The Silence of the Buddha

8/9/2019 The Silence of the Buddha

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The Silence of the Buddha

TROY WILSON ORGANPhilosophy East and West 4, no. 2, JULY 1954.

(c) by The University Press of Hawaiip.125-140

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THE SIXTH CENTURY B.C. marks the beginning ofan intellectual renaissance in lndia. Radhakrishnanhas said of this period, "There are many indicationsto show that it was an age keenly alive tointellectual interest, a period of immensephilosophic activity and many-sided development....It was an age full of strange anomalies andcontrasts. With the intellectual fervour and moralseriousness were also found united a lack of mentalbalance and restraint of passion.... When thesurging energies of life assert their rights, it isnot unnatural that many yield to unbridledimagination."(1) Another authority on Indian

philosophy has written, "Speculation was almostrampant in the period just preceding the time of theBuddha and an excessive discussion of theoreticalquestions was leading to anarchy of thought."(2)

One restraining influence in this period ofspeculation was Siddhaartha Gautama, the Buddha, whoby counsel and example discouraged abstracttheorizing. When asked to express his view on anumber of metaphysica1 problems, he remained silent.Thus, there come to be in Buddhism a group ofproblems which are known as theavyaak.rtavastuuni--the undetermined, orunelucidated, or unprofitable questions. The mostcomprehensive list of forbidden speculations is foundin the Brahma Jaala Sutta of the Diigba Nikaaya. Hereare listed sixty-two ways in which "recluses andBrahmans... reconstruct the past, and arrange thefuture." The Buddha says they "are entrapped in thenet of these sixty-two modes; this way and that theplunge about, but they are in it; this way and thatthe flounder, but they are included in it,caught init." (3) Buddhists are warned to avoid the netaltogether.


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Only ten of the questiom raised in the BrabmaJaala Sutta appear in the Lesser Maalu~nkyaaputtaSermon which is Sutta 63 of the Majjhima Nikaaya, yetthese are especially important, for with somealterations they constitute the avyak.rtavastuuni,The Sutta opens as follows:_____________________________________________________

(1) S.Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1927),p.272.

(2) M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1932),p.136.

(3) T.W. Rhys Davids, trans, Dialogues of the Buddha.Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol.II (London:Oxford University Press, 1899), p.54.

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Thus have I heard. On a certain occasion TheBlessed One was dwelling at Saavatthi in Jetavanamonastery in Anaathapi.n.dika's Park. Now it happenedto the venerable Maalu~nkyaaputta, being in seclusionand plunged in meditation that a considerationpresented itself to his mind a follows: "Thesetheories which The Blessed One has left unelucidated,has set aside and rejected-that the world is eternal,that the world is not eternal, that the world isfinite,that the world is infinitte, that the soul andthe body are identical, that the soul is one thingand the body another, that the saint exists afterdeath, that the saint does not exist after death,thatthe saint both exists and does not exist after death,that the saint neither exists nor does not existafter death, --these The Blessed One does notelucidate to me. And the fact that The Blessed Onedoes not elucidate them to me does at please me notsuit me.Therefore I will draw near to The Blessed Oneand inquire of him concerning this matter."(4)

Maalu~nkyaaputta adds that if the Buddha will solve

these problems he will lead the religious life underhim; but if the Buddha will not solve them, he willabandon religions training and return to the lowerlife of a layman. By adding the pairs,eternal-non-eternal and infinite--finite, which arefound in other lists of the avyaak.rtavastuuni, wehave fourteen questions to which no reply isgiven:(5)

1. Is the universe eternal?(6)


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2. Is the universe non-eternall3. Is the universe at one and the same time

eternal and non eternal?4. Is the universe neither eternal nor

non-eternal?5. Is the universe infinite?(7)6. Is the universe finite?7. Is the universe at one and the same time

infinite and finite?8. Is the universe neither infinite nor

finite?9. Are the vital principle (jiiva) and the

body identical?10. Are the vital principle and the body

non-identical?11. Does the Tathaagata(8) survive death?12. Does the Tathaagata not survive death?13. Does the Tathaagata both survive death and

not survive death?14. Does the Tathaagata neither survive death

nor not survive death?_____________________________________________________

(4) Henry Clarke Warren, trans., Buddhism inTranslations. Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. III(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1896), p.117.

(5) Other lists of the avyaak.rtavastuuni may befound in the following works: Majjbima Nikaaya,Sutta 72; Mebaali Sutta; Paasaadika Sutta;Po.t.tapaada Sutta; Dharmasa^mgraha.

(6) I.e., without begining.

(7) Sankrit authorities define "infinite" as havingno end in time; whereas in Paali it connoteshaving no end in space, e.g., in the Brahma JaalaSutta "finite", according to the translation ofT.W. Rhys Davids, means "that a path could betraced round it."

(8) Etymologically this term means "he who has gone(or come) thus."

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Questions about the origin and end of the cosmos,about the relationship of soul and body,and abouthuman immortality are questions which positivistsfrom Comte to Carnap would reject as insoluble byscientific methods, as unverifiable, assuper-empirical, as metaphysical, as meaningless.

There are many other incidents in the life andteachings of Gautama in which he avoids metaphysicalspeculation. On on occasion he engages in delicateridicule of the gods.(9) A monk goes to each of the


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gods and asks, "Where do the four greatelements-earth, water, fire, and wind-cease, leavingno trace behind?" But the gods do not know. Finally,the monk asks the question of the Great Brahma.Brahma does not answer until he has led the monkaside. Then he explains, "These gods the retinue ofBrahmaa, hold me,brother, to be such that there isnothing I cannot see, nothing I have not understood,nothing I have not realized. Therefore I gave noanswer in their presence." Then he, too, confesseshis ignorance and suggests that the monk put hisquestion to the Buddha. When the question finallyreaches the Buddha, the Buddha informs the monk thehe asks the wrong sort of question. Again in a numberof passages in the Paali texts the Buddha refuses togive information as to the workings of Karma.(10) Inthe Saama~n~na Pbala Sutta, King Ajaatasattu asks theBuddha what are the fruits of the life of thereligious recluse. The Buddha's answer is that therecluse is treated with respect and reverence; he

enjoys freedom from the hindrances of household life;he develops compassion and kindness for allcreatures; he is content; he attains self-possession,etc. In other words, the returns of the religiouslife are all terrestrial in character. Finally, thereis the record that the last words of the Buddha werenot on immortality or annihilation, as might havebeen expected; instead, they were advice to hisdisciples to work out their own salvation withdiligence: "Decay is inherent in all componentthings! Work out your salvation with diligence!"(11)

Gautama's avoidance of there metaphysicalsubtleties has been called "the silence of theBuddha" His silence has been as fruitful as hisutterances in the production of philosophies andtheologies. Sometimes it is far more interesting toconjecture what a prophet might have meant if he hadspoken than to listen to what be actually said. Inthis paper, however, we are concerned with the moreprosaic question: Why was the Buddha silent on thesemetaphysical issues? There are several possibleanswers:_____________________________________________________

(9) Kevaddha Sutta. T.W. Rhya Davids, trans., SacredBooks of the Buddhist, Vol. II, pp.280-284.

(10) Anguttara Nikaaya ii.80; Diigha Nikaaya iii.138; Sa^myutta Nikaaya iii. 103.

(11) Mahaa Parinibaana Sutta vi. 10. T.W. RhysDavids, trans., Buddhist Suttas. The SacredBooks of the East, Vol. XI (Oxford: TheClarendon Press, 1881), p.114.

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1. He accepted the current views. One reason the

Buddha did not answer the questions about thetermination of the universe, the extent of theuniverse, the relation of soul and body, and thestate of the saint after death may have been that heaccepted the conclusions of the Brahmanism of hisday. He had nothing new to offer. Many students ofBuddhism have pointed out that the Buddha did notbreak away from the religious and philosophicalthought of his culture. E. G. A. Holmes contends,

The teachings of Buddha can in no wise bedissociated from the master current of ancient Indianthought. The dominant philosophy of ancient India wasa spirtual idealism of a singularly pure and exaltedtype, which found its truest expression in thoseVedic treatises known as the Upanishads. The greatteacher is always are former as well as an innovatorand his work is,in put at least, an attempt to,return to a high level which had been won and then

lost. Whether Buddha did or did not lead men back (bya path of his own) from the camparatively low levelsof ceremonialism and asceticism to the sublimely highlevel of thought and aspiration which had beenreached in the Upanishads is, perhaps, an openquestion. But that he had been deeply influenced bythe ideas of the ancient seen can scarcely bedoubted; and the serious and sympathetic study oftheir teaching should therefore be the first stage inthe attempt to lift the veil of his silence andinterpret his unformulated creed.(12)Coomaraswamy observes, the more profound our study,the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhismfrom Brahmanism."(13) Keith thinks that the Buddhaand the early disciples believed in the existence ofthe gods. This conviction, according to, Keith, mustbe held "in the absence of a single hint to thecontrary in the texts of early Buddhism and in faceof the belief of pious Buddhists throughout theages."(14) Radhakrishnan writes,''Early Buddhism isnot an absolutely original doctrine.... Buddhahimself admits that the dharma which he hasdiscovered by an effort of self-culture is theancient way, the Aryan path, the eternal dharmaBuddha is not so much creating a new dharma asrediscovering an old norm. To develop his theoryBuddha had only to rid the Upanisads of their

inconsistent compromises with Vedic polytheism andreligion, set aside the transcendental aspect asbeing indemonstrable to thought and unnecessary tomorals, and emphasize the ethical universalism of theUpanisads. Early Buddhism, we venture to hazard aconjecture, is only a re-statement of the thought ofthe Upnisads from a new standpoint."(15) Even thePaali scholar T. By. Rhys Davids admits, "Gautama wasborn,and brought up, and lived, and died a Hindu..There


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_____________________________________________________

(12) E.G.A. Holmes, The Creed of Buddha (New York:John Lane Company, 1908), p. x.

(13) Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Hinduism and Buddhism(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p.45.

(14) A. Berriedale Keith, Buddhist Philosophy inIndia and Ceylon (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1923), p.94. But doesn't the KevaddhaSutta contain "a single hint to the contrary"?

(15) Op.cit, Vol. I, pp. 360,361.

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was not much in the metaphysics and psychology of

Gautama which cannot be found in one or another ofthe orthodox system, and a great deal of his moralitycould be matched from earlier or later Hindubooks"(16)

While it is obvious that the Buddha cannot beunderstood save in his Hindu background, one cannotbut feel that some critics have deprived the Buddhaof the uniqueness commonly associated with hisdoctrine. Takakusu goes to the opposite extreme inhis emphasis on the originahty of the Buddha. Hemakes the Buddha stand alone-much too alone "It isdifficult to determine how such a man as the Buddha,who is so different from the other philosophers andreligious men of India, could have appeared there,for he denied entirely the traditional gods,religious beliefs, institutions and customs."(17)While Takakusu's generalization may seem to be toobroad, since the Buddha took for granted such basicdoctrines as rebirth, karma, and nirvaana, considerthe fact that, whereas in the Upani.sada ultimatereality (Brabman) is characterized by being (sat),thought (cit) and joy (aananda), in original Buddhismthese attributes are displaced byimpermanence(anitya), ignorance(avidyaa) , andsuffering(du.hkba).

2. He rejected the current views. Perhaps theBuddha's silence was a formal denial of the views of

Brahmanism. On at least one occasion he was silentbecause he rejected the current views. According tothe Sa^myutta Nikaaya a wandering monk, Vacchagotta,once asked the Buddha if there was an ego (aatman,aattaa). When Gautama made no reply, the monk asked,(How then... is there not the ego?" But to this alsoGautama gave no response. When Vacchagotta had leftthe company, AAnanda asked Gautama why he had notanswered the questions put to him by the monk.Gautama replied, "If I... had answered:'the ego is,'


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then that, AAnanda, would have confirmed thedoctrine of the Samanas and Brahmanas who believe inpermanence. If I... had answered: 'the ego is not;then that, AAnanda, would have confirmed the doctrineof the Samanas and Brahmanas, who believe inannihilation."(18) The obvious interpretation of thisconversation is that the Buddha did not agree withthe Samanas and the Brahmanas; he believed that anyanswer to Vacchagotta's question would give animpression contrary to his convictions Oldenbergfinds more than this in the incident. He writes, "Wesee: the person who has framed this_____________________________________________________

(16) T.W. Rhya Davids, Buddhism (London: Society forPromoting Christian Knowledge, 1894), pp. 83,84.

(17) Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of BuddhistPhilosophy, W.T. Chan and Charles A. Moore, eds.(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1947), p.20.

(18) Sa^myutta Nikaaya. Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha:His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, Translatedfrom the German by William Hoey (London:Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1882), pp.272,273.

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dialogue, has in his thought very nearly approachedthe consequence, which leads to the negation of theego. It may almost be said that, though probablyhe did not wish to express this consequence withovert consciousness, yet he has in fact expressedit.... Through the shirking of the question as to theexistence or non-existence of the ego, is heard theanswer, to which the premises of the Buddhistteaching tended: The ego is not. Or, what isequivalent: The Nirvana is annihilation."(19)Oldenberg may be charged with reading into thedocument an idea which became a fundamental one inthe later development of Buddhism. Keith in hisdiscussion of this passage warns that even if we feelthe idea is hinted at, the author is teaching thedoctrine of non-ego, "it is perfectly obvious that wehave no right to go beyond the plain assertion of thetext as to the doctrine of the Buddha."(20)

Yet Oldenberg's position may be supported byappeal to other Paali texts in which the assertion ofthe non-existence of the ego indisputable, e.g. inthe Visuddbi Magga we find the following: "the words'living entity' and 'ego' are but a mode ofexpression for the presence of the five attachmentgroups,(21) but when we come to examine the elementsof being one by one, we discover that in the absolutesense then is living entity there to form a basis forsuch figments as I 'am,' or 'I'; in other words, that


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in the absolute sense there is only name andform."(22) Again,in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya the priestYamaka, who held the view that "on the dissolution ofthe body the priest who has lost a11 depravity isannihilated, persishes, and does not exist afterdeath, " has his heresy corrected by the venerableSaariputta, who reveals to him that according to theteachings of the Buddha theren is no ego to beannihilated.(23)

La Vall‚e Poussin says that the record ofGautama's refusal to discuss metaphysical topics is atechnique by which he denied the existence of theego, God, and the Tathaagara is the view which must betaken by modern Buddhists but it need not be taken byscientific-minded students of Buddhist_____________________________________________________

(19) Ibid., p.273.

(20) Op. cit., p.62.

(21) According to Buddhism the individual beingconsists of a combination of five skandhas(groups), viz., ruupa (body, form), vedanaa(sensation, feeling) , sa^mj~naa (conception,thought), sa^mskaara (conformation, action), andvij~naana (consciousness).

(22) Warren, op.cit., pp.133,134.

(23) Ibid., pp.138-145. In time the doctrine of thenon-ego became the orthodox view in Buddhism.Suzuki says, "What distinguishes Buddhism mostcharacteristically and emphatically from allother religions is the doctrine of non-atman ornon-ego." (Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Outlines ofMahaayaana Buddhism. London: Luzac and Company,1907, p.32.) Yet some Buddhists refuse to denythe reality of a self. They use the term"pudgala" (an individual) which seems to servefor all parctical purpose as a self. L. de laVal l‚e Poussin surmises that the word "pudgala" is used rather than the word "aatman" to avoidthe suspicion of heresy. See the article byPoussin, "Agnosticism (Buddhist) " in JamesHasting, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion andEthics (New York: Charles Scriner's Sons, 1928),

Vol. I, pp.220-225, See also Keith, op. cit.,p.81.

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religion and philosophy.(24) And Geden it of theopinion that, although the Buddha consistently refusedto teach about the supernatural, the"inference...that he intended to imply personal


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disbelief in the supernatural and in the existence ofGod, and to urge or enjoin this upon his disciples,is certainly mistaken."(25)

My conclusion is that neither of these first tworeasons for the Buddha's silence is adequate,although this opinion may he explained by theinevitable difficultics a modern Westerner has intrying to understand the dialectics of ancientEastern minds. It it patent, a least to thedisinterested student, that the teachings of theBuddha were in part a continuation of and in part arevolt against Brahmanism.

3. He bad no views of his own. A third possiblesolution to the problem as to why Gaurama gave noanswers to the avyraak.rtavastuuni is that he had noanswers to give. He could not accept the Upani.sadicsolutions; he could not offer alternatives. He wasagnostic. Agnorticism is a word of many meanings. Forour purposes only two general meanings need to bedirtinguished. One may be agnostic in the tense that

one believes that the mind of man is congenitallyunable to arrive at a cognitive grarp of the realworld; or one may be agnostic in the sense that onebelieves that the real world is of such a nature thatit forever lies beyond the cognitive grasp of thehuman mind. Perhaps these should be described as twoemphases in agnosticism rather than a two types ofagnosticism. Some agnostics emphasize the inadequacyof the mind and its operations, e.g. Hume and Kant;others emphasize the unknowable character of theworld, e.g., Herbert Spencer. In Buddhism bothemphases are found. The limited capacity of the humanmind is implied in the Buddha's reply when he wasasked to reconcile anaatman and karma "Shall one whois under the dominion of derire think to go beyondthe mind of the master?"(26) The unknowabihty ofultimate reality is stressed in Maadhyamika andZen.(27) But such paaages cannot be interpreted assuggesting that the Buddha mind was agnostic in anysense.

We should note that the doctrine that Gaautamahad no views of his own on these metaphysicalquestions, that he was ignorant, is possible only inHiinayaana Buddhism, although it is never to statedIn the Paali texts he is portrayad generally as ateacher, considerate, kindly, fatherly. Even though_____________________________________________________

(24) Op. cit., I, p. 225.

(25) Alfred Shenington Geden in his article, "God(Buddhist)" in James Hastings, ed., Encyclopediaof Religion and Ethics, Vol. VI, p.270.

(26) Sa^myutta Nikaaya iii. 103, Keith, op.cit.,p.78.


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(27) See my article, "Reason and Experience inMahaayaana Buddhism, " The Journal of Bible andReligion, XX, No.2 (April, 1952),77-83.

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he was said to have changed his heritage by reason ofhis enlightenment, he still remained subject to thephysical limitations of all flesh: he became weary,he hungered and thirsted, he died as the result offood poisoning. In the Sanskrit texts, on the otherhand, the Buddha is a celestial, transcendentalfigure. He is worshipped by animals, men, demons,bodbisattvas and other buddhas. He speaks not as aman who has found salvation and who willingly shareswhat he has discovered, but as a supernatural beingwho condescends to reveal some of his truth to manThe earthly Gautama is a Docetic messianicincarnation of the Eternal Buddha. The Vetulyakas

believe that the Buddha dwelt in the Tu.sita heavenwhile a magic form acted out a life on earth. SomeMahaayaanists describe the earthly life of the Buddhaas a "skillful device" (upaaya-kausaalya) to leadcreatures in the Buddha way. The Suvarna PrabhaaSuutra teaches that the Buddha did not die; he gavethe appearance of death for the sake of sentientbeings.(28) Suzuki says that "the Buddha in theMahaayaana scriptures is not an ordinary human beingwalking in a sensuous world; he is altogetherdissimilar to that son of Suddhodana who resigned theroyal life, wandered in the wildernms, and after sixyears' profound meditation and penance discovered theFourfold Noble Truth and the Twelve Chains ofDependence and we cannot but think that theMahaayaana Buddha is the fictitious creation of inintensely poetic mind."(29) Much of the confusion asto the nature of the Buddha would be avoided if itwere always clear whether references were being madeto the Hiinayaana Buddha or to the Mahaayaana Buddha.

Keith is one of the few students of Buddhism whoexplains the silence of the Buddha on the groundsthat the Buddha did not have answer to certain fairand reasonable questions put to him. Keith writes,'Todeny that the teaching of the Buddha himself stoppedat this attitude of agnosticism appears contrary toevery sound principle of criticism. It is true that

it has been suggested that it is impossible toconceive that the master would be contented withoffering nothing more positive in the way of a hopefor the future, but this is obviously to beg thequestion [Keith has been discussing the nuture ofnirvaa.na.] By leaving the matter unexplained theBuddha allowed men to frame their own conceptions ofthe future of the enlightened man after death.... Ithas, however, been urged that we cannot suppose thatso, able a thinker as the Buddha was without personal


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convictions on such a vital issue, even though he mayhave deemed on good grounds that it was neitheradvantageous nor necessary to explain his opin-_____________________________________________________

(28) See Keith, op. cit., pp.221, 271, 272. AlsoSuzuki, op. cit., pp.242-256.

(29) Ibid., p.245.

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ions to his disciples. Here again we are confrontedwith bare possibilities; it is quite legitimate tohold that the Buddha was a genuine agnostic, that hehad studied the various systems of ideas prevalent inhis day without deriving any greater satisfactionfrom them than any of us to-day do from the study ofmodern systems, and that he had no reasoned or other

conviction on the matter. From the general poverty ofphilosophical constructive power exhibited by suchparts of the system as appear essentially Buddha's,one is inclined to prefer this explanation."(30) Onthe other hand, Poussin says that the agnosticposition has nothing to support it other than a fewtexts and "the sympathy of several Europeanscholars."(31) And Radhakrishnan advises, "To believethat Buddha himself did not know the truths andcovered up his confusion and non-knowledge bysilence, is hardly consistent with his claim to haveattained enlightenment or bodhi."(32)

None of the texts which may be interpreted asimplying agnosticism present the Buddha as saying, "Ido not know." Rather, they affirm that theinformation requested is not necessary forsalvation;(33) or that men hold a variety of opinionson the issue in question;(34) or that men have only alimited view of the world. For example, in theUdaana, Gautama tells the story of a king who,wishing to stop a long discussion in his court,called in all the blind men of the city and askedthem to describe an elephant. The blind men were soonquarreling among themselves because they could notagree as to the physical characteristics of anelephant. The king observed:

In such points Brahmans and recluses stick.Wrangling on them, they violently discuss-Poor folk! they see but one side of the shield.(35)

Thus, one ought to maintain an attitude ofintellectual indecision until evidence sufficient fora well-founded opinion has been acquired. One ought asee both sides of the shield--and all parts of theelephant. We must not fail to note, however, that the


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Buddha is not speaking directly here about his ownknowledge or lack of knowledge. Buddhists insist thatthe Buddha was the one who saw all sides.

The conclusion that the Buddha was all-knowing isa much more defensible conclusion to be drawn fromthe text of the Buddhist than the conclusion_____________________________________________________

(30) Op. cit., pp.62,63.

(31) Op. cit., p.224.

(32) S. Radhakrishnan, "The Teaching of the Buddha bySpeech and Silence, "The Hibbert Journal, XXXII,No. 3 (April,1934), 353.

(33) See section 6 below.

(34) Sa^myutta Nikaaya v.437; Diigha Nikaaya i.179.

(35) Quoted from the Udaana by T.W. Rhys Davids,trans., Sacred Books of the the Buddhists,Vol.II, p.188.

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that the Buddha was agnostic. He is the EnlightenedOne, the one possessing perfect enlightenment(bodhi), Not only is he said to be omniscient(sarvaj~na) in the sense that he possessed all theknowledge one needs for salvation, but he is alsosaid to be universally omniscient(sarvaakaarsj~nasva), that is, he knew everythingpast, present, and future. Poussin says that the onlywork he knows which denies that the Buddha wasuniversally omniscient is that of the BrahminKumaarila, in which the author admits that the Buddhadid not know the number of the insects!(36)

Thomas holds that Gautama may be said to, be anagnostic "in excluding from investigation certaindefinite problems which were useless to the practica1aim of the seeker after freedom from pain."(37) Butmerely refraining from investigating problems on theground of their failure to contribuce to a practicalend does not make one an agnostic.

4. He would not tell his own views. Gautama's

silence may be accounted. for by the hypothesis that,while he had solutions for all speculative problems,he did not reveal them because he believed men wouldnot understand them. It would be better do let menwork out their own answers than to give themdoctrines which they would corrupt. Like St. Paul hegave milk to babes and reserved the solid nourishmentfor the spiritually mature. In other words, theBuddha had an esoteric doctrine besides the exotericdoctrine of the Fourfold Noble Truth and the


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Twelvefold Wheel of Causation Several passages fromthe Paali scriptures lend themselves to thisinterpretation. One is this story from the Sa^myuttaNikaaya: "At one time the Lord dwelt at Kosambi inthe sisu-grove. Then the Lord took a few sisu leavesin his hand and addressed the monks: 'What do youthink, monks, which are the more, the few sisu leavesI have taken in my hand, or those that are in thesisu-grove?' 'Small in number, Lard, and few are theleaves that the Lord has taken in his hand: those arefar more that are in the sisu-grove' 'Even so, monksthat is much more which I have realized and have notdeclared to you; and but little have I declared.'"(38) In the Mahaayaana scriptures may be foundpassages such as the following which support thetheory of an esoteric doctrine: "My original vows arefulfilled, the Dharma (or Truth) I have attained istoo deep for the understanding. A Buddha alone_____________________________________________________

(36)Op. cit., p.223. How this doctrine of fullOmniscience can be reconciled with the Buddha'sobviously false prediction that his teachingswould last but five hundred years I cannotimagine. E.g.,"Not a long time, AAnanda, willholy living remain preserved; five hundred years,AAnanda, will the Doctrine of the truth abide."(Oldenberg, op. cit., p.387. Text not given.)

(37)Edward J.Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend andHistory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr•bner andCompany, 1927), p.202.

(38)Sa^myutta Nikaaya v.437. Edward J.Thomas, EarlyBuddhist Scriptures (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,Tr•bner and Company, 1935), pp.117,118.

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is able to understand what is in the mind of anotherBuddha."(39) Radhakrishnan is one of the moderninterpreters who accepts the esoteric doctrinetheory. He concludes that the "hypothesis remainsthat Buddha knew all about the ultimate problems, butdid not announce them to the multitudes who came tohim for fear that he might disturb their minds. This

view seems to us to be the most saticfactory."(40)The theory of an esoteric doctrine easily

explains the conversation between Gautarma andVacchagotta. Gautama, according to this theory, hadanswers to Vacchagotta's questions about theexistence of the ego but, knowing that th impetuousand bargaining monk was not ready to grasp his fulldoctrine, he gave no answer to the questions. But thetheory of an esoteric doctrine can be refuted byquoting the Buddha himself: "I have preached the


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truth without making any distinction between exotericand esoteric doctrines, for in respect of the truths,AAnanda the Tathaagata has no such thing as theclosed fist of a teacher who keeps somethingback."(41) In Tbr Questions of King Milinda, one ofthe twenty-five virtues of a good teacher is: "Heshould be zealous, he should teach nothingpartially, keep nothing secret and hold nothingback."(42) In the same writings the Buddha is quotedhas having said, ' The Dhamma and the Vinayaproclainmed by the Tathaagata shine forth when the medisplayed, and not when they are concealed."(43)Davids in footnotes to the above two passageswrites: "So that, in the author's opinion, there isno 'Esoteric Doctrine' in true Buddhism";(44) and'The fact is that there never has been any such thinga esoteric teaching in Buddhism, and that the modernso-called esoteric Buddhism is neither esoteric norBuddhism."(45) In a literature as large as theBuddhist scriptures it is not surprising that

conflicting statements can be found on manyissues.(46) La Vall‚e Poussin is the author of thefollowing discouraging observation: "Cependant,prenons-y garde, si on peut parfois affirmer quelquechose du Bouddhisme, il est rare qu'on no puisse af-_____________________________________________________

(39) Suutra on the Cause and Effect in the Past andPresent, Quoted by D.T. Suzuki, in Eassays inZen Buddhism, First Series (London: Rider andCompany, 1927), p.47, footnote 1.

(40) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp.466. See alsoOldenberg, op. cit., p.273.

(41) Mahaa Parinibbaana Sutta, Diigha Nikaaya ii.100. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans.,Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II, Sacred Booksof the Buddhists, Vol. III (London: OxfordUniversity Press, 1910). p.107.

(42) T.W. Rhys Davids, trans., The Question of KingMilinda iv. 1. 8. The Sacred Books of the East,Vol.XXXV (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1890),p.142.

(43) The Questions of King Milinda iv. 4. 4, ibid.,

p.264.

(44) Ibid., p.142, footnote 3.

(45) Ibid., p.268, footnote 3 (footnote begins onp.267)

(46) According to Dwight Goddard there are over onethousand titles in the Buddhist Scriptures. Headds, "In the Sung Dynasty about 972 A.D. a


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determine the canonicity of the books (although therewas at least one council to determine the orthdoxdoctrine of Buddhism) , and--most confusing ofall--the Buddists have an open canon. New works areconstantly being added. Furthermore, the figure ofthe Buddha in the later scriptures, if not in theearlier--and the earlist were were wirtten centuriesafter the life of Gautama--is a vehicle for othermen's words and ideas.

(47) L. de la Vall‚e Poussin, Bouddhisme (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne and Company, 1909), p.139.

(48) In some schools of Mahaayaana Buddhism silenceis regarded as the only fitting manner in whichto describe ultimate reality (Bhuutatatbaataa).D.T. Suzuki has written, "Bodhi-Dharma... wasfully convinced of the insufficiency of thehuman tongue to express the highest truth whichis revealed only intuitively to the religious

consciousness." And again Suzuki writes,"Another interesting utterance by a ChineseBuddhist, who, earnestly pondering over theabsoluteness of Suchness for several years,understood it one day all of a sudden, is: "Thevery instant you say it is something (or anothing) , you miss the mark.'"(Outlines ofMahaayaana Buddhism, p.105, footnote 1.)

p.137

answer involved a rephrasing of the question, for heanswered "I proclaim, Siiha, the annihilation oflust."(49) At another time we are told explicitlythat the Buddha was unable a answer certain questionsbecause they had a frame of reference which made ananswer impossible for him. I refer to the occasion inwhich King Pasenda asked the nun Khemaa why the Buddhahad not revealed whether the Enlightened One existsafter death The nun replied that the question assumesthat the axistence of the Buddha can be measured inarms of the physical, but this is not the Me: "thesepredicates of the corporeal form are abolished in thePerfect One, their root is severed, they we hewn awaylike a palm-tree, and laid aside, so that they cannotgerminate in the future. Released, O great king, is

the Perfect One from this, that his being should begauged by the measure of the corporeal world: he isdeep, immeasurable,.unfarhomable as the great ocean'The Perfect One exists after death this is notapposite;'the Perfect One does not exist afterdeath,' this also is not apposite;'the Perfect One atonce exists and does not exist after death,' thisalso is not apposite; 'the Perfect One neither doesnor does not exist after death' this also is notapposite."(50) Thus, in typically labored fashion we


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are informed that axistence is not a predicate whichcan be applied to the being who has entered into thestate of pariuirvana. Existence becomes a meaninglessword when used in this context.

Gautama, like all religious reformers, faced theproblem of pouring the new wine of his teachings intoold bottles the verbal patterns which were familiarto those to whom he preached. Mahaayaanists believethat some of his doctrines would not fit the languagepatterns of his day. According to the Zen school hisdoctrine will not fit the language patterns of anyday. The Mahaayaana texts warn over and over againagainst the dangers that lurk in the use of words.They are fingers which point to the moon One mustbeware lest one concentrate on the word and miss thereality to, which the word points. "But neither wordsnor sentences can exactly express meanings, for wordsare only sweet sounds that are arbitrarily chosen arepresent things, they are not the things themselves,which in turn are only manifestations of mind."(51)

Zen masters, beginning with Bodhidharma are fullyconvinced of the insufficiency of human language toexpress the fundamental nature of reality. Even tosay "I do not know" is inadequate, sinc confession ofnot knowing implies a measure of knowledge. Silenceis the best expression of reality. "What I think maybe stated thus: That which it in_____________________________________________________

(49) Mahaavagga vi. 31.7. T.W. Rhys Davids andHermann Oldenberg, trans., Vinaya Texts, PartII, The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XVII(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1882), p.112.

(50) Sa.myutta Nikaaya. Oldenberg, op.cit.,pp.279,280.

(51) La^nkaavataara Suutra. Goddard, op.cit., p.286.

p.138

all beings wordless speechless, shows no signs, isnot possible of cognisance, and is above allquestioning and answering."(52) Man should live inreality, not discourse about it. But this silence isnot the silence of the misologist; it is the silence

of a "higher affirmation."6. He would not be distracted from his main

purpose. We noted at the opening of this paper Sutta63 of the Majjhima Nikaaya in which is found animportant listing of the undetermined questions.After Maalu~nkyaaputta had put his questions to theBuddha with the threat that unless they were answeredhe would desert the order, the Buddha gives one ofhis most elaborate refusals to answer speculativequestions. He reminds Malunkyaputta that he had never


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promised to give such teachings to his followers, norhad Maalu~nkyaaputta set this as a condition of hisbecoming a disciple. Further more, adds the Buddha toset up such a condition for joining or remaining inthe order would be acting a foolishly as a woundedman who refused to have a poisoned arrow removed fromhis body until he learned the caste of man who shotthe arrow. The religious life..., " continues theBuddha, "does not depend on the dogma that the worldis eternal; nor does the religious life... depend onthe dogma that the world is not eternal. Whether thedogma obtain... that the world is eternal or that theworld is not eternal there still remain birth, oldage, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grid, anddespair, for the extinction of which in the presentlife I am prescribing." The Buddha then reiteratesthe other issues on which Maalu~nkyaaputta is seekinginformation, viz., the finitude or infinitude of theworld, the identity of soul and body, and theexistential status of the saint after death. The

consideration of these problems, he contends, is notprofitable, and does not touch the fundamentals ofreligion. "And what, Maalu~nkyaaputta, have Ielucidated? Misery... the origin of misery...thecessation of misery... and the path leading to thecessation of misery have I elucidated. And why...have I elucidated this, Because... this does profit,has to, do with the fundamentals of religion, andtends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation,quiescence. knowledge, supreme wisdom, andNirvaa.na."(53) The Buddha's reply is a pragmaticreply. He is a religious teacher, not a philosopher.He has come to show men how to overcome thesufferings inevitably involved in living. Anythingwhich does not contribute to that end is extraneous.

Similar responses me found in other suttas. Forexample, in the Paasaadika Sutta the Buddha tellsCunda that when men ask why the Buddha has notrevealed whether a Tathagata exists after death, theyare to be told: "Because,_____________________________________________________

(52) Vimalakiirti Suutra. Quoted by D.T. Suzuki, inOutlines of Mahaayaana, p.107.

(53) Majihima Nikaaya. Warren, op. cit., pp.118-122.

p.139

brother,it is not conducive to good, not to truedoctrine, nor to the fundamentals of religion, nor aunworldliness, nor to passionlessness, nor totranquillity, nor to peace, not to insight, nor toenlightenment, nor to Nibbaana Therefore, it is notrevealed by the Exalted One."(54) And in theSa^myutta Nikaaya the Buddha, admitting that there is


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much that he knows which he has not revealed,explains, "And why, monks have I not declared it?Became it is not profitable, does not belong to thebeginning of the religious life, and does not and torevulsion, absence of passion, cessation, calm,higher knowledge, enlightenment, Nirvaa.na. Thereforehave I not declared it."(55) A slightly differentanswer is given in the Kevaddha Sutta. Kevaddha, ayoung householder, asks the Buddha to perform, or tohave one of his monks perform a miracle in the townof Naalandaa In his reply the Buddha says nothingabout his disbelief in miracles. Instead, he saysthat he abhors the practice of miracles: "It isbecause I perceive danger in the practice of mysticwonders, that I loath, and abhor, and am ashamedthere of."(56) Then he adds that if Kevaddha reallywants to, see a miracle he ought to, study theselftraining of a monk.

If one must choose only one of the six hypothesesa the reason Gautama the Buddha avoided speculative

questions, the pragmatic hypothesis seems to me to bethe best explanation. The picture we get of theBuddha is that of a remarkably single-minded man.Speculation was not only useless but harmful, for itwould sidetrack him from his main goal. He had nodisinterested love for truth. He admitted that he hadmore truths which he might disclose, but he refrainedand limited himself to the revelation of only thosetruths which he considered to be religiouslysignificant. Truth was a value for him only when itwas a means a man's release from suffering. ForGautama, all knowledge was ideology, that is, allknowledge was held and expressed for certain reasons.His dharma was revealed only because it contributedto man's salvation.

What do the avyaak.rtavastuuna reveal aboutGautama himself? First, they reveal the greatness ofGautama the religionist. He saw clearly that religionis first and foremost a way of life. Religion neednot have a fully developed philosophy. Many of itsfoundation stones may remain unexamined. The Buddhadid not argue for the truth of his Fourfold NobleTruth. Men were expected to see its truth intuitivelyand to test to in the logic of life._____________________________________________________

(54) Paasaadika Sutta, Diigha Hikaaya iii.136 T.W.

and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., Dialogues of theBuddha, Part III, Sacred Books of the Buddhists,Vol.IV (London: Oxford University Press, 1921),p.128.

(55) Sa^myutta Nikaaya v.437. Thomas, Early BuddhistScriptures, p.118.

(56) Kevaddha Sutta, op. cit., Vol. II, p.278.


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p.140

The avyaak.rtavastuuni also reveal a weakness ofGautama the philosopher. Did Gautama think that a wayof life could be established without a metaphysicalsubstructure? Or did he believe that the substructurewas already established and was in such soundcondition that it need not be examined? Even thoughhe refrained from certain metaphysical speculationand asked that his followers likewise reffrain, it ismanifest that his final evaluation of life, "To liveis to suffer" or "All is suffering" (sarvam du.hkham)rests upon the following metaphysical conceptions:All thing are the effects of causes and the causes ofeffects (pratiityasamutpaada) ; all things aretransitory (anitya); all things are devoid of asubstantial self (anaatma); all animate beings passthrough many existences (sa^msaara); all existencesof an animate being are conditioned by its past

existences (karma); all existences can terminate(nirvaa.na).

And, finally, did Gautama believe that he coulddissuade his followers from engaging in speculationon the deepest mysteries of Life? If he did, I submitthat he misjudged human nature. The unanswerableproblems remain problems still. Any person, earlyBuddhist or contemporary logical positivist, whobelieves that man can refrain from raising questionsabout the ultimate nature of the universe and man'splace in it has made a superficial observation ofhuman behavior. No restraints, no warnings are strongenough to stop man from wondering.

Buddhism might have remained a religion "pure andundefiled" if the Fourfold Noble Truth could havebeen kept free from metaphysics; but a metaphysicalview was implicit in the Fourfold Noble Truth and so,from the teachings of this man who refused to, engagein metaphysical thinking and who warned others of thedangers which lurk in theorizing have emerged some ofthe most speculative philosophical systems the worldhas yet seen. The history of Buddhism is evidence ofthe inevitability and necesssity of metaphysics, inspite of the insistent silence of the Buddha.

Documents

The Silence of the Buddha