The Significance for Cognitive Realism of the Thought of John Poinsot - Douglas B. Rasmussen

The Significance for Cognitive Realism of theThought of John Poinsot

by Douglas B. Rasmussen

To the question "Whether the formal rationale constitutive ofa sign as such consists, primarily and essentially, in anontological or in a transcendental relation," we have only twosystematically conceived answers. One, published by a pro-fessor at Alcala, in Iberia, in the year 1632, according to whichconcepts (being natural signs formal in type) as they functionin cognition are ontologically relative, and so sustain theconvertibility of being with truth: this is Poinsot's Treatise onSigns. The other, published by a professor at Konigsberg,Germany, in 1781, according to which concepts even as func-tioning in actual cognition remain primarily transcendentalin their relative being, and so compromise the transcendentalcharacter of truth (that is, the character of truth as mind-in-dependently founded) and its convertibility with being.—John Deely, "Editorial AfterWord," Tractatus de Signis,508-09.

It seems very hard to defend cognitive realism in this day and age.To some contemporary philosophers the very idea of making referenceto realities that exist and are what they are apart from some concep-tual/linguistic scheme is unintelligible. For them such realism is noth-ing more than a relic from the classical and mediaeval past. To others,it is the central metaphysical and epistemological truth upon which allwisdom is based. To many, realism is but a part of an endless debate inwhich philosophers engage without too much evidence of progress. I planto continue the debate, but I do nonetheless hope to provide someevidence of progress.

I argued recently, in response to Hilary Putnam's assertion that

1 Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Realism, Intentionality, and the Nature of Logical

Copyright 1994, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVIII, No. 3

410 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYreference to transtheoretical/translinguistic reality is impossible, thatPutnam had failed to consider Poinsot's claim that a concept or inten-tion2 is a formal sign which as such does not stand in need of somescheme, linguistic or otherwise, to relate it to reality. As a result,Putnam failed to see the import of concepts as formal signs for therealisi/anti-realist debate. In the penultimate paragraph of my critiqueof Putnam,3 I considered the following objection: "Concepts do not existapart from mental acts; but if this is so, how can concepts have theirrelational character in virtue of themselves? Does not their power torefer or signify depend on our mental acts and thus how we choose torelate them to realities? If this is so, are we not back with Putnam inholding that all reference and signification depend on our conceptualchoices?" My response was that, while it is true that concepts do not existapart from our mental activities, this does not mean that the relationalnature of concepts is determined by how we choose to relate them. Onthe contrary, the relational or intentional character of concepts flowsfrom the fact that they are essentially relative: their being consists inrelating, and this does not depend on us. Just as the mental acts which

Relations," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 65(1992): 267-77.2 'Concept' or 'intention' can, of course be used to describe the psychological actsof cognition as well as the logical instruments of cognition. I shall be using theseterms primarily in the latter sense. I am using 'logical' here in an Aristoteliansense, that is, as an organon or tool for knowledge. Also, when I speak of logicalrelations," I am referring to concepts, propositions, and arguments, which arerelations of reason because they never exist apart from psychological operationsbut are, nonetheless, distinct from and not reducible to them. Finally, I amfollowing the practice of Francis H. Parker and Henry B. Veatch in their book,Logic as a Human Instrument (New York and Evanston: Harper & RowPublishers, 1959), 28-29, in considering logical relations or second intentions asformal signs. This, however, requires further explanation.

To begin with, it should be noted that there is a significant, though confusing,ambiguity in the word 'intention.' It may be used to indicate the operation ofintendi/ig or the object which is intended. Thus an intention involves an objectintended in an intending. Suppose, for example, that the object intended is ahorse and that the operation of intending is one of conceptualization. We maysay, then, that a horse is the first intended of a first intending. The firstintending, however, can become the object of a second intending.

We may note that what is formed by this act of conceptualization is the conceptof a horse. We can note the concept's features, such as predicability, and howthese features may be related, such as genus to species. Thus, the concept of ahorse becomes the second intended, and it has features that its object, the firstintended, a horse, does not have. Moreover, we can note that there is an overallcharacter that all logical relations have that first intended objects do not have.This is intentionality; for they are that in and through which first intendingsintend their objects. Thus, logical relations or second intentions are formal signsor intentional in nature, because they are simply that in which first intendingscarry out their acts of cognition.3 "Realism, Intentionality," 274.

COGNITIVE REALISM 411

produce concepts do not have to be thought of to exist and have thenature they have, so. also it is with concepts: they do not have to beobjects of some awareness in order to exist or to have their relationalnature.

Though sufficient for casting doubt on Putnam's views, my claim thatconcepts as formal signs are essentially relative requires further expla-nation. I propose to provide additional explanation now. I will use someof the central insights that Poinsot develops in his Tractatus de Signis,which is the principal classical locus for discussions in this area.4 In thisway I also plan to show the importance of Poinsot's thought for cognitiverealism.5 Poinsot's views seem to be the best hope for the realist claimthat knowledge of transtheoretical/translinguistic reality is possible.

1.

I shall understand "realism" to consist of two claims. The first isontological in nature and the second is epistemological:

1. There are beings which exist, and are what they are,

4 See the critical bilingual edition of John Poinsot, Tractatus de Signis, ed. JohnDeely in consultation with Ralph A. Powell (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1985). Henceforward I will often abbreviate this work to TDS. Also, seeYves Simon, John Glanville, and Donald Hollenhorst's translation, TheMaterial Logic of John of St. Thomas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1955). The Simon translation includes much material from Poinsot's workoutside the scope of the Deely edition of the Tractatus de Signis (for particulars,see the "Editorial AfterWord" to TDS, 406 note 15).These two major English translations of Poinsot's philosophical work are both

based on the Ars Logica, which is Volume I of the three-volume CursusPhilosophicus of Poinsot in the edition of B. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930-1937),although Deely brings in much material from the other volumes in notes to theTractatus text. Reiser's edition of Poinsot's philosophical work is standardlyreferred to by volume, page, column, and line numbers. Difficulties peculiar totranslating Poinsot's Latin are discussed at length by Deely, Tractatus deSignis, 457ff.6 This is not to say that Poinsot's thought is only important for the issue ofcognitive realism. His insights have implications for both the philosophy of mind(for example, mental states cannot be reduced without remainder to physicalstates), and language (for example, thought is actualized in language and is notsomething private and internally present only to the knower). For a discussionof these claims, see Douglas B. Rasmussen "Deely, Wittgenstein, and MentalEvents," The New Scholasticism 54 (Winter 1980): 60-67; "Wittgenstein and theSearch for Meanings," in Semiotics 1982, eds. John Deely and Jonathan Evans(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 577-90; and "Rorty,Wittgenstein, and the Nature of Intentionality," Proceedings of the AmericanCatholic Philosophical Association 57 (1983): 152-62.8 I shall confine myself in this essay to discussing the importance of Poinsot'sthought for cognitive realism. It would, however, be remiss of me not to notethat Poinsot indicates that the term "relatio rationis" has a wider extension than

412 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYindependent and apart from, anyone's cognition of them.

2. These beings can be known more or less adequately, oftenwith great difficulty, but still known as they really are.

There are, however, many other distinctions that must be made if thisaccount of realism is to be properly understood:

(a) A real being is a being whose existence and nature is independentof its being thought about or, in general, being cognized. Its existenceand nature is not dependent upon the fact that it may be an object ofawareness. Note carefully, therefore, that mental or psychological ac-tivities, since they do not have to be objectified or known in order to existor be what they are, are not mind-dependent in the sense contrastedwith real beings. On the contrary, they are a subset of real beings.

(b) A being of reason is a being whose existence and nature isdependent on its being thought about. It is an object-of-thought, or moreexactly, an object-of-awareness. It would be wrong, however, to identifya being of reason with the psychological activities sufficient for itsexistence. A being of reason is in principle distinct from a real being—regardless of whether it be physical or psychological—for a being ofreason only exists in relation to some knower. It is for that reason anobjective being. A real being does not exist only in relation to someknower. It does not require a subject to which to be related. It could,then, contrary to what is common in English usage, be termed a"subjective" being,8 be it physical or psychological.

(c) A physical being is a being whose existence is independent ofmental or psychological activities. Sometimes a physical being is also

just logical relations or second intentions. (Tractates de Signis, First Preamble,article 2, 58-64.) This term also refers to fictional, mathematical, and culturalbeings—in principle, to all the various forms of human thought and expression.Further, it is the case that many things which are first intentions, for example,a thoroughbred horse like Secretariat, are not simply beings in rerum natura,but beings that are the result of much artifice, custom, and convention. This is,of course, not to deny that there are beings in rerum natura that exist and arewhat they are, nor is it to say that there is not an important difference betweenthe concept "horse" and a horse. Yet it is to say that many of our first intentionsdo involve relations resulting from the activities of speculative or practicalreason. Indeed, there is a history that is involved with some of them. There is,however, more to this issue than I can discuss here. So, it will have to sufficefor me to observe that I do not think any of the foregoing observations areinconsistent with realism as I have defined it here.7 For purposes of this discussion we will ignore the issue of how thesedistinctions would be modified if we assume the existence of a Deity.8 The consequences of such a terminological shift are developed at length byJohn Deely, first in his Basics of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1990), but especially in his more recent The Human Use of Signs(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), which is a kind of extended essayon the point.

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called a "real" being in order to indicate the dependency of the psycho-logical on the physical, but not vice-versa. In other words, mental orpsychological activities do not exist apart from physical states, such asneurological conditions of the brain, but physical states can exist apartfrom mental or psychological activities. This is, of course, not to say themental or psychological can be reduced without remainder to the physi-cal.

(d) A mental or psychological being is an activity of a particular mindor consciousness. It is important to note that while a mental or psycho-logical being, for example, an act of perceiving or of conceiving, cannotexist apart from a particular knower, a being of reason, for example, theconcept of hydrogen or the character Hamlet, is independent of anyparticular knower. It is, however, not independent of every particularknower, tout court.9

2.

As said, realism claims that we can know both the existence andnature of reality. The nature of the cognitive relation is such that whatone knows is not some tertium quid—be it a copy or image or idea—butreality itself. When one knows something, one knows it, not somethingelse. Thus if one knows something, there is an identification by theknower of the object. An identity between knower and known results.This identity is a formal identity in that the form of the object becomespresent to the knower. The process by which an identity betweenknower and known is achieved—specifically the role of logical relationsin this process—will be discussed shortly.

It is crucial to realize at the start that it is the very nature or formof a real being that makes it potentially sensible and intelligible and notthe knower. The knower does not'create the sensibility and intelligibilityof a real being. It is the knower, however, who makes a real beingactually sensible and intelligible. Though what can sound and what canhear are different things, the actual sounding of the sound and theactual hearing are one actuality, as Aristotle notes (DeAnima, 466al5),

9 See the summary discussion in John Deely, "The Ontological Status ofIntentionality," The New Scholasticism 2 (Spring, 1972): 232-33, note 24.10 See Joseph Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (Houston, TX: TheCenter for Thomistic Studies, 1992), 33-62; and John Wild, Introduction toRealistic Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948), 407-12and 441-68 for an excellent account of the formal identity between knower andknown.

414 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

and as Aquinas claims (De Veritate, q. 8): "Knower and known are oneprinciple of activity inasmuch as one reality results from them both,namely the mind in act. I say that one reality is the result, becausetherein mind is conjoined with its object." So, as said, there are nointermediate entities that are known, but only one actuality. Theactualization of objects of sense and thought is the actualization of senseand thought faculties.

Though the knower receives the form of the object and thus ismetaphysically passive, the knower must be epistemologically active forcognition to occur. Thus, the cognitive relation is real because theformal identity between knower and known does not need to be an objectof cognition in order to exist. Knower and known are really identified.Yet such a relation cannot exist without the requisite psychological ormental activities and the logical relations they create.

Accordingly, the passive and active dimensions of human knowledgegives rise to the distinction between the real cognitive relation ofidentity and the logical relations which make it possible.12 These logicalrelations do not represent or signify something in virtue of being like orsimilar to that other thing, but simply in virtue of being of or about thatother thing. As said, they are intentions or formal signs, but what is thenature of these intentions or formal signs? They are essentially relative,for they necessarily involve an ordination or respect to something else.Yet such relations as "north of," "father of," "equal to," and even "similarto" do not capture the character of intentions or formal signs. Theirwhole nature does not consist in being merely of or about somethingelse. They have a character of their own. They cannot be used to explainthe character of intentions or formal signs. So, what sort of relation couldserve to explain the nature of intentions or formal signs?

3.

Henry B. Veatch in his classic work, Intentional Logic, followsPoinsot in arguing that logical relations are fundamentally intentionalrelations of identity:

There is a type of structure or relation of which it may be saidnot just that it can serve as an intentional form, but ratherthat it is simply an intentional form. That relation, I believe,

"See Poinsot, TDS Book II, Questions 1-3.12Obviously, sense perception plays a crucial role in the acquisition ofknowledge, but a discussion of this role will have to be left for another time.However, see David Kelley, Evidence of the Senses: A Realist Theory ofPerception (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

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COGNITIVE REALISM

is none other than a relation of identity.13

415

He claims that concepts, propositions, and arguments have differentfunctions, but they each constitute a relation of identity. They respec-tively allow the knower to identify what something is (essence), whethersomething is (existence), and why something is (cause).14 They are, asalready noted, the relations through which the real cognitive relationcomes about.

The basic idea behind the claim, that an intentional form is a relationof identity is as follows: since to know anything, regardless of what itmay be, requires that we know what it is, this means that we have toknow it in terms of what it is. Accordingly, we must intellectuallyseparate what something is from itself and reidentify it. This is pre-cisely what a relation of intentional identity is. A relation of identity canonly hold between a thing and itself, not something else, but in order tobe identified with itself, it must in some sense or other be separated fromitself. Thus, a relation of identity cannot be like a relation amongphysical things, because no such being is ever separate from itself, muchless related back to itself. It is only through an act of abstraction thatthe intelligible features of things can be universalized and becomepredicable. It its only through an act of judgment that something isactually predicated and thus identified with itself, and it is only throughan act of reasoning that something is demonstrated or explained andthus identified as the cause of something else. Thus, relations of identitymust be relations of reason.

There is, however, much involved in the claim that an intentionalform is a relation of identity. To see more clearly just what an intentionalrelation of identity is we shall examine the particular case of concepts.The context for this examination will be the "problem of universals."

The problem of universals as it will be discussed here is based onepistemological considerations. If our concepts are to provide knowledgeof what something is, it must be accomplished by abstraction. It isimpossible to recognize anything, for example, what a horse is, withoutdistinguishing it from the things with which it is conjoined but which

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/ersity Press, 1986).

13Henry B. Veatch, Intentional Logic: A Logic Based On Philosophical Realism(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1952; reprinted 1970 by Archon Books),23. Veatch states in the preface, "I have relied heavily on the very rich but sadlyneglected Ars Logica of John of St. Thomas." See Poinsot, "On the UniversalConsidered in Itself," Part II, Question 3, of The Material Logic of John of St.Thomas, but especially article 5, "Whether universality consists essentially ina relation," 123-30 (= Artis Logicae Secunda Pars, q. 3 "De Universal! SecundumSe," art. 5 "An consistat essentialiter universalitas in relatione," Reiser ed. I333a28-342b48).14 For a thorough discussion of this claim, see Francis H, Parker and Henry B.Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument (New York: Harper & Row, 1959) inaddition to Veatch's Intentional Logic.

416 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYare really different from it, for example, a horse's color, size, and shape.The senses alone cannot provide such recognition; a conceptual consid-eration is needed.

Yet to consider just what a horse is, as such, apart from its color, size,and shape is to have a universal concept of horse, because it is to considerany horse, or horse in general, without regard to any of its individuatingfeatures. If the foregoing, however, is true, that is, if what a horse is

is really distinct from its color, size, and shape and if through abstractionwe consider horse just as such in itself, then it would seem that we donot know the nature or essence of any individual horse but rather someuniversal nature or essence of horse.

So, it seems that if we are to have knowledge, we must have universalconcepts; but if we have such concepts, we do not know particular things,but only universal natures. Essences would not really be particularizedbut would instead be universal. This is, of course, the challenge ofPlatonic extreme realism. On the other hand, if to avoid the threat ofextreme realism we deny that we have universal concepts and confineour concepts to what the senses explicitly recognize for themselves, thenwe are very limited in our ability to differentiate and discriminate. Wewould have no real knowledge of what even a horse, for example, is. Insuch a context, the very claim that there is a nature or essence thatmakes a horse what it is would indeed be most dubious.15 This is, ofcourse, the challenge of nominalism.

To meet the challenge presented by Platonic realism and nominalismit should first be determined just what it is to say that the essence ofsomething is really distinct from something else. Most generally put, itmeans that everything is what it is and not something else. For example,a substance is not its quality (a horse is not its color), even though asubstance has a quality (a horse has a color). A substance is a substance,and a quality is a quality. Neither is the other nor anything else. Thisdistinction is a real distinction. It holds in reality, apart from whatanyone says or knows. To say that some essence is really distinct fromanother essence, however, does not necessarily mean that they existapart from one another—as do, say, two substances, the horses Secre-tariat and Seattle Slew. Our ability to separate an essence from otheressences through abstraction, to consider it universally apart from itsindividuating conditions, does not mean that it really exists apart fromother essences or in any manner other than as particularized. Essencesneed only be abstract and universal when considered by the mind.

Be this as it may, it seems nonetheless that the problem of universalsremains, because the intellectual activity of abstraction which makesessences universal would seem to distort reality. Essences as they exist

16 See Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism," The NewScholasticism 58 (Summer 1984): 316-35, for a discussion of this issue.

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in reality are particular and conjoined with other essences. So, how canthat which is a universal ever be identified with that which is particular?Concepts cannot tell us what things really are and thus are anythingbut relations of identity.

The solution to this problem has two parts. The first part comes fromAquinas. An essence considered in itself, apart from its manner ofexistence and solely in terms of its intelligible content, is neitherexistent nor non-existent. Nor is it either particular or universal.17 Itis, however, capable of existing in either manner. The very sameessence, for example, "horse," that exists as individuated in many horsescan also exist as one when conceived intellectually. Thus, we canthrough abstraction conceive the whole essence or nature of a particu-lar thing,19 not some universal essence or part, because the manner ofexistence of an essence does not pertain to the essence itself. It is theneutrality of essences in themselves to their manner of existence thatallows Aquinas to make the following observation (Summa ContraGentiles, II, 2.75): "Although it is necessary for the truth of cognitionthat the cognition answer to the thing known, still it is not necessarythat the mode of the thing known be the same as the mode of itscognition." Being a universal pertains to the mode of existence of anessence as an object of cognition. It does not pertain to the essence itself,and does not require that an essence in reality, apart from cognition, be

16Aquinas, Being and Essence, 2nd ed. rev., trans. Armand Maurer, C.S.B.(Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 37-44."This type of consideration is called an "absolute consideration," where oneabstracts from every way of existing but prescinds from none (see followingnote). One thus never encounters an essence absolutely considered in reality orcognition, for the essence is freed from all modes of existence. Yet it is an essenceso considered that makes conceptual knowledge possible.18Technically, this is abstraction without precision—that is, abstraction whichmerely does not express, as opposed to excludes, differentiating traits of anessence or nature. What this type of abstraction considers is the wholeindividual viewed in a distinctive way as, for example, when we abstract theessence "horse." "Horse" is truly predicable of Secretariat. It is not merely ofsome "part." Abstraction with precision, however, cuts off differentiating traitsas, for example, when one abstracts a form as a part, say, "horseness." This isnot an abstraction of a whole. "Horseness" is not truly predicable of Secretariat.In non-precisive abstraction differentiating traits are implicit. For example,though the non-precisive abstraction of the essence "horse" does not specify theparticular color, size, or shape of the essence "horse"—it can be any within acertain range—it does require that there be some determinate color, size, orshape the essence "horse" takes. It thus includes the differentiating traits in thesense that it allows them to be different in each instance when they are madeexplicit.19Particular things are the material objects which we know through theirintelligible aspects (natures), which are the formal objects. The material objectsare what we know and the formal objects are what we know about them. SeeParker and Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument, 47, n. 1.


anything other than always individualized. Conceptualization need notdistort reality.20

The second part of the solution to the charge that conceptualizationdistorts reality comes from Poinsot.21 The universal is not somethingexisting by itself—whether it be a Platonic "form," some Porphyrian"part" existing in particular things (in rebus) or some "idea" which onementally inspects before knowing anything else. It is not some tertiumquid. Rather, it is a relation.22 The foundation for this relation is theessence or nature as such that has been abstracted, but the universalitself is the expression of this nature as a whole (or unit) which bearsupon its many instances. The universal is a relation of one nature oressence to many particulars in which it is found.23 This relation is arelation of reason in that it is the result of an intellectual process ofabstraction and comparison. It is a relation of identity because it isthe same essence, the essence considered in itself, that is both one andmany.

As a universal, a nature or essence is capable of being predicated ofmany, but what is predicated is the essence as such, not the universal.The mode of existence which makes it possible, for example, to predicate"horse" of Secretariat does not pertain the essence "horse" itself. Oneshould be careful not to confuse the mode of existence of the essence"horse" when intellectually conceived as one—the second intention—with its mode of existence as it exists in many—the first intention. To

think things to be other than they are is to think falsely—for example, tothink that Secretariat had no color, size, or shape. To think of Secretariat,however, without thinking of his color, size, or shape involves no falsehood. Toabstract is not the same as to judge falsely ("abstractio non est mendacium,"isthe old scholastic adage).21 Tractates de Signis, Book I, question 1, "Whether a sign is in the order ofrelation," 116-34, and Book II, question 2, "Whether a Concept is a Formal Sign,"240-53.^Poinsot makes clear in the Tractates de Signis that the concept understood as"a specifying form expressed by the understanding" is "most properly a formalsign" (24fyl3-15), and that the being proper to a sign is that of "a relationaccording to the way a relation has being" (119/10-15).23Aristotle (De Anima, 3.4429bl6-17) describes this relationship as being likethe relationship that a bent line has to itself when pulled out straight.24 Arelation of reason can be of two types: either with no foundation in real beingsor with a foundation in real beings. It is, of course, being argued that we arehere dealing with the latter type. (See Poinsot, Artis Logicae Secunda Pars, q.17 "De Ente Rationis Logico," art. 3, "Quid Sit Distinctio et Unitas RationisRatiocinatae et Ratiocinantis," Reiser ed. I 294a3-300b48.)26 A concept's signification involves both comprehension, which is not limited towhat is only explicitly considered, and an extension that extends over anindefinite number of individuals. A concept's signification is, then, notsomething that is determined by an inspectio mentis procedure. On this verypoint, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Logical Possibility: An AristotelianEssentialist Critique," The Thomist 47 (October 1983): 423-40.

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ignore this point is to commit a fallacy. This is illustrated by thefollowing syllogism: (1) Secretariat is a horse. (2) Horse is a universal.(3) Therefore, Secretariat is a universal.

Though it is doubtful that there ever has been anyone who hasseriously and explicitly accepted a syllogism of this sort, it is the verysame reasoning that lies behind the epistemological form of the problemof universals. Both extreme realists and nominalists fail to see thatessences in themselves are neutral with respect to their manner ofexistence, and both fail to see that a universal's essential character isthat of a relation. As a consequence of these dual failures, a universalis treated as if it were either the primary object of cognition or simplygroupings of individuals whose basis is, at best, some vague resemblanceor, at worst, something entirely arbitrary. In either case our conceptscannot know the essence or nature of individual things. If Aquinas andPoinsot are right, however, such a consequence seems avoidable.

4.

Has the charge that concepts cannot tell us what things really arebeen entirely met? As universals, concepts are a relation of identitybetween an abstracted essence and the possible particulars in whichthat essence exists. Yet how are we to understand a universal's statusas a relation? If relations of identity are to be formal signs, they have tohave the ability to refer or signify in virtue of themselves. They need tohave the character of a relation. Yet do they have a respect or ordinationto something because of themselves, or because of how they are under-stood? Do they really allow the knower to overcome the limits of his orher subjectivity, or is it ultimately the case that all referring,27 meaning,or signifying is determined by how we attempt to explain things? Or, toexpress the issue as Kant saw it, do our concepts conform to the objectsor do the objects conform to our concepts?

It would seem that if cognitive realism is to be possible, the relationalstructure that we recognize our logical instruments to have cannot quarelation be something that results from their being an object of cogni-tion. Instead, their relational structure must be independent of cogni-tion. It must be something real; something they have by their verynature. It is here, then, that we come to the central insight of Poinsot'sTractatus de Signis. Poinsot argues that the relation that is proper to a

26 The failure to see that a universal is a relation is also found in those so-called"moderate realists" who hold that there are universal natures existing inparticular things, in rebus.271 use 'referring' in a semantic sense and not solely to indicate existentialdenotation. For a discussion of the importance of not conflating these two sensesof the term, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism,"320. n. 10.


formal sign is that of a relation considered just as such, that is, accordingto the way relation has being.28 To better understand this claim,however, we need to avail ourselves of the following distinction.

This distinction is between a relation secundum esse (RSE) and arelation secundum did (RSD). 'Esse' does not mean here existence butessence. The distinction pertains to that which is by its very nature arelation and that which is not. Something is a RSE when both itsdefinition and explanation require a reference to something else. Some-thing is a RSD when it can be defined without reference to another, butcannot be explained or accounted for except by reference to somethingelse.29 This distinction focuses on the way that relations have being

28 Deely coins the term "ontological relation" in order to replace the cumbersomeexpression, "a relation according to the way it has being" (see the "EditorialAfterWord" to TDS, esp. 463-65). We should be careful not to impose any othermeaning on this term that might lead us to assume that it refers only to relationsthat exist apart from cognitive activities, for the following reason, which goesto the heart of Poinsot's doctrine of signs (TDS 96/28-36): "in the case of relatives,indeed, not only is there some non-being conceived on the pattern of relation,but also the very relation conceived on the part of the respect toward, while itdoes not exist in the mind-independent order, is conceived or formed on thepattern of a mind-independent relation, and so that which is formed in being,and not only that after whose pattern it is formed, is a relation, and by reasonof this there are in fact mind-dependent relations, but not mind-dependentsubstances."

Deely, in "The Two Approaches to Language: Philosophical and HistoricalReflections on the Point of Departure of John Poinsot's Semiotic," The Thomist37 (October 1974): 869-70, explains the point as follows: "Like each of the othercategories relation is a rationale of being, an 'ontological' rationale, that is, arationale expressive of the possibilities of existence. But unlike the othercategories, relation as an ontological rationale embraces in its positive contentboth the mind-dependent and mind-independent orders of being; and so relationmay be most properly called 'ontological' when it is understood that the positivecontent in question is indifferent to realization according to its proper being inthe opposed orders of what is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent.Not that mental relations belong to the category of relation—which would be acontradiction in terms—but that mental relations are relative according to theway they have being, just as are categorial relations."29 Relativity in this sense (as Deely pointed out in his controversial note 16 toTDS 86/22, as well as in the Editorial AfterWord, 472ff. section on "thefundamental architecture of the Treatise on Signs," and in his subsequentdiscussion, "The Semiotic of John Poinsot: Yesterday and Tomorrow, "Sent iotica69.1/2 [April, 1988]: 31-127) pertains to every category, not relation alone, forif one is to understand what something is, be it substance or accident, theremust be a reference to something else—namely, its principles and causes. Therequirement to refer to something else results from what is necessary to graspthe intelligible character of something. Since relativity in this sense is notrestricted to any one category, it is also a "transcendental relation." Not only,then, is a transcendental relation not essentially relative, it is not a categorialrelation. Moreover, it differs from categorial relation in that there is not adistinction between the relation and its subject or foundation, they are merged:for example, the relation of potency to act, substance to accident, and supposit

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apart from the cause or foundation of their existence. To say that thereis such a thing as an RSE is to say that there is something whose entirecharacter (ratio) is nothing more than a respect, an ordination, tosomething else and that this is so apart from whether it is cognized orapprehended. In other words, it is to say that a relation is a real beingin the sense that its distinctive character as a respect or ordination toanother is not formally caused by its being cognized.

To say that something is an RSE, however, does not mean that itexists in any other manner than that of an accident.30 Nor does itsuppose that a relation can exist without some foundation in a substancesuch as quality, quantity, or activity. Yet it is to say two very importantthings: (1) a relation as such is not reducible to merely those accidentsthat provide its foundation; and (2) a relation as such can base its

to essence. Yet the fundamental question that concerns us is whether a logicalrelation is simply a transcendental relation or also an "ontological relation," aRSE.^This seems to be contrary to what Mortimer J. Adler holds. Though heenthusiastically endorses Poinsot's treatise on signs in his book, Some QuestionsAbout Language (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), 172, Adler denies theexistence of relations as such because he believes that commits him to rejectingthe fundamental division of being into substance and accident. This is consistentwith his earlier position in "Sense Cognition: Aristotle vs. Aquinas," The NewScholasticism 53 (Autumn 1968): 582: "That which is a non-entity is anon-existent. Relations do not exist as such; they do not constitute a mode ofbeing; when two entities are related—whether as knower and known, as fatherand son, as double and half, or any other way—the relation exists entitativelyas an accident in each of the relata. It does not exist as something in betweenthem, not inhering in either of them. There is in short no inter-subjective modeof being; for everything that exists exists either as a subject (that is, a substance)or in a subject (i. e., an accident)."

Despite his words, it is not clear whether Adler really has to deny the existenceof relations as such; for what he seems to be insisting is that everything mustexist as either a substance or an accident. Yet to claim that relations as suchexist does not require running afoul of the claim that everything is either asubstance or an accident. Relations exist only as accidents (and are only foundedin other accidents), but their nature as a respect or ordination to another is stillirreducible to the natures of other accidents. Thus, relations as such exist.

Yet Robert W. Schmidt, S J., notes that "though we some times speak of arelation between two things, more properly it is of something, to something."The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 138. So, one should be careful not to let an image of arelation as a kind of metaphysical cord or string between a subject and a termdominate or replace one's intellectual apprehension of a relation's character asa respect or ordination of something to something. Deely expressly addressedthis misbegotten image comparatively early in his work on Poinsot ("Semiotic'as the Doctrine of Signs," Ars Semeiotica 1/3 [1977], 60 n. 12): "we must be waryof picturing relations to ourselves ... as if they were lines or 'metaphysicaltightropes' between subjects. If Poinsot is correct, they would be better imaginedas a kind of field or zone consequent upon interactions and resulting formalstructures." See, in TDS, the Second Preamble, Article 1, 80-87, and AppendixC, 378-89.

422 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYexistence on something physical or something mental, but as such it isindifferent to the cause or foundation of its existence. These last twopoints are crucial to understanding how logical relations, which are, ofcourse, relations of reason, can nonetheless have the very character ofa relation (and thus the intrinsic capacity to refer or signify) which doesnot result from their being cognized.

Returning to our discussion of universal concepts from the previoussection, we can recall that a mental process of abstraction is necessaryfor the essence of a particular thing to be apprehended and that thenature or essence as such provides the foundation for the universal.Further, the universal itself is just the relation of the essence expressedas one to many particulars. It is nothing more. Now a universal's statusas a relation, that is, as a respect or ordination to another, is notdependent on its being cognized, even though, of course, it cannot existwithout the mental or psychological activities which make abstractionpossible and even though it is only the universal as a relation in whichsomething is apprehended that is independent of being cognized. Obvi-ously, that which is cognized cannot exist as an object without beingcognized, for example, the concept "horse." Yet, the relation in andthrough which this being of reason is formed—that is, the very "of-ness"or "aboutness" that characterizes concepts as intentions or formalsigns—is an RSE.

It was Poinsot's genius to see that formal signs, though founded inthe subjective means of knowing, are nonetheless able to present objectsother than themselves without first having to be identified as objects,because of their character as relations and because that character isboth independent of cognition and indifferent to being realized insideand outside cognition. Concepts as psychological states are modifica-tions of a knower, indeed; but as formal signs they are nothing morethan a respect or ordination to an object superordinate to that modifi-cation. They remain incapable of being identified without presentingwhat they are of. Thus, according to Poinsot, the signifying character offormal signs is not determined by the knower even though the founda-tion for the relation is caused to exist by a process of abstraction, andeven though the essence as such (the foundation of the relation ofsignification) exists according to its manner of existence in cognition—that is, abstractly and universally. Poinsot's view remains the syste-

31 Tractatus de Signis, Book I "Concerning the Sign in Its Proper Being," question2 "Whether the Sign Relation in the Case of Natural Signs is Mind-Independentor Mind-Dependent," esp. 15V9-15; Book I, question 3 "Whether the Relation ofSign to Signified Is the Same as the Relation of Sign to Cognitive Power,"163/12-36; and see also Book II, question 3 "Whether an Impressed SpecificationIs a Formal Sign," 261/12-36.

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matic alternative to both Kantian and neo-Kantian views of cognition.32

5.

"Postmodernism" has yet to be given a positive characterization. Theonly thing that is sure about its meaning is that it refers to that whichcomes after modernity. Thus, whatever the character of postmodernismmay ultimately be, it is one that is informed by an historical perspective.

In epistemology this means that postmodernism cannot ignore therecord of modern thought. This record reveals, however, that the modern"way of ideas" is bankrupt. Nearly every major thinker of this period,with the notable exception of Thomas Reid, shared the assumption that"ideas" are the direct objects of cognition. Be they Cartesian "clear anddistinct ideas" or Humean "impressions," it was nonetheless assumedthat knowledge began first with ideas which were private and internal.Even Kant's grand synthesis was not an overcoming of this assumption,but the final integration of its meaning and scope. Kant took the logicof modernity's epistemological starting point to its inexorable conclu-sion: the realization that we cannot know the truth about real beings.

Much of contemporary philosophy operates in a neo-Kantian context.It attempts to defend, without much success, the possibility of truth andknowledge against versions of ontological and epistemological relativ-ism—versions which grow more extreme and virulent with each newincarnation. Yet what is becoming clearer and clearer is that much ofphilosophy or, at least, philosophy that has its origins in modernity, isdead or dying.

We need to make a new start, but we cannot, as Descartes seems tohave supposed, ignore the history of philosophy. It is here that theimportance of Poinsot's thought enters, for he provides a gatewaythrough which we can discover the insights of premodern thought. InPoinsot's hands these insights can aid us in transcending the dichoto-mies that have resulted from both premodern and modern philosophy,which is the basic argument of Deely's latest book33 subtitled "earlymodern philosophy and postmodern thought."

The set of oppositions between thought and things, thought andlanguage, culture and reality, and discourse and being, ultimately hasits source in a view that treats "ideas" not as essentially relative. Poinsotdefends, of course, the view that "ideas" are essentially relative, and, ifhe is correct, there is in principle no problem as to our ability to haveknowledge of real beings. Yet, since thought is not caught up withinsome Cartesian ego but expressed in human action in various ways, the

32 See Edward Pols, Radical Realism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1992) for a discussion of the Kantian spirit of contemporary antirealism.^New Beginnings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

424 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYworld we inhabit is much richer and complex than either the premod-erns or the moderns ever imagined.34 We seem to have reached a pointwhere the insights of John Poinsot can no longer be ignored.

St. John's UniversityJamaica, New York

34 See note 6 above.

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The Significance for Cognitive Realism of the Thought of John Poinsot - Douglas B. Rasmussen