The Shanghai Cooperation Organization And the Security of

Hoyt, David

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CISAC HONORS THESIS

The Authoritarian Club:

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

And the Security of Central Asia

Hoyt, David

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project, the culmination of my undergraduate career and by far the most difficult project I

have ever undertaken, would never have been possible without the mentorship, help, support,

and love of many people.

Dr. Crenshaw, Dr. Felter, and Daniel Cassman, thank you for running an unforgettable thesis

program. From the adventures in Washington through the trials of researching this topic, you

made this project worth it. Thank you for putting up with my topic, for always believing in me

despite my initially sluggish progress, and for being willing to read this behemoth.

Dr. Thomas Fingar, thank you for the inspiration that led me to choose this topic in the first

place. But most importantly, thank you for the guidance and mentorship you have shown me

throughout my entire Stanford career. You were an instrumental part of my Stanford journey and

I would not be who I am today if you had not guided me.

To my fellow CISAC honors students, it was a pleasure working alongside with each of you.

Thank you for putting up with my ramblings on Central Asia and my obsession with Grand

Strategy. Without you and the ability to commiserate this project would have been much more

daunting; instead you made it something we could smile and laugh.

To Stanford University, thank you for giving me a home, a future, a passion, and the three most

wonderful years I could ever have dreamed of. I am grateful every day to be a part of the small

19 person transfer class in the fall of 2010.

To all my friends who encouraged me throughout this process and made me smile when it

seemed impossible. To my favorite dorm, Grove, and its wonderful residents who checked in

with my project every day and kept a countdown going all while cheering me onward. Special

thanks to Ryan Mayfield and Daniel Reynolds for helping peer edit this monstrosity; you are

brave souls to tackle my passive voice constructions and I am so very grateful for your help and

for your friendship.

To Julia Ishiyama, you are the best friend and thesis writing partner I could ever have asked for.

Without all of the encouragement working through three straight weeks of all-nighters, I don’t

know if this project would have been completed.

To the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation and all of my ‘Cooke Cousins,’ thank you so much for

giving me and all of my fellow scholars the opportunity to attend the dream schools of our

choice. The gift of an education is priceless and you have changed each of our lives and given us

a family of like-minded, passionate scholars.

To the professors, administrators, and peers from Mercer County Community College, thank you

for providing me with a second chance. It is not often in life that we get to start over and make

amends for the past. You allowed me to reenter education and fall in love with learning. Without

each of you I could never have made it here.

Hoyt, David

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To my co-workers and bosses and students at the Princeton YWCA and especially to Barbara

Griggs, you saved my life. I owe the Y so much. Barb, thank you for helping me get my life back

and learning the great parables of life through service. Without the lessons of optimism and

determination I gained under your tutelage, I would be unable to write these words here.

To the order back on the east coast: Kellen, Chris, JR, Rudy, Evan, Ryan, Mike, you guys are the

best friends anyone could ask for and I am so grateful you have been there with me and for me

throughout the whole journey.

And to Max, Irene, and Charles – the best family ever. Thank you for starting me early with

stories of adventures and then teaching me the life lessons and skills to make sure I could live

those stories for real. Thank you for always being there for me. I love you all.

Hoyt, David

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Abstract

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), comprised of Member States China, Russia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is arguably the most under-researched

multinational regional security organization in the world. The SCO enables its Member States to

pursue diplomatic, security, economic, and soft power goals but remains primarily an institution

focused on security. Within its mandate, the SCO holds the prime security goal of combating the

‘Three Evils’ of Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism. However, the top-down political

oppression used by the SCO Member States in their pursuit of these security goals is more likely

to be the catalyst that creates the root causes of the ‘Three Evils’ indicating that the SCO may be

a long-term threat to state and regional security in Central Asia. When pursuing sensitive or

contentious issues within the SCO, the consensus decision-making institution of the SCO often

prohibits the SCO from acting as the national interests of the SCO member-states tend to

conflict; the Central Asian republics fear loss of political autonomy and China and Russia,

though tacit allies in the face of US influence, are often in direct regional competition. The SCO

does challenge US interests. The large-scale exercises represent a latent geopolitical threat to

U.S. interests Meanwhile, the so-called ‘Shanghai Spirit’ of SCO norms seeks to create an aegis

that protects the authoritarian regimes within the organization from the spread of U.S. norms

and democracy while reducing U.S. influence and relative power to take the first steps in

recreating a multipolar world.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Acknowledgments iii

Abstract iv

CHAPTER I: Introduction and Argument 001

1.1 - Thesis Argument and Why the SCO Matters 001

1.2 -- Structure and Scope of this Study 004

CHAPTER II: Getting to Know Central Asia – A Brief Regional History 009

2.1 - What Constitutes Central Asia? 010

2.2 - Russia and China: Early Engagements on the Steppes 011

2.3 - The Great Game 012

2.4 - Soviet Central Asia 015

2.5 - A ‘Brotherly’ Fight – The Sino-Soviet Split 019

2.6 - Chechnya – Russia’s Near Abroad Headache 021

2.7 - China – The Trouble with Xinjiang 024

CHAPTER III: The History, Organization, and Purpose of the SCO 027

3.1 - History of the Membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 028

3.2 - Structure of the SCO 032

3.3 - Success of the ‘Shanghai Five’ Treaties 035

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3.4. – An Exclusive Club 038

3.5 - SCO Goals and Principles 045

3.6 – SCO Practices 048

3.7 - Conclusion 054

CHAPTER IV: The SCO vs. the ‘Three Evils’ 055

4.1 – Introduction and Definition of the ‘Three Evils’ 055

4.2 - Evil 1: Extremism - Radical Islam and other Competing Ideologies 058

4.3 - Evil 2: Separatism – Threats to Existing Regimes 074

4.4 - Evil 3: Terrorism 100

4.5 - Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS) 131

4.6 - Final Analysis of the SCO’s Effect on Combating the Three Evils 138

CHAPTER V: National Interests-Their Effect on SCO Consensus Decision-Making 142

5.1 - The United States in Central Asia 145

5.2 - The National Interests of the SCO Great Powers: Russia and China 158

5.3 - The National Interests of the Central Asian States 182

5.4 - How Strategic Interests Play Out Within the SCO 191

CHAPTER VI: The SCO vs. the West. Is the SCO Anti-America? 205

6.1 - SCO Joint Operations and Peace Missions 206

6.2 - The Shanghai Spirit a Threat? 232

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CHAPTER VII: The Future of the SCO and Policy Implications for the US 242

7.1 - Summary of the Answers to the Major Questions about the SCO 243

7.2 - The Question of Afghanistan 250

7.3 - Policy Implications and Recommendations 257

7.3 - The Future of the SCO 262

Appendixes 264

References 281

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APPENDIXES

NAME Page #

A1: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States 264

A2: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Observer States 264

A3: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Dialogue Partners 264

A4: Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 265

A5: Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism 268

A6: Chapter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 274

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Commonly Used Abbreviations and Acronyms

AQ – Al-Qaeda

ASEAN - The Association of South East Asian Nations

CACI - Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization

EAEC - Eurasian Economic Community

ETIM - East Turkistan Islamic Movement

ETLO - East Turkistan Liberation Organization

EU – European Union

EurAsEc - Eurasian Economic Community

FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FSB – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

FSU – Former Soviet Union

HRIC – Human Rights In China

HT – Hizb-ut-Tahrir

IJU - Islamic Jihad Union/Group

IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IMT - Islamic Movement of Turkistan

IRP - Islamic Renaissance Party

IRPT - Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan

MIRT - Movement for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan

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MIRU - Movement for the Islamic Revival of Uzbekistan

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

PLA – People’s Liberation Army

PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PRC – People’s Republic of China

RATS – Regional Anti-Terror Structure

SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization

TIP – Turkistan Islamic Party

UN - United Nations (UN)

US – United States of America

USSR – Soviet Union

UTO - United Tajik Opposition

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CHAPTER I: Introduction and Argument

1.1 - Thesis Argument and Why the SCO Matters

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the most important regional

organization that most Westerner foreign policy observers ignore or do not even know exists.

The SCO was founded in 2001 based on a group of five nations who met in Shanghai in 1996

and were clichéd the Shanghai Five. After Uzbekistan joined the forum, the now six nations

formally organized the SCO. The six SCO member states are: China, Russia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO’s founding mandate authorizes the

organization to manage regional issues concerning but not limited to terrorism, Islamic

fundamentalism, separatism, economic development, and energy in an effort to promote regional

stability. Despite sweeping pronouncements made by the SCO heads of state, the number of SCO

actions taken during the organization’s twelve year existence has been minimal. Perhaps as a

result, to date there has been a dearth of Western scholarship reporting on the SCO other than

oblique references within articles examining energy concerns or terrorism in Central Asia. The

Brookings Institute research on the SCO states that:

Perhaps no other regional organization is less consistently or objectively studied than the

SCO…The basic facts about the organization are so laxly tracked that even prominent

authors mistakenly include all five Central Asian states as official members… in their

best-selling books.1

This quote reveals the underlying paradox of the SCO. The SCO’s founding members include

two of the world’s great non-western powers. If one includes all its observer states, the SCO

1 Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?”

(Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011), accessed 30 Nov 2012,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghai%20cooperation%20organization%20bola

nd/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland, 6.

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghai%20cooperation%20organization%20boland/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland


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account for 45% of the global human population2. The SCO also only includes non-Western

countries and operates in such an unstable region of the world – a region likely to become more

unstable as the US withdraws in 2014 and leaves Afghanistan. Yet, ‘why has the SCO, given its

scale and scope, received so little academic attention’ is the principal motivation for the

undertaking of this study.

Despite being underappreciated in academic literature, researchers are now increasing

their focus on the SCOs as a result of the escalating international security risks present in

modern-day Central Asia. Given the plastic nature of Central Asia post-2014, The SCO can

potentially play a crucial role in shaping the future of the region. Consider, for example, the

following critical policy questions that should be queried regarding SCO’s role in Central Asia.

How does Afghanistan’s stability hold enormous implications for regional stability? The

United States intends to finish its current combat mission in Afghanistan by 2014;

however, a stable Afghanistan remains an unrealized dream. As the US commitment

winds down, few regional security organizations exist to fill the geopolitical vacuum that

the American withdrawal will create. Among those few organizations with the

opportunity to provide regional stability is the SCO.

How many of the SCO Member States possess the perfect draconian political and

security apparatuses for top-down suppression of political voice, human rights, and

religion, which when fused with undeveloped economic conditions, high unemployment,

and low levels of education becomes, as demonstrated in Middle Eastern states such as

2 Alyson Bailes, J. K. Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”,

Vol. 17, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Policy Paper, (Stockholm May 2007),

Voltairenet.org. Voltaire Network, accessed Mar. 2013. <http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/SIPRI-

Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf>. 4.

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Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a potential breeding ground for violent extremism.3 How the

SCO acts as a security force protecting against the ‘Three Evils, of Terrorism,

Separatism, and Extremism’ may affect the political development of these Central Asian

Republics as well as what violent extremist threats these regimes inadvertently spawn in

the future.

How does the very composition of the SCO Member States raise basic questions

regarding the organization’s intentions? Of considerable interest to even a casual

observer is the fact that the SCO contains two great powers, China and Russia, that hold

national interests that often conflict with those of America. The other Member States are

also highly authoritarian and Iran and Pakistan are attempting to join as well. Thus, from

the perspective of the interests of Western actors, the question ‘Should the SCO be

feared as a regional competitor to US interests’ is often raised by US observers.

Historically, American academics are always behind the proverbial curve when it comes to

Central Asia. This lack of deep understanding has hurt US national interests on numerous

occasions. In the 1990s, the lack of knowledge about Afghanistan and the transnational terrorist

threat growing within allowed Al-Qaeda to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks. A lack of understanding

of Afghanistan and the factors needed to build its political-economic institutions stymied military

efforts for over a decade. Although the above four questions are by no means exhaustive, these

essential queries demonstrate the need, especially given the dangers posed by the current

nontraditional security threats of Central Asia, of an in-depth understanding the SCO for

academics and policy-makers alike.

3 L. Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11”, ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).

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This study undertakes a serious effort to rectify the dearth of critical academic work

regarding the SCO, specifically its security dimension. The primary question of this thesis is,

‘Has the SCO been successful in achieving its stated security goals and how does this impact US

interests in the region?’ In particular this thesis will examine the primary question through the

following secondary questions: (1) Does the organizational structure of the SCO enable it to

pursue its security goals in the face of competing national interests? (2) How have SCO actions

taken to combat the ‘Three Evils’ affected Central Asia’s security and stability? (3) Does the

SCO represent a threat to the US interests? (4) What are the implications of these findings for the

SCO’s future and what options should US policy makers pursue with regards to the SCO? This

study will address these questions in turn through a qualitative analysis and help illuminate the

world’s most unknown regional organization.

1.2 - Structure and Scope of this Study

This paper will be structured around topics that aim to answer the secondary questions in

sequential order. There will be no formal literature review for this paper. Although the SCO

crops up as tertiary information occasionally in other books focused on Central Asia (usually to

describe specific points), only a few in-depth academic sources exist that are focused directly on

the organization. As a result, any literature review on the SCO would be severely limited in

scope. The information that would normally comprise a literature review will instead be

distributed into the respective chapters as part of the overall effort to answer the secondary

questions. In this way, the information should be more useful in drilling down to a better

understanding of the SCO. While this investigative approach may be a departure from the norm,

it will be more effective for the long-term success of this honors thesis.

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Chapter II will cover a brief regional history of modern Central Asia. Although this

historical overview is by no means expansive, many readers may be unfamiliar with the region of

Central Asia outside of Afghanistan. This background will give readers enough understanding of

the historical context of the enduring regional trends so as to better understand the SCO and the

conclusions this paper seeks to reach. Key trends that emerge from this historical analysis are

first how Soviet actions taken in Central Asia to divide and rule the states led to most of the

enduring problems of the region; this ingrained dependence on the Soviet Union into the political

framework of these states so that when they became independent in the 1990s they struggled to

govern themselves. The trend of historical repression of Islam has carried on since the fall of the

Soviet Union. China and Russia have both been players in Central Asia for two centuries but

share a historical animosity. Finally, the trend of failed revolts against government oppression

where the losing side retreats into Afghanistan has endured until today.

Chapter III outlines the SCO as an organization from the limited academic research

available that cover the history and structure of the SCO. The SCO was initially founded as the

Shanghai Five in 1996 after helping deescalate border tensions between China, Russia and the

new Central Asian republics. The Shanghai Five morphed into the SCO in 2001 with the addition

of Uzbekistan and since then has expanded to include numerous Observer States and Dialogue

Partners. However, the mechanisms for joining the SCO are not articulated and no new Member

States have been added as of 2013. The bureaucracy of the SCO divides into the Secretariat and

the Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS). The SCO is involved in a myriad of actions related

to security, economic, and soft power operations.

Chapter IV begins to address the stated secondary questions by focusing on, “How have

SCO actions taken to combat the Three Evils of Extremism, Separatism and Terrorism, affected

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Central Asia’s security and stability?’ The Chapter divides into a subsection on each ‘Evil’ and

reviews the background literature and history on that evil to understand the threat posed to each

SCO Member State in turn. Extremism appears to be generally overblown as a threat throughout

the SCO Member States (Russia is an exception) and is often legitimate politically marginalized

Islamic groups who are labeled as radicals. Separatism was a much larger threat throughout the

1990s as multiple SCO Member States dealt with secession, uprisings, and civil wars; since the

turn of the century, Separatism has come to represent democratic movements and political

challenges to regime stability. Terrorism tied directly to failed Separatism threats and the ability

for terrorists to base themselves in Taliban-run Afghanistan. The US invasion crippled the

majority of the regional terrorist actors leading to the reduction of the threat. RATS, the SCO’s

multilateral initiative, has had limited success and may exist for extra-judicial extraditions. The

SCO appears to actually create the ‘Three Evil’ threat it fears through its repressive policies to

stamp them out and the US has been more active than the SCO in defeating terrorist threats.

Chapter V will focus on answering the next secondary question, ‘Does the organizational

structure of the SCO enable it to pursue its security goals in the face of competing national

interests.’ As the SCO decision-making process is conducted on a consensus norm, all nations’

national interests must theoretically be in relatively close alignment to allow the SCO to act. This

chapter examines first the US regional interests in order to understand the extent of Eurasian

pushback before examining the national interests of each SCO member state in turn. Russia

aspires to regain its great power status and re-exert influence throughout the region. China seeks

to enter Central Asia to protect its strategic rear of Xinjiang as to expand influence and economic

gain. China and Russia work well at the surface level when their interests align, such as blocking

American influence, but their numerous conflicting interests make this a fragile relationship that

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is unlikely to endure. The Central Asian states, meanwhile, strive for a multi-vector diplomacy to

play the great powers against each other in order to avoid being dominated; Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan in particular seek limited hegemony over their fellow Central Asian republics. The

consensus norm leads to a difficulty in decision-making and commitments among SCO Member

States; this trend is likely to increase as the US leaves the region.

Chapter VI addresses the third secondary question, “Does the SCO represent a threat to

the US and/or NATO’s interests.” In the past, Cold War legacy fears of Russia, fears of a rising

China, and hostility toward Central Asia conjured by the War in Afghanistan and the terror

attacks of September 11th

, have led many observers to mistrust the intentions of the SCO. There

are two potential threats to US interests presented by the SCO. First is the hypothetical

conventional threat of joint military exercises conducted by the SCO such as the Peace Missions.

Although the SCO currently lacks the institutional capacity to make it a security bloc comparable

to NATO, these exercises are conducted to achieve objectives directly contrary to US interests.

The second case study is the normative threat of the ‘Shanghai Spirit.’ A study by Thomas

Ambrosio reveals that these norms are designed to insulate the SCO Member States from

democracy promotion and delegitimize any and all actions taken to change the regimes in power.

The Shanghai Spirit is also designed as an alternative model to the US-led international system

and implicitly seeks to weaken US relative power and influence.

Chapter VII handles the final secondary question, “What are the implications of these

findings for the SCO’s future and what options should US policy makers pursue with regards to

the SCO.” This Chapter presents as an overarching conclusion and analysis by summarizing and

synthesizing the findings of the other secondary questions. These findings are then applied to

understand the SCO’s potential role in the aftermath of the 2014 US withdrawal from

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Afghanistan. Despite pundits’ calls for the SCO to take a bolder step in Afghanistan, this

outcome is highly unlikely; a combination of SCO national interests and the lack of institutional

capacity indicates that the SCO is unlikely Afghanistan’s savior. Finally this study concludes

with a list of recommendations for US policymakers and an analysis of how the SCO will

develop in the near future.

The lack of existing scholarship on the SCO leaves many other avenues for research open

that are not addressed in the above chapters. This study has purposely narrowed its focus strictly

to security issues. Regionally, this study will not focus on efforts dealing directly with Central

Asian energy geopolitics and Central Asia water shortages among the other issues that are woven

into the SCO security mandate. In addition the effect of the SCO on human rights and economic

development will not be dealt with directly despite their important impact on understanding the

SCO. Some of these issues may be mentioned when they coincide with the research effort but

otherwise will not be delved into deeply. Further scholarship can and should address these other

aspects of the SCO.

Finally this thesis makes extensive use of the limited sources on its subject matter. Every

effort has been taken to cite these faithfully and accurately so as to best give credit where credit

is due. This study has attempted to take an honest assessment of the SCO and the actions and

intentions of its Member States. Invariably this has often led to criticism (often sharp) of the

policies enacted on the part of SCO Member States and the organization as a whole. These views

represented are those of the cited authors and of the author of this study. The views presented are

not intended to represent the views held by Stanford University or Stanford’s Center for

International Security And Cooperation (CISAC).

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CHAPTER II: Getting to know Central Asia –

A Brief Regional History

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded with the core goals to

address the threats to the national security of the Member States defined by the SCO as the Three

Evils of Extremism, Separatism, and Terrorism. These threats to Member State national security

are caused by the deep-rooted issues of economic underdevelopment, transnational terrorism,

regional independence movements, and religious-sectarian tensions that have plagued Central

Asia for centuries. Upon deeper analysis, Central Asia’s chronic security issues all derive

directly from its turbulent history. Central Asia is a unique region of the world famous for its

insular geography, intemperate climates, rich natural resources, Turkic culture and language, and

ancient trade and migration routes. Central Asia is also a region unique for its tribal larceny,

ethnic conflicts, internecine politics, separatist movements, irredentist obsessions, sectarian

violence and religious extremism. The natural buffer zones created by the geography of Central

Asia has been a fatal attraction to empires, large and small, foreign and local, secular and

religious, civilized and tribal, modern and ancient, throughout history and for the last two

millennia.4 It is also a region poorly understood and frequently misunderstood by outsiders.

Many of the structural problems that plague Central Asia in the 21st century have their

origins in the policies pursued first by the Czarist Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union

when they ruled over Central Asia. The principal catalyst for these policies was the geopolitical

struggle between Russia and the West for supremacy in Central Asia. Rudyard Kipling made

famous this duel between the world’s Great Powers with his immemorial description, ‘the Great

4 Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia in World History”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126-121.

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Game,’ a violent conflict that began in the 19th

century, ran through the 20th

century and

continues into modern times. To understand how all of the above relates back to the formation of

the SCO, the creation of its institutional goals and objectives, and its development, it is first

necessary to understand the history of Central Asia. This chapter presents an abbreviated review

of that history. The most important takeaway for the reader should be how cyclical the trends of

trials and tribulations that occur in Central Asia are and how Central Asia’s present and future

are heavily constrained by its tragic past. In later chapters, these observations will manifest with

shocking regularity and undeniable importance for the SCO.

2.1 - What Constitutes Central Asia?

Given the ambiguity of the term, a clear definition of what comprises Central Asia must

first be established. Each effort of literature revolving around Central Asia defines Central Asia

differently based upon the effort’s scope and the time period it illuminates. Central Asia lacks

stable border definitions and what constitutes as this region has changed over time.5 In the past it

has included China’s Xinjiang province, Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, etc.6 While other sources

include members of the caucus states as part of Central Asia. For the purposes of this analysis,

the Central Asian States will be defined as: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and

Turkmenistan. Thus, when this paper refers to the Central Asian States, the aforementioned five

states are being referenced. Afghanistan is sometimes included in Central Asia while other times

it falls in South Asia groupings of states. Including Afghanistan as a Central Asian State will

complicate the above grouping of states for three main reasons: first it is not a member state of

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, second America’s War in Afghanistan adds many new

5 Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia History in World”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 116-121.

6 R. A. Mullerson, “Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game”, (London: Kegan Paul, 2007),

4.

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factors that are unique to any analysis of Afghanistan, and third Afghanistan’s close ties and

shared geography with Pakistan make adding Afghanistan to the definition of Central Asian

States too complicated. Although other states will of course be referenced as necessary

(including Afghanistan), the designation of ‘Central Asian State’ will refer only to the

aforementioned five states.

2.2 - Russia and China: Early Engagements on the Steppes

In the 17th

Century, Russian and Chinese competition for control of Central Asia began in

earnest. The Russian Empire and China’s Qing Empire faced a serious challenge from the

Jungars, a Central Asian Empire that originated from the Oirat peoples of Inner Mongolia. By

1677-8, the Jungar leader, Galdan, had transformed the Jungars into a powerful counter-weight

to the Russian and Chinese imperial powers. Galdan demonstrated just how serious a threat he

was to these two rival empires after he successfully brought Tibet and Xinjiang under Jungar

control. In response, first the Russians tried draw Galdan into an anti-Qing coalition, then the

Chinese tried to recruit him with an offer to control those Mongols not already ruled by the Qing;

Galdan successfully played both sides off of one another. In the end, Galden’s reach exceeded

his grasp, and his territorial expansion pushed the other Mongols closer to the Qing. In 1696, the

China’s Qing forces destroyed the Jungars and by 1698, had assassinated Galdan.

The Jungar threat returned between the years 1717-1720. Once again, the Jungar actions

pushed Tibet toward the Qing sphere of control. On the other side of the Jungar Empire, the

Kalmyks, who were members of the Altay tribes of Southern Siberian and also implacable foes

of the Jungars, switched allegiances and joined sides with Russia in exchange for protection. In

1757, the Qing finally ended Jungar threat by destroying the last great Steppe Empire and

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thereby crushing Central Asia’s hopes of producing a great power in the centuries to come. In the

aftermath of the Jungar demise reversals, large parts of Central Asia became subjugated under

Imperial Russian or China’s Qing rule.7

2.3 - The Great Game

In the 19th

century, the era of the ‘Great Game’ began. The Great Game represented “The

vast power struggle between Russia and Great Britain for control of Asia that used Central Asia

and Afghanistan as pawns in their efforts to outmaneuver each other, and build influence.”8 The

Great Game is a succinct concept for strategic struggle that has colored all great geopolitical

power interactions in Central Asia. At the same time, the Great Game has become a paradox of

expression for a highly romanticized adventure that belies a hopelessly violent geopolitical

struggle for supremacy in the Central Asia region. In 1716, the Russian Empire started building

forts in Central Asia and advanced progressively southward, year by year. These encampments

allowed Russia to subdue all of Central Asia’s Kazakh Khans by 1750. “The Russian expansion

was fueled by the empire’s vast military and bureaucratic apparatus, which had subdued the

Caucasus and was now without a mission as the Tsars eyed the potential resources of Central

Asia: minerals and cotton.”9 The advent of outside great powers eyeing Central Asia’s rich

natural resources is a trend that has parallels to the modern times where today’s Great Powers

once again covet the vast array of Central Asians’ hydrocarbon, hydropower, and mineral wealth.

7 Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia in World History”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 116-121.

8 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 24.

9 Ibid.

Hoyt, David

13

Interestingly, the American Civil War10

is credited with starting the Great Game. This

150 year geopolitical struggle to control Central Asia began when all supplies of cotton from the

American South’s Confederates, normally sent to Czarist Russia and Great Britain, were cut off

by the American North’s Union blockade. At same time, Russia watched with growing concern

the steady expansion of the British Empire around the world and especially into Central Asia.

Great Britain was in the process of consolidating her colonial holdings in Central Asia, which

then revolved around India and extended south to Bengal and northwest toward Afghanistan.

Over time India became the crown jewel of the British Empire and the primary source of much

of her empire’s wealth. India’s cotton yields as well as many other riches sustained the English

Empire into the mid-20th

century. Not surprisingly, the British viewed with national indignation

Russia’s southward advancement and relentless effort to absorb the various tribal lands in

Central Asia as nothing less than geostrategic angling to pry India from the British Crown.11

In the end, Afghanistan became the obvious solution to keep the two empires from

clashing, and in the nineteenth century, with its impenetrable mountain borders, became a buffer

state between the two great empires.12

Throughout history, Afghanistan, with its natural

mountain borders and fertile valleys has been home to a tribal mix of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks,

Turkmens, and Mongols, while its ancient cities became the junctions connecting East and West

trade routes, religious pilgrims and migration networks on the Silk Road between Beijing and

Venice. Today few Westerners are aware that Afghanistan became a modern state in 1747, after

a nine-day-long council of elders elected Ahmad Shah Durrani as their leader who quickly

consolidated the surrounding regions and outmaneuvered the Russians and fought two wars with

10

The American Civil War lasted from 1861 to 1865. 11

Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 24. 12

Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia History in World”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 123-24.

Hoyt, David

14

the British. The Durrani Khan produced Afghanistan rulers for the next 240 years until the last

descendant was assassinated by the Taliban in 1978.13

To say Afghanistan has a war-torn history may be an understatement. Afghanistan has

been invaded throughout history by the Mongols, Deli Sultanate, Tamerlane, Mughals, Han,

Persians, Alexander, Qing, Jungars, Russians, British, French, Mujahedeen, Taliban, Al Qaeda,

and the Americans. Afghanistan, with its mountain borders and central location became the

battlefield for many of History’s great geopolitical struggles in Central Asia. Over time

Afghanistan developed a reputation as a graveyard for empires and History’s pivot points. Thus,

the agreement the reached by the Russians and the French that recognized Afghanistan as a

buffer state started a trend that has continued into modern times.14

Russian imperial ambitions in Central Asia were not easily stopped. Between 1865 and

1876, “Russian armies captured Tashkent and much of modern-day Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,

and Tajikistan.”15

The Afghan-Tajik border was left open and many tribal leaders and bandits

would flee between the different territories. Russia established the territory of Turkestan and

located its capital in Tashkent, where it was ruled by Moscow’s appointed governor-general.

Some nomadic tribes continued to resist throughout the Fergana Valley. Russian troops dispersed

tribal revolts in 1885 and again in 1889. To gain control of this region, the Russian government

resettled the region with ethnic Russians and Cossacks and then turned the lands over to cotton

production. Later Russia linked the region into the Russian Empire with a rail network in order

to better control Central Asia.16

Russia governed at a distance and “sought to keep Central

Asians divided and isolated from ‘harmful’ modernizing ideas such as democracy…over time

13

Stanley A. McChrystal, “My Share of the Task: A Memoir”, (New York: Portfolio, 2013), 377. 14

Patrick O'Brien, ed., Atlas of World History,2nd ed. Rev.,(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2010). 15

Ahmed Rashid, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia: (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 24. 16

Ibid., 24-5.

Hoyt, David

15

[these] policies perpetuated backwardness.”17

These policies that Russia adopted for the region

became the genesis of direct Russian influence in Central Asia. Years later this official policy

was credited with being largely responsible for the absence of modernization in Central Asia

during the 19th

and 20th

centuries.18

2.4 - Soviet Central Asia

Central Asia’s modern history begins with World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution.

World War I drew all of the great powers into a struggle for empire. Russia’s weak political and

economic institutions, rising civil discontent, and inept war effort coalesced to imperil the

empire. In 1916-17, the government was overthrown, the Tsar and his family were deposed, the

military resigned, and the Russian Empire collapsed. Shortly thereafter, Central Asia succumbed

to famine, influenza, revolt, and the politicization of the population due to anti-Russian

sentiments. Bolshevism spread rapidly outward from Russia and soon arrived in Tashkent, an

ancient and important city on the Silk Road.

In 1918, Tashkent became the capital of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist

Republic, a newly independent state that was founded as the bastion for Bolshevik ideas in

Central Asia. The Bolshevik declaration of human rights sparked an ideological revolution in

Central Asia that included an Islamic Revival, nascent Central Asian nationalism, and the ideas

of Pan-Turkism. The Russian Bolsheviks tolerated this flowering of ideas until they had defeated

the White Russian opposition armies in 1923. Then they quickly re-conquered Central Asia,

instituted a single-party rule, and imprisoned or purged thousands from every intellectual group

that opposed Bolshevik orthodoxy. Many thousands of Central Asians died during this

17

Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia in World History”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126-128. 18

Ahmed Rashid, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia: (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 24.

Hoyt, David

16

consolidation of Bolshevik rule. Just as fast as it began, the nascent ideological revolution of

Central Asia was squashed in its infancy. The ensuing political vacuum was quickly filled by

what was later called the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Within a few short years,

Central Asia was once more cut off from the outside world as the newly formed Soviet Union

slammed shut its borders. These same borders would remain closed to the outside world for

Central Asia until the Soviet Union collapsed and her former republics emerged again as newly

independent states seven decades later.19

Soviet intervention in the affairs of Central Asia did not stop after the Bolshevik

reconquered Turkistan. Groups of Central Asians started an uprising in 1917 known as the

‘Basmachi Revolution.’ Muslim Traditionalists and Independent guerilla groups from Turkistan

and throughout the entire Central Asian region fought for a variety of ideological causes that

happened to overlap in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. However, their disunity of cause

weakened their struggle and the uprising was brutally suppressed by the Soviets in 1929. Tens of

thousands of surviving supporters of the Basmachi Revolution fled to Afghanistan in an

analogous event that foreshadows the Soviet Invasion in 1979, the Mujahedeen wars in the

1980s, subsequent rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the 1990s and the US invasion in 2001.20

After the 1929 uprising in the Soviet state of Turkistan, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin

redrew the borders of Soviet Turkistan into five separate states whose new boundaries were

designed to keep them purposely disjointed and subservient to Soviet Russia. The five Central

Asia states that subsequently came into existence are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The most fertile part of Central Asia, the Fergana Valley, was

19

Ahmed Rashid, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia”, (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 32-35. 20

Karl E. Meyer, “The Dust of Empire: The Race for Mastery in the Asian Heartland), (New York: The Century

Foundation, 2003).

Hoyt, David

17

split three-ways among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The artificial borders had their

desired effect and thus divided clans, villages, and ethnic groups so that the ancestral cultural and

economic centers for one ethnicity were routinely placed in another state and vice versa. Stalin’s

policies led to many of the modern ethnic and sectarian tensions, general infrastructure problems,

and border and water disputes still plague Central Asia.21

After Stalin’s division of Central Asia’s borders, the Soviets began to expand their

control and sought to remake the new Central Asian Soviet Republics into the Soviet model. The

first Soviet step was implementing the system of forced land collectivization, which also helped

destroy the nomadic culture in Central Asia. Tens of thousands of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz fled to

China, and many more died from murder or starvation. Following collectivization, the Soviets

tried to eliminate Islam in Central Asia. Although all religions were targeted in the Soviet quest

to remove ideologies counter to Communism, “Islam was particularly targeted because it was

considered backward and reactionary, and because the Soviets feared it.”22

Religious repression

ebbed and flowed like the ocean tide. It receded temporarily during World War II and again in

the 1960s when the Soviets created ‘official Islam’ to permit a limited but tightly controlled

degree of Islam among the population by essentially co-opting the religion. Each relaxation of

the reigns was followed by a more repressive crackdown. The final crackdown occurred under

Gorbachev who pursued another anti-Islam crusade during Perestroika because he associated

Islam as an anti-modernizing ideology. Consequently, Islam went underground during Soviet

21

Karl E. Meyer, “The Dust of Empire: The Race for Mastery in the Asian Heartland), (New York: The Century

Foundation, 2003). 22

Ahmed Rashid, “The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia”, (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 35-8.

Hoyt, David

18

rule throughout all of the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union reached its twilight years,

however; there arose an ideological vacuum inside Central Asia.23

During this era, understanding of the tenets of Islam among Central Asian Muslims was

at its lowest point. Thus conditions were ripe for people in Central Asia to be very susceptible to

a new wave of radical ideologies that sought to capitalize on this vulnerability through

ideological exploitation.24

This concern for the acute ideological vulnerability of the citizenry

continues to the modern day, except it transforms into an outright fear that can consume the

leaders of the some Central Asian regimes. Many of these rulers are despots who rule by decree

but who see Radical Islam as a threat to their national security that is spreading throughout the

Central Asian States and taking root amongst the populace. Years of religious oppression,

however, have left Central Asian leaders afraid of most forms of Islam and often unable to

discern Muslim from Islamist.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In response, the United States began a

covert war in the 1980s against the Soviet forces. The US started initially funneling money and,

later, shoulder-fired “stinger missile” and other arms to the Mujahedeen, the Muslim guerrilla

fighters in Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). By the time the

Soviet Union’s forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, the ISI, along with elements in Saudi

Arabia, had distributed money and arms to many different militant groups that yearned to create

an Afghanistan nation founded on Islamic principles; some of these factions would later form the

Taliban government that the United States is presently fighting.25

Furthermore, Central Asians

who had been conscripted by the Soviets to fight the Mujahedeen returned home with a

23

Ibid., 36-46. 24

Ibid. 25

Steve Coll, “Ghost Wars”, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 3-266.

Hoyt, David

19

surprising respect for their foes and a collection of radical Islamic ideas. A few years later the

Soviet Union ceased to exist and in 1991 the Central Asian states were left to their own means to

survive.26

Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sowed the seeds of many of the security

threats that still persist within Central Asia. Today, the Taliban and militant Islamist groups are

considered prime threats by many Central Asian regimes. A decade later, these regimes would

form the SCO in order to combat these threats of Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism that

they viewed as threats to their national security.

2.5 - A ‘Brotherly’ Fight – The Sino-Soviet Split

Adding to the complexity of great power relations in Central Asia important for the

SCO’s founding was the Sino-Soviet split, which was a major turning point in the Cold War. To

the Western world at the time, Soviet Russia and Communist China seemed a perfect partnership

and a threat to Western interests and ideals. However, this relationship struggled from the very

start. The Chinese link with Russia came through the world Communist movement and the few

thousands of Chinese Marxists who traveled to Moscow before and right after WWII for

intensive study and leadership training. This influence began in the 1920s but even if the Russian

and Chinese communists drew closer “they did not necessarily become greater friends.”27

Stalin

had supported the Nationalist Chinese as late as 1945 in an effort to support Russian interests in

Manchuria; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership could not forgive this error. Thus,

26 Ahmed Rashid, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia”, (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 6-7.

27 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, “China: A New History”, 2nd enl. ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 378.

Hoyt, David

20

“The Sino-Russian linkup was tenuous and could dissolve as soon as the CCP began to develop

its own style of national communism.”28

The relationship began to come apart in the 1950s. First, it is The Russians used China as

a pawn to fight the Americans in the Korean War (1950-53).29

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev

was a public critic of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and “he and Mao did not get along.”30

Furthermore, in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis that could have led to hostilities between China

and the US, “the Soviets refused to back China up and then reneged on their earlier promise to

give China an atomic weapon.”31

In the mid-1960s, Khrushchev withdrew all Soviet technicians

from China signifying an official falling out point. China responded by publicly blasting Soviet

Russia with ideological attacks. “By 1963 this altercation between the two parties was being

made public to the whole world.”32

The split intensified and hostility increased as time passed. “Incidents began to occur

along the 4,000 mile border, and Soviet forces were built up accordingly.”33

The Chinese found

the Brezhnev doctrine of “where a communist regime had been established, it could not be

allowed to be subverted” to be very aggressive sounding.34

In addition, a Chinese ambush of a

Russian patrol on a disputed island in China’s northeast boundary on March 2, 1969 brought the

28

John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, “China: A New History”, 2nd enl. ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 378-79. 29

Paul Lashmar, “Stalin’s ‘Hot’ War”, New Statesman and Society, 9.388 (February 2, 1996): 24. 30

Fairbank, Ibid., 379. 31

Ibid. 32

Ibid., 379-80. 33

Ibid., 396-97. 34

Ibid., 397.

Hoyt, David

21

tension to the breaking point. The Soviet retaliation was vigorous at this site and at other points

along the border where incidents erupted putting the Chinese under pressure.35

These incidents caused significant troop pressures to be increased along the border.

“Initially 25 Soviet divisions were deployed along the [4,673 mile] Sino-Soviet frontier.”36

A

Soviet-Mongolian defense treaty in 1966 moved two Soviet divisions plus air assets to Mongolia.

China viewed this as a “‘fist in the back’”37

as they were within striking range of Beijing. After

the 1969 skirmish, “45 Soviet divisions were deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, confronting

70 less well-equipped Chinese divisions, while Soviet frontline aviation was increased from 200

to 1,200 aircraft. By the 1980s, “one quarter of the Soviet ground forces, were stationed in the

Soviet Far East and Mongolia” and were supported by the nuclear forces, the Soviet Pacific

Fleet, and political alliances with North Korea (at that time favoring its relationship with Russia

over China) and Vietnam.38

The level of force deployment in the split should not be

underestimated and left a very difficult starting place for Sino-Russian relations after the Cold

War.

2.6 - Chechnya – Russia’s Near Abroad Headache

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, while free of having to

manage the five Central Asian states, tried to control its former republics through its ‘Near

Abroad’ foreign policy. Difficult challenges arose for Russia from a different geographical

location shortly thereafter. In the northern Caucasus (a region sometimes grouped with Central

35

John Kind Fairbank and Merle Goldman, “ China: A New History”, 2nd enl. ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 397. 36

Maria Raquel Freire, and Roger E. Kanet, “Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the

‘Great Game'”, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 127.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

Hoyt, David

22

Asia), the autonomous republic of Chechnya (population 1.2 million) sought independence.

Chechens are deeply committed to the Sunni branch of Islam and have a long history of fierce

resistance to Russia dating back to the 19th

century. In 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin

installed General Dzhokhar Dudayev, a Soviet army officer, to lead the Chechen republic.

However, Dudayev announced his support for Chechen independence shortly after taking his

post and formally declared Chechen independence in November 1991.39

In 1994, Yeltsin’s government moved to stop Chechnya’s separatist movement toward

independence. Russian xenophobia feared the fact that given 18 percent of Russia’s population

was non-Slavic, and then any decision permitting Chechen independence on ethnic grounds

would set a dangerous precedent that could threaten the entire Russian Federation. This concern

was not an isolated fear given that “In eight regions of the Russian Federation movements for

autonomy or independence were becoming increasingly vocal.”40

Chechnya also had an oil

pipeline that transferred oil from the Caspian oil fields to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.41

Russian security, stability, and economic interests were thus felt threatened by separatist forces

necessitating the first of many interventions to protect Russian interests in its traditional sphere

of influence.

The resulting conflict was a bloody six-year intermittent conflict that extracted a terrible

toll of suffering upon the Chechens. Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, was subjected to air

attacks and invasions and “it is estimated that during the first two years alone sixty thousand

Chechens lost their lives and much of the capital was reduced to rubble.”42

The Russians also

39

Abraham Ascher, “Russia: A Short History”, Rev. ed., (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 236-37.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Abraham Ascher, “Russia: A Short History”, Rev. ed., (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 237.

Hoyt, David

23

suffered about twenty-five thousand causalities. The setbacks and failures of the Russian Army

exposed the army as an “undisciplined, ill-equipped force that could not defeat a small country

that officials denigrated as a haven for bandits and terrorists.”43

The war seemed to end in

August 1996 when an agreement with the Chechens was signed that “grant[ed] them ‘political

autonomy,’ a concept so vague that many commentators predicted, correctly, that the conflict

would be resumed.”44

The 1998 peace treaty did not end the Russian-Chechnya conflict. Chechen terrorist acts

continued throughout the end of Yeltsin’s presidency and into the start of his successor, Vladimir

Putin. Although Yeltsin promised to be tougher, it was Putin who exercised extreme toughness to

gain the support of his Russian citizen base by giving them security. Putin vowed “to ‘kick the

shit’ out of the Chechen terrorists.”45

Putin ordered the Russian Army back into Chechnya and

within eight months pacified the region and rescinded the virtual independence Chechnya had

won in 1998. After the Russian siege of Grozny the United Nations report described [Grozny] as

“the most destroyed city on earth.”46

Reliable causality statistics are notoriously difficult to

ascertain. But it is clear that Russia employed brutal tactics in order to suppress the separatist

threats that threated to allow Chechnya to remain a seceded province.

Russian actions in Chechnya symbolized the start of a Russian view of the threat

presented by Central Asia. Putin was given a broad mandate that allowed authoritarianism in

response to the extremist attacks – a mandate he has used in the years since. In addition, Russian

fears of Chechnya explain why Russia fears Separatism, Extremism, and Terrorism as the

43

Ibid., 238. 44

Ibid. 45

Ibid., 242. 46

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

24

Chechens represented all three in Moscow’s eyes. Russia, like its other great power counterparts,

started the 21st century with concern over the security on its borders.

2.7 - China – The Trouble with Xinjiang

The Chinese are drawn into Central Asia through a combination of historical precedent,

ethnic diaspora, and territorial control. The primary security concern that keeps China involved

in Central Asia are China’s western most Autonomous provinces, specifically Xinjiang, whose

Mandarin spelling translates to “New Frontier.” China has had an irredentist obsession with

Xinjiang for two and a half centuries, ever since the 1758 defeat of the Jungar Mongols by the

Qing dynasty. Today, “Official Beijing claims that Xinjiang has been part of China for at least a

millennia.”47

Many academics contend that China’s claims notwithstanding, its irredentist hold on

Xinjiang has always been of a tenuous nature. First in 1816, Jahangir, a scion of the line of

descendants from the original rulers of Turkistan before the Manchu Qing Conquest, launched a

devastating invasion of Chinese Turkestan. The Qing reconquered the area in 1827 and Jahangir

was executed.48

In 1865, Yakub Bek, a Muslim warlord, took Xinjiang back from the Chinese

and held it under his own authority until he died in 1877. The Great Game also transcended into

China’s power politics in Central Asia as Russia debated seizing territory from Yakub Bek.49

Xinjiang managed to seek independence once more during the chaos the surrounded the

fall of the Qing dynasty. In this chaos, a series of warlords commanded Xinjiang. “They held

47

R. A. Mullerson, “Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game”, (London: Kegan Paul, 2007),

106. 48

John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, “China: A New History”, 2nd enl. ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 197-98. 49

Mullerson, Ibids., 107.

Hoyt, David

25

power, while fending off encroachments from Russia/USSR and the Chinese Republican (KMT)

government. All of them faced unrest from the local Turkic Muslims.”50

In 1921, the Uighur

name was resurrected to promote Uighur nationalism by East Turkestan intellectuals. “The

majority of the Turkic-speaking population adopted this common designation.”51

In 1944,

Uighur uprisings created the East Turkestan Republic. The KMT and CCP forces were at that

point distracted by the war with Japan.52

In addition to the Uighur Separatist threat; during the

period following the end of World War II and before Mao Zedong had reconstituted modern

China; Stalin made “serious preparations for the takeover of Xinjiang.”53

This effort by Stalin

included the arming of Uighur and Kazakh fighters, creation of military bases, and infiltration of

Soviet agents until Mao persuaded Stalin otherwise.54

Finally, in 1949 the Chinese Communist

Party, that had just gained victory in the Chinese Civil War, took control of the region and

dismantled East Turkestan Republic and suppressed Uighur Nationalism.55

Since the latest Chinese acquisition of Xinjiang, the actual integration of Xinjiang into

China proper has proved very difficult. During the Cultural Revolution, “large numbers of

Chinese were settled there, putting the demographic dominance of the local Muslim people in

jeopardy.”56

Since then the “Uighur resistance and separatist movements have developed…such

as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement [and] have adopted violent tactics and are considered

50

Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia In World History”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 138. 51

Ibid. 52

Ibid. 53

R. A. Mullerson, “Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game”, (London: Kegan Paul, 2007),

106-7. 54

Ibid. 55

Golden, Ibid. 56

Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia in World History”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 138.

Hoyt, David

26

terrorist organizations with possible ties to Al-Qaeda.”57

This new movement forms the

foundation of the security threat that the Chinese leaders fear in Xinjiang.

China thus has always had a strained and irredentist relationship with Xinjiang. The

Xinxiang culture has been non-Han, driven by ethnic affinities and religious beliefs, and very

different from that of Beijing. Every time China is weak, Xinjiang province in particular

expresses its irrepressible separatist tendencies and attempts to seek independence. Furthermore,

Xinjiang province has historically generated terrorist movements and violence against Han

Chinese. Given the cultural links between Xinjiang and the Uighurs and the people of Central

Asia, China knows that it must work with Central Asia in order to co-op any outside influence

that could weaken its hold on Xinjiang. Thus, this fear of vulnerability on its western border

keeps China focused on Central Asia.

57

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

27

CHAPTER III: Shanghai Cooperation Organization –

History, Organization, and Purpose

The SCO, like many successful international organizations, developed over time based

upon the institutional norms adopted in response to the needs of its membership. These same

factors are what give the SCO its institutional uniqueness as an organization. To understand the

SCO’s efficacy, especially within the scope of this study, this Chapter will examine the SCO’s

founding history, organization structure, treaty origins, membership issues, organizational norms,

and strategic goals and practices. The discussion in this Chapter provides critical insight into the

factors that originally drove the creation of the SCO and continue to guide its decision making

today. A fact that must be emphasized to the readers is the fact that before the creation of the

SCO the individual Member States had never trusted each other enough even to consider forming

a group with outsiders to meet the threats to their national security. Recall, that three of these

countries had until recently been vassal states of one of the other Member States for the prior 70

years). Thus, a careful reading of the original treaties that brought together the SCO’s processor,

the “Shanghai Five”, reveals why these countries were willing to put aside their past in order to

meet the new security challenges of the present. These treaties also provide invaluable insight

into the mandate for the SCO and its operational agenda. Since its inception the SCO has

become an exclusive club where membership is highly coveted. The SCO’s purpose and goals

prioritize national security over the concerns of economic development, energy, soft power, etc.

As such, our focus is confined to security. Therefore, this Chapter will present the history of the

SCO organization in order to prepare the reader for the analysis found in the later chapters.

Hoyt, David

28

3.1 - History of the Membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The SCO’s origin can be traced to five neighboring nations located in Central Asia, (later

referred to as the Shanghai Five), that include China and, Russia, as well as Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (these last three became newly independent states after the Soviet

Union imploded in 1989), who came together as participants in the China-Soviet/Russia border

issue negotiations.58

In April 1996, at a meeting in Shanghai convened by China, the leaders of

the Shanghai Five settled their mutual border concerns by signing the Treaty on Deepening

Military Trust in Border Regions in Shanghai. The Shanghai Five’s initial goal, necessitated by

the Soviet Union’s collapse, and reflected in the treaty’s title was to “deepen military trust,

reduce military forces in border regions, and define China’s borders with the [five] nations.”59

As

Kuralai Baizakova of Kazakhstan University presciently observes, “The main factor pushing

these countries toward closer ties was the threat to the security of their borders emanating from

the chief source of instability in Central Asia—Afghanistan, where a civil war had broken out

between the Northern Coalition and the Taliban.60

The Sino-Soviet split, as discussed in Chapter II, had left a military buildup on both sides

of the Soviet-Chinese border. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, creation of the Central

Asian Republics, and end of the Cold War, the member states of the SCO needed a mechanism

to unwind the region’s existing military preparations and replace them with a structure that

would encourage and facilitate mutual security. The initial agreement above, signed in 1996,

58

Jing-Dong Yuan, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, November

2010, Journal of Contemporary China”, 860. 59

Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?”

Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011, accessed Nov. 30, 2012,



60

Kuralai Baizakova, “The Shanghai Cooperative Organization’s Role in Countering Threats and Challenges to

Central Asian Regional Security”, January 2013, Russian Politics and Law 51, no. 1, Academic Search Premier,

EBSCO assessed May 10, 2013, 61.



Hoyt, David

29

became the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions, and formed the essential

building block for by these five states to achieve this goal. The Shanghai Five reconvened in

Moscow, in 1997, and signed a second treaty, known as the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of

Military Forces in the Border Area. The Member countries in the Shanghai Five continued to

stabilize their relations through a series of bilateral agreements on frontier delineation, trade, and

cooperation.61

The Shanghai Five leaders not only signed a multilateral agreement but also

agreed to meet with some regularity indicating that “a mechanism for regular meetings had been

created, but also that it had begun to function.”62

The details of these agreements will be

discussed later in this chapter. With border issues settled, the Shanghai Five next addressed

additional mutual issues and took another large step forward when they announced in the 1998

Almaty Summit Joint Statement, “for the first time, the member states…would unite to combat

terrorism and that none would allow its own territory to be used for activities that harm the

sovereignty, security, and social order of another member state.”63

In addition, regular channels

of communication were fostered among prime ministers and government agencies.64

In June 2001, Uzbekistan, which does not border China, joined the Shanghai Five. The

six nations, acknowledging the need to tackle long-term issues, signed an agreement officially

forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization thereby institutionalizing this forum to a higher

61

Alyson Bailes, J. K. Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”,


Voltairenet.org. Voltaire Network, accessed Mar. 2013, http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/SIPRI-

Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf, 4. 62



EBSCO assessed May 10, 2013, 61. 63

Eugene B. Rumer, Dmitriĭ Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, “Central Asia: Views From Washington, Moscow, and

Beijing”, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 141. 64

Jing-Dong Yuan, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”,

November 2010, Journal of Contemporary China, 19(67), 860.

http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/SIPRI-Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf


Hoyt, David

30

level of regional cooperation.65

As will be discussed in Chapter IV, Uzbekistan, which had

initially rejected joining any regional security bloc, eventually relented because of to pressure to

respond to internal and regional security threats generated by the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Taliban. Thus, internal and regional security and terrorism threats

were catalysts that drove the formation of both the Shanghai Five and the SCO. Security related

issues such as terrorism and militarism were to become enshrined at the core of the SCO’s

founding objectives and in the process caused other issues related to economics or soft power to

be overshadowed in importance.66

As the SCO created its own bureaucratic structures, deepened its inter-member

cooperation, and expanded its goals, it began to form relations with non-member nations and

multilateral groups. To differentiate these new relationships from core members, the SCO

created the status of an Observer State in 2004. The SCO originally had no institutional

mechanism for adding new states in any capacity. Mongolia was inducted as the first Observer

State in 2004 and thus represented the impetus for the SCO to create the ad-hoc Observer State

position to differentiate the non-member position from that of a Member. Mongolia was

followed by Iran, India, and Pakistan who all join as Observer States in 2005. Afghanistan also

slowly joined the fold of the SCO in 2005 and the SCO created the SCO-Afghanistan Contact

Group to institutionalize its contact with Afghanistan. Brookings states that this was done both

with the understanding of Afghanistan’s impact on regional stability and to balance out the

65


Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011, accessed 30 Nov 2012,


nd/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland, 10. 66

M. S. Ashimbaev, “New Challenges and New Geopolitics In Central Asia: After September 11”, (Almaty: KISI

pri Prezidentom RK, 2003), 83-4.



Hoyt, David

31

Western coalition forces in the region.67

Afghanistan also became an Observer State in June of

2012.68

Turkmenistan, the final Central Asian State, has a strict foreign policy of neutrality and

refuses to join the SCO in any formal capacity. Instead Turkmenistan participates as a guest and

as such is allowed to attend meetings of the SCO but has no say in the organization. This special

exception for Turkmenistan allows the last Central Asian State to be nominally involved with the

SCO in order to make sure that the entire region is represented at the SCO. In 2010, the SCO

approved an agreement permitting the admission of additional Member states, but despite

petitions by several Observer states, no new members have been admitted.

In addition to Member States and Observer States, the SCO also has other types of

foreign relationships. For example, the SCO also has Dialogue Partners. Belarus, despite

requesting observer status, and Sri Lanka were inducted as the inaugural Dialogue Partners in

2009.69

Turkey is the newest Dialogue Partner having joined in June 2012 during SCO’s most

recent annual Summit at the same time as Afghanistan became an Observer State.70

Furthermore, the SCO concludes Memorandums of Understanding with other multilateral

organizations. The SCO has a Memorandum of Understanding with the following organizations:

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 2005, the Association of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN) in 2005, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC or EAEC) in 2006,

67


Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, (20 June 2011), accessed 30 Nov 2012,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghai%20cooperation%20organization%20bol

d/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland,10. 68

Ria Novosti, "Afghanistan SCO Observer Status 'Will Help Fight Terrorism, Drugs,'" Ria Novosti (Moscow,

Russia), June 14, 2012, Accessed December 11, 2012. http://en.rian.ru/world/20120614/174027013.html. 69

Boland, Ibid. 70

Xinhua, "SCO Accepts Afghanistan as Observer, Turkey as Dialogue Partner," China Daily, (Beijing, China),

June 7, 2012, Accessed December 13, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-6/07/content_15483673.htm.

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghai%20cooperation%20organization%20bolnd/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghai%20cooperation%20organization%20bolnd/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland

Hoyt, David

32

and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2007.71

The SCO also received

observer status with the United Nations (UN) in 2004 and then, in 2010 “signed a Joint

Declaration on Cooperation between the UN and SCO Secretariats.”72

Lastly, the SCO is

working on building economic and cultural relations with the European Union (EU) and the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) by attending mutual forums.73

It

should be noted that the United States, which petitioned the SCO for Observer status but was

rejected in 2006, is conspicuously absent from the SCO’s list of cooperating nations.

Thus by 2013, the SCO had built relations with a large segment of the international

community. Each diplomatic linkage with other members of the international community further

enhances the SCO’s legitimacy. Furthermore, the increasing number of states who want to

interact with the SCO validates the SCO’s rising legitimacy and growing political capital within

the international community. The extent of clout the SCO carries in international relations is not

intuitively obvious to most Western observers and policymakers at present. However, the

unequivocal message of the focus and momentum that the SCO is applying toward expanding its

membership pool and diplomatic relations suggests that at the bare minimum, the SCO not only

is here to stay, but also needs to be taken a lot more seriously by Western international trade and

defense institutions.

3.2 – Structure of the SCO

71Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?”




Ibid. 73

Ibid.



Hoyt, David

33

The bureaucratic structure of the SCO has evolved alongside the organization’s member

pool and scope. The SCO at its core is comprised of two standing bodies. First is the Secretariat,

which is based in Beijing, China. The Secretariat is overseen by a Secretary General who serves

a three-year term. The second body is the Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS – a terrible

acronym name which is often maligned in the literature), is based in Tashkent, the capital of

Uzbekistan.74

The SCO’s structure, staff, and procedures are subject to a general ongoing review

and can be the cause of later disagreements, compromise, or reforms among member states.75

Thus, there is an air of impermanence to the SCO. Although it has not been changed drastically

since its inception, the members, in respect of their inviolable sovereignty, are not bound by firm

agreements within the SCO and all agreements are always open to later redress as circumstances

change. Thus, deep commitments are in short supply.

The main event for the SCO each year is the Annual Heads of State Summit. The summit

is hosted on a rotating basis among the different SCO Member States. The heads of state, heads

of government, foreign ministers, and defense ministers of the SCO Member States meet

throughout the year to prepare for this summit. The Secretariat and ministerial-level officials

compile an agenda and deliverables that each of the SCO Member States can agree to in

advance. The SCO functions on a consensus basis so all actions must be agreeable to all

members. As such, the summits are rote events with all major events scripted in advance.76

As

74


Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011, accessed 30 Nov 2012,













Hoyt, David

34

the entire process is preplanned, members are able to avoid losing face if negotiations were to

break down over an issue. Most working meetings within the SCO are dominated by security

issues. These meetings now include experts on information security, secretaries of national

security councils, and heads of supreme courts. There have been efforts to bring together other

government sector leaders and experts as well including for example speakers of parliament.77

Thus, the SCO’s political capacity and expertise have grown since its conception as more

technocrats are involved in preparing the decision-making.

RATS exists as a hub of information exchange between the security services of the SCO

and its Member States and conducts analytical work with a special focus on anti-terrorism and

counter-narcotic trafficking. Upon closer examination, RATS confirmed the singular purpose of

the SCO is to eliminate security threats to the Member States. In 2004, it received slightly more

funding than the Secretariat with RATS receiving $3.1 million to the Secretariat’s $2.6 million.

As of 2006, the staff of RATS numbered 30: seven from Russia and China each, six from

Kazakhstan, five from Uzbekistan, three from Kyrgyzstan, and two from Tajikistan.78

In terms of

bureaucratic funding and support, RATS appears to be treated as a vital part of the SCO. The

President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, claimed in a 2011 Op-ed in the Moscow Times

that, “Between 2004 and 2011, the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure prevented more

than 500 terrorist acts and saved thousands of lives.”79

However, specific information on the



77 Alyson Bailes, J. K. Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”,


Voltairenet.org. Voltaire Network, accessed Mar. 2013. http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/SIPRI-


Ibid., 5-6. 79

Nursultan, Nazarbayev, Nursultan, "The Smart Power of the SCO" Russia & India Report. Rossiskaya Gazeta -

Russia Behind the Headlines, 15 June 2011, Web. 20 Mar. 2013,

<http://indrus.in/articles/2011/06/15/the_smart_power_of_the_sco_12648.html>.





Hoyt, David

35

practical successes and effects engendered by RATS is difficult to obtain. The relative successes

and failures of RATS in combating the ‘Three Evils’ will be examined in Chapter IV.

3.3 - Success of the ‘Shanghai Five’ Treaties

As previously discussed in section 3.1, the ‘Shanghai Five’ passed two major treaties in

order to stabilize the border regions in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The

success of these initial treaties created the political space for the SCO to form due to gradual

successes through negotiations. The conflicts from 1969 between the Soviet Union and China

left this long border distinctly militarized and caused increased tensions and uncertainty as the

Soviet Union vanished. The border talks between China and the Soviets were half completed

when the USSR vanished. In 1989, China and the Soviet Union “initialed the Sino-Soviet

Agreement on the Eastern Section of the Border.”80

The Western portion of the border was only

45 kilometers in length and had yet to be resolved. However, the borders between China and the

new Central Asian states were expansive: over 1,700 kilometers with Kazakhstan, roughly 1,000

kilometers with Kyrgyzstan and approximately 450 kilometers with Tajikistan.81

These borders

presented a threat to security, stability, and territorial integrity; these imperatives forced China to

act in order to secure itself.

The negotiations between the aforementioned parties were difficult but in the end proved

fruitful. The negotiations were conducted as two parties, with China representing the first party

and the other four states of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan representing the

second party. In September 1994, the parties resolved the differences on the western section of

the Sino-Russian border – the very same area where the 1969 clashes had occurred. This

80



Ibid.

Hoyt, David

36

breakthrough was a huge step forward for Sino-Russo relations. On the heels of the 1994

success, the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions was signed by the five

counties on April 26, 1996.82

This Treaty contained the following provisions:

Military forces deployed in border regions will not attack each other;

No side will conduct military exercises that are targeted against the other;

The scale, range and number of military exercises are to be limited;

Each side will inform the other of important military activities scheduled to be conducted

within 100 kilometers of the border;

Each side will invite the other to observe military exercises that involve the use of live

ammunition;

Dangerous military activities are to be avoided; and

Friendly communications between military forces and frontier guards in border regions

should be promoted.83

The treaty provided the framework for new negotiations that led to the next treaty in 1997.

This new treaty became known as the Agreement among Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,

and Tajikistan. The 1997 Treaty is distinguished by the fact it was negotiated by the five

counties as equals and who later became the genesis for the Shanghai Five. This change

demonstrated the growing ability of the Central Asian republics to govern themselves

independently of Russia. The 1997 Treaty agreed to the following provisions:

Military forces deployed in border regions were to be reduced to a level compatible with

the good-neighbor relations and defensive in nature;

No side would use, or threaten to use, force against the other or unilaterally seek military

superiority;

The military forces deployed in border regions would not attack the other side;

All sides would reduce the number of military personnel including army, air force, air

defense forces, and Fortier guards, and also reduce the quantity of the main categories of

weaponry deployed within 100 kilometers of the border;

The upper limit after reduction, as well as the method and time limit for implementation,

would be specified at a later date;

82



Ibid., 139-40.

Hoyt, David

37

The parties would exchange pertinent information on military forces in the border

regions; and

Implementation of the treaty was to be supervised.84

The treaty also specified the total numbers of military forces allowed at the border, “the total

number of army, air force, and air defense forces after reduction would be no more than 130,400

within 100 kilometers on each side of the border having a length in excess of 7,000

kilometers.”85

That these states were able to build a political space to create a constraining treaty

is impressive and important as it demonstrates a capable political base for future developments.

These Treaties at first glance appear to be simply a list of provisions to improve basic

border security among the Member States. Upon closer examination, however, these treaties

become very important because the reveal vital insights into the SCO’s organizational mandate

and provide critical understanding of the SCO’s operational agenda true nature of the SCO. The

Member States’ recognition of a commonality of shared national security threats having the

potential to cause greater tensions and instability in the region motivated this unique cast of

states to put aside their differences and mistrust and unite. In hindsight, these treaties look

inevitable. But given the strained history between Russia and China during a time period that

Russia was very unstable and the Central Asian states were new to autonomous governing of

their respective foreign policies, the inevitability of these treaties was far from certain. In many

ways it is amazing that not only did these nations negotiate these treaties (especially considering

the number of territorial disputes in East, Southeast, and South Asia that exist concerning some

of these states such as China), but also that the states involved continued to build upon their

successes. The development from initial discussions over border security to the ability to

84



Ibid.

Hoyt, David

38

institutionalize the SCO is all due to these talks. In many ways, it was these treaties that allowed

a reset of Sino-Russian relations. Without these treaties or if there had been a failure in the

negotiating process, the SCO would never have come into existence. Thus, the SCO is absolutely

predicated upon the above agreements and one can see how the elements of cooperation that the

SCO would adopt in later legal documents can be found in the treaties’ provisions.

The root of SCO gradualism is also located in the negotiations of these treaties. The

members of the fledging Shanghai Five were adroit in their early negotiations; they did not reach

for grand agreements or commitments until they could guarantee full support. Instead the

members tackled smaller challenges in order to build legitimacy through political successes. By

beginning with just Russia and China, and then slowly integrating new states and tackling harder

issues, the Shanghai Five also maintained a political base that could be built upon to enable and

ease further negotiations. The need to act in concert in a gradualist manner most likely facilitated

the formation of the consensus manner of decision-making; voting based upon this manner

seems a logical outgrowth from the need to have all parties in agreement to sign a treaty. Thus, it

was the strength of a united gradual approach that allowed the formation of the SCO and what

indicates that the SCO’s gradual development, despite observers calls to the contrary, is a lasting

strength of the organization.

3.4. – An Exclusive Club

The Undefined Process

How new states join the SCO as Member States is a murky affair without clear

institutional mechanisms to support the process. This lack of clear institutional mechanisms is

further complicated by the fact that no new Member States have been added since the SCO was

founded indicating that no precedence exists. The step below a Member State is an Observer

Hoyt, David

39

State, which also has an inherently ambiguous nature. The status of Observer States was not

originally foreseen when the SCO was founded. As a result, the original SCO charter makes no

mention of this position. Instead the charter allows states to apply for membership if they are in

the region and adhere to both the charter and other international treaties adopted in the SCO.

However, the concept of ‘the region’ is also not defined within the charter. Given the

difficulty of even defining the borders of Central Asia, the SCO’s charter statement leaves

ambiguous which states even have the legal potential to join the SCO. Due to the ambiguity in

the SCO charter, questions of membership have some flexibility and can conceivably be

conducted in an ad-hoc fashion after a state makes a formal application to join as a Member

State. The SCO’s Council of Heads of State would make this decision likely based upon a

representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.86

Iran is the Observer State that has pushed the hardest to join the SCO; but thus far Iran

has not been granted that right. Iran applied in 2006 prior to the SCO Summit Meeting. The SCO

responded that it “entrusted the Council of National Coordinators to recommend procedures on

SCO Membership Enlargement.”87

However, the Iranian sanctions vis-à-vis the United Nations

Security Council have been cited as an example of one of the reasons why Iran has not yet been

allowed to join. Within the SCO there seems to be a mix of differing opinions regarding Iran’s

request to join. The Russian Foreign Minister stated that the Iranian President had been invited at

86





Ibid.



Hoyt, David

40

the behest of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the 2006 SCO Summit seemingly indicating that

China is more interested than Russia in Iranian membership.88

Meanwhile, there are less conclusive signs that India and Pakistan may be interested in

pushing for SCO Member State status or even what interest India and Pakistan once fostered is

now diminished. It is hypothesized that if one of these two states pushes hard to become a

Member State the other states will try as well.89

Given the varying relations India and Pakistan

have with Russia and China, it is difficult to conceive of how the SCO will handle any requests

by India and/or Pakistan to ascend to Member State status.

The Case for Turkey

Not only Observer States have advocated their desire to join the ranks of the SCO

Member States. Turkey, though currently only a Dialogue Partner, in February 2013 expressed

its interest in joining the SCO. “[The] Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced

that he had made an overture to Russian President, Vladimir Putin about joining the

SCO, stating ‘If we get into the SCO, we will say good-bye to the European Union. The

Shanghai Five is better — much more powerful.’”90

Erdogan also remarked that he believed that

“Turkey has more ‘common values’ with SCO member states.”91

It is unknown why Erdogan

mentioned the Shanghai Five, instead of the SCO in his address. This would imply that

Uzbekistan is not counted as a full member of the SCO in Turkey’s statement but the rationale of

88





Ibid. 90

Raffaello Pantucci, and Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey: Abandoning the EU for the SCO?" The Diplomat: Blogs.

The Diplomat, 17 Feb. 2013, Web. 20 Mar, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/17/turkey-abandoning-the-eu-

for-the-sco/?all=true>. 91

Raffaello Pantucci, and Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey: Abandoning the EU for the SCO?" The Diplomat: Blogs,

The Diplomat, 17 Feb. 2013, Web, 20 Mar. 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/17/turkey-abandoning-the-eu-

for-the-sco/?all=true>.



Hoyt, David

41

why Turkey would say this, if it is more than a slip of the tongue remains elusive. A hypothesis

may be that given Uzbekistan’s ambivalent relationship toward the SCO and its other member

states, Uzbekistan may not be considered a full partner within the internal discussions.

The more important question raised by Erdogan’s comments is why is Turkey suddenly

making a shift toward the SCO perhaps at the expense of its accession to the EU. There are two

major possibilities that explain Turkey’s actions; the first is that Erdogan’s advance to Putin may

not be overly serious:

Far more likely, Erdogan is hinting at a shift in orientation in frustration at the West’s

relationship with his country. Europe has repeatedly proven an awkward partner and the

United States has demonstrated little appetite to get overly involved in the problems that

sit right on Turkey’s border.92

Alternatively Erdogan’s flippant comment could merely be a bluff to scare the EU into granting

Turkey concessions over membership. In fact, in reaction to Erdogan’s pro-SCO comments, the

French and Germans indeed offered Turkey negotiable membership considerations.93

Then,

again on May 16, 2013, Erdogan announced in the media that he was conducting favorable

discussions regarding Turkey’s possible EU entrance.94

If Turkey remains committed to joining

the EU, then using the SCO as a bluff may be a sound strategy for aiding its negotiations.

Furthermore, if this is merely a negotiation stratagem, it would also explain why Erdogan

appeared to verbally slip-up by using the former name of the SCO, the Shanghai Five in his

speech.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (the biweekly journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus

Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center), conversely, sees significant impetus for

Turkey to join the SCO. Turkey, given its proximity to the western SCO affiliated nations has

92

Ibid. 93

Stephen Blank, "What Impact Would Turkish Membership Have On The SCO?", The Central Asia-Caucasus

Analyst, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12705-what-impact-would-turkish-

membership-have-on-the-sco? html (accessed May 12, 2013). 94

Ibid.

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12705-what-impact-would-turkish-membership-have-on-the-sco


Hoyt, David

42

always been interested in the region especially given that it shares such a lengthy and intertwined

mutual history, culture, language, and ethnicity. After the Central Asian states received their

independence in 1991, Turkey made overtures to help the newly minted nations modernize but

was rebuffed. Joining the SCO, and thus gaining the approval of Russia and China, would

legitimize Turkey as a bona fide major player in the region. In addition, joining the SCO “would

also facilitate Turkey’s efforts to gain access to Central Asian oil and gas, and realize its

obsession with being an energy hub. Membership in the SCO might also strengthen the forces

making for an Islamist turn or even Pan-Turkic visions in Turkish foreign policy”95

According once more to the Central Asian-Caucasus Analyst, Turkey’s application for

membership in the SCO may actually also be in the interest of the SCO Member States. The

newsletter reasons that Central Asian states may welcome further Turkish investment as well as

the opportunity to add another large power in order to further dilute Russia’s, and to a lesser

extent, China’s influence in the region. Turkey’s admission plays right into the region’s “‘Multi-

vector’ policies toward the larger powers by stimulating a three-sided economic rivalry among

Turkey, China, and Russia.”96

Russia might see this attempt as “another sign of the weakening of

the West that they wish to encourage. Turkish membership could then be construed as Turkey’s

turning away from Europe and the U.S. towards a policy posture more compatible with SCO

members’ political values and ideologies.”97

While China would applaud Turkey’s

“Commitment to the three principles of fighting terrorism, secession, and extremism that

comprise the SCO charter, as that would force [Turkey] to reduce if not terminate support for

95







Ibid.





Hoyt, David

43

Uyghur nationalists in China.”98

Thus, allowing Turkey to join the SCO as a Member State could

conceivably be quite beneficial for the founding members of the organization.

The Lack of Political Will

Despite any overtures made by outside states or the potential gain they might bring the

SCO by joining, the apparent lack of political will within the SCO to add new Member States is

a difficult problem to overcome. There are signs, despite SCO internal opacity, that the Central

Asian states are not interested in allowing new Member States. Six major reasons appear given

the states most interested in joining. First, including new members would allow new economic

competitors into the organization and region and potentially dilute the organizations benefits if

they are shared amongst more members. Second, more Member States would weaken the SCO’s

already broad geostrategic focus. Third, addition of a state such as Iran would anger the US and

potentially harm bilateral relations between the Central Asian States and the US. Fourth, the

addition of India and/or Pakistan would absorb the India-Pakistan potential for crisis into the

SCO further deteriorating the already difficult decision making process.99

Fifth, Turkey’s

position as a dialogue partner is below that of India and Pakistan’s Observer Status. Given the

importance of Pakistan and India strategically for China and Russia respectively, it is unlikely

that Turkey will be allowed to pass them in the queue.100

Sixth, the nature of decision-making via

consensus means that the addition of new members, with individual and potentially conflicting

98

Ibid. 99




Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf, 19-20. 100

Raffaello Pantucci, and Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey: Abandoning the EU for the SCO?", The Diplomat: Blogs.

The Diplomat, 17 Feb. 2013, Web. 20 Mar. 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/17/turkey-abandoning-the-eu-




Hoyt, David

44

national interests as well as a dogma of mistrust of outsiders would make the SCO even more

unwieldy and unable to act.101

Analysis of SCO Membership politics

The above difficulties indicate that it will be some time before any more states are fully

inducted into the SCO with full Member State status. First, the need to have consensus among

any action will mean that this decision will not be a quick decision. It is not impossible for these

states to work through their differences, especially given how China prefers to ‘log-roll’ issues

together. This institutional restraint may create the political space for it to become possible for

another state to join. Second, the SCO member states do understand that whichever state they

choose to allow to join first and the criteria and method they employ will enshrine that processes

for future membership considerations. Therefore, considering the number of factors at play it is

highly probable that the SCO will continue to take a long time to decide how it wants this

process to evolve. Third, the SCO is unlikely to allow Turkey to jump to the front of the line.

Despite what the above scholarship suggested about the gains for Turkey joining the SCO, the

bonuses will be weighed against the risk of generating the potential ire of the states that applied

before such as India and Pakistan.

Similarly, solving the India and Pakistan entrance question here will be hard enough

given that it is unlikely that China will relent in the short-term to allow India to join unless

Pakistan also joins. Pakistan carries extra political baggage that raises serious questions about its

ability to contribute to Central Asian security given its record of numerous violations of the

SCO’s charter goals of fighting the ‘Three Evils.’ In addition to these violations, Pakistan’s

chances for membership are at a further disadvantage because of its failure or inability to even

101

“Central Asia Strategic Context 20 Years after Independence”, American Foreign Policy Issues, 33:136-140,

(2011), accessed May 10, 2013, EBSCOhost, 140.

Hoyt, David

45

protect and police the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border Afghanistan and

contribute to Central Asian insecurity. Iran is also unlikely to be admitted in the near term. The

SCO remains cognizant about Iran’s international reputation as a sponsor of terrorism. Thus, the

SCO is not likely to approve Iran for membership status given the mounting tension with the

West over the Iranian nuclear program. International observers should not expect Iran to be

admitted, barring unforeseen changes in the Iranian situation, unless the SCO wishes to officially

brand itself as anti-Western. Moreover, similar to Pakistan, Iran is also buffeted not only the

Three Evils but also, human rights, and drug trafficking violations.

Some indications are likely that the SCO will pursue Mongolia first. Mongolia is a state

that brings with it less geopolitical baggage despite its rocky history with China. Mongolia is not

a direct geopolitical threat to either China or Russia, is also located in a region defined by many

scholars to be Central Asia, and was the first country to receive Observer State status. Mongolia

also does not rock the boat with the West nor seem to be in violation of SCO’s expanded goals.

Thus Mongolia is likely to make the best test case for Member state admission. If Mongolia is

not added, then that suggests the SCO has yet to decide or maybe cannot agree on whether or

how to introduce more Member States. Regardless, these severe limitations to bringing on board

new Member States indicate that it is unlikely that any other member states will be admitted in

the near future and the SCO will remain with six Member States.

3.5 - SCO Goals and Principles

The SCO’s goals mirror many of the more abstract, normative goals seen in other Asian

multilateral organizations. The main objective of the SCO is for the Member States to work

together against the ‘Three Evils’ of ‘Terrorism,’ ‘Separatism,’ and ‘Extremism.’ In 2001, the

SCO signed the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism. This

Hoyt, David

46

convention defined each of these three terms as threats that “use violence or intimidation against

people or governments in an attempt to change behavior, borders, or regimes.”102

In Chapter IV,

the success or failure of the SCO and its Member States to combat these ‘Three Evils’ amid the

changes in Central Asian security will be examined in detail.

The SCO’s founding principles are more opaque than its expressed strategic goals. The

driving philosophy for the SCO is the so-called ‘Shanghai spirit,’ which “emphasizes harmony,

working via consensus, respect for other cultures, and noninterference in others internal affairs,

and nonalignment.”103

These vaguely expressed norms have led to a division between Western

and Eurasian viewpoints on what the long-term implications of the SCO are for the region and

the world. Chinese and Russian sources often posit these norms as counter to the prevailing

norms of the US-led international system which further sows distrust amongst the viewpoints of

Western observers. These norms provide a dual function; internally, they provide a basis for the

SCO member states to work together and externally they challenge “what at least some of these

states see as a threat of both strategic and philosophical unipolarity in international relations.”104

The SCO is sensitive to criticism that it is practice simply a geostrategic alternative to the

prevailing US centric political, trade, and defense international system that promotes democratic

ideals, human rights, free trade, environmental protection, legal institutions and NATO. The

102


Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011), accessed 30 Nov 2012,



103 Ibid.

104Alyson Bailes, J. K. Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”,



Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf, 6.





Hoyt, David

47

SCO’s responds that it is not anti-Western orientated but rather that it is organization focused

predominately on addressing the security threats unique to its region. The SCO also

acknowledges that it’s sphinxlike framework may appear imperfect by Western standards, but

nevertheless it is suited for the security landscape of Central Asia and the political needs of its

Member States.105

The SCO charter includes several principles of international law that correspond to the

legal foundations of other international institutions such as the United Nations. The SCO Charter

references the equality of all states and rejects hegemony. In contrast to the United Nations

Charter, the SCO charter omits respect for human rights and the self-determination of all

peoples. The SCO charter also mentions the equality of all states and the rejection of

Hegemony.106

Not supporting the above elements that are embraced by the US-led international

system may indicate that the SCO functions much closer to the Westphalian definition of

sovereignty embraced by Russia and particularly China. Alternatively, authorities believe that

the SCO is not anti-Western by design but rather by virtue of reacting to the challenges

encountered by this unique region of nascent nations.107

The SCO Charter also establishes legal

basis for cracking down on dissident groups under the aforementioned goal of stopping

separatism. The push back against the prevailing Western values and norms is the explanation

for why the SCO is often seen as an Anti-NATO and a potential threat to US interests. An in

depth analysis of the Shanghai Spirit and whether its support for absolute sovereignty presents a

threat to Western Liberal norms will be discussed in Chapter VI.

105

Stephen Aries, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:’Tackling the Three Evils’ A Regional Response to

Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc”, Europe-Asia Studies, v. 61 Issue 3, accessed

EBSOhost, May 10, 2013, 460. 106

Bailes, Ibid. 107

Stephen Aries, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to

Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?”, (May 2009), Europe-Asian Studies, Vol 61 Issue 3,

(May 2009) 457-452, accessed EBSCO May 10, 2010, 467.

Hoyt, David

48

3.6 – SCO Practices

The SCO strives to accomplish a wide-variety of missions. As the SCO responds to the

tradeoff between effectiveness and legitimacy, the organization often pursues an opportunistic

approach. First, the SCO functions as a shell so that its structure promotes the creation of bi-

lateral relationships. Although this is often derided,108

this ability to build stronger bilateral

diplomatic relations should not be understated especially given the SCO’s founding as the

Shanghai Five and the history of the Sino-Soviet split as discussed above in section 3.3. In

addition to facilitating diplomacy, Brookings breaks the SCO’s actions down into three broad

categories of issues: Security, Economic, and Soft Power.

SCO SECURITY ASPECTS

Responding to the many facets of Security is currently the prime focus of the SCO.

“Regarding regional stability,” Baizakova argues, “the SCO has the potential to serve a unique

role in promoting security, because it is the only organization that ties the two major regional

powers—China and Russia—into a cooperative framework with the states in Central Asia.”109

The SCO launched its first joint anti-terrorism security exercises in 2002. These

‘missions’ were basically military maneuvers but not all members were present for all security

exercises. In terms of troops sent, “The Central Asian SCO states normally send far fewer troops

and personnel than do China and Russia.”110

Uzbekistan appears to have the lowest commitment

108

Raffaello Pantucci, and Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey: Abandoning the EU for the SCO?", The Diplomat: Blogs.

The Diplomat, 17 Feb. 2013, Web. 20 Mar. 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/17/turkey-abandoning-the-eu-

for-the-sco/?all=true>. 109

Kuralai Baizakova, “The Shanghai cooperative Organization’s Role in Countering Threats and Challenges to

Central Asian Regional Security”, January 2013, Russian Politics and Law 51, no. 1, Academc Search Premier,




Hoyt, David

49

to the proceedings, having opted out numerous times or sent only officers to observe. Security

operations range from smaller ‘Anti-Terror’ exercises to large multi-country ‘Peace Missions.’ In

most large exercises at least one great power, Russia and/or China, is involved along with

thousands of troops. Therefore, these exercises receive the most public relations coverage,

especially from Chinese news sources.111

“All [of these exercises] depict joint efforts at

disrupting and defeating simulated ‘three evils’ behavior.”112

Members States benefit from these

exercises by receiving not only in the field weapons and tactics experience but also practicing

strategic aspects of military exercises including planning, command and control, and logistics

with other countries. Each year the SCO’s operations generally become more sophisticated as

they attempt to broaden their security scope. In addition, under the framework of SCO Peace

Mission, China and Russia have held three military missions (2005, 2007 and 2009) combining

land, sea, and air drills. At least one drill should be held in 2013. These exercises are discussed at

length in Chapter VI.

In addition to the more conventional military exercises aimed at combating the ‘Three

Evils,’ the SCO has also begun to focus on nontraditional security threats. Recently the SCO has

become involved with counter-narcotics and activities related to Afghan stability and the

containment of such activities.113

The SCO is also taking cyber protection steps by helping

Member States monitor and control their country’s internet’s impact on the government. The



111 Ibid.

112 Ibid. 11.

113 Boland, Ibid., 13.



Hoyt, David

50

goal of the SCO here is to manage what is called ‘information terrorism’ to help stability and

regional security.114

The later chapters of this study will examine in considerable detail into the progress the

SCO has made toward its objectives in the field of security. Chapter IV will expand the

discussion of the ‘Three Evils’ by examining each evil: extremism, separatism, and terrorism, in

turn as it pertains to each SCO Member state. This analysis will be supplemented with an in-

depth discussion of RATS as well. Chapter VI will then discuss the implementation of the SCO

Peace Missions and will also document the evolution of the different mission archetypes and

what they are targeted at solving. Finally, that chapter will examine whether these missions

represent a boon or a threat to Western security interests so that the efficacy of the SCO and its

efforts at security in Central Asian can be better understood.

SCO ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Economic security and economic development are important priorities for the SCO. In

September 2003, the SCO established the Multilateral Trade and Development program which

expanded over the years. This program encompassed over 120 projects, including developing of

trade free zone and cooperation to increase the flow of goods such as energy, agriculture and

telecommunications in the region.115

In June 2006, the SCO created the SCO Business Council to

link businesses and banks in order to speed investment and economic development in Central

Asia. The Secretariat of this Bank is located in Moscow and is run by a Chairman, Deputy

114

Ibid. 115



EBSCO assessed May 10, 2013, 66.

Hoyt, David

51

Chairman, and Board of Directors composed of Member State representatives.116

This Business

Council’s “key functions are to facilitate cooperation in trade, credit, financial, scientific,

engineering, transport, telecommunications, agricultural and other spheres, to implement projects

in different sectors of the economy in members’ territory”117

as well as “to assist in finding

funding for and making recommendations towards improving economic cooperation between

SCO countries.”118

It has been stated by the SCO that the organization believes that “there cannot

be stability in the region without economic security.”119

The Business Council has also attempted

to improve basic living and business countries within Central Asia, specifically in the realm of

healthcare, all of which aids the soft power of the SCO.120

SCO economic cooperation also seeks to deepen other economic relations between

members of the SCO. The SCO also founded an Interbank Association (IBA) in 2005. The goal

of the IBA was part of the “ongoing effort to strengthen cooperation between the major banks of

the SCO nations, helping to implement investment projects that are bilateral or multilateral.”121

In 2006, the IBA began to credit and fund joint investment. Under the SCO, Member States have

found it easier to deepen economic ties and many bilateral deals are signed under the SCO

umbrella. Furthermore, SCO Member States are working to improve the region’s transportation

116





117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Boland, Ibid., 15.



Hoyt, David

52

networks and some construction has also begun.122

However, Kuralai Baizakova of Kazakhstan

University notes that:

Despite the development of institutions, the signed agreements, the ministerial meetings,

and the existence of twenty specialized bodies responsible for the development of

economic cooperation, economic cooperation has remained more declared than real in the

ten years since the SCO was established.123

Baizakova further notes that underneath the veneer of the SCO’s documents the

economic development may be more unbalanced. Confirming what some Putin observers have

long thought, Baizakova confirms that “Russia has no interest in using state funds for SCO

economic program forcing the SCO to pursue alternative funding. China has stepped forward to

fill this multilateral economic void, but in a bilateral manner.”124

Consequently, concludes

Baizakova,

China now “dominates the SCO's economic agenda, including negotiations to establish

an SCO Free Trade Area (FTA), an SCO Development Bank, and Beijing offering $10

billion in loans for member states. All of this alarms Russian strategists who see China

encroaching on Moscow's Central Asian interests.

Despite all this effort expended by the SCO at economic development in the region,

scholars on the ground state “all of this [SCO effort] results in a minimal concrete presence,

something we found first-hand as we travelled around Central Asia over the past year, finding

little tangible evidence of the [SCO] Organization’s footprint on the ground.” 125

Baizakova in

his candid assessment of the extent of the SCO efforts at economic development and trade in the

122

Ibid. 123




Ibid. 125

Raffaello Pantucci, and Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey: Abandoning the EU for the SCO?" The Diplomat: Blogs.

The Diplomat, 17 Feb. 2013, Web, 20 Mar. 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/17/turkey-abandoning-the-eu-


Hoyt, David

53

region comments, “Most of the existing economic programs in eleven areas of cooperation have

not been implemented.”126

Despite the importance of economic issues within the SCO and the

amount of content that should be explored, this study will not pursue further research into

economic issues unless they pertain to Chapter V’s analysis of national interests.

SOFT POWER ASPECTS

In addition to the soft power the SCO generates through security and economic

endeavors, the SCO attempts to build soft power through other forms of regional cooperation.

The SCO has taken steps to address healthcare issues in Central Asia. In addition, disaster relief

is an area the SCO aims to address. In 2009, the SCO founded a Youth Council with the purpose

of stimulating cooperation in education, and culture. The SCO also assists in domestic elections

by providing election observers to monitor contests. However, as the SCO and OSCE often come

to different conclusions as to how free or fair regional domestic elections are, how these services

are helping democratic elections is debatable.127

An understanding of how the SCO attempts to

preserve regime stability will be made evident through the security discussions in Chapter IV and

the analysis of how the SCO prevents Western democratic influences in Chapter VI. However,

the other soft power missions of the SCO will not be discussed in this study.

126





Brookings Institution, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011), accessed 30 Nov 2012,





Hoyt, David

54

3.7 - Conclusion

Today the SCO as an organization has become a powerful source for regional

cooperation, trade and economic development, and national security in Central Asia for its

Member States. The principle objective of the SCO is to combat what it defines as the ‘Three

Evils of Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism’ with Terrorism ranked by the SCO as the most

important. While the SCO decision making process may be slow and constrained, nevertheless,

the organizational structure and operational activity is almost exclusively directed toward

fighting terrorism, providing national security, and maintaining the leadership status quo in each

Member State. To date, the West has largely ignored the SCO and discounted its actions; yet to

continue to do so would be a mistake. In the opinion of experts who understand the SCO, they

recognize that the SCO is creating something much larger than a simple anti-terrorist

organization. Their analysis suggests, instead, that the SCO is laying the long-term foundation

for a new Eurasian polarity, with a center of gravity that has already emerged and will continue

to expand its reach and responsibility.

Hoyt, David

55

CHAPTER IV: SECURITY GOALS –

THE SCO vs. THE THREE EVILS

3.1 - Introduction and Definitions of the ‘Three Evils’

The SCO Charter asserts the mission of combating the ‘Three Evils’: of Terrorism,

Separatism, and Extremism. Beyond this statement, numerous questions remain. First, has this

process been successful and has it increased stability in Central Asia? In addition, is the SCO

targeting the proper issues, entities, organizations, ideologies, or people? This chapter examines

the history of Central Asian engagement with the Three Evils to provide background and context

on the struggles of the SCO Member States. In doing so, this section addresses the question,

“Have SCO actions taken to combat the Three Evils affected Central Asia’s security and

stability?” As security is the SCO’s core goal, evaluating the Organization’s success at achieving

these goals is instrumental to the broader analysis of its effectiveness.128

The SCO’s organizational documents indicate that Terrorism is the prime evil from

which Separatism and Extremism stem. However, these documents provide no legal definition or

distinguishing characteristics for these three terms. A study of terrorism’s root causes indicates

that the SCO’s causal approach to understanding and diagnosing the Three Evils is illogical;

Terrorism does not create Extremism. Rather a stronger model, which will be utilized in this

chapter, is one designed by Dr. Marsha Crenshaw of Stanford University. Crenshaw states that:

[Terrorism] represents the disaffection of a fragment of the elite, who may take it upon

themselves to act on the behalf of a majority unaware of its plight, unwilling to take

128

Please note, that the author will present the Three Evils through the eyes of the SCO Member States, which carry

its own prejudices. These opinions are not the viewpoints of Stanford University or the authors.

Hoyt, David

56

action to remedy grievances, or unable to express dissent. This discontent, however

subjective in origin or minor in scope, is blamed on the government and its supporters.129

Crenshaw continues by describing how that “Terrorists perceive an absence of choice. Whether

unable or unwilling to perceive a choice between terrorist and nonterrorist action, whether

unpopular or prohibited by the government, the terrorist group reasons that there is no

alternative.”130

Crenshaw’s theory is that an absence of political choice incentivizes elites to

develop radical ideas on how to rectify their particular situation and then use terrorism to achieve

that goal.

Applied to the SCO member states, this model would begin with government actions that

create the roots of Extremism. Extremism will lead to acts that seek to create violence for

political objectives; these actions, depending on the scale would be described by the SCO as

either Separatism or Terrorism. This study will say that as Separatist actions are more large-

scale, when these threats are defeated and only the most extreme radicals remain committed, the

security threats shift to small-scale acts of Terrorism. These Terrorist acts are more usually

small-scale, convenient forms of violence that have little chance of overthrowing the government

and represent that last attempts of committed radical elites to their cause. This Chapter follows

this logic to examine the evils in order: Extremism, Separatism, and Terrorism.

Classifying the security threats of Central Asia into the individual categories of the

‘Three Evils’ is extremely difficult as the SCO provides no concrete definitions or distinctions.

As the Three Evils are very interrelated, this study will categorize the security threats to the SCO

Member States under the following categorical divisions.

129

Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 13.4 (July 1981): 396. 130

Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 13.4 (July 1981): 396.

Hoyt, David

57

Extremism131

is focused on radical ideologies. Given the SCO Member States fear of

radical Islam and its perceived corrupting factor for political institutions, Extremism in this study

will be confined to an analysis of Islam in each Member State and the occurrence (or lack

thereof) of elements that seek to proclaim either an Islamist state or Jihadist ideas.

The difference between Separatism and Terrorism is even harder to parse. Separatism132

in this case is broadly categorized as large-scale actions taken with the intent and potential to

cause regime change, specifically sectarian strife, civil wars, ethnic tensions with the intent to

create breakaway states, large-scale protests, and democratic movements fall into this category.

These activities have a conceivable chance to actually topple a nation and hence will be

classified under the evil of Separatism.

Finally, Terrorism133

encompasses two main categories. The first includes domestic

actions pursued to provoke violence with the goal being political change; what makes this

different from Separatist behavior is that Terrorism activities tend to be smaller scale and have a

lower probability of accomplishing any large scale political change. The second is the threat of

Transnational Terrorism, such as militants in Afghanistan prior to the US invasion. This threat is

particularly problematic for the SCO in threatening the overthrow of Central Asian regimes.

These proposed categorical distinctions will make the analysis of threats posed by each

‘Evil’ more coherent. Yet these groupings are absolute, and therefore there are differences of

opinion as to which category a given threat should fall. However, this study’s grouping

131

In this study, Extremism (uppercase) refers to the SCO Evil while extremism (lowercase) means the normal

definition of the word. 132

In this study, Separatism (uppercase) refers to the SCO Evil while separatism (lowercase) means the normal

definition of the word. 133

In this study, Terrorism (uppercase) refers to the SCO Evil while terrorism (lowercase) means the normal

definition of the word.

Hoyt, David

58

mechanism is still more precise than that of the organization it studies due to the lack of legal

definitions from the SCO. Thus, any disagreements on groupings are acceptable and should not

affect any overall conclusions derived from the study.

Next, after the study of the Three Evils, this Chapter analyzes the SCO’s reaction to

perceived threats. Followed by examine SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS)

including the structure’s history, legal documents governing its agenda, and then a discussion of

its limitations. Chapter IV will then conclude with an evaluation of the SCO’s success vis-à-vis

combating the Three Evils.

4.2 – Extremism: Radical Islam and other Competing Ideologies

Although the SCO suggests that Extremism stems from Terrorism, this study posits that

Extremism should be examined first, as it logically spawns the other two Evils. As the First Evil,

Extremism breeds ideologies amongst its adherents that engender the desire to change or to

overthrow regimes. These extreme ideas prompt adherents to actions classified under either

Separatism or Terrorism. Hence Extremism as the root Evil it will be analyzed first.

Radical Islam is the ideology most feared by the SCO Member States’ governments, due

to historical memories. As described in the historical section of Chapter II, the Soviet Central

Asian republics were prohibited from publicly practicing Islam as the Soviets sought to eradicate

all religions beliefs. As Islam went “underground”, the Soviet regime perceived it as a subversive

element. Radical Islam spread throughout the region in response to the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan; fear of militant and extreme Islamic groups swelled and has not abated to date.

China fears its Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang, Russia remembers its past encounters with

Islam in Central Asia, and each of the Central Asian Republic’s leaders – as former Soviet

Hoyt, David

59

leaders – maintains the older suspicions of Islam. In attempt to control subversives, leaders

adopted many Soviet-era policies in order to suppress religions. Thus, within the historical

memories of the SCO member states, a real threat is posed by Extremism.

In several of the Member States,134

Muslims are a majority of the population; not all are

radicals.135

This section will discuss Extremism in each SCO member state as well as

Turkmenistan (given its regional proximity) and examine whether the threat of radical Islam is

real or merely inflated by the local regimes.

China

The Three Evils in China do not follow the cycle of Extremism leading to Separatism and

ending in Terrorism. As discussed below in the section on Separatism, elements within Xinjiang

categorized roughly as the ‘East Turkestan Movement’ declared their independence from

Xinjiang twice during the Chinese Civil War. As this Separatism movement failed repeatedly, its

leaders were jailed. They radicalized in prison. Thus, in China Separatism begat Extremism.

According to Stratfor’s136

intelligence briefings, the Islamic revival in Xinjiang began in

the 1980s. At that time, in tandem with student protest movements:

There was also a protest movement in Xinjiang … to promote literacy and to refocus on

religious and ethnic heritage that saw a resurgence of Islamic schools and mosques. This

movement was to take on a stronger role with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the

134

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 135

This statement is the belief of the author. SCO member states do not hold this belief. 136

Stratfor is a for-profit corporation that specializes in real-time geopolitical intelligence. Their greatest strength is

their global, rapid reporting. Given that Central Asia is usually under-reported on, Stratfor is one of the few sources

that has database records of all major Three Evil events going back over a decade. However, they tend to use a

hawkish perspective and have biases regarding an overemphasis of the rise of Russia and (until recently) an

overemphasis on the Islamist threat in Central Asia. These biases have been accounted for in this study.

Hoyt, David

60

independence of the Central Asian States and the broader Islamic revival in Central

Asia.137

However, in the 1990s Chinese security imprisoned many members of the movement in the wake

of a series of early terrorist actions. For example, Hassan Mahsum, who later revived the East

Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), was imprisoned from July 1993 until April 1996. “During

his time in prison,” Stratfor reported:

Mahsum was one of many Uighurs who shifted from a political Islamic philosophy to a

more militant one. The various students, militants, criminals and bystanders picked up in

China’s broader sweeps … began to reshape the militant ideology in prison, which

became perfect militant training grounds.138

Through mutual imprisonment,139

the Uighurs and other protest leaders were able to formulate

the building blocks of radical ideology and networks that would become a threat in the near

future.140

During the mid-1990s, actions by militant and criminal groups tied to Uighur movements

raised security threats. China’s reaction was to “began to crack down on Islamic teaching in

Xinjiang. In July of that year [1995], authorities arrested two imams… which led to riots and

clashes with security forces.”141

Stratfor attributes, most likely erroneously, the rise of the

Shanghai Five at this time to respond to the militant activities of the Uighur diaspora. This

multilateral cooperation is perhaps tied to the 1998 Almaty Declaration and not tied to the year

1996 when border security was a key issue. Regardless, from the mid-1990s onward, it appears,

137

"China: The Evolution of ETIM , Stratfor | Geopolitical Intelligence, Economic, Political, and Military Strategic

Forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013. 138

Ibid. 139

This is a trend that has been observed in multiple countries that have dealt with Radicalism such as Egypt. When

the malcontents who were initially separatists are imprisoned for their initial activities against the state, they catalyze

one another into more extreme ideologies while serving time. This also allows them the time to build their

institutional capacity and membership that they rely on once released from prison. 140

L. Wright, “The LoomingTower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11”, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 2007). 141

Stratfor, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

61

according to Stratfor, that the East Turkistan Movement had an Islamic core.142

However, the

Chinese government’s ‘Strike Hard’ campaigns forced many of these militant groups out of

Xinjiang into Central Asia, specifically Afghanistan. During this time abroad, Xianjiang militant

groups, such as Mashum and the ETIM, made contact with members of Islamist groups such as

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.143

These militant organizations later evolved into terrorist entities.

While the threat of Extremism in China seems overblown, it is not entirely fabricated.

Islamist elements exist within the Uighur movements and that these elements have become more

radicalized over time. The difficulty in parsing this analysis is that there is a large difference

between Muslim Uighurs and those who are subscribe to radical Islamist beliefs. It appears that

the majority of Uighurs and even most Uighur militants fall into the former category. 144

However, China has a rocky history with Muslims and is more likely to place Uighur movements

in the latter category of extremists. Thus, Extremism is not a dire threat to the Chinese state.

Russia

Russia’s fear of Extremism, especially stemming from radical Islamists, is deeply rooted

in its history and buttressed by events spanning the last 20 years. In Russia, the Caucasus is the

region most likely to be framed as the root of Extremism. In the northern Caucasus, the

142

"China: The Evolution of ETIM." Stratfor | Geopolitical Intelligence, Economic, Political, and Military Strategic

Forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013.

143 Ibid.

144 Militant Uighurs are considered an extremist element within China due to the ongoing clash; however, this

fighting is not motivated by extremist ideals. It is instead inspired by aspirations for autonomous rule and

nationalistic sentiments.

Hoyt, David

62

autonomous republic of Chechnya145

is deeply committed to the Sunni branch of Islam.146

The

neighboring province of Dagestan is also linked to Extremism.

Dagestan and Chechnya are viewed as breeding grounds for Extremism. After the fall of

the Soviet Union, Dagestan was chaotic and corrupt: “Regional governments co-opted Sufism--a

variant of Islam popular in Central and South Asia--by building government Islamic schools and

mosques, but their own venal appetites tainted the faith by association.”147

Wahhabism, which

appeared conversely devout, spread into Dagestan via students and preachers and pushed back

against government-controlled Sufism. As a result, “the ensuing struggle between Kremlin-

backed Sufi authorities and the growing tide of Wahhabis has been bloody and clannish, and it

has reached far beyond the mountains of the Caucasus.”148

University of Kent Professor Richard Sakwa’s research on the Chechen conflict reveals

that over time, Islamist leanings took root in the conflict and subsumed some of the nationalistic

goals. By 1995, “nationalist aspirations were tempered by a local reading of jihadist ideologies,

which by and large subsumed Chechen concerns into a much broader regional struggle for

affirmation and recognition.”149 When Aslan Maskhadov, elected President of Chechnya in 1997,

was killed by Russian forces in March of 2005, the Chechen revolutionaries altered their end

goals. “His death further weakened the classic nationalist wing of the insurgency, and the

importance grew of other forces that Maskhadov had long failed to contain, let alone

145

For reference, the population of Chechnya is estimated at 1.2 million. 146

Abraham Ascher, Russia: A Short History, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009): 236-37.

147 Nathan Thornburgh and Simon Shuster, "Russia's Long War." Time 176, no. 7 (August 16, 2010): 30-

35. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013. 148

Ibid. 149

Richard Sakwa, "The Clash of Regionalisms and Caucasian Conflicts." Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 3 (May

2011): 467-491, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013, 476.

Hoyt, David

63

confront.”150

The new leader, Abdul-Halim Sadulaev broadened the war to include all of

Northern Caucasus. “Their aim was to establish an Islamic state in Chechnya and to achieve the

‘decolonisation’ of the whole North Caucasian region through a ‘national liberation struggle’,

although ‘nationalism’ was less the governing ideology than a jihadist inflexion of political

Islam.”151

Thus by late 2005 it was clear that “Maskhadov’s death provoked the further

radicalisation of the militants and the extension of the insurgency…[and] the original goal of

building an independent Chechen state was now subsumed into a broader civilisational war

against the corrupt West, with the Russian state, in their view, only its most boorish

manifestation.”152

This trend of radicalization continued as established field commanders were killed, new

recruits moved toward radical Muslim fundamentalism (i.e. Washhabism) and the nationalist

insurgency waned. Defended by the Chechen elite, Sufi practices were further radicalized. In

2006 Sadulaev was killed and the leadership passed to Dokku Umarov.153

Umarov has arguably

been the most dangerous radicalized leader/terrorist the Russians have faced in the North

Caucasus. Umarov, the self-proclaimed ‘Emir of the Caucasus Emirate’ is one of the few

surviving Chechen Chieftains who has fought since Russian forces invaded in 1994. Umarov is

an accurate representation of the Russian fear of the evil of Extremism: “Umarov's aim is to

establish an Islamic caliphate that would be independent from Russia, would be governed by

strict sharia law, and would span several republics of Russia's restive and mostly Muslim North

150


2011): 467-491, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013, 476. 151

Ibid., 477. 152

Ibid. 153

Ibid., 478.

Hoyt, David

64

Caucasus.” 154

Umarov’s new views demonstrate that “Chechen separatism and a centuries-long

struggle for freedom from Russia were renounced in favour of global jihad against the

proclaimed enemies of Islam.”155

The only counterweight to Umarov’s ideology within the

Chechen movement is the lingering ideology of national liberation. However, the national

liberation group is now only tied to a small group based in London and led by Akhmed Zakaev

and have very little traction with the development of the Chechen movement on the ground.

Umarov reinforced this trend of Islamist thought creeping into the Chechen movement.

“Although few in number, the creation of radical and well organized military jamaats made up of

radical Muslims represented a major escalation of the war.”156

The government leaders who rule Chechnya fear this Islamist threat. Ramzan Kadyrov,

the leader of Chechnya, is Muslim but attempts to balance between secularism and

fundamentalism. His policies demonstrate this duopoly of priorities. “He creates laws and

introduces holidays aimed at bringing the region in line with the practices of an Islamic state.

Ignoring Russian law, he has allowed polygamy in Chechnya and mandated that all female civil

servants wear headscarves to work.”157

However, he will not allow religion to dominate the state

or spread Extremism so as to challenge his rule, “he viciously persecutes anyone he suspects of

radical Islamism.”158

Thus, Kadyrov represents the need to both adhere to Islamic tenets to

maintain his ability to govern but also to suppress these beliefs in order to prevent Umarov’s

ideology from taking hold of political institutions.

154

Anna Badkhen, "Nightmare in Chechnya." New Republic 241, no. 6 (April 29, 2010): 10-14, Academic Search

Premier, EBSCOhost, accessed May 22, 2013. 155



Ibid. 157

Badkhen, Ibid. 158

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

65

Despite the dire predicament Chechnya historically demonstrates, Sakwa sees less to be

afraid about. Sakwa claims that, “Chechnya is no longer the centre of radical insurgency in the

North Caucasus, and to that degree the insurgency in the republic has been defeated. Political

Islam has come to the region, although refracted through the prism of post-Soviet realities.”159

Sakwa articulates that Umarov’s goal of designing the emirate was his political way to unite the

different regional ethnic struggles. However as this goal being the only an aspiration advanced

by radical Muslims it has not found enough traction among followers. “The idea was to rally all

the militant jamaats into a single struggle, which would become the armed wing of the Caucasus

emirate. In practice, however, the insurgency remains fragmented and divided along ethnic and

regional lines.”160

Russia, therefore, represents a SCO Member State where the threat of the first Evil

Extremism is very real, and the most frightening out of all SCO Member States. Radical Islam is

not just a historical memory from Russia’s ill-fated War in Afghanistan. It has spread through the

North Caucasus. Although Sakwa’s views that the Islamists numbers and organizational capacity

in Chechnya and Dagestan are less than what is necessary to actually unify cross-region, Russia

can most likely ill afford to hold that view because of the combination of historical fears of

Islam, Chechen secession in the 1990s, and continuous terrorist attacks throughout Russia until

the present. In addition, as mentioned later in the Section on the Third Evil of Terrorism, radical

groups draw support from other Extremists such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban and are located in

nearby states. Therefore, Russia has grounds to worry about the transnational nature of this

threat.

30. Richard Sakwa, "The Clash of Regionalisms and Caucasian Conflicts." Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 3 (May

2011): 467-491, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013, 476.

160

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

66

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan seemingly faces no current threat of Islamic Radicalism. Despite Muslim

missionary activity throughout the early 1990s, there is little evidence that any significant

portions of the indigenous population were radicalized or adopted the basic behaviors of

traditional Muslims. Southern Kazakhstan, adjacent to Uzbekistan, has a larger population of

devoted Muslims than the north. The North Kazakhstani population is dominated by Slavs,

whose Orthodox Russia tendencies neutralize the smaller Muslim population. Although

Kazakhstan experienced a recent Islamic revival, it was not as strong as in the neighboring

Central Asian states.161

Kazakhstan remains largely secure from Extremist sponsored terrorism. According to

sources published in 2010, since its independence, Kazakhstan has not suffered “a single

significant incidence of violence that may be attributed to Islamic radicalism.”162

Many accused

of fermenting violence or radicalism were foreigners who were quickly deported. However, the

fear of an illusory radical threat is prevalent in Kazakhstan. Small-scale arrests in southern

Kazakhstan of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a caliphate supporting Muslim group, exaggerated fears of a

deteriorating Extremist situation. On the contrary, since the 1990s, President Nursultan

Nazarbayev’s regime instituted an increasingly repressive policy toward religion, specifically

targeting Islam. Although there has been a minimum of activity by Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Salafists, and

Wahhabism-advocates among other Islamist groups, the message of these groups found little

161

Reuel Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia”, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 61-4. 162

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

67

traction among the local populace. Yet the erosion of fragile religious rights draws the

Nazarbayev regime closer in character to the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia. However,

“this [authoritarian] formula has not brought security to those states, and is unlikely to do so in

Kazakhstan as well.”163

Thus, Kazakhstan is not presently under threat from Islamic Radicalism

or Extremism. It is likely that the shifting government policy is a greater threat, as it will

encourage radicalism in response to the repression of religious rights.

Kyrgyzstan

Until recently, Kyrgyzstan was a positive example of state policies that promoted

inclusion to prevent Extremism. Kyrgyzstan “was considered the most open and democratic state

in the region, and religious believers of all faiths were allowed to operate more or less

unrestricted by government authorities.”164

Many religious groups actively recruited followers in

the country and although religious organizations were required to register with the State Agency

for Religious Affairs, few groups were denied their applications. In 1997, the Law on Religious

Freedom and Religious Organizations “specifically prohibited government interference with

religious groups that follow Kyrgyz law, although it did contain provisions that banned religious

political parties in the country.”165

A 2006, a government edict recognized Islam and Russian

Orthodoxy as ‘Traditional Religions’ in Kyrgyzstan, but this title does not appear to contain any

legal privileges.166

As such, Kyrgyzstan is a historically open society that may co-opt religious

forces before radicalization.

163


Ibid., 60. 165

Ibid. 166

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

68

The Kyrgyzstani government supports open access to religion despite conflict with

external radical forces. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) penetrated Kyrgyzstan in

both 1999 and 2000 and conducted terrorist attacks. However, IMU activity tapered off after the

start of the US invasion of Afghanistan. Despite these examples of violence, studies indicate the

“historically tolerant and respectful posture Kyrgyz have adopted toward other Muslims

and…other faiths.”167

As such, average Kyrgyz do not appear worried about external threats of

Islamic radicalism.

In the wake of the government change in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the crackdown against

extremism increased demonstrably. The government adopted a more extreme policy toward the

IMU, Wahhabis and Hizb-ut-Tahrir; in 2006, Kyrgyz security forces killed several alleged

Islamist militants in Jalal-abad.168

In 2008, Kyrgyzstan’s Prime Minister Victor Chudinov

announced “the start of an intensified effort to eradicate ‘religious extremism’ and stated that

Hizb-ut-Tahrir represented a specific threat to the country’s stability.”169

The government also

cracked down upon the fundamentalist South Asian sect, Jamaat-ut Tabligh by labeling it as

radical and subsequently threatening its members with persecution. The Tabligh officially

registered with the government in 1996. While they directly eschew political action, this did not

prevent the new Kyrgyz government from withdrawing its legal rights. In 2009, a new religious

law supplanted previous statutes with severe limits on religious activity. The law “denies

believers the right to distribute religious literature, prohibits the involvement of children in

religious movements and organizations, strictly limits the ability to proselytize new members,

167

Reuel Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia”, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 59. 168

This should not be confused with Jalalabad, in Afghanistan. 169

Reuel, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

69

and requires all religious organizations to re-register with the Kyrgyz government”170

in addition

to increasing the number of members required to register a religion.171

The new law, despite

having been “designed to quell ‘religious extremism’ and ‘destructive actions’”172

is unlikely to

have any effect on radical groups. “The new law … in fact may drive more potential members to

them.”173

As groups feel that they are losing their freedoms and identity due to government

policy, they are more likely to shift toward ideologies that are deemed more radical as a

response.

Extremism appears to be a perceived threat within Kyrgyzstan. The apparent mismatch

between academic perceptions of Extremism in Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz government

perception that Extremism exists in Kyrgyzstan is distressing. Despite government fears,

academics such as Reuel Hanks state that “there is no evidence that the IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, or

any other extremist group enjoys a significant popular following, and since 2000 acts of violence

associated with Islamic terrorism in Kyrgyzstan have been isolated and quite small in scale.”174

As such, the government appears to be chasing a shadow of radicalism instead of a real threat. A

more disturbing view is that “the threat of an Islamic takeover may be used to justify the erosion

of Kyrgyzstan’s fragile democratic institutions and undermine the foundations of civil society

and political dissent.”175

This increased perception of Extremism should be correlated with

increased government oppression of the rights of the Kyrgyz people. Thus, Extremism is an

overstated threat and its perceived existence is often used as a pretense for greater government

control.

170


Ibid. 172

Ibid. 173

Ibid. 174

Ibid. 175

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

70

Tajikistan

Of any Central Asian state, Tajikistan possesses the most experience with Islamist

movements. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party

(IRP) of the Soviet Union formed in June 1990. The IRP branch in Tajikistan (IRPT) was

summarily banned by the Tajik government. By August 1991, pressure for the Tajik government

to recognize the opposition permitted the IRPT to register as an official political party. The IRPT

geographical base was the Garm Valley, which later becomes the site of future Separatism

events. The IRPT candidate for the 1991 elections, Davlatnazar Khudonazarov, received more

than 30 percent of the vote due to a strong base of support. Thus, the IRPT demonstrated its

credibility in challenging the existing government. In response, the government cracked down on

the IRPT in May 1992. The IRPT formed an armed resistance movement in the face of political

marginalization and oppression,176

leading the Tajik government to label them as an Islamist

movement with an Extremist ideology. However, this so-called Extremism emerged in response

to government actions.

After their expulsion from Tajikistan, the IRPT sought refuge in northern Afghanistan.

The group took sanctuary with the Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud.177

Once settled in

Afghanistan, the IRPT formed the Movement for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT)178

and

launched a civil war against the Tajik state. The details of the Civil War will be discussed in the

subsection on Separatism.

In the aftermath of the Civil War in Tajikistan, the IRPT was allowed to register as a

political party once more. In 2006 it boycotted the presidential election in the face of unfair

176


Ibid. 178

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

71

election processes. Today, the IRPT remains politically marginalized as President Emomali

Rakhmon consolidates his political power.179

However it is notable that the IRPT is the only

Islamic party allowed to participate in political elections in any Central Asian country.180

Since

the IRPT remains willing to work within the broken political system of Tajikistan, it does not

appear to harbor unequivocal Extremist ideologies.

Thus, Extremism in Tajikistan does not appear to be a fanatical Islamist party attempting

to take power. Instead, the IRPT, the main example of so-called Tajik Radicalism, appears to be

a legitimate Islamic revival party that speaks to the interests of its political base. Any party that

garners 30 percent of the vote does not represent a fringe extreme ideology but rather a dominant

strain of political interests. As such, alienation of the IRPT was an ill-planned move for the Tajik

government. IRPT’s radical activities are in response to the Tajik government eliminating the

political freedoms of the IRPT. Hence, from the perspective of the SCO, Tajikistan appears to

have a streak of Extremism. However this Extremism is not the danger of organized radicalism

such as movements like the Taliban or Al-Qaeda but rather Extremism that stems from

government repression. As such, the threat of the first ‘Evil’ of Extremism is misplaced.

Turkmenistan

Although Turkmenistan is not a SCO member state181

due to its strict neutrality policy

(rather its presence as a guest attendee), its geographic location makes Turkmenistan important

to the potential spread of Extremist Islamist thought. Given the usually porous borders of most

Central Asian states, Turkmenistan may allow radical ideas to flow into Central Asia. Turkmen

are predominantly Sunni Muslims and Sufism has strong roots. Turkmenistan’s former President,

179


Ibid. 181

Despite SCO attempts to ask Turkmenistan to join.

Hoyt, David

72

Saparmurat Niyazov, maintained strict control over religion. The most radical of ideologies in

Turkmenistan is the book Rukhnama, which is a state sponsored work created and used by

Niyazov to co-opt the Islamic revival movement in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Even

moderate Islamic groups fail to appeal to the Turkmen population and there is virtually no

Islamist extremist activity. There have been no serious incidents of violence at the hands of

Islamist extremists since Turkmenistan’s independence from the Soviet Union and “radical

Islam…represents virtually no challenge to the security of the state.”182

Thus, Islamic radicalism

and the terrorism that stems from these ideologies are not fears that should be linked to

Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan faced an early challenge from Extremism that had inadvertently been created

by the regime’s own actions. The All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) also founded a

branch in Uzbekistan in 1990. However, in January 1991, a meeting of IRP in Uzbekistan and

other opposition parties was disrupted by the Uzbekistan National Security Bureau secret police.

The IRP was henceforth declared an illegal organization and driven underground. The Uzbek

IRP declarations that the group is nonviolent fell upon deaf ears.183

Thus, “from the very

beginning the President Islam Karimov regime ruthlessly crushed any manifestation of

politicized Islam in the country.”184

This government continued the Soviet era policy of

eradicating Islam. However, “Karimov’s brutalization of Muslims who simply wished to form

alternative political parties in the wake of Soviet repression only served to radicalize them,

182


These claims at the initial time of their utterance seem valid. 184

Ibid., 50.

Hoyt, David

73

although only a small minority eventually resorted to violence in an effort to achieve their

political goals.”185

Uzbek law also seeks to create a secure bulwark that prevents Islam from spreading

throughout the country. In 1998, The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious

Organizations was passed. This Law “is considered one of the most restrictive statutes governing

religion in the world.”186

The Law on Freedom is a misnomer because it allows the Uzbek

government to ban activities that attract new converts, restrict religious clothing, requires

licenses to disseminate religious works, and requires every religious organization to register with

the government and provide a list of every, single member thereby permitting the government to

disrupt potential political opponents. A second piece of legislation revised the criminal code and

increased penalties for unauthorized teaching and proselytizing of religious ideas. Finally, the

Karimov government attempted to bring Islamic education under complete state control.187

Through these mechanisms, the Uzbek state strives toward absolute political power to

marginalize any competing ideology that may embolden political challengers.

Uzbekistan’s extreme crackdown creates the very conditions that it fears the most.

Islamic groups, seeing no other way for political representation, are forced to radicalize. As

described in the sections on Separatism and Terrorism, Uzbekistan faced a high level of violence

because its government prohibits political participation. A correlation appears to exist as

Karimov’s repressive policies are followed by the creation of radical groups such as the IMU and

terrorist attacks. Yet without downplaying the issue of Extremism within Uzbekistan, the larger

issue is that other Central Asian states adopted Uzbekistan’s model of oppression as the means to

185


Ibid., 52. 187

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

74

isolate Extremism, real or imagined. This model of brutal oppression serves as a root to spread

the three evils throughout Central Asia.

Overview of Extremism

The first Evil of Extremism within the SCO Member States is mostly an overblown

threat. Historic memory of Soviet suppression of Islam and fears of Mujahedeen warriors

destroying Soviet forces in Afghanistan created a legacy of fear toward Extremism, specifically

that of radical Islam. Furthermore, each of these authoritarian states seeks to maintain absolute

political domination and prevent any political opposition from coalescing. Islam represents one

of the few ideas that may create a potential political challenger. Russia faces the most dangerous

examples of Extremism as the United Caucasus Emirate under Umarov proves itself to be the

leading group in a regional struggle while maintaining commitment to Islamist Universalism.

Among Central Asian States, only Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have real experience with

domestically created Extremism, while Kyrgyzstan grappled with fallout from Uzbekistan.

However, in each of these cases, government repression of religion and/or political expression

seems to have prompted the Extremist activities that the SCO Member States feared. These

States instigated government oppression of political power and religious identity, a trend

spreading throughout Central Asia. Extremism in the form of Islamist or Jihadist movements, on

its own, does not appear to be a legitimate modern threat for the SCO as Extremism. Extremism

as an ‘Evil’ is exaggerated and does not represent a threat to the SCO Member States.

4.3 - Evil 2: Separatism – Threats to Existing Regimes

The second ‘Evil’ that the SCO is combating as part of its core goal is Separatism. This

threat evolved dramatically throughout the post-Soviet era. Civil wars in the early 1990s initially

Hoyt, David

75

presented a serious separatist threat, as sectarian violence between ethnic groups derived from

the arbitrary design of the Central Asian states threatened destabilization. The Separatist threat

changed in the 21st century. The Color Revolutions

188 in particular changed the scope of

Separatism and may have allowed SCO States to define democratic movements as falling within

this ‘evil.’ Combining this fear of civil unrest with the SCO Charter’s purposeful exclusion of

respect for human rights and the right to self-determination; any perceived threats to the existing

regime may fall under the label of Separatism.

China

The main Separatist threat facing China lies in Xinjiang Province in Southwest China and

stems from the ‘East Turkestan’ Movement. China has seven ethnic ‘Turkic’ groups of which

five are located in Xinjiang: the Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tartar. These Turkic

groups have inhabited this region for centuries and as such have a long history of interactions

with China and the Central Asian region.189

The ‘East Turkestan’ group emerged in 1933 when it

rebelled in Xinjiang against the Chinese government and seceded proclaiming the ‘East

Turkestan’ Republic. The new Republic collapsed a few months later. The second uprising

occurred in 1944 and reestablished the separatist ‘East Turkestan Republic’ in Xinjiang.190

This

revolution was more successful. However, in 1949 the Chinese Communist Party, which had

recently gained power in the Chinese Civil War, reestablished control of the Xinjiang region

dismantling the East Turkestan Republic and suppressing Uighur Nationalism.191

Thus, “the

principal political objective of the ‘East Turkestan’ movement,” according to Zhao Huasheng,

188

Colored Revolutions is a term for non-violent revolutions that adopted a color or flower as their symbol. 189



Ibid. 191

Peter B. Golden, “Central Asia In World History”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),138.

Hoyt, David

76

Director of SCO Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, “is the independence of Xinjiang

and the formation of an ‘East Turkestan’ state.”192

However, as an Islamic state, the underlying

philosophical goal is spiritual not political, and therefore China cannot easily resolve the

Separatist movement. As such, China’s goal is to suppress these calls for self-determination

since the unrest cannot be solved by eradicating the movement.193

The East Turkestan resistance has not been dormant since China reunified its borders in

1949. With their central principle in mind, “the movement resorts to violence and terrorist

means”194

conducting its strongest operations in the first decades of the People’s Republic of

China’s (PRC) existence. The East Turkestan Movement was so active in this time frame that

according to Chinese sources, “from the early 1950s to the late 1980s the Xinjiang region

witnessed more than twenty large-scale rebellions and disturbances.”195

The East Turkistan Movement, as described further in the Terrorism section below, is

actually a blanket name that the Chinese use to describe Uighur nationalistic movements. As

such this shorthand clouds our understanding as to which groups are actually rebelling against

the Chinese government. Stratfor’s understanding is that the primary group within the East

Turkistan Movement is actually named the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The

ETIM was formed in 1940s under the name Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan (meaning Turkistan

Islamic Movement) and was founded by three Uighur Muslims. Until 1952, these three leaders

led the movement in uprising against the status quo seeking a separate identity and an

independent state. The Chinese government’s retaliated and severely damaged the organization

192Rumer, Eugene B., Dmitriĭ Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao. Central Asia: Views From Washington, Moscow, and

Beijing. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 144. 193

Ibid., 194

Ibid., 142. 195

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

77

by assassinating or imprisoning its leaders. The organization reformed the ETIM attempting an

ill-fated uprising in 1956. The movement remained dormant until either the late 1970s or early

1980s.196

Stratfor further posits that the uprisings in Xinjiang in the 1960s and 1970s,

erroneously blames on the ETIM, were more linked to the instability of the Cultural

Revolution.197

In the 1980s several schools for Islamic study opened and Islam saw a cultural revival. In

the wake of Chinese leaders ‘Reform and Opening Up’ policies, the ETIM sought to have its

voice heard. “The 1980s also saw a resurgence of activism among Uighurs in Xinjiang and

elsewhere in China, triggered by calls for religious or ethnic rights, greater student freedoms and

opposition to Chinese nuclear tests at Lop Nor in Xinjiang.”198

A series of student protests

occurred in Xinjiang in 1985, 1988, and 1989, each suppressed by Chinese security forces. These

movements, however, were probably more inspired by growth of student activism throughout

China than Separatists.199

But by suppressing student movements, the Chinese government

continued to increase the tensions of the Uighur population.

Starting at the end of the 1980s and culminating in the April 5, 1990 ‘Baren Incident,’

Xinjiang experienced several large-scale Separatist attacks. In 1990, a revived Hizbul Islam Li-

Turkistan again sought independence and planned a series of attacks against their oppressor, the

Chinese government. Beijing uncovered the plots and sought to quash them by deploying

196

Sources appear unclear as to the exact date. 197


Forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013.

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid.

Hoyt, David

78

paramilitary forces to the town of Baren. After three weeks, most of the militants were captured

or killed.200

At the same time a splinter group, Hizbul Islah Al-Islami (The Islamic Party of

Reformation) conducted a series of car and bus bombings. Other Separatists factions as well as

Uighur organized-crime groups staged militant activities. The variety of incidents and

organizations involved complicates attribution of these attacks. Beijing responded fiercely with a

wide security sweep, in which activist leaders were captured and imprisoned.201

These security

sweeps were successful as they appear to have disrupted the capacity of these Uighur

organizations:

Many other future leaders of Uighur/East Turkistan movements (political, militant and

secular) fled China in the 1980s and 1990s, settling predominately in Central Asia,

Turkey and Germany. Inspired by the newly independent Central Asian states, members

of this Uighur diaspora held the first Uighur National Congress in Istanbul in December

1992. However, like most overseas and domestic attempts to unite the Uighurs under

central coordination, this gathering failed to provide a center of gravity for the nascent

Uighur movement.202

The actions taken by Beijing proved to be an inflection point for the East Turkistan Movement.

Although still possessed with a secessionist goal, the group no longer was capable of mounting

large-scale uprisings that could threaten Beijing’s territorial holdings; instead shifted toward

isolated guerilla-style terrorist attacks, which, although deadly, are extremely unlikely to threaten

overall Chinese domestic stability and control of Xinjiang. In the aftermath of these attacks and

harsh government reactions, Separatists radicalized. From 1996 to 2003, “more than half a

million Uighurs reportedly... fled from China into neighboring Pakistan and Central Asia since

200


Forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013.

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid.

Hoyt, David

79

1996,”203

as they have more in common with neighboring populations than the influx of Han

Chinese, relocated to Xinjiang by the central government.

Even though the East Turkestan Movement would now be classified by this study as a

terrorist threat, China continues to fear the movement as a major force for secession. The threat

articulated by the ETIM seems real, “those who adhere to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement

(ETIM) have prioritized their main goal as being primarily the independence of East Turkestan,

and secondly, to convert all Chinese people to Islam.”204

However, “as a large-scale secessionist

movement in the making, the Uighur threat is overplayed by the Chinese, who view the various

Uighur groups as more unified than they really are.”205

Stratfor sees the overall Uighur

movement as “highly fractured”206

citing multiple member efforts to take a leadership role by

pitting opposite interests against one another.207

Stratfor also hones in on the fact that the

organization is neither robust nor resilient and that its rifts and small membership makes it

“susceptible to massive dislocation and fragmentation when a major Chinese raid occurs, a

leader is killed or a sanctuary is lost.”208

Thus, for a secessionist movement, “the movement itself

is small, fractured, poorly supported by the domestic and overseas Uighur community and

increasingly encompassed by the broader international Jihadist movement. T

203

"Trouble Brewing Between China and Pakistan?”," Stratfor | Geopolitical Intelligence, Economic, Political, and

Military Strategic Forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/trouble-brewing-between-china-and-pakistan,

accessed May 20, 2013.

204 Paul Le Blanc, “Exploring the Historical Origins and Developments of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement

(ETIM), Academic.edu., 2010, http://www.academia.edu/2373455/Chinese_Muslim_Radicals_Exploring_the_Histo

rical_Origins_and_Developments_of_the_East_Turkistan_Islamic_Movement_ETIM_ , accessed May 2013. 205

"China: ETIM and the Olympic Games," Stratfor | Geopolitical Intelligence, Economic, Political, and Military

Strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-etim-and-olympic-games,accessed May 20, 2013. 206

Ibid. 207

This activity likely harms the movement. 208

"China: ETIM and the Olympic Games,” Ibid.

http://www.academia.edu/2373455/Chinese_Muslim_Radicals_Exploring_the_Historical_Origins_and_Developments_of_the_East_Turkistan_Islamic_Movement_ETIM_


Hoyt, David

80

his dilutes its forces and focus even further.”209

The ETIM therefore does not present a credible

Separatist threat unless they are able to exploit exogenous geopolitical shocks that threaten China

or Central Asia as a whole. Instead they have switched to minor terrorist actions that present a

violent nuisance to the Chinese state.

The threat of Separatism within China then, unlike that of Extremism, is not baseless.

Given the long list of historical events of portions of Xinjiang attempting to break free of

Beijing’s grasp, Xinjiang and the Uighur nationalistic movements located there will be a political

threat to Beijing’s continued dominance. As these movements draw strength from their

historical, cultural, and ethnic ties to Central Asia, addressing these Separatist threats through the

SCO is a logical move for China. Furthermore, as the East Turkestan Movement weakens as the

Chinese state’s power and its security apparatus strengthens, the likelihood of a successful

Uighur secessionist movement without the aid of an exogenous shock to the CCP regime’s

control of the state is low. Thus, the ‘Evil’ of Separatism, although it exists and requires

government attention, is no longer a major threat to China.

Russia

A Separatist threat for Russia, like the rest of the SCO Member States, was strongest

right after the USSR’s Collapse when Russia was weak and the state was unable to effectively

project power to maintain its territorial integrity. In 1991, President Boris Yeltsin appointed

General Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet army officer, to lead the Chechen republic.

However, Dudayev announced his support for Chechen independence shortly after taking his

209

"China: ETIM and the Olympic Games," Stratfor | Geopolitical Intelligence, Economic, Political, and Military

Strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-etim-and-olympic-games,accessed May 20, 2013.

Hoyt, David

81

post and formally declared Chechen independence in November 1991.210

Russia feared that with

18 percent of its population non-Slavic, Chechen independence, on ethnic grounds, would set a

dangerous precedent that could threaten the Russian Federation’s stability. This worry was not

isolated as “in eight regions of the Russian Federation movements for autonomy or independence

were becoming increasingly vocal.”211

Chechnya also had a pipe line that transferred oil from the

Caspian oil fields to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk,212

and therefore is vital to the national

economy. Separatist forces thus threatened Russian security, stability, and economic interests,

necessitating the first of many interventions to protect Russian interests in its traditional sphere

of influence.

Although the Russian government did not immediately respond, in 1994 Yeltsin’s

government acted to stop Chechnya’s move toward independence. The resulting conflict was a

bloody six-year intermittent conflict that inflicted considerable suffering on the Chechens. The

capital, Grozny, was subjected to air attacks and ground assaults and “it is estimated that during

the first two years alone sixty thousand Chechens lost their lives and much of the capital was

reduced to rubble.”213

The Russians also suffered about twenty-five thousand causalities and

ultimately failed to accomplish their objectives. The First Chechen War ended in August 1996

when an agreement with the Chechens was signed that “grant[ed] them ‘political autonomy,’ a

concept so vague that many commentators predicted, correctly, that the conflict would be

resumed.”214

210

Abraham Ascher, Russia: A Short History, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 236-37.

211 Ibid., 237.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.

Hoyt, David

82

The failure of the Russian Army to accomplish its objective of retaking Chechnya was a

major political blow for the army and Russia as a whole. The events of the First Chechen War

exposed the Russian army as an “undisciplined, ill-equipped force that could not defeat a small

country that officials denigrated as a haven for bandits and terrorists.”215

The defeat of the

Russian armed forces was symbolic of Russia’s wider geopolitical context, “The once-mighty

Russian army's defeat in 1996 at the hands of separatist rebels in Chechnya was the lowest point

in a dreadful post-Soviet decade, during which the economy collapsed, the government defaulted

on its debts and the population's life expectancy slumped.”216

Journalists broadcasted Russia’s

defeat to the world further shaming the Russian government. Despite defeating the Russians in

combat, in the aftermath of the war “the victorious Chechens failed to build a viable state,

however, and Chechnya collapsed into chaos.”217

Thus, the Chechens could not consolidate their

gains in order to build a state strong enough to deter the return of Russian forces.

The peace treaty did not end the Russian-Chechnya conflict. Chechen terrorist activities

continued through Yeltsin’s presidency and into Putin’s. Although Yeltsin promised tough

responses, it was Putin who exercised aggression to gain the support of his citizen base by

providing security. Putin vowed “to ‘kick the shit’ out of the Chechen terrorists.”218

Putin

became the Russian Prime Minister in August of 1999 and immediately began to reverse

Russia’s decline. According to journalist Oliver Bullough, “Since the war resumed in 1999,

Chechnya's separatists have been reduced to a tiny, defeated rump hiding in the mountains.”219

Within two months of Putin’s appointment, the Army reclaimed part of Chechnya. Bullough

215

Abraham Ascher, Russia: A Short History, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 238.

216 Oliver Bullough, "Far beyond Moscow (Cover story)" New Statesman 141, no. 5121 (September 3, 2012): 20-

25, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013. 217

Ibid. 218

Ascher, Ibid., 242. 219

Bullough, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

83

comments, “That success and the campaign that followed propelled Putin from unknown

bureaucrat to national hero, and swept him to the presidency in March 2000.” Within eight

months of Putin’s ordering the Russian Army back into Chechnya, the region was pacified. The

success of Russia’s armed forces in the Second Chechen War rescinded the virtual independence

Chechnya had won in 1996. The damage inflicted on Chechnya was immense. For example, after

the Russian siege of Grozny, the “United Nations … described [Grozny] as ‘the most destroyed

city on earth.’”220

Reliable causality statistics are notoriously difficult to ascertain. The Russians

were so effective in breaking the resistance that many militants switched side including the

current leader of Chechnya and his father, the former leader of Chechnya until he was

assassinated in 2004.221

As the war progressed, Russian forces understood that they had to consolidate their gains

in order to actually reintegrate Chechnya back into the Federation. In a failed effort to prevent

insurgency, “Putin's officials were ruthless in establishing order behind the lines in the early

months of his campaign in Chechnya. Young Chechen men of military age were assumed to be

guilty and sent to filtration camps.”222

Many were sent to Chernokozovo, considered the worst

prison in an already terrible Russian prison system. Here prisoners, whether innocent or guilty,

were tortured, raped, and/or killed.223

The view of how the Chechen crisis has evolved implies

that Moscow only maintains control through fear, terror, and violence:

And then, there are conflicts like the one unfolding in Chechnya, where a government,

having killed hundreds of thousands of civilians since 1994, is now running an

220

Abraham Ascher, Russia: A Short History, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 242.

221 Anna Badkhen, "Nightmare in Chechnya." New Republic 241, no. 6 (April 29, 2010): 10-14, Academic Search


Oliver Bullough, "Far beyond Moscow (Cover story)" New Statesman 141, no. 5121 (September 3, 2012): 20-

25, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013. 223

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

84

authoritarian police state of the most brutal kind--and the other side is responding by

murdering children and commuters.224

Richard Sakwa, Professor of Russia and European Politics, notes that these extra-judicial tools

used to achieve short-term victories, undermines the coherence of the Chechen state in the long-

run meaning that it prolongs the threat of Separatism.225

The Chechnya Struggle accelerated over time. The struggle as changed from:

A type of civil war within Chechnya and the region as a whole between separatist

militants and those willing to seek accommodation with Moscow, accompanied by a

change in ideological emphasis in the former from a national liberation to an Islamist

supra-national rhetoric. The declaration of the Caucasus emirate in November 2007

subordinated Chechen national goals to the broader struggle for an expansive anti-

modern and anti-statist form of universal Islam.226

Stratfor’s analysis is that “Russia was able to eventually overcome the insurgency, mainly by

splitting nationalist factions from the jihadists. Russia then installed one of the nationalist

families, the Kadyrovs, into power in Chechnya and granted these factions autonomy in

controlling security forces in the republic.”227

However, despite these successes, even after

Russia retook Chechnya, its war in Chechnya functions “essentially [as] a civil war. Chechnya is

‘our Afghanistan… inside Russia.’”228

And of late, even Kadyrov's grip is slipping as the

Separatist fight has flared in neighboring republics, which often serve as bases for insurgents to

launch attacks all throughout Russia, including Moscow.229

224

Anna Badkhen, "Nightmare in Chechnya." New Republic 241, no. 6 (April 29, 2010): 10-14, Academic Search




Ibid. 227

Eugene Chausovsky, "Continued Violence in the North Caucasus | Stratfor," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence,

economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/video/continued-violence-north-

caucasus, accessed May 26, 2013. 228

Nathan Thornburgh, and Simon Shuster, "Russia's Long War," Time 176, no. 7 (August 16, 2010): 30-

35, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, accessed May 22, 2013. 229

Nathan Thornburgh, and Simon Shuster, "Russia's Long War," Time 176, no. 7 (August 16, 2010): 30-

35, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013.

Hoyt, David

85

Russia’s fear of Separatist movements is well grounded given the two wars it has fought

in Chechnya and the temporary independence Chechnya gained after the first. Despite brutal

repercussions, extensive loss of life, property and infrastructure, the militant forces, jihadists,

ethnic separatists consistently regroup and emerge against their oppressors – the Russia regime–

possibly more determined more radicalized each time. The more brutal the Russian state cracks

down on the Separatists, the more radicalized they become. Yet, the Separatists ability to secede

from the Russian Federation—with Putin in power—seems slim. Russia fought strenuously to

maintain control of this region and more specifically, in control of the crucial pipeline running

through its countryside. Russia fought its internal strife without help from its SCO Member and

neighboring States. Although the SCO purports to work against this evil, Russia will likely not

seek its assistance. However, the determination exhibited by the Separatist movement in Russia

indicates that although sometimes invisible, they are far from extinct. Thus, Russia’s threat from

the Evil Separatism will continue to be one feared by the Federation for some time.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s initial fears regarding Separatism are unusual due to a unique ethnic

composition left over from the period of Soviet rule. The state includes some 131 minority ethnic

groups, with the largest being Russian Slavs. Under the Soviet rule, many Russians were forcibly

relocated to sections of Kazakhstan. Upon Kazakhstan’s independence, its President, Nursultan

Nazarbayev faced rising Russian nationalism from the deportees, as well as from Kazakh

nationalism. As of 1989, the Soviet Census showed that “five of the oblasts of northern

Kazakhstan held Russian pluralities, and two more contained an absolute majority of ethnic

Hoyt, David

86

Russians.”230

Prominent Russia nationalists advocated that the border between Russia and

Kazakhstan was “‘artificial’ and should be redrawn to include the ‘Russian zone’ within the

Russian Federation.”231

As such, Russia attempted to influence its diaspora to secede its northern

regions from Kazakhstan – a clear Separatist threat. It was only through the adroit foreign and

domestic policies of Nazarbayev, such as moving the Capital to the renamed Almaty in the

North, that the government maintained the territorial integrity of the state of Kazakhstan.232

The

Russian’s posture was that “Moscow did not support the few and feeble attempts by local

separatists; indeed, it was tolerant of Kazakhstan’s 1999 clampdown on ethnic Russian activists

in Ust-Kamenogorsk.”233

However, this may be a face-saving attempt by Russians who saw the

annexation of Northern Kazakhstan as impractical and opposed to Russian interests. Thus,

Kazakhstan inherited a Separatist threat that it has skillfully defused.

After the attempted coup in the 1990s, Kazakhstan experienced few Separatist threats.

President Nazarbayev is a popular leader who united the country. In addition, Kazakhstan does

not border Afghanistan, which harbored many separatist groups that threatened to destabilize the

other newly minted Central Asian regimes. It was not until a decade into the new millennium

that Kazakhstan faced dangerous levels of protests. During 2011 and 2012, large scale protests

and border skirmishes234

erupted. Several border guards were killed in anomalous incidents.

Meanwhile, the protests started in the Western oil city of Zhanaozen and spread through other

non-energy sectors including mining. However, most of the protests have been nonviolent thus

far. Stratfor hypothesizes that these “trends could be related to an ongoing power struggle in the

230


Ibid. 232

Ibis., 21-6. 233



These deaths occurred near the Kazakhstan-China border.

Hoyt, David

87

country surrounding the future of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.”235

If so then these

new security threats are related to the regime’s failure to create a stable political transition

process as opposed to movements seeking to secede or overthrow the existing regime.

Kazakhstan’s Separatist threat has decreased in danger over time and is the mildest of all

of the SCO Member States. Initially Kazakhstan’s Separatist threat was real due to the state’s

ethnic cleavages but by the time the SCO was founded the threat was a non- issue. The

multilateral border treaties signed by the Shanghai Five most likely aided Kazakhstan’s ability to

form stable relations with the Russian Federation and defang any Separatist threats related to

Russia. The recent wave of protests, although noteworthy, does not present a threat on the scale

of Russia’s Chechen Wars or China’s ETIM nationalistic movement. Despite the recent wave of

tensions, no serious Separatist threat seems to have emerged for Kazakhstan since the formation

of the SCO. Unlike the rest of the SCO Member States, Kazakhstan has been fortunate and has

experienced relatively high internal stability. Thus, Separatism as the second ‘Evil’ the SCO

guards against is a non-issue for Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyzstan

At independence, Kyrgyzstan’s demographic geography placed the state at risk from

Separatism. The state’s ethnic breakdown is divided between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek, both of

which are predominately Muslim populations. Northern Kyrgyzstan is dominated by the Kyrgyz

who tend to be less strict with their interpretation of Islam. The South is majority ethnic Uzbek

populations who have historically followed stricter interpretations of Islam. “This difference in

235

“Central Asia’s Increasing Volitility," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military

strategic forecasting, Stratfor. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/central-asias-increasing-volatility, accessed May

19, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/central-asias-increasing-volatility

Hoyt, David

88

worldviews represents a fundamental split in social attitudes and behaviors in the country”236

that

falls down a geographic North-South divide. This split has led to ethnic tensions throughout

Kyrgyzstan’s modern history.

Kyrgyzstan initially avoided the danger of this ethnic split and the separatist forces that it

could engender by creating an open access society. As the Soviet Union dissolved, riots between

the two ethnicities in the Southern city of Osh left hundreds if not thousands dead and forced the

newly independent Kyrgyz government to confront the difficult task of reconciling a cleft

state.237

The first Kyrgyz president, Askar Akayev, was a scientist who ran unopposed and

initially promoted democratic reforms. In particular, he allowed opposition parties to organize.

This created an inclusive state that allowed Uzbeks and Kyrgyz to live together more peacefully.

However, President Akayev undermined the democratic foundations of Kyrygzstan as he

attempted to sidestep the democratic process to remain in power; this shifted the state toward

authoritarianism throughout the 1990s.238

From the perspective of the SCO, in 2005 a new Kyrgyz Separatist threat materialized. In

response to Akayev’s progressively more authoritarian rule, the Tulip Revolution, a nonviolent

protest, occurred in early 2005. Widespread demonstrations were staged opposing Akayev’s re-

election and his Soviet style of government forcing Akayev to resign and flee Kyrgyzstan.

President Bakiyev, leader of the opposition group and the revolution, was elected in the

aftermath of the revolution on a platform of more democratic ideals. Unfortunately for his

236


Hanks, Ibid., 30. 238

Hanks, Ibid., 31-33.

Hoyt, David

89

supporters, Bakiyev’s promises were empty and his regime became noticeably more pro-Russia

and anti-West.239

The Color Revolutions, such as the Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution, frighten the SCO. It is

unclear if this grassroots democratic movement that overthrew a post-Soviet regime was inspired

by other like-minded people in analogous events in nearby nations. Regardless, authoritarian

governments watched nervously as the three Color Revolutions in 18 months occurred in former

Soviet countries and ousted the regime in power. Unfortunately, once in power, these new

regimes were less democratic than hoped. In the aftermath, authoritarian regimes such as the

SCO Member States feared being forced out power by a grass root mass movement of repressed

marginalized people; as a result they labeled such movements as a Separatist Evil.

Five years later, a still unstable Kyrgyzstan was rocked by a second Revolution and again

the government toppled reigniting sectarian tensions. In June 2010, the city of Osh suffered

another bout of violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The violence caused thousands of Uzbeks

to flee south to Uzbekistan and the violence left hundreds dead.240

The North-South split was

exacerbated when the Uzbekistan government supported the interim Kyrgyz government causing

the Kyrgyz majority to retaliate violently toward the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan

increased its forces on the border as a response and opened its borders to refugee evacuations. 241

Tensions between these two states died down afterwards and despite continued protests, the

“likelihood of protest-related violence is much lower in Kyrgyzstan than in other Central Asian

239


Hanks, Ibid. 241

"Kyrgyzstan: Eyes Turn to Moscow as Instability Grows Read more: Kyrgyzstan: Eyes Turn to Moscow as

Instability Grows," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/kyrgyzstan-eyes-turn-moscow-instability-grows, accessed May 19, 2010.

Hoyt, David

90

countries.”242

The North-South differences in Kyrgyzstan continue to make the nation the most

volatile Central Asian country and thus another revolution is always possible. However, the

desire for another revolution should diminish with the adoption of a new constitution and the

election of a new president. In addition the presence of Russian security forces stationed within

Kyrgyzstan should encourage the status quo.243

Russia’s role in the 2010 Revolution is sometimes disputed. During the crisis, the interim

Kyrgyz government requested military assistance from Russia. Russia refused, Russian President

Dmitri Medvedev reaction was that:

During a speech given at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization June 11 [2010]. Russia

would not be sending its troops to meddle in internal Kyrgyz affairs. The wording of

Medvedev's statement is key, because Russia does have the legal right to send troops to

Kyrgyzstan under the regional military alliance of the Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO).244

Furthermore, Uzbekistan “indicated that it would consider a Russian troop deployment outside

the guise of the CSTO as a precursor to a larger military push against Uzbekistan.”245

These

comments may indicate that Russia kept a hands-off approach to the 2010 Kyrgyz Revolution.

However, a few articles published by Stratfor and others also imply that the 2010 Revolution

initiated by the Russians. Stratfor reports that:

In the weeks before the revolution, select Kyrgyz opposition members visited Moscow to

meet with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Stratfor sources in Kyrgyzstan

reported the pervasive, noticeable presence of Russia's Federal Security Service on the

ground during the crisis, and Moscow readied 150 elite Russian paratroopers the day after

242

"Central Asia’s Increasing Volatility." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military

strategic forecasting, Stratfor, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/central-asias-increasing-volatility, accessed May

19, 2013. 243

Ibid. 244


Instability," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/kyrgyzstan-eyes-turn-moscow-instability-grows, accessed May 19, 2013. 245

Ibid.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kyrgyzstan-eyes-turn-moscow-instability-grows

Hoyt, David

91

the revolution to fly into Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan. As the dust began to settle, Russia

endorsed the still-coalescing government.246

Stratfor sees this operation as tailor made for Kyrgyzstan and part of an overall Russian Grand

Strategy of Russian Resurgence by replacing and dominating the Kyrgyz government to re-exert

regional influence. This study is uncertain as to the accuracy of Stratfor’s allegations.

New Separatist fears arose once more in 2013. Nationwide protests with numbers in the

thousands demonstrate for weeks during February and March over a range of politico-economic

issues. The root of these protests can be traced back to October 2012 when, “Kamchybek

Tashiev, the head of the southern-based Ata-Jurt party, led protests … calling for the overthrow

of the government…Tashiev has since been arrested. His detention has spawned protests from

his supporters.”247

The actions taken by the Kyrgyz government to jail a Member of Parliament

over his call for regime change follow a reoccurring theme of SCO Member States oppressing

political opponents that threaten the regime’s survival.

Kyrgyzstan’s threat of Separatism is unique amongst the SCO states and represents an

important model to study. The threats of Separatism in Kyrgyzstan are two-fold. First, its ethnic

breakdown creates a country inherently fragile and prone to sectarian violence and strife. Only

through a powerful top-down state-sponsored force or a stable open access society can the

Kyrgyzstan government govern effectively; otherwise it risks ethnic division. Second, the threat

to regime stability is evident that Kyrgyzstan has undergone two (so far, as a third may+ occur

after the writing of this study given the mounting tensions) grassroots regime changes. Given the

246

Lauren Goodrich, "Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence | Stratfor." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence,

economic, political, and military strategic forecasting,

http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/20100412_kyrgyzstan_and_russian_resurgence, accessed May 19, 2013. 247


Instability Grows," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/kyrgyzstan-eyes-turn-moscow-instability-grows, accessed May 19, 2010.

Hoyt, David

92

violence in 2010, Kyrgyzstan is now less likely to use force to prevent this manner of regime

change. This therefore presents a chink in the SCO’s goal of stable regimes. If Kyrgyzstani

citizens can overthrow their regime twice, it can set a precedent for other SCO countries and

encourage other domestic opposition movements.248

Thus, the SCO Member States are

inherently threatened by democratic movements and are quick to label them under the evil of

Separatism. This point will be expanded upon in Chapter VI.

Tajikistan

The greatest Separatist threat in Central Asia was the 1992-1997 Tajik Civil War. The

Tajik Civil War was precipitated by the political marginalization of the Islamic Renaissance

Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). After the 1991 election, the representative of the Tajik Communist

Party, Rakhman Nabiev, won the presidential election and then immediately began to purge his

political opponents. In advance of the formation of an opposition, he distributed arms to his

supporters in the capital city and the opposition’s protests turned into riots. The chaos and

fighting that followed forced the IRPT to flee to Afghanistan where they continued to advocate

for a democratic political process and Islam ideology as a political principle. Nabiev’s failure to

maintain domestic stability forced from office and replaced by Emomli Rakhmonov often

referred to as Rakhmon.249

The IRPT’s exodus to Afghanistan sparked a full civil war. The IRPT stationed in

Afghanistan continued to threaten the Tajik government and merged with several other Tajik

Islamic factions to create the MIRT. Once unified, the IRPT ran the MIRT as a shadow Tajik

government and coordinated a guerilla war against the Tajik government from the relative safety

248

A notable example discussed below is Uzbekistan’s Andjian Protests. 249

Reuel Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia”, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 35.

Hoyt, David

93

of its bases in Afghanistan. The other major rebel group was the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).

The UTO was not only an ideological front; it was supported by geographically determinate clan

loyalties. The MIRT joined the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1994 and helped play a key

role in eventually forcing a negotiated settlement to the end of the civil war.250

The civil war

“ultimately cost between 50,000 and 100,000 lives and seriously damaged Tajikistan’s already

limited infrastructure and industrial capacity.”251

This left Tajikistan weak and fractured to face

the security threats of Central Asia.

Since then a fragile peace has held the country intact but Tajikistan is still considered the

most unstable252

Central Asian state.253

Rakhmonov was only able to maintain the post-war

peace by offering government and security positions to opposition figures. The power-sharing

arrangement gave the UTO 30 percent representation but was never fully implemented.254

In the

20 years since, Rakhmonov “has phased out many opposition figures from government and

security ranks in an attempt to consolidate his grip over the country.”255

Russian intervention in Tajikistan may be responsible for Tajikistan’s ability to reunify

after the civil war and remain politically stable. In 1993, Russian military units were deployed to

Tajikistan in a peace-keeping capacity. The units were stationed to protect the Tajik border with

Afghanistan in order to guard against the Taliban threat. In reality, they actively supported the

official Rakhmonov government against his opposition. Built upon these initial deployments,

250

Reuel R. Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia,” (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 49.

251 Ibid., 35.

252 Afghanistan is considered more unstable.

253 Hanks, Ibid., 34-6.

254 "Potential New Parties Ahead of Tajik Presidential Election Read more: Potential New Parties Ahead of Tajik

Presidential Election," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting,

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/potential-new-parties-ahead-tajik-presidential-election. accessed May 20, 2013. 255

"Tajikistan Launches Security Operation in Restive East." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-launches-security-operation-restive-

east, accessed May 19, 2013.

Hoyt, David

94

Moscow established the Russian Border Guard Force that has controlled the Tajik-Afghan border

for 18 years. The Russian border guard forces also focus on anti-narcotics trafficking, stopping

the movement of insurgents, and enhancing Russian influence in the region.256

Thus, Russian

forces were useful in the Civil War and decisive in keeping the Taliban from further

destabilizing Tajikistan in the 1990s but at the sacrifice of some political autonomy for

Tajikistan.

Ever since the Tajik Civil War, Tajikistan remains whole but very fragile. Stratfor

describes the internal stability:

The eastern part of the country, particularly the Rasht Valley region, remains a rebel

stronghold, and the government has limited control over many parts of the country.

Militants, separatists and the country's proximity to the conflict in neighboring

Afghanistan further undermine internal consolidation.257

This rebel enclaves and regional unrest perpetuates an uneasy peace that causes the Separatist

threat is treated seriously. Rakhmon has strengthened the security apparatus since the 1990s in

order to maintain control. Although there is an underlying sentiment throughout Tajikistan of

government corruption, “protests are rare in Tajikistan, as Rakhmon has used the country's

security apparatus to clamp down on social dissent.”258

A representative example of Rakhmon’s

repression is the recent death of a leader of the IRPT for protesting. Right before the military

operations in Gorno-Badakhshan in 2012, the head of that region’s branch of the IRPT, Sabzali

Mamadrizoyev:

256


"The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence: Central Asia Read more: The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence:

Central Asia." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting,

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia, accessed May 19, 2013. 258

"A Microcosm of Tajikistan's Underlying Security Issues." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/microcosm-tajikistans-underlying-

security-issues, accessed May 19, 2013.

Hoyt, David

95

Led a demonstration in Khorog, the regional capital, reportedly against the government's

unwillingness to address the poor socio-economic situation in the region. Mamadrizoyev

was detained after this demonstration, and three days later he was found dead after

reportedly being beaten and shot with an assault rifle.259

Thus the strength of Rakhmon’s security apparatus makes a grass root opposition movements

unlikely to succeed in reigniting the sectarian tensions to destabilize Tajikistan.

The upcoming 2013 Tajik elections has caused new political movements to form and

challenge the Rakhmon regime. The three main movements are the ‘National Movement of

Tajikistan’, the ‘Popular Front Without Weapons’ and the ‘Youth Movement’. In particular the

Youth Movement’s leader has supposed ties to the IRP and its message may have a large appeal

across Tajikistan, given the country’s young demographic and growing religiosity.260

The IRPT

should also run candidates in 2013. It missed the 2006 presidential elections as the party was

going through a leadership transition after the death of its former leader. The new leader

Muhiddin Kabiri has built a stronger organization and has said that:

A runoff election would be inevitable if the polls are held transparently. Amid this

growth in campaigning and support, several officials from the party have been killed or

detained over the past year, indicating that the Rakhmon government considers the party

to be a serious challenger in the elections.261

Given the increase in the number of security crises262

and Rakhmonov need to consolidate his

power further, the steps Tajikistan takes in preparation for the 2013 elections should be closely

monitored in case the election re-ignites sectarian tensions.

259

"Tajikistan: An Islamist Party's Growing Significance," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-islamist-partys-growing-significance,

accessed May 20, 2013. 260

"Potential New Parties Ahead of Tajik Presidential Election Read more: Potential New Parties Ahead of Tajik

Presidential Election," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting,

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/potential-new-parties-ahead-tajik-presidential-election, accessed May 20, 2013. 261

"Russia's Islamist Quandary." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic

forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/russias-islamist-quandary, accessed May 20, 2013. 262

Discussed in Tajikistan’s Terrorism section.

Hoyt, David

96

Separatism remains a serious threat to Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s sectarian divides have

never healed and remain a latent threat to stability. Unless a political power-sharing arrangement

is reached that is more equitable for the marginalized elites, the state remains perpetually at risk.

Difficult geography also hinders the ability of the state to project power and unify the state,

which is an issue that cannot be changed but merely worked around. Two factors that strength

the state’s hand are the expansion of the state’s political base (coupled with the corresponding

decrease in the opposition) and the supporting influence of Russian security forces. Although

government actions are to blame for the severity of Separatism threats in Tajikistan, Tajikistan

faces a series of grave difficulties that make the state vulnerable to Separatism.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan, unlike the other Central Asian Republics, is not at risk from Separatist

forces. The population of Turkmenistan is relatively homogenous as Turkmen are approximately

85 percent of the population with the remaining 15 percent split between Uzbeks and Russians.

Underneath the state’s political structure, Turkmen society is heavily broken down into clans that

dictate the country’s political relationships. President Saparmurat Niyazov, serving from

independence until his death in 2006, wasted no time in crushing all of his political opponents in

the first few years of his reign. Opponents were either imprisoned or forced into exile. The

regime’s extreme top-down control over this nation has managed to prevent any Separatist

movements from arising despite the large number of crippling social and economic issues facing

Turkmenistan.263

As such, Separatism is not an issue for Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan

263

Reuel Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia”, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 37-40.

Hoyt, David

97

Geopolitically, Uzbekistan is well-suited to avoid ethnic tensions and sectarian strife.

Uzbekistan is very homogenous and Russians only account for six percent of the population.

Uzbek is the official language of the state and Uzbek ethnicity is predominant. This lack of

ethnic tensions is especially important considering Uzbekistan’s geographic location.

Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to touch all of the Central Asian Republics. Thus,

Uzbekistan’s internal security situation has enormous repercussions for its neighbors since, as

discussed before, instability can spread.264

Uzbekistan has faced repeated security threats since its independence. President Islam

Karimov’s initial consolidation of power through brutal crackdowns and removal of political

opposition generated Uzbekistan’s security risks. Among the marginalized groups that struck

back at the state were terrorist movements such as the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

These movements sought to destabilize the Uzbek state in both 1999 and 2000.265

The IMU

threat will be discussed in the next section on Terrorism..

In the post-9/11 Central Asia, Uzbekistan’s largest Separatism threat occurred during the

Color Revolutions. After President Karimov charged and detained 23 businessmen from Andijan

with being Islamic radicals and members of a terrorist organization, their supporters stormed a

police station and a military garrison freeing the accused and other inmates. After these

protestors seized a government building, 20,000 people rallied in the central square to

demonstrate their opposition to Karimov. In response, “Karimov claimed that the events in

Andijan were linked to the Tulip Revolution: ‘The scenario was identical, they wanted to repeat

264

Reuel Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia”, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 26-30.

265 Ibid.

Hoyt, David

98

the coup in Kyrgyzstan.’”266

The Color Revolution was stamped out quickly as Uzbek troops

were deployed and fired en masse into the unarmed demonstrators. Karimov much later claimed

that “nearly 200 ‘terrorists’ who were ‘taking hostages and executing people’ where Opposition

forces put the death toll at more than 500, with some 200 additional civilians killed as they tried

to flee the city.”267

The event is known by Western academics as the ‘Andijan Massacre.’

Western governments and many international organizations condemned the violence and the

government’s brutal actions. Karimov responded by condemning the West for meddling in

Uzbekistan’s internal affairs and allowed only Russia to conduct an official, independent inquiry.

Unsurprisingly, Russia did not encounter any human rights violations or oppression of political

expression.268

Uzbekistan’s Separatism threats create potential instability for the state. Since its

inception, this state faced dangerous Separatist and Terrorist threats that arose in response to

Karimov’s brutal consolidation of power. These groups sought the overthrow of the Karimov

regime. The Uzbek democratic movements, encouraged by other Colored Revolutions, arose as

well as reactions to the regime’s excesses. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, in Uzbekistan the mass

movements were ruthlessly quashed. Karimov thus prevents Separatism using extreme top-down

force. This policy works in the short to mid-term as long as these measures are repeatedly

implemented. However, these heavy fisted actions function as a catalyst that continuously

generates new movements that seek regime change. As Karimov is aging without any apparent

mechanism for political transition in place, this strategy is not sustainable. Thus, the actions

266

Thomas Ambrosio, "Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes

Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia,"Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8 (2008): 1331. 267

Ambrosio, Ibid. 268

Ambrosio, Ibid., 1331-32.

Hoyt, David

99

Uzbekistan takes to combat the Evil of ‘Separatism’ create further separatist threats and

undermine the long-term stability of the state.

Overview of Separatism

Unlike Extremism, Separatism presents a much more credible threat to the stability of

SCO Member States’ regimes. The SCO parameters of what constitutes as Separatism has

evolved and now includes any political movement that threatens the control of the regime, which

is seen as undermining the state’s stability. Separatism was a much greater threat in the 1990s as

nearly every SCO Member State was threatened making it a logical catalyst for forming the

SCO. However, the SCO purposely avoids dealing with the roots of Separatism.

The roots of Separatism within the histories of SCO Member States can be divided into

two broad categories. First is an ethnic/sectarian divide that is difficult to reconcile and stems

from the artificial creation of the Central Asian states. Second is political marginalization and

oppression from state security apparatuses that leads to the desire for political change. The first

issue often bleeds into the second as Member State governments have internalized the lessons of

deploying state-sponsored force on anyone who challenges the regime’s control. Although this

strategy may solve issues in the short-term, it is counterproductive for long-term stability. SCO

states can only hope to maintain control through this method if their state power is expansive –

something that may be possible for states at the scale and power level of China or Russia but

significantly more difficult for a state such as Tajikistan. Even then, China and Russia may face

repercussions for their actions to stifle political inclusion. As these actions engender anti-regime

sympathies, they necessarily create the seeds of grassroots movements of regime change. The

two forms of governments most likely to be able to handle a sectarian divide are stable, open

Hoyt, David

100

access societies that allow broad-based political participation or excessively strong authoritarian

states; thus many of these organic movements will be democratic in nature.

This fear of instability that threatens the regimes in power forces the SCO to label

democracy promotion as part of the ‘Evil’ of Separatism. In particular, the states of Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan should be watched most closely as their sectarian divides are the worst, their

power projection the weakest, and their historical instability the highest. The SCO will likely

monitor them closely as a democratic movement that topples an existing authoritarian regime

may set a dangerous precedent for continued regime stability. Therefore Separatism is a

legitimate fear for the SCO but not necessarily in the way Western observers would normally

assume as democracy appears outlawed. SCO actions to counter the spread of democracy will be

examined in depth in Chapter VI’s analysis of the ‘Shanghai Spirit.’

4.4 - Evil 3: Terrorism

The third Evil, Terrorism, is a threat taken extremely seriously by the head governments

of the SCO Member States and was one of the prime motivations for the SCO’s formation in

2001. Beginning with the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979 and continuing until the present, the threat

of terrorism, although it has changed, has not abated. In the post-Soviet Union era of Central

Asia, the newly founded Russian Federation assumed the mantle of security guarantor. Terrorism

rose to the fore once again in the 1990s during the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s neighboring Central Asian States along with Russia viewed the Taliban as a

significant security threat that could destabilize the Central Asian region. Russia, however,

lacked the resources to take action to stop the Taliban threat. Before the American regional

Hoyt, David

101

involvement for the War on Terror, Terrorism was a more serious threat to the security of the

SCO Member States.

The security dynamics in Central Asia experienced a seismic shift after the tragic events

of September 11th

, 2001. Once the US invaded Afghanistan, the US took over the primary role in

combating terrorist forces in the region and replaced Russia as the security guarantor. As

described below, the US invasion into Afghanistan proved to be a significant step toward

disrupting the operational capacity of the various terrorist groups then using Afghanistan as a

staging base. With the capacities of the conventional terrorist threats broken, the nature of what

was defined as terrorism soon shifted in the region. Some sectarian violence and democratic

movements appeared to represent new threats. Starting in 2010 and continuing to the present, the

security situation in Central Asia has become increasingly volatile. Although the question of is

the violence linked to militant Islamism is constantly raised, observers, such as Stratfor, say “the

notion that militant Islamists primarily are responsible for Central Asia's volatility is shortsighted

because it ignores other political and economic dynamics at play in the region.”269

Potential Terrorist Organizations

Because each country defines Terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist organization

differently, there is no gold standard source that describes the terrorist entities active in Central

Asia. However, there are a set of groups that appear frequently in Central Asian terrorism

269

Eugene Chausovsky, "Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism," Stratfor | Geopolitical

intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-

central-asia-more-religious-extremism, accessed May 19, 2013.

Hoyt, David

102

literature and represents the core of the militant groups in the region. Stratfor provides a handy

list that includes each of the groups270

that have been active since the 1990s until 2010.:

Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Founded in 1990, it was the first Islamist political

party to gain Soviet recognition. After it was banned throughout Central Asia in 1992,

many of its members resorted to violence.

Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). The Tajik branch of the IRP, the IRPT was

active during the Tajik civil war of 1992-97 but has since turned to the political

sphere.

United Tajik Opposition (UTO). UTO was an umbrella organization for the groups

that fought against the Moscow-backed Tajik government during the Tajik civil war,

but most of its members turned to politics at the end of the war. UTO derived much of

its strength from constituent Islamist groups like the IRP, but it also encompassed the

Democratic Party of Tajikistan and Gharmi and Pamiri, the ethnic groups.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Founded in East Jerusalem in 1953, HT seeks to establish a

worldwide caliphate. The group is present in more than 40 countries; its Central

Asian base is Uzbekistan. The group promotes ideological extremism, though it does

not directly engage in violence. Even so, the region's security forces have targeted it.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). A militant Islamic group aligned with the al

Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. IMU was formed in 1998 after the UTO turned to

politics. Its ultimate aim was to transform Uzbekistan into an Islamic state. IMU

leaders since have spread to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Afghanistan

and Pakistan.

Islamic Jihad Union/Group (IJU). The IJU split off from IMU; it has a small presence

in Europe.

Movement for the Islamic Revival of Uzbekistan (MIRU). MIRU was formed in 1994

and was incorporated into the IMU in 1998.

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). A group primarily focused on

independence for the northwestern Chinese region of Xinjiang, ETIM is thought to

have ties with the IMU.

Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT). Like ETIM, IMT is thought to have ties with

the IMU.271

A few groups in particular receive a large amount of the attention related to the threat

they pose as terrorist organizations that may not be justified. First is Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). HT’s

270

Although Stratfor classifies them all as militant groups (and labels many of them as Islamist), this is not

technically accurate. Some of these groups, as described in the above subsections on Extremism and Separatism, are

more moderate and represent marginalized organizations not militant organizations. In this case, Stratfor’s chart is

very useful but its hawkish view is less helpful. 271

Ben West, "The Tajikistan Attacks and Islamist Militancy in Central Asia," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence,

economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/

20100922_tajikistan_attacks_and_islamist_militancy_central_asia, accessed May 19, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/

Hoyt, David

103

name means ‘Liberation Party’ and its ideology calls for “the re-establishment of a global

Islamic caliphate using nonviolent means and rejects democracy as un-Islamic.”272

In the 1990s

due to the lack of allowed political opposition to the new Central Asian regimes, it became the

“only relatively coherent alternative view to corrupt autocracy.”273

HT is banned throughout

Central Asia and the SCO Member States see it as a terrorist organization despite it never having

been implicated in any terrorist attacks. The US government has not designated HT a terrorist

group. As of 2005, “HT's membership in Central Asia is estimated at between 7,000 and 10,000

people, and interest has been tapering off region-wide.”274

Thus, the threat posed by HT appears

over exaggerated, a fact that should be kept in mind when reading news sources from SCO

Member States.

China also obfuscates the reality of the terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Terrorist attacks in

China, according to Chinese sources, are credited to the ‘East Turkestan Movement’ at large as

opposed to any specific group. Within this movement the main threats are the East Turkistan

Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the related East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO).

China’s broad attribution is an issue for observers, “This ambiguity, and the fact that there are

numerous variations of the movement’s name, has led many foreign observers simply to credit

ETIM with all the militant attacks or plots in China.”275

Thus, to the casual observer the nuanced

factors that distinguish which group represents a legitimate threat or should be held accountable

after an attack may be lost due to the over use in the world media of this blanket terminology.

272

"Kyrgyzstan: Political Shockwaves Fracture an Islamist Group," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/kyrgyzstan-political-shockwaves-

fracture-islamist-group, accessed May 20, 2013. 273

"Kyrgyzstan: Political Shockwaves Fracture an Islamist Group, Ibid. 274

Ibid. 275

"China: The Evolution of ETIM," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic

forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013.

Hoyt, David

104

Uzbekistan’s IMU is treated throughout Central Asia much the same way uninformed

sources casually throw around the moniker of the ‘East Turkistan Movement’ inside China.

Stratfor concludes that:

[Central Asian] governments frequently use the IMU as a catchall phrase for Islamists in

Central Asia who would like to overthrow the regions' governments. In reality, various

factors divide the region's militants, and continuing to use convenient labels like IMU

frequently masks real shifts and complexities in Central Asia's militant landscape…The

name IMU to a large degree has become a generic label for Islamic militant activity in a

similar fashion to how the devolution of al Qaeda has shifted the original understanding

of the group and its name. 276

As such, the name IMU, especially after the organization’s capacity was disrupted in the wake of

the US Invasion of Afghanistan, may not mean much. Instead news sources from Central Asian

Republics, particularly Uzbekistan, should not be taken merely at face-value when attributing

terrorist attacks to the IMU.

China

The threat from the East Turkestan Movement morphed in the 1990s as the heretofore

geographically closed Central Asia opened up in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

China viewed this seismic geopolitical event as triggering a threat that could easily degrade

Xinjiang’s security as Central Asia changed overnight into a geopolitical vacuum.277

Furthermore, from the Chinese perspective:

International terrorists and religious extremists poured into the region; the internal

terrorism and extremism of Central Asia spread as a result of domestic pressures and the

276


economic, political, and military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/20100922

_tajikistan_attacks_and_islamist_militancy_central_asia, accessed May 19, 2013. 277

The instability of this vacuum in the region was exacerbated due to the weakness of state power and political

institutions of each of the Central Asian Republics, which rendered them vulnerable to instability.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100922

Hoyt, David

105

external environment. All this enabled international terrorist and extremist forces to

advance toward the Chinese frontier of Xinjiang and to erode its security.278

This shift in Central Asia’s security status quo increased Chinese fears of the effect of exogenous

threats on domestic security and stability.

According to Chinese sources, the East Turkestan Movement took advantage of the

opportunities created by the shifting security framework in Central Asia. “From 1990 to 2001,

‘East Turkestan’ terrorist forces perpetrated more than 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, killing

162 and injuring another 440.”279

Although China had treated Terrorism seriously, China did not

report any of the Terrorism-related events that occurred in Xinjiang nor did the state allow any

public discussions in order to maintain an image of domestic stability until after the events of

9/11. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, China quickly changed its information policies and began to

discuss the terrorist issues publicly. In doing so, China attempted to frame the ‘East Turkestan

Movement’ as part of America’s emerging War on Terror.280

This new stance would allow China

to gain a broader international mandate for cracking down on the East Turkestan Movement.

Stratfor’s reports dig deeper into the events of the 1990s in order to provide a more

complete understanding of this new shift from Separatism threats to Terrorist threats in Xinjiang.

According to Stratfor, “In Xinjiang, the separatist movement continued to stumble along in the

early 1990s.”281

The group conducted bus bombings in 1992 and 1993, and a large scale riot in

1992. In 1993, the founder of Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-Sharqiyah died. “By the mid-

278



Rumer, Ibid. 280

Rumer, Ibid., 143. 281

“China: The Evolution of ETIM," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic

forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim

Hoyt, David

106

1990s, several smaller militant and criminal groups were active in Xinjiang, with names,

memberships and ideologies frequently shifting.”282

This dynamic environment created new security concerns that drove China to push back

against the militants, once more perpetuating the cycle of violence, “This was followed by a

series of so-called ‘strike hard’ campaigns in Xinjiang by Chinese security forces. But rather

than quell separatism and militancy, this move caused a flare-up in Xinjiang as Beijing tightened

its grip.”283

In 1996, the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) was formed and in

response future members of the ETIM started militant groups in Xinjiang. These groups

undertook a series of terrorist attacks in the region. That same year, a larger flood of Uighurs left

China, seeking shelter in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The ‘Strike Hard’ campaigns caused a

large amount of Uighurs to leave China for Central Asia and Afghanistan.284

Stratfor refers to

this time as the zenith of the Uighur threat in Xinjiang, “From 1995 to 1997, the struggle in

Xinjiang reached its peak, with increasingly frequent attacks by militants in Xinjiang and equally

intensified security countermeasures by Beijing.”285

Thus, despite many more minor attacks over

the years after 1997, the Xinjiang Separatist threat never materialized in quite the same

magnitude as before. Instead the threat morphed into minor, isolated terrorist attacks.

The character of Hassan Mahsum, an Islamist Uighur militant, began his rise during this

time period. As described in the section on Extremism, Mahsum had been imprisoned in 1993-96

where he was radicalized during his incarceration. He was imprisoned once more in 1996 during

282


forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013. 283

"China: The Evolution of ETIM," Ibid. 284


Rodger Baker, "China and the Enduring Uighurs," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/china_and_enduring_uighurs, accessed May 22,

2013.

Hoyt, David

107

a ‘Strike Hard’ campaign and then upon release from prison left China to rebuild the ETIM. He

traveled from Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang to Beijing onto Malaysia and then on to Jeddah,

Saudi Arabia. From Saudi Arabia he traveled first to Pakistan and then on to Turkey in 1997.

After following the Hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, Mahsum then journeyed back to

Central Asia most likely stopping in Afghanistan.286

In each location he tried to convince people

“to fund or join Uighur-East Turkistan Islamist militancy and challenge Beijing’s rule over

Xinjiang.”287

But in each location Mahsum received little support. This failure to gain support

demonstrates an apparent apathy by the broader community of Muslims in Central Asia toward

the Uighur struggle. Around September 1997, Mahsum and his associates reformed the ETIM set

about following in the footsteps of the image of the defunct Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-

Sharqiyah. The ETIM then formalized its mission, “[It] sought closer cooperation with other

Turkic peoples and non-Uighurs abroad and no longer focused on starting an uprising or holding

territory in Xinjiang. In September 1998, the ETIM moved its headquarters to Kabul,

Afghanistan, taking shelter in the Taliban-controlled territory.”288

The ETIM apparently gave up

on the broad Uighur community located outside of China with the exception of a potential

alliance with the ETLO in March 1998. Instead they “began to take advantage of the regional

Jihadist movement, particularly in Afghanistan, for support and training.”289

They also reached

back into Xinjiang to establish contacts with criminal and militant groups.290

Mahsum’s ETIM became involved in terrorism in China in 1999. In March 1999, PLA

trucks where attacked outside of Urumqi by militants with potential ties to the ETIM. The

286


forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-evolution-etim, accessed May 20, 2013. 287




"China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Ibid.

Hoyt, David

108

Chinese police cracked down in Hotan during September saying that they had broken up a

‘political rebellion.’ At the same time, “Mahsum and other ETIM leaders reportedly met in

Afghanistan with Osama bin Laden and other leaders of al Qaeda, the Taliban and the [IMU] to

coordinate actions.”291

The ETIM technically renamed itself at this time by dropping the E for

East (hence renaming itself the Turkistan Islamic Movement) to symbolize a wider mandate for

its Jihad; but most observers continued to refer to it by its initial name, the ETIM. To prepare for

this larger Jihadist role, the ETIM took advantage of its base in Afghanistan, “For much of 2000

and 2001, ETIM sought to recruit Uighurs heading to Central Asia, Afghanistan or the Middle

East for Islamic training. In addition, Uighurs gained experience at training facilities in

Afghanistan and on occasional operations with the Taliban.”292

However, the ETIM maintained

minimal connection to Xinjiang during this time. Their ties with AQ purportedly grew tighter as,

“In February 2001, bin Laden and Taliban leaders reportedly met to discuss further assistance to

the various East Turkistan and Central Asian Islamist militant movements, including ETIM.”293

But these ties were transient at best as AQ became focused increasingly on its upcoming attack

on the US.294

This preparation demonstrates that the ETIM, at the conception of the SCO, was a

strong threat in theory. Despite its developed capacity, it had yet to act in force – and would not

be given the opportunity.

The US invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th

,

2001 drastically set back the ETIM in a fashion similar to many of the other militant groups

based there. The US invasion routed the ETIM from Afghanistan, killing members and scattering

the group, thereby breaking cohesion and disrupting capacity. Mahsum and his remaining

291

Stratfor. "China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Ibid. 292

"China: The Evolution of ETIM." Ibid. 293


"China: The Evolution of ETIM," Ibid.

Hoyt, David

109

members relocated to Central Asia and Pakistan while also publicly declaring that the ETIM was

not linked to AQ and the Taliban to avoid being lumped into the American War on Terror. The

ETIM received no international sympathy and the US Department of State listed the ETIM as a

terrorist organization in 2002. This posting to the US terror watch list also undermined the wider

political Uighur nationalistic movements which became casually linked with the radical Islamist

terrorist movements. 2003 shattered the ETIM. First, Beijing claimed to have broken an ETIM

cell in Hebei while Kazakhstan claimed to have broken another cell. In October 2003, a joint US-

Pakistan operation in South Waziristan killed Mahsum leaving his fractured organization

leaderless and potentially defunct.295

ETIM action since the demise of Mahsum in 2003 has been limited other than a small

potential spike prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. From the end of 2003, “there was little

mention of ETIM activity until 2007.”296

Instead during this timeframe, the remnants of ETIM

continued to interact with the Taliban and other Central Asian militants297

and “slowly re-formed

into a more coherent group on the Pakistan/Afghanistan frontier. In 2005, there were more

stirrings of this new Uighur Islamist militant group, known as the Turkistan Islamic Party

(TIP)”298

which established a robust internet media presence.299

In 2006, the Chinese state started

coming across Uighur jihadist literature emanating from Pakistan and news that the ETIM

remnants had started integrating into the other Jihadist elements. Chinese fears increased further

near the end of 2006 when reports surfaced these forces had begun to reassemble in far West

Xinjiang. China raided suspected ETIM militants in January 2007 in an area that sits at the

295



Potentially the IMU. 298

Rodger Baker, "China and the Enduring Uighurs," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and


2013. 299

Baker, R., Ibid.

Hoyt, David

110

Chinese-Tajik-Afghanistan-Pakistan border. A year later in later in January 2008, Chinese forces

raided another suspected ETIM camp near Urumqi. A failed Uighur militant plot to down a

Chinese airliner also raised concerns for the Chinese government. More security raids in March

and April in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics further disrupted the group.

China continued to increase its public statements about the threats represented by the ETIM and

crackdowns leading up the Beijing Olympics. Stratfor, reporting in 2008, said that, “There are

indications that a small number of Uighur militants remain among groups of foreign militants in

Pakistan, either in the tribal areas or in Kashmir, and occasionally travel back into Afghanistan

and Xinjiang.”300

After the attacks leading up to the Beijing Olympics, coordinated strikes by Uighur

terrorist groups such as the ETIM or the TIP appear to have diminished. In the summer of 2009,

large-scale violent protests rocked Xinjiang, specifically Urumqi. Although Stratfor states that

the riot may have been pre-planned, it appears that it was not the work of any Uighur terrorist

group but was instead tied to the social-economic tensions that are omnipresent within

Xinjiang.301

Violence was also salient in Xinjiang in 2011. The TIP, which had already linked

itself to the ETIM through a video released in 2008,302 took credit for a series of violent but

disorganized attacks during the summer of 2011. Stratfor’s analysis of the attacks was

300

Stratfor, "China: The Evolution of ETIM," Ibid. 301

"China: Unusually Lethal Unrest," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic

forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-unusually-lethal-unrest, accessed May 22, 2013. 302

Roger Baker, "China and the Enduring Uighurs," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and


2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china_and_enduring_uighurs

Hoyt, David

111

dismissive, “If ETIM was in fact behind the attacks, it is apparent that the group's capabilities are

very limited.”303

Thus, it appears that the ETIM and the TIP have been effectively neutralized.

China’s history of combating the Evil of Terrorism has been robust. The evident trend

line reflects how the overall threat posed by Uighur movements to undermine the Chinese state

has decreased steadily since the 1940s. As the threat decreased, Uighur nationalists first lost the

ability to secede, second the ability to execute large-scale separatist movements, third the

capacity to conduct larger-scale terrorist actions, and fourth the organizational coherence for

small-scale terrorism; at present the best they can do is to conduct disorganized knifings of Han

Chinese in Xinjiang. The threat was clearly the most dangerous in the 1990s, until the security

apparatus broke the Uighur movements and organizations located within China and forced them

into Central Asia. However, the fight against Uighur Terrorism was not waged solely by China.

The US conducted much of the heavy-lifting by destroying the ETIM inside of Afghanistan and

subsequent actions in Pakistan. That being said, the Chinese security apparatus continued to

disrupt alleged terrorist cells and plots within Xinjiang. Therefore, the Chinese faced a real threat

of Terrorism and actually implemented much of the actions needed to reduce the threat of

terrorism to where it is today – a minor threat.

Russia

Parsing the differences between Separatism and Terrorism for Russia is very difficult.

Even though Russia retook Chechnya within eight months after the Second Chechen War started

in 1999, it did not declare the Second Chechen War’s battle phase over until 2000. However, the

303

"China Security Memo: The Limited Capabilities of Uighur Militants Read more: China Security Memo: The

Limited Capabilities of Uighur Militants," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military

strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-security-memo-limited-capabilities-uighur-militants,


http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-security-memo-limited-capabilities-uighur-militants

Hoyt, David

112

insurgency phase lasted until 2009. During this time many attacks occurred within the Northern

Caucasus as well as in Russia proper. Unlike the other SCO Member States, the number of

attacks perpetuated by terrorist across the Russian state is very high and this section does not

pretend to represent a full comprehensive listing.

Russian Terrorism has a long history but those terrorist attacks specifically tied to

Chechnya are particularly robust. In addition to the formal fighting in the aftermath of the

Second Chechen War, numerous attacks have occurred throughout Russia’s Post Soviet territory.

In 2004, the Russian backed President of Chechnya was assassinated by a bomb plot.304

A year

later, one of the most publicized terrorist attacks was the massacre at an elementary school in

Beslan, Russia where over 330 people, mostly children, were killed.305

In April 2010, Chechen

suicide bombers detonated in the Moscow subway system thereby demonstrating their ability to

strike even the Russian capital.306

Furthermore, in 2011, there was a bombing of the Russian

Domodedovo Airport in Moscow.307

Therefore large-scale attacks throughout Russia are a

feature of Russian Terrorism.

The level of radicalism that underlined these terrorist attacks has increased over time. The

Originally the Chechen warriors were nationalists but have progressively included more

Islamists as the insurgency continued. The Chechen leader, Dukka Umarov demonstrated the

deadly ability to link his movement with other groups:

304

Anna Badkhen, "Nightmare in Chechnya," New Republic 241, no. 6 (April 29, 2010): 10-14. Academic Search

Premier, EBSCOhost accessed May 22, 2013. 305

Badkhen, Ibid. 306

Badkhen, Ibid. 307

Eugene Chausovsky, "Continued Violence in the North Caucasus," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/video/continued-violence-north-caucasus,


Hoyt, David

113

Umarov's insurgency is not an isolated movement. For years, international Jihadists have

fought and died in Chechnya, and foreign fighters are believed to run Taliban-style

training camps in southern Chechnya's nearly unassailable mountains. Meanwhile,

American troops in Afghanistan report they have also faced off against Chechen

fighters.308

Thus, as Russia consolidates its control over Chechnya, the terrorist threat in the region grows

more insidious by attaching itself to other global Jihadist threats.

Russia’s response has been especially harsh toward its terrorist foes. Against normal

terrorist threats, Russian responses are usually conducted with ground operations that utilize

overwhelming force. These displays of force are coupled with a media blackout of the offensives

so that people will not pay attention to the government’s actions, “The Kremlin's brute

counterterrorism tactics are rooted largely in the fact that there is little free press or political

opposition to hold it accountable for the deaths of civilians.”309

Putin receives additional credit

from native Russians for being tough and using force and his poll numbers do not drop from the

use of excessive force. Furthermore, “Each terrorist attack, in fact, has been used as a pretext for

even more Kremlin control.”310

At the regional government level of Chechnya, Russia

implements draconian measures under the watchful eye of Razman Kadyrov, the Warlord-in-

Chief who rules over Chechnya. The government has shot and killed people for aiding, feeding,

being related, or just being suspected of belonging or associated with terrorist groups. They also

purportedly abduct people, dress them as rebels, and then execute them to produce a body for

success records.311

According to human rights workers in Chechnya, "There is a fight going on

308

Anna Badkhen, "Nightmare in Chechnya," New Republic 241, no. 6 (April 29, 2010): 10-14, Academic Search


NathanThornburh, and Simon Shuster, "Russia's Long War." Time 176, no. 7 (August 16, 2010): 30-

35. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, accessed May 22, 2013. 310

Thornburgh, Ibid. 311

Badkhen, Anna. Ibid.

Hoyt, David

114

against terror.” Kheda Saratova, a Chechen human rights worker, added, “Of course you have to

show some results. These fake, created, and killed so-called fighters are the main proof.’”312

Over time, the levels of violence have decreased drastically throughout the North

Caucasus. Stratfor reports that “Because of the drop in violence in Chechnya and elsewhere in

the North Caucasus, Dagestan now accounts for almost 60 percent of violence and attacks in the

region.”313

Dagestan is also where Umarov commands his Caucasus Emirate group. Umarov is

credited with many large terrorist attacks within the heart of Russia. However, surprisingly

enough, “in early 2012, Umarov reportedly ordered the group to halt attacks on civilian targets,

and there have not been any major attacks by the Umarov group in Russia proper since.”314

The

two brother bombers who claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Boston Marathon on

April 17, 2013 were from Dagestan, next to Chechnya. However, the Umarov group has publicly

stated in the wake of the Boston Bombings of 2013 that “it was at war with Russia and not the

United States.”315

Thus, the Boston Bombings appear unrelated to Russia’s chief Dagestani foes.

Russia has had a violent history with terrorism that has only worsened in recent years

until very recently. Since the breakup of the old Soviet Union the frequency and level of terrorist

attacks has escalated inside Russia. The Russian government has responded with even greater

force, thereby begetting a cycle of violence that may be difficult for Russia to sustain over the

long run. The drivers of this terrorism are a deadly combination of Extremism and Separatism

whose roots originated in two very different causes of political association and religious

312

Anna Badkhen, 0"Nightmare in Chechnya" New Republic 241, no. 6 (April 29, 2010): 10-14, Academic Search


Eugene Chausovsky, "Continued Violence in the North Caucasus," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/video/continued-violence-north-caucasus


Ibid. 315

Chausovsky, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

115

expression. But over the past decades they have intertwined in an attempt to resist the Russian

state. This has led to the Islamization of the terrorist forces facing Russia. Despite breaking the

Chechen insurgency, Russia has yet to pacify Dagestan; as a result, attacks are executed

throughout Russia including Moscow indicating that Russia’s domestic terrorists possess an

organizational capacity in excess of the Terrorism threats faced by the other SCO members.

Russia has had to face this threat mostly on its own, without foreign help or assistance from the

SCO. Thus, Russia has and continues to face the most serious Terrorism threat within the SCO.

Kazakhstan

Although violent attacks categorized as Terrorism have been executed against various

SCO Member States, Kazakhstan has luckily been largely immune. Stratfor attributes this

relative peace to Kazakhstan’s geography and that it is isolated from the explosive Fergana

Valley. Despite the volume of attacks in the other Central Asian provinces, “Kazakhstan did not

experience Islamist militancy in the 1990s and 2000s.”316

Kazakhstan is also unique because

Terrorism was not the catalyst causing Kazakhstan to join the SCO.

Kazakhstan’s peace has been unsettled in recent years. “Only in 2011 did Kazakhstan see

violence start to rise significantly, with the country experiencing in May 2011, its first suicide

terrorist attack in its modern history and several police shootings across the country in places like

Aktau, Almaty and Taraz.”317

Stratfor places the blame on factors such as the worsening

economic situation in Kazakhstan and a recent crackdown on religion. Further violence occurred

in December in the “energy-producing province of Mangistau in the west of the country, where

316



central-asia-more-religious-extremism, accessed May 19, 2013. 317

Chausovsky, Ibid. .

Hoyt, David

116

clashes occurred between protesters and police.”318

Initial reports by Stratfor attributed the

violence in 2011 to Islamic militancy but also points out that, “even events that are not related to

Islamist militants, like the protests in western Kazakhstan, have received calls for solidarity from

Kazakh militant groups like Soldiers of the Caliphate.”319

This same group claimed

responsibility for some of the attacks such as the bombings in Atyrau in October of 2011.

Stratfor takes this as a sign that there may be a “genuine militant Islamist threat in

Kazakhstan.”320

However, the Soldiers of the Caliphate were unknown until 2011 and little

remains known about the members or leadership.321

Since the initial reports in 2011, Stratfor has changed its analysis of these terrorist

attacks. Stratfor now notes that the “attacks were conducted with different tactics all across the

country, including Almaty, Atyrau and Taraz, is particularly anomalous.”322

Despite the Kazakh

government blaming a combination of Islamic militants and religious propaganda that spread

through the nation, this terror attack may not be the work of Islamists:

The timing of these attacks was curious because they came amid a growing political

battle over the succession of the country's long-serving president, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

It follows that these attacks could have been inspired less by Islamic radicalism, which

has hardly been evident in Kazakhstan over the past 20 years, and more by the power

struggle between various players seeking to position themselves for Nazarbayev's

succession. 323

Thus, these growing incidents of violence appear to be tied more to domestic socio-economic-

political factors than Jihadists.

318

Eugene Chausovsky, "Dispatch: Islamist Militancy in Kazakhstan," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence,

economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com//analysis/20111220-dispatch-

islamist-militancy-kazakhstan, accessed May 19, 2013. 319

Chausovsky, Ibid. 320



Chausovsky, Ibid 323

Chausovsky, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

117

If Stratfor is correct in its analysis, then the Evil of Terrorism appears virtually

nonexistent in Kazakhstan. Unlike the enormous threats initially posed by Terrorism to other

SCO Member States, the fact that Kazakhstan has had a 20 year period of security is astounding.

Recent threats seem more of a function of violent pushback against the regime which is

consolidating power under an aged leader. However, the ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate’ is a

potentially new emerging threat. Despite there being little known about them and the yet

undemonstrated capacities of this organization, it would be better to remain cautious and assume

this group is a threat until better intelligence can be collected. Yet overall the threat of Terrorism

in Kazakhstan has been relatively non-existent until recently and should not rank as a domestic

factor that motivates Kazakhstan’s security actions within the SCO.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan suffered from the first wave of Central Asian transnational terrorism in the

1990s. The IMU represented a credible threat to Kyrgyzstan in cross-border attacks as they

attempted to link up with the Uzbek minorities located within Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan suffered

from the 1999 and 2000 Batkan events, which undermined and threatened its government.

Furthermore the IMU entered southern Kyrgyzstan by way of Tajikistan. In response,

Kyrgyzstan first joined the CSTO and then asked the CSTO to help in its defense against the

IMU.324

However, the CSTO, lacking the strength to actually deal with terrorist threats

coalescing in Afghanistan, failed to act. The threat posed by the IMU was halted by the US

during its invasion of Afghanistan.325

The next major destabilizing event was the 2005 Tulip

Revolution, a Separatist Evil as discussed above. Thus, the early threat of Terrorism motivated

324

Ashimbaev, M. S. New Challenges and New Geopolitics In Central Asia: After September 11. Almaty: KISI pri

Prezidentom RK, 2003. P. 86-7. 325

This will be described in Uzbekistan’s subsection below.

Hoyt, David

118

Kyrgyzstan to join both the CSTO and found the SCO, especially as Kyrgyzstan lacks the

military capacity to effectively combat Terrorism alone.

As the 2005 Tulip Revolution featured sectarian as well as politically motivated violence,

it was expected that the 2010 Revolution would also see ethnic violence break out. However,

violence in the wake of the 2010 second Kyrgyz Revolution was surprisingly mild sans the

ethnic violence was seen in the Southern provinces.326

The post-revolution political transition

operated for all intents and purposes, smoothly. Since then, clashes erupted between the Kyrgyz

and Uzbeks in Osh and Jalal-Abad when “Kygryz authorities conducted security sweeps through

predominantly Uzbek neighborhoods under the pretense of rooting out suspected militant

Islamists. In reality, these sweeps most likely were directed at ethnic Uzbeks.”327

Stratfor reports

that the Kyrgyz in that region are always suspicious of the Uzbek population and that the actions

taken by the government seem to imply that the militant activity could be tied to the ethnic and

political tensions in this area between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.328

.

Kyrgyzstan, if it fears the threat of any one Evil, would fear Terrorism far less than

Separatism. The Terrorist activities that were the largest threat to Kyrgyzstan were destroyed in

the early 2000s after the US took over the role of security Guarantor in the region. With the IMU

broken and a lack of domestic Kyrgyz terrorist groups, the largest threat to stability and peace is

sectarian tensions. Ethnic targeted government crackdowns in the wake of the 2010 Revolution

will not help maintain the peace but rather will exacerbate the sectarian divisions. Thus, the Evil

326

This violence was described in Kyrgyzstan’s section on Separatism. 327


Chausovsky, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

119

of Terrorism is no longer a major threat in Kyrgyzstan but not due to the work of Kyrgyz

security forces.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan suffers from extreme security threats that continually threatened the country’s

stability. Not only did the nascent Tajikistan fight a Civil War, but also the 1990s also included

the dangers of transnational terrorism. As the IMU was forced out of Uzbekistan by Karimov’s

regime, it gained refuge in Tajikistan by temporarily exploiting the power vacuum created by

Tajikistan’s ongoing civil war. Tajikistan’s long porous border with Afghanistan also allowed

the IMU to cross back and forth unmolested. Thus, “Tajikistan became the primary base of

operations for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, this

Terrorist group conducted attacks from Tajikistan throughout the Fergana Valley and into

southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.”329

The Civil War’s aftermath propelled additional terrorist groups to target the Tajik

government. At the conclusion of the war, the government promised to incorporate some

elements of the opposition, such as the IRPT, into the government and security forces. The

power sharing arrangement with the UTO failed to materialize and “caus[ed] discontent in the

opposition and problems for Rakhmonov, including an assassination attempt in 1997 and two

coup attempts in 1998.”330

Rakhmonov’s government responded by consolidating power and

used the country’s security apparatus to repel these threats. Members of more radical groups,

329


"Potential New Parties Ahead of Tajik Presidential Election Read more: Potential New Parties Ahead of Tajik

Presidential Election," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting

http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/potential-new-parties-ahead-tajik-presidential-election, accessed May 20, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/potential-new-parties-ahead-tajik-presidential-election

Hoyt, David

120

such as the IMU, were suppressed by the Tajik government. The “violence peaked in the early

2000s, after which Tajikistan experienced nearly a decade of relative calm.”331

The calm was broken by new terrorist threats at the end of the first decade of the 21st

century. In July 2009, two attacks occurred in Tajikistan that “appeared to target a security

summit which Tajikistan hosted and which the presidents of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Russia

attended.”332

Neither caused any severe damage but they were taken seriously given their

proximity to foreign leaders.333

In mid-September 2010, more than two dozen high-profile

Islamist militants broke out of a jail in Dushanbe, many most likely linked to the 2009 bombing

attempts, and then fled to the Rasht Valley. The government responded by launching security

sweeps into that area, “which in turn led to attacks against Tajik military convoys -- attacks that

the Tajik government blamed on Islamist militants.”334

As Tajik troops were killed, the Tajik

government deployed military operations to hunt down these militants.335

Despite government

claims that these threats came from Islamist elements, sources propose that more likely these

militants were linked to the opposition groups that fought during the Tajik Civil War than they

were linked to Jihadi groups. Stratfor attributes the 2009 jailbreak to the resurfacing of the power

331

Chausovsky, Eugene. "Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism." Stratfor | Geopolitical

intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-

central-asia-more-religious-extremism (accessed May 19, 2013). 332

Stratfor. "Tajikistan: The Aftermath of a Prison Break ." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-aftermath-prison-break (accessed May

19, 2013). 333

Stratfor. "Tajikistan: The Aftermath of a Prison Break ." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-aftermath-prison-break (accessed May

19, 2013). 334

Chausovsky, Eugene. "Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism." Stratfor | Geopolitical

intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-

central-asia-more-religious-extremism (accessed May 19, 2013). 335

Stratfor. "Russia’s Ambitions for the Ferghana Valley." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting. Stratfor. http://www.Stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russias-ambitions-fergana-

valley (accessed May 19, 2013).

Hoyt, David

121

struggle between the Tajik clans that was common in the 1990s and that “in itself, the jailbreak

does not signify Jihadist resurgence.”336

Islamist or not, Tajik forces have successfully destroyed the militant forces in the Rasht

Valley. In April 2011, Tajik forces reportedly killed a high-profile rebel, Mullah Abdullah.

Abdullah, a key commander of the UTO during the Tajik Civil War, never accepted the peace

treaty and instead fled to Afghanistan and joined the IMU. In 2010, Abdullah supposedly

returned to the Rasht Valley which “coincided with an uptick in violence and militant activity, in

the Rasht Valley and elsewhere in Tajikistan”337

in the aftermath of the Dushanbe prison break.

Several of Abdullah’s associates were killed and many other members switched sides and lent

assistance to the government. It is possible to note that Abdullah may not have been killed as he

has been reported dead before.338

This operation was not run by Tajikistan alone; according to

Stratfor sources in Dushanbe:

The Russians have been intensifying their intelligence capabilities in Tajikistan as well.

Sources report that the targeting of Abdullah was a product of joint intelligence between

the West and Russians, as the West has watched Abdullah since his time in Afghanistan.

This joint intelligence made it easier for Tajik forces to carry out the strikes.339

Thus, the capacity to deal with these current Terrorist threats hails somewhat from the great

powers. The Tajik government, despite its general ability to deal with many of its militant

threats, still requires a certain degree of outside assistance to ensure the nation’s security from

Terrorism.

336


"The Effects of a Militant Leader's Reported Death in Tajikistan Read," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence,

economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/effects-militant-leaders-

reported-death-tajikistan, accessed May 19, 2013. 338

"The Effects of a Militant Leader's Reported Death…,” Ibid. 339

"The Effects of a Militant Leader's Reported Death….,” Ibid.

Hoyt, David

122

Stratfor gives a similar rationale that the government is fighting militants tied to the

losing side of the civil war when describing the 2012 military operations conducted in Gorno-

Badakhshan, an autonomous province in the Pamir Mountains. Tajik security forces were sent to

that eastern province after a top security officer was allegedly killed by a warlord and former

opposition leader Tolib Ayombekov. However, Stratfor sources note that Ayombekov was

supposedly tied to the regional smuggling networks and his continued resistance to the Tajik

regime – not to a religious cause.340

Cease-fire negotiations with regional elders followed the

fighting but Stratfor reports that “the fighting was the most serious Tajikistan has seen since its

civil war in the 1990s, and the country risks resurrecting unaddressed grievances from the war.

The military operation has also sparked protests and threats of larger demonstrations in the

future.”341

What should be remembered is that this region was the stronghold of the opposition

forces during the Tajik Civil War. Stratfor confidential sources report that, “A Tajik security

official has said that the murder was the ‘last straw’ and that Ayombekov and his armed

supporters must be ‘destroyed.’"342

Lastly, an attack in June 2012 killed the President’s brother-

in-law.343

In the aftermath of the military operations, “Ayombekov reportedly escaped across the

Afghan border, and no major violent incidents have been reported since the major military

offensive subsided in August.”344

State media has reported that the military had departed from

the province but Stratfor notes that “the military has remained in the area, sparking protests by

340


"Central Asia’s Increasing volatility." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military


19, 2013. 342

"Tajikistan Launches Security Operation in Restive East," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-launches-security-operation-restive-

east. accessed May 19, 2013. 343

"Killing in Tajikistan Could Justify Crackdown," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/killing-tajikistan-could-justify-crackdown, accessed

May 19, 2013. 344

“Tajikistan: Regional Visit Highlights Challenges To Regime," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-regional-visit-highlights-

challenges-regime, accessed May 20, 2013.

Hoyt, David

123

the local population. A residual security force similar to what remained after security sweeps in

the Rasht Valley in 2010 will likely stay in Gorno-Badakhshan province.”345

A high-profile

killing such as that of the President’s brother-in-law along with these Tajik military operations

do bring with it the potential risk that this type of violence could spark a civil war.

Of all of the SCO Member States, Tajikistan’s government has been the most likely to

fall from the Evil of Terrorism. The combined threat of the Civil War, which the Russians had to

help Rakhmonov fight, and the IMU Terrorist threats, nearly destabilized Tajikistan. It is likely

that the Russians intervened in Tajikistan for precisely this reason. Tajikistan’s peril

demonstrates the inherent danger of compounded internal and external threats striking the young

Central Asian republics simultaneously when the state’s power is not robust enough to resist

multiple simultaneous threats.

Once the Tajik Civil War was resolved, the government was able to expel the IMU

within two years and then create a decade of peace despite bordering Afghanistan. Thus the

threat in the 1990s was real but the magnitude of this threat has changed since the founding of

the SCO. Since the SCO was organized, Tajikistan suffered from no major Terrorist threats for a

decade. The threats that arose starting in 2009 were minor346

and most likely linked to the

politically marginalized groups tied to the losing side of the Civil War. Furthermore, high-profile

terrorist threats that were eliminated required the assistance of outside great powers such as

Russia and the West. Tajikistan may not be completely self-sufficient in its fight against the

Terrorism. Thus, at present the Evil of Terrorism in Tajikistan has dwindled and is mostly

345

"Tajikistan: Regional Visit Highlights Challenges To Regime," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-regional-visit-highlights-

challenges-regime, accessed May 20, 2013. 346

Minor when compared to the threats faced in the 1990s.

Hoyt, David

124

associated with threats reminiscent of Separatism as they stem from politically marginalized

groups that have not yet forgotten the inequitable outcome of the Civil War.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan, although not a SCO Member State, is surprisingly unaffected by the Evil

of Terrorism. Turkmenistan’s quiet history with terrorism has continued from its founding until

the present. In 2012 it had not produced notable incidents and “remained the quietest country in

Central Asia.” This may be due to it being the farthest removed country from the traditionally

volatile Fergana Valley.347

Thus, Turkmenistan does not represent a state that is contributing the

continued existence of any form of Terrorist threat and can be safely discounted.

Uzbekistan

Other than Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has faced the most difficult threat from Terrorism. The

threat began in the 1990s, as described in the above two Evils sections, when the Karimov

government preemptively cracked down on the IRP group that was forming in Uzbekistan. As a

result, Uzbekistan generated extremism sentiments that pushed back against the Karimov regime.

One of Central Asian terrorist organizations that represented a large threat to Central Asian

security and stability is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU appears to have

been formed in 1998 and led by Tahrir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani. These two individuals

had formed another organization called Adolat in the early 1990s but had fled Uzbekistan due to

a government crackdown taken in response to their earlier movement. After fleeing Uzbekistan,

like so many other militants, they set up camp in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The two

347

"Central Asia’s Increasing Volatility." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military


19, 2013.

Hoyt, David

125

leaders of the IMU began cooperating with the Taliban in Afghanistan and received financial

support and training from Al-Qaeda in the late 1990s. After 1997, as Uzbeks from the Fergana

valley trickled into training camps, the group likely grew to several thousand fighters.348

Thus,

upon its founding, the IMU had the strength and capacity to present a serious threat to the

security of Uzbekistan.

The IMU began its campaign against the Uzbek government in 1999. In February, a

series of bombs went off in Tashkent. President Karimov labeled the attack an assassination

against himself though his location in Tashkent that day compared to the locations of the attacks

makes this claim dubious. No group has ever claimed responsibility for this attack though the

Uzbek government labeled Islamist terrorists as the culprits. Other commentators speculate that

the attacks may have come from either organized crime syndicates, terrorists from Tajikistan,

Russian intelligence services, or even the Uzbek government in order to legitimize a security

crackdown for control.349

In August 1999, members of IMU launched an attack from bases in

Southern Tajikistan350

against elements of the Uzbek portion of the Fergana Valley in order to

catalyze a revolt against Uzbek President Karimov. Despite the populist appeal against Karimov,

“The militants received little support from the local people.”351

Uzbekistan drew closer to Russia

in the aftermath to depend on Russia for help in threat prevention in the face of IMU

aggression.352

348


Hanks, Ibid., 53-4. 350

The IMU had set up bases in Tajikistan during the recently ended Tajikistan Civil War. 351

Hanks, Ibid., P54. 352

Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, "Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8 (2008): 1334.

Hoyt, David

126

Attacks continued in 2000 against the Uzbek government. In August, the IMU attacked

the Surkhandarya Province in eastern Uzbekistan. This event led to the US Department of State

officially classifying the IMU as a terrorist organization. However, the IMU lacked the capacity

in terms of numbers and weapons to hold territory and were forced to withdraw in the face of

Uzbek and Kyrgyz military forces in a matter of weeks.353

At around the same time, members of

the Taliban practically crossed the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan further threatening

regional stability. Russia offered to create collective regional armed forces in opposition to the

Taliban, which Russia viewed as the primary security threat in the region. However, Tashkent

pushed back against Moscow’s offer. Tashkent stated that Russia was using the threat of the

Taliban to frighten Uzbek citizens, that the Taliban threat and the danger of internal Islamism

was exaggerated, and that Moscow was inventing the threat for its own interests to maintain

control over Central Asia.354

However, by 2001, continued pressure by the IMU and the Taliban led to Tashkent

changing its position toward collective security. This reversal of Uzbekistan’s stance led to the

official creation of the SCO. By May of 2001, Tashkent recognized the right of Russia for the

protection of its interests in Central Asia. This happened after a counterattack by Afghanistan’s

Northern Alliance and UN sanctions on the Taliban that caused Russia to take a more active role

in the region. Uzbekistan was invited to join the Shanghai Five and in June 2001, the Shanghai

Five morphed into the SCO to formally create a system of collective security for the region.355

Thus, the SCO was formed directly in response to the security threats posed by terrorism

353

Reuel R. Hanks, “ Global Security Watch: Central Asia. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010,) 54. 354

M.S. Ashimbaev, “New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: After September 11,” ( Almaty: KISI

pri Prezidentom RK, 2003), 83.

355 M. S. Ashimbaev, “New Challenges and New Geoplitics in Central Asia after September 11,” (Almaty: KISI pri

Prezidentom RK, 2003,) 83-4.

Hoyt, David

127

conducted from Afghanistan and by groups such as the IMU. This clearly identifies that security

was the founding goal of the SCO.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the threat of Terrorism for

Uzbekistan drastically. As Washington initiated the global War On Terror, America took a

proactive role in counter-terrorist actions in the region. After the US announced its intentions to

pursue the War on Terror, there was a high level meeting between Russia and the Central Asian

States in early October before the US invasion of Afghanistan. In each of the meetings the

implementation of joint actions of the CIS on their struggle against terrorism was discussed.

However, no general block came out of these discussions. The members of the CSTO lacked the

military, technical and financial capacity for full-scale participation in the anti-terrorist

operations in Afghanistan – considered the core of terrorist threats in Central Asia. The political

failure on Russia’s part in trying to organize a regional response to Central Asian terrorism

caused Russian influence in the region to decrease.356

This decrease in influence made it even

easier for the US to enter the region and replace Russia as the primary security guarantor as well

as projecting its influence throughout Central Asia. This failure also set the CSTO back multiple

years before Russia attempted to revive it.

The US invasion of Afghanistan was also a major turning point for regional security. The

IMU, which had bound itself to the Taliban and established safe-havens in Afghanistan, faced

the American military after the US invasion. According to Hank, “The American assault on

Taliban positions in northern Afghanistan reportedly killed hundreds of IMU insurgents, and

most importantly, resulted in the death of Juma Namangani”357

one of the two founders of the

356

Ashimbaev, Ibid., 90. 357

Hanks, Ibid. 55.

Hoyt, David

128

IMU. Although Tahrir Yuldashev survived the initial attack and slid into Waziristan to hide, he

was reportedly killed in a US drone strike in the fall of 2009. The IMU have conducted a few

shootings and bombings after the US invasion but these appear to be mere random acts of violent

defiance. The American attacks appear to have largely eliminated the IMU bases in Northern

Afghanistan and Tajikistan and killed most of the militants thus reducing IMU’s threat as a

terrorist organization.358

Two other groups have taken credit for attacks in 2004 that were originally attributed to

the IMU. Jamoat and Islamic Jihad were originally unknown, and many analysts believe they are

either the remnants of the IMU or IMU sleeper cells sent back to Uzbekistan. As of 2010, it is

hypothesized that small numbers of IMU soldiers train in bases on the Afghan-Pakistan border

but there is no evidence of significant numbers of Central Asian Muslims joining the IMU in

Afghanistan recently. The group has also not launched any large-scale operations since 2004.359

As such, it appears that the operational capacity of the IMU has been terminally reduced. Stratfor

agrees with Professor and Editor Reuel Hank’s analysis, “While the Uzbek and Tajik

governments routinely blame attacks such as the Sept. 19 [2010] raid on the IMU, the group is

no longer the coherent movement it was in the late 1990s.”360

Thus the IMU is no longer a major

Terrorist threat; yet it should be remembered that it was the US operations not those of any SCO

Member State that defeated this threat.

Since the defeat of the IMU, the threat and frequency of Terrorist threats against the

Uzbekistan state have noticeably reduced in magnitude. Furthermore, the source of terrorist

358

Hanks, Ibid. 359

Hanks, Ibid. 360


economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/weekly/20100922

_tajikistan_attacks_and_islamist_militancy_central_asia, accessed May 19, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100922

Hoyt, David

129

attacks and whether they are in fact actual terrorist attacks has become more difficult to attribute

without the IMU acting as public enemy number one. As described in the Separatism section, the

Andijan Massacre of 2005 was attributed by the Karimov regime as security actions taken

against terrorists who threatened the government and the lives of innocent civilians. In

November 2011, a bomb went off on a rail line near the Tajik border. Stratfor hypothesizes that,

“Since the blast occurred in a remote area with relatively little strategic significance, many

speculated that the Uzbek government conducted the attack to halt traffic and goods into

Tajikistan, with which Tashkent has had several disputes.”361

Thus, once the backbone of the

IMU was broken, the threat of Terrorism appears to have definitively decreased.

The threat to Uzbekistan from the Evil of Terrorism has lessened over time. In the 1990s

the IMU was most definitely a threat but a threat the Karimov regime created through its political

oppression. The IMU endangered not only Uzbekistan, but also other SCO Member States.

However, it was not Uzbekistan or the SCO that dealt with this threat but rather the American

invasion of Afghanistan as well as targeted drone strikes that killed the IMU leaders and

destroyed most of its members. The minimal terrorist actions after 2004 seemed to appropriate

the IMU name in an attempt to garner legitimacy. These actions demonstrated that the IMU

threat had been broken by US forces. Since then, Karimov has twisted the Evil of Terrorism in

order to use it to further crack-down on his populace and solidify his control. In doing so,

however, Karimov is contributing directly to the problem of generating the ‘Three Evils’ by

marginalizing his citizen base.

361

Eugene Chausovsky, “Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism," Stratfor | Geopolitical



Hoyt, David

130

Overview of Terrorism

First, please note that the tragedy and death caused by any and all acts of terrorism

should not be understated or diminished by this analysis. The SCO Member States have all faced

the Evil of Terrorism that is a difficult and legitimate threat to these states. The threat was

greatest during the 1990s, in the aftermath of the Collapse of the Soviet Union but peaked at the

end of 2001. Afghanistan functioned as a safe-haven for the terrorist groups that threatened these

six countries362

; the SCO was formed as a response to this threat as Russia, the regional security

guarantor, could not deal with it unilaterally. However, it was not the SCO but the US that

eliminated the threat of Terrorism by invading Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban, and destroying

many of the militant groups there, including the IMU and the ETIM. The threat of terrorism is

thus logically correlated with the stability and strength of the states in the region. The threat was

the most severe when Afghanistan failed and Tajikistan was collapsing from Civil War. With the

US as regional guarantor of security, it lifted the security burden from Russia and the Central

Asian regimes and thus allowed them to consolidate their domestic power. Without the US, only

China and Russia, conducting joint operations could have stopped the Terrorism that threatens

Central Asia.

The Evil of Terrorism, like that of Separatism, morphed after the US had eliminated the

main terrorist threats. The terrorist attacks seemed less frequent, smaller in scale, less effective,

and less attributable. The larger incidents of violence stemmed from marginalized groups, such

as in Tajikistan, instead of the feared mass Jihadist movements that many of the SCO members

claim. But there is most definitely a domestic political gain to hunting down real or perceived

terrorists. In the case of China:

362

Russian terrorists remained predominantly in the North Caucuses.

Hoyt, David

131

[It] also creates a focal point for Chinese national unity…by raising the Uighur ‘terrorist’

issue, Beijing can create a sense of trouble and a rallying point for national unity without

needing to threaten its foreign relations… it does serve as a way to shift attention to

another security issue, diffusing some of the focus on economic and social problems.363

Russia and the leaders of many of the Central Asian states have consolidated their power under

the aegis combating Terrorism. But the diminished impact of recent terrorist attacks implies that

the Terrorist threat is at the moment reduced and that most actions taken to fight the Evil of

Terrorism are going to be conducted by the SCO Member States in order to further consolidate

political power. The danger of this series of actions is that, as previously mentioned, it will create

a cycle of repression that can serve as a focal point for disaffected members of society to gather

to create new strands of the ‘Three Evils.’

4.5 Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS)

The SCO Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS) is the SCO standing body responsible

for combating the Three Evils and assisting in the protection of SCO Member State security. As

stated in Chapter III, RATS serves as a hub for information exchange between the security

services of the SCO and conducts analytical work almost exclusively on anti-terrorism. As of

2006, the staff of RATS numbered 30: 7 from Russia and China each, 6 from Kazakhstan, 5 from

Uzbekistan, 3 from Kyrgyzstan, and 2 from Tajikistan.364

In terms of bureaucratic funding and

support, RATS is treated as a vital part of the SCO. The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan

Nazarbayev claimed in a 2011 Op-ed in The Moscow Times that, “Between 2004 and 2011, the

SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure prevented more than 500 terrorist acts and saved

363

"China: Exploiting the Uighur 'Terrorist Camp' Raid," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting.,http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-exploiting-uighur-terrorist-camp-raid


Alyson Bailes, Alyson. J. K, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, The Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, Vol. 17, (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007), SIPRI Policy

Paper, Voltairenet.org. Voltaire Network, May 2007, Web. 15 Mar. 2013, http://www.voltairenet.org/

IMG/pdf/SIPRI-Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf>, 5-6.

http://www.voltairenet.org/

Hoyt, David

132

thousands of lives.” 365

As a practice RATS does not disseminate much specific information and

the RATS official government website conveys at best a dearth of information. With these

constraints in mind, this study of RATS will begin with an overview of the RATS website’s

information, followed by information gleaned from outside observers.

Official RATS Documents

Examination of the RATS official government website exposes visitors to a barren site

that appears rarely updated. The visitor can toggle through the information on the website in

English, Mandarin Chinese, or Russian. Depending on the language selected, different

documents and information show up with the most available in Russian. This study is based upon

consultation of the website in English, Mandarin Chinese; further scholarship on RATS should

consult the Russian language documents.366

Exploration of the RATS English and Chinese webpages yields minimal results. The

activity page on the RATS website provides a brief explanation about the organization, “The

Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is a permanent acting agency of the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO). In its activity [RATS] follows the documents and decisions

adopted within SCO and is designed for assisting, coordinating and interacting with the

competent agencies of SCO member countries on fighting the Three Evils of terrorism,

365

Nursultan Nazarbayev, "The Smart Power of the SCO." Russia & India Report. Rossiskaya Gazeta - Russia

Behind the Headlines, 15 June 2011, Web, 20 Mar. 2013.

<http://indrus.in/articles/2011/06/15/the_smart_power_of_the_sco_12648.html>. 366

This study lacked a Russian language expert. Given the specificity of language in legal documents, the author

erred on the side of caution and did not use digital translation software (Russian is notoriously difficult) lest a poor

translation skew the end results of the study.

Hoyt, David

133

separatism and extremism.”367

The sub-headings of ‘Conferences and Seminars’ as well as

‘Counterterrorist Trainings’ are also blank with the mere phrase “Data is absent.”368

The RATS history page is just as vague. The only historical document is from November

30, 2004. The historical document restates the goals outlined in the Shanghai Convention “on

fighting with terrorism, separatism, and extremism” of June 15, 2001 and mentions how the

goals and norms of the Convention and the initial SCO founding documents have led to the

establishment of RATS in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on June 7, 2002. The document then states that

the Executive committee of RATS has been functioning since January 1, 2004, and goes on to

describe the background of the first directorate of RATS. The norms expressed, along with a

copy of the norms in the founding documents, are a facsimile of many western institutional

norms:

Member countries of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which are participants

of Shanghai convention “On fighting with terrorism, separatism and extremism” from

June 15, 2001, taking the aims and principals of UN, concerning international Peace,

security and good neighborly relations, and also cooperation between states, realizing that

terrorism, separatism and extremism are the threat for Peace [sic] and security of nations,

for developing friendly relations between countries, and also for ensuring the main

human rights and freedom, being convinced in necessity of mutual coordinating actions

in interests of providing territorial integrity, safety and stability, also by increasing

cooperation on fighting with terrorism, separatism and extremism. 369

Note that the above SCO document pays homage to the Principles of the UN. But these basic

human rights and freedoms, even though they are mentioned, are never defined and stand alone,

unrelated to all other information on the RATS website. What is even more important about this

367

Shanghai Cooperation Organization,"RATS Activity," The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), www.ecrats.com/en/rats_activity/, accessed May 3, 2013.

368 SCO,"RATS Activity," Ibid.

369 SCO, "RATS History," The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS

SCO), http://www.ecrats.com/en/rats_history/2010, accessed May 3, 2013.

http://www.ecrats.com/en/rats_history/2010

Hoyt, David

134

statement is the fact that it not only authorizes the mandate for RATS to fight the ‘Three Evils,’

but also defines the modus operandi for RATS to pursue toward protecting territorial integrity,

safety (of whom is the real question), and stability. Thus, this statement confirms why the prior

analysis of the history of the Three Evils provided the raison d’etre for the SCO and ranked

RATS’ priorities.

The next subheading, ‘Terrorist Organizations’ is also virtually without substance. The

only available document in this section is a letter from the Ambassador of India in Uzbekistan

addressed to the RATS director.370

There are no other documents in this section.371

Perhaps

RATS has an excuse for why this page is disturbingly empty, but this section moniker is

deceiving to any discussion of a serious anti-terrorist institutional structure as well as devoid of

useful information. What arises as a possible explanation is that RATS does not have or publish

an aggregated, approved terrorist watch list despite being around for almost 10 years.

Alternatively, if RATS does have such a terrorist watch list then it must not feel compelled to

disclose it on its website or publicly. Intentional or not, RATS appearance is one of an opaque

organization.

Outside Observer Perspectives

RATS’ headquarters is located within a walled compound in the center of downtown

Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The compound and structures look like an embassy enclave with housing

and dining facilities inside the walls and minimal security visible within the compound. Since

RATS opened in June, 2004 it has “fostered coordinated policies and joint action on potential

370

In the letter, the Indian Ambassador thanks the RATS director for his earlier expressed message of condolences

in the aftermath of the 2006 terrorist bombings of Mumbai, India and reiterates Indian resolve to stand firm against

fundamentalism. 371

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "Terrorist Organizations," The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), http://www.ecrats.com/en/terrorist_organizations/2009, accessed

May 3, 2013.

http://www.ecrats.com/en/terrorist_organizations/2009

Hoyt, David

135

terrorist threats in SCO member states. RATS also has planned SCO exercises and organized

efforts to disrupt terrorist financing and money laundering.”372

Despite this coordination on

security issues, “RATS representatives [stress] that ‘the SCO is not a military bloc’.”373

RATS’ history is better documented by third-party observers such as Richard Weitz,374

who describes the Three Evils as really one in the same; terrorism is only defined in the context

of including both separatism and extremism. Since it officially opened, RATS has “facilitated

information sharing about terrorist threats, provided advice on counterterrorism policies, and

mobilized collective action against terrorist threats.”375

According to the interview Weitz

conducted with RATS director, Vyacheslav Kasimov, who stated that from “2004 to 2006,

RATS also adopted unspecified ‘early-warning and prevention measures’ designed to ‘help keep

the overall security situation of SCO Member countries stable.’”376

RATS operations mandate

expanded further on March 27, 2008 when the “RATS Council approved agreements to combat

weapons smuggling and train counterterrorist personnel.”377

In 2009, RATS drafted an action

plan to combat the three evils during the 2010-2012 timeframe. On June 16, 2009 the “SCO

heads of state signed a Counter-Terrorism Convention that established a more comprehensive

legal foundation for greater cooperation among SCO governments in this area.”378

RATS has

therefore had a consistent institutional development since its inception.

372

Richard Weitz, "Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Center." EurasiaNet.org.

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65960 (accessed May 2, 2013). 373

Weitz, Ibid. 374

Richard Weitz is the Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Affairs at Hudson Institute. 375

Richard Weitz, "SCO Struggles to Meet Renewed Terrorism Challenge,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Analyst, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5848, accessed May 3, 2013.

376 Weitz, Ibid.

377 Weitz, Ibid.

378 Richard Weitz, "SCO Sturggles to Meet Renewed Terrorism Challenge,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Analyst. http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5848, accessed May 3, 2013.

Hoyt, David

136

A high priority goal of RATS is to compile an integrated terrorist list. Despite nearly a

decade of existence, RATS Expert Pavel Ostrikov argued that it remained a work in progress and

that it focuses on organizations as opposed to individuals. Furthermore, Ostrikov further

explained that RATS does not try to identify or eliminate terrorists itself; this task is done instead

by member governments.379

In 2012 the RATS Deputy Directory, Aleksey Krilov, “confirmed

that RATS is having problems compiling an integrated terrorist list because ‘each government

defines terrorism somewhat differently.’”380

In practice RATS usually cooperates most closely

with a single government agency focused on national security381

from each SCO member state.

Conversely, according to Deputy Director Krilov, RATS maintains minimal ties between itself

and other Russian security organizations such as the CSTO and CIS. Most importantly, Kirov

confirmed that all countries affiliated with the SCO engage in RATS operations; thus the RATS

intelligence database is not limited to merely SCO Member States but also includes Observer

States and Dialogue Partners. RATS also encourages intelligence sharing and “harmonizing anti-

terror policies.”382

RATS intelligence sharing is hampered by its absence of authority to work with the

United States. As explained by Ostrikov, “RATS’ legal mandate does not allow for direct

cooperation with national governments that lack formal affiliation with the SCO.” As the SCO

appears extremely unlikely ever to create a formal partnership with the US, direct intelligence

sharing with the US is unlikely in the SCO’s future. However, indirect contacts between the US

379

Richar Weitz, "Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Center"

EurasiaNet.org..http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65960, accessed May 2, 2013. 380

Weitz, Ibid. 381

This agency is usually the agency/bureau that is tasked with dealing with terrorism. Usually this is the Ministry of

the Interior for most SCO states. 382

Weitz, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

137

and the SCO can be initialized through some of the SCO’s partnerships with large multilateral

organizations in which the US is a key player, such as the UN.383

The SCO’s nontraditional security units are also struggling to meet existing threats. The

SCO also has difficulty with its counter-narcotics mandate. Some SCO Member States, such as

Russia, split terrorism and drug trafficking into separate agencies. As RATS partners with one

agency from each SCO member, it is unable to aggregate the information it needs. In the wake of

the Arab Spring, SCO states are now worried about cyber threat to domestic stability. Each SCO

country “acts on the basis of its own laws and capabilities to counter perceived cyber threats”384

and “each SCO member has a specialized internet security unit.”385

This individual but

coordinated response indicates that RATS and the SCO are taking steps to prevent circulation of

information that may engender democratic movements.

Agentura, a Russian investigative journalist internet community focused on intelligence

and security affairs, has done extensive intelligence gathering on Russian state security, and by

extension RATS.386

On RATS operating procedures, Agentura states that the SCO provides

absolute protection to its representatives. All the SCO representatives and experts, as per the

Convention on Privileges and Immunities of SCO, of these members are considered as having the

rank of diplomats. That rank means, “They are not subject to criminal liability for any actions

committed by them on their duty, they have immunity from arrest, detention etc.”387

Finally, the

RATS facility is also secured from outsiders as no SCO representatives can enter the main hub

383

Weitz, Ibid. 384

Weitz, Ibid. 385

Weitz, Ibid. 386

Agentura has been cited before by the New York Times as a source for issues dealing with Russian security. 387

"The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (RATS SCO)," Agentura.Ru.

Спецслужбы под контролем, http://www.agentura.ru/english/dossier/ratssco/, accessed May 2, 2013.

Hoyt, David

138

compound without official consent from the RATS’ director. In addition, RATS property has

immunity from interference, which includes means of transportation and all documents.388

Agentura’s analysis of RATS indicates RATS may exist for darker reasons than simply

sharing intelligence. Agentura claims that aside from its stated purpose, RATS’s “was formed for

coordinating the actions of mutual giving up the suspects. Its main objective is helping special

services of the states-members to bypass the obstacles presented by national legislations and by

the norms of the international law about giving up the suspects.”389

Thus, Agentura perceives the

Three Evils as nothing but a political cover for simplifying procedures related to detention and

giving individuals up to respective SCO governments. The shared database is being created to

make the system work. According to Aventura’s intelligence sources:

RATS and SCO are engaged in making their own parallel structure that can be used

instead of official extradition. Cooperation between the special services and enforcing

bodies is done through placement of direct requests of assistance. A request includes the

name of an enforcing body, a purpose and justification, and a description of the action

required, e.g. detention and passing a person. The request is signed by the head, or his

deputy, of the central authorized body, i.e. the local special service. In urgent cases the

request may be passed in an oral way.390

Thus, the Agentura report indicates that RATS exists for the purpose of extra-judicial ‘black-

bagging’ of individuals suspected of violating the limits of the SCO’s opaque goals on the Three

Evils, which may include anything from a terrorist to a democratic activist.

4.6 Final Analysis of the SCO’s Effect on Combating the Three Evils

Although the threat of the ‘Three Evils’ for the SCO has decreased over time, this trend is

not the result of SCO actions. Each of the Three Evils posed a varying degree of very real danger

to the different SCO Member States during the turbulent 1990s. During this decade, Extremism

388

"The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO,” Ibid. 389

"The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO,” Ibid.

390 (RATS SCO)." Ibid.

Hoyt, David

139

was generally overblown as legitimate Islamic groups were marginalized and branded radicals.

In the four Central Asian States, this political marginalization combined with ethnic divides and

sectarian tensions led to the Evil of Separatism, which Tajikistan suffered the worst from. By

contrast, the Separatist threat faced by Russia and China was based upon historical animosity in

volatile regions. Russia suffered worse as it nearly lost its battle with Separatism when the

Chechens won the First Chechen War in 1996 and temporarily gained independence. The

response to each of these failed Separatist movements was the rise of Terrorism. The failed state

of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s support enabled some terrorist threats to become more

dangerous as these militants now had a safe haven from which to launch attacks. The rise of the

Taliban in Afghanistan threatened each of the SCO Member States. As a combined result of all

of these security concerns, the SCO was created.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th

, the USA entered Central Asia and

changed the Three Evils threat facing the SCO. The USA defeated the Taliban,391

and

decapitated and decimated the terrorist organizations operating inside Afghanistan. In many

ways the US operation in Afghanistan bolstered the SCO and contributed toward the

achievement of the SCO’s goals. As a Stratfor analyst observed, “Of course, Jihadist groups and

elements exist in Central Asia, but most evidence suggests that the serious Jihadist players have

largely been eliminated, marginalized or pushed into the Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater.”392

Only

Russia, (and to a lesser degree China), had to defeat their separatist and terrorist groups without

major US assistance. With these clear militant threats gone, the SCO Member States widened the

scope of the Three Evils to include any threat to regime stability.

391

This is in reference to the initial invasion which denied the militant groups a safe-haven. The US has since

struggled for years against the Taliban. 392

Chausovsky, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

140

By widening their apertures, the SCO regimes used the Three Evils as blanket statements

to delegitimize any opposition – militant or political. Threats of Islamic Radicalism continued to

be inflated:

As the dynamics and circumstances in most Central Asian countries suggest, often times

it is in the government's interest to refer to any militant activity as Islamist. Doing so

suggests the activity of transnational rather than local political elements and gives an

excuse to crack down on those elements.393

These opposing groups, though some still contained legitimate militants, usually contained

politically marginalized groups and democratic grassroots movements. This transformation of

the Three Evils appears to be used as a tool for the regimes to solidify their domestic power

bases. The domestic crackdowns since 2005 in many of the SCO Member States, but specifically

Uzbekistan, indicate the SCO’s new goal is to suppress anything that may pose a threat to

perpetual regime stability. Despite its institutional inefficiencies, RATS stands out as a vital

component of this part of the SCO mission. Initially RATS appears to be a small failure,

especially given its intelligence sharing handicaps. However, if the SCO exists to remove any

threat to regime stability, then Agentura’s analysis, if accurate, is a chilling indictment to how

RATS enforces the new SCO mandate.

Finally the real threat of the Three Evils is extensively woven into the fabric of

Afghanistan. When Afghanistan was a threat to regional stability before 2001, the SCO Member

States were more focused on Afghanistan and the Three Evil threats, were more destabalizing.

The most essential question now is what happens when the US leaves the region. Stratfor

summarizes these fears:

393


intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-


Hoyt, David

141

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could provoke Jihadist resurgence in the region.

The security vacuum created by the departure of U.S. and International Security

Assistance Force personnel could also destabilize Afghanistan as various internal forces

compete to fill the void. Due to Central Asia's proximity to Afghanistan and the porous

and poorly guarded border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, there is certainly

potential for violence and instability to spill over…Until then, any developments on the

militant front in the region need to be examined within the context of the internal power

struggles and political dynamics of each country in addition to the Islamist angle.394

Today the fear is mostly about what happens when the US withdraws as,

Central Asian countries will face a much less restrained Taliban in Afghanistan. The

Taliban's relative weakness in northern Afghanistan will mitigate this threat, but the

region will nonetheless be in limbo…Central Asia's militants hope…the hoped-for

Taliban rise to power will restore Afghanistan as a militant safe haven from which to

pursue their home-country ambitions.395

Therefore, although the threat of the Three Evils has been mitigated over the last two

decades, the threats have a new chance to return. This outcome depends on how the USA

executes its withdrawal strategy and if the fragile Afghani government can maintain its security

and power projection to hold. If Afghanistan weakens or fails, may repeat the instability of the

1990s, threatening the neighboring states. Thus, the development of how the SCO combats the

Three Evils in an age of increasing regional risk remains uncertain.

394

Chausovsky, Ibid.; 395


economic, political, and military strategic forecasting http://www.stratfor.com/weekly

/20100922_tajikistan_attacks_and_islamist_militancy_central_asia, accessed May 19, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly

Hoyt, David

142

CHAPTER V: National Interests and Their Effect On

SCO Consensus Decision Making

Every organization is bound by the interests of its members and the collective ability, or

lack thereof, of the members to reach a political consensus to achieve these interests. The SCO’s

consensus oriented decision-making process as discussed in Chapter III requires all Member

States to vote in the affirmative or to abstain in order for any decision to pass. This “all or none”

consensus requirement raises the bar very high on the SCO’S decision-making process; and

forces Member States to overlap their interests if they want to take any collective action.

Conversely, this need to align all member interests imposes a serious constraint if not also an

impediment to the SCO’s ability to develop and harness the cooperative potential of its Member

States. Consequently, the majority of actions taken to combat the ‘Three Evils,’ of Extremism,

Separatism, Terrorism (as analyzed in Chapter IV), are undertaken, by design, within the domain

of domestic sovereignty and as such are accomplished unilaterally within each SCO Member

State’s territory. This conditional requirement prevents the SCO from taking any actions that

violate this strict code of ‘non-interference’ in another state’s ‘domestic affairs’ and has become

a policy that is strongly espoused within the SCO. Respect for this institutional norm also

relieves the SCO from the burden of having to take any action on an issue it wants to avoid, for

example, like a thorny membership application or whether to intercede in the domestic threats to

another Member State’s stability. Thus, these actions become localized, and are resolved as

internal actions. The benefit of this approach is that these issues get done concurrently under the

aegis of the SCO but at a lower level, with ministry and agency cooperation in order to avoid any

undesirable actions that must be decided by a vote of the Member States.

Hoyt, David

143

Conversely, in those opposite instances where the SCO does want to take action, (e.g., to

tackle any large scale organizational changes, approve new members or undertake any

multilateral actions to combat the myriad of transnational issues facing the SCO member states),

the SCO must first secure approval without objection from the Member States or else secure the

necessary abstention(s). Thus, the current effectiveness of the SCO to pursue grander goals is

wholly dependent upon its current governance structure, which in turn imposes serious limits on

SCO decision-making and forces trade-offs against the SCO expanding and evolving longer term

into a significant global institution.

An effective method for this study to employ to examine whether any basis for consensus

exists between the SCO Member States is to examine their respective national interests. When

national interests are in conflict with another Member State, then they should, in theory, prevent

the SCO from taking any actions since the opposing or slighted Member State will exercise its

veto power to obstruct the intended cooperative actions. Conversely, when National interests are

aligned then at least (hypothetically) they should create the political space for compromise and

coordinated action.

However, the SCO and Central Asia do not exist in a vacuum but rather define their

national interests vis-à-vis the actions of other state actors in the region from outside Central

Asia and then proceed accordingly. The principal outsider state in Central Asia and for the SCO

is the United States (US), because it is a global hegemon. When the US, acting as global

hegemon, decides to involve itself in any region of the world, then that action impacts the

national interests of the regional powers and causes them to respond according to their national

interests, and the states in Central Asia are no different. With regards to Central Asia, numerous

works of scholarships have analyzed how US interests and actions have caused the two SCO

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great powers, Russia and China, to recalculate their global and national interests in response to

the US current involvement in Central Asia and then formulate appropriate polices. Typically the

Central Asian States then respond to the regional great powers and the US, usually by playing

these powers off of one another. This circular chain reaction creates a model where the cascade

of decision-making follows the descent along a gradient measured in the power of states.

This chapter examines the national interests in order to better understand the ability for

the SCO to achieve consensus in its decision-making. First, this chapter the national interests of

the United States in Central Asia are analyzed since US action is often a catalyst for geopolitical

pushback by SCO Member States. The US will be examined first from the Western perspective

to demonstrate how the West views itself and then second from a Eurasian perspective to allow

the reader to understand how SCO member states may view US strategic interests. Next, the two

SCO great powers, Russia and China, will be examined concomitantly. Historically, China and

Russia have displayed a natural proclivity to define their regional interests in Central Asia in

reaction to US actions. As a result, their Eurasian pushback is important to understanding how

each of these nations may attempt to use the SCO to further their individual and mutual interests

in Central Asia and elsewhere. However, each of these two great powers has had a fierce rivalry

since the mid-20th

century. As such, the potential for this Russian-Chinese relationship to be a

larger constraint to the SCO will be examined in order to determine see if this potential for great

power rivalry will be the largest constraint to SCO action and long term institutional viability.

To limit our analysis of national interests only to the perspectives of American academics would

implicitly include American biases into this research. As such, care has been taken in each of

these examinations of national interests to locate at least one reputable scholar from each of the

three great powers and present an ‘insiders’ view of that country’s national interests. Allowing

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for the fact that such local scholar’s analysis will also be biased, however; does provide an

unfiltered attempt to achieve a unique non-Western prospective on national interest. This

approach, albeit unique, should provide a clearer understanding of how other nation’s views its

national interests and priorities. Next, differing national interests of the Central Asian states will

be explained. These states have many shared as well as state-specific interests. Finally, this

chapter will conclude with an analysis of how these interests play out within the SCO and

therefore illuminate the SCO’s prospects for action.

5.1 - The US and the West in Central Asia

Although To better facilitate this study’s focus on how SCO and its Member States

decide to take action to protect their national security interests, a discussion of power politics in

Central Asia would be incomplete without a description of the role of the West, particularly

United States of America (US), has played in Central Asia. As previously stated, the

involvement of a global hegemon, with the military, economic, and political power of the US, in

any region causes all other regional actors have to adapt their plans accordingly to hegemon’s

actions. Literature on this subject, particularly from Russian sources, regards the US as the prime

regional actor whose actions, regardless of their nature, compel other regional actors, notably

Russia, constantly to react in response. China national interests in Central Asia are predicated

upon US involvement in the region.396

Furthermore, the Central Asian States use the US as a

third-party to play against Russia and China to minimize how much they will be dominated.

Thus, if the US, with its collateral impact as a global hegemon, was ignored completely in this

study, then such an omission would lead to incorrect analyses of the geopolitical interests of the

396

Eugene Rumer, Dmitriĭ Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao. Central Adsia: Views from Washington, Moscow, an

Beijng, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).

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Member States and the SCO. However, this section will not analyze whether or not the SCO, as a

whole, is geared toward countering the US in Central Asia but rather that issue will be studied in

Chapter VI.

US national interests and strategic goals in Central Asia appear to vary greatly depending

upon the source of the literature consulted. Western analyses posit that Washington pursues a

prominently democracy and free-market agenda while also focused on the War on Terrorism397

.

By contrast, the views from Central Asia, Russia, and China are inclined to interpret

Washington’s actions through a realpolitik lens.398

As such, in order to understand the interplay

between how both sides view US involvement, the US national interests and goals will be

analyzed first through Western sources and then through Eurasian sources.

Washington’s National Interest – Western Position

Central Asia has undeniably become more important for the United States. The

geopolitical shifts over the past three decades have forced US policy to change substantially as

the US modulates its interests in response Central Asia’s changing environment. This period

breaks down into two principal eras of US involvement in Central Asia. The first era covers the

US involvement in the twilight of the Cold War in the 1980s and through the 1990s with the

collapse of the Soviet Union. US policy then takes an abrupt turn in reaction to the world-

changing events of September 11, 2001. The terror attacks of that infamous day brought a

renewed US focus on Central Asia and precipitated a new era of greater involvement. Unlike

what many foreign observers believe when watching American actions in Central Asia, there

397

Eugene Rumer, Dmitriĭ Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, "Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and

Beijing,” (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 398

M.S. Ashimbaev, “ New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: after September 11,” (Almaty: KISI

pri Prezidentom RK, 2003).

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appears to be no long-term enduring US grand strategy for the region. Throughout the entire

duration of Central Asian independence since end of the Soviet Union, the one persistent aspect

of US policy “is the lack on the part of the United States of a clear vision of its interests in this

remote and unfamiliar region…[and that] inertia still weighs heavily on Washington’s

approach.”399

Thus, it is appears that ad-hoc interests and not a higher strategic aim are what

dictates Washington’s actions in Central Asia. This absence of a coordinated strategic approach

is obvious from the US failure to differentiate among the various nations’ problems, and instead

focus solely on Afghanistan and adopt a “one size fits all approach.”400

American interests in Central Asia the end of the Cold War but then morphed throughout

the Post-Cold War period. US policy was initially focused on contesting the Soviet invasion and

occupation of Afghanistan through the support of the Mujahedeen; this set of policies was

considered a major success when the Soviets withdrew in 1989. In the ensuing breakup of the

Soviet Union and the myriad of subsequent international crises faced by the Bush ’41

administration, Central Asia fell off of the proverbial US radar. The most important policies the

US adopted toward Central Asia during this time were a set of five guidelines devised by US

Secretary of State James Baker and his team that were aimed at US policy in the former Soviet

Union:

1. Peaceful self-determination consistent with democratic values and principles;

2. Respect for existing borders, with any changes occurring peacefully and consensually;

3. Respect for democracy and the rule of law, especially elections and referenda;

4. Human rights, particularly minority right;

5. Respect for international laws and obligations.401

399

Rumer, ibid., 23. 400

John Russell, “Kadyrov’s Chechyna Temlate Test or Trouble fr Russia’s Regional Policy?”, Europe-Asia Studies,

63 no. 3 (May 20110: 509-528, EBSCOhost, accessed May 22, 2013, 204. 401

Rumer, ibid., 18-21

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These principles were important because they created the only policy momentum for the United

States in Central Asia during this time period. Throughout much of the 1990s, the US was not

focused on Central Asia and “did not devise a strategy to ensure a coherent, determined actions

in the region. Rather, American policy toward Central Asia…was driven more by inertia,

convenience, and attention to other factors deemed to be of greater significance.”402

Although Central Asia, as a region, did present in the aggregate an any important national

interests for the US during the 1990s, individually none of the American interests in the region

was important enough on its own for the Clinton Administration to force American policy to be

specific toward the region. As such, once again, Central Asia got lost in the shuffle. US interests

in the 1990s in the region did rekindle albeit briefly, with the importance Washington placed on

securing the Weapons of Mass Destruction stored in Post-Soviet Republics in Central Asia,

specifically the ICMB arsenal in Kazakhstan. In tandem, the US initiated a political-economic

reform program that emphasized market institutions and democratic governance. The liberal

economic principles of the Washington Consensus informed the economic beliefs and the

political reforms enjoyed the support of newly developing NGOS, political parties, independent

media, and free elections. This development strategy, however; met with mixed results

throughout Central Asia, as described in Chapter II, and the five Central Asian Republics states

developed differently. On security matters, Washington attempted to draw Central Asia into

deeper relations with the existing, Western, Cold-War institutions such as NATO and the OSCE.

Finally, to stop the spread of drugs, the US made an ineffectual attempt to aid border security.403

402


Rumer, ibid., 23-7.

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US policy toward the region in the late 1990s under President Clinton was articulated by

in 1997 by US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, in a speech known as ‘Farewell to

Flashman’, (named after a popular fictional Victorian-era character in the Great Game). The

speech contained not a single mention of the Taliban, who were already becoming an escalating

menace in Afghanistan and a genuine threat to Central Asian stability. The speech described US

interests “in terms of conflict avoidance, building democracy, market reform, and cooperative

security arrangements.”404

The US wanted an end to great power politics and musings of the

Great Game and instead sought a win-win future for the region, but “Talbott’s rejection of the

Great Game approach was neither understood nor accepted by the most important audience of all

– in Central Asia proper.”405

Russia and China were also dubious; they saw this as, first,

Washington asserting leadership across the globe, second, calling for Central Asia to be Russia

and China free, and third, disingenuous given Washington’s actions toward Central Asian

hydrocarbon resources. The US actions toward oil and pipelines did receive the most attention

but “American policy on Caspian pipelines was a product of many considerations, among which

energy and economics were only two and not the most significant ones.” The US backed

pipelines were also very strategic in countering Russian and Iranian attempts to corner the energy

market in that region and control the pipeline path used by which oil flowed to Europe.

As the 1990s drew to a close, “U.S. policy was beset by growing disillusionment with

Central Asia.”406

The US viewed Central Asia as a region that might be among the next wave of

failing states thus having missed its potential. The threat of terrorism arose but the US ignored

the threat of regional destabilization as opposed to counter-terrorism. The US foreign policy

404



Rumer, Ibid., 36.

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argued that adherence to international human rights and good governance would prevent

destabilization and radicalization. But the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia saw the US

actions as engendering exactly the opposite outcome. As President George W. Bush began his

tenure at the White House, his administration had yet to formulate a new policy toward Central

Asia until events took a drastic turn for the worst.407

Thus, during this first era, US interests in

Post-Soviet Central Asia revolved around promotion of globalization, democracy, and the

Washington Consensus, as well as achieving scattered security concerns and access to energy.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th

, 2001 changed US policy from ambivalence and

detached to hyper-focused intervention in the span of a single morning. In response, the US

initiated the War on Terror, which forced the US to take a longer term interest in Central Asia.

“The war on terrorism, however, did not alter many basic long-term trends that have complicated

the conduct of American policy in the region and profoundly affected Central Asian perceptions

of the United States.”408

By intervening in Afghanistan, the US became the principal actor and de

facto guarantor of the regional security affairs of Central Asia. Washington established two main

air bases, which bound it closer to the Central Asian republics: Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan

and Manas in Kyrgyzstan.409

Uzbekistan, in particular, became a crucial ally of the US, as

reflected in the 2002, a new treaty, United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic

Partnership and Cooperation Framework. This Treaty was adopted because the US needed a

staging point accessible by air that was near Afghanistan, while Pakistan was viewed as “an

407

Rumer, Ibid., 36-39. 408


Rumer, Ibid., 39-40.

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uncertain ally because of its sponsorship of the Taliban regime and domestic political

fragility.”410

The US reform agenda was given acquired a new life in the aftermath of September 11th

because reform of the governments of the Central Asian Republics now became a critical

element of US national security that prevented states from and/or radicalizing individuals. The

US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, identified the ‘4Ds’ of Defeat, Deny, Diminish,

and Defend, which in essence meant:

1. Defeat terrorists and their organizations;

2. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;

3. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;

4. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.411

Number three, “Diminish”, in particular made reform critical for winning the War on Terror,

argued US policy-makers because without attainment of internal reform, the cycle of instability

and radicalization will not end.

Finally, in addition to pursuing larger goals to stop terrorism and spread democracy, the

US adopted strategic interests toward the specific states in the region. For example, the US

policy toward Russia was summarized as, “The United States must counter Russian influence

either to challenge Russia’s undemocratic tendencies at home and abroad, or to offset Moscow’s

growing influence in Central Asia.”412

Toward China, in the event of rising tensions between

Washington and Beijing, US policy was defined such that, “Although the main theater of Sino-

U.S. tensions is likely to be the Pacific, access to Central Asia could prove helpful in that highly

410



Rumer, Ibid., 59.

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uncertain scenario.”413

The US also must maintain access to Afghanistan and the ability to

operate in South Asia, because the US, “Has a strong interest in Central Asia not becoming a

collection of even weaker states--with shaky sovereignty and uncertain control over their

lands.”414

Ultimately, for the US, “Central Asia is too important to be left to its own devices. It

is also too important for the United States to leave it to Russia and China to manage between

themselves. They lack the resources and the vision to put the region on a path toward long-term

stability and security.”415

As such, the US maintains enduring national interests in the Central

Asia region and although the US will finish its mission in Afghanistan in 2014, it is unlikely that

the US will revert to the hands off ambivalent approach of the 1990s.

Washington’s Strategy – A Eurasian Viewpoint

The Realpolitik views from Eurasian sources contrast with the above American views

and instead describe Washington as pursuing a power politics approach that makes the concept

of geopolitical great power struggle in Central Asia such as the New Great Game more probable.

The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, a notable think-tank in Kazakhstan and Central

Asia at large, views US interest in the region as being stimulated by Central Asia has become a

strategic region located between Russia, China, and the Islamic arc of countries. Furthermore,

Eurasian scholars note the importance of the hydrocarbon resources located throughout Central

Asia with more emphasis than American observers.416

The factors listed in this study are purely

geopolitical in nature and tend to ignore any of Washington’s articulated desires for human

rights, democracy, and free-markets.

413




Ashimbaev, Ibid., 93-4.

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The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies creates a three tiered formula for assessing

US foreign policy in Central Asia. First, the Kazakh Institute identifies two overarching foreign

policy imperatives for the US. From these two central tenets, the Kazakh Institute describes

seven major American national interests in Central Asia. Finally the Kazakh Institute lists nine

‘planks’ of US foreign policy. Thus, the Kazakh Institute contends the US executes these foreign

policy planks to achieve its interests which will ultimately allow the US to attain its two central

strategy tenets. These two tenets are equivalent to what could be described as grand strategy

imperatives for the US to follow. The first is that the USA must reduce Russia’s influence in the

region and then create the enduring conditions to prevent a resurgence of Russian influence.

Second, in the vein of the concept of The Great Game, the USA will use its presence and

influence in Central Asia to apply economic and political pressure on strategic rivals, such as

China and Iran.417

The experts who subscribe to the Eurasian viewpoint look upon US actions in

the wake of September 11th

, 2001 as a vindication of their view. They believe the 21st century

American policy in Central Asia is “characterized by the aspiration to establish there the direct

political, military and economic control by the USA.”418

The Kazakhstan Institute suggests that the two central tenets of American strategy toward

Central Asia can be broken down into a list of seven key regional interests that the US is focused

on the US desires to achieve through a comprehensive set of regional policies. The Kazakh

Institute also believes that these strategic interests are enduring and have not morphed since 9/11.

According to the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, the seven regional interests for the

US are:

417

Ashimbaev, Ibid.,94. 418

Ashimbaev, Ibid.,95.

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1. Establishment and expansion of US presence in the region is an element of general US

strategy of consolidation of global leadership.

2. Allow access to natural resources in Caspian region.

3. Have regional states fit into a policy that could potentially restrain or contain China

and/or Iran.

4. Prohibit Russia or China from dominating the region.

5. Reserve space for dealing with problem states (such as Afghanistan).

6. Make sure local domestic markets can purchase industrial goods from the West.

7. Develop Eurasian Strategic transport units for hydrocarbon resources.419

It should be noted that each of these strategic interests is purely geopolitical and stems from a

realist view of foreign relations. There is no mention of norms or international institutions among

the list. Instead all of the US interests exist either to increase US relative power such as by

attaining energy goals or new markets in a neo-mercantilist fashion, decrease the relative power

of rival powers, or maintain access to decrease threats such as an unstable Afghanistan. These

interests are contrary to what Rumer’s Western viewpoint analysis in the prior section and the

American emphasis on norms, institution building, and international institutions.

The Kazakhstan Institute elaborates on the US interests contends US foreign policy is

comprised of nine major foreign policy ‘planks.’ These ‘planks’ are in fact general guidelines,

akin to foreign policy tools, that the US can and does use in order to achieve its interests in the

region. The nine major planks are:

1. Programs on assistance and investment policy

2. Involvement of USA into regional affairs

3. Strong pushes for democratization and human rights

4. Support for market reforms

5. Decrease of conflict potential and potential threats

6. Cooperation on security issues

7. Integration of Central Asia into the wider world

8. Aspire to create a buffer around Russia

9. Uphold the power interests of the USA420

419

Ashimbaev, Ibid., 93-4. 420

Ashimbaev, Ibid., 99-104.

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155

The first plank is the use of targeted investment policy to encourage the expansion of American

companies into Central Asia and to support American economic interests. The second plank is

predicated upon prominent US politicians and business leaders traveling to the region to build

political ties with the leaders of Central Asian Republics in order to facilitate the formation of

stronger bilateral relations. The Eurasian view minimizes the importance of the third plank,

human rights and democratization, and argues to the contrary stating that it mainly a method that

Washington uses to create political influence and pressure in the Central Asian states. The

Kazakhstan Institute’s views human rights diplomacy as being linked to other carrots and sticks

within US foreign policy in order to engender domestic changes within the Central Asian states;

while conversely, Kazakh Institute chooses to ignore the ideological grounds of Wilsonian

thought in US foreign policy and its importance in Washington’s calculus. The fourth plank,

market reform, focuses on implementation of privatization, legal and administration reforms, and

changes in the business climate that are part of the liberal Washington Consensus of US led

economic reform. The fifth plank is focused on peace-making between regional powers to

prevent conflict. However, the Eurasian view treats this plank as expendable as they view the

greatest possible threat of regional confrontation as one between the US and one of the other

regional powers (e.g., Russia, China, or Iran). Thus the Eurasian view devalues the American

interests in reduction of interstate tensions. Plank six focuses on how Washington has extended

invitations to join the NATO Partnership For Peace to the different Central Asian states in order

to build stronger relations and move these states closer to Washington’s strategic orbit.

Furthermore, this study emphasizes how Washington is pushing hardest to establish close short-

term relations with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, while, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, on the other

hand, represent long-term strategic interests for the USA in the region. The Seventh plank is an

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effort by the US to incorporate the Central Asian states into the US-led international system that

they had been so long excluded from during Cold War. This effort focuses specifically on

economic integration as well as adopting the norms that the US pushes in its system. Plank eight

focuses on how the US is working to create a buffer around Russia by weakening the geopolitical

position and influence of Russia in the region. The main instruments employed by the Americans

involve the creation of strategic organizations that have anti-Russian orientations. The GUAM

alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in 1997 is mentioned as an example.

Washington made a concentrated effort to recruit Uzbekistan to join the US strategic orbit to

pivot the strongest Central Asian state against Russia. The final plank in the Kazakhstan Institute

guidelines to US foreign policy listed upholding US power throughout Central Asia, which

Eurasian thinking translates into control of the global energy market via Central Asia through

easy access to diversified sources of hydrocarbons.421

These nine planks exemplify the realist

assessment of US intentions in Central Asia that has permeated the Eurasian viewpoint for many

years now and continues by minimizing ideas, norms, institutions, and promote any non-zero

sum thinking.

The Eurasian assessment concludes the US strategic objective in the region is to pull the

Central Asian Republics into the orbit of the American regional and global strategy. After

enacting the Bush ’43 doctrine in the wake of 9/11, Central Asian policymakers determined that

the US’s underlying foreign policy goal is to proclaim the US as the leading global power as

evidenced by its superiority in military, economic, and political power. The Eurasian view then

elaborates on possible next steps for the US. Out of this list, the strategic goal identified as most

421

Ashimbaev, Ibid., 99-104

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relevant to the SCO is, “weakening of the Shanghai process as a system of the regional

security.”422

This strategic point will be discussed in more detail later.

Although the Eurasian viewpoint expressed by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic

Studies may have only outlined their assessments of US regional interests in Central Asia

however; the perceptions held by Central Asian policymakers are equally as important as what

the US believes it is doing in Central Asia. First, it cannot be overemphasized the extent that

Eurasian policy experts interpret the US commitment to promoting human rights and democracy

themes are simply a masque for power projection and not legitimate core US goals.

Consequently, the basic refusal by the Kazakh Institute to accept what the US views as legitimate

assistance distorts the perception of the US effort in Central Asia into something that appears

subversive to regional interests and thus reinforces distrust. Unfortunately, such mistrust will

surely result in continued pushback by regional interests who feel threatened as the US promotes

its Freedom Agenda and calls to help build open access political institutions. If the Kazakh

specialists in fact think the US is acting as such, then it is highly probable the other Member

States see malign intentions within US foreign policy. Next, if the US normative push is thrown

aside and there is no major mentioning of counterterrorism, then what remains is a perceived

interest by the US in reducing the influence and power of its rival states. If this viewpoint is held

by Central Asia state actors then these US interests, whether real or merely perceived, are in

direct contrast to many of the strategic interests of the SCO Member States. As such, the

pushback by SCO Members States as well as the SCO against Washington may only be against

the perception of Washington’s ambitions exists then further geopolitical pushback will persist

nonetheless. Thus, how these Eurasian perceptions of Washington’s regional interests in Central

422

Ibid., 105

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Asia function as a catalyst for SCO Member States to take regional actions, particularly Russia,

in order to deny the US attainment of its regional interests.

5.2 - The National Interests of the SCO Great Powers: Russia and China

Within the SCO, the two states with the greatest power and influence in the Central Asian

region are undoubtedly Russia and China. Russia has a long history in the region and clearly has

designated interests. Meanwhile, China, although historically relevant due to Xinjiang, Tibet and

East Turkestan, is an essentially a newcomer to the region, arriving in the wake of the Soviet

Union collapse. As the two strongest powers in Central Asia, both have global and regionally

specific interests that manifest themselves in the actions they pursue in the region Asia. Given

their entrenched interests and a historically difficult bilateral relationship, a major question arises

as to whether these two states can even work with one another. A failure in the SCO consensus

decision-making will most likely occur between these two great powers. As such, this section

will examine first the national interests of first Russia and China before studying the nature of

their bilateral relationship to determine if these two great powers will allow the SCO to achieve

its potential or if competing interests will cause the SCO to be paralyzed with gridlock.

Great Power 1: Russia

Of all of the great powers involved in Central Asia, Russia has the strongest historical

legacy that affects its strategic interests in the region. As described in the history in Chapter II,

Russia dominated Central Asia first as the Russian Empire and then as the Soviet Union. After

the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Russia lost control of the region and remained relatively

hands-off for a few years, thus allowing the newly constituted Central Asian states their first

chance at independence. Near the end of the 1990s, Russia’s present day strategic interests

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formed and then solidified later under Vladimir Putin and have remained fairly consistent

through the present. In essence, Russia’s strategic interests are a combination of global interests

played out at the regional level and specific regional interests unique to Central Asia. However

the revival in region’s religious movements (e.g. spread of Islam) are changing demographics

between Russia and Central Asia place Russia in a delicate position. For Russia, “The ‘time of

the Southern nations’ has arrived. The challenge is twofold, internal and external.”423

Going

forward, Russia cannot simply build a homogenous Russia state but rather in its quest to revive

itself in the 21st Century, Russia must internally factor in a rapidly shrinking indigenous Russian

population, a growing Muslim population that is part of an Islamic renaissance as well as a mix

of external security threats stemming from Central Asia. Only by carefully pursuing its interests

in Central Asia will Russia be able to achieve its Grand strategy to regain influence in this

region.

Russia’s global Grand Strategy can best be categorized as reestablishment of the

country’s great power status.424

In the view of many Russian elites, “Russia can only survive and

prosper in the 21st century if it is a free-standing great power.”

425 A central element of reasserting

itself as a great power is Russia regaining its influence over Post-Soviet ‘near abroad’ regions.–

an aspiration that Russia is vigorously pursuing Central Asia was a part of Russia’s imperial

holdings for well over one hundred years, thus regaining influence if not control over the Central

Asian states falls within this mandate. However, Russia does not seek to restore the super-state

of the USSR or create a new formal empire; rather instead Russia wants “favorable conditions

for economic expansion in the former borderlands and for a high degree of Russian political

423


Rumer, Ibid., 81.

425 Rumer, Ibid., 81.

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influence, which guarantees loyalty.”426

This primary goal puts the Russian Federation directly at

odds with the United States.as both nations are exerting competing geopolitical influences upon

the region. Russia perceives US involvement as meddling in Russia’s sphere of influence or

worse that US actions interfere w ith Russia’s efforts to realize its Grand Strategy.

Regionally, Russia has very specific interests, goals, and fears based upon its long history

and close proximity with the region. Russian security interests can be broken down into two

large categories: the first is strategic interests and the second is specific interests. But regionally,

“Russia’s overriding interest in Central Asia is in the new states’ internal stability. Should they

fail, and open the floodgates to chaos, the effect on Russia could be overwhelming.”427

To

prevent this collapse Russia targets its regional interests and foreign policy actions to maintain

the status quo in Central Asia. Russia does not have any ideological affinity for authoritarian

states but rather Russians believe that in the case of regime change in Central Asia the

authoritarian regimes are more likely to be replaced with Islamist radicals and not enlightened

democrats.428

Thus, a Russian mandate for preserving authoritarian control is conceived on the

grounds of regional stability.

As explored above, the Russian primary strategic interest is to maintain domestic

stability. Russia’s need to maintain domestic and regional security within Russia and the Central

Asian regimes is driven largely by Russia’s fear of radical Islam. Russia dreads that any

instability in the region will allow Islam to control parts of the post-Soviet sphere. This fear is

validated by Russian memories from their Afghanistan war and the threat they then faced from

the Mujahedeen and other warriors with apparent ties to radical Islamic beliefs. Russia’s

426



Rumer, Ibid.,. 84.

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antipathy toward democratic governance results from earlier Marxists-Leninist beliefs that

democracy establishes a weaker political system in terms of state power and would potentially be

overwhelmed as they were in the past by Islamist regimes.

Domestically, Russia has dealt with threats to its homeland security during two

separate Chechnya wars. Russia also regards the Taliban, even before the US invasion into

Afghanistan, as the prime regional security threat. Russia sought to be the guarantor of regional

security during the 1990s but lacked the resources or capacity to do so. Russian “anxiety [over

the security situation] peaked in 1999, when a loose alliance emerged among the Chechens, the

Taliban, and the Central Asian rebels.”429

The different extremist groups during this time used

“Taliban-ruled Afghanistan …as a rear supply base and a training area.”430

US actions have

reduced much of the danger presented by these threats but Russia continues to push hard to

maintain security by supporting the regimes in power. Moscow has “never seriously considered

undermining them from within…[and] since 2000 Russian security agencies have been seeking

out Central Asian dissidents and opposition figures in Russia and turning them over to their

governments.”431

Thus, it is clear that Russia will go to almost any length to maintain stability

and security over the region.

Russia’s other regional strategic security interests are varied. First is the need to prevent

the “Colored Revolutions”. (Colored Revolutions is shorthand for non-violent revolutions that

adopted a color or flower as their symbol. Some of these resistance movements overthrew

authoritarian governments in post-Soviet nations.) Russia still believes that these revolutions

“were part of a U.S.-inspired plot that aimed to replace Soviet-era elites with pro-Western ones

429

Rumer, Ibid.,. 92. 430

Rumer, Ibid p. 92. 431

Rumer, Ibid., p. 92.

Hoyt, David

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and thus forever limit Russia’s influence in the neighborhood.”432

Russia was surprised by both

the violent Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005) and the country-wide demonstrations that

were quickly squashed at the start of a colored revolution in Uzbekistan (2005). As a result,

“Russian policymakers consider the promotion of democracy by the United States, not

indigenous problems, as the real source of instability.”433

Russia’s second strategic security goal for Central Asia is to contain foreign military

presences and the spread of third-party security alignments in the region. This foreign policy

is enshrined in Russian doctrine as the “Russian military doctrines of 1993 and 2000 [which]

declared foreign military presence in the former Soviet space and third-party security alignments

with the new independent states a threat to Russian national security.”434

However, in this

instance, the United States military assistance was welcomed into the region because Russia

needed help to defeat the Taliban. First, Russia could not block the US’s entry into the region

without suffering political setbacks, and second, Russia feared that if China entered this sphere,

it would stay drive out Russian influence. Russia also seeks to prevent the various Central

Asian states from fighting and to maintain border security. If the Central Asian states war

amongst themselves, it logically disrupts the primary objective of regional stability.

Next, Russia sought to stem the drug trade in Central Asia. The drug trafficking is

rampant with all SCO states, sans China, participating act as transit countries and markets for

Afghan produced narcotics. Organized crime networks destabilize the region through links and

funding to Islamic radicals, corrupting political and security institutions. Finally, Moscow seeks

to prevent nuclear nonproliferation -- a prime concern right after the Soviet breakup as ICBMs in

432

Rumer, Ibid.,. 92. 433


Rumer, Ibid.,. 94.

Hoyt, David

163

Kazakhstan had to be secured. Since then, the local nuclear threat has decreased though Russia

remains moderately concerned.435

Russia’s specific security interests focus on mechanisms that will increase Russian power

projection in that realm. First Russia must consolidate the Collective Security Treaty

Organization, CSTO, a Russian led security/military alliance. The CSTO was founded in 1992

before the SCO and has a similar member group that includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan with Uzbekistan suspending membership in 2012. The

CSTO similarly seeks intergovernmental cooperation to maintain regional security -- but lacks

China’s participation. However, there is innate tension between the CSTO and the SCO, which

weakens Russian resolve in the SCO, and perhaps even the SCO. Russia also sought and

achieved bilateral agreements on security issues with all of the SCO Central Asian states. These

agreements provide for “political consultations, joint strategic assessment, joint military

planning, and joint operations.”436

Operations created a parallel universe of interconnectedness.

Russia also strives to weaken the Central Asian arms market so that Russia remains the

dominant force in arms trading.. This objective exemplifies Russia’s goal of controlling the

region by determining that the “Central Asian states use the same weaponry, observe virtually

the same military regulations as the Russian armed forces, and largely retain the Russian and

Soviet military culture. Central Asian officers still speak, and even issue commands in, Russian.

Interoperability is not an issue.”437

This level of operational congruence in military hardware,

tactics, communication, makes it possible to conceive of Russia having the institutional building

blocks to manage a workable Central Asian regional security bloc led by Russia. The more

435

Rumer, Ibid., 93-8. 436


Rumer, Ibid.,. 103.

Hoyt, David

164

Russian security culture, institutions, and equipment permeate Central Asia, the more Russian de

facto influence can overwhelm the influence of the other great powers as well as subordinate

national interests in the region

Russian economic interests divide into two categories as well. The first category is a mix

of economic integration and trade related activities. In the 1990s Russia tried multiple attempts

to create a post-Soviet economic space. The most successful of these attempts was a custom

union that in 2000 that was upgraded to form the EAEC—Eurasian Economic Community. The

EAEC contains Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus with Uzbekistan entering

later. This organization promoted a common economic zone and freedom of movement which

makes sense since Russia is a major economic partner for all four other members. Russia has

also built a Single Economic Space with Kazakhstan and Belarus (Ukraine withdrew). Russian

companies are also active in Central Asia in the following industries: ferrous and nonferrous

metallurgy, chemicals, machine-building, telecoms, food, and textiles.438

The second group of Russian economic interests has to do squarely with Central Asian

energy. Russia’s primary program goals in the energy sector are, “to gain something like veto

power regarding oil and gas exploration and transportation rules in the Caspian basin, to

dominate the region’s gas business and market, and to control hydroelectric power

productions.”439

Russia has sought, without much success, to control Kazakhstan’s oil exports.

Gas exports are even more important for Russia and Russia is doing its best to control them. For

Turkmenistan’s gas industry, Russia is trying to bind the country to itself by creating pipeline

dependency. Uzbekistan may only be a minor gas producer, but Gazprom, Russia’s largest gas

438

Rumer, Ibid., 105-10. 439

Rumer, Ibid. 106.

Hoyt, David

165

producers, wants to become a part-owner as well as the as the Uzbekistan’s sole gas exporter.

“Russia also plans to supply Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Southern Kazakhstan with the Uzbek

gas produced by Gazprom. This [control] would reduce Tashkent’s [Uzbekistan] political

leverage over Bishkek [Krgyzstan]; it would also make Kyrgyzstan even more beholden to

Russia.”440

These actions taken by Gazprom have led to “A Ukrainian analyst claim[ing] that

Gazprom’s efforts aimed at turning Central Asia into Russia’s ‘gas caliphate.”441

Hydroelectric energy is the other prevalent energy resource in this region. The Russian

company RAO UES, has been buying electric power stations in Kazakhstan and then after 2000

began trying to exploit the hydroelectric power potential of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, driven in

large measure by its inability to keep up with power demands in Russia. Not only did these

acquisitions bring Russia much needed revenue but also they “would put Russia in control of the

water resources of Central Asia as a whole, which could be even more important than control

over gas pipelines.”442

Thus, Russia’s regional energy strategy can best be described in the

single word – dominance.

The last item in this discussion of Russia goals in the region is Russia’s so-called

humanitarian interests. First, among these interests, is the Russian diaspora, a legacy of the

Soviet era, when Russians emigrated, often with the government’s forceful encouragement to

farming collectives and manufacturing facilities throughout the Soviet Union including Central

Asia. Even now “Ethnic Russians permanently residing abroad are officially considered by

Moscow to be ‘compatriots.’”443

Although there is no public outcry regarding Russians living

in Central Asia, (obviously many Russians still reside in the now independent states for 30+

440

Rumer, Ibid.,. 108. 441

Rumer, Ibid.,. 108. 442

Rumer, Ibic., 109. 443


Hoyt, David

166

years). Russia has worked to create dual-citizenship programs and ease travel restrictions to aide

its Russians living abroad.

Second, is Russia’s immigration issue – a necessary evil to combat the demographic

changes that threaten Russia. Russian demographers, eyeing an ever declining population and

growing need for labor, contend that immigration is critical to Russia’s future prospects as a

great power but the Russian population is split in its opinions on the issue. Conversely, excessive

immigration, in the eyes of other experts, may be destabilizing. As immigration to Russia is most

likely going to come from Central Asia, bringing with it conflicting ethnicities, languages, and

religions (Islam in particular) Russian policymakers wrestle with the question of what is the

best way for Russia to proceed. Russian language and culture provide a third concern for Russia.

Maintaining Russian cultural and linguistic links to these independent territories keeps Central

Asia within a Russian sphere of influence. Once again subordinating domestic national

development enables Russia to be a regional superpower while having greater influence in the

region than its great power rivals.444

In order to achieve these interests, Russia’s Central Asian foreign policy can be

characterized, principally, as reactionary. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian policy was

seen as ‘frozen’ maintaining the minimal inertia required to exert a modicum of influence over

the fledging Central Asian Republics. Not until the mid-1990s did Russian elites realize that their

foreign policy had fallen behind contemporary events and that they were losing influence in the

region. In response, With Putin’s ascendance, Russia has attempted to reinsert t itself as the

primary guarantor of security in the region and exerted its influence by becoming a neutral

arbiter in disputes between the new Central Asian States. Economic interests took a backseat in

444


Hoyt, David

167

comparison to security interests with the sole exception of the energy market.445

Starting in 2003,

“Russia embarked on something that might be termed a Reconquista policy, aimed at regaining

positions temporarily forfeited to the United State, at restoring the ‘natural borders of Russian

influence.’”446

Russia also focuses on preventing revolutions before they arise in Post-Soviet

space. Russian Reconquista policy divides into two types. The first, involves smaller, albeit

more important issues that require the Kremlin’s input-- these often involves summit diplomacy.

The second type of reinsertion policy is found within the larger category of all things controlled

by he government bureaucracy through numerous agencies and bureaus.

Thus, Russia’s 21st century Central Asian foreign policy implements its goals to

command influence over the region so that it has a greater sphere of influence than other super

powers. But overall the critique is that Russian foreign policy lacks coordination even if it has

well specified interests.447

With one critic suggesting that ‘Russia remains a regional power that

acts as a global superpower’ and further that losing its regional hegemony “would undermine

Russia aspirations to return as a great power.”

Great Power 2: China

China is the second regional great power that has a huge stake in the future developments

of Central Asia. Chinese strategic interests in Central Asia will be broken down into two

categories. The first set of interests is derived from Chinese global Grand Strategy and has

specific components in Central Asia. The second set of strategic interests is regional in nature

and also include China’s Xinjiang problem. Overall, western writers interest in writing about

China and Central Asia is “lukewarm” and Chinese authors on Chinese policy and relations

445



Rumer, Ibid.,118-26.

Hoyt, David

168

with Central Asia are considered very difficult to research and it seems unclear whether China

has a concrete strategy, “although China does have macro-conceptions and specific goals and

tactics, they do not constitute a formal strategy.”448

Essential Chinese Grand Strategy related to Chinese actions taken in Central Asia has

two major components. First, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) primary strategic goal is to

stay in power. The CCP will pursue the necessary strategic actions that maintain its legitimacy,

reduce domestic political/social unrest, and minimize existential threats to China or itself. The

primary pillar of legitimacy left for the CCP is that it has brought a historically unprecedented

level of economic development to China.449

However, as China begins to prosper not every

region or citizen will prosper equally thus creating the conditions of economic inequality and

social instability. The CCP must continue to grow China’s GDP at a rate fast enough so to add

sufficient number of jobs to the Chinese economy annually. The magic number that is often

cited is 7% GDP growth rate with the caveat that anything less and China will face potential

domestic unrest. Thus, the first two key grand strategic interests are (1) maintain CCP rule of

China, and (2) continue the Chinese economic growth.450

Huasheng Zhao, Director, Center for

Russia and Central Asia Studies, Center for SCS, Fudan University, Shanghai, supports this

hypothesis, publicly stating that “China’s primary objective is to satisfy domestic demands,

especially economic ones, not expand the country’s power and influence.”451

As China’s rise continues, its increased economic clout and military build-up cause

tensions with both regional actors and the US. A combination of regional historical memory

448


Susan L. Shirk, “China: Fragile Superpower”. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 450

Aaron L. Friedberg, “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery In Asia,”(New

York: W.W. Norton, 2011). 451

Rumer, Ibid., 157.

Hoyt, David

169

toward China and the CCP’s use of overly vague, non-transparent governmental language toward

undeclared strategic principles have caused a wave of ‘China Threat’ thinking around the world.

The China Threat perception is most problematic for the US-China bilateral relationship. China

sees the alliances that Washington created during its strategy of Cold War Containment as “A

‘Crescent-shaped encirclement’ along China’s eastern coast parts of which are now being

revitalized.”452

China views its Xinjiang province and Central Asia as its Strategic Rear. China

now fears that “After 9/11 [the US] went even further, achieving a ‘historic break-through’ by

penetrating into Central Asia…thereby positioning themselves to apply pressure on China from

all sides.”453

Thus, China believes having influence in Central Asia is critical to its safety and

envisions long-term US intervention in the region as untenable for its strategic interests. To push

back and defend its strategic rear, China must exert geopolitical influence into Central Asia to

protect itself from what it views as Washington’s aggressive policies.

China’s interests in Central Asia can be now be examined with more granularity.

Huasheng Zhao describes China’s regional interests as “six key elements: (1) border security; (2)

combating the “East Turkestan” movement; (3) energy; (4) economic interests; (5) geopolitics;

and (6) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”454

These six interests have emerged

sequentially over time and reveal Chinese interests in Central Asia in the wake of changing

geopolitical currents.455

As of Zhao’s writing in 2007 (a recent literature review suggests these

interests have not changed), China ranked these six interests into three tiers based upon their

priority. The primary tier included Terrorism and Energy. The secondary tier included Economy

452

Friedberg, Ibid.,138

453 Friedberg, Ibid.,

454 Rumer, Ibid.,138.

455 Rumer, Ibid.,138.

Hoyt, David

170

and the SCO. The tertiary tier included Geopolitics and Border security. One note assert that

geopolitics can be included in much higher tiers depending on its definition. Zhao points out, as

shall be discussed shortly, that geopolitics is protecting China’s strategic rear and that at present

it is a latent threat as opposed to the more active threats in the higher tiers.456

order security and stability became primary Chinese national interest when the USSR

broke apart. China and Russia and the newly formed states had thousands of kilometers of

borders that had been heavily militarized since the Sino-Soviet split throughout the Cold War.

China concerns quickly focused on how to best protect its borders and manage its relationship

with these newly minted countries, and their spreading Muslim population. In order to pursue

this objective, China formed the initial grouping that would become the ‘Shanghai Five’ and in

1996 passed the initial Treaty on Deeping Military Trust in Border Regions and in 1997 the

Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. These successful agreements led not

only to having border security decrease in salience in 1997, but also the issuance of the 1998

Almaty Joint Statement that officially codified the Shanghai Five that would lead to the

formation of the SCO.457

As China acted to promote further cooperation with its bordering

central Asian nations to satisfy its Chinese national security interests, at the same time Chinese

leadership concern for border security became the driving force behind the formation of the

SCO.

Security is the China’s second regional interest in Central Asia. Starting in the 1990s,

the threat of terrorism and separatism grew in China’s Western province of Xinjiang particularly

between the large Muslim Uighur population and the Hans. As was discussed in greater depth

456

Rumer, Ibid.,150-1. 457

Rumer, Ibid.,139-141.

Hoyt, David

171

in Chapter IV, the Chinese feared the ‘East Turkistan’ movement because it has conducted

numerous terrorist attacks in Xinjiang as well as attempted to secede from China to form an

independent Muslim East Turkestan This extremist movement is culturally tied to Central Asia,

and draws strength and support from this region. In order to stop the ‘East Turkistan’ movement,

China must face it in the external environment by denying it the support it may otherwise gain.

This interest led to China rebranding the struggle against the Uighur movement as a part of the

US led global War on Terror. As the issue of terrorism threatens domestic security, growth, and

legitimacy, it is now the most important issue for China in Central Asia.458

It should be noted

that the problem posed by ‘East Turkestan’ is fundamentally a problem that emanates from

within China and as such must be stopped within Chinese territory and is not a problem that can

threaten the overall national stability of China (barring a cascade effect).459

Energy and energy security is the third national interest for China in this region. In 1993,

“China became a net oil importing country”460

and its demand for oil has skyrocketed since. In

order to achieve the requisite economic growth rate each year and prevent domestic instability,

China’s needs for energy have grown exponentially. Without an endless supply of energy,

China’s economic growth will stall. China concluded after the events of September 11th

, 2001,

that “the Middle East is vulnerable to long-term turbulence and instability – critical problems for

a region that is the world’s primary source of energy.”461

China also witnessed the introduction

of American forward bases in Central Asia and Iraq with concern this was “an apparent attempt

to assert control over global energy supplies.”462

By pursuing the energy sources in Central Asia,

China can begin to diversify its energy sources as well as supply a greater share of China’s

458

Rumer, Ibid., 140-44. 459

Rumer, Ibid., 153-54. 460



Rumer, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

172

energy demands (potentially 8+ percent).463

Finally, in the event of increased tensions with the

United States or a conflict with Iran over its nuclear program, China will have backup energy

supplies in case the Strait of Hormuz (one of the world’s most strategic oil shipping waterways)

is closed or the US closes the Straits of Malacca (an important shipping waterway connecting the

Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean) Thus, Chinese leadership deems achieving this national

interest is imperative to safeguarding China’s future

Central Asia also enables China to pursue economic interests. Although Central Asia

does not trade much with China, the latest data of 2007 show China “accounts for about 10

percent of Central Asian foreign trade volume.”464

This trade is of primary importance for

developing China’s Northwest with specific emphasis on Xinjiang, which stands to benefit more

than any other Chinese province:

Development of China’s Northwest and the prosperity of border areas are a part of the

country’s development strategy. The Northwest is distance from China’s developed

eastern coastal regions, lags far behind the economic level of the latter, cannot compete

economically, and finds it difficult to integrate into eastern China’s economy.465

China also desires access to the rich mineral resources that are underexploited in Central Asia

in order to fuel further its economic growth. China will also construct transportation

infrastructure to link China, and China’s markets, to countries on its Northwest perimeter and

beyond via over land routes. Lastly, the Central Asian markets are still developing, however; as

the Chinese economy moves toward regionalization the need to maintain market growth, drives

China to encourages this expansionist trend in surrounding countries. Beijing wants to build an

463

Rumer, Ibid.,145-6. 464

Rumer, Ibid.,147. 465

Rumer, Ibid.,147.

Hoyt, David

173

economic framework for the region that will enhance Chinese economic influence in contiguous

areas.466

The geopolitical interests of China, although similar to the US and Russia, have changed

dramatically in scope and urgency between the pre- and post-9/11 worlds. Before

September11th

, China was not overly concerned about the region’s geopolitical security.

However, this changed with 9/11 and the introduction of two US bases in Central Asia as

China’s regional concerns were altered. Although the US asserts these bases are temporary,

China believes they will have a long-term presence. Again, China’s historical fear a threat to

its strategic rear, in this case, are reinforced by America’s geopolitical and physical presence

in Central Asia.467

The sixth interest for China is the promotion of the SCO. From China’s perspective

the SCO represents an important instrument to pursue the other Chinese interests in Central

Asia. The SCO provides the vital framework for multilateral understandings while, at the same

time, enhances China’s ability to form bilateral relationships with other nations in the region.

Zhao specifically states that “given China’s active participation in the organization, its special

role in establishment and development of the SCO, and its close relations with the organization,

China has a special relationship to this organization.”468

Zhao also notes that it is often thought

that the development of the SCO is tied to the relative growth or decline of Chinese influence

and ties with Central Asia. Thus, promoting the forward momentum of the SCO is important for

China.469

This interest should be specifically noted as no other nation in this Chapter is as

strongly tied to the SCO’s future. China was the driving force behind the signing of the first

466


Rumer, Ibid..148-150. 468


Rumer, Ibid., 150.

Hoyt, David

174

security agreement that foreshadowed the Shanghai Five group. Consequently, China may have

more to gain but definitely more to lose from the SCO’s future. Also, since China is not a

member of the Russian dominated CSTO in order to achieve its her regional strategic objectives

in Central Asia it should be expected that China will continue to exert more political capital and

diplomatic energy within the SCO to propel the organization forward.

How Central Asia as a region ranks in Chinese diplomatic hierarchy is also important. It

should be noted that, “China has not issued an official document specifically outlining its

diplomatic strategy and giving a systematic explanation of its objectives, priorities, and

methods”470

and thus Zhao’s and other scholars’ analysis of China’s strategies for Central Asia

are purely hypothetical. Analysis of Chinese diplomacy divides international relations into three

categories: great powers, neighboring countries, and developing countries. China also breaks

relations down into spheres by region. Based upon these methods of analysis, “Central Asia’s

ranking corresponds to the Chinese conception of ‘periphery diplomacy’ one of the principal

concepts in its foreign strategy.” This connotation means that the neighboring countries share

contiguous borders with China, that they are very close to China, and that the periphery of China

expands as China develops (implying greater power projection) meaning that is a nebulous

concept.471

The main goal of this peripheral strategy is “to promote friendly relations with all the

contiguous or proximate countries that form a stable belt around [China].”472

China’s need to decrease the perceived regional threat of a ‘Rising China’ and build a

more stable periphery region caused it to introduce three new policies geared towards

strengthening neighborly relations. The first policy creates an ‘amicable neighborhood’ that

470


Rumer, Ibid., 152-3. 472

Rumer, Ibid., 153.

Hoyt, David

175

“gives priority to developing friendly relations with all the surrounding countries.”473

The

Second policy asserts China wants to build a ‘tranquil neighborhood’ which “implies the need

for China to make its neighbors especially small and weaker ones, feel safe and secure in

neighboring with China.”474

The third policy is the ‘prosperous neighborhood’ an economic

policy that “requires Beijing to provide more aid to its neighbors and enable them to benefit from

China’s own growth.”475

Taken together these policies should allow China to create stability and

positive relations in its periphery and thus hold constant the international factors needed for

domestic economic development, specifically in Xinjiang.

Thus, China must extend the international circumstances that have generated its present

day level of phenomenal national prosperity since the collapse of Central Asia. China

acknowledges that it must become even more involved with Central Asia since the region’s

future direction is critical to China. Furthermore, China seeks to prevent another Great Game

situation but rather prefers a scenario where all regional powers, excluding the United States,

are allowed access to the region. The US is not explicitly mentioned as a foe in most Chinese

documents but it is implied as the country whose influence and power projection over the mid to

long term most threaten Chinese interests. But as is explained below, Chinese and Russian

interests also do not sync up perfectly.

Russian-Chinese Relations

473



Rumer, Ibid.,159.

Hoyt, David

176

Russian and Chinese relations in Central Asia begin from a very difficult starting

position. First, the burden of history weighs heavily on the two countries. As described in

Chapter II, the Sino-Soviet split has created historical animosity between these two nations that

was not fully erased by the end of the Cold War. As tensions mounted during the Cold War,

Russian and Chinese locations bordering Central Asia such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia were

the site of the security escalation. Second, China and Russia have different unilateral global and

regional strategic interests. These states see coordination at one level but others as separate from

the other. Thus, many news sources mistake cooperation in the United Nations Security Council

between Russia and China as signs of a strategic partnership while on regional or issue specific

interests, Russia and China may oppose one another. Central Asia is one of the regions where

interests between these two great powers are often at odds.

On the global scale, Russia and China appear to act much more in accordance with each

other. Lauded expert Bobo Lo describes the relationship between Russia and China as one of

‘strategic convenience.’ Lo describes how nowhere in Russia-China relations has this bilateral

relationship ever been one of “unalloyed good relations.”476

Many Russians envy the political

stability and economic success of China but large elements of ‘Sinophobia’ still exist as China’s

rise is viewed as a to threaten Russian interests. China, on the other hand, appears to have a

more “benign, if not dismissive” view of Russia and does not view Russia as a threat to its

strategic interests.477

Ideology, unlike during the Cold War era, no longer governs the foreign policy and

strategic interests of either nation, which both helps reduce historical animosity but makes

476

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., .2.

477 Lo, Bobo, Ibid., .3

Hoyt, David

177

potential cooperation more difficult. China and Russia “share neither a long-term vision of the

world nor a common understanding of their respective places in it, a disjunction reflected in

differing perceptions of the bilateral relationship.”478

Chinese and Russian foreign policies are

also oriented differently. Russian foreign policy is more globalist publishing in 2008) and is

focused on the West as a reference point, while China is focused on its rise and maintaining the

conditions for its continued growth.479

These factors make an enduring strategic partnership

unlikely and China’s continued economic growth is likely to continue to decrease those chances

in the future.

Despite these differences, on the global level China and Russia can find occasional

common ground upon which to align their interests. The most common ground is resistance to

American hegemony and the threat it represents to both Chinese and Russian interests. Both

countries want to restrain America’s overwhelming power, especially during its unipolar

moment after the turn of the millennium. In Bobo Lo’s words:

What binds them is a largely defensive agenda: stability and confidence building along

the common border; resisting the influence of “alien” Western values; emasculating UN

action over Iran’s nuclear program; and excluding or weakening an outside strategic

presence in Central Asia. The axis of convenience is in many respects an “anti-

relationship,” directed more at containing undesirable developments than creating new

structures and mechanisms for cooperation.480

Both superpowers embrace “selective globalization”, but only in ways that will strengthen

Russian and Chinese sovereignty – in economic and political terms. Yet even in this spirit of

shared cooperation, China and Russia apply different styles of foreign policy, “Russia is taking

every opportunity to contest America’s global leadership, China has adopted a more restrained

approach.” Both Moscow and Beijing enjoy drumming up talk about the quality of their bilateral

478

Lo, Bobo, Ibid. 479

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 4. 480

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 4-5.

Hoyt, David

178

relationship as a factor in regional and global politics. But the underlying rationale in fact is that

these relations are often “tactical and instrumental, and expediency and opportunism are more

relevant considerations than an often illusory likemindedness.”481

As such, the scholar Bobo Lo’s

moniker of a relationship of ‘strategic convenience’ is quite apt to describe global Chinese-

Russian relations.

Russian author Dmitri Trenin, paints a more negative view of global Sino-Russia

relations that still supports the Chinese scholar, Lo’s claims. Russia is generally seen as

uncomfortable with China’s rise, “Historically regarded as huge, but essentially inferior to

Russia, China has, within a decade and a half, achieved formal equality with and informal

superiority over its former hegemon and mentor.”482

Trenin states that Russia has moved closer

to China to avoid America’s influence, “its strategy could be described as leaning on the East to

raise its stakes in the West.”483

But at the same time Russia seeks to avoid becoming China’s

satellite. Russia believes that China’s focus on domestic issues will grant Russia the time to

consolidate its vital interests.484

Thus, Trenin’s realpolitik view is one of opportunistic

coordination to achieve Moscow’s goals but with no consideration of a longer term partnership.

Within Central Asia, Russian-Chinese relations become even more nuanced and difficult

to sync together based upon historical time period with major changes occurring after September

11, 2001. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had unquestioned dominance over the

region. China recognized this regional hegemony and did not challenge it. Even after the collapse

of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian Republics, Russia maintained

relative dominance over the region. This situation was not a problem for China after the cooling

481




Rumer, Ibid. 83.

Hoyt, David

179

off that followed in Sino-Russian relations. According to Bobo Lo, “Russian primacy in Central

Asia represented a comforting constant, a guarantee of stability at a time of otherwise great

uncertainty.”485

Russia and China were synchronized in their averse view of the separatist

elements in the region that challenged their respective domestic control. As such:

Beijing concluded a tacit bargain with Moscow. It was happy to recognize the status quo

in Central Asia and defer to Russia’s regional leadership in exchange for the latter

continuing to take care of business. With its “strategic rear” covered, China could then

focus on domestic modernization and Taiwan. Russia would also help to suppress Uighur

separatism, either directly or by pressuring the Central Asian governments to take active

measures against groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.486

This agreement fell apart in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 when the US increased

activity and presence in the region. From the Russian perspective, Putin made a quick strategic

choice after 9/11. Assuming the Americans would enter Central Asia, Putin decided to work

with them, and exploit the US war effort to accomplish Russian security interests in Afghanistan

and to maintain the stability of the Central Asian Republics. Russia also assumed that US

presence would be temporary thus America would do Russia’s dirty work and leave Russian

regional hegemony stronger after America’s withdrawal. When America indicated its willingness

to stay for the long haul and this decision relegated Russia to a weaker strategic partner, instead

of the indispensable ally Putin had wished to be. As a result, Russia’s support for America’s

actions weakened. Other global events such as the Invasion of Iraq and the Color Revolutions in

former Soviet republics convinced Putin that America’s unilateral actions and subversive

normative roles meant that America was of a greater geopolitical threat than previously

considered. Russian regional hegemony was broken and Russia was left with the only other

485


Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 92.

Hoyt, David

180

option of trying to coopt China and the Central Asian Republics into constraining American

influence.487

China internalized the post- 9/11 geopolitical changes in Central Asia very differently

than Russia. First, China received no advance warning of Putin’s decision to allow the West

into Central Asia and was completely shocked by this geopolitical change. In addition, China

was relegated to a lesser role as Russia pursued more favorable relations with America over the

first few years of the Bush ’43 presidency. China internalized this point quite seriously as it

realized that Russia’s relations with the West would always take precedence over its relations

with China. The West remained the global power, so that mulit-polarity was not a reality yet, and

Russia would use its relations with China as a source of strength when relations with the West

were sour but remained only a fair weather friend who could abandon without any hesitation

relations with China when Russian relations improved with the West. China also realized that it

would have to pursue its own agenda and that the aforementioned tacit agreement of the 1990s

was now off. Even as relations deteriorated between Russia and America starting in late 2002 to

the benefit of Russian-Sino relations, the strategic rift remained.488

As a result, “China could not

depend on Russia as in the past, since the latter was both untrustworthy and weak. It was also

important to avoid being sucked into Moscow’s growing anti-American agenda. The solution lay

in pursuing a more flexible and active policy toward Central Asia, one that involved the

accelerated expansion of ties with all states in the region.”489

These different strategic positions have created tensions between China and Russia

within Central Asia but outside the confines of the SCO. Russia’s goals to expel US influence

from the Central Asia region suggest some degree of Chinese complicity. However, today China

487

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 93-5. 488

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 95-7. 489


Hoyt, David

181

is most definitely an independent player and will not be easily directed by Russia. Russia’s

goals to recapture the past state of indirect control (as opposed to the direct control under the

Tsars and the Soviets) over the region has been s broken by China, who is now not only a

permanent player in the region, but also quickly amassing the power and influence at the expense

of Moscow to have a greater say in Central Asian affairs than even Russia. China will not

acquiesce to Russian dominance in the region in the long-term.490

This presents a problem also

for views on stability. Russia sees regional stability as stemming from its hegemonic, top-down

imposition of power and control. China sees stability as stemming from a more equitable balance

of power in the region as China sees a level playing field as more in tune with its interests.491

These interests are very zero-sum and cannot be easily reconciled in the long-term.

Chinese energy demands also present a serious issue for Russian interests. China has

attempted to purchase as much equity as possible in many of the hydrocarbon sources in

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia, traditionally, has maintained a near monopoly over the

Central Asian pipelines. China, which seeks to diversify its strategic supplies, also seeks leverage

against Moscow for being the only provider. Russia seeks to keep its grip on China by keeping

China energy-dependent.492

This conflict of interests over energy is only going to intensify as

time passes.

As such, China and Russia are unlikely long-term allies in the region. When there exists a

unifying interest, which is most commonly the threat of increasing US hegemonic influence in

the region, Russia and China can find it in their interests to act on the same proverbial page. That

does not entail the same plan, overt agreement, or a true partnership but merely tacit cooperation.

However, underneath the issues of the US and the ‘Three Evils,’ China and Russia appear to be

490

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 98-102. 491

Lo, Bobo, Ibid., 98-103. 492


Hoyt, David

182

competitors in the mid-long term time frame. As such, outside, and potentially within the SCO,

the interests of these two great powers should theoretically clash and prohibit direct, bold, large-

scale cooperation. It is highly probable that as US involvement in Central Asia diminish with

after US President Obama’s ordered its 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the same time,

there will exist a proportional decline in Sino-Russo relations and coordination in Central Asia.

5.3 - The National Interests of the Central Asian States

Central Asia’s great power actors discussed above, have intersecting global and regional

strategies. Moreover, these superpowers with their significant reserves of political, military, and

economic power, can obtain important strategic interests them deem as important. Uninformed

observers may naively treat the minor Central Asian states as non-entities in the development

of Central Asia’s future. However, unlike the Great Game of the 19th

century, the minor powers

of the Central Asian States cannot be ignored as they now have strategic interests of their own

and the means to pursue them.

Although the Central Asian states’ individual situations and specific goals vary to a

degree, they share certain national strategic interests. The primary strategic goal of all of “the

Central Asian Regimes is to stay in power, and not only their domestic, but also their foreign

policy is dictated by this basic concern.”493

This strategic goal can be bifurcated into two parts.

First, this goal indicates that the regimes’ leaders (i.e. the respective authoritarian governments)

want to remain in power. They do not want to lose control, nor be overthrown, etc. This primal

desire will force them to take seriously issues of separatism, terrorism, and/or radical Islam (as a

493

R. A. Mullerson, Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player In the New Great Game. London: Kegan Paul, 2007. 56

Hoyt, David

183

competing ideology or opposing political force ) much more seriously. This survival need is

congruent with the SCO’s goals of protecting against the Three Evils.

Second, each Central Asian regime wants to remain in control of its own respective

state’s destiny and not surrender its nation’s future to the whims of any super powers involved

in the region. This strategic interest is historically significant in the cultural memory of each of

the Central Asian states. The Central Asian region was historically dominated by regional great

powers, specifically Russia, for well over 100 years. Although they received their independence

in 1991 after the Soviet Union dissolved, today these regimes are again striving to avoid

surrendering their newly won freedoms.494

As a result, each Central Asian state attempts to play

the great powers off of one another through a combination of actions within the SCO and

through bilateral agreements on the side to maximize their geopolitical positions and diminish

any super power’s domination

Unfortunately, the people in the Central Asian nations have somewhat different goals

than those of their respective governments. As these countries’ populace have little collective

political voice, their goals may be closer to desires or mere hopes. “The people of Central Asia,

at least the majority of them, want economic prosperity, personal security, political stability and

wider and deeper freedoms (probably in this and not in any other order).”495

The first three of

these goals are congruent in theory with the various regimes’ goals for their nations. However,

the methodology of how to secure gains in these policy areas may be different between the

people and the regimes. The difficulty for the people of Central Asian states now is how to

reconcile their desires for a more prosperous future with an increase in legally protected human

494

Mullerson, R. A. Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player In the New Great Game. London: Kegan Paul, 2007. 495

Mullerson, Ibid.,.56.

Hoyt, David

184

dignity against the repressive desires of their governments to remain in power. (As discussed in

Chapter IV and once more in Chapter VI,) these contradictory ideas do not usually coincide;

consequently the people of Central Asia suffer under some of the most oppressive political

regimes in the world.

Kazakhstan

Given Kazakhstan’s geographic location bordering Russia, Kazakhstan’s prime national

interest is to maintain its political independence from Russia. “Empires have a bad habit of

surviving their demise.” states a Central Asia proverb. Post-Soviet nations, must now reconcile

old fragments of beliefs with their new nation building thinking. 2002 article p384 Kazakhstan

faces difficulty maintaining internal coherence and integration given its large size vis-à-vis its

small population.496

large size vs small population?? To maintain independence of action and

control over the large Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan’s north, President Nursultan Nazarbaev

transferred the capital from Almaty to Astana and a move that helped revitalize the country.497

However, this strategy does not necessarily minimize the growing Islamist militant movements

that some observers assess as a domestic threat to Kazakhstan’s continued unity.498

Among its fellow Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has grown regional affairs confidently

Kazakhstan, given its size, population, and wealth of natural resources is a potential regional

leader in Central Asia. Unfortunately, this goal places Kazakhstan at odds with Uzbekistan who,

496


Central Asia." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic forecasting.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia accessed May 19, 2013. 497

Rumer, Ibid., 85-6. 498

Stratfor. "The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence: Central Asia Read more: The Next Stage of Russia's

Resurgence: Central Asia." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military strategic

forecasting. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia (accessed May 19, 2013).

Hoyt, David

185

through its more independent foreign policy, seeks the same geopolitical goal.499

In order to gain

regional influence above and beyond the other Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan sought to

spread its influence regional forums, “Astana aspires to the role of a ‘third pillar’ in the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, alongside China and Russia.”500

In doing so, Kazakhstan hopes to be

viewed on par with the regional great powers and thereby more influential than other Central

Asian states.

In pursuing other more complicated foreign policy interests in the region, Kazakhstan

must maintain a careful balancing act. Russian authors hypothesize that Russia considers

Kazakhstan as the most important Central Asian state and wants Kazakhstan to be a successful

multiethnic state with a strong bond with Russia. Kazakhstan in response, although a strong

advocate for the Eurasian Union, is a strong opponent of Russian imperialism and wants

minimize Russia’s control over Kazakhstan also perceives Russia as interested in maintaining

dominance over Kazakh hydrocarbon supplies; the two can be partners together but Kazakhstan

is continuously worried about being the junior partner.501

To improve Kazakhstan’s balancing,

politically, Kazakhstan aligned itself closer to Russia while still maintaining independence. This

realignment is different from Kazakhstan’s economic position where its oil and mineral resource

wealth attracts diverse attention. Kazakhstan, through its energy cooperation, draws a growing

Chinese presence thereby keeping Russia’s presence in the country in check..502

499

Stratfor. "Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan: An Unusual Summit ." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kazakhstan-uzbekistan-unusual-summit accessed

May 20, 2013. 500


Rumer, Ibid., 85-6. 502



http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia (accessed May 19, 2013).

Hoyt, David

186

Kazakhstan, thus far, is achieving the majority of its foreign policy goals. However,

much of Kazakhstan’s success in attainment of its national interests is directly due to the deft

leadership of President Nazarbayev, who has ruled Kazakhstan since it became independent.

Whether Kazakhstan will prosper as well when Nazarbayev eventually passes away is

uncertain.503

Thus continued attainment of these national interests is uncertain.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan’s national interests are dictated heavily by its perpetual unstable domestic

situation. Since independence the nation has been wrought with ethnic uprisings, economic

troubles, unstable governments, and unending corruption. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan’s ability to

pursue its own foreign policy interests is considered by observers, as being more constrained.

Geopolitically, the ethnically divided country has been subject to perpetual internal instability

that has confounded its efforts at foreign policy. Political leaders come from either the north or

the south but remain unable to align with the opposite region.504

Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

and Russia had formed very symbiotic relations. The security threats of 1999 and 2000 described

in Chapter IV demonstrated the Kyrgyz army’s weaknesses and underlying political instability

arising from sectarian tensions. With no alternatives to quash the internal unrest , Kyrgyzstan has

sought Russian technologies, humanitarian aid and economic cooperation. Consequently,

Kyrgyzstan now faces mounting foreign debts; the resolution of these significant external

financial debts is now a high priority for Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan sought third party

arbitrators to calm conflicts with its neighbors, notably Uzbekistan. Russia preyed upon these

503



http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia accessed May 19, 2013 504



http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia accessed May 19, 2013

Hoyt, David

187

needs by gaining leverage as an arbiter for the country’s inexperienced leaders in the capital,

Bishkek. As a result, Russia gained control over numerous strategic enterprises in Kyrgyzstan in

exchange for the resolution of external Kyrgyz debts. This political leverage allowed Russia to

reinitiate economic supply chains that had been interrupted by the fall of the Soviet Union.505

Kyrgyzstan like the other Central Asian states has attempted to play the great powers off

against each other for gain. Bishkek has allowed the different great powers to host bases inside

its territories; today Russia and America have bases that are geographically close and China may

be interested as well. In theory, Kyrgyzstan could use these transit depot deals as a means to play

the three great powers off of one another while simultaneously procuring rents to reduce its

external debt. However, Russia is not pleased with the level of American influence in

Kyrgyzstan and has repeatedly tried to reduce it. Fortunately, Kyrgyzstan has its own water

resources which provide it with significant leverage over its neighboring states whose own water

resources grow w more and more scare.506

However, Kyrgyzstan’s ability to successfully

navigate between great powers may be at an end. Stratfor analysts contend that Russia

masterminded and steered the 2010 Kyrgyz Revolution in which bloody ethnic clashes almost

produced civil war. Russia did supply humanitarian aid and helped stabilize the unrest.

Consequently Kyrgyzstan’s future interests may now have no choice but to be more in step with

Russia’s growing influence in the region.507

505

Ashimbaev, Ibid., 87. 506





Hoyt, David

188

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s national interests, according to Stratfor are largely confined by a mix of its

geography and the political aftermath of the Tajik Civil War 1992-1997. To Tajikistan remains

divisive and the government has limited control over many parts of the country, such as the

Rasht Valley region. Thus Tajik’s government still lacks sufficient the necessary domestic power

to pursue domestic security and stability.508

Tajikistan also, like Kyrgyzstan, has its own water

resources, which are becoming more important for regional strategic interests given Central

Asia’s scarce water supplies. 509

Tajikistan’s geographic location has made it pivotal to regional security interests. At one

time, Russia considered Tajikistan as its own checkpoint on the Afghanistan border. Tajikistan

has now become a gateway to Afghanistan and the first embarkation point in the drug routes that

flow from the Afghan poppy fields.510

Tajikistan must also maintain border security to prevent

any threats and instability from Afghanistan flowing into its territory and thus further

destabilizing the state. However, Tajikistan is not only worried about border security with

Afghanistan but also Uzbekistan presents a security challenge. Given few alternative security

options, Tajikistan depends more on Russia today for security in the face of Uzbekistan as well

as other external security threats. 511

Like all of the other Central Asian states, Tajikistan “Carefully maneuvers among all the

players in the region, including the United States, Iran, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India,

508




Rumer, Ibid., 88-9. 510

Rumer, Ibid., 88-9. 511




Hoyt, David

189

not to mention [its] powerful neighbor Uzbekistan.”512

Tajikistan, recognizing the obvious, has

allowed China to build economic ties. Russia’s increased security influence does not mean that

Tajikistan is completely helpless; the Tajik government has stood up to Russia on multiple issues

including security and economic concessions.513

Finally, and perhaps most importantly,

Tajikistan is the poorest Former Soviet Union state and as such needs funds badly; this vital need

has led Tajikistan to attempt to extract high rents from the Great Powers from its leases of

military and air bases or for access to Afghanistan.514

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is one of most critical states in Central Asia in terms of regional security and

exerts more influence than many of its regional peers. Uzbekistan has significant economic

resources, a relatively strong army, and a favorable geopolitical position. Uzbekistan views itself

as the regional actor that should have the greatest geopolitical influence over the other Central

Asian States.515

Recent Stratfor intelligence also affirms that Uzbekistan’s primary foreign policy

goal is to pursue regional hegemony. One example of Uzbekistan’s foreign policyis it

coordinated effort to exercise more control over the periphery areas of its neighbors who have

large Uzbek minority populations such as southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan.516

512

Rumer, Ibid., 88-9. 513




"Russia, Tajikistan: Moscow Sends Dushanbe a Message." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-tajikistan-moscow-sends-

dushanbe-message accessed May 19, 2013 515





Hoyt, David

190

In order to achieve any semblance of regional hegemony, however; Uzbekistan takes a

more independent stance toward Russia and other regional organizations in order to protect its

freedom of action.517

This defiance causes the nation to be rather prickly over its sovereign

status. Throughout the 1990s, Uzbekistan pushed back against Russia’s influence in Uzbekistan

affairs and in 2002 aligned closer to the United States . In 2005 in the wake of the Color

Revolutions and US call for investigations into the ‘Anjian Massacre’, Uzbekistan pivoted away

from the US and back toward Russia’s sphere. However, this decision had nothing to do with

Russia being special, “Had Putin rejected the [Uzbekistan President Islaam] Karimov plea, the

Uzbek leader would have aligned his country with China.”518

Uzbekistan also sees Kazakhstan as

a regional competitor and this competition and lack of enmity permeates the meager bilateral

relationship.519

Thus, Uzbekistan performs a careful balancing act between the great powers in a

mercenary fashion in order to maintain its freedom of action. This may also explain why

Uzbekistan often contributes less frequently to regional SCO exercises.

. Uzbekistan’s national security is also vital for the region as a whole. Uzbekistan’s

primary concern is the spillover of militants from Afghanistan and any outflow of indigenous

Islamist (or secular) militancy.520

Russia views Uzbekistan as “the linchpin of regional stability.

As a front-line state in the battle against religious extremism, it is very vulnerable.” Russia, and

perhaps the other Central Asian states, believes that should Uzbekistan fall to radical Islam the

entire region would fall over in time, as well, and threaten even Russia through its underbelly of

517

Ashimbaev, Ibid.,82-83. 518

Rumer, Ibid., 86-8. 519

"Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan: An Unusual Summit ." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kazakhstan-uzbekistan-unusual-summit ccessed May

20, 2013. 520



http://www.,.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia accessed May 19, 2013.

Hoyt, David

191

Kazakhstan. Karimov, while perhaps not caring about the region as a whole, definitely takes this

mandate of preventing perceived Islamists from gaining a foothold in his country.. Thus, despite

Karimov’s well-known brutality, countries such as Russia believe “a strong regime in

Tashkent…is a bulwark against militant Islam.”521

Uzbekistan also uses economic interests to enhance its domestic power while balancing

out its relations with the great powers. Uzbekistan has geo-economic synergies which it can

leverage with Russia. The two share geographically close markets and centers of production

though trade and economic cooperation remain low.522

Uzbekistan is willing to partner e with the

US in order to maintain freedom from Russia in the form of base agreements. As such, the

Tashkent administration does not fear US involvement in the region except when the US applies

political pressure on the Karimov regime such as in the wake of the Anjian Massacre. To balance

out Russia’s interest in subduing Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan has invited additional Chinese

investment in energy. Finally, Karimov has governed the state since its inception. Eventually he

will be replaced and unclear succession plans lend an air of doubt and potential instability to

Uzbekistan’s future.523

5.4 - How Strategic Interests Play Out Within the SCO

Analyzing the national interests of the SCO Member States highlights a large range of

divergent and often over-lapping or conflicting interests within Central Asia. These national

interests also play out within the confines of the SCO in very specific ways. The Great Powers

have attempted to use the SCO as a vehicle to accomplish some of their regional goals.

521

Rumer, Ibi. 87. 522





Hoyt, David

192

Meanwhile Uzbekistan, in particular, has used its limited partnership with the organization to

bolster its national interests. This section will examine how the national interests of the SCO

Member States incentivize these countries to act within or through the SCO. The examination

will conclude with an analysis of how national interests function in the SCO’s consensus model

of decision-making.

China – The SCO’s Number One Fan

The SCO facilitates China’s geopolitical power growth, security goals, and economic

progress. These gains are largely related to China’s potentially eminent position in the

organization. According to Bobo Lo, “It is also undeniable that China and, to a lesser extent,

Russia dominate the organization.”524

The SCO enables greater cooperation with Russia in

Central Asia and facilitates an expansion of Chinese power in the region.525

Regarding the

security issues detailed in Chapter IV, China focuses the SCO on combating militant Islam and

the Separatist threats presented by Uighur nationalism.526

Economic growth, through market

expansion, infrastructure improvements and region stability is also an important interest that

Beijing attains through its preeminent role in the SCO.”527

Continuous economic expansion is China’s main motivator, Stratfor notes, as it is

necessary for China to enjoy uninterrupted and unparalleled prosperity at its present pace.

Beijing has steadily pursued this key interest by attempting to bolster the Organization’s

economic institutions. However, this strategy created controversy within the SCO. Beijing

proposed that the SCO include an economic component in its goals. Russia, “opposed China's

524

Bobo Lo, “Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics,” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution Press, 2008), 106. 525

Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics”,(Lanham, Md.: Roman &

Littlefield, 2009),.218. 526

Mankoff, Ibid., 196. 527

Mankoff, ibid., 218-9

Hoyt, David

193

initiatives, however, because Moscow has no interest in allowing Beijing to strengthen its

economic ties to the region.”528

In 2009, China proposed a new economic component that again

Moscow rebuffed. This refusal forced Beijing to create bilateral agreements directly with SCO

Member States and also with the SCO as a mechanism for cooperation; as the SCO continues to

develop its economic goals, China is pushing for an inter-SCO development banking system.

Moscow will now be forced to support this endeavor in order to monitor and influence how

China spends and loans money within the SCO.529

In addition to the banking system idea, trade

is a contentious issue:

The lack of progress over Beijing’s proposals for an SCO ‘free trade zone’

indicates that Russia and the Central Asians are conscious of the challenge

posed by China… A more transparent commercial environment would

accelerate the extension of Chinese influence, undermine Russian interests,

and make the local economies “China-dependent” to an uncomfortable degree.530

Thus, although China attempts to use the SCO to push for further increases in economic

opportunities, development, and trade, the country is only moderately successful. The regional

balance of power weighs heavily in the SCO’s decisions on the issue, inhibiting China’s use of

the organization to maximize its national growth.

Unlike Russia, China is hesitant about further institutionalizing the security goals of the

SCO, especially to counter the United States. “China,” according to Jeffrey Mankoff, a specialist

in Eurasian/Russia Affairs, “made clear its opposition to transforming the SCO into a full-

fledged security organization (in line with Beijing’s commitment to a nonaligned foreign policy

that seeks to avoid confrontation with the West). Consequently, the deterrence capacity of [the

528

"China, Russia: The SCO's Possible Evolution ." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-scos-possible-evolution, accessed May

20, 2013. 529

Ibid. 530

Lo, ibid., 111.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-scos-possible-evolution

Hoyt, David

194

Peace Missions] is not great.”531

Author Bobo Lo agrees with Mankoff, “that none of the

Member-States—not even China, which has been the most enthusiastic supporter of the SCO’s

development—believes that it will evolve anytime soon into an international organization

rivaling NATO”532

Even the normally hawkish Stratfor concurs, “With no desire to confront the

West -- particularly the United States -- on security matters, China sees such a goal [evolving the

SCO into an anti-NATO] as dangerous.”533

Given China’s eminent position in the SCO and its

ability to veto decisions relating to SCO development, it appears extremely unlikely that the

SCO will develop into an Eurasian version of NATO or similar collective security institution.

The SCO is vital for Chinese regional interests, and Beijing’s support is vital for the

continued evolution of the SCO. As scholar Lo explains:

It is Beijing, not Moscow, that has been the driving force behind [SCO] evolution into

‘the most important multilateral organization in Central Asia.’ The growth of the SCO is

inextricably linked to China’s re-entry as a major player in the region, at once

legitimizing and reinforcing its involvement. As a multilateral institution that emphasizes

the ‘democracy of international relations’ and ‘an inclusive environment for cooperation,’

the SCO enables Beijing to do what might otherwise be unpalatable and unachievable.534

Thus, Beijing’s interests vis-à-vis the organization and its formation are key, and China, as the

initial proponent of the cooperation that spawned the Shanghai Five, merits the first look of the

six nations in examining the direction of the SCO. Regardless of competition from Russia, it is

China’s influence that is driving the SCO forward, compelling progress that is only slowed

because of the consensus norm and China’s naturally conservative foreign policy.

Russia – Stopping China through Cooperation

531

Mankoff, ibid., 221 532

Lo, ibid., 108. 533

Stratfor. "China, Russia: The SCO's Possible Evolution ." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political,

and military strategic forecasting. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-scos-possible-evolution (accessed

May 20, 2013). 534

Lo, Ibid., P 112.

Hoyt, David

195

Russia views China as the lead figure in the SCO. According to Dimitri Trenin, Director

of the Carnegie Moscow Center for International Peace, “Originally, the SCO could well be

dubbed ‘China in Central Asia.’”535

The early years of the SCO’s development definitely

supported this conclusion: “With its headquarters in Beijing, and its [initial] secretary general a

Chinese national, the SCO marks China’s comeback in Central Asia.”536

But Trenin concedes

that its purpose has expanded with its Members’ geographical scopes.

The SCO allows Russia to maintain its presence in Central Asia. First and most

importantly, Russia has used the SCO to great effect to ameliorate its relationship with China. At

the same time as the SCO decreases tensions, it affords Russia another tool to maintain its

influence in the former Soviet Union and to “keep an eye on Beijing’s activities in the region.”537

While Russia works with China through the SCO, it also attempts to weaken Chinese influence:

Moscow has supported the expansion of the SCO: Iran, India and Pakistan that have

observer status in the SCO have applied to become full members. The expansion of the

SCO’s membership is seen in Moscow as a way to dilute Chinese influence and boost

Moscow’s role, but the acceptance of new members has been vetoed by Beijing.538

Thus Moscow understands the power of turning the SCO into a larger ‘talk shop’ in order to

prevent China from monopolizing the organization and using it as a vehicle to increase its

regional influence at Russia’s expense.

Despite initial reservations surrounding China’s involvement in the region, Russians are

not necessarily opposed to the SCO, “At least in potential, some Russians believe, the SCO

535

Eugene B. Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao. “Central Asia: Views From Washington, Moscow, and


Ibid. 90. 537

Mankoff, Ibid.,196. 538

Pavel Felgenhauer, "SCO Fails to Turn Into an “Eastern NATO.” The Jamestown Foundation,

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38055, accessed May 27, 2013.

Hoyt, David

196

could become an alternative to the US led international community.”539

According to Mankoff,

“Some Russian thinkers in particular have advocated using the SCO as a kind of replacement for

the old Warsaw Pact, that is, as a kind of geopolitical counterweight against the US and a NATO

that has increasingly committed itself to conducting out-of-area operations and drawing Russia’s

neighbors into its orbit.”540

The Jamestown Foundation agrees with Mankoff’s opinion

commenting, “During the ten years of the SCO, Russia has been unsuccessfully trying to

transform it into an ‘eastern NATO’ – a continental military and political alliance aimed

primarily to oppose Western (US) influence.”541

Stratfor echoes the opinions of the Jamestown

Foundation, “Moscow wants the SCO to become a political and security alliance that could

eventually rival NATO in terms of organization, clout and capability -- or at least to appear

comparable to NATO.”542

However, given the resistance by China on this issue (mentioned

above), it is unlikely that this Russian interest will come to fruition.

However according to some, Russia in reality prevents the SCO from evolving. Trenin

states that, “As a co-leader of the SCO, Russia has resisted the securitization of the

organization.”543

The reason given for this observation is Russia’s continued investment in its

own regional organization, the CSTO. “The two organizations,” poses Trenin, “have a nearly

overlapping membership, with one major exception: the CSTO does not include China.”544

The

problem is that:

539


Mankoff, Ibid.,196-97. 541

Felgenhauer,Ibid. 542

"China, Russia: The SCO's Possible Evolution." Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-scos-possible-evolution (accessed May

20, 2013). 543


Rumer, Ibid. 95.

Hoyt, David

197

Russian claims to regional leadership, however, are more seriously challenged by the

SCO: assigning it a security role would probably render the CSTO redundant. Some,

however, support ‘combing the capabilities of the CSTO and the SCO’ in order to

‘strengthen multi-polarity.’ But others reject that strategy and point to ‘important

differences’ between the two bodies. Confining the SCO to the economic development

area, however runs the risk of undermining the EAEC.545

Mankoff argues in contrast that:

Russia continues to express interest in a broadening of the SCO’s responsibilities in the

security sphere (and has even raised the possibility of India’s participation in future

military exercises)…The SCO’s main contribution to security lies in its ability to address

a variety of more local security threats.546

Mankoff’s research emphasizes the Russian preference for the CSTO but is derived because,

“Russia’s uncertainty about Chinese intentions led many Russian officials to view the CSTO, of

which China is not a member, as a better vehicle for promoting the integration of Central Asia

into a Russian-led security architecture.”547

Bobo Lo’s analysis bridges the contradicting academic hypotheses of Trenin and

Mankoff:

Although the notion of a distinct CSTO military capability is a fiction, it has encouraged

Moscow to promote a military agenda within the SCO and in Central Asia more broadly,

since this is one sphere where Russia will continue to enjoy a considerable advantage

over China. The proposal to conduct “Peace Mission 2007” under combined SCO/CSTO

auspices was a transparent bid to reassert a leadership role and put the Chinese back in

their place.548

Lo also agrees with Trenin that the CSTO and SCO serve identical purposes for the two great

powers and that each great power is likely to pour more effort into their respective institution.549

Stratfor agrees with the above sentiments.550

545

Rumer, Ibid..100. 546

Mankoff, Ibid. 221. 547

Mankoff, Ibid.,221. 548

Lo, Ibid. 112-13. 549

Lo, Ibid., 113.

Hoyt, David

198

Russia’s unsettled relationship with the SCO clearly derives from China’s competitive

presence. Russia pursues foreign policies that favor anti-Americanism, potentially more

securitization, and political domination; it cannot achieve these goals because of China. But if it

is not in the organization, it grants China free reign to pursue its own regional goals. Mankoff

accurately summarizes Russia’s dilemma, “Compared with the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic

Association (EAEC), and the CIS, Russia’s influence in the SCO is relatively limited; as a result,

Moscow’s approach has emphasized using the SCO to preserve its existing influence and provide

a channel through which to shape Chinese thinking.”551

For Russia, even if the SCO will not be

the platform for it to obtain its primary goal of politically dominating Central Asia, the

organization is too important not to be a Member. Furthermore, the SCO is a convenient stage on

which to bandwagon against American influence and Western norms. Thus, the conflict in

interests between China and Russia will continually stonewall the SCO’s actions because of its

consensus decision-making requirement.

Uzbekistan and Ambivalence toward the SCO

Uzbekistan’s strategy, in terms of commitment to the SCO, is to achieve its national

interests by being only marginally involved. Uzbekistan desires regional hegemony, as does

Kazakhstan, over the other Central Asian Republics, but logically it recognizes that the two

neighboring great powers have a better chance of achieving this political domination. As a result,

Uzbekistan practices a very independent foreign policy, even though it is an SCO Member State.

Uzbekistan’s ambivalence is unusual—it was the last nation admitted as a Member but continues

to vacillate in its support of SCO activities. Tashkent hosts RATS and SCO heads of state

550


military strategic forecasting. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-scos-possible-evolution (accessed May

20, 2013). 551

Mankoff, Ibid.,219.

Hoyt, David

199

summits, indicating a willingness to remain a part of the SCO. However, Uzbekistan participates

infrequently in SCO regional Peace Missions. Curiously, the first year Uzbekistan participated in

an exercise was in 2006 when it hosted the SCO sponsored East Anti-Terror 2006 exercise. In

2007 and 2009, it only contributed staff observers to Peace Missions, and it was noticeably

absent in 2010 and 2012. Although Uzbekistan’s parliament ratified the SCO’s 2007 agreement

to cooperate on security exercises, Kazakhstan Today reported that Tashkent’s participation has

been limited because of national legislation that prohibits sending military contingents to other

countries.552

As such, Uzbekistan appears to be contributing the bare minimum to the SCO.

Uzbekistan’s actions can be explained based upon global context and a multi-vector

foreign policy. In 2005 and 2006, due to Tashkent’s severe response to the Andijan riots and

Karimov’s brutal crackdown on opposition, relations soured between Washington and Tashkent.

Now, as the US influence in the region has diminished in preparation for its 2014 departure from

Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is becoming more independent from Russia and China’s sphere of

influence and, in fact, has stopped participating in many of the SCO actions. Uzbekistan’s

vacillation among superpower spheres demonstrates how the country, like all of the Central

Asian Republics, uses its SCO membership to balance the great powers. For example, as

Washington becomes a less involved player in the region (given geographical distance)

Uzbekistan leans toward the US to balance out Russia and China. If the West attempts to change

Uzbekistan’s domestic policies or if Uzbekistan feels alienated from the US, it will align closer

to the SCO great powers.

552

Julie Boland,. "Learning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 'Peace Mission-2010' Exercise." The

Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution, 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 18 Mar. 2013.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/10/29-asia-war-games-boland>.

Hoyt, David

200

Uzbekistan evades many of the larger military/security exercises potentially to avoid

institutionalizing cooperation. Yet the country, despite its ambivalence, now has geographic

control over the RATS headquarters. It can also steer the SCO’s decision-making process

because the organization requires unanimity to approve all decisions. Thus, this country can veto

or at least abstain from all decisions that are not in its interests while being privy to the secret

deliberations of the other Member States. Uzbekistan maximizes its interests by being within the

organization but doing nothing, therefore guiding a slow, weak development for the SCO that

will bind Russia and China from taking control over the region without inhibiting Uzbekistan’s

actions. Uzbekistan is to a lesser degree an accurate representation of the other Central Asian

Republics and their multi-vector foreign policy.

Prospects for Decision-Making and Analysis

The consensus norm of SCO decision-making places the organization in a difficult spot

from the get-go, but this does not mean that this process relegates the SCO to the ash heap of

history. On the positive side, authors such as Bobo Lo state that despite these difficulties, “Today

the SCO is a genuinely multilateral organization, even if some member-states are more equal

than others. The weakest, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, can make themselves heard.” 553

Thus

because of the consensus norm, SCO Member States that would otherwise get lost in the

diplomatic shuffle, are actually players in making the organization legitimate. Bobo Lo also

believes that the common interests of all of the Member States, such as stability, combating the

553

Lo, Ibid., 107.

Hoyt, David

201

Three Evils, and other goals, mean existing overlapping interests will incentivize the SCO to

continue its developments.554

Yet outside these convenient issues, the SCO runs into difficulties precisely because of

the divergent interests of its member states. The more difficult the topic, the less likely a

consensus can be achieved, especially if a firm commitment is required on the issue.555

Lo

describes how the lack of progress on many pressing yet contentious issues “highlights the

SCO’s limitations as a would-be bloc. Not only have member-states rejected the principle of bloc

politics, but they have demonstrated no capacity to act as one.”556

Instead Lo presciently

describes why the SCO has had limited progress:

Thus far the relative unity and cohesiveness of the SCO have been preserved through

self-moderation, whereby all members, China and Russia included, recognize implicitly

that they cannot overtax the capacities of the organization …it is more probable that its

expansion—qualitative and quantitative—will generate increasing internal tensions. A

radicalized agenda would jeopardize the unity that has been its greatest asset so far, not to

mention undermine the SCO’s wider legitimacy as an ‘organization of a new type’

supporting international peace and stability.557

Although Bo attributes this stifled progress to the germ that binds the SCO together, it does

invite skepticism and dismissal from many observers. Mankoff derisively concludes that this

failure to bridge the consensuses of Members’ national interests results in a SCO “that …

remains less than the sum of its parts.”558

The greatest challenge to SCO decision-making remains the Sino-Russian relationship.

These powerful nations, both within and outside the SCO, act fully on strategies geared toward

achieving realist national interests. However, it is the competition for regional influence that

554

Lo, Ibid., 109. 555

Lo, Ibid , 109. 556

Lo, Ibid., 109. 557

Lo, Ibid., 110. 558

Mankoff, Ibid., 223.

Hoyt, David

202

scholars contend will alienate them.559

Lo proposes that this perpetual tug-of-war is “one of the

principal reasons the organization is unlikely to become a major security player in the

foreseeable future.”560

In fact, he presents a difficult developmental paradox for the SCO based

upon this dysfunctional relationship:

The more the SCO grows in importance, the greater the potential for Sino-Russian rivalry

to emerge. As long as the organization remains a relative sideshow, Moscow and Beijing

will be careful to manage their reservations about each other. But if a leadership role

within the SCO becomes synonymous with a broader influence in Central Asia, such self-

restraint will come under increasing strain. The changing balance in the bilateral

relationship could spill over and the SCO could become a forum for great power

competition. For the time being, however, the organization serves to reinforce the

bilateral partnership.561

This paradox places a potential limit on SCO development based upon the competing interests of

Russia and China and the need for the two to maintain cordial relations. Thus, the veto power

they each have, as well as their abilities to work bilaterally with the other states, implies that the

Great Powers of the SCO have already and will continue to have national interests that

incentivize them to utilize the decision-making consensus norm to inhibit the SCO’s future

development.

The Sino-Russian relationship will continue to crumble over time. As America withdraws

from the region, the major point of cooperation between the two powers will erode. In the short-

term, the tensions between Beijing and Moscow will be limited.562

However as time passes,

China’s rise seems likely to continue; this will threaten Russia progressively more. Russia will

559


military strategic forecasting. http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-scos-possible-evolution (accessed May

20, 2013). 560

Mankoff, Ibid.,196-97. 561

Lo, Ibid, 110. 562

Lo, Ibid., 110.

Hoyt, David

203

have to resist the growing Chinese influence or else be displaced.563

Lo states that, “These

circumstances mean that Russia and China will inevitably compete with each other. In a manner

of speaking, they are two powers divided by a common purpose—to be the leading power in the

region… Strategic divergence seems more probable than strategic convergence.”564

Both

Moscow and Beijing will need to gain influence over the smaller Central Asian Republics.

However, this need for alignment gives the Central Asian Members States potentially more

control, as they “will look to exploit this rivalry to maximize their freedom of action. The result

will be an increasingly tense regional environment.”565

5.5 - Conclusion

The prospects for mid- to long-term coordination amongst the SCO Member States seem

low. The States will work together best when presented with external stimuli, especially threats.

Many of the easy points of cooperation over overlapping national interests have already been

explored and are best described in Chapter IV’s combating the Three Evils and Chapter VI’s

Shanghai Spirit sections. The Central Asian States do not wish to be dominated and will push for

Russia and China to continue to be at loggerheads; however it will be interesting to see if rising

tensions between these two powers will force the Central Asian States to change their tactics.

With the US withdrawing from the region, Russia and China have less of a reason to cooperate

against a common foe, which will lower the ability for the SCO to find consensus. The large

inflection point will be after the US leaves; what happens in Afghanistan? If the Taliban threat

returns in force, the SCO will have an opportunity to refocus on a new external threat and use

563

Lo, Ibid., 111. 564

Lo, Ibid., 114. 565

Lo, Ibid., 114.

Hoyt, David

204

that accompanying fear to push for further collaboration. Failing that, the SCO will continue to

slowly develop, impeded by its method of decision-making.

The consensus decision-making has allowed the SCO great progress thus far, however,

and should not be overly maligned. By providing a gradualist approach, the organization

institutionalized cooperation amongst many states that would otherwise fear one another, has

fostered strong bilateral relationships and increased trust, and it has allowed an organization to

form and grow that 30 years ago would have been inconceivable. Thus, although the consensus

form of decision-making means that the SCO is unlikely to be able to create any radical new

developments on controversial issues; the gradualist approach promoted by the consensus norm

does offer the political space for greater developments within the SCO. As the Central Asian

States go through their regime changes in the upcoming years (the leaders are old and physically

cannot possibly survive much longer), it will be important to monitor how the consensus

potentially changes within the SCO. The SCO will most likely not develop in an unpredictable

fashion, but it should continue to develop unless Sino-Russian tensions put a halt to the

organization.

Hoyt, David

205

CHAPTER VI: The SCO vs. the West –

Is the SCO Anti-America?

One question constantly raised with regards to the SCO is, ‘Does this organization

represent a threat to US interests?’ Some SCO skeptics, conservative critics, and hawkish blogs

look askance at the SCO with fear and suspicion. Journalist articles will consistently raise

rhetorical questions about the ‘malign intents of the SCO’ or the ‘threat the SCO represents to

NATO. A cursory search on Google for ‘NATO’s Evil Twin’ will include links to websites

discussing the SCO. But even balanced sources raise these questions. For example, an internet

newspaper titled Global Politician published a piece on the SCO in response to the Astana

Declaration and Peace Mission 2005566

. As hawkish as the article reads, the journalist’s final

thoughts best summarize his opinion of the SCO, “The simple truth is that the SCO is a

mechanism for China, Russia and Iran to increase their collective power under the guise of

‘friendship, peace and security.’ If successful, such an organization will not only become a

regional threat, but also a threat to world peace.”567

This uncertainty about the SCO’s intent

stems from its Membership. With lingering Cold War worries about Russia, fear of a ‘Rising

China,’ and apprehension over the Iranian nuclear program mixed with a dismal understanding

of Central Asia and the War on Terror, it is highly probable that mistrust is the first emotion

many Americans feel when encountering the SCO.

566

The Astana Declaration is a jointstatement signed by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan at SCO 2005

Summit demanding the US withdraw its military from Central Asia 567

Frederick Stakelbeck, Jr., "The Kings of Asia are Gathering: But Why?", Global Politician: News, Interviews,

Opinions and Analysis, http://www.globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=1066, accessed May 13, 2013.

http://www.globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=1066

Hoyt, David

206

This Chapter explores these fears about the SCOs intentions to ascertain if they are valid.

The SCO presents two conceivable threats to US interests: first a conventional military threat and

second a normative threat. Analyzing the feasibility of the conventional military threat involves

exploring the SCO joint military exercises including the large scale ‘Peace Missions.’ SCO

Peace Missions represent the only conceivable conventional military threat to the US, NATO,

and/or the West in general as these missions involve the multinational coordination on a grand

scale of multiple land, air, and sea units that involve thousands of armed forces across different

cultures, languages and military backgrounds. Each joint operation conducted by the SCO will

be examined to better ascertain the SCO’s assessment of an array of security threat scenarios the

SCO considers important enough to simulate. The general development of the scale and scope is

important to discover. The internal dynamics of these missions including the interactions among

participants, rationales for mission objectives, and post-mission evaluations by the various SCO

Member States are also useful to answer these questions about the SCO’s “true” intentions.

Second the potential normative threat of the SCO will be assessed by examining the

Shanghai Spirit. This section relies on a study by Thomas Ambrosio and an analysis of the

founding documents of the SCO to Compare how the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ and the SCO’s normative

culture compares and relates to Western foreign policy goals of democracy. A better

understanding of these two potential threats will help answer the question of whether the SCO

represents a geopolitical counterweight to the US in Central Asia.

Hoyt, David

207

6.1 SCO Joint Operations and Peace Missions

The SCO joint operations Peace Missions represent multinational coordination against

perceived security threats. As stated in Chapter III, most Peace Missions involve at least one

great power, thousands of troops, a degree of coordinated support across multiple war theaters

(i.e. land, air, and sometimes sea) with the end goal being to combat one or more of the ‘Three

Evils.’ Member States benefit from these exercises not only by holding live field practice with

weapons and tactics, but also by developing coordination with Member states’ leadership on

military strategies of planning, commanding and control, and logistics.568

These joint operations

began in 2002 and occur on a semi-regular basis; broadening in scope and sophistication with

each next generation mission. Also, these missions effectively demonstrate resolve and power to

the world and to militant groups that may pose a security threat to the SCO Members States. In

2011 Human Rights in China (HRIC) issued a white paper stating that “these exercises have,

among other things, served to communicate a strong rhetorical message to international

audiences that the SCO is prepared to meet ‘terrorist’ threats with full, united force.”569

In practice, the goals of the SCO Peace Missions’ are designed to target ‘Three Evil’

threats within Central Asia. However, this is not always the case, “Other SCO members have

used the Peace Mission exercises to demonstrate capabilities difficult to characterize as

568





“Counter Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Human Rights

In China, March 2011, < http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-

Whitepaper.pdf>, 331.



http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-Whitepaper.pdf


Hoyt, David

208

counterterrorist-related.”570

For example, Peace Missions 2005 and 2011 took place in the Far

East, much closer to (and within) the Pacific Ocean – clearly not a locale that borders four of the

six SCO Members States. Given this discrepancy between articulated intent and actions taken,

the most efficient way of uncovering what the joint exercises and Peace Missions demonstrate

about the evolution of the SCO’s intentions and capabilities is to examine them chronologically.

This study has attempted to analyze these joint operations based upon available data; however,

that data set is noticeably incomplete.

Exercise – 01

The first ever bilateral SCO anti-terror exercise was conducted October 10-11, 2002, at

the border between China-Kyrgyzstan in the Pamir-Alay Mountain range and staged in part in

Xinjiang. China and Kyrgyzstan operated the mission jointly while the other four Member States

observed. The operation’s intentions were to demonstrate and implement the SCO’s charter goal

of fighting the Three Evils and to build experience in jointly repelling transnational terrorist

incursions. The operation included hundreds of troops as well as helicopters, armored vehicles,

and border defense units.571

Oh note, this exercise was the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)

first ever joint military maneuver with a foreign military.

Coalition 2003

Coalition 2003 was conducted on August 6-12, 2003 at the border in Yili and Xinjiang,

China and Ucharal, Kazakhstan. Five of the six SCO Member States participated with the

570

Julie Boland, "Learning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 'Peace Mission-2010' Exercise." The

Brookings Institution, The Brookings Institution, 29 Oct. 2010, Web. 18 Mar. 2013,

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/10/29-asia-war-games-boland>. 571

“Counter Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Human Rights





Hoyt, David

209

exception of Uzbekistan; beginning a trend of Uzbekistan refusing to join its fellow SCO

Member States in these missions. The exercise was conducted to demonstrate that the SCO

Member States were united in combating the Three Evils. 1,300 total troops were committed

under a joint command of officers from the participating Member States. The Chinese, in

particular, contributed the bulk of the forces (700 troops) and supported the infantry with

mechanized transports, tanks, artillery, helicopters, and special forces units. Coalition 2003 was

conducted in two phases. Phase One, held in Kazakhstan, involved exercises that eliminated

terrorists across the borders and stopped hijackers who held a passenger plane. Phase Two,

conducted in China, involved hostage rescue and the destruction of terrorist camps. Notably, this

was both the SCO and China’s first experience in multilateral military maneuvers.572

N/A - 2004

To this study’s knowledge the SCO did not conduct any major joint exercises in 2004.

Peace Mission 2005

On August 18-25, under the SCO framework, Russia and China conducted Peace Mission

2005 in the Far East near the Shandong Peninsula, China and Vladivostok, Russia.573

The other

SCO Member States sent observers to watch the events.574

Russia sent a substantial naval

contingent from its Pacific fleet and Russian strategic bombers. Peace Mission 2005 objective

was “to simulate a major amphibious landing on a beachhead in the Jiaodong [Shangdong]

572



Whitepaper.pdf>, 331. 573

Ibid., 332. 574

Richard Weitz, "Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s Character”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute




http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5565

Hoyt, David

210

peninsula.”575

The mission hypothetically simulated an international terrorists or Separatist

conflict requiring intervention to promote regional stability. Russian bombers, under cover of

fighter support, staged an air landing near Qingdao City. The air cover was conspicuously armed

with missiles to target naval targets.576

The forces cost 5 million dollars and were far in excess of

the previous exercises. The Peace Mission involved approximately 9,800 troops (with China

contributing 8,000 to Russia’s 1,800), 140 naval ships and submarines, four Chinese cargo jets,

Russian bombers, missile destroyers, airborne warning and control system aircrafts including

anti-naval cruise missiles.577

It is hard to conceive of a ‘Three Evil’ threat that would require this

arrangement of forces to combat.

The Jamestown Foundation reports that although this Peace Mission was nominally

poised against the threat of Separatism, it was actually intended for other audiences. “As experts

noted, this exercise sent Japan (and by implication the United States) a message regarding

Russia’s and China’s capability to defend their interests in the Korean peninsula against both

allies, and second, in China’s case, its capability to defend itself against Japan in any territorial

disputes.”578

The Jamestown Foundation analysis is supported by Dr. Robert Sutter579

who

comments that:

Reflecting some revival of anti-U.S. emphasis…the SCO military exercise of August

2005…had little to do with traditional SCO concerns about border security and

575

Stephen Blank, "The Jamestown Foundation: Peace-Mission 2009: A Military Scenario Beyond Central Asia,"

The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/

chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35433&cHash=34ba0dd177, accessed May 12, 2013. 576






Whitepaper.pdf> , .332. 578

Blank, Ibid. 579

Dr. Robert Sutter is Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/




Hoyt, David

211

antiterrorism; they were focused instead on a show of force in waters east of China that

appeared directed at Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.580

Curiously, this event does not truly link into the SCO’s mandate of combating the Three Evils:

the geographic location was inappropriate because most of the SCO States are land-locked, the

scale involved was overwhelming, and the represented target unclear. Instead this exercise

represented China and Russia plans to build joint military capacity in the event of foreign

intervention in the Far East. This theme will be reassessed in the final analysis as Peace Mission

2005 is not an anomaly.

Vostok Anti-terror / East Anti-terror 2006

For the first time all six SCO Member States participated in the Vostok/East Anti-Terror

exercise held March 2-5, 2006, in Ulugbek and Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The exercise focused on

preventing terrorist groups from taking hostages and from damaging critical state infrastructure

and government facilities. All six SCO States committed troops, as well as special forces and law

enforcement bodies. RATS ran the exercise which was a simulated attack against the Uzbek

Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Physics which owns a nuclear reactor. Special forces’

units were specifically trained for a hostage situation at the location.581

Importantly, Uzbekistan not only chose to participate in the multinational exercise, but

also hosted the operation.582

Uzbekistan’s actions in drawing closer to the SCO in 2006 probably

stem from the diplomatic fall-out with the West in the wake US condemnation of the Andijan

Massacre and Uzbekistan’s subsequent pivot toward Russia and China. Hosting this exercise was

580

Robert G. Sutter, “Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War,” 2nd ed., (Lanham, Md.:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 260. 581



Whitepaper.pdf> , 332. 582Weitz, "Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s Character”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst,

http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5565, accessed May 27, 2013.




Hoyt, David

212

a means for Uzbekistan to signal the US that it was drawing closer to the SCO in defense its

political independence and to signify displeasure with Washington’s democratic agenda. Thus,

unlike the other Central Asian Republics who consistently attend these multilateral movements,

Uzbekistan calculates its attendance as an international message.

Tianshan – 1 2006

Tianshan-1 mission featured law enforcement and special forces, as opposed to military

units. The exercise was conducted by China and Kazakhstan in the Almaty region of Kazakhstan

and Xinjiang of China. The two nations contributed law enforcement and special forces

(including 700 from China with the inclusion of the Xinjiang border police force and the

Xinjiang anti-terror special forces), gunship helicopters, and armored anti-riot vehicles. The goal

of the exercise was to improve cooperation between law enforcement and special forces in

guarding the shared border region. The exercise was conducted in two phases on opposite sides

of the border. The first phase was held in Kazakhstan and the second in China. The second phase

also simulated a conflict between border police and transnational terrorists.583

Coordination 2006

China and Tajikistan conducted Coordination 2006 on September 22-23, 2006 in Kulyab,

Tajikistan. The exercise included over 450 troops with Tajikistan bringing the majority (300

infantry, airborne, and artillery) versus China’s 150 from a reinforced company and People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) helicopters for support. This operation included coordination between

583



Whitepaper.pdf> , 333.



Hoyt, David

213

the theaters of air and land in a mountain warfare exercise that also involved a simulated hostage

rescue operation. This exercise was also poised as a test for the 2007 Peace Mission.584

Peace Mission 2007

On August 9-17 2007, all six SCO Member States participated in Peace Mission 2007.

The multinational military exercise was held in Chelyabinsk, Russia in the Ural Mountains of

Russia as well as in Xinjiang Province. The operation was massive--costing a reported $77

million and dwarfed only by Peace Mission 2005. It included in excess of 6,500 troops

(including 1,600 from China, 2,000 from Russia, 143 from Kazakhstan, 120 from Tajikistan, and

the remainder split between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), mechanized-infantry combat vehicles,

armored personnel carriers, artillery, ground-attack jets, bombers, fighters, helicopters, and

unmanned aerial vehicles. For the first time intact PLA organizational units participated in joint

anti-terrorism military exercise outside of China.585

Russia also used this exercise to showcase

the return of its heavy bomber force to regular patrols.586

However, logistically, Kazakhstan

created difficulties by claiming that there was no legal provision providing for foreign troops to

traverse through its country. Kazakhstan forced Chinese troops to take a 10,000 kilometer detour

around the country to reach the exercise grounds in Chelyabinsk, Russia.587

This demonstrated

that as of 2007 mistrust existed Kazakhstan and other SCO Member States.

584

Ibid.

585 “Counter Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Human Rights


Whitepaper.pdf> , 333. 586


Brookings Institution, The Brookings Institution, 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 18 Mar. 2013,


Ibid.



Hoyt, David

214

Peace Mission 2007 was held to demonstrate that the SCO Member States stood together

to combat the Three Evils and that they desired regional security.588

The exercise’s scenario was

designed so that:

Under the support of an international terrorist organization based in the north border of

Country N, a terrorist organization of Country A launches an anti-government movement.

At the headquarters of the joint drill, commanders from the six SCO members decided to

annihilate the terrorists.589

This first possible scenario that Peace Mission 2007 was simulating was “oriented toward

suppressing a major Islamist insurgency (such as occurred in Chechnya).”590

Given the scale and

coordination of joint theaters of war, this is likely as high levels of coordination would be

necessary to conduct a successful operation against Chechen seperatists.

This scenario, however, may have been modeled around the events that took place in

Andijan, Uzbekistan that led to the Andijan Massacre by the government. This suppression of

terrorists by annihilation indicates tacit approval, on top of the Astana Declaration, for

Uzbekistan’s extreme actions and that the SCO could potentially act in unison to crush a

democratic-styled movement (though it did not do so in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan). The fact that part

of the exercises were held in the less stable Uighur dominated areas of Xinjiang is important as

the exercise sends the message that Separatist actions by Uighur nationalists will be put down,

violently if need be.591

588

Ibid. 589

Xinhua. “SCO Conducts Final Stage of Joint Anti-Terror Drill,” Xinhua, August 17, 2007,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/17/content_6553596.htm. 590

Richard Weitz, "Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s Character”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Analyst, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5565, accessed May 27, 2013. 591



Whitepaper.pdf> , .333.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/17/content_6553596.htm.




Hoyt, David

215

Cooperation 2007

China and Russia conducted Cooperation 2007 on September 4-6, 2007 in Khabarovsk

and Moscow, Russia. The exercise’s central goal was to expand bilateral cooperation and

coordination in combating criminal activities including smuggling and illegal immigration. This

goal was conducted in accordance with SCO principles. China contributed 600 troops including

its “30-member Snow Leopard Commando unit from the 13th Special Brigade of the People’s

Armed Police,”592

in addition to two military transport planes. Russia sent 1,000 troops including

domestic security forces and a special task force unit. This exercise marked the first international

anti-terrorism exercise for the People’s Armed Police outside of China. The final stage of the

exercise also included a hostage rescue exercise at Khabarovsk airport.593

Volgograd Anti-Terror 2008 Exercises

These 2008 Anti-Terror Exercises were held on August 18-September 4, 2008, in the

Volgograd region of Russia among anti-terrorist units of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan. The central objective was to improve the multilateral coordination among SCO

Member States’ anti-terrorism units.594

“Russia’s National Antiterrorist Committee coordinated

the drills and the joint strategic command post exercises were held in accordance with the SCO’s

Cooperation Plan on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism for 2007 to 2009.”595

State

security forces were joined by private security forces throughout the exercises. These Anti-

Terror exercises were broken into two stages. Stage One lasted from August 18-28 and required

592

Ibid. 593




Ibid. 595

Ibid.



Hoyt, David

216

cooperation among the four States in combating domestic subversive and terrorist groups. Stage

Two took place at the Lukoil Volgograd oil refinery. This stage was designed specially to

practice landing operational combat units in a crisis area, conduct a special operations to free

hostages, and neutralize terrorists all while operating in a hazardous facility.596

Norak Anti-Terror 2009

The Norak Anti-Terror exercise was held in the Fakhrabad training grounds of Tajikistan

on April 17-19, 2009. Five of the SCO Member States, sans Uzbekistan, participated in this

exercise that attempted to demonstrate the SCO’s military preparedness to repeal the ‘Three

Evils.’ In addition, these exercises attempted to further improve the joint capacity of the SCO

Member States in anti-terrorist operations as well as to enhance vocational training, combat

training, and exchange experience and practical skills.597

The “exercises demonstrated the work

of the operational headquarters for the counter-terrorist operations, the landing of special forces

in crisis situations, negotiations with terrorists, and the release of ‘hostages.’”598

China, Russia,

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan all contributed operational groups and special armed forces units

while Tajikistan sent members of the Tajik National Guard and the Committee of Emergency

Situations and Civil. These troops were supplemented with armored vehicles, helicopters, and

other aircrafts while the troops tested a multitude of different weapons and ammunition to

increase institutional experience. In the aftermath of the exercise the parties agreed that they

would continue counter-terrorism drills in the future.599

596

Ibid. 597



Whitepaper.pdf>, 335. 598

Ibid. 599

Ibid.



Hoyt, David

217

Peace Mission 2009

Peace Mission 2009 echoed Peace Mission 2005 and once more took place in the Far

East. The five-day joint exercise ran July 22-26, 2009, in Khabarovsk, Russia (located in

Russia’s far East, 30 kilometers from China’s border) and the Shenyang Military Area Command

in Taonan Tactical Training Base and Jilin in Northeast China.600

The stated goal of Peace

Mission 2009 was “to verify operations, plans, and capabilities to respond to unexpected

incidents under the unstable environment of countries and regions.”601

As usual, Peace Mission

2009 also sought to demonstrate the abilities of the SCO States in combating the Three Evils.

Russia and China, the only two participants, each contributed 1,300 troops (for a total of 2,600)

joint forces, tanks, armored personal carriers, self-propelled guns, paratroops, helicopter

gunships, fighter planes, and jet transports – indicating that this was a very serious endeavor.602

However, the number of troops (as opposed to the supporting vehicles) was much less than

previous years.603

The Human Rights In China report translated the Russian comments from the

Deputy Director of RATS and commented that, “the exercises were carried out within the

framework of the SCO and were a ‘logical continuation of Russian-Chinese military exercises

Peace Mission 2005 and Peace Mission 2007.’”604

However the nature of Peace Mission 2009

has led some observers, including Japanese war correspondent Shunji Taoka, a journalist for the

600

Ibid 601







Richard Weitz, ”Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s Character,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Analyst, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5565,accessed May 27, 2013). 604

“Counter Terrorism and Human Rights, Ibid.




Hoyt, David

218

Asahi Shimbun605

that the scope of the operations was well beyond that of any anti-terror

mission.606

In retrospect, the goals for Peace Mission 2009 were perhaps driven by the events during

2009, which was a difficult year geopolitically for SCO member states; not only had there been

massive unrest in Xinjiang following Uighur protests, but also 2009 represented the start of high

levels of North Korean brinksmanship. For an unknown reason, the planning of Peace Mission

2009 was last minute. According to the “Shenyang Military Area and head of the Center for

Commanding and Decision-making for Peace Mission 2009, Senior Colonel Zhang Xudong, his

military command was ordered to prepare for this exercise in February.”607

Zhang commented

that, “due to the late decision to hold the drill, we only had three months to prepare for it."608

The

actions taken in the exercise do not stimulate steps that would be utilized to repress traditional

terrorists:

The supposed terrorists that were targeted in the operation possessed combat

aircrafts…and a major electro-magnetic operation took place, signaling a very intricate,

large-scale, and even atypical counter-terrorist operation. These large-scale conventional

exercises involving combined arms operations against terrorists in an urban setting,

while deploying missiles, air assaults, aerial bombings, air defense forces and ground

attack all point to the fact that these operations could easily be duplicated to scenarios

extending beyond Central Asia.609

Instead another source suggests that, “The recent joint Sino-Russian exercises of 2009 in China’s

Jilin province may be intended to intimidate the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of

605

The Asahi Shimbun is Japan’s second largest national newspaper that purportedly slants liberal to center-left. 606



chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35433&cHash=34ba0dd177, accessed May 12 607

Stephen Blank, "The Jamestown Foundation: Peace-Mission 2009: A Military Scenario Beyond Central Asia ."

The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/

?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35433&cHash=34ba0dd177, accessed May 12, 2013. 608

Ibid. 609

Ibid.


http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/

Hoyt, David

219

Korea].”610

This assessment does resonate with the fact that at the prior SCO summit, “the six

members agreed that Pyongyang’s threats were unacceptable.”611

Opening speeches given by the Russian and Chinese at the start of Peace Mission 2009

also add weight to a North Korean incident being the catalyst. Russian General Nikolai Makarov

“said that, ‘Russia and China should develop military cooperation in the wake of North Korean

missile threats that prompted intensified military preparations in Japan and South Korea.’”612

He

said that this cooperation was necessary in addition to the traditional stomping grounds of the

SCO as well as pushing for the need of “interoperability in command and control of future

common groups of Russian and Chinese troops.”613

Chinese General Chen Bigde remained vague

and did not explicitly support the expressed Russian views and he denied that the exercises were

targeted at a third party. However, Chen’s views are undermined by a statement by Colonel Li

Jiang, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Affairs Office of China’s Ministry of Defense, who stated

under the mandate to make the world multipolar not to not rule out “a situation in which the

armed forces of the two countries receive the order: ‘Not to allow the navies of third countries to

have access to the place of conducting a peacekeeping operation’ will be a scenario of the current

peacekeeping exercises.”614

This statement is reasonably unequivocal for government language

and indicates that the SCO States of Russia and China are building capacity to intervene against

a US-led peace-keeping mission in East Asia. As Central Asia has no naval operations and

Taiwan is of no interest to the Russians, the Korean Peninsula is the most likely intention of this

Peace Mission. Thus, Americans should beware that the SCO is developing the capacity to

610

Ibid. 611

Ibid. 612

Ibid. 613

Stephen Blank, "The Jamestown Foundation: Peace-Mission 2009: A Military Scenario Beyond Central Asia."

The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/

?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35433&cHash=34ba0dd177 (accessed May 12, 2013). 614

Ibid.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/

Hoyt, David

220

intervene on the Korean Peninsula to uphold the interests of Russia and China and if need be,

repel a US led operation.

2010 Law Enforcement Exercise

The 2010 Law Enforcement Exercises were held in Russia’s Saratov Region on August

16-28, 2010, which shares a border with Kazakhstan. The Law Enforcement and special forces

of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan all participated in the exercise. This exercise is unique in

that India, Mongolia, and Pakistan (the majority of the 2010 Observer States) all observed the

exercise. In addition to these Observer States, representatives from the CSTO and the CIS anti-

terror center also attended and observed the exercise. The objective of the 2010 Law

Enforcement Exercises was to promote cooperation between the national antiterrorism centers,

law enforcement organizations, and special forces of the SCO Member States to prevent terrorist

attacks in crowded places. In order to achieve this goal, the exercise included a simulation of an

anti-terrorism operation in a crowded location. Furthermore, this exercise included a meeting of

the leaders of the special forces of the SCO countries.615

Peace Mission 2010

Peace Mission 2010 was conducted September 9-25 and in Kazakhstan at Almaty, Otar,

and the Matybulak air base.616

Once again, Uzbekistan was the only SCO Member State not in

attendance. According to the Central Asian Caucasus Institute Analyst, Uzbekistan had

originally intended to join but apparently “pulled out at that last minute.”617

Peace Mission 2010

615




Ibid., 336 617






Hoyt, David

221

assembled a large and diverse range of forces from the different SCO states. Over 5,000 troops

attended including 1,000+ PLA army and air force soldiers and officers; 1,000+ troops from

Russia; and at least one operational-tactical group from each Member State in attendance. These

ground soldiers were accompanied by an enormous amount of land and air support vehicles

including some 1,600 tanks and armored vehicles, 32 fighter planes, 100 artillery and rocket

batteries, and 25 helicopter gunships. Specifically China sent tanks, armored cars, bombers, and

fighters, while Russia sent 130 armored vehicles of all types, over 100 trucks, more than 10

airplanes including bombers, close air support, and helicopters.618

This exercise featured the first

integration of nighttime maneuvers into a joint SCO exercise.619

Similar to all other joint SCO exercises, Peace Mission 2010 was aimed at demonstrating

the resolve and capacity of the SCO Member States in combating the Three Evils. The exercise

was designed to “test the interoperability of the SCO armed forces in rendering assistance to a

member state involved in an internal armed conflict or subjected to a mass terrorist attack.”620

Furthermore the HRIC report citing a Global Times article (with a broken link if it has not been

removed for political reasons) quoted Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo explaining, “The strategy behind

the SCO anti-terror military drill is to unite countries in Central Asia and help them crack down

on extremists who conduct terrorist activities through international organizations that may pose a

threat to the safety of a legitimate government.”621

Examining the context of the Peace Mission

618



Whitepaper.pdf>, .336. 619


Brookings Institution, The Brookings Institution, 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 18 Mar. 2013,


Ria Novosti, “SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in Kazakhstan,” RIA Novosti, September 9, 2010,

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100909/160523960.html. 621

Fu Wen, “Drills Around China Raise Temp,” Global Times, September 26, 2010,

http://china.globaltimes.cn/chinanews/2010-09/577093.html, (citing statement by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, a senior

researcher at the Chinese Navy’s Equipment Research Center).



http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100909/160523960.html.

http://china.globaltimes.cn/chinanews/2010-09/577093.html

Hoyt, David

222

in 2010, Julie Boland of Brookings commented that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s interests in

Peace Mission 2010 were underscored by recent instability they have faced. Tajikistan suffered

terrorist attacks in the months leading up to the exercise. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, suffered

domestic instability when its president was ousted during the Second Kyrgyzstan Revolution.622

Thus, the Peace Mission may have been a response in how to break a large scale democratic

movement that threatened regime stability. This is seemingly alluded to in the quote above from

Ria Novosti through the language of “internal armed conflict or subjected to a mass terrorist

attack.”623

As the SCO, as per Chapter IV, identifies democratic movements as a Separatist evil

hence stemming from Terrorism, this attack seems geared toward preventing a repeat of the 2010

Kyrgyz Revolution. Furthermore, Admiral Zhuo in his continued remarks on the exercise said,

“Crack down on extremists who conduct terrorist activities through international organizations

that may pose a threat to the safety of a legitimate government”624

is more difficult to interpret

but seems to imply outside states, such as the US, that employ NGOs to promote democracy.

This statement implies that the SCO sanctions suppression of democratic demonstrations and

thereby creating precedent for the SCO to oppress human rights, democracy, and free speech.

Peace Mission 2010 also demonstrated some of the Member States increase in individual

capacity and interconnectedness. China gained much practical experience in these exercises.

China practiced its first cross-border air missions for the PLAAF. China also took advantage of

the opportunity to practice and demonstrate its capacities at mid-air refueling. Indian officials

saw this aspect of the mission as more relevant in the event of a conflict with India. Furthermore,

622

Boland, Ibid. 623

Ria Novosti,“SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in Kazakhstan,” RIA Novosti, September 9, 2010,

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100909/160523960.html. 624

Fu Wen, “Drills Around China Raise Temp,” Global Times, September 26, 2010,

http://china.globaltimes.cn/chinanews/2010-09/577093.html, (citing statement by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, a senior

researcher at the Chinese Navy’s Equipment Research Center).

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100909/160523960.html.

http://china.globaltimes.cn/chinanews/2010-09/577093.html

Hoyt, David

223

Chinese spokesmen talked about the experience of transporting troops and materials in large-

scale movements by rail. As the track gauges between China and Central Asian countries differ,

rail maneuvers require significantly higher logistical challenges. Boland’s analysis of Peace

Mission 2010 and the previously executed exercises is that China does not only pursue economic

opportunities in the region while Russia focuses on security. She states, “This is clearly in error.

While China undoubtedly pursues economic interests in the region, any assessment that it’s not

as interested in the security side of the SCO needs to be revisited.”625

Kazakhstan also demonstrated interesting gains in its ability and willingness to cooperate

and work in a multilateral exercise effectively. Recall how in Peace Mission 2007, Kazakhstan

had not allowed any other SCO Member State to enter its territory with military units. However,

unlike Peace Mission 2007, Kazakhstan permitted thousands of foreign forces on its own borders

thus demonstrating the closer ties that it has built with its neighbors under the auspices of the

SCO.626

This demonstrates the reduction in the trust deficit that plagued Kazakhstan’s limited

cooperation with the SCO in the past. However, Kazakhstan’s willingness to work in a

multilateral fashion differs depending on its partners. In an effort to keep its options open,

Kazakhstan, in addition to hosting Peace Mission 2010, also hosted the NATO Steppe Eagle

2010 Multilateral Peacekeeping exercise in 2006, 2007, 2009, and just a month before the SCO

Peace Mission in 2010. This demonstrates Kazakhstan’s foreign policy prerogative to keeping

multi-channels open.627

Brookings expert Boland’s takeaway from Peace Mission 2010 was that:

625


Brookings Institution, The Brookings Institution, 29 Oct. 2010, Web. 18 Mar. 2013.


Ibid. 627

Boland, Ibid.

Hoyt, David

224

Peace Mission-2010 showed a growing security focused edge to the SCO, but it also

reflected some of the organization’s political and military tensions, which should be

considered as Washington seeks partners in the region. It demonstrated the SCO’s

coherent and continuing concern about the ‘three evils’…something the United States

could build on as it encourages engagement with the region.628

Tianshan–2 2011

Operation Tianshan 2 was held on May 6, 2011, between China, Kyrgyzstan, and

Tajikistan.629

The exercise appears to have been conducted in Kashi, Xinjiang.630

During the

exercise, “the three countries’ security forces conducted joint operations against supposed anti-

PRC terrorists based in the border region.”631

A Chinese military blog, although implying

(incorrectly) that the operation was solely between China and Russia said that TianShan-2

involved the use of the Chinese elite Snow Leopard Commandos. The exercise was “divided into

‘use of force to rescue hostages’ and ‘wipe out fixed-point’ action.”632

The organization purpose

was to build further anti-terrorist combat readiness and capacity between the Member States. In

addition, like all SCO operations, it sought to demonstrate the ability of SCO forces to deter

terrorists from obtaining their goals as well as preparing the organization’s capacity to defend

China’s western border.633

Peace Mission 2012

628

Julie Boland, "Learning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 'Peace Mission-2010' Exercise," The

Brookings Institution,The Brookings Institution, 29 Oct. 2010, Web. 18 Mar. 2013.




ZhaoYan, "SCO "Tianshan 2″ joint anti-terrorism exercise was held in Xinjiang - China Military Report," China

Military Report, http://wuxinghongqi.blogspot.com/2011/05/sco-tianshan-2-joint-anti-terrorism.html, accessed May

26, 2013. 631

Weitz, Ibid. 632

Yan, Ibid. 633

Yan.Ibid.


http://wuxinghongqi.blogspot.com/2011/05/sco-tianshan-2-joint-anti-terrorism.html

Hoyt, David

225

Peace Mission 2012 was held from June 8-14, 2012, in northern Tajikistan at the

Chorukh-Dayron training range. Although Uzbekistan chose not to attend, the other five SCO

Member States contributed a total of 2,000 troops for the exercise. According to Moscow, Peace

Mission 2012 tested new methods of blocking and destroying illegal armed groups. A major

strategic test for the Russian forces, because these specialist forces also belong to the CSTO’s

Rapid Reaction Force, was how to insert into difficult mountain terrain.634

Although Peace Mission 2012 was the smallest Peace Mission since that of 2003, Ci

Guowei, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Ministry of National

Defense who was involved in the planning and organizing of the exercise, stated that, “In his

view ‘The joint military exercise is not a pure military action,’ adding that its main aim was to

build political trust and steadily increase the capability of the SCO to act as a security guarantor

in Central Asia.”635

According to the Jamestown Foundation, Peace Mission 2012 highlighted the differences

between Russia and China. According to exercise observers, “[the] forces they saw were quite

clearly ‘China-led.’ Despite official claims of deferring to the Tajikistani General Staff, or

showing a parity of numbers of personnel between China and Russia, Peace Mission 2012 had a

de facto leader: the PLA.”636

The Jamestown Foundation believed this to be the most important

feature of Peace Mission 2012 and stated that “China’s leadership of the SCO will likely shape

its future security evolution and capabilities.”637

634

Roger McDermott, "China Leads SCO Peace Mission 2012 in Central Asia,"Jamestown.org, The Jamestown

Foundation, 26 June 2012, Web, 18 Mar. 2013.

<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39538>. 635

Ibid. 636

Ibid. 637

Ibid.

Hoyt, David

226

Analysis

This list of joint military exercises conducted by SCO Member States is vitally important

for understanding the SCO, its developing capacity, and the emerging trends relevant for US

policy-makers. A review of these peace keeping/security/military missions reveals the posturing

of the Member States vis-à-vis each other and, more precisely, the great powers during the last

10 years of joint/multilateral maneuvers.

Prior to an analysis, it is important to soothe any fears that these military exercises may

pose a current direct conventional military threat to the US as an anti-NATO or anti-US

organization. An examination of the SCO’s structure and institutional limits reveals that the SCO

as an organization is not set up to function in the capacity of a NATO-esque military alliance.

The SCO’s military exercises are carried out against theoretical internal threats. However,

NATO and/or the US are external threats and are not the threats simulated, “There are no

provisions for member states of the SCO to act collectively against external threats, no unified

command structure exists to coordinate such a response, and there are no mechanisms for the

projection of a joint military action outside the SCO region.”638

Without a binding agreement, the

SCO lacks a mechanism to force any action past its consensus decision-making process. This

decision-making, as shown in Chapter V, makes it highly unlikely that bold military operations

would be taken against the US, especially given Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s multi-vector

diplomacy. These two countries would probably veto or abstain from such a proposal thus

dividing the SCO from the onset. Consequently, the institutional capacity for the SCO to

function as a joint conventional military organization is currently non-existent and these threats

for the near future can and should be retired.

638

Reuel Hanks, “Global Security Watch: Central Asia,” (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), 123.

Hoyt, David

227

The Central Asia Caucuses Institute (CACI), one of the few sources to conduct an

analysis on these joint exercises describes, the impacts of this multinational cooperation. First,

the CACI views the exercises as deterrence against the Three Evils and opposition movements

while improving the capacity and interoperability of the SCO Member States’ militaries, special

forces, and law enforcement through practical experience and the exchange of knowledge. The

military exercises also enhance the SCO Member States knowledge regarding evolving

capabilities one other’s militaries allowing reassurance, confidence, and trust to be built among

the Member States.639

As per discussions in Chapter III, this goal of cooperation links back to the

initial border and security Treaties of 1996 and 1997 executed by the Shanghai Five.

Russia’s continuous support of the missions either jointly or multilaterally with China

demonstrates that “Moscow recognizes China’s legitimate security role in Central Asia”640

as

well as demonstrating to third parties that Russia and China “consider Central Asia as lying

within their overlapping zones of security responsibility.”641

At the same time:

These maneuvers also aim to reassure Central Asian leaders that China and Russia will

help them manage their security challenges. Eurasia’s precarious regional security

situation, combined with the SCO’s failure to intervene in Kyrgyzstan to suppress the

June 2010 riots, alarmed many Central Asians about whether they can confidently rely on

the SCO to protect them against external and domestic security threats.642

Moreover, as the Central Asian Member States rely on Russia and China them the West’s

influence is diminished. Plus the Central Asian governments gain more political room to

maneuver to dodge domination by these Great Powers and to play one power against another.643

639

Richard Weitz,”Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s Character,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute


Ibid. 641

Ibid. 642

Ibid. 643

Richard Weitz,”Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s Character,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute




Hoyt, David

228

CACI also discusses the SCO’s difficulties developing its security arm. Throughout the

SCO’s development, “with low-key Chinese support, Uzbek officials have been leading the

effort to resist expanding the SCO’s military functions.”644

This problem stems from the rivalries

that exist among the Member State governments. Yet consistently, the Uzbekistan government

blocks not only military development, sponsored mainly by Russia, in the SCO, but also in the

CSTO as well.645

The fact that China is perceived, by CACI, as siding with Uzbekistan is

interesting but at odds with China’s military commitments to all of the exercises. Such

convenient posturing by China may reflect China’s determination to block the SCO’s security

evolution on Russian terms.

The 2011 HRIC’s white paper discussing the SCO, agrees with these theories and further

draws out a few important trends regarding the SCO’s joint military exercises for analysis. The

first trend is what they label as ‘Tactics of Joint Intimidation.’ HRIC comments that despite no

threatening nomenclature being expressed in the SCO’s mission proposals:

The stated objectives and geographic locations of the exercises suggest an intention to

target ‘problem’ populations. The exercises send a chilling message: threats deemed

‘terrorist,’ ‘separatist,’ or “extremist” in nature will be met with heavy-handed force. The

climate of fear perpetuated through these joint exercises has the effect of intimidating and

compromising domestic populations…by deterring them from exercising their legitimate

rights, including the exercise of freedoms of association, expression, and religion.646

Second is the use of these operations as events to demonstrate Member States’ increased military

ambition and prowess. The Peace Missions offer notable ‘firsts’ for SCO Member States,

specifically China. Finally, HRIC, having its focus on China issues, construes these missions as

representative of China’s domestic agenda. China was involved in nearly every exercise. Two

644

Weitz, Ibid. 645

Weitz, Ibid. 646


In China, March 2011. < http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-




Hoyt, David

229

exercises were held near North Korea and three partially in Xinjiang, by choice, and perhaps for

the purpose of demonstrating China’s goal of establishing domestic and regional stability

through the SCO.647

This study both agrees and disagrees with the above expert analysis of the trends

exhibited in the SCO’s military exercises. First the discussion points out that the level of

cooperation, trust, reassurance and integration developed by the SCO in 10 years is admirable

and extraordinary. Given the desire each of these nations share for political independence as well

as the historic levels of mistrust they have shown, the fact that they are willing to work together

on this scale-- share tactics, experience, strategies, and overall military capacity-- should not be

underestimated by Western observers. This type of multilevel, multinational event would simply

not transpire without a solid political base of overlapping interests and ever-strengthening

relations. Second, Uzbekistan is an especially interesting study given its lack of participation.

This nation is one of two doubly land-locked countries in the world – meaning it is surrounded

twice by neighboring countries with which Uzbekistan must co-exist. Yet, Uzbekistan only

participated in three missions: 2006, 2007, 2008. And, these three years immediately followed

Andijan Massacre (2005) when Uzbekistan pivoted closer to Russia and, to a lesser degree,

China in order to signal to the West its displeasure with the apparent meddling and censure of the

Bush ’43 regime. Unlike the CACI analysis, this posturing should not be viewed as Uzbekistan

drawing closer to the SCO but rather as Uzbekistan expanding its diplomatic options by pulling

away from Washington.

These SCO joint security/military/peace missions represent an important albeit latent

geopolitical threat to the West, in particular the US. SCO exercises consistently claim the ever-

647

Ibid., 327-28

Hoyt, David

230

present ‘Three Evils’ as their reason for conducting a multinational or joint-exercise. But based

upon the examination of these ‘Three Evils’ –Extremism, Separatism, and Terrorism in Chapter

IV and the nature of simulation conducted, this moniker appears to be thinly stretched.

First, Peace Missions 2005 and 2009 instantly spring to mind as potential threats to

American interests. In these missions, Russia and China built enhanced military cooperation,

coordination, and capacity by working together without the other SCO Member States in Far

East Asia around the Korean Peninsula. This location is clearly not relevant to the SCO’s

geographical purpose of Central Asia but rather to the overall interests of the SCO’s great

powers and the Shanghai Spirit (discussed below). In truth, Russia and China are practicing large

scale interventions of US led peacekeeping forces on either the Korean Peninsula or the Island of

Taiwan.

Second, Peace Mission 2007 likely simulated suppressing a hypothetical democratic

movement with excessive force. Coming on the heels of the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan

(2005) and the Andijan Massacre in Uzbekistan (2005), the SCO was actively building capacity

to curb opposition movements. Such security goals are obviously contrary to US interests in

promoting democracy and condemning blatant planned human rights violations. These practiced

actions are against US interests; the US does not want the spread of democracy obstructed,

innocents to be killed, or on a politico-military level for Russia and China to draw closer and

build capacity to work together especially if it is to stop US actions in east Asia. As these threats

build the capacity to challenge US interests, they represent a clear latent geopolitical threat to

American interests.

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One final puzzle remains related to these joint exercises. In 2010, Kyrgyzstan underwent

a Revolution. According to a report by CACI:

[The] two regional security organizations, the [CSTO] and the [SCO]…proved unable or

unwilling – or both – to intervene in Kyrgyzstan to stabilize its southern region despite

the repeated requests of the Kyrgyz interim government. Russia turned down similar

requests to intervene on a bilateral basis.648

In response to this crisis, “Both organizations invoked the absence of foreign aggression as

justification for the lack of any military and security assistance to Kyrgyzstan.”649

This seems

apparently at odds with Peace Mission 2007’s simulation of readiness to stop a Separatist threat

posed by a domestic movement threatening a regime’s stability. When push came to shove, it

appeared the SCO blinked. This bold refusal of assistance was addressed at the SCO’s June 2011

Summit Meeting. Although Kyrgyz President Rosa Otunbayeva thanked the SCO for its aid to

prevent a humanitarian crisis, “the host – Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was not

impressed: ‘We have seen conflicts and coups in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and our organization

[SCO] failed to do anything.’”650

In reaction to this failure, “Nazarbayev proposed creating a

special SCO consultative body or ‘conference’ to strengthen regional security and ‘take

preventive measures in potential hot spots.’ Unfortunately, the Summit did not create the special

‘conference,’ Nazarbayev proposed.”651

In the aftermath of the 2010 Kyrgyzstan Revolution,

Peace Mission 2010 was a simulation that actually reenacted the Kyrgyz Revolution.

The following Peace Mission in 2012 was much smaller than prior operations. Why? Did

Peace Mission 2010’s large scale exercise indicate that the SCO feels prepared for a future

648

Sergei Gretsky, "A New Security Architecture for Central Asia?”, | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst."

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5514/, accessed May 27, 2013. 649

Ibid. 650

Pavel Felgenhauer, "SCO Fails to Turn Into an “Eastern NATO,” The Jamestown Foundation,

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38055, accessed May 27, 2013. 651

Pavel Felgenhauer, "SCO Fails to Turn Into an “Eastern NATO,” The Jamestown Foundation,

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38055 , accessed May 27, 2013.

http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5514/

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38055

Hoyt, David

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intervention and no additional practice is required? Or, instead does the failure to create a new

SCO body to take preventative measures coupled with low turn-outs in Peace Mission 2012

indicate that Peace Mission 2010 was an after-the-effect show of force to save face and that the

SCO will not intervene in future domestic threats? These questions will prove more relevant in

the future as the Central Asian Republics begin to face regime transition crises given the age of

their respective leaders.

6.2 - The Shanghai Spirit a Threat?

A normative challenge to the US is the second conceivable threat the SCO may present.

Part of the fear that the West holds of the SCO may stem from how the SCO Member States (and

many other affiliated states) represent and advocate a political model and world view that is

absolutely antithetical to that of the US. Each Member State is governed by an authoritarian

regime and several are in the lower ranks on freedom or human rights watch lists.652

Furthermore, the SCO founding documents appear to pay only the barest of lip service to many

of the liberal rights that the West hold as inalienable; these rights appear to be mentioned for the

sake of legitimizing the SCO internationally as opposed to actually preserving these rights for the

citizens of SCO Member States.

This conflict of values between the authoritarian SCO Member States and the democracy

promoting policies of the US came to a head in the wake of the Color Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan

and Uzbekistan. As explained earlier in Chapter IV, Kyrgyzstan’s government was toppled and

Uzbekistan put down its democratic protests with brutal force. The US and the OSCE decried the

severe actions pursued by the Karimov regime. Uzbekistan responded in solidarity with the

652

On the scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being the highest, none of the six SCO Member States (or for that matter, even non-

members) are ranked higher than a 6.0 on Freedom House 2012 Nations in Transit Data democratic progress

analyses. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit

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Astana Declaration demanding the US abandon its Central Asian bases. This string of incidents

raised the notion whether the SCO merely represented an aegis that the SCO regimes used to

counter Western principles of democracy and human rights while strengthening their

authoritarian rule.

Thomas Ambrosio, Associate Professor at North Dakota State University, is one of the

few experts to have tackled a full-fledged study of the SCO. Ambrosio conducted and published

a detailed study that examines how international organizations can be used to spread and support

political institutions and norms. He examines how the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ supports the

authoritarian norms of the SCO Member States. Given the strength and uniqueness of

Ambrosio’s study, this study will summarize some of his insightful his findings below.

Ambrosio begins by explaining the effect of international organizations on the spread of

political norms that are ordinarily reserved for democracy promotion rather than authoritarian

promotion, but still can demonstrate how norms are shared,

Socialisation refers to the transmission of norms and values (liberal democracy being one

such norm) from an international organisation to a target state through the use of ‘social

influence or persuasion’ to alter the latter’s belief systems and ensure that the new norms

and values are internalised.653

Powerful states, either hegemonic states or ‘critical states’ within the international organization

produce ‘norm cascades’ that cause states that violate the given norms to switch their behavior to

become more in accord with the norms of the critical state(s).654

Ambrosio next cites academic

literature to illustrate how authoritarian states halt democratic promotions:

653


Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, "Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8, (21008): 1324. 654

Ibid.,1324-25.

Hoyt, David

234

Rather than acting as passive targets of democratic trends, non-democracies have several,

international-level strategies of what can be called ‘authoritarian resistance’, including

policies to insulate, redefine, bolster and subvert. By countering the ways in which

democracy promotion operates, authoritarianism is more likely to be preserved.655

Although these actions can be unilateral, authoritarian states can coordinate to accomplish this

resistance of regime change; cooperation works especially well through international like-

minded organizations.656

A study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

found, for example, that the “organisation’s non-democratic members have reinforced

authoritarian tendencies in the region”657

by prioritizing “the ‘ASEAN way’…‘sovereignty’ and

‘non-interference’…purposefully emphasised regime survival over the promotion of liberal

democratic norms.”658

The study indicates that authoritarian states, especially when banding

together, can successfully resist democracy promotion.

Ambrosio’s next step compares his theoretical approach to the SCO and the norms

expressed in its founding documents and articulated by its leaders. In the words of its first

Secretary-General Zhuang DeGuang, “The Shanghai Spirit represents ‘a consolidating

component, a source of unity and spiritual power…a common concept of security, a civilization

formula, a concept of development and a system of values’.”659

Ambrosio digs deeper and his

analysis of the Shanghai Spirit is invaluable to understanding the SCO:

The Shanghai Spirit has six components: ‘mutual, trust, mutual benefit, equality,

consultation, respect for multicivilisations, [and] striving for common development’.

These principles ostensibly establish a set of regional norms which move beyond power

differentials amongst the organisation’s members and toward a consensus-based

approach to resolve regional problems. It is also important to note that this ‘spirit’ is not

seen as solely a set of regional norms, but is openly promoted as universally applicable

and as a basis for global politics. As an outgrowth of China’s ‘New Security Concept’,

655

Ibid.,1325. 656

Ibid. 657

Ibid.,1324. 658

Ibid. 659


Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia," Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8 (2008): 1327.

Hoyt, David

235

this is constituted in opposition to the current American-dominated power-based

international system.660

The SCO charter also pays lip service to many of the other norms of the international

system. However, “the SCO Charter and its founding documents are almost devoid of any

mention of democracy. Instead, respect for state ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ in the

internal affairs of the members figure prominently.”661

The SCO also places emphasis on the

word ‘diversity,’ in the respect of “the right of all countries to choose their ‘own way of

development.’”662

When analyzed as a whole, these ideals, contends Ambrosio, promote

multiple paths of development through ‘diversity,’ but also terms such as the absolute

‘sovereignty’, rules governing ‘non-interference’ in internal affairs, and the lack of support of

domestic democracy, “reinforce a sense of the absolute pre-eminence of states to regulate their

domestic politics and to defend their domestic political systems.”663

Finally, Ambrosio discovers

that the only mention of democracy within SCO documents is in reference to a change in the

international system by it becoming more multipolar – not in reference to domestic political

institutions. This is implicitly aimed at the United States and:

The SCO can be seen as the institutionalisation of the opposition of Moscow and Beijing

to the American-dominated, unipolar international order in which the US promotes

democracy and universal human rights, and has used these values to intervene in the

domestic affairs of states seen by Washington as violating these norms.664

Thus, for the SCO, democracy promotion in the international system is akin to a roll back of US

hegemony and influence.

SCO actions and statements made, since the Color Revolutions of 2005, supporting

regime stability and avoidance of Western interference, reinforce Ambrosio’s argument. The

660

Ibid. 661

Ibid. 662

Ibid.,1328. 663


Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, "Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8 (2008): 1328. 664

Ambrose, Ibid.,1328-29.

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236

Color Revolutions toppled the Kyrgyz Government in the Tulip Revolution and similar events in

Uzbekistan ended in the Andijan Massacre. The SCO followed with the Astana Declaration, as

its backlash to western and European condemnations. General-Secretary Zhang’s statements in

response to these events are pivotal. He argued, “that stability ‘is the common interest of all

parties’ and he rejected external calls for additional colour revolutions in Central Asia by linking

them to ‘extreme measures’ and ‘chaos’, and providing ‘extremist and terrorist forces’ with the

opportunity to achieve their goals.”665

Thus, the word of the SCO was that these pro-democracy

movements, of which OSCE studies indicate were for the vast majority non-violent, are

considered part of the ‘Three Evils’ and should be cracked down upon.666

This linkage of

democratic movements and the ‘Three Evils’ by SCO’s General further supports Ambrosio’s

theories and this thesis’ analysis of the SCO and The Three Evils.667

Ambrosio chronicles each of these major takeaways from how the SCO views the

importance of stability in the post-Astana declaration time period. First, the actions taken by the

SCO Member State regimes in response to the Central Asia color revolutions indicate that

“virtually any anti-regime activities…are deemed illegitimate by the SCO and contrary to the

security of its members.”668

Second, Zhang’s comments on the Color Revolutions:

Demonstrate[e] that they represent values that are well entrenched in the organisation and

amongst its members…thus, anti-regime activities are considered inherently illegitimate

and any changes to the political systems of the Central Asian states must ‘be resolved by

legal means and not by breaking stability or by creating chaos in the Central Asia.669

665

Ibid., 1333. 666

Ibid.,1333-36. 667

For more information, see Chapter IV’s conclusion on the Three Evils. 668



Ibid.

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237

Third, that, as discussed in Chapter IV, any political change actions not taken in line with the

regime’s wishes are considered parts of the Three Evils for Extremism or Terrorism. Fourth, the

SCO remains committed to ever-constant vigilance against any source that may cause

instability.670

Given these limitations, Ambrosio muses that “since none of these regimes have

legalised substantive opposition to their rule, it is unclear how any political changes unacceptable

to the rulers could occur legally since, by definition, any anti-regime actions have been

outlawed.”671

Ambrosio’s analysis indicates that the SCO norms provide the legal basis for the

current SCO regimes to be sustained ad infinitum.

Ambrosio’s concludes that the SCO claim of ‘stability’ allows the SCO to maintain

domestic control over any potential opposition groups, then ‘diversity’ is used to insulate the

SCO from foreign meddling. SCO speeches by Zhang indicate that the SCO states that there are

“different ‘paths’ of socio-economic development, each, by implication, with its own

validity.”672

The SCO member States also use the word democracy to subvert it; they know that

outright rejection of this norm may cost them international political capital so they “stretch its

definition to the point of meaninglessness by calling one’s political system democratic when it

clearly is not.”673

Furthermore, Zhang claims that democracy:

Is not seen as a universal concept, but rather determined by a state’s “national features

and historical traditions”: as “a product of the development of the internal politics,

economic and culture for every country”; and as based upon a country’s “different stage

and level of development.”674

Combined together, the SCO is attempting to make the case that “Regimes are on equally valid,

but divergent, paths of development and should therefore be exempted from any criticism

670

Ibid. 671

Ibid., 1333. 672

Ibid., 1334. 673



Ibid.

Hoyt, David

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regarding how they govern their people…and reject[s] the legitimacy of external interference in

a state’s political system.”675

The ability to use ‘diversity’ to defend against democracy is

predicated upon a different interpretation of human rights:

[The] SCO nominally supports the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, but has taken a firm stance against the notion of universal human rights. Instead,

they have adopted a relativist notion which bases human rights on ‘historical traditions’

and ‘national features’, while at the same time defending the ‘sovereign equality’ of

states to determine the content and application of rights.676

As such, Ambrosio’s conclusion is that, “By rejecting the very legitimacy of outside criticism,

these states are seeking to use the language of diversity and democracy to preserve the

authoritarian status quo.”677

Analysis

Ambrosio’s study lays out a few more final conclusions which are worth noting for the

understanding of the SCO. The SCO, he contends, “seeks to establish a normative system for

interstate relations in Central Asia and, in its most expansive statements, for the international

system as a whole.”678

Within the region, the SCO used the normative key phrases discussed

above to maintain the authoritarian status quo in the face of global democratic promotion by

delegitimizing any and all anti-regime activities. Since the SCO has both Russia and China, each

of which functions as a critical state for norm promotion, the SCO not only reflects their values

but also helps in “setting the contours of what is ‘appropriate’ within the region in line with their

interests and the interests of the other autocratic regimes in Central Asia.”679

The combination of

two critical powers in one organization will also ensure that these norms have a greater influence

675

Ibid. 676

Ibid., 1339. 677

Ibid. 678



Ibid.

Hoyt, David

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on Central Asia and the Central Asian SCO Members. Most likely any state that shifts away

from the stability presented in the Shanghai Spirit will be opposed by the other SCO Member

States. Maintaining this authoritarian solidarity is imperative, according to Ambrosio. Thus, the

SCO will probably not admit a democracy to participate beyond the role of an Observer States.680

Finally Ambrosio says that the SCO’s norms have a “strong, negative impact on the prospects for

democratisation in the region.”681

After examination of the SCO legal documents, this study agrees with Thomas

Ambriosio’s findings. The SCO does appear to reinforce authoritarianism, block democracy

promotion, and attempt to undermine US influence and the pillars of the US-led international

system. As a result, the SCO on a normative represents a active geopolitical challenge to US

regional and potentially global interests. US interests, outlined in Chapter V, include both

security/counter-terrorism and democratic promotion interests. The SCO’s Shanghai Spirit

actively works against and blocks the latter. As discussed in depth in Chapter IV, the SCO’s

method of combating the Three Evils through top-down force and political oppression, as

articulated in the norms of the Shanghai Spirit, actually creates the root catalyst for the Three

Evils; political oppression and marginalization thus not only blocks democracy but creates

Extremism, which manifests itself through Separatism and Terrorism. Thus the Shanghai Spirit is

the legal-normative approach that is the root cause of the Three Evils. In doing so, the Shanghai

Spirit also directly opposes both US interests in regional security and in democracy promotion.

Thus the SCO’s definitions of success create a zero-sum paradigm where if the SCO succeeds

the US must therefore fail to achieve some of its regional national interests.

680


Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, "Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8 (2008):1341-2. 681

Ibid., 1341.

Hoyt, David

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The SCO also undermines US international interests. The American regional interests of

democracy promotion are part of a larger interest of international democracy promotion. The

SCO seeks to prevent this but also provides an example to other authoritarian states on how they

can band together effectively through international institutions in order to resist the spread of

democracy. This is a dangerous precedent for US interests abroad and if other authoritarian states

realize this, it can impede the global transition toward democracy. The only way in Ambrosio’s

opinion to reverse this trend within the SCO was for China and/or Russia to become more

democratic; as critical states their influence will spread throughout the SCO. Thus, democracy

within Central Asia and the SCO may only be possible if the US pursues democratic promotion

within its rival great powers.

The SCO also seeks to undermine US leadership throughout the international system and

create an alternate system of international norms that can be adhered to by states. This clearly

weakens US global power projection and undermines the pillars of the international system. The

active shift by the SCO to make the world more multipolar undermines the continued American

hegemony, which has been the prime international interest of the US since the end of the Cold

War. The SCO therefore represents a latent geopolitical threat because it seeks to decrease US

relative power both in the region of Central Asia and international.

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CHAPTER VII: The Future of the SCO and

Policy Implications for the US

At the beginning of this analysis of the SCO, this study outlined a few fundamental

questions regarding the organization. Chapter 1 asked the primary question:

Has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization been successful in achieving its stated security

goals, and how does this impact US interests in the region?

In order to understand the fundamentals of this unique little-explored regional security

organization, this study subsequently raised four secondary questions:

1. How have SCO actions combating the ‘Three Evils’ affected Central Asia’s security and stability?

2. Does the organizational structure of the SCO enable it to pursue its security goals in

the face of competing national interests?

3. Does the SCO represent a threat to the US interests?

4. What are the implications of these findings for the SCO’s future and what options

should US policy makers pursue with regards to the SCO?

The analyses in chapters IV, V, and IV addressed the first three secondary questions. This final

chapter seeks to answer the last secondary question. First, however, it is necessary to recap the

analyses of the previous chapters. With this information as a foundation, this chapter next

contains a cursory overview of the issue of post-2014 Afghanistan, a situation vital to

understanding the upcoming geopolitical climate that the US will face when seeking to attain its

national interests in Central Asia. After establishing an understanding of the difficulties

Afghanistan presents, this Chapter will present a series of policy implications and

recommendations for the United States.

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7.1 - Summary of the Answers to the Major Questions about the SCO

The beginning of this study asks questions designed to drill into the SCO and understand

its effects on security concerns within Central Asia for the purpose of providing an analysis to

aid US policymakers. In order to best understand the policy implications presented at the end of

this Chapter, it is important to restate the key points uncovered during the investigation of each

of the study’s primary and secondary questions. It should be noted that the analyses presented in

this subsection are not meant to be in-depth or complete but merely the highlights of the research

presented in each of the previous chapters.

Chapter IV addressed the first secondary question: How have SCO actions taken to

combat the ‘Three Evils’ affected Central Asia’s security and stability? This study found that

threats resulted from a variety of sources in the different SCO Member States, but that in general

the ‘Three Evils’ were over-hyped. The ‘Three Evils’ were larger threats in the 1990s during the

decade of instability following the Soviet Union’s Collapse but since the turn of the century,

which coincided with the SCO’s formation, this threat has decreased exponentially. Extremism,

Russia’s greatest problem, was largely nonexistent within Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and

minimal and overblown in China. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan a disproportionate majority of

Extremism cases stemmed directly from government policies and the mislabeling of legitimate

Islamic groups as radicals. Separatism was a difficult and very real threat in the 1990s as

Chechnya seceded, Tajikistan battled a civil war, and China dealt with the last major Uighur

revolts. However, the majority of Separatist threats relied on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for

staging purposes and as a base of operations for militants. The US invasion of Afghanistan

destroyed many of the major Separatist threats. In response to the revolutions caused by political

Hoyt, David

243

and ethnic unrest, the SCO Member State regimes labeled democracy promotion a Separatist

threat. In the last few years, political marginalization has resulted in a resurgence of Separatist

threats, most notably in Tajikistan. The Threat of Terrorism was also most dangerous in the

1990s. After the US invaded Afghanistan, American forces destroyed many of the terrorists

arrayed there, specifically the IMU and ETIM. More recent terrorist attacks are usually

disorganized and smaller-scale. They present a limited threat to political stability and are linked

to politically marginalized groups. Although the threat of the ‘Three Evils’ has declined since the

SCO was founded, this was not due to the actions taken by the SCO but rather caused by the

anti-terrorist operations conducted by the US in the region.

In conjunction with the domestic security actions that SCO Member States have taken to

combat the ‘Three Evils,’ the SCO RATS exists to aid in this fight. However RATS is extremely

non-transparent and suffers from great difficulties in coordinating intelligence between SCO

states. External monitors of RATS accuse the group of existing for the sake of extra-judicial

retaliation. Instead of winning against the Three Evils, this study found that the actions taken by

RATS and the governments of the SCO Member States unconsciously create or accelerate the

root problems of the Three Evils. Government suppression for the nominal sake of security

breeds Extremism and movements that seek political change, labeled Separatism. When peaceful

forms of expression fail, marginalized groups morph into large-scale Separatism movements or

small-scale Terrorism actions. Thus, the SCO is part of the problem, not the solution, in

combating the Three Evils.

Chapter V addressed the second secondary question: Does the organizational structure of

the SCO enable it to pursue its security goals in the face of competing national interests? The

chapter examined the regional interests and Grand Strategies of the United States, then Russia,

Hoyt, David

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followed by China, and ended with those of the Central Asian Republics. The United States

pursues regional security and democracy promotion primarily by its presence and actions in the

region and by thwarting pushback from the other two great powers, Russia and China. Russia

seeks to maintain its historical influence over the region while dominating the hydrocarbon trade

and suppressing Islamist militants’ threats. China, meanwhile, entered the region to stabilize its

strategic rear by increasing security Xinjiang Province and growing economic development.

China also seeks to increase its regional influence. The Central Asian States in general pursue a

multi-vector diplomacy that plays the three great powers against one another and maintains their

independence. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, given their relative power, also seek regional

hegemony over their Central Asian neighbors. These two larger Central Asian states generally

have more independent foreign policies (especially Uzbekistan).

The SCO’s decision-making process via consensus has achieved many goals thus far but

leaves much to be desired. Most Western observers see the difficulty presented by this system

and write off the SCO as having no hope for the future. This form of decision-making has

institutionalized a process of gradualism, as interests must be carefully aligned, and the states

respond better to external stimuli (especially threats). Through this process, The SCO has

enabled historical enemies to build trust and cooperation, create and strengthen bilateral

relationships, demilitarize borders, and increase economic connections and trade. The result is a

legitimate and functioning multilateral organization where the minor members are not

completely marginalized due to their lack of relative power. However, the consensus norm

makes agreements on and sensitive or contentious issues extremely difficult, especially if they

require firm commitments. Consequently progress, if any, is very slow as all members regularly

have a reason to veto new actions.

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The largest challenge to the SCO’s consensus decision-making and future development is

the Sino-Russian relationship. According to scholar Bobo Lo, Russia and China have a

relationship of strategic convenience. Certain issues, such as the American presence in Central

Asia, join these two powers in the face of a common opponent. However, underneath that

interest the two have many conflicting national and foreign objectives. Foremost of these goals is

the desire of each nation to expand its influence in the region—a zero-sum game. Competition

between the two countries has led each to impede the other, thus far restricting the SCO’s

development. China pushes for more economic development through the SCO framework, which

Russia blocks, fearing that approving economic development plans would enhance Chinese

power. On the other hand, China seeks to prevent securitization of the SCO and Russian desires

to make the SCO more overtly anti-American. Consequently, the SCO is caught in a terrible

paradox. The more important the SCO becomes to the region and the world, the more cause

exists for Russia and China to politically duel for prime influence in the organization, which is

currently held by Beijing. As the US withdraws from the region, experts project that Sino-Soviet

tensions will increase as the commonality of their interest decreases.

In light of these tensions, future decision-making will likely be contentious, limiting

progress and developments; any approved agreements will lack substantive issues. Consensus

decision-making will handicap the SCO from making the leap to a more expansive mandate.

However, without the consensus decision-making, the political coalition that holds the SCO

together would likely fail, given that the competing interests of its member-states would fracture

the organization. The state of Sino-Russian affairs has an important impact on SCO functions,

and observers should look to Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s actions within the organization for

a response as these states seek to maximize the opportunity presented by great power tensions.

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Chapter VI examined the third secondary question raised in this study: Does the SCO

represent a threat to the US interests? This Chapter first examined the SCO’s potential as a

conventional threat by reviewing joint military, Special Forces, and law enforcement exercises

conducted between member states. Generally, exercises were held yearly (and in many years

more than one per year) since 2002. The size and scope of these operations steadily increased

until 2011, after which the size of the exercises was historically low in 2012. Uzbekistan

participated the least in these endeavors, and China attended the most. The SCO as it is currently

structured cannot present a conventional military threat to the United States or US led security

organizations such as NATO; the SCO lacks legal mechanisms to go to war, a mutual defense

pact, a joint-command structure, etc. However, these military exercises, which often go

unnoticed, are incredibly important. Coordinated maneuvers demonstrate a remarkable ability to

increase trust, interoperability, and experience sharing among nations that are incredibly

independent and historically mistrustful. For example, through the SCO exercises, the People’s

Republic of China conducted its first ever joint-exercises. These exercises also allowed Russia

and China to work together and build joint-military capabilities. Of greatest concern to the US

are the simulated targets and hypothetical scenarios of a selective few of these security missions,

specifically Peace Missions 2005, 2009, and 2010. The scale and equipment (land, air, and sea as

well as specialist equipment) were more massive than other missions. Peace Mission 2010 was

directed toward suppressing a grassroots democratic movement, while Peace Missions 2005 and

2009 were located in the Far East and focused on the Korean Peninsula. These last two security

missions supposedly practiced preventing an intervention led by the US and intervening on the

Peninsula to protect Chinese and Russian interests. These exercises were thus conducted to

simulate denial of US interests in Central Asia (democracy promotion and human rights) and in

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East Asia (Resolution of the Korean crisis on US, Japanese, and/or South Korean terms). Thus,

these security/military exercises, although not a direct conventional threat, represent a latent

geopolitical threat to the US by practicing thwarting US interests and building joint-military

capacity between the two great powers most likely to overtly challenge the US.

The second threat that the SCO could present examined in Chapter VI was that of a

normative challenge to the US through the ‘Shanghai Spirit.’ The section of this paper that

examined the Shanghai spirit examined an excellent, well researched study by Thomas Ambrosio

that revealed how authoritarian states can use international organizations/institutions to work

together to resist the spread of democracy and reinforce the longevity of their rule. The Shanghai

Spirit warps the definitions of terms such as ‘democracy,’ ‘stability,’ ‘non-interference,’ and

‘sovereignty’ to create a normative-legal aegis that gives the SCO the ability to resist democracy

and push back against the norms propagated by the US in the international system. The Shanghai

Spirit suppresses all forms of political expression, opposition, and regime change, effectively

outlawing democratic movements and thereby legitimizing the use of force against these

movements as threats under the ‘Three Evils.’ Furthermore, the Shanghai Spirit defends SCO

Member States from outside interference and condemnation through support for ‘mutual respect

for different paths of political development.’ These actions tie back into the conclusions of

Chapter IV in that they threaten the mid to long-term stability of Central Asia by legitimizing the

top-down governmental oppression that creates the roots of political instability in the Central

Asian Republics. This works against the US national interests of democracy and human rights

promotion and regional security and stability. With aging leaders at the helm and unclear plans

for succession, SCO Central Asian member states have diminished chances for long-term

stability. Lastly, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ actively pushes against US hegemony by using the

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principle of ‘democracy’ as an excuse to push for the ‘democratization of the international

system,’ moving toward international multi-polarity. The ‘Shanghai Spirit’ posits itself and the

SCO as an alternate system to that of the US. This model directly seeks to weaken US

international relative power as well as undercut the US’s leadership and hence the stability of the

international system. As such, the Shanghai Spirit is an active geopolitical threat to the US and

its regional and global interests.

The analyses provided by the answers to the secondary questions allows this study to

return to its primary question once more - Has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization been

successful in achieving its stated security goals and how does this impact US interests in the

region? In answer to the first part of that question, this study judges that the SCO has failed in

achieving its stated security goals. The SCO supports political objectives that create the root

causes ‘Three Evils’ instead of ending them. Increased security and stability in Central and South

Asia has largely been the result of American forces operating in the region rather than the actions

of SCO Member States. The SCO lacks the ability to create effective counter-measures to these

‘Three Evils’ security threats because of its consensus decision-making. Furthermore, the SCO

enshrines political institutions through the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ legal-normative framework that

undermines long-term regional stability. On the other hand, the SCO has been successful in its

goals to reduce US regional influence, deny US the attainment of its regional strategies, and

block the spread of US norms and political institutions. The organization’s aims have been

successful in terms of the security and stability definitions used by the Eurasian member states.

However, the SCO’s strategy understandably impacts US interests negatively in the region. The

joint exercises represent a latent geopolitical threat and the Shanghai Spirit’s goal to reduce US

relative power and undermine the norms of the US-led international system presents a

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249

geopolitical challenge to America. From the perspective of a US policymaker, the SCO is

detrimental for regional security and a challenge for US interests in both the region and the

world.

7.2 - The Question of Afghanistan

Before presenting a list of policy recommendations for US policymakers, it is necessary

to examine the potential role the SCO can play in Afghanistan. As the NATO mission in

Afghanistan winds down in 2014, stability in Afghanistan is still uncertain. Afghanistan remains

the lynchpin of regional security; the less stable Afghanistan is, the greater the risk to nearby

states. Looking to fill the geopolitical vacuum created by the withdrawal of the US, academics

and pundits alike are searching for a state or group of states to fill that void. Many articles reach

out and latch on to the SCO and attempt to advocate the organization take a deeper role in

Afghanistan. As this is the main policy recommendation that is tossed around based upon casual

analyses of the SCO, it must be addressed first before any broader policy recommendations are

discussed.

2014 is the year of judgment for Afghanistan. President Karzai, the only Afghan to have

been president of the new Afghan state since the US invasion expelled the Taliban from

Afghanistan, will step down in 2014, and the country will elect a new leader. NATO forces will

draw down at the same time, leaving domestic forces to handle security for the Afghan state. The

prospects of this transition are dubious. “Afghanistan is far from politically stable, and Karzai's

departure raises questions about whether his eventual successor will be able to hold the state

together.”682

The US and Afghan governments, having not definitively defeated the Taliban

682

"China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in Transition," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/china-pakistan-and-afghanistan-transition,


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250

insurgency, seek for the Taliban to join the current political order in a power-sharing

arrangement.683

Stratfor’s analysis is that:

The Taliban know they will never reclaim their emirate, a single-party state established

through military conquest. The combination of factors that allowed the Taliban to come

to power through force no longer exists…[but] The Taliban want a far greater share of

power in the political system, while their opponents are negotiating to limit the extent of

the Taliban’s political comeback.684

Reconciling these differences will be challenging. Stratfor also reports that “Karzai pointed out

that a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban was not possible without the help of

Pakistan.”685

The actions of Afghan Minister of Water and Energy Mohammad Ismail Khan

epitomize this lack of faith in the situation. In November 2012, Khan was caught attempting to

form a group of private militias led by warlords like himself that will be used to combat the

Taliban after NATO troops leave in 2014:

Khan's initiative shows how even senior government officials have very little faith in the

capabilities of the Afghan state security apparatus that has been developed over the past

decade under U.S. and NATO supervision. Furthermore, Khan and warlords like him

have more faith in their private militias to protect them from an unencumbered Taliban

movement…Khan's proposal speaks to the fear of recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate

political authority and consequently their security presence in the country.686

The situation in Afghanistan is delicate and primed to explode. How it will play out is the best

guess of policymakers everywhere. But the outcome of Post-2014 Afghanistan is of direct

consequence to the Member States of the SCO.

683

“Considering a Post-Karzai Afghanistan," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military

strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/considering-post-karzai-afghanistan, accessed May

28, 2013. 684

"Considering a Post-Karzai Afghanistan," Ibid. 685

"China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in Transition, Ibid. 686

"Afghanistan, Pakistan: Preparing for the Taliban Comeback," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic,

political, and military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/analysis/afghanistan-pakistan-preparing-

taliban-comeback, accessed May 28, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/considering-post-karzai-afghanistan

Hoyt, David

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Stratfor sees this current situation as analogous to the state of affairs in Afghanistan in

the 1990s. In the 1990s the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and left a Marxist stratocracy in

place and then tried to support it from afar against competing groups of militants backed by

outside patron states. Stratfor paints a surprisingly optimistic picture in that:

If the Marxist regime, reviled by millions of its citizens and facing a large insurgent

coalition, wasn't easily toppled after the departure of Soviet forces, then it is reasonable

to assume that post-NATO Afghanistan, which will continue to have substantial

international backing, won't be easily toppled by Taliban insurgents. It should also be

kept in mind that when the Taliban last came to power, Afghanistan was experiencing

anarchy after nearly two decades of civil war. In contrast, today there is a functioning

state with institutions and a large number of security forces.687

Thus Stratfor predicts that a long civil war between the Taliban and Afghan forces is likely in the

wake of the NATO withdrawal.688

Neither side will have the power to fully enforce its will, so a

power sharing arrangement punctuated by violence is likely. However, because of the much

slower timeframe of the Taliban toppling the state, outside actors have a larger potential

opportunity to intervene in order to secure national interests in regional security.

The SCO Member States, specifically the Central Asian Republics, know that the fate of

Afghanistan is directly tied to their future fortunes. The Central Asian States have increased their

foreign policy activity, engaging with external partners about how to stabilize Afghanistan’s

future domestic situation. In June 2012, the SCO conferred Observer State status on Afghanistan

to help guide its rapprochement with the organization in preparation for the NATO departure.

The second meeting of the ‘Heart of Asia’ countries met in Kabul days later to help establish an

institutional framework of seven working groups that will deal with the mix of security,

687

"The Taliban and the Post-NATO Afghan State," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and

military strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/taliban-and-post-nato-afghan-state


"The Taliban and the Post-NATO Afghan State," Ibid.

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economic, and humanitarian issues that may arise.689

The CSTO also unveiled plans to “tighten

cooperation between member states, basing them on highly negative forecasts with regard to the

post-2014 situation in Afghanistan and its impact on regional security in post-Soviet Central

Asia.”690

However, the Jamestown Foundation sees limited chances for the Central Asian States

to become masters of this problem. “Since the regional security landscape is largely undermined

by unresolved disputes between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the current efficacy of

comprehensive cooperation at the regional level remains subject to debate.”691

The foundation

believes that Central Asia disputes prohibit coordination and that demonstrations of Central

Asian multilateral diplomacy, such as Kazakhstan’s leadership on the Afghan issue during its

time chairing the OSCE in 2010, have led to little progress. As such, the Jamestown Foundation

projects, “the future of Central Asia’s stability after the West’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is

due to stay in Russian and Chinese hands.”692

But taking charge of the Afghan problem, unilaterally or multilaterally, may not be in the

interests of either Russia or China. In the wake of a post-NATO Afghanistan, Moscow will

maintain its strategic interest in the security and stability of Central Asian States and preventing

the spillover of militancy (Islamist or otherwise) into the Central Asian Republics or Russia

proper. In many ways, this will return Russia to the regional position it held during the late 1990s

before the US intervened in the region. However, Stratfor reports, “it is unclear what Russia --

689

Georgly Voloshin, "Central Asia Prepares for Post-2014 Afghanistan." Jamestown Foundation.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e

&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=shanghai%20cooperation%20organization&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40226

&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=83e53e64149c15ae7ee4763b3acc0386, accessed May 10, 2013. 690

Voloshin, Ibid. 691

Voloshin, Ibid. 692

Voloshin, Ibid.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=shanghai%20cooperation%20organization&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40226&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=83e53e64149c15ae7ee4763b3acc0386



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whether unilaterally or through the CSTO -- is willing to do about it.”693

Aiding security

missions is different from filling the security void left by the United States. Conflicting quotes by

the CSTO (which is dominated politically by Russia) and Russia itself compound this

uncertainty. Stratfor reported in October 2012 that “Valery Semerikov, the Deputy Secretary-

General of the CSTO, said…that the Russian-led security bloc is considering sending

peacekeepers to Afghanistan after NATO's withdrawal in 2014.”694

Semerikov only stated that a

“working group had been set up to study ‘relevant proposals.’”695

His statement leaves the idea

of a CSTO deployment vague. However, Russia contradicted the statements made by the CSTO

Secretary-General:

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov forcefully denied the claims, reflecting Russia's

aversion to direct military involvement in the country. Lavrov said that actions outside

the security organization's area of responsibility, which does not include Afghanistan, are

“out of the question.”696

Thus Russia does not appear to have the stomach to fill the politico-military vacuum left by the

US. Instead, Russia is investing in military loans to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.697

This indicates

that Russia may be preparing to contain an unstable Afghanistan. Overall, though it seems that

“Moscow wants to prevent Afghanistan from erupting into chaos; it just needs someone else to

do the heavy lifting.”698

693

"Russia's Limited Options in Afghanistan," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military

strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russias-limited-options-afghanistan, accessed May

28, 2013. 694

"Russia's Limited Options in Afghanistan," Ibid. 695

"Russia's Limited Options in Afghanistan," Ibid, 696

"Russia's Limited Options in Afghanistan," Ibis. 697

Rafaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen, "China rapidly becoming primary player in post-war Central Asia."

China in Central Asia, chinaincentralasia.com/2012/12/05/china-rapidly-becoming-primary-player-in-post-war-

central-asia/, accessed May 21, 2013. 698

"Russia's Limited Options in Afghanistan," Stratfor | Geopolitical intelligence, economic, political, and military

strategic forecasting, http://www.Stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russias-limited-options-afghanistan, accessed May

28, 2013.

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russias-limited-options-afghanistan

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russias-limited-options-afghanistan

Hoyt, David

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China does not appear any more willing than Russia to engage in the monumental task

that is required to create a stable post-NATO Afghanistan. Beijing’s strategic interests in

Afghanistan lie with the protection of Chinese companies that are acquiring energy and raw

materials. China gives minor financial assistance to Afghanistan as well.699

Chinese State Owned

Enterprises have made large strides in investing in the commercial and infrastructural

components of Afghanistan.700

This is all part of “China’s overall policy of development to

achieve stability.”701

In addition, “On the ground in the country, China is already involved in

low-profile training of Afghan diplomats and security officials. So far, this has not amounted to

much,”702

as the number involved is very small. Furthermore China has publically called for

enhanced military ties, including regular communication and cooperation between the security

forces of both countries.703

As great as many of these actions sounds, they lack specifics as well

as direct support for political and security institutions. “More likely, however, it is Beijing’s

effort to make sure that future instability in Afghanistan does not affect restive Xinjiang.”704

So given their difficult position vis-à-vis Afghanistan, “What is the SCO’s role in

Afghanistan’s post-2014 future?” The proposed answers run the gambit of possibilities real and

remote. Some pundits argue that RATS may be a “useful tool for tracking potential spillover

threats from Afghanistan should the situation there become more volatile in the coming years.

Afghan security structures may well be asked to contribute to the Regional Anti-Terrorist

699

George Voloshin, "Central Asia Prepares for Post-2014 Afghanistan," Jamestown Foundation,

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e

&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=shanghai%20cooperation%20organization&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40226

&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=83e53e64149c15ae7ee4763b3acc0386 , accessed May 10, 2013. 700

Alexndros Petersen, "China’s Strategy in Afghanistan," China in Central Asia, chinaincentralasia.com/

2013/05/22/chinas-strategy-in-afghanistan/,accessed May 28, 2013. 701

Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Peterse, "China in Afghanistan." China in Central Asia.

http://chinaincentralasia.com/2012/10/12/china-in-afghanistan/, accessed May 27, 2013. 702

Pantucci, Ibid. 703

Pantucci, Ibid. 704

Pantucci, Ibid..

http://chinaincentralasia.com/

Hoyt, David

255

Structure in the future.”705

Former Secretary-General of the SCO Zhang Deguang706

said that

Afghanistan has continuously been on the agenda for the highest level meetings of the SCO and

that the “SCO’s position on Afghanistan was very similar to that of China, which is to have a

stable, independent, peaceful, and prosperous Afghanistan.”707

He also added that China and the

SCO have held many meetings with Pakistan, Russia, and Afghanistan on the issue of

Afghanistan’s future.708

However Zhang, as in most Chinese reports on the matter, was light on

substance and emphasized dialogue rather than China or the SCO deepening involvement.

Comments made by Ci Guowei, the Chinese Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the

Chinese Ministry of National Defense, countermanded any optimistic hopes of SCO involvement

raised by Zhang’s words. Guowei stated after Peace Mission 2012 that the “SCO will not

become a ‘NATO of the East,’ or fill a vacuum created in Central Asia post-2014.”709

Instead the

SCO still seems unsure about its role in the Post-2014 Central Asian environment:

China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping told the SCO Heads of State Council in

Beijing on June 7 [2012] that the SCO will for the first time develop a ‘fully-fledged

strategic development plan,’ part of which relates to security. A number of factors,

including the Arab Spring and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, are serving to push

the SCO’s level of political activity beyond its traditional focus.710

Although the SCO fails to yet decide how it plans to tackle the Post-2014 reality of

Afghanistan, pundits and academics, specifically those in the West, who call for the SCO to fill

the vacuum left by the departing US, are most likely calling upon deaf ears. The threat of an

705

Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen "China in Afghanistan," China in Central Asia,

http://chinaincentralasia.com/2012/10/12/china-in-afghanistan/, accessed May 27, 2013. 706

Zhang Deguang is now Chairman of the China Foundation of International Studies. 707

"Chinese expert sees bigger role for SCO in Afghanistan." The Express Tribune,

http://tribune.com.pk/story/435138/chinese-expert-sees-bigger-role-for-sco-in-afghanistan/,accessed May 29, 2013. 708

"Chinese expert sees bigger role for SCO in Afghanistan," Ibid.. 709

Roger McDermott, "China Leads SCO Peace Mission 2012 in Central Asia,"Jamestown.org., The Jamestown

Foundation, 26 June 2012, Web., 18 Mar. 2013.

<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39538>. 710

Roger McDermott, "China Leads SCO Peace Mission 2012 in Central Asia,"Jamestown.org., The Jamestown

Foundation, 26 June 2012. Web., 18 Mar. 2013.

<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39538>.

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unstable, Taliban-led, Afghanistan is not new to the SCO; in fact the SCO was founded in

response to the security threats posed by just such an occasion. However, in the 1990s Russia,

the CSTO, and the SCO711

all failed to act (for a variety of reasons) to remove the Taliban from

Afghanistan, and it was the US who ultimately deposed the threatening regime. In the time that

has passed since the SCO’s founding, many factors remain that affected the decision not to

intervene in the past. The Central Asian States lack the capacity to act even if they had the will.

Russia seems hesitant to intervene and instead appears to be trying to firewall off Afghanistan’s

neighboring states from the instability to come. China is involved in Afghanistan only enough to

secure economic gains. Despite China’s claims that this economic development is beneficial,

Afghanistan needs stable political and security institutions first that will allow the state to

weather the instability caused by the reintegration of the Taliban back into the Afghani territory.

China has not yet expressed its interest in being more deeply involved in the country. Thus, none

of the SCO Member States are expressing interest in stabilizing Afghanistan. Hypothetically if

the SCO, united, could make a difference, it would be in the collective interests of the Member

States. However, the consensus norm makes the possibility of a firm commitment on the part of

the SCO incredibly difficult based upon the natural hesitations of shouldering this type of

geopolitical involvement (and financial burden). Therefore SCO action in stabilizing

Afghanistan should be considered extremely unlikely. This does not mean that the US should not

lean on China, Russia, and the SCO to take a greater stand in Afghanistan; it just means that

those policies (necessary as they are to go through the motions) are extremely unlikely to bear

fruit.

7.3 - Policy Implications and Recommendations

711

The SCO was not founded until June 2001 and had very little time to act before the US invasion of Afghanistan.

The Shanghai Five lacked the institutional capacity to coordinate such an effort.

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Based upon the above analysis of the SCO, conducted by answering primary and

secondary questions, this study aims to provide recommendations for US policymakers on how

best to deal with the SCO. It should be noted that the recommendations given here will be on the

macro level to help frame policies but will not give specifics, which can and should be

determined by policymakers with more contextual information. The policies suggested here may

not all have a high degree of success; some recommendations are likely to fail but should be

attempted by the US because to not do so represents a greater loss to American interests. These

recommendations are also in no ways comprehensive and absolute. Other scholars, notably Julie

Bailes from the Brookings Institute, have their own counsel to supply.

First and most importantly, the US must not repeat the 1990s policies of abdication of

Central Asia come 2014, particularly with regards to commitment or strategic thinking. The

failure of the US to stay engaged, even diplomatically, throughout the 1990s yielded disastrous

results that flew directly in the face of American interests in the region. US absence and

ambivalence gave rise to the support for the Taliban in Pakistan, the creation of a failed state,

and the establishing of an AQ base of operations, all of which precipitated the terrorist attacks of

September 11th

, 2001 and two large-scale wars. Hindsight demonstrates that staying engaged is

ultimately much cheaper in every sense of the word.

US policymakers should hold no illusions of the SCO’s ability to replace the service

provided by the US and NATO in Afghanistan. It is unlikely, as described at length in the section

above, that the SCO will take a deep commitment, particularly on security issues, within

Afghanistan. This should be seen as a potential cascade event—if Afghanistan destabilizes, the

threat to regional security will be greater. However, the US can and should continue to lean on

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the SCO and its members individually to make a deeper commitment in Afghanistan – even if

the involvement of the collective organization may be a mere pipedream.

US intelligence should monitor closely the bilateral relationships between the SCO great

powers and the smaller Central Asian Republics. China, especially if it increases economic

linkages through the SCO (e.g. SCO Free Trade Zone), can gain economic dominance over these

states. Conversely, in the event that regional tensions, insecurities, and instability begin to

mount, America should carefully track the actions taken by Russia to consolidate security gains

over Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A dramatic rise in the regional influence by one of these great

powers would be cause for US concern.

The US must continue to build some form of diplomatic connection with the SCO

(outside of the United Nations). Specifically the US should attempt to become an observer at

SCO joint military/special forces/law enforcement exercises. The more America knows about

operations that could potentially endanger its regional interests, the better, and access through

diplomacy is the most viable course of action. The US should also attempt to create a NATO-

SCO dialogue in order to retard any future developments of the SCO toward a military

organization (as unlikely as that may be).

The US should observe very closely the health and domestic politics of the Central Asian

Republics’ leaders. Aging leaders govern virtually all the Central Asian Republics and have as

individuals consolidated virtually all political power under themselves (Kyrgyzstan is an

exception given its 2010 Revolution). These regimes have no stable political transition

mechanisms worked out. The death or incapacitation of even one of these leaders may throw a

country into turmoil and could present an increased security threat to the entire region.

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Conversely, in this moment of uncertain regime transition, the chance for democracy promotion

may be higher as the security apparatus will be leaderless. The US should understand that Russia

(and to a lesser extent China) will not be idle during this transition.

The US should not compromise its strategy of democracy promotion. Democracy

promotion remains the surest way to reduce long-term threats within the region by reducing the

political marginalization that leads to the ‘Three Evils.’ In addition, the very nature of the

Shanghai Spirit is such that if the US compromises on its mandate of supporting liberal ideas, it

will fuel this opposing ideology. As the Shanghai Spirit was designed as a direct counter to US

norms and as a prototype for a new international system, America must aggressively attempt to

undercut this threatening alternative as much as possible. The Shanghai Spirit remains a long-

term threat to the model presented by the US-led international system.

The US should attempt to build stronger bilateral relationships with the Central Asian

Republics within the SCO. In particular, the US should focus more on Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan given their history of pressing for foreign policies independent of regional great

powers. Stronger bilateral relationships may allow the US to co-opt these states in order to

constrain the SCO’s decision-making via consensus.

The US should look for opportunities to exacerbate the Sino-Russian relationship. These

opportunities need not be limited to Central Asia but can be anywhere around the globe. Within

Central Asia, access to energy resources and pipeline politics is an increasingly contentious issue

that can potentially be used to divide these two powers. As the US withdraws and this bilateral

relationship grows more brittle, pushing Russia and China apart is tantamount to creating a

political blockage that prevents the SCO from developing.

Hoyt, David

260

Given the SCO’s current inflection point (discussed in the final section after

recommendations), its path of growth has multiple possible futures. The US should monitor

institutional developments within the SCO to better understand and predict where the

organization is going and what that means for US interests.

US Policymakers should expect that the post-2014 era will see increased instability in

Central Asia. Depending on the magnitude of threats to the stability of the individual regimes,

the US should be prepared for further failed state crises or civil wars. These crises present the

opportunity for transnational terrorists to increase their base and power projection – an

unacceptable outcome for US interests. America should maintain close contacts with the SCO,

Russia, and China in the event of a regional emergency that may require international assistance,

aid, or intervention.

The US MUST remain engaged in the Central Asian region after 2014.

US Policy Makers should not expect the SCO to be able to ‘fix’ Afghanistan or Central

Asia after the US influence decreases.

Analyze the bilateral relations between SCO Member States to see signs of greater

political domination by the great powers over the Central Asian republics.

The US should maintain its attempts to develop relations with the SCO and attempt to

found a NATO-SCO dialogue.

Monitor the health of the aging leaders of the Central Asian republics in order to be

prepared for moments of crisis during political transitions that can be exploited.

The US should continue to support liberal ideas of democracy, human rights, and liberal

economics. Abdicating this role empowers the Shanghai Spirit.

The US should attempt to co-opt the smaller SCO states in order to constrain the SCO

through its consensus decision-making. Focus efforts on Uzbekistan & Kyrgyzstan.

The US should attempt to exacerbate the Sino-Russo tensions.

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The US should monitor institutional developments of the SCO very carefully, looking for

trends of increased cooperation.

The US should expect greater regional instability and potential new terrorist threats to

emerge under the oppressive aegis of the SCO.

7.4 - The Future of the SCO

The SCO is here to stay. Despite the dismissive comments of many pundits over its slow

development or failures to act, the SCO has demonstrated an unmistakable overall positive

growth trend in terms of capacity and cohesion since its inception as the Shanghai Five in 1996

and as the SCO in 2001. The reason for this continued growth and cohesiveness is best

articulated by Bobo Lo:

The engine of the SCO’s development today is the intrinsic logic of intra-regional

cooperation. It is this logic that will ensure its continued growth, regardless of whether

the Americans stay in Central Asia. There are enough commonalities in the interests of

member-states—regime stability, counterterrorism, trade—for the organization to

develop without the reference point of an external enemy, real or artificial.712

This commonality in interests drew the states together in the first place and proved strong

enough to last over a decade. Although the SCO may not make any spectacular or radical

developments in the near future, it will continue its slow growth forward.

However, this slow growth has led Western observers to often fixate on the SCO’s

current lack of deliverable results, especially with regards to Western interests, and its lack of

rapid progress over short time spans. In this regard, most observers miss the importance of the

growth of the SCO over time. The organization has developed slowly, but in doing so it has

overcome enormous hurdles and built a very unlikely coalition. This collection of states would

have been impossible to imagine 30 and perhaps even 20 years ago. The gradualist deliberations

done behind the scenes usually result in stronger institutions that work for countries that would

712

Bobo Lo, “Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics,” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution Press, 2008), 109.

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otherwise wish to be independent. In addition, Western observers often miss the importance of

the SCO simply existing; they look for it to execute some NATO-esque operation. The SCO,

through its mere existence, provides a bilateral shell to enhance economic growth while diffusing

regional geopolitical tensions. It provides a forum for Russia and China to draw closer, despite

their numerous difficulties, and it helps reinforce authoritarianism in the region. These alone are

notable and cause for concern. The hasty analyses by casual observers miss the importance of the

organization.

The SCO right now stands at a crucial point in its evolution. It was formed to pivot

against the threat posed by the Taliban and the Three Evils harbored within that government.

Mere months after the SCO’s creation, the US entered the region, retook Afghanistan, and forced

the Taliban south into the tribal areas on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. As a result, the SCO

never had an opportunity to test its mandate. Instead, the organization, conceived as a security

institution, had to find another security threat to continue its existence. It pivoted against the US

and its democracy promotion regimen, which undermined the control of SCO Member States’

authoritarian regimes. The SCO therefore became a pseudo-anti-US organization that sought to

decrease US power, norms, and influence. However, it has now reached a new inflection point in

its lifespan. As the US withdraws from Afghanistan, it lessens its presence and influence in

Central Asia and minimizes the SCO’s primary security threat. However, at the same time the

potential for the return of the SCO’s original security threat is steadily increasing. The SCO thus

stands at a divide in its development. Either the SCO can maintain the anti-US posture that it has

adopted over the course of the last decade or it can pivot back to facing the Taliban and the

‘Three Evils’ threat represented by that regime. Alternately, the SCO can use this moment to

choose a new, yet unforeseen path (as hinted at in the above quotes from Cheng Guoping) in its

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development. As the SCO is most prone to act under the duress of external pressure, the next

steps the SCO chooses are vitally important to the SCO’s future and should be carefully

observed and analyzed.

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Appendixes

A1: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States

# Name of State Type of Affiliation Year Joined Notes

1 China Member State 1996 Shanghai Five Founding

Member

2 Kazakhstan Member State 1996 Shanghai Five Founding

Member

3 Kyrgyzstan Member State 1996 Shanghai Five Founding

Member

4 Russia Member State 1996 Shanghai Five Founding

Member

5 Tajikistan Member State 1996 Shanghai Five Founding

Member

6 Uzbekistan Member State 2001 Only Founding Member

not part of the Shanghai

Five.

A2: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Observer States


1 Mongolia Observer State 2004 -

2 Iran Observer State 2005 Wants to Become a

Member State

3 India Observer State 2005 -

4 Pakistan Observer State 2005 -

5 Afghanistan Observer State 2012 Was originally part of the

SCO-Afghanistan Contact

Group

A3: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Dialogue Partners


1 Belarus Dialogue Partner 2009 -

2 Sri Lanka Dialogue Partner 2009 -

3 Turkey Dialogue Partner 2012 -

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265

A4: Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

15.06.0001

Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

June 15, 2001

The heads of state of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian

Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan,

Highly appraise the positive role played by the "Shanghai Five", in the five years since its founding, in promoting and

deepening mutual trust, relations of friendship and good-neighborliness among the member states, consolidating

regional security and stability and facilitating common development;

Unanimously recognize that the founding and development of the "Shanghai Five" have conformed to the post cold-

war historic trend that mankind aspires to peace and development, shown the great potentiality of peaceful and

friendly coexistence, unity and cooperation realized through mutual respect and confidence by countries with different

civilization backgrounds and traditional cultures;

Point out, in particular, that the two agreements signed by the five heads of state of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the

People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan respectively

in Shanghai in 1996 and in Moscow in 1997, on confidence-building in the military sphere in border areas and on

mutual reduction of military forces in the border areas, and the summary documents signed during their meetings in

Alma-Ata (1998), Bishkek (1999), Dushanbe (2000), have made important contributions to preserving regional and

world peace, security and stability, greatly enriched contemporary diplomatic and regional cooperation practices and

exerted extensive and positive influence in the international society;

Firmly believe that against a background of the rapid development of the process of political multipolarization and

information globalization in the 21 st century, it is conducive to the member states more effectively jointly making use

of the opportunities and replying to the new challenges and threats;

And hereby solemnly declare:

1. The Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the

Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan have founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

2. The purposes of the SCO are: strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship among the member

states; encouraging effective cooperation among the member states in political, economic and trade, scientific and

technological, cultural, educational, energy, communications, environment and other fields; devoting themselves

jointly to preserving and safeguarding regional peace, security and stability; and establishing a democratic, fair and

rational new international political and economic order.

3. The SCO shall hold a formal meeting of heads of state of the member states a year, hold meetings of heads of

government regularly; the meetings shall be held in rotation among the member states. With a view to expanding and

strengthening cooperation in all fields, in addition to the established meeting mechanisms for the leaders of the

relevant departments, new meeting mechanisms may be set up in accordance with circumstances, and permanent

and temporary experts' groups may be formed to study work plans and proposals for further developing cooperation.

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4. The "Shanghai Spirit" formed during the "Shanghai Five" process, with "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,

consultation, respect for multicivilizations, striving for common development" as its basic contents, has been precious

treasure accumulated in the cooperation among the countries of the region in recent years. This spirit should be

carried forward so that it will become the norm governing relations among the SCO member states in the new

century.

5. The SCO member states shall abide by strictly the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

mutually respect independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, not interfere in each other's internal affairs, not

use or threaten to use force against each other, adhere to equality and mutual benefit, resolve all problems through

mutual consultations and not seek unilateral military superiority in contiguous regions.

6. The SCO has been evolved on the basis of the two agreements signed respectively in 1996 in Shanghai and in

1997 in Moscow on confidence-building in the military sphere in the border areas and on mutual reduction of military

forces in border areas. Its cooperation has been expanded to political, economic and trade, cultural, scientific and

technological, and other areas. The principles embodied in the above-mentioned agreements have determined the

basis of the mutual relations among the SCO member states.

7. The SCO adheres to the principle of non-alignment, does not target any other country or region, and is open to the

outside. It is ready to develop various forms of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation with other countries,

international and regional organizations. On the basis of consensus, it shall admit as its new members those

countries which recognize the cooperation purposes and tasks within the framework of the organization, the

principles expounded in Article 6 of the this declaration and other articles, and whose joining will facilitate the

realization of cooperation.

8. The SCO sets special store by and makes all necessary efforts to ensure regional security. The member states will

cooperate closely to implement the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,

including setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center of the SCO in Bishkek. Moreover, relevant multilateral cooperation

documents will be formulated to restrain illegal weapons and narcotics smuggling, illegal immigration and other

criminal activities.

9. The SCO will make use of the huge potential and extensive opportunities in the mutually beneficial cooperation in

economic and trade fields among its member states, strive to enhance further development of both bilateral and

multilateral cooperation among the member states and plurality of this cooperation. For this purpose, a negotiating

process on trade and investment facilitation will be initiated within the framework of the SCO to formulate an outline of

long-term, multilateral economic and trade cooperation and relevant documents will be signed.

10. The SCO member states will strengthen their consultations and coordination of activities in regional and

international affairs, support and cooperate with each other closely on major international and regional issues, and

jointly promote and consolidate peace and stability of the region and the world. In the current international situation, it

is of particular significance to preserve global strategic balance and stability.

11. To coordinate the cooperation of the departments in charge of the SCO member states and organize their mutual

collaboration, a State Coordinators' Council of the SCO member states is hereby set up and foreign ministers of the

SCO member states will approve the council's temporary rules to regulate its activities.

The heads of state instruct the State Coordinators' Council, on the basis of this declaration and the documents signed

by the heads of state of the "Shanghai Five", to start drafting the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

which, among other things, shall clearly enunciate the purposes, goals and tasks of future cooperation of the SCO,

the principle and procedures for the admission of new members, legal effect of the decisions made and the way to

conduct mutual coordination with other international organizations. The document will be signed at the 2002 meeting

of heads of state.

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Summarizing the past and looking forward into the future, the heads of state firmly believe that the founding of the

SCO marks the entry into a brand new development phase for the cooperation of the member states. This is in

conformity with the trend of the times, the realities of this region and the fundamental interests of the peoples of the

member states.

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev (signed)

President of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin (signed)

President of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Akayev (signed)

President of the Russian Federation V. Putin (signed)

President of the Republic of Tajikistan I. Rakhmonov (signed)

President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov (signed)713

713

“Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Regional Anti-Terrorist

Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), Normative Document, June 1, 2001,

http://www.ecrats.com/en/normative_documents/2006.

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A5: Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism

15.06.0001

The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Peoples' Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the

Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"), guided by the

purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning primarily the maintenance of international

peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States;

aware of the fact that terrorism, separatism and extremism constitute a threat to international peace and security, the

promotion of friendly relations among States as well as to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms;

recognizing that these phenomena seriously threaten territorial integrity and security of the Parties as well as their

political, economic and social stability;

guided by the principles of the Almaty Joint Statement of 3 July 1998, the Bishkek Declaration of 25 August 1999, the

Dushanbe Declaration of 5 July 2000 and the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization of 15 June 2001;

firmly believing that terrorism, separatism and extremism, as defined in this Convention, regardless their motives,

cannot be justified under any circumstances, and that the perpetrators of such acts should be prosecuted under the

law;

believing that joint efforts by the Parties within the framework of this Convention are an effective form of combating

terrorism, separatism and extremism, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the terms used in it shall have the following meaning:

1) "terrorism" means:

a) any act recognized as an offence in one of the treaties listed in the Annex to this Convention (hereinafter referred

to as "the Annex") and as defined in this Treaty;

b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active

part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to

organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a

population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain

from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the Parties;

2) "separatism" means any act intended to violate territorial integrity of a State including by annexation of any part of

its territory or to disintegrate a State, committed in a violent manner, as well as planning and preparing, and abetting

such act, and subject to criminal prosecuting in accordance with the national laws of the Parties;

3) "Extremism" is an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or changing violently the

constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organization, for

the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and participation in them, criminally prosecuted in conformity with the

national laws of the Parties.

2. This Article shall not affect any international treaty or any national law of the Parties, provides or may provide for a

broader application of the terms used in this Article.

Article 2

1. The Parties, in accordance with this Convention and other international obligations and with due regard for their

national legislations, shall cooperate in the area of prevention, identification and suppression of acts referred to in

Article 1 (1) of this Convention.

2. In their mutual relations, the Parties shall consider acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention as extraditable

offences.

3. In the course of implementation of this Convention with regard to issues concerning extradition and legal

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assistance in criminal cases, the Parties shall cooperate in conformity with international treaties to which they are

parties and national laws of the Parties.

Article 3

The Parties shall take such measures as can prove necessary, including, as appropriate, in the field of their domestic

legislation, in order to ensure that in no circumstances acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention should be

subject to acquittal based upon exclusively political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other

similar considerations and that they should entail punishment proportionate to their gravity.

Article 4

1. Within 60 days after the Depositary has been notified about the completion of internal procedures necessary for

the entry into force of this Convention, a Party shall provide to the Depositary, through diplomatic channels, in writing

a list of its central competent authorities responsible for the implementation of this Convention, and the Depositary

shall transmit the above list to other Parties.

2. Central competent authorities of the Parties in charge of issues relating to implementation of the provisions of this

Convention shall directly communicate and interact with each other.

3. In case of any amendments to the list of central competent authorities of a Party, that Party shall send an

appropriate notification to the Depositary who shall inform the other Parties accordingly.

Article 5

Upon mutual consent, the Parties can hold consultations, exchange views and coordinate their positions on issues of

combating acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, including within international organizations and at

international forums.

Article 6

In accordance with this Convention, the central competent authorities of the Parties shall cooperate and assist each

other through:

1) exchange of information;

2) execution of requests concerning operational search actions;

3) development and implementation of agreed measures to prevent, identify and suppress acts referred to in Article 1

(1) of this Convention, as well as mutual information on the results of their implementation;

4) implementation of measures to prevent, identify and suppress, in their territories, acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of

this Convention, that are aimed against other Parties;

5) implementation of measures to prevent, identify and suppress financing, supplies of weapons and ammunition or

any other forms of assistance to any person and/or organization for the purpose of committing acts referred to in

Article 1 (1) of this Convention;

6) implementation of measures to prevent, identify, suppress, prohibit or put an end to the activities aimed at training

individuals for the purpose of committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;

7) exchange of regulatory legal acts and information concerning practical implementation thereof;

8) exchange of experience in the field of prevention, identification or suppression of acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of

this Convention;

9) various forms of training, retraining or upgrading of their experts;

10) conclusion, upon mutual consent of the Parties, of agreements on other forms of cooperation, including, as

appropriate, practical assistance in suppressing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention and mitigating

consequences thereof. Such agreements shall be formalized in appropriate protocols that shall form an integral part

of this Convention.

Article 7

The central competent authorities of the Parties shall exchange information of mutual interest, inter alia, on:

1) planned and committed acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, as well as identified and suppressed

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attempts to commit them;

2) preparations to commit acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, aimed against heads of state or other

statesmen, personnel of diplomatic missions, consular services and international organizations, as well as other

persons under international protection and participants in governmental visits, international and governmental

political, sports and other events;

3) organizations, groups and individuals preparing and/or committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this

Convention or otherwise participating in those acts, including their purposes, objectives, ties and other information;

4) illicit manufacturing, procurement, storage, transfer, movement, sales or use of strong toxic, and poisonous

substances, explosives, radioactive materials, weapons, explosive devices, firearms, ammunition, nuclear, chemical,

biological or other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as materials and equipment which can be used for

their production, for the purpose of committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;

5) identified or suspected sources of financing of acts indicated in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;

6) forms, methods and means of committing acts indicated in Article 1 (1) of this Convention.

Article 8

1. Cooperation among central competent authorities of the Parties within the framework of this Convention shall be

carried out in a bilateral or multilateral format on the basis of a request for assistance as well as by way of providing

information upon the initiative of the central competent authority of a Party.

2. Requests or information shall be forwarded in writing. In case of urgency, the requests or information can be

transmitted orally but within 72 hours thereafter they should be confirmed in writing and with the use of technical

means of text transmission, as necessary. If there are any doubts about the authenticity of a request or information or

the contents thereof additional confirmation or clarification of the above documents can be requested.

3. A request should contain the following:

a) the name of the requesting and requested central competent authorities;

b) purposes of and grounds for the request;

c) description of the contents of the assistance required;

d) any other information which could be useful for a timely and appropriate execution of the request;

e) degree of confidentiality, as necessary.

4. Requests or information transmitted in writing shall be signed by the head of the requesting central competent

authority or his or her deputies or shall be certified by the official seal of that central competent authority.

5. Requests and documents transmitted therein, as well as information shall be provided by the central competent

authority in one of the working languages mentioned in Article 15 of this Convention.

Article 9

1. The requested central competent authority shall take all necessary measures to ensure a prompt and most

complete execution of the request and, within the shortest possible time, shall provide information on the results of its

consideration.

2. The requesting central competent authority shall be notified, without delay, about the circumstances that prevent or

significantly hamper the execution of a request.

3. If the execution of a request is outside the competence of the requested central competent authority that authority

shall transmit the request to another central competent authority of its State, which has the competence to execute it

and shall without delay notify the requesting central competent authority accordingly.

4. The requested central competent authority can request additional information which it considers necessary for the

execution of the request.

5. Requests shall be executed on the basis of the legislation of the requested Party. Upon request by the requesting

central competent authority, the legislation of the requesting Party may be applied if this does not contradict

fundamental legal principles or international obligations of the requested Party.

6. Execution of a request can be postponed or denied completely or in part in case the requested central competent

authority considers that its execution could prejudice the sovereignty, security, public order or other substantial

interests of its State or that it contradicts the legislation or international obligations of the requested Party.

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7. Execution of a request can be denied if the act in connection with which the request was made does not constitute

an offence under the legislation of the requested Party.

8. If, in accordance with paragraph 6 or 7 of this Article, the execution of a request is denied in full or in part or if it is

postponed, the requesting central competent authority shall be notified accordingly in writing.

Article 10

The Parties will conclude a separate agreement and will adopt other necessary documents in order to establish and

provide for functioning of a Parties' Regional Counter-terrorist Structure with the headquarters in Bishkek, the

purpose of which would be to effectively combat the acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention.

Article 11

1. For the purposes of implementation of this Convention, central competent authorities of the Parties may establish

emergency lines of communication and hold regular and extraordinary meetings.

2. For the purposes of implementation of the provisions of this Convention, the Parties may, as necessary, provide

technical and material assistance to each other.

3. Materials, special means, facilities and technical equipment received by a Party on the basis of this Convention

from another Party shall not be subject to transfer without a prior written consent of the providing Party.

4. Information about methods of conducting operational search activities, specifications of special forces and means

and supporting materials used by central competent authorities of the Parties in order to provide assistance within the

framework of this Convention, shall not be subject to disclosure.

Article 12

The central competent authorities of the Parties may conclude specific agreements among them governing modalities

for the implementation of this Convention.

Article 13

1. Each Party shall assure the confidential nature of the information and documents received if they are sensitive or if

the providing Party considers their disclosure undesirable. The degree of sensitiveness of such information and

documents shall be determined by the providing Party.

2. Without a written consent of the providing Party, the information or response to the request received pursuant to

this Convention, may not be used for purposes other than those for which they were requested or provided.

3. The information and documents received by a Party pursuant to this Convention from another Party shall not be

transmitted without a prior written consent of the providing Party.

Article 14

Each Party shall bear independently the costs of the implementation of this Convention, unless otherwise agreed.

Article 15

The working languages to be used by the central competent authorities of the Parties in their cooperation within the

framework of this Convention shall be Chinese and Russian.

Article 16

This Convention shall not limit the right of the Parties to conclude other international treaties on matters that

constitute the subject of this Convention and do not contradict its purposes and object, nor shall it affect the rights

and obligations of the Parties under other international treaties to which they are Parties.

Article 17

Any disputes, concerning interpretation or application of this Convention shall be settled through consultation and

negotiation between the interested Parties.

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Article 18

1. This Convention shall be deposited with the People's Republic of China. Official copies of this Convention shall be

sent by the Depositary to other Parties in the course of 15 days after its signing.

2. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the receipt by the Depositary the last notification

in writing from the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian

Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, or the Republic of Uzbekistan informing it of the completion of national

procedures necessary for this Convention to enter into force.

Article 19

1. Following the entry into force of this Convention other States may, subject to the consent of all the Parties, accede

to it.

This Convention shall enter into force for each acceding State on the thirtieth day following the receipt by the

Depositary of a notification in writing informing it of the completion of national procedures necessary for this

Convention to enter into force. On this date, the acceding State shall become Party to this Convention.

Article 20

1. Amendments and additions may, subject to the consent of all Parties, be made to the text of this Convention, which

shall be effected by Protocols being an integral part of this Convention.

2. Any Party may withdraw from this Convention by notifying in writing the Depositary of the decision 12 months prior

to the date of anticipated withdrawal. The Depositary shall inform the other Parties of this intention within a 30?day

period following the receipt of the notification of withdrawal.

Article 21

1. When forwarding to the Depositary its notification of the completion of internal procedures necessary for this

Convention to enter into force, a Party which does not participate in one of the treaties enumerated in the Annex may

declare that this Convention shall be applied to the Party with that treaty regarded as not included in the Annex. Such

declaration shall cease to be effective after notifying the Depositary of the entry of that treaty into force for the Party.

2. When one of the treaties listed in the Annex ceases to be effective for a Party, the latter shall make a declaration

as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. The Annex may be supplemented by treaties that meet the following conditions:

1) they are open for signature to all States;

2) they entered into force; and

3) they were ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by at least three Parties to this Convention.

4. After the entry into force of this Convention, any Party may propose an amendment to the Annex. The proposal for

amending the Annex shall be forwarded to the Depositary in written form. The Depositary shall notify all the proposals

that meet the requirements of paragraph 3 of this Article to the other Parties and seek their views on whether the

proposed amendment should be adopted.

5. The proposed amendment shall be considered adopted and shall come into force for all the Parties 180 days after

the Depositary has circulated the proposed amendment, except when one-third of the Parties to this Convention

inform in writing the Depositary of their objections to it.

Done at Shanghai, this 15th of June, 2001, in one original copy in the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts

having equal validity.

For the People's Republic of China

For the Republic of Kazakhstan

For the Kyrgyz Republic

For the Russian Federation

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For the Republic of Tajikistan

For the Republic of Uzbekistan714

714

“Shanghai Convention on Countering Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism,” Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure

of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), Normative Document,


http://www.ecrats.com/en/normative_documents/2005

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A.6 - Chapter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

07.06.2002

The People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the

Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan being the founding states of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (hereinafter SCO or the Organization),

Based on historically established ties between their peoples;

Striving for further enhancement of comprehensive cooperation;

Desiring to jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability in the region in the

environment of developing political multi-polarity and economic and information globalization;

Being convinced that the establishment of SCO will facilitate more efficient common use of opening possibilities and

counteracting new challenges and threats;

Considering that interaction within SCO will promote the realization of a huge potential of goodneighborliness, unity

and cooperation between States and their peoples;

Proceeding from the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural

variety and aspiration for joint development that was clearly established at the meeting of heads of six States in 2001

in Shanghai;

Noting that the compliance with the principles set out in the Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the

Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on

Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area of 26 April, 1996, and in the Agreement between the

People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the

Republic of Tajikistan on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area of 24 April , 1997, as well as in the

documents signed at summits of heads of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz

Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in the period from 1998

to 2001, has made an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region and in

the world;

Reaffirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other commonly

acknowledged principles and rules of international law related to the maintenance of international peace, security and

the development of goodneighborly and friendly relations, as well as the cooperation between States;

Guided by the provisions of the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of 15 June,

2001,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Goals and Tasks

The main goals and tasks of SCO are:

to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and goodneighborliness between the member States;

to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in

the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order;

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to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, to fight against illicit narcotics and

arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;

to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such spheres as politics, trade and economy, defense, law

enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, transport, credit and

finance, and also other spheres of common interest;

to facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through

joint action on the basis of equal partnership for the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and

improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member States;

to coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy;

to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of the member

States and their national legislation;

to maintain and develop relations with other States and international organizations;

to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful settlement;

to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in the 21st century.

Article 2

Principles

The member States of SCO shall adhere to the following principles:

mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-

aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking

no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas;

equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for

opinions of each of them;

gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest;

peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States;

SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations;

prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests;

implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and other documents adopted within the framework of

SCO, in good faith.

Article 3

Areas of Cooperation

The main areas of cooperation within SCO shall be the following:

maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region;

search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including issues arising within international

organizations and international fora;

development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism,

illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal

migration;

coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control;

support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in various forms, fostering favorable environment for

trade and investments with a view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and technologies;

effective use of available transportation and communication infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of

member States and development of energy systems;

sound environmental management, including water resources management in the region, and implementation of

particular joint environmental programs and projects;

mutual assistance in preventing natural and man-made disasters and elimination of their implications;

exchange of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within SCO;

development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology, education, health care, culture, sports and

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tourism.

The SCO member States may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual agreement.

Article 4

Bodies

1. For the implementation of goals and objectives of the present Charter the following bodies shall operate within the

Organization:

The Council of Heads of State;

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers);

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies;

The Council of National Coordinators;

The Regional Counter-terrorist Structure;

Secretariat.

2. The functions and working procedures for the SCO bodies, other than the Regional Counter-terrorist Structure,

shall be governed by appropriate provisions adopted by the Council of Heads of State.

3. The Council of Heads of State may decide to establish other SCO bodies. New bodies shall be established by the

adoption of additional protocols to the present Charter which enter into force in the procedure, set forth in Article 21 of

this Charter.

Article 5

The Council of Heads of State

The Council of Heads of State shall be the supreme SCO body. It shall determine priorities and define major areas of

activities of the Organization, decide upon the fundamental issues of its internal arrangement and functioning and its

interaction with other States and international organizations, as well as consider the most topical international issues.

The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council of Heads of State shall be chaired

by the head of State organizing this regular meeting. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall generally be

determined in the Russian alphabetic order of names of the SCO member States.

Article 6

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) shall approve the budget of the Organization, consider and

decide upon major issues related to particular, especially economic, spheres of interaction within the Organization.

The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the head of

Government (Prime Minister) of the State on whose territory the meeting takes place.

The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall be determined by prior agreement among heads of Government

(Prime Ministers) of the member States.

Article 7

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall consider issues related to day-to-day activities of the Organization,

preparation of meetings of the Council of Heads of State and holding of consultations on international problems within

the Organization. The Council may, as appropriate, make statements on behalf of SCO.

The Council shall generally meet one month prior to a meeting of the Council of Heads of State. Extraordinary

meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be convened on the initiative of at least two member

States and upon consent of ministers of foreign affairs of all other member States. The venue of a regular or

extraordinary meeting of the Council shall be determined by mutual agreement.

The Council shall be chaired by the minister of foreign affairs of the member State on whose territory the regular

meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, during the period starting from the date of the last ordinary

meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.

Hoyt, David

277

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall represent the Organization in its external contacts, in

accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council.

Article 8

Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies

According to decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)

heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the member States shall hold, on a regular basis, meetings for

consideration of particular issues of interaction in respective fields within SCO.

A meeting shall be chaired by the head of a respective ministry and/or agency of the State organizing the meeting.

The venue and date of a meeting shall be agreed upon in advance.

For the preparation and holding meetings the member States may, upon prior agreement, establish permanent or ad

hoc working groups of experts which carry out their activities in accordance with the regulations adopted by the

meetings of heads of ministries and/or agencies. These groups shall consist of representatives of ministries and/or

agencies of the member States.

Article 9

The Council of National Coordinators

The Council of National Coordinators shall be a SCO body that coordinates and directs day-to-day activities of the

Organization. It shall make the necessary preparation for the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council

of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. National coordinators shall

be appointed by each member State in accordance with its internal rules and procedures.

The Council shall hold its meetings at least three times a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the

national coordinator of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State

takes place, from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next

ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.

The Chairman of the Council of National Coordinators may on the instruction of the Chairman of the Council of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of

Procedure of the Council of National Coordinators.

Article 10

Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure

The Regional Counter-terrorist Structure established by the member States of the Shanghai Convention to combat

terrorism, separatism and extremism of 15 June, 2001, located in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic, shall be a standing

SCO body.

Its main objectives and functions, principles of its constitution and financing, as well as its rules of procedure shall be

governed by a separate international treaty concluded by the member States, and other necessary instruments

adopted by them.

Article 11

Secretariat

Secretariat shall be a standing SCO administrative body. It shall provide organizational and technical support to the

activities carried out in the framework of SCO and prepare proposals on the annual budget of the Organization.

The Secretariat shall be headed by the Executive Secretary to be appointed by the Council of Heads of State on

nomination by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Executive Secretary shall be appointed from among the nationals of member States on a rotational basis in the

Russian alphabetic order of the member States' names for a period of three years without a right to be reappointed

for another period.

The Executive Secretary deputies shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on nomination by

the Council of National Coordinators. They cannot be representatives of the State from which the Executive Secretary

has been appointed.

Hoyt, David

278

The Secretariat officials shall be recruited from among nationals of the member States on a quota basis.

The Executive Secretary, his deputies and other Secretariat officials in fulfilling their official duties should not request

or receive instructions from any member State and/or government, organization or physical persons. They should

refrain from any actions that might affect their status as international officials reporting to SCO only.

The member States shall undertake to respect the international character of the duties of the Executive Secretary, his

deputies and Secretariat staff and not to exert any influence upon them as they perform their official functions.

The SCO Secretariat shall be located at Beijing (the People's Republic of China).

Article 12

Financing

SCO shall have its own budget drawn up and executed in accordance with a special agreement between member

States. This agreement shall also determine the amount of contributions paid annually by member States to the

budget of the Organization on the basis of a cost-sharing principle.

Budgetary resources shall be used to finance standing SCO bodies in accordance with the above agreement. The

member States shall cover themselves the expenses related to the participation of their representatives and experts

in the activities of the Organization.

Article 13

Membership

The SCO membership shall be open for other States in the region that undertake to respect the objectives and

principles of this Charter and to comply with the provisions of other international treaties and instruments adopted in

the framework of SCO.

The admission of new members to SCO shall be decided upon by the Council of Heads of State on the basis of a

representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in response to an official request from the State

concerned addressed to the acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

SCO membership of a member State violating the provisions of this Charter and/or systematically failing to meet its

obligations under international treaties and instruments, concluded in the framework of SCO, may be suspended by a

decision of the Council of Heads of State adopted on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers

of Foreign Affairs. If this State goes on violating its obligations, the Council of Heads of State may take a decision to

expel it from SCO as of the date fixed by the Council itself.

Any member State shall be entitled to withdraw from SCO by transmitting to the Depositary an official notification of

its withdrawal from this Charter no later than twelve months before the date of withdrawal. The obligations arising

from participation in this Charter and other instruments adopted within the framework of SCO shall be binding for the

corresponding States until they are completely fulfilled.

Article 14

Relationship with Other States and International Organizations

SCO may interact and maintain dialogue, in particular in certain areas of cooperation, with other States and

international organizations.

SCO may grant to the State or international organization concerned the status of a dialogue partner or observer. The

rules and procedures for granting such a status shall be established by a special agreement of member States.

This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the member States under other international treaties in

which they participate.

Article 15

Legal Capacity

As a subject of international law, SCO shall have international legal capacity. It shall have such a legal capacity in the

territory of each member State, which is required to achieve its goals and objectives.

SCO shall enjoy the rights of a legal person and may in particular:

- conclude treaties;

Hoyt, David

279

- acquire movable and immovable property and dispose of it;

- appear in court as litigant;

- open accounts and have monetary transactions made.

Article 16

Decisions-Taking Procedure

The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no

member State has raised objections during the vote (consensus), except for the decisions on suspension of

membership or expulsion from the Organization that shall be taken by "consensus minus one vote of the member

State concerned".

Any member State may expose its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which

shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.

Should one or several member States be not interested in implementing particular cooperation projects of interest to

other member States, non?participation of the above said member States in these projects shall not prevent the

implementation of such cooperation projects by the member States concerned and, at the same time, shall not

prevent the said member States from joining such projects at a later stage.

Article 17

Implementation of Decisions

The decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member States in accordance with the

procedures set out in their national legislation.

Control of the compliance with obligations of the member States to implement this Charter, other agreements and

decisions adopted within SCO shall be exercised by the SCO bodies within their competence.

Article 18

Permanent Representatives

In accordance with their domestic rules and procedures, the member States shall appoint their permanent

representatives to the SCO Secretariat, which will be members of the diplomatic staff of the embassies of the

member States in Beijing.

Article 19

Privileges and Immunities

SCO and its officials shall enjoy in the territories of all member States the privileges and immunities which are

necessary for fulfilling functions and achieving goals of the Organization.

The volume of privileges and immunities of SCO and its officials shall be determined by a separate international

treaty.

Article 20

Languages

The official and working languages of SCO shall be Russian and Chinese.

Article 21

Duration and Entry into Force

This Charter shall be of indefinite duration.

This Charter shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following

the date of the deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification.

For a State which signed this Charter and ratified it thereafter it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its

instrument of ratification with the Depositary.

Upon its entering into force this Charter shall be open for accession by any State.

Hoyt, David

280

For each acceding State this Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of receiving by the

Depositary of appropriate instruments of accession.

Article 22

Settlement of Disputes

In case of disputes or controversies arising out of interpretation or application of this Charter member States shall

settle them through consultations and negotiations.

Article 23

Amendments and Additions

By mutual agreement of member States this Charter can be amended and supplemented. Decisions by the Council of

Heads of State concerning amendments and additions shall be formalized by separate protocols which shall be its

integral part and enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided for by Article 21 of this Charter.

Article 24

Reservations

No reservations can be made to this Charter which contradict the principles, goals and objectives of the Organization

and could prevent any SCO body from performing its functions. If at least two thirds of member States have

objections the reservations must be considered as contradicting the principles, goals and objectives of the

Organization or preventing any body from performing its functions and being null and void.

Article 25

Depositary

The People's Republic of China shall be the Depositary of this Charter.

Article 26

Registration

Pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Charter is subject to registration with the Secretariat

of the United Nations.

Done at Saint-Petersburg the seventh day of June 2002 in a single original in the Chinese and Russian languages,

both texts being equally authoritative.

The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with the Depositary who will circulate its certified copies to all

signatory States.715

715

Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), Normative

Document, “Chapter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” July 16, 2000,


Hoyt, David

281

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