Israel’s military operation will not suffice to bolster thedeterminationof the international community to actdirectly againstIran,throughsanctionsorinanyotherway.

Lebanonhasbecomeatestcaseintheconfrontationbetweentherivalcamps in thenewMiddleEast,with theSunniArabcountries–Egypt,Jordan,andSaudiArabia–seekingtostabilizethestateorderandtoblockIran,theShiites,andthenon-stateplayersthatareupsettingthebalance


ofpower. Inpractice, Israelbelongs to the formercampandso, for thefirst time, Israel has become a member of one of the rival camps in the region and is not excluded based solely on the old definition of Israel as an outsider,analienforcethatdoesnotbelongtoanyoftherivalblocswithintheArabMiddleEast.

Lebanonitselfisatanhistoricalcrossroads.SinceitscreationLebanonhasstruggledwithitsidentity,betweentheArabandWesternworlds,intermsofLebanonasamostlyChristiancountrywithclosetiestoFrance,oracountryinwhichtheMaronitesandSunnis,astheleadingcommunitiesshared, a commongoalofnational stability as apart of theArab–notWestern–world.ThisissuewassettledlongagowiththedeclineofFranceandtheMaronites,andLebanonbecameafoundingmemberoftheArabLeagueandanArabcountryineveryrespect.NowthequestioniswhetherLebanonwillremainanintegralpartoftheArabworld,asthenon-ShiitecommunitiesinLebanon(Sunnis,MaronitesandotherChristians,andtheDruze)wish,orwillthepoweroftheShiites,whoarebyfarthelargestcommunityandwillbecomethemajorityintheforeseeablefuture,dragthecountrytowardsIranandintotheShiitecrescent?IsraelandtheSunniArabsnowhaveacommoninteresttomaintainArabLebanesesovereigntyand weaken the Hizbollah state-within-a-state in Lebanon, and to see adecline in Hizbollah’s capacity to erode Lebanon’s sovereignty in theserviceoftheinterestsofIranandSyria.

ThelessonslearnedbySyriaandthePalestiniansfromthewararenotclearcut,andstemfromthecomplexassessmentofIsraelideterrenceafterthewar.Both inSyriaandamong thePalestinians thereare thosewho,followingthewar,speakhighlyofthemeritsofwaginganon-conventionalstruggle, like theone carriedout byHizbollah.The advantageof usingrockets and missiles is obvious and they must therefore be acquired atall cost, and the more the better, for effective war to be waged againstIsrael.However,throughouttheArabworldtherewasalivelydebateandmultifacetedanalysisofthewaranditsresults.Alongsidethosewhosawjust the benefits of using missiles and rockets and consider them the wave ofthefuture,othersarguedthatHizbollahwasdefeatedinanirresponsiblewar. Now is the time to contain and constrain Hizbollah within theLebanesepoliticalcentertopreventtherepeateddestructionofLebanonthroughanotherescapadeonbehalfof IranandSyriaat theexpenseof


LebanonandthemajorityoftheArabs.ThefailuresoftheIDF’soperationnotwithstanding, the mass destruction that resulted from the effectiveuseofIsraeliairpowerwasevidenttoall,aswasthefactthatduringthewar, there were hostilities in Gaza that inflicted very heavy losses on the PalestiniansatverylittlecosttotheIDF.

All these influence Syria’s continued restraint, at least thus far, despite aggressive statementsmade immediatelyafter thewar.ThePalestiniansare, on the one hand, encouraged by the fighting success of Hizbollah –whichiswhythey arelookingtochangetheirowntacticsaccordingly(more rockets, anti-tank missiles, and subterranean fortifications) in order tocontinuetheirstruggleagainstIsrael.Ontheotherhand,thereisthepricepaidbyLebanon,evaluatednotonlyintermsoftheenormousdestructionsustainedbytheciviliannationalinfrastructure,unprecedentedinanyofIsrael’swars,butalso theveryextensiveproblemof refugees,althoughtemporaryinLebanon’scase.ItishardtobelievethatthePalestinianshavemissedthispoint.

Thus,theycanalsodrawtheconclusionthatrestraintmightbeinorder.The Palestinians noted Hizbollah’s relative efficiency resulting from the disciplined and unified organization of the Shiites in Lebanon, which contrastssharplywiththeirowntotalchaos.Thismayencouragerenewedeffortstoestablishanationalunitygovernmentthatwillworktorestorelaw and order and return to the ceasefire agreement (tahdiya),andpossiblyeventoengageindialoguewithIsrael,andnotjustontheissueofprisonerexchange.

Israelhasavestedinterest inthe“stateness”ofitsneighbors,forthesake of stability, security, and the obstruction of the non-state actors,whoseek towreakhavoc.This isas relevant toLebanonas it is to thePalestinianAuthority,bothintheinterestsofaregionalsettlementandthepreservationofIsraelasthestateoftheJewishpeople,intermsofsecurityanddemography.Thestate-likenatureof theneighborhood, inLebanonandinaPalestinianstate,istheonlyalternativetoanarchy,whichishardlyinIsrael’sbestinterests.

Chapter 14

The Regional Implications of the War in Lebanon: From Radicalism to Reform

Yossi Kuperwasser

Fromamilitarystandpoint,theSecondLebanonWarfocusedonexchangesof fire between Hizbollah and Israel. The war’s political, strategic, ideological,andphilosophicaldimensions,bothinLebanonandthroughoutthe region, were naturally influenced by events on the battlefield, but went farbeyondthem.Thosewhoinitiatedthewaressentiallyhopedtoimpacton these dimensions through the military factor, which subsequentlyassumed greater importance in and of itself, particularly in the internalIsraelicontext.

For some years, Lebanon has served as a microcosm of sorts of theregionaltheater,inwhichtheregionalcampscompetewitheachotherviatheirproxiesinthehopeofgainingpoliticalstrengthandvalidatingtheirrespective ideological and philosophical approaches. This experimentalground generally favored the radical camp, which channeled all itsresourcesdirectlyintothearenaandmanagedtoturnLebanonintoamodelfor forcing “the Zionist enemy” and theWest to withdraw.The radicalcamp’s stubborn fighting cleverly exploited the absence of an authoritative centralgovernmentand thedecline in theWest’swillingness to toleratecasualtiesinwarforthesakeofitssecurityandvalues.OneoftheregionalimplicationsoftheIDF’swithdrawalfromLebanoninMay2000wasthePalestinian terror campaign against Israel, which erupted a few monthslater and flourished at the expense of the pragmatic sector of the Palestinian campwhilemarginalizingthereformistelements.Itisunclearhowmuchthesedevelopments also encouragedglobal jihad forces that planned to

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carryoutlargescaleandprominentterrorattacks,andhowmuch,togetherwiththelessonslearnedfromotherwars,theyimpactedontheopponentsoftheAmericancampaigninIraq.

However, in something of a dialectic process, the IDF’s withdrawalfromLebanonalsobecameacatalystforanattemptbythereformiststreamtoturnLebanonintoameansofadvancingitsphilosophies.Theprincipalagent here was the reformists’ political representative, Rafiq al-Hariri, who wasencouragedtoshapeLebanonintoastatethathasthesoleauthorityfortheuseofforcewithinitsborders,andtofocusonimprovingthewelfareofLebanon’scitizens rather thanonaviolent strugglewith theWest torestorelostIslamicpride.Thisattempt,whoseclimaxwasSecurityCouncilresolution1559,naturallyledtoheightenedtensionbetweenthecampsinLebanon thatpeakedwith theassassinationofHariri inFebruary2005.Theassassinationhighlightedboththepotentialforchangeandthedepthof commitment of both camps to fight for their philosophies, as reflected in thelargedemonstrationsthatfollowed.TheattemptbyHariri’ssuccessorsinLebanon,withaid from theUnitedStates,France,SaudiArabia,andotherparties,tofurthertheworkoftheslainprimeministerwaspartiallysuccessful, evidencedmainlyby thewithdrawalofSyria fromLebanonandtheincreasedpressureonHizbollahtodisarm.

ThispressurewasthefactorthatimpelledHizbollahtodecidetokidnapIsraeli soldiers, regardless of the consequences. Nasrallah assumed thatthiswouldenablehimtodemonstratetheimportanceofhisorganizationinadvancing Lebanon’s national aims, as he defined them, and to prove once againthevalidityofhissecurityethos,wherebyIsraelcouldnotrespondforcefully against Lebanon to a serious provocation carried out againstit,bothbecauseLebanonisnotresponsiblefortheuseofforcefromitsterritoryandbecauseIsraelwouldnotdareexerciseitspowerinresponseandendanger its soldiersandcitizens.Some timeearlier,NasrallahhadabandonedthespiderwebimagehehadonceattributedtoIsraelisociety,butheseemedtoprefertoignorethisrevisionismwhenissuinganordertocarryoutthekidnapping.

Thekidnapping,whichtookplaceshortlyafterthesoldierGiladShalitwaskidnappedbyHamasfrominsideIsraelnear theGazaStripborder,and Israel’s strong response and pronouncements about its intention todefeatHizbollahledtoasituationinwhichthewarinLebanonaroused

Regional Implications: From Radicalism to Reform I 1��

expectationsonbothsidesof“abigbang,”inotherwords,ofaformativeeventthatwouldchangetheessenceofthecomplexandundecidedreality.IntheUnitedStates,inthereformistcampinLebanon,andevenamongreformistelements inotherArabcountries, a long-heldhope reemergedthat Israelwoulddo thework for themandwould strikeHizbollahandthosebehindit.TherewasasenseofdisappointmentwhenIsraeldecidednottobroadenthecampaigntoincludeSyria.

Inpractice, thewar’s regional impact is still largelyunclearbecauseeach side magnifies different aspects of the events and interprets them in itsownway inorder toadvance itsobjectives.Thereformists,with thesupportoftheUSadministrationandIsrael,correctlynotetheinternationalcommunity’s efforts to use the war to generate a greater possibility ofturning Lebanon into a responsible country, as indicated by SecurityCouncil resolution 1701. They also point to the enormous damage inflicted onLebanonfollowingthekidnappingasevidenceofandleveragefortheneed for reform. The radicals, led by Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah, flaunt their success in thwarting the intention todestroyHizbollahand inupsettingIsrael’s confidence in its military strength as another achievement in their listofvictoriesovertheWest.Thepragmaticelements,ledbyEgyptandSaudiArabia,withthesupportofheadsofEuropeanstates,includingtheprime minister of Britain at the time, fear actual reforms.At the sametime, they are concerned over the threat of the radical elements and find proofinthewaroftheirbeliefthatneithersideisabletodefeattheother.Continuationofthestrugglebetweenthesidesendangersthestabilityoftheregion,whichintheviewofthepragmatistsisessentialtotheirsurvival.Theconclusiontheydrawisthatinordertominimizethedamageofthewar and reap benefit from its results, such as the erosion of Israel’s image ofstrength,theillusionofstabilityshouldbeenhancedthroughfamiliarmeans, inotherwords,byrenewing thepoliticalprocessbetweenIsraelandPalestiniansregardlessoftheactualstatusofthisconfrontationarena.

Thus, analysis of the regional significances of the war requires the distinctionusedbyAhadHa’aminhisessayonMosesonthedifferencebetweenhistoryandarcheology,inotherwords,whatactuallytookplaceinthewaris lessimportant thanhowitwillberecordedintheregionalhistoricalmemory.AnanalysisoftheeventsofJuly-August2006revealscontrastingcomponentsthattogether,albeitwithmuchdisarray,comprise

1�0 I Yossi Kuperwasser

thewholeofwhatuntilnowhasemergedastheregionalhistoricmemoryof the war. Despite Nasrallah’s repeated attempts to claim that the USpresidentand theBritishprimeminister–andnothe,Nasrallah–wereresponsible,andthatIsraelinanycaseplannedtodeclarewarinOctober2006,theinternationalhistoricalmemoryhasacceptedthebeliefthattheinitiativeforthewarcamefromNasrallah.Thiscomponentofthememoryisnotonlyimportantintermsofapportioningblame,butitalsohasafarwider significance as it makes it hard for the radicals to resort to the mantra thatliesatthecoreoftheirphilosophy,accordingtowhichthedirestraitsofMiddleEastresidentsaretheresultofadastardlyplotdevisedbytheWest,ledbytheUSandIsrael.

ItisnotjustblamethathasbeenassignedtoNasrallah;itisalsohardforhimtoshakeoffanotherimportantfactorofthehistoricalmemoryofthewar,namely,thathisinitiativewasdesignedtoserveforeigninterests,specifically of Syria and Iran. In this context, the regional historical memory hasalsorecordedthemassiveIranianandSyrianmilitaryaidtoHizbollahand the ease and consistency with which Hizbollah fighters, under Iran’s guidance, used military force to strike systematically at civilians. Theregional significance of this memory may accentuate the Iranian threat in theeyesofthereformistandpragmaticelements,andmaypositionitastheprincipalregionalthreat.Indeed,itispossiblethattheirperceptionofthethreatwillpromptgreaterwillingnesstohelprestraintheIranianregime’saspirationsofhegemonyandpower,althoughitdoesnotappearthattheseelements will extend themselves sufficiently to achieve significant results.

Withregardtotheregionalbalanceofdeterrence,thewarerodedthedeterrence image of all those that participated, directly and indirectly,although it appears that in the wider sense Israel’s deterrence imagesuffered the most. Several axioms have been etched in the regionalhistorical memory regarding the image of Israeli power, first and foremost thatIsrael’sabilitytoemployitsmilitarystrengthhaslessened,particularlyinthecontextofitswarwithanorganizationoperatingatalowsignaturelevel (a guerilla force fighting from subterranean fortifications and using rocket fire). On the other hand, the IDF’s airpower and intelligence abilitiesweredemonstratedclearly,aswasIsrael’swillingnesstouseitsforce,andIsrael’s imageasastate thatexercises itsmilitarystrengthindisproportionately large measures was enhanced. Nasrallah’s statement

Regional Implications: From Radicalism to Reform I 1�1

thathewouldnothavecarriedoutthekidnappinghadheknownthatIsraelwouldrespondinthewayitdidshowsthatevenanorganizationsuchasHizbollahcanbedeterred.ThewaralsoclearlydemonstratedthelevelofAmericanadministrationsupportforIsrael.

Thedeterrencelevelof theradicalelementswas likewise tested,andwasdamagedbyIsrael’swillingnesstoabsorbtherocketbarrageslaunchedbyHizbollahandalsobythefactthattheextentofdamagecausedbythethousands of rockets fired (around 4,000 according to Israel, 8,000 according toNasrallah)wasfarsmallerthanonemighthaveexpected.Moreover,thedamage to Lebanon resulting from the Nasrallah-led “escapade” etchedintheLebaneseandregionalmemorytheunderstandingthatusingforceagainstIsraelcanincurahighpriceandthusHizbollahshouldnotresorttoweaponslightly.Inthisway,theabilityoftheradicalcamptomustertheLebanesearenainfuturecontexts,suchasanescalationontheIraniannuclearissue,hasweakened.

On the other hand, Hizbollah emerged as an organization that didnot shrink from fighting a superior military force and even to a degree successfullyresistedit.Overall,thiscomponentappearstobethedominantamong the balance of deterrence factors. It clearly reflects the basic asymmetrybetweentheelementsintheWestthatarerequiredtodefeattheenemyinordertoachievevictory,andtheradicalparties–particularlythenon-stateentities–thatonlyhavetosurvivetoclaimvictory.Thisfactorisexploitedbytheradicalsinordertoimpactonthepoliticalmoodacrosstheregionandtogaincredencefortheirphilosophy,whichcontendsthatonly through sacrifice and willingness to suffer can the inhabitants of the MiddleEastbothquash theirenemies thatare trying toperpetuate theirdistressandregaintheirrespect.Onthisbasis,SyriaeventoyedwiththeideaofheatinguptheborderontheGolanHeightsthroughlowsignaturewarfare, although this does not appear to reflect any real intention in view ofitsawarenessofIsrael’sstrength,whichismorerelevantinthecontextofanorganizedstatewitharegulararmy.

The ceasefire and the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon did not end the strugglebetweentheregion’scampsregardingthewar.Instead,thefocusshifted from the battlefield to the implementation of resolution 1701 and the internaldevelopmentsinLebanon.Thestrictrealizationoftheresolutionwould indicate a considerable achievement for the reformist camp. It


wouldwrest thecontrolofLebanon from the radicals that theyhithertoenjoyed due to the absence of state responsibility; through their power,Lebanon became a base for terror and training personnel as part of thestruggleagainsttheWestanditsregionalproxies.Resolution1701wouldenablethereformiststodemonstrateanalternativemodeltothesufferingandongoingstruggleinthepursuitofhonorprofferedbytheradicals.Thismodel focuses on enabling inhabitants of the region to seek fulfillment by developingtheirabilitiesandtakingresponsibilityfortheirfate.

To the radical elements, the risk inherent in the Security Councilresolutionissubstantial,andpossiblyamatterofsurvival.Assuch,theyaredeterminedtopreventtheresolution’simplementationatalmostallcosts.Ontheotherhand,theforcesthatsupportthereformistsexhaustedthemselvestryingtoachievetheSecurityCouncilresolution,andthoughinterestedinitseffectiveimplementation,theydidnotattachtoitsimplementationthesamelevelofimportancethattheradicalshaveattachedtoitsobstruction.Thusthemannerinwhichthewarwillultimatelyimpactontheregionalbalanceofpowerisyetemerging,andthesupportersofreforminLebanonand the region – including Israel and the US – can still influence the end result.

The war accentuated the crucial role of weak and weakened statesin the formation of the regional system. Lebanon, and particularly theareas controlled by Hizbollah, is just one example of this reality. Evenif each case has its particular attributes, the Palestinian Authority, theSinai Peninsula in Egypt, large parts of Iraq, parts ofYemen, and in awider sense, certain parts of Pakistan andAfghanistan are similar. Thecommondenominatorofalltheseareas,thelackofcontrolofthecentralgovernment,isnotonlyaresultoftheweaknessofthegovernment.Itisalso to a great extent an expression of the radicals’ interest to promotethelackofcentralresponsibilityasapoliticalalternativetotheWesternapproach.ThisisanadditionalcomponentoftheefforttoturntheWesternconceptofaccountability–whichwasdesigned,accordingtotheradicalview, to perpetuate Western control of the Muslims’ deprivation – intoa tool that specifically serves the radicals as a means of advancing their ultimategoal,achangeinworldorder.

Theexistingworldorderrestsonthelogicthateveryplaceissubjecttothefullandsovereigncontrolofsomenationalentity,which,basedonits


sovereignty,isexclusivelyresponsiblefortheeventsthattakeplacewithinitsterritoryandinparticularfortheuseofforcewithinitsborders–andinastatecontext,outsideaswell.Whenradicalelementsupsetthislogic,theyareableontheonehandtoexploitthelackofstatecontrolinordertobuildupaforcethatactsagainsttheWesternrulesofwarfare–inotherwords,employ terror against citizens – and on the other hand, to benefit from the West’scommitmenttostatelogictopreventmassiveforcefulinterventionagainstthembyWesternforces,aslongasthey(theradicals)donotgotoofar.Thus,theUnitedStatesdidnotemploymassiveforceagainstal-QaedabasesinAfghanistanbetween1998and2001,despitethefactthatitwasclearthattheorganizationusedtheareatoprepareterrorattacksagainstAmerican targets. Israel toodidnotcarryoutanextensivecampaign inGazaanddidnotact intheareasthatwereunderthefullcontrolof thePalestinianAuthority(AreaA)fromthestartoftheconfrontationwiththePalestiniansinSeptember2000untilearly2002.

Theradicalcamp,headedbySyriaandIran,isdeterminedtomaintainand develop this reality, and has succeeded in doing so even in placeswhere thegovernment is already in thehandsof radicals.Thiswas thesituation in Lebanon when it was fully controlled by Syria, and thiswasthesituationintheGazaStripwhenHamaswasingovernmentbutpresenteditselfasnotfullyresponsiblefortheactsofterror,evenwhensuch acts were performed by its own terror branch, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Battalions. This achievement was largely possible due to theimpressive success of the radical parties in inculcating the terminologythat they imprintedon the regional political culture.The recognitionofterrorasnationalorIslamicresistance,andthefulladoptionoftheconceptoflackofresponsibilityanddenialbythepragmaticforcesasameansofevadingtheneedtoactagainstterrorprovidedacomfortablebasisforthedevelopmentofareasofnon-accountability.Thus,AbuMazenpreferredto deny the responsibility of Islamic Jihad for a series of suicide terrorattacks carried out by the organization during 2005, in order to avoidhavingtoconfronttheorganization,eventhoughhewasabletodothis.ThePalestiniansalsodidnotacttoarrestthekillersoftheAmericandiplomatsinOctober2004,eventhoughalmostallPalestinianpartiescondemnedtheact.LikewiseEgyptdidnottakedecisiveactiontopreventthesmugglingofweaponsfromtheSinaiPeninsulatotheGazaStripandevenmaintains


ongoingpoliticaldialoguewithHamas,whichhasmanagedthisextensivesmugglingoperation.

TheWest–EuropeinparticularthoughinnosmallmeasuretheUnitedStates and Israel as well – shares considerable responsibility for thedevelopmentof thissituation.ToleranceofMiddleEasternregimes thatgenerate this reality is tantamount tobeingapartner incrime.Notonlydoes this tolerance, which reflects a naive belief that apparent stability will preventempowermentoftheradicalstream,makeiteasierfortheregimestoadheretoapolicyofdenialanddoesnotprovidethemwithgroundsandstrengthtochangethesituation;italsoprovidesevidencefortheprincipalradicalargumentswherebythehollowWesthaslostfaithinitsvaluesandis not willing to fight for them. Unfortunately for the West, the war in Iraq hasturnedintoatestcasethatinsteadofencouragingtheWesttodealwithsuchproblemsasitdidinAfghanistan,infactsharpenedthereluctanceofelementsintheWesttocontendwiththeproblem.

Israel’sreactionstothekidnappingsofShalitontheGazaStripborderandGoldwasserandRegevontheLebaneseborderweredesignedtotransmitamessage that as far as Israel is concerned, the situationhad escalatedoutof control and Israeldidnot intend toaccept the furthercultivationof theideaofnon-accountabilityandthepresenceofuncontrolledareasalongitsborders.Itappearedthatthemessagewasreceivedfollowingtheheavy casualties of the Palestinians and the heavy damage in Lebanon,particularlyofHizbollah.However,Israelwasalsoperceivedtobehesitantinallaspectsofusinggroundforcestogeneratefundamentalchangeofthesituationandasaresult,itwasviewedasonceagainleavingtheproblemtothelocalregimesandtheinternationalcommunity.Onecanassumethataslongasthereisnochangeinthepoliticalcultureandtheterminologyusedintheregionalpoliticaldialogue,andaslongastheWestdesistsfromdiscouraging such change through its actions, the radical elements willcontinue benefiting from the existence of areas that are not subject to state controlandaccountability.

In thiscontext it is interesting toexamine theapproachpresentedbyRichard Haass in his article on the end of the era of American influence in theMiddleEast.1Thequestionis:didsuchaneraeverexist?InpracticetherewasanattemptbytheUnitedStatestoexploitthefalloftheSovietUnionandthe1991GulfWartoestablishanewrealityintheregionthrougha


peaceprocessandapolicyofdualcontainment.However,thisattemptdidnottakeholdintheregionatanystage:peaceremainedadistantprospectanddidnotincorporateacceptanceofIsrael’srighttoexistorrejectionofterror.Irancontinueditsprocessofempowermentandtheprincipalcurrentthatgarneredstrength in theMiddleEastduring thisperiodwas radicalIslam, which genuinely reflected the feelings of deprivation, jealousy, frustration, and hatred of much of the Middle East towards the UnitedStates.Thetruefeatureof theperiodis thestrugglebetweentheradicalstreamandthereformiststream,whichincludesthepragmaticelements.The war in Lebanon and the war in Iraq reflect the advantages of the radical elements resulting from their willingness to suffer and sacrifice more than the reformists and their supporters in the West. On the other hand, thesituationhasyettobedecided,andasithasbeendevelopingdialecticallythroughout,oneshouldwaittoseehowthereformistsandtheWestreacttothechallengesoftheradicals,includingthecontinuedkillingsinIraq,theassassinationofseniormembersoftheLebanesereformistcampandtherearmamentofHizbollah,ongoingPalestinianterrorintheGazaStrip,thecontinuednuclearizationofIran,andpossiblyanothermega-terrorattackbyal-Qaeda.

Note1. RichardN.Haass,“TheNewMiddleEast,”Foreign Affairs85,no.6(2006):2-11.

Chapter 15

The Impact of the War on Arab Security Concepts

Ephraim Kam

The Arab street has for the most part heralded the results of the fighting inLebanonasaHizbollahvictory.TheprevalentArabnarrativeisthatforseveral weeks a small military organization with a few thousand fighters, without an air force or tanks, displayed determination and the abilityto realize itspotential,and thuswithstood themightof thearmythat isconsideredtobethestrongestintheMiddleEast.ItmaybeassumedthattheArab defense establishments and other regional elements examinedthe progress and results of the fighting, and scrutinized the strengths andweaknesses shownby IsraelandHizbollah. It isnotyetclearwhatconclusionstheyhavedrawn,andwhethertheconfrontationinLebanonwillimpactonArabsecurityconceptsandifso,how.Certainly,theprocessof internalizing the significance of the war in Lebanon by the Arab security systems and translating this into specific practical results – if this occurs at all–willtaketime.

This essay aims to consider how the results of the fighting in Lebanon may ultimately influence Arab security concepts. In the absence of actualdataonanylearningprocessontheArabside,theanalysis,basedon theknowncomponentsofArab security thinking, attempts to assesshow the Arab approach may change in the wake of the fighting. What follows, therefore, isa reviewof theoverall impactof thewaronArabsecurity thinking, followed by a look at the security approach of statesandorganizations thathavehostile relationswith Israelandaredirectlyaffected by Israel’s military strength and behavior: Syria, Iran, and thePalestinianorganizations.Naturally,themoreinformationisgleanedonthe

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conclusionsdrawnbytheArabsandtheIraniansfromthewarinLebanon,themoreitwillbepossibletoreexaminethisanalysis.

The Principles of the Arab Security Concepts

WithregardtoIsrael,thecurrentArabsecurityconceptshavecrystallizedprimarilysincetheseventiesbasedonthemaindevelopmentsintheArab-Israeliarena: theSixDayWar, theYomKippurWar, the1982LebanonWar, thecollapseof theArabcoalitionagainst Israel, thesigningof thepeace accords between Egypt and Israel and Jordan and Israel, and thetwo violent clashes between the Palestinians and Israel. At the sametime,regionalandglobaldevelopmentscontributedtotheirformulation,particularlythetransitionofthelocusofinstabilityintheMiddleEastfromthe Arab-Israeli conflict to the Gulf area, reflected by the Iraq-Iran War, the GulfWar,andthe2003IraqWar;theeconomiccrisisintheArabworldthatbeganinthemid-eighties;thecollapseoftheSovietUnion;andtheemergenceoftheUnitedStatesasthelonesuperpower.

Fromthesedevelopments,mostArabstatesdrewanumberofprincipalconclusionsvis-à-vis Israel.First, Israelhasoverallstrategicsuperiorityover the Arab states and as such, the Arab armies are unable, in theforeseeable future, to defeat it on the battlefield and destroy it as a political entity.ThisconclusionderivesfromtheassumptionthatIsraelismilitarilystrongerthaneachindividualArabstateandapparentlythananentireArabmilitarycoalitionaswell(whichinanyeventtheArabshavebeenincapableofmobilizingeffectively).ThecentralfactorsinIsrael’ssuperiorityareitsaerialstrength,itsqualityintelligence,itsabilitytooperatelargegroundformations, its advantage in the field of precision arms, its command and controlsystems,anditsextendedreach.TheArabsappeartobelievethatdespitetheadvancesinqualitymadeinsomeArabarmiesinthelasttwodecades,particularly in theEgyptianarmy, thediscrepancybetween theIDFandtheArabarmieshasincreasedfurtherinIsrael’sfavor.

Second, Israel’s strategic superiority results from the confluence of several factors: on the one hand, Israel’s ability to develop and utilizeitshumanresourcesandharnessthemforitsdefenseneeds;itsabilitytoobtainadvancedmilitarytechnologiesandweaponsystems–somefromAmericanandWesternsources,andsomeself-developed;anditsability

The Impact of the War on Arab Security Concepts I 1��

to formulate and adopt advanced fighting methods and adapt them to the conditionsoftheArab-Israeliarena.Fortheirpart,theArabshavefailedinmostoftheseareas,andhavenotmanagedtoharnesstheirresourcesandunitetoovercometheirinferiorityvis-à-visIsrael.

The special relationship between the United States and Israel; thecommitmentofAmericanadministrationstoIsrael’ssurvivalandsecurity;andtheUScommitmenttomaintainIsrael’squalitativeedgeovertheArabstatesareamongthepillarsofIsraelisecurity.TheserelationsprovideIsraelnotonlywitha sourceof technological superioritybutalsosuperpowerbacking in timesofmilitarydistressduringawar.TheArabs,however,havenosuchsupportintheirconfrontationwithIsrael.

Israelhasastrategicsecuritynetbasedonitsnuclearcapability.Atthesametime,theArabsdonotbelieveIsraelwillusenuclearweaponsagainstthem unless it finds itself in extreme distress and has no other option, which theydonotthinkwillhappenintheforeseeablefuture.Assuch,theArabsareoftheopinionthatIsrael’snuclearcapabilityshouldnotlimitordeterthemfromactingagainstit,eitherinaconventionalwarorthroughterrorandviolence.Inaddition,Israelhasweakpointsthatstemfromitssmallergeographicalsizeandpopulation,sensitivitytolosses,politicalconstraints,dependence of the IDF on reserve forces, and its difficulties in contending withterrorandguerillaorganizations.

ThesefactorsobligetheArabstoadoptstrategicconclusionswithregardto their approach towards Israel.Here, theArabsaredividedoverwhatconclusionstodraw.TodayalltheArabregimesbelievethatembarkingonanotherwarwithIsraelinthecomingyearsisnotintheirfavorbecausetheywould inevitablybedefeated.As such, their strategic interest is tosolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means, while adhering to the objectiveofattainingtheArabdemands.EgyptandJordantranslatedthisapproachintopeaceagreementswithIsrael.Syriahaslookedforapoliticalsettlement, but has not achieved it due to the gap between Syrian andIsraeli positions. OtherArab countries are divided between willingnesstomaintain informal relationswith Israelanda refusal tohaveany tieswithIsraelatall.ThePalestiniansaredividedintheirapproach:somearewilling to accept a political compromise settlement with Israel that satisfies theirbasicconditions,whiletheradicalorganizationssupportmaintainingthearmedstruggleuntilattritionachievesthevictoryoverIsrael.Theonly

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regimeintheregionthatsupportsanarmedstruggleagainstIsraeluntilitisannihilatedistheIranianregime.

ForoveragenerationtheArabshavenotedIsrael’sinabilitytoachieveallitsmilitaryobjectives.Israelisstillconsideredbythemasathreatdueto its military ability and intentions to occupyArab territory. However,in all wars since the Six Day War – the peak of Israel’s realization ofitsmilitaryabilitiesagainsttheArabs–theArabshaveuncoveredweakpoints inIsrael’sstrength: in theWarofAttrition, theYomKippurWar,theLebanonWarand theclashwithHizbollah,and thestruggleagainstPalestinianterror.IntheArabs’eyes,thelastwarinLebanonis,therefore,partofthisgeneralpattern.

The War in Lebanon: General Arab Lessons

BeforeexaminingthepossibleArabconclusionsfromthewarinLebanon,a preliminary observation should be made. Not only is there not yetsufficient evidence as to the conclusions the Arabs will draw from the war; itshouldbeassumedthatforanumberofreasonstheywillneedtoexercisecautionwithregardtotheconclusionstheydodraw:(a)Thereisclearlya fundamental difference between fighting a small military organization andwagingwaragainstregulararmiesbackedbystatesandgovernments.Thus,themainconceptualproblemwillbetoexaminewhichlessonsfromthewar inLebanoncanbeapplied tocountriesandregulararmies,andwhich are irrelevant. (b) It should be clear to theArabs that Israel willalsodraw itsownconclusions from thewarandwillaim tocorrect thelapsesanddefectsthatsurfaced.Consequently,theywillmakeamistakeif they relyonlyon the lessons learned from the lastwar in examiningIsrael’sfuturedefenseactivities.(c)Despitetheprolongednatureof thewar,onlypartofIsrael’smilitarycomponentsweretested,whiletheArabstateswerenot involvedatall.Thus, it is reasonable toassumethat theArabswillcontinuetomaintaintheirfundamentalapproachtowardsIsraelwithregardtotheirperceptionofitsabilitiesandlimitations,buttheywillprobablyupdatesomecomponentsbasedontheconclusionsdrawnfromthewarinLebanon.

ThebasisofArabanalysisof thewar’sresultswill likelybe thatfortheforeseeablefutureIsraelwillcontinuetomaintainitsoverallstrategic-

The Impact of the War on Arab Security Concepts I 201

militarysupremacyanditstechnologicaladvantageovertheArabstates.SomeofthefundamentalcomponentsinIsrael’ssupremacy,whichwerereflected in the last war, once again demonstrated to the Arabs that they lackanadequateresponse.Firstandforemost,theArabstatesdonothavean answer to Israel’s aerial ability, firepower, and precision capabilities that weredemonstratedinthewar,despitethefactthatinLebanonthesewerenot tested against an enemy air force and significant aerial defense. Second, Israel’s intelligence capability, lapses notwithstanding, still provides itsfighting forces with sufficiently accurate intelligence that lends them an advantage in the field and enables them to hit quality targets. And third, theUnitedStates’ full supportof Israelduring thewar inLebanonwasentirelyclear,moresothaninanypreviouswar.Notonlydidthesebasiccomponentsnotdecline;theirqualitywasfeltevenmorekeenlythaninthepast.

Ontheotherhand,thewarinLebanongavetheArabsfoodforthoughtas to possible ways of eroding Israel’s supremacy and, principally, ofexploitingitsweakpoints.FirstthereisthevulnerabilityofIsrael’shomefront. The 2006 war was the first time since the War of Independence that anArabforcelaunchedalargescaleattackonIsrael’shomefront,otherthanIraq’sScudmissilesduringtheGulfWarandterroristattackswhosescope and the damage are far more limited. Ultimately, theArabs willlikely come to the conclusion that they cannot defeat Israel by strikingatitshomefront,whichdemonstratedconsiderableresilienceduringthewar. On the other hand, the damage was significant enough to justify developmentofanoptiontostrikeatthehomefrontinthefuture,intheexpectation that the Israeli home front will find it hard to withstand more prolongedandintensiveattrition.WilltheArabsexploitsuchanoptioninfutureconfrontations?Thatdependsonthestate.ArabstateswhosehomefrontisasvulnerableasIsrael’s–Syria,forexample–wouldhavetoweighcarefullywhethertheywanttoignitethehomefrontduringawar.Ontheotherhand,countrieswhoserearislessvulnerabletoanIsraeliresponsedue to the distance, such as Iran, or elements that are less sensitive tostrikesof this sort, suchasHizbollahandPalestinianorganizations, areliabletousethisoptionandtrytoenhancetheirabilitytostrikeatIsrael’shomefront.

202 I Ephraim Kam

Second,therearerocketsandmissiles.AsfarbackastheGulfWartheArabs viewed Iraq’s Scud missile fire as a means to offset part of Israel’s aerial advantage.TheArabs, including more distant states, see missilesasalongarmandanoptionforstrikingagainstIsrael,ameansofhittingIsrael’s home front and inflicting material and psychological damage, a deterrent,andameansoflaunchingnon-conventionalweapons.InrecentyearsmissileshavebecomealessattractiveoptionfortheArabs,probablydue to the interception capability of the Arrow system. The missiles’efficiency was not tested during the war in Lebanon; the effectiveness ofrockets,however,was testedandtheArabsmaydrawtheconclusionthattheyprovedthemselves.AlthoughthethousandsofrocketslaunchedbyHizbollahat Israeldidnotbreak the Israelihomefront, theyprovedthemselves a simple, available, and convenient weapon that is difficult to destroy and has a high level of survivability against aerial attacks.TheuseofrocketscanalsoforceIsraelintoasituationofprolongedwarfare,highcosts,partialparalysisof thenationaleconomy,intensefrustration,anddamagetonationalmorale,allofwhichhavealwaysbeenviewedbytheArabsasbeingtoIsrael’sdisadvantage.Theconclusion,bothofArabstatesandIranandofmilitaryandterrororganizations,islikelytobethatthey should expandandenhance theirmissile and rocket arrays againstIsrael.

Third, thereareanti-tankmissiles.TheArabshavelongrealizedthatin light of Israel’s firepower and high level of mobility and its aerial supremacy,itisbestnottoengageitusinglargeformations.Hizbollah’suse of anti-tank missiles, some advanced, is apparently viewed as oneof the organization’s successes. Hizbollah proved capable of using lowsignaturesmallforcesinareassaturatedwithanti-tankweaponry,suitedto operations in built-up areas and in a manner that optimizes forcemobility.ThissuccessmaymotivateArabarmiestoestablishmoreanti-tanklightforcesandteams,perhapsattheexpenseoflargearmoredunits,tostopgroundadvances.Theseunitswouldlikelybeequippedwithmoreadvancedanti-tankmissilesandwithmoreadvancedmissilesthatmaybemostlyofRussianmanufacture.Thismayalsobetheconclusiondrawnbysmallermilitaryorganizations.

One important question is how the deficiencies discovered in the IDFduring theSecondLebanonWarare likely to impacton theArabs’


perceptionoftheIsraelithreat.InthelastclashtheIDFdidnotfunctionwell, partly due to defective planning and its use of ground forces andreserves, the quality of some of the officers, and logistical failures. Will theArabstakethistomeanthattheIDF’sstrengthhasdeclinedandthethreatitposestoArabstateshaslessenedtotheextentthattheyareabletolaunchnewoptionsagainstIsrael?Notnecessarily,andmuchdependson the processes that the IDF undergoes in the wake of the war. If theIDFmanagestorelaythemessagethatitiscorrectingthemistakesandisrestoringitscapabilities,itisreasonabletoassumethattheArabswillalsoconcludethatitspowerbasehasnotbeendamagedandthatitsdeterrentlevelhasbeenmaintained.Ontheotherhand,iftheArabsdeterminethattheIDF’sproblemsaresubstantialandlongterm, itsdeterrencemaybeeroded.

Will Israel’s deterrence capability against its rivals be influenced by the confrontationinLebanon?Presumablyso,buttheextentoftheimpactandthe final result are still unclear. On the one hand, Israel surprised its enemies and launched a large scale military operation, during which it enjoyedpoliticalfreedomofoperation,almostwithoutrestraint.Italsomanagedto dismantle Hizbollah’s system of fortifications along the border and to destroy some of its rocket array, thereby decreasing the organization’sdeterrence. On the other hand, despite the abilities and resources Israelutilizedfreely,itpaidahighpriceanddidnotachievesomeofitsobjectives,whatmaypersuadetheArabsthatIsraelwillnothurrytorepeatsuchanoperation.AttheendofthedayitappearsthatIsrael’sabilitytodeterSyriafrom launchingamilitaryoperationagainst itwillnotbeaffected.Thisdeterrentabilitywillevenincrease,possiblybecausetheSyrianswillbemoreimpressedwithIsrael’sstrategiccomponents–particularlyitsaerialstrength–thanthetacticalweaknessitdisplayedagainstHizbollah.Israel’sdeterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah and the Palestinians will be significantly affectedbothbytheIDF’smeasuresandthestepstakenbyHizbollah,aswellasbytheorganizations’abilitytorehabilitateandevenimprovetheircapabilitiesinthenearfuture.

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Lessons of the War: Syria and Iran

The lessons of the fighting in Lebanon may be of particular importance to Syria and Iran, both because they consider Israel an enemy they areliabletoencounterinthefuture,andbecausetheyarebothconnectedtoHizbollah, which is an important component of their security concepts.SyriaconsideredHizbollahpartofitsmilitarydeploymentagainstIsrael,whichincludesstrategicweapons,regularconventionalforces,andterrorsystems, where Hizbollah occupies center stage alongside Palestinianorganizations. Syria attached particular importance to strengtheningHizbollahaftertheIDF’swithdrawalfromsouthernLebanonin2000,asthe organization’s ability to act against Israel declined after that. Thus,Hizbollah’slargearsenalofrockets,mostofwhichweresuppliedbySyria,wasdesignedtodeterIsraelfromattachingLebanon,Hizbollah,andSyria,andtoprovidetheorganizationwitharesponsecapabilityifsubjectedtomassiveattack.

IsSyrialikelytochangeitsstrategicapproachtowardsIsraelfollowingthe clash in Lebanon? Since the end of the hostilities Syrian officials, principally Bashar Asad, have made militant statements against Israelwhoseprimarymessagehasbeen:ifIsraeldoesnotmakeprogresstowardsapeacesettlementwithSyriatherewillbenochoiceotherthantoreturntheGolanHeightstoSyriancontrolbyforce.Thedeclarationsweregeneralandit is difficult to determine whether has been a change in Syria’s approach toapotentialmilitaryoptionagainstIsrael.Asfarasonecantell,Syria’sbasicunderstandingofIsrael’sstrategicsupremacyremainsunchanged.Inthisrespect, theconfrontationinLebanonconveyedtheadvantagesofaflexible and determined military organization like Hizbollah in the area of asymmetricwarfare.Nonetheless,themajorityoftheseadvantageswouldbeeclipsedinawaragainstaregulararmybackedbyaresponsiblestate,suchasinthecaseofSyria.

IsSyrialikelytochangeitswarobjectivesbasedonthelessonsoftheclashinLebanon,andsetasitsobjectivemeresurvivalagainstasuperiorenemy,ratherthanvictoryinawar?Itisreasonabletoassumethatitwillnotdoso,asinsuchacase,incontrastwithHizbollah,itwouldmightlosestrategicassetsinawar,suchasterritories,elementsofmilitarystrength,financial assets, and centers of government. The loss of such assets is liable


todamagethecountry’sstrategicpower,leadtoalossofwilltocontinuefighting, and even bring about the downfall of the regime. It is also unlikely thatSyriawouldconsideralimitedmilitaryoperationwhileexploitingitsadvantagesinordertogenerateapoliticalprocess,duetoitsweakness,itsfrail political standing, and its insufficiently strong basis for diplomatic leverage.

However,theSyriansmaywellconcludethatstrengtheningHizbollahhaslessenedsomeofIsrael’sadvantagesandassuchhasprovenitsworth.ThereforeSyriaislikelytodrawatwofoldconclusionfromtheconfrontationinLebanon.First, it is important to strengthenHizbollahwith themostadvanced weaponry in the field of rockets and anti-tank missiles in order tobolsteritsdeterrenceagainstIsraelanddemandaheaviertollinafutureconfrontation.Second,itisimportanttoadoptsomeofthelessonsofthefighting in Lebanon in the Syrian army, mainly in the area of missiles and rocketsandanti-tankweapons.

Iranmayreachsimilarconclusions.IttoocontributedtostrengtheningHizbollah in its fortifications along the border and its rocket array in order tocreateathreattotheIsraelihomefront,whichincludeddeterringIsraelfromattackingthenuclearfacilitiesinIran.However,IsraelsurpriseditwiththescaleofitsresponseandforcedHizbollahtoresorttoitsrocketarrayaheadoftime,andnotforthepurposeforwhichtherocketsweredesigned.Moreover, in the situation that arose at the end of the war, Hizbollahlost part of its deterrent capability against Israel, including through thedismantling of its border fortifications. Thus, Iran’s basic strategic interest instrengtheningHizbollahhasnotdeclined,ratherhasbeenaugmentedbyideologicalandpoliticalconsiderations.Forthisreason,onemustassumethatIranwillmakeeveryefforttorearmtheorganizationandrestoreitsmilitarystrengthand,ifpossible,provideitwithmoreadvancedweaponsandequipment.

The Lessons Learned by the Palestinians

The way Hizbollah conducted itself in the past had significant impact on the defense perceptions of Palestinian organizations. In particular, theIDF’swithdrawalfromsouthernLebanoninmid-2000wasperceivedbythePalestiniansasamajorsuccessbyHizbollahthatshouldbeduplicated,

206 I Ephraim Kam

and this appears to have impacted on the conduct of the Palestiniansand contributed to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada. The influence of HizbollahonPalestinianmilitaryactivityroseduringtheintifada,withthesignificant increase in the military aid and training that Hizbollah provided tothePalestinianorganizations.

OfalltheArabelements,thePalestinianorganizationswillundoubtedlybe most influenced by the war in Lebanon due to the similarity between conditions in southern Lebanon and the conditions in which theseorganizationsoperate,particularlyintheGazaStrip.ThelessonsthatthePalestinian organizations are likely to glean from the fighting in Lebanon, inordertoreduceIsrael’soverallsupremacywhileenjoyingthesupportofHizbollah,canbesummarizedinanumberofareas:

• EnhancingtheuseofcivilianpopulationsasashieldforthePalestinianfighters. The Palestinian organizations already use civilians as a shield. However,inordertocomplicatemattersfortheIDF,Hizbollahrelaxeditsconstraintsonactivityinacivilianenvironment,andthePalestiniansare liable for follow suit: to conceal fighters and make it difficult to trace them;todetertheIDFfromattackduetothepresenceofcivilians;toturn a civilian area into a fortified entity; to lead the IDF into fighting inabuiltuparea;toexploittheimpressionofIDFattacksinpopulatedareas; and to inflate the number of losses for the sake of propaganda.

• Expandingtheuseofrockets,whileexploitingthevoidintheRafaharea to smuggle new weapons into the Gaza Strip and, as much aspossible,alsointotheWestBank.ItmaybeassumedthatPalestinianorganizationswilltrytobuildforthemselvesenhancedrocketarsenals,bothintermsofrangeandwarheads,inordertobeabletolaunchlongandongoingattacksonIsraelipopulatedareasinthefuture,includingonthecenterofIsrael.Themainconstraintonthisis,naturally,Israel’spreventiveandobstructivemeasures.

• Establishing a control system in the field, as well as an alternative system, that offers centralized, hierarchical, and flexible control of the forces.

• Increasing theuseofsubterraneanchannels forsmugglingarmsandforoperationaluses.

• Enhancing the use of communications and psychological warfare,whileexploitingIsrael’ssensitivities.


ThePalestinianorganizationsalreadyusesuchmeans,anditisclearthattherearedifferencesbetweentheconditionsinthePalestinianterritories–evenintheGazaStrip–andtheLebanesearena.However,thelessonsofthe fighting in Lebanon are likely to provide them with leverage for trying toturnfromaterrororganizationtoasemi-militaryguerillaorganization,assimilaraspossibletotheHizbollahmodel.

Conclusion

OneoftheimportantfeaturesofthewarinLebanonisthatitremainedanarenaoftwoplayers:Israelontheoneside,andHizbollahandLebanonon theother side.DespiteHizbollah’sclose linkswithSyriaand Iran–during the fighting there was concern that the situation could deteriorate into a direct conflict between Israel and Syria – ultimately all the players stayed outside the circle of fighting. Nevertheless, the war in Lebanon is consideredaconfrontationwithawidercontext:theradicalelementsintheregion view it as a reflection of the Israeli-American struggle against them. ThemoderateArabelementsviewed it aspartof theclashbetween theradicalMuslimcampandthemoderatecamp,andpartlybetweenSunnisandShiites.Allseethewaraspotentialforescalationinthefuture.

Because of the wider significance of the confrontation and its being a prolonged testbetweena regular,modern,andstrongarmyanda smallguerillaorganizationthatwaswellarmedandwelldeployed,thewarhasdrawntheattentionofArabandotherpartieslookingtodrawtherelevantconclusions.AtthisstageitdoesnotseemthattheArabsecurityconceptswill change significantly as a result of the war. It was not comprehensive enough, and in any case,Arab states and armies did not participate init sufficiently to leave a lasting impression on the Arabs’ approach. A significant portion of the war’s features is relevant to a confrontation with a smallmilitaryorganizationthatisnotbackedbyastate,andnotnecessarilytoaconfrontationbetweenregulararmies.Thelessonstobelearnedfromthe war should also not be detached from the conclusions drawn fromprevious and future developments that influenced the formulation of the security concepts, especially since security concepts generally evolveslowlyandchangegradually.

20� I Ephraim Kam

Nevertheless, the conclusions that the Arab elements and Iran maydraw from the war are significant. The most important conclusions will be studiedbythePalestinianorganizations,whichareliabletotrytoemulatetheHizbollahmodel,particularlyintheGazaStrip.Syriaisapttodrawconclusionsat theoperativeandtacticallevelinordertoreduceIsrael’soverallsuperiority–mainly inareasrelating tostrengtheningHizbollahand theuseof rocketsandanti-tankmissiles–and lesson thestrategiclevel. The scope and nature of these lessons will be influenced not only by thewarbutalsobythemeasurestakeninthenearfuture,bothbyIsraelandbyHizbollah.

Chapter 16

The International Dimension: Why So Few Constraints on Israel?

Mark A. Heller

The Second LebanonWar lasted just over one month. Its duration wasdeterminedbyavarietyoffactors,butprimarilybyIsraeli’sownassessmentthat prolongation of the fighting would not advance any war aims even moreambitious than those that Israelhadalreadyachieved, at leastnotat a cost deemed acceptable to the society and political system. Unlikepreviouswars,Israeldidnot–contrarytothepredictionsofmanyanalysts– have to operate under severe time constraints, because its margin ofmaneuverwasnotseriouslycurtailedbydiplomaticpressure.Whetherornot that freedom of maneuver ultimately worked to Israel’s benefit is a subjectofsomecontroversyinIsrael’scollectivepost-warassessment,butasanoperationalfactoritappearsincontrovertible.

IntheIsraelidiscourse,“diplomaticpressure”isnormallyunderstoodtomeanAmericanpressuretoceasehostilities.ThereasonforthefocusontheUnitedStatesisself-evident:IsraelidependencymakestheUnitedStatestheonlyforeignactorwhosepoliciesconstituteacriticalinputintoIsraelidecisionmaking.TheconvergenceifnotcongruenceofIsraeliandAmericanattitudestowardHizbollahanditsregionalpatronsmeantthattherewaslittleintrinsicreasonfortheUnitedStatestopushforanearlyterminationofIsraelioperationsagainstHizbollah.However,therestoftheinternationalsystemor“internationalcommunity”wasnotirrelevant,evenifIsraelitselfmightbeinclinedtodownplayitsimportance,becauseitcouldhavefedintotheAmericancalculusand,giventhebroaderAmericanagenda, have moved the administration to accommodate international

210 I Mark A. Heller

preferences even if theydidnot accordwith its own.That explains thepotentialimportanceoftheinternationaldimensionintheSecondLebanonWar.Inpractice,however,thatpotentialdidnotcomeintoplay.

There are two fairly straightforward reasons for this. The first is strategic. Becausenoothermajorextra-regionalregionalactorswerecloselyalignedwiththeprotagonistsassumedtobeatgreatestrisk–LebanonandHizbollahortheirregionalpatrons–thecriticalinterestsandprestigeofotherswerenotengagedintheconfrontation,obviatinganyanxietyaboutescalationof the type that often influenced superpower behavior in local conflicts duringtheheightoftheColdWar.Moreover,itquicklybecameclearthatevenotherMiddleEasternactorswerewaryofbeingdirectlyimplicatedin the fighting, alleviating concerns that the fighting might precipitate a broader regional conflict. In fact, some regional governments, perhaps for the first time in the history of Arab-Israeli wars, actually distanced themselvesfromanArabprotagonist,inpartbecausetheyobjectedtothe“hijacking”ofnationalsecurityagendasbyanon-stateactor.SaudiArabia,for one, officially condemned the “rash adventures carried out by elements inside the state,” in part because of Hizbollah’s identification with Iran and with Islamist radicalism – factors that threatened its own state orregime security. But even Iran and Syria, which did support Hizbollah,nevertheless communicated their own intention to stay outside the frayin order to avoid jeopardizing what they deemed were more importantnationalsecurityinterests.

Second, the emotional sympathy with the targets of Israeli militaryattacks that did exist was too limited to drive the foreign policies ofmajor international actors.True, Israel did attack theLebanesenationalinfrastructure (the Beirut airport, oil storage facilities, an electricitytransformer, some bridges) in the first few days of the war in the hope of generating more active Lebanese opposition to Hizbollah, and thatpromptedwidespreadcondemnationsof“disproportionateresponse.”Butthe failure of this mode of operation to produce any discernible benefits led Israel to abandon it in favor of more focused attacks on Hizbollah,andthesedidnotproducethesameemotionalresonanceevenwhentheytookplace inShiite-populated areas.That isnot just becauseHizbollahwasalmostuniversallyseenasresponsiblefor theoutbreakofviolence.It also stemmed from Hizbollah’s association with Syria and especially

The International Dimension: Why So Few Constraints on Israel? I 211

Iran. At the global level, that placed it in the same camp with forcesthatare themselvesobjectsof fearand loathing,particularlybecauseofthe Iranian leadership’sbelligerent rhetoricandrefusal to take thestepsnecessarytodispelwidespreadsuspicionsthatitisembarkedonaquestfornuclearweapons.Attheregionallevel,itmadeHizbollahappeartobethespearheadofgrowingShiiteself-assertionandbelligerency thathadalreadypromptedKingAbdullahofJordan toexpressanxietyabout thedangerofa“Shiitecrescent”surroundingtheSunniArabworldandledPresidentMubarakofEgypttocomplainthatIraqiShiitesaremoreloyaltoIranthantotheirowncountry.

Ofcourse,therewerelarge-scalecondemnationsofIsraelioperationsinLebanon and expressions of sympathy for its victims, usually defined as “the Lebanesepeople”ratherthanasHizbollahperse.TheseweremostevidentindemonstrationsthroughouttheMuslimworldfromMoroccotoIndonesia,althoughsuchdemonstrationsalsotookplaceinWesterncities,wherethemostprominentparticipantswereoften localArabsorother residentsofMuslimoriginalongwithleftistsobjectingtowhatevertheUnitedStatesdidor(inthiscase)didnotdo.Asaresultofthesepublicsentiments,ArabgovernmentsquicklydesistedfromtheirinitialcriticismofHizbollahandbegantoissuedeclarationsofsupportforHizbollah/Syrian/Iraniandemandsfor an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. But while they shared the Hizbollah/Syrian/Iranian assessment that a prolongation of the fighting wouldbe to thedetrimentofHizbollah, theydidnot share theobjectiveofavoidingthat,andtheirdeclarationsthereforeseemedtobeproforma effortstoappeasedomesticpublicopinionratherthanrealinvestmentsofpoliticalcapital.Thesamecanbesaidofnon-regionalgovernmentsinAsiaandEurope,includingGreatBritain,wherePrimeMinisterTonyBlairdidfacestrongcriticismwithinhisownpartyforaligninghimselftoocloselywiththesubstanceandpaceofAmericandiplomacy.

As a result, none of the institutions that are taken to embody theinternational community (or significant parts of it) – the United Nations, theEuropeanUnion,theG-8,eventheArabLeague–pressedvigorouslyfor an early cessation of hostilities, and real momentum for a SecurityCouncil ceasefire did not begin to build until several weeks into the war, whenboththeUnitedStatesandIsraelitselfconcludedthatfurthercombatwasunlikelytoproduceadditionalsubstantialgainsorconsolidatewhat


had been already been achieved. Moreover, the ceasefire resolution that dideventuallyemerge–SC1701–wasverydifferentfromtheversionthatHizbollahanditsbackershadwanted:acessationofhostilities thatwaseitherunconditionalor(evenmoreambitiously) thatalsocalledforthe immediate withdrawal of whatever Israeli forces were in Lebanon.Instead, by reaffirming previous Security Council resolutions that had neverbeen implemented (especially1559), it endorsed theextensionofcentral Lebanese government authority throughout the country and thedeploymentoftheLebanesearmyuptotheIsraeli-Lebaneseborder.ThiswasoneofIsrael’scentralobjectivesbuthadpreviouslybeenanathematoHizbollah.However,1701wentfurtherandestablishedamechanismforthe implementation of this goal: a strengthened United Nations InterimForce in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Despite initial delays and widespreadskepticismaboutwhether this forcewouldactuallycome intoexistenceormeetitsforce-leveltargets,variousinternationalactors(especiallyItalyand France) did come forward with contributions substantial enough towarrantthewithdrawalofIsraeliforcesremaininginLebanon.

Allinall,itcanthereforebearguednotonlythatinternationalpressuredidnotcompelIsraeltoterminateoperationsinLebanonbeforeititselfwasinclinedtodoso,butalsothattheinternationalcommunityactuallyhelpedtoentrenchandconsolidatewhatevergainsIsraelhadmanagedtomakethroughmilitarymeans.Ofcourse,thatdoesnotmeanthatinternationalinvolvementhelpedsecuregoalsthatIsraelwasunabletoachievebyitsownactions.NordoesitnecessarilymeanthatinternationalinvolvementinLebanonwillcontinuetooperatetoIsrael’sadvantageinthefuture.Therelativelypermissiveinternationalenvironmentinthesummerof2006wasalmostcertainlyafunctionoftheparticularcircumstancessurroundingtheoutbreakandevolutionofthecrisis.ItisfarfromcertainthatIsraeliandinternational – or even Israel andAmerican – perspectives will overlapontheissuesintheLebanesearenathatremaintobeaddressed,suchasthe disposition of Shab’a Farms, the release of prisoners, Israeli aerialoverflights, the prevention of arms smuggling into Lebanon and, most significantly, the eventual disarming of Hizbollah.

Even more uncertainty attaches to perceived or proposed linkagesbetween theLebanesearenaandother regionalproblems.For example,analystsandpolicymakersinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesbeganalmost

The International Dimension: Why So Few Constraints on Israel? I 213

immediately after the fighting stopped to endorse the idea that Hizbollah canonlybefurtherunderminedorat leastpreventedfromrehabilitatingitselfbyinducingSyria,whichiswidelyseentobetheweakestorleastnatural link in the Hizbollah-Syria-Iran axis, to defect, and that IsraelneedstocontributetothatbyagreeingtorenewpeacenegotiationswithSyriaontheclearunderstandingthatamajorIsraeliwithdrawalin–andalmostcertainlyfrom–theGolanHeightswillbethefocusofanysuchnegotiations. It isunclearhow internationalpreferencesorprescriptionswillevolveconcerningthislogic,buttheAmericanadministrationcurrentlyshows little enthusiasm for it, regardless of the attitudes of others, andunlessthatchanges,thereluctanceoftheIsraeligovernmenttoembraceit will probably not be influenced by other attitudes in the international arena.

Butthatmaynotbethecasewithrespecttootherlinkages,particularlythelinkagebetweenthePalestinianissueandinternationalapproachestoHizbollah’sotherpatron– Iran.On thePalestinian issue,AmericanandIsraeliapproachesmayalsobegenerallyconvergent.ButthereisgreaterinclinationelsewhereintheregionandtheworldtobemoreresponsivetoPalestinian demands and requirements, at least concerning financial support andothermeasures to facilitate improved functioningof thePalestinianAuthority.TheAmerican agendavis-à-vis Iran also largely correspondswith Israel’s, but thepromotionof that agenda requiresmobilizationofregional and international support, and failure to promote a resolutionof the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or least a reduction of its profile, may wellcometobeseenasanirritantifnotanobstacletotheformationofabroadercoalitioninsupportofAmericanactionagainstIran.Sympathyfor the Palestinian cause, especially in the Middle East, outstrips anysympathyforHizbollah’scauseandmayactuallybeoneofthefewthreadspreventing the Sunni-Shiite fault line from turning into a real rift thatcouldmake iteasier for theUnitedStates todealmoreeffectivelywithIran.Bythesametoken,clearevidenceofengagementonbehalfof thePalestinianswouldallowEuropeanstoconvincethemselves,ifnotothers,that forceful diplomatic/economic and even military action against IrancouldnotbedepictedaspartoftheclashofcivilizationsbetweenIslamandtheWestthattheydesperatelywanttoavoid.TheUnitedStatesmaywellconcludethatithastoaccommodatethisreality.Andifthathappens,


theinternationalsystemthatallowedIsraelsomuchfreedomofmaneuverinLebanoncouldhavearatherdifferentimpactonIsraelirelationswiththePalestinians.

Appendix 1

Shab’a Farms

Amos Gilboa

Shab’aFarms,thehillyridgethatformsthewesternextensionofMountHermon next to Israel’s primary water source, appeared on the agendaafter the IDFwithdrawal fromLebanon inMay2000,and it reemergedprominently during and after the Second Lebanon War. The LebanesegovernmenthasrepeatedlydemandedpossessionofShab’aFarms,knownin Israel as Mount Dov. Security Council resolution 1701 explicitlyincludesitasanissuetobediscussedinthecontextofrelationsbetweenLebanonandIsraelandinstructstheUNsecretary-generaltosubmittotheSecurityCouncilrecommendationsforresolvingthedispute.Inaddition,PresidentBasharAsadpointedoutinatelevisioninterviewonSeptember26,2006thatbeforeallelseIsraelmustwithdrawfromShab’aFarms;andintheLebanesepresstherearepublicannouncementsfromtheLebanesegovernmentcallingforformerresidentsofthefarmstocomeforwardandpresenttheirownershippapers.

The aim of this essay is to outline the Shab’a Farms dispute: whatit actually is about, how Israel arrived at it, and how it evolved – andcontinuedtoevolve–intoanissue.ThiswillgenerateafactualbasisforpublicdebateoverIsrael’spolicyonthematter.

1967-1999

Justbefore theendofhostilities in theSixDayWar theseniormilitaryechelongatheredattheheadquartersofDivision36,whichwasresponsiblefor the Golan Heights. EzerWeizmann, then head of Operations in theIDF,turnedtoDefenseMinisterMosheDayanandsaid:“Don’tyouthink

216 I Amos Gilboa

theairforcedeservesareward?”“Certainly,”answeredDayan,“askforanything.”At the timetheIDFforceshadadvancedasfaras theDruzevillageofMajdalShams,inthefoothillsofMt.Hermon.WeizmannpointedatMt.Hermonandsaid:“Iwantustohaveapositionupthere,thepointfromwhereyoucanseeDamascus.”

Wherewasthatpoint?Everyonelookedatthedivisionalintelligenceofficer, Danny Agmon, one of the founding fathers of IDF combat intelligence.Agmonsatdown,calculated,measuredthemaps,andwentupto thespot inahelicopter.Golanisoldiersfollowed,andonthenextdayUNpersonnelandasurveyorwenttothespottotakemeasurementsandmarktheplaceontheirmapsasanIDFlocation.Butthenaproblemarose:thelinehadtocontinuetotheLebaneseborder.Inaccordancewiththe“accepted”signforaninternationalborderonthe1:100000scalemapof the intelligence officer, a number of soldiers were stationed on the prominenthilltopsalongtheborder.TheUNpersonnelandsurveyorcameandnotedthelineoftheIDFforcesontheirmapsasfollowingthelineoftheinternationalborderbetweenSyriaandLebanon.

The IDF later abandoned the area of the Syrian-Lebanese border.In the early 1970s, however, Palestinian terrorists infiltrated the area, subsequently nicknamed “Fatahland.” The IDF took possession of it,pavedaroad,andestablishedachainofpositionsthere.Thehill,calledJabalRus,becameknownasMt.Dov,namedafterCapt.DovRodbergwho was killed there inAugust 1970 in a battle with terrorists.This isalso the timewhenthefarmerswholivedthereabandonedtheirhomes,and ever since the farms have been unoccupied.After theYom KippurWarandthesigningof thedisengagement treatybetweenIsraelandtheSyrians,theUNforce(UNDOP)wasestablished.TheoperationalregionalmapnaturallyincludedMt.Dov,basedonthemarkingoftheinternationalborderthataUNsurveyorandDannyAgmondelineatedin1967.

2000-2006

WheninlightofthefailedmeetingbetweenPresidentsClintonandAsadonMarch26,2000PrimeMinisterBarakmadethedecisiontowithdrawfromLebanonwithout anagreementwithSyria,hedetermined that thewithdrawalwouldtakeplaceaspartofSecurityCouncilresolution425,

Shab’a Farms I 217

adoptedfollowingOperationLitaniin1978.Accordingtothisresolution,Israel was to withdraw to the international Israel-Lebanon border. UNenvoyTerjeLarsenwassenttoIsraelandLebanon,togetherwithateamofUNsurveyors,inparttoclarifythelinetowhichIDFhadtowithdrawinordertocomplywithresolution425.ThemainproblemwastheborderwithLebanon,drawnin1923–whereexactlydiditrun?Ontheeasternborder, from theHatzbaniRiver and eastwards,meaning theLebanese-Syrianborder,therewerenospecialproblems,exceptfortwoimportantIDFpositionsinsideLebaneseterritory.

Andthenamajorsurpriseoccurred.LarsenandhisteammetLebanesePresidentEmileLahoudonMay4.Thepresident,whowasclosetotheSyrians, toldLarsen that theborderwith Israeldidnot interesthimjustthen.Theeasternborderwasfarmoreimportanttohim.Heclaimedthatthisarea,whichwascalledShab’aFarms,wasLebaneseandnotSyrian,and Israel had to withdraw from it in accordance with resolution 425.Lahoudnotedthatatthislocationtherewereatleastfourteenfarms,thelargestofthembeingMizratShab’a(afterwhichtheregionofthefarmsisnamed,nottobeconfusedwiththeLebanesevillageofShab’a),withothersincludingFashkol,Ramatha,Zabdin,andAiazel.

The Lebanese media, including Hizbollah’s media and the speakerof theLebaneseparliament,NabihBerri, immediatelymade thispublic.LarsenreturnedtoIsraelwhereaLebanesemapwasshowntohimwiththeacceptedLebanese-Syrianborder,withShab’aFarmsclearlymarkedinSyrianterritory.TheLebaneseclaimedthatthemapwasnotup-to-dateandinanycasewasinaccurate,andinsistedthattheareaofShab’aFarms(withoutpreciselydenotingitsboundaries)islocatedinLebanon.FromthatmomentanduntilthepublicationofareportbytheUNsecretary-generaltotheSecurityCouncilonMay23,astruggleensuedoverthepositionoftheSyrian-LebaneseborderandtowhomShab’aFarmsbelong:SyriaorLebanon.TheUNaskedIsraelandLebanontoprovideevidencetosupporttheirclaims,andlaunchedaninvestigationofitsown.

Two fundamental historic facts lay at the basis of the struggle: one,therewasnoformalagreementbetweenSyriaandLebanonoveraformalinternational border, and second, there was no agreed marking of theborder.TheactualborderbetweenLebanonandSyriawassetin1920bytheFrenchwhenthestateofLebanonwasestablished.

21� I Amos Gilboa

TheLebanesehadfourarguments:

• SyrianpropertynotestestifythatthefarmsbelongtotheLebanese.

• VariousdocumentsshowthatreligiousleadersfromLebanonprovidedtheinhabitantsofthefarmswithreligiousservices.

• PartialminutesofaLebanese-Syrianborderscommitteemeetingfrom1964 allegedly indicated that the Syrian side agreed that the farmsbelongtoLebanon,andtherouteofthebordershouldbereset.

• OneLebanesemapfrom1966showsthefarmsasbeingonLebanesesoil.IsraelclearlysawthisasaHizbollahpretexttofabricateanissuethat

wouldvalidateactsofviolenceaftertheIDFwithdrawal,claimingthatthisisoccupiedLebaneseterritory.TheargumentsIsraelsubmittedtotheUNtoshowthattheareaisSyrianandnotLebaneseincluded:

• Dismissal of the Lebanese claim of a purchase certificate as being entirelyirrelevanttothequestionofsovereignty.

• Showing proof that the so-called 1964 minutes, presented by theLebanese,wereinfactforged.

• ShowingdozensofLebanesemapsprintedafter1964,includingfromtheLebaneseMinistryofDefense,thatclearlyindicatethatthefarmsarelocatedonSyriansoil.

• Syrianmapsrepresentingthesameinformation.

• French maps were brought in, along with testimony of French officials whodescribedwhere theborderbetweenSyria and thenew stateofLebanonran.

• ASyriancensus from1960showed that the inhabitantsof the farmswere incorporated intoapopulationcensus(this rangedfromseveraldozentoseveralhundredateachfarm).

• ALebanesebanknotewithavalueof1000Lebaneselira,whichwasissued in1988andwhichbearsamapofLebanon.The routeof theSyrian-Lebaneseborder,markedoutonthemap,indicatesthatareaofShab’aFarmsis,infact,Syrianland.

• MapsbelongingtoUNDOPandUNIFIL,includingtheiractivityareas,aredividedbythe“accepted”lineoftheSyrian-Lebaneseborder.

• TheUNannouncementfrom1978(afterOperationLitani)statedthatIsraelhadcompleteditswithdrawalfromallLebaneseterritory(withoutreferring to IDF positions on Mt. Dov as belonging to Lebanon).

Shab’a Farms I 21�

LebanondidnotclaimthenthatShab’aFarmsbelongedtoLebanon,anddidnotdemand that Israelwithdrawfrom theareaaspartof itswithdrawalfromallLebaneseterritory.TheUNacceptedIsrael’spositionandannouncedthistotheLebanese

governmentseveraldaysaftersubmissionof theUNsecretary-general’sreporttotheSecurityCouncilonMay23,2000.TheUN’smainreasonforrejectingtheLebanesedemandwasconnectedtotheUNDOPandUNIFILmaps.TheUNDOPmapappeared in theprotocolof thedisengagementagreement between Israel and Syria in May 1974, which Syria signed,thereby confirming that the area of Shab’a Farms is located in Syria, as part oftheoccupiedGolanHeights;LebanonnevercomplainedthatUNIFIL’soperationalareadoesnotincludeShab’aFarms.

TheLebanesedidnotgiveup.TheyrepeatedtheirclaimthattheareaisLebaneseand therefore theUNposition isunacceptable.TheSyrianssupported the Lebanese and, in a telephone call to the UN secretary-general,Syrian foreignministerFarouqa-Shara said thatShab’aFarmswere,infact,Lebanese.ThustheSyriansclaimedthen,andstilldotoday,thatthefarmsbelongtotheLebanese.IntermsofownershipthefarmsinfactbelongtoLebanese.However,theSyrianshavealsomadesurenottostatethatthefarmsareinsovereignLebaneseterritoryandnotinSyriansovereignterritory.

On May 20, 2000, for the first time since 1983, Hizbollah fired a number of shells on the IDF Gladiola outpost on Mt. Dov. That day Nasrallahannounced that this is occupied Lebanese territory, thereby establishingthelegitimacyforfutureviolenceagainstMt.Dovpositions.

At the same time, the UN secretary-general updated Prime MinisterBarak with regard to the pressure being exerted on him on the matter,includingthewordsoftheSyrianforeignminister.BarakdecidedtotesttheSyriansandcalltheirbluff.HesuggestedtotheUNsecretary-generalto ask President Hafez Asad to send an official letter to the UN secretary-general stating that Shab’a Farms are not part of Syria and the GolanHeights, but part of sovereign Lebanon. Syria was to sign an official border agreementwithLebanon,marktheborder(accordingtowhichthefarmswould be in Lebanese territory) and initiate the accepted internationalprocesses pertaining to defining an international border (parliamentary approval,sendingmapstotheUN,andsoon.).

220 I Amos Gilboa

Barakwas certain thatAsad wouldnot signbecause if hedid,Asadwould officially signify that he was ceding part of the Golan Heights thathadbeenoccupiedsinceJune4,1967.InsodoinghewouldcreateaprecedentthatwoulddamagethefundamentalSyrianposition.Barak’sassumptionwascorrect.An international applicationwasmade toAsadregardingtheborderintheareaofShab’aFarmsbuthedidnotrespondtoitandindeeddidnotsendtheletterBarakhadsuggested.

The Israeli position was officially embraced in the UN secretary-general’s report to theSecurityCouncilsubmittedonMay23,2000.At thesametime,thereportemphasizedthatitwasnotrulingoutthepossibilitythatLebanonandSyriawouldsignabindinginternationalborderagreementinthefuture(inwhichsovereigntyofthefarmswouldbedecided).Sincethen,Mt.Dovhasbecomethemain–andalmostonly–areaonwhichHizbollahoccasionally fires. The Lebanese government, for its part, has continued to makeitsclaimtoShab’aFarmsintheinternationalcommunity.

Afterresolution1559inSeptember2004waspassedandtheSyrianswithdrewfromLebanonthefollowingyear,UNMiddleEastenvoyTerjeLarsenraisedtheideathatIsraelwouldvacatetheareaofShab’aFarmsandtransferittotheLebanesegovernment(or,initially,totheUN).Thereweretwocomponentstothisrationale.First,thiswouldobviateHizbollah’sgrounds for firing on Israel and bring complete quiet to the northern border. Second,thiswouldbolsterthereformistforcesinLebanon(forexample,PrimeMinisterSiniora)againstHizbollahandaddweighttothedemandthatHizbollahdisarminaccordancewithresolution1559.LarsenfoundadegreeofresponsivenessinIsraeltotheidea,particularlyintheNationalSecurity Council. On the other hand, the official Israeli position rejected the idea outright, arguing first and foremost that since this is not Lebanese territory, it is a clear Hizbollah excuse for continuing to fire on Israel. If Hizbollah did not have the pretext of Shab’a Farms it would find another, for example, the demand to return seven Shiite villages to Lebanonthat, it claims,havebeen in Israeli territory since1948.Transferof thefarms would strengthen Hizbollah, not Siniora. In addition, Mt. Dov isofsupremestrategicimportanceasitcontrolsthethreewatersourcesoftheJordanRiver(Dan,Hatzbani,andBanias),andingeneral,thereisnopreciseandcleargeographicdelineationofShab’aFarms.According to

Shab’a Farms I 221

someLebaneseclaimstheareastretchesasfarasthesettlementofSnirandextendstotheIsraelisideofMt.Hermon.

2007

This is thebackground to thecurrentsituation.TheShab’aFarms issuewill undoubtedly remain on the political, diplomatic, and even militaryagenda in the future. There are five main direct players in the issue: the UN,theLebanesegovernment,Hizbollah,Syria,andIsrael.

WithregardtotheUN:Clause10ofSecurityCouncilresolution1701instructstheUNsecretary-generaltoprepareproposalswithinthirtydaysconcerning the possibility of finding a solution for the issues of the unclear andcontroversialinternationalbordersofLebanon,includingtheareaofShab’aFarms.Wellafterthirtydays,nosuchproposalsweresubmitted.One may assume with a high degree of probability that any proposalsubmitted in the futureby theUNsecretary-generalwillnot essentiallydepart from the position presented by the UN in advance of Israel’swithdrawalfromLebanon.Inotherwords,thisisanissuethatissubjecttoSyrian-Lebaneseconsentandwillbeformallyshapedinaccordancewithsettinganinternationalborderthatisagreeabletoboth.

FouadSiniora,theLebaneseprimeminister,istheprincipalinterestedparty in a political-diplomatic settlement of the Shab’a Farms problem.SincehiselectionasprimeministerhehasaskedSyriaseveral times toreachawrittenagreementwithhimthatrecognizesLebanesesovereigntyovertheareaofthefarms,therebygeneratingadynamicofinternationalpressure on Israel to withdraw from the area. His obstinacy led to theexplicitcitingofthefarmsinclause10ofResolution1701.ItishardtoknowwhetherSiniorasincerelybelieves that thefarmsare insovereignLebanese territory. For him the importance of the issue is not onlyterritorialbut fundamentalaswell,andconcerns the internalbalanceofpower in Lebanon and relations with Syria: if he succeeds in restoringthefarmstoLebanesesovereigntythroughdiplomatic-politicalmeanshewillstrengthenhispositionvis-à-visHizbollah,openanewandpositivechapterinhisrelationswithSyria,anddemonstrateadegreeofpower.

Hizbollah naturally objects to Siniora’s concept, arguing that IsraelshouldwithdrawfromShab’aFarmsbeforeanySyrian-Lebaneseagreement.

222 I Amos Gilboa

It has already declared that Israel’s presence in the farms, like its flights overLebanon,areabreachofresolution1701,andtheorganizationhastherighttorespondwitharmedresistance.ItwouldcomeasnosurpriseifHizbollahweretouseviolenceagainagainstIsrael’sstrongholdsatMt.Dovaspartofitsstruggle.

For now, it is hard to find a satisfactory reason that would motivate the Syrians to help Siniora and transfer Shab’a Farms to Lebanon in aformalandbindingway.Onthecontrary,itappearstheSyrianshavegoodreasonstoobstructSiniora.TogetherwithNasrallah,theyarenowlookingtodeposeSiniora;theirsoleinterestliesinstrengtheningNasrallah;theyhavealltheevidencethatshowsthatShab’aFarmsareinsovereignSyrianterritoryasdeterminedby theFrench in1920; there isnoprecedent forSyria giving up sovereign territory unless faced with a superior force(suchasTurkey,ontheAlexandrettaissue);and,ingeneral,whyshouldHizbollahbeleftwithoutapretextforcontinuingwithitsarmedstruggle?

And what about Israel? Two brief points will suffice here. The first is highlypractical.EveryonetalksaboutShab’aFarms,butwhatisimportantis that this is not a defined area enclosed by clear topographical lines. In any case, the Mt. Dov ridge controls all of Israel’s water sources. Thesecondpointisafundamentalone.IfSyriaagreesforsomereasontomarkandsignaborderagreementwithLebanon,includingtheareaofthefarms,thenIsraelcouldconsiderthepossibilityofmeetingSiniorahalfway;ifnot,itshouldnotrushtowithdrawfrommore“Lebaneseterritory”asoneoftheresultsoftheSecondLebanonWar.

Appendix 2

Observations on Hizbollah Weaponry

Yiftah S. Shapir

The Second Lebanon War aroused much discussion as to the weaponsharbored and employed by Hizbollah.The following essay offers someobservationson the technicalaspectsof theweaponsusedbyHizbollahduring the war and their ramifications.

Rockets

Hizbollah’s use of rockets against Israeli civilian targets was theorganization’smostconsistentandblatantaggressivemeasureduringthehostilities,andingeneral,rocketstookonnewstrategicimportanceduringthe Second Lebanon War. According to figures supplied by the Israeli police,3,970rocketlandingsinIsraelwererecorded,withanaverageofover120rocketseachdayduringthethirty-threedaysofhostilities(table1).Hamasalsousesasimilarweapon,althoughfarmoreprimitive,andfires it from Gaza into nearby Israeli towns.

Table 1. RocketLandingandCasualtyData(accordingtoIsraeliPolice)

Galilee (Acre to Kiryat Shmona) 3,530 launchesCoastal region - (Acre to Hadera, including Haifa) 221 launchesValley region (Tiberias, Bet She’an, Afula) 217 launchesSamaria region 2 launchesTotal 3,�70 launchesLaunches into populated areas �01 launchesHome front casualties 2,412Deaths (of the total number of casualties) 52Shock (of the total number of casualties) 1,31�

224 I Yiftah S. Shapir

Rocketsareusedbyregulararmedforcesforspecialpurposesonly,anddonotappearinanymilitaryasthebackboneofartillerysupport.Militariescontinuetorelyontowedorself-propelledartillery.Hizbollah,however,prefers rockets for several reasons.First, rocket launchersare simple toproduceandoperate.Arocketislaunchedfromathinbarrelorrailthatisnot heavy or rifled like a cannon barrel. Unlike an artillery shell, there is no recoil,andthereforeitdoesnotrequirethecomplicatedrecoilabsorptionmechanismofcannons.Manylaunchingbarrelscanbemountedonalighttruckorjeep,andasinglelaunchingbarrelcanbeplacedonthebackofan animal or even a soldier. Second, artillery rockets provide firepower coverageforgreaterrangesthanstandardartillery:unguidedrocketsaregenerallyeffectiveupto100km.WarsawPactarmedforcesusedFROG-7 rockets for ranges of up to 70 km. Even today weapon systems suchas theRussianSmerch system (for rangesup to70km)or theChineseWS-1Bsystem(whichboastsarangeofupto180km)aremanufactured.Third,artilleryrocketsproviderapidanddensecover:aRussianBM-21launcher, for example, is capable of firing forty 122 mm rockets in less thanaminute.

Atthesametime,artilleryrocketshaveaninherentsetofdisadvantages.Rocketweaponsarefarfromaccurate:areasonablelevelofaccuracyisa range dispersal of between 1-1.5 percent. For relatively short rangesthey can be used against defined field targets, but for long ranges there is no point aiming them at specific targets. As a result, during the war therocketswerelaunchedagainstpopulationcenters.AlthoughHizbollahleaderNasrallahtriedtoclaimthatheintentionallydidnotaimtherocketsatthechemicalplantsintheHaifaBayinordertoavoidmasskillings,itisclearthatHizbollah’srocketattackswereaimedatcentersofpopulation.Inthesouth,theQassamrocketsareaimedbyHamasatpopulatedareas,forsimilarreasons.Thisusageofrocketshasmadeitaseriousstrategicthreat.

Special expertise is required for the manufacture of rockets thathave a reasonable degree of accuracy, and for longer range rockets themanufacturingprocessishighlycomplex.Inaddition,andthisisprobablythe greatest disadvantage, rocket fire produces large volumes of fire and smoke, which immediately exposes the launch location to the enemy.Therefore, rocket launchers must withdraw from their firing positions as

Observations on Hizbollah Weaponry I 225

soon as they finish shooting, although their high mobility level greatly facilitatesthisrapidexit.Inthecaseofguerillaforcesoperatingasinglebarrel, several launchers can be placed in the field, aimed at the target, and operatedbyremotecontrolorbyadelayed-actionfuse,therebypreventingexposure of the operators to counter-fire. This enables the attacking force to move quickly, hide, fire, and flee to other hiding places. This is anadvantagenotenjoyedbyregularartillerybatteries,whicharenotasmobile and are more difficult to conceal.

Hizbollah’s rocket system (table 2) was arranged in a number offormationsaccordingtorocketrange.Themainformationincludedseveralthousandshortrange107mm.and122mm.caliberlaunchers.Somewerefired from multi-barrel launchers that were moved around on small vehicles. Portablebarrelswereoccasionallytransportedondonkeysormotorcycles.Othersweremadeof static launchingbarrels installed in small bunkers(2 meters by 3 meters) positioned in well camouflaged areas with dense vegetation,sometimesinorchards.Missileswerestoredinnearbyhouses.Whiletheserocketshavearangeofnomorethan20km,thisformationmanaged to fire throughout the north of Israel. The launchers were elusive and the IDF had difficulty attacking them.

Thesecondformationincludedmediumrangerockets,withrangesofbetween35and70km.These included Iranian-madeFadjr rockets andSyrian-made220mm.rockets,whichwerelaunchedfrommobilelaunchersonheavycustom-madetrucks.ThisformationwasoperatedfromextendedrangesdeepinHizbollahterritory.Itismorecomplicatedtousethanthefirst formation, and while the launchers were operated from concealed positions, the IDF succeeded in identifying them immediately after therocketswerelaunchedanddestroyedthem.Thethirdformationincludedlongrangerockets–theZelzalrocketwitharangeofupto200km(whichextendstothecenterofIsrael).Thisunitwasatleastpartlydestroyedandwasnotusedinthewar.

Inrecentyearsattentionhasbeengiventothepossibilityofinterceptingrockets,mainlythebyproductoftheideaofinterceptingintercontinentalballistic missiles, from theAmerican Sprint system of the 1960s to theIsraeli Arrow system and anti-ballistic missile systems currently beingdevelopedintheUnitedStates.


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The Nautilus project (also known as Tactical High Energy Laser –THEL)wasestablishedinthe1990stoadvancerocketinterception.TheNautilussystemusesdirectedenergy,intheformofalaserbeam,directlyagainst rockets in flight. The laser beam is designed to generate heat that causestherockettoexplodeinmid-air.ThesystemusedchemicallasersandwastriedoutatmissilerangesintheUS.Followingthesuccessofthetechnologydemonstrationphase–inwhichthetechnologywasoperatedfromaheavyapparatustransportedonanumberoftrucks–developmentwork was started on the mobile model (MTHEL), the first model designed foroperationaluse.However,developmentofMTHELdidnotprogressbeyond the heavy experimental system and the work was shelved onfinancial grounds, after the US military lost interest in the system.

Despitetheattractivenessoftheidea,interceptingartilleryrocketsisavery complex matter. First, the flight duration of the rockets is relatively short–aboutonetotwominutes,forrangesof20-40km.Second,theyarelowsignature.Intermsofaradarcross-section,theyconstituteextremelysmall targets. True, the propellant has a significant signature (in the infra-red wavelength) while burning, but it operates for a few seconds only,and for most of the flight duration the rockets fly in a ballistic trajectory, withoutpropulsion.Third,theyarenormallylaunchedinlargesalvos.Asuccessfulinterceptionwouldbeonethathitsaveryhighpercentageofthesalvo,but theattackerwillalwaysbeabletosaturatethedefender’sdefensesystemswithmorerockets.

TheNautilussystemhadarelativelyshortrange,andthusdefenseofthe north of the country would have required deployment of dozens ofsystemsforlocalizedprotectionofstrategictargetsandpopulatedareas.Moreover,interceptionwasexpensive:eachlaser“launch,”atleastintheexperimentalsystem,costseveralthousandsofdollars.

Here the economic factor comes into play. A careful financial analysis showsthatrocketsdonotcauseagreatdealofdamage.Theirwidedispersalaroundtargetsontheonehand,andthedispersalofelementsliabletobehitinthetargetareaontheotherhand,meansthatthevastmajorityoftherocketslandinopenareaswithoutcausinganydamage,whileonlyasmallfraction actually hit targets and cause death and injury. However, coldcalculationisofnovaluewhenthecountry’sleadershipfacesasituationinwhichitscitizensareattackedintheirhomesbyenemyweapons.

22� I Yiftah S. Shapir

Nonetheless,acalculationofthissortmustbemadewhenconsideringthecostofdevelopingarocketinterceptionsystem,whichinturnwillfurnishthecostofinterceptingasinglerocket.Itispreciselysuchcalculationsthathavethusfaroverriddentheideaofdevelopinganartilleryshellinterceptionsystem, forexample.Noone thinks itworthwhile to investhundredsofmillionsofdollarsindevelopingsuchasystem.However,whenrocketsarefired at cities and political pressure is exerted on the country’s leadership, this consideration assumes a different shape. From the perspective ofthepoliticalleadership,theveryexistenceofatechnologicaloption–aslimitedasitmaybe–tointerceptrocketsconstitutesacrucialfactor,astheleadershipfeelsitisunabletowithstandtheinevitableargument,“Youcouldhavedonesomething,andyoudidn’t.”

Thus, once again, rocket fire impacts on weighty and costly political andmilitarydecisions,sinceitwaspreciselytheseconsiderationsthatledIsraeltobegindevelopingasystemsimilartotheNautilus.Itislikelythatinthewakeofthewarinthenorth,thereisagreaterchancethatIsraelwillinvestmoretodevelopthisorothersystemsdesignedtoachievethesameresult.

The main method of the IDF, and particularly the air force, to dealwiththeproblemofrocketlauncheswastheattempttohitthelaunchersthemselves.Theidealsituationis,ofcourse,tohitthelauncherpriortothelaunch.However,chancesofsuccessareslim,duetothelaunchers’lowsignature in the field and the difficulty of tracking them. The problem is less acutewithregardtoheavyrocketstransportedonheavyvehicles,whichareeasiertotracewhentheyleavetheirhidingplace.Theproblemismoreseriouswhenthelauncherisasinglebarrel,transportedonamotorcycleoradonkey,orconcealedinasmallbunkerinanareacoveredwiththickvegetation.

On theotherhand,as soonas the launchhasoccurred it is easier toidentify the launcher and pinpoint its precise location. The difficulty lies incompletingtheprocessofpinpointinganddirectingajettostrikethelauncher. This difficulty is illustrated by the attempt of the Americans to hitIraq’sScudlaunchersduringtheGulfWar.Despitethelaunchesbeingobserved from distances of hundreds of kilometers the American warplanesdidnotmanagetohitasinglelauncher.

Observations on Hizbollah Weaponry I 22�

InasmallareasuchassouthernLebanon,distancesdonotposesucha serious problem, although a mobile launcher can still disappear fromthe field within a few seconds, particularly in a built-up or forested area. Thusatleastwithregardtomediumandheavylaunchers,Israel’sairforceachievedhighly impressivesuccesses.Theseresultswereonlyachievedbyvirtueof the ability to complete thepinpointingprocess, connectingtheattackerwiththetargetsothattheattackerreachedthetargetbeforethe launcher could vanish. This is naturally more difficult when dealing withaverylargenumberoflightlaunchers,asusedbyHizbollahfromtheborderarea.

Anti-Tank Missiles

Hizbollah fighters used anti-tank missiles during the Second Lebanon War (table3).BeforethewartheorganizationwasknowntohaveAt-3SaggermissilesoritsIranianversion,i.e.,RaadandevenenhancedRaadmissiles,butessentiallythesewerethesamemissilesusedintheYomKippurWar.Inthesummerof2006itbecameapparentthatHizbollahhadmoreadvancedKonkursanti-tank(knownintheWestastheAT-5BSpandrel)andFagotmissiles (known in theWest as theAT-4 Spigot). However, the biggestsurprisetotheIDFweretheMetis-MandKornet-Emissiles,whichareanewergenerationofRussiananti-tankmissiles.ThesemissilesweresoldbyRussiatoSyriain2000.Thegreatadvantageofthenewmissilesliesintheirenhancedaccuracy,andthefactthattheycarrya“tandem”warhead.ThisheadwasdesignedtoovercomethereactivearmorusedbytheIDF(armorenhancement thatwasdevelopedby Israel following the lessonslearnedfromtheYomKippurWar).Theseanti-tankmissileswereusedinlargenumbersandagainstinfantryforceshidinginbuildings.

The endless race of new attack measures and countermeasures hasreached a new turning point. In 1973 the Egyptian army surprised theIDFwithitsuseofSaggermissiles.Sincethen,manydefensemeanshavebeendeveloped,themostprominentofwhichisreactivearmor.ThisisanIsraelidevelopmentusedtodaybymanyarmiesaroundtheworld.Anotherphenomenonisthegradualincreaseintheweightofarmoredvehicles.TheM-47vehicleusedinthesixtiesweighed46tons,whiletheM1A1AbramsandMerkavaweighinexcessof60tons.


Tab

le 3

.Ant

i-Ta

nkM

issi

les

inth

eA

rena

:Tec

hnic

alD

ata

Russ

ian

Nam

eW

este

rn

Nam

eIn

trod

uced

Mis

sile

W

eigh

tRa

nge

War

head

Ty

peAr

mor

Pe

netr

atio

nGu

idan

ce Ty

peSp

eed

Note

s

Mal

yutk

aAT

-3

Sagg

er36

�110

.� k

g50

0 m

. -3,

000

m.

Des

igne

d lo

ad (h

eat)

4�0

mm

Man

ual

Com

man

d to

Lin

e of

Sig

ht (M

CLO

S)

115

ms.,

26

seco

nds t

o m

axim

um

rang

e

Trac

k la

unch

ed; w

eigh

t of

“sui

tcas

e” la

unch

er -

appr

ox. 3

0 kg

; use

d in

larg

e qu

antit

ies i

n th

e Yom

Kip

pur

War

Mal

yutk

a-P

AT-3

c11

.4 k

g50

0 m

. -3,

000

m.

Des

igne

d lo

ad (h

eat)

520

mm

Man

ual

Com

man

d to

Lin

e of

Sig

ht (M

CLO

S)

Fago

tAT

-4

Spig

ot37

�113

.0

kg in

cl.

laun

cher

70 m

. -2,

000

m.

Des

igne

d lo

ad (h

eat)

4�0

mm

Sem

i-Aut

omat

ic

Com

man

d to

Lin

e of

Sig

ht (S

ACLO

S)

1�6

ms.,

11

seco

nds t

o m

axim

um

rang

e

Barre

l-lau

nche

d m

issile

, po

rtab

le; r

epla

ced

the

Sagg

er u

sed

by th

e Ru

ssia

n ar

my

Konk

urs

AT-5

Sp

andr

el37

�125

.2

kg in

cl.

laun

cher

75 m

. -4,

000

m.

Heat

650

mm

SACL

OS

200

ms.,

20

seco

nds t

o m

axim

um

rang

e

Barre

l-lau

nche

d m

issile

, pr

otot

ype

of th

e Fa

got,

with

ver

y sim

ilar f

eatu

res.

Norm

ally

tran

spor

ted

by

vehi

cle,

such

as t

he B

MP

arm

ored

per

sonn

el ca

rrier

Met

is-M

AT-1

32�

�113

.� k

g in

la

unch

er�0

m. -

1,50

0 m

.Ta

ndem

do

uble

load

�00-

1,00

0 m

mSA

CLO

S (b

eam

-ridi

ng?)

2�7

ms.,

�

seco

nds t

o m

axim

um

rang

e

The

new

gen

erat

ion

of a

nti-

tank

miss

iles –

repl

aces

the

Fago

t use

d by

the

Russ

ian

arm

y. Po

rtab

le m

issile

Korn

et-E

AT-1

42�

�127

kg

�0 m

. -4,

400

m.

Tand

em

doub

le lo

ad1,

100-

1,20

0 m

mSA

CLO

S (la

ser-b

eam

?)

Prot

otyp

e of

the

Met

is-M

; tra

nspo

rted

on

arm

ored

ve

hicl

es; r

epla

ces t

he

Konk

urs


The next phase in the race is already imminent: active protectionsystems(knownasDAS–defensiveaidssuite,orAPS–activeprotectionsystems). These systems are based on principles similar to those ofintercepting ballistic missiles. Combat vehicles will be fitted with various detectorsystemsthatidentifythecombatthreats–tankshellsoranti-tankmissiles–andwilloperatesystemsthatinterceptandneutralizethethreatat a safe distance from the defending vehicle. Detector systems can beradar-based, or based on optical identification in the fields of the visible, IR or UV, and laser detectors (for laser range detection or beam-ridingmissileguidancesystems).Interceptioncanbeimplementedbyamissile,but this is generally achieved by firing a spray load meant to hit and set off theapproachingmissile.

Such systems will offer a significant advantage when they reach technologicalmaturityandcanbe reliedon.Then itwillbepossible toreducetheweightofthecombatvehiclesconsiderablyanddefendagainstlightarmsonly(upto14.5mm),forwhichsuchprotectionsystemsarenotefficient. A vehicle with this kind of protection can protect not only itself butanearbyvehicleaswell.

Thereareseriousproblemswithdevelopingsuchsystems,duetotheneed to identify targets quickly, to assess if they present a direct threatto the defending vehicle (and are not aimed at another target, outsidethe range of self-protection), and to decide how to act and activate thecountermeasures.Inaddition,thecountermeasuresmustbedesignedsoasnottoendangerfriendlyforcesnearthedefendingvehicle.

Suchsystemsarecurrentlyatvariousstagesofdevelopmentaroundtheworld,andsomearealreadyoperational.InIsrael,theTrophysystemwasunveiledinearly2005(knownintheIDFasRaincoat,madebyRafael);IsraelAerospaceIndustrieshasunveiledtheIronFistsystem.Nodetailsofthesesystemsareyetavailable.However,evenifadecisionwasmadetopurchasethem,itwouldbealongprocessofseveralyearstoattainfullequipping,anditisquestionablewhethertheywouldhaveimpactedonthepatternsofthelastwar.Indeed,theTrophysystemwastestedbytheUSarmyandwasfoundtobeunsuitableforitsneeds.

As with any other technological innovation, it is easy to argue withhindsight thatanerrorwasmadebynot investing inequipping theIDFwithmaximumprotection.Suchanargumentisalwaysproblematicinthat


itdoesnot lookbackat the investmentalternativesand the informationin thehandsof thedecisionmakers in relation to each of the availablealternatives.BasedontheSecondLebanonWar,however,itisreasonableto assume that a significant effort will be made to acquire such protection systems.

Appendix 3

UN Security Council Resolution 1701

August 11, 2006

The Security Council, Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions425(1978),426(1978),520(1982),1559(2004),1655(2006)1680(2006)and1697(2006),aswellasthestatementsofitsPresidentonthesituationinLebanon,inparticularthestatementsof18June2000(S/PRST/2000/21),of19October2004(S/PRST/2004/36),of4May2005(S/PRST/2005/17),of23January2006(S/PRST/2006/3)andof30July2006(S/PRST/2006/35),

ExpressingitsutmostconcernatthecontinuingescalationofhostilitiesinLebanonandinIsraelsinceHizbollah’sattackonIsraelon12July2006,whichhasalreadycausedhundredsofdeathsandinjuriesonbothsides,extensivedamage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internallydisplacedpersons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same timeemphasizingtheneedtoaddressurgentlythecausesthathavegivenrisetothecurrentcrisis,includingbytheunconditionalreleaseoftheabductedIsraelisoldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivityof the issueofprisoners andencouraging theeffortsaimedaturgentlysettlingtheissueoftheLebaneseprisonersdetainedinIsrael,

WelcomingtheeffortsoftheLebanesePrimeMinisterandthecommitmentoftheGovernmentofLebanon,initsseven-pointplan,toextenditsauthorityoveritsterritory,throughitsownlegitimatearmedforces,suchthattherewillbenoweaponswithout theconsentof theGovernmentofLebanonandnoauthorityotherthanthatoftheGovernmentofLebanon,welcoming alsoitscommitmenttoaUnitedNationsforcethatissupplementedandenhancedin

234 I UN Security Council

numbers,equipment,mandateandscopeofoperation,andbearing in minditsrequestinthisplanforanimmediatewithdrawaloftheIsraeliforcesfromsouthernLebanon,

Determinedtoactforthiswithdrawaltohappenattheearliest,Taking due noteoftheproposalsmadeintheseven-pointplanregarding

theShebaafarmsarea,Welcoming theunanimousdecisionby theGovernmentofLebanonon

7August2006todeployaLebanesearmedforceof15,000troopsinSouthLebanonastheIsraeliarmywithdrawsbehindtheBlueLineandtorequesttheassistanceofadditional forcesfromUNIFILasneeded, tofacilitate theentryoftheLebanesearmedforcesintotheregionandtorestateitsintentiontostrengthentheLebanesearmedforceswithmaterialasneededtoenableittoperformitsduties,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

DeterminingthatthesituationinLebanonconstitutesathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,

1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, theimmediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediatecessationbyIsraelofalloffensivemilitaryoperations;

2. Uponfullcessationofhostilities,calls upontheGovernmentofLebanonandUNIFILasauthorizedbyparagraph11todeploytheirforcestogetherthroughouttheSouthandcalls upon theGovernmentofIsrael,as thatdeploymentbegins,towithdrawallofitsforcesfromsouthernLebanoninparallel;

3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of theGovernmentofLebanonoverallLebaneseterritoryinaccordancewiththe provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006),andoftherelevantprovisionsoftheTaifAccords,forittoexerciseitsfull sovereignty, so that therewillbenoweaponswithout theconsentof theGovernmentofLebanonandnoauthorityother thanthatof theGovernmentofLebanon;

4. ReiteratesitsstrongsupportforfullrespectfortheBlueLine;5. Also reiteratesitsstrongsupport,asrecalledinallitspreviousrelevant

resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and politicalindependenceofLebanonwithinitsinternationallyrecognizedborders,ascontemplatedbytheIsraeli-LebaneseGeneralArmisticeAgreementof23March1949;

Resolution 1701, August 11, 2006 I 235

6. Calls ontheinternationalcommunitytotakeimmediatestepstoextenditsfinancial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including throughfacilitatingthesafereturnofdisplacedpersonsand,undertheauthorityoftheGovernmentofLebanon,reopeningairportsandharbours,consistentwithparagraphs14and15,andcalls on it also toconsiderfurther assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction anddevelopmentofLebanon;

7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action istaken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the searchfor a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations,includingsafepassageforhumanitarianconvoys,orthevoluntaryandsafereturnofdisplacedpersons,andcalls onallpartiestocomplywiththisresponsibilityandtocooperatewiththeSecurityCouncil;

8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-termsolutionbasedonthefollowingprinciplesandelements:– fullrespectfortheBlueLinebybothparties;– security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities,

including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litaniriver of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weaponsotherthanthoseoftheGovernmentofLebanonandofUNIFILasauthorizedinparagraph11,deployedinthisarea;

– full implementationof therelevantprovisionsof theTaifAccords,and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require thedisarmamentofallarmedgroupsinLebanon,sothat,pursuanttotheLebanesecabinetdecisionof27July2006,therewillbenoweaponsorauthorityinLebanonotherthanthatoftheLebaneseState;

– no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of itsGovernment;

– nosalesorsupplyofarmsandrelatedmaterieltoLebanonexceptasauthorizedbyitsGovernment;

– provisiontotheUnitedNationsofallremainingmapsoflandminesinLebanoninIsrael’spossession;

9. Invites the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon aspossibleagreementsinprinciplefromtheGovernmentofLebanonandtheGovernmentofIsraeltotheprinciplesandelementsforalong-termsolution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to beactivelyinvolved;

236 I UN Security Council

10.Requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevantinternationalactorsand theconcernedparties,proposals to implementtherelevantprovisionsoftheTaifAccords,andresolutions1559(2004)and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of theinternational borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where theborder is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaafarmsarea,andtopresenttotheSecurityCouncilthoseproposalswithinthirtydays;

11.Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers,equipment,mandateandscopeofoperations,toauthorizeanincreaseintheforcestrengthofUNIFILtoamaximumof15,000troops,andthattheforceshall,inadditiontocarryingoutitsmandateunderresolutions425and426(1978):(a) Monitorthecessationofhostilities;(b) AccompanyandsupporttheLebanesearmedforcesastheydeploy

throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as IsraelwithdrawsitsarmedforcesfromLebanonasprovidedinparagraph2;

(c)Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with theGovernmentofLebanonandtheGovernmentofIsrael;

(d)Extenditsassistancetohelpensurehumanitarianaccesstocivilianpopulationsandthevoluntaryandsafereturnofdisplacedpersons;

(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards theestablishmentoftheareaasreferredtoinparagraph8;

(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implementparagraph14;

12.ActinginsupportofarequestfromtheGovernmentofLebanontodeployaninternationalforcetoassistittoexerciseitsauthoritythroughouttheterritory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas ofdeploymentofitsforcesandasitdeemswithinitscapabilities,toensurethat its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of anykind,toresistattemptsbyforcefulmeanstopreventitfromdischargingits duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protectUnitedNationspersonnel,facilities,installationsandequipment,ensurethe security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,humanitarianworkersand,withoutprejudicetotheresponsibilityoftheGovernmentofLebanon, toprotectciviliansunder imminent threatofphysicalviolence;

Resolution 1701, August 11, 2006 I 237

13.RequeststheSecretary-GeneralurgentlytoputinplacemeasurestoensureUNIFILisable tocarryout thefunctionsenvisagedin thisresolution,urges Member States to consider making appropriate contributions toUNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from theForce,andexpressesitsstrongappreciationtothosewhohavecontributedtoUNIFILinthepast;

14.Calls upontheGovernmentofLebanontosecureitsbordersandotherentrypointstopreventtheentryinLebanonwithoutitsconsentofarmsorrelatedmaterielandrequestsUNIFILasauthorizedinparagraph11toassisttheGovernmentofLebanonatitsrequest;

15.Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures toprevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vesselsoraircraft:(a) Thesaleor supply toanyentityor individual inLebanonofarms

andrelatedmaterielofalltypes,includingweaponsandammunition,militaryvehiclesandequipment,paramilitaryequipment,andspareparts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in theirterritories;and

(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of anytechnicaltrainingorassistancerelatedtotheprovision,manufacture,maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above;exceptthattheseprohibitionsshallnotapplytoarms,relatedmaterial,trainingorassistanceauthorizedbytheGovernmentofLebanonorbyUNIFILasauthorizedinparagraph11;

16.Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31August 2007, andexpresses its intentiontoconsiderinalaterresolutionfurtherenhancementstothemandateandotherstepstocontributetotheimplementationofapermanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17.RequeststheSecretary-GeneraltoreporttotheCouncilwithinoneweekontheimplementationofthisresolutionandsubsequentlyonaregularbasis;

18 Stressestheimportanceof,andtheneedtoachieve,acomprehensive,justandlastingpeaceintheMiddleEast,basedonallitsrelevantresolutionsincludingitsresolutions242(1967)of22November1967,338(1973)of22October1973and1515(2003)of18November2003;

19.Decidestoremainactivelyseizedofthematter.

23� I Contributors

Contributors

Dr.Yehuda Ben Meir,INSSprincipalresearchassociate,formerdeputyministerofforeignaffairs

Brig.Gen. (ret.)Shlomo Brom, INSSsenior researchassociate, formerdirectorofStrategicPlanningintheIDF

Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, INSS senior research associate, formerheadoftheNationalSecurityCouncil

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Meir Elran, INSS senior research associate, formerdeputyheadofMilitaryIntelligenceintheIDF

Prof.Yair Evron,INSSadjunctprincipalresearchassociate,DepartmentofPoliticalScienceatTelAvivUniversity

Brig.Gen.(ret.)Amos Gilboa,formerheadoftheResearchDivisioninIDFIntelligence

Dr. Mark A. Heller, INSS principal research associate and Director ofResearchatINSS

Dr. Col. (ret.) Ephraim Kam, INSS principal research associate anddeputydirectorofINSS

Brig.Gen.(ret.)Yossi Kuperwasser,formerheadoftheResearchDivisioninIDFIntelligence

Contributors I 23�

Dr.Anat Kurz,INSSseniorresearchassociate

Prof.David Menashri,headoftheCenterforIranianStudiesatTelAvivUniversity

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Romm, adjunct INSS senior research associate,formerly assistant commander of the IAF and IDF attaché in theUnitedStates

Yoram Schweitzer,INSSseniorresearchassociate

Yiftah S. Shapir,INSSseniorresearchassociate

Dr.Col.(res.)Gabriel Siboni,INSSresearchassociate

Prof.Asher Susser,DepartmentofMiddleEasternStudies,seniorresearchfellowattheMosheDayanCenterforMiddleEasternandAfricanStudiesatTelAvivUniversity

Maj.Gen.(ret.)Aharon Ze’evi Farkash,INSSseniorresearchassociate,formerheadofMilitaryIntelligenceintheIDF

Prof.Eyal Zisser,DepartmentofMiddleEasternStudies,directoroftheMosheDayanCenterforMiddleEasternandAfricanStudiesatTelAvivUniversity

Documents

The Second Lebanon War - Strategic Perspectives