The Sinking of the Cheonan and the Politics of National In Security

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RACE TO JUDGE, RUSH TO ACTJae-Jung Suh

Online publication date: 18 August 2010

To cite this Article Suh, Jae-Jung(2010) 'RACE TO JUDGE, RUSH TO ACT', Critical Asian Studies, 42: 3, 403 424To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2010.507393URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2010.507393

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Suh / Race to Judge

RACE TO JUDGE, RUSH TO ACT

The Sinking of the Cheonan and

the Politics of National Insecurity

Jae-Jung Suh

ABSTRACT: On 26 March 2010, theRepublic of Korea(ROK) Navy corvette Cheonan

broke in half and sank near Baekryong-do Island off the coast of North Korea.Forty-six sailors lost their lives. Mysterious as the cause of the incident is, the ROKgovernments responses the Navys failure to communicate through the chain ofcommand, themilitarys incompetence in rescue andsalvage operations, theMinis-try of National Defenses efforts to cover up basic facts, and the governments rushto blame North Korea as the culprit and take punitive measures all added confu-sion and heightened already high tensions on the peninsula. This articles arguesthat the ROK governments report failed to substantiate its claim that North Koreaattacked and sank the ship. Moreover, the author shows, its claim was based on in-ternally inconsistent logic and likely fabricated data. The governments rash, andunsubstantiated, judgment was accompanied by saber-rattling against the Northand scare tactics intended to silence domestic critics immediately before local gov-ernment elections. Amidst the heightened tension caused by the incident, the U.S.administration succeeded in pressuring the Japanese prime minister Hatoyama tocave in to its demand to keep the Futenma base within Okinawa. Also it agreed topostpone the transfer of the wartime command control over the Korean military totheROKuntil 2015. TheUnited States, economicallywounded by thefinancialcrisisof 2008, found the heightened state of insecurity created by the Cheonan incidentan opportune excuse to strengthen its allies and its military, if not political, influ-ence in Northeast Asia, although its success may prove Pyrrhic in the long run.

Onthe night of26 March 2010, the 1,200-ton RepublicofKorea (ROK) Navycor-

vette Cheonanwas torn inhalf and sankoff Baekryong-do Island in the West Sea(or, Yellow Sea). Initially informed that the ship had run aground, the ROKCoast Guard was called in for a rescue operation. All fifty-eight crew members

Critical Asian Studies

42:3 (2010), 403424

ISSN 1467-2715 print/1472-6033 online / 03 / 00040322 2010 BCAS, Inc. DOI:10.1080/14672715.2010.507393


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standing on the deck of the sinking ship were rescued. But the rear part of thesevered ship sank fast, taking the crews remaining forty-six sailors. Over thenext few days, while the Navy was trying to locate the sunken vessel and rescuethe sailors, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) kept hopes alive that themissing sailors would be able to survive on the air trapped inside the ship. Two

days passed before the rear part of the ship was located, although the wreckagewas reportedly only about 600 meters away from the accident site. 1 The rescueoperation went on for additional agonizing days, with the nation transfixed onthe details of the search for sailors who might still be alive. On 3 April eightdays after the Cheonans sinking, four days after a fishing boat, the Ynsng(which was assisting the Navy) sank and disappeared with its crew in a bizarreturnofevents, and the day after a NavySEALmemberdiedin the rescueattemptin curious circumstances2 the families of the sailors gave up hope and askedto have the rescue stopped. The following day, the Navy honored their requestand announced the initiation of the salvage operation. It was not until 15 Aprilthat the rear part of the ship was salvaged and the bodies of most of the missingsailors wererecovered.On24April, the front portion of the Cheonanwasrecov-

404 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)

1. Chng Yngil, Ch'nanham hammi palgynch'immol wonin misteri pullina [The Cheo-nan's rear part discoveredwill the mysterious cause be found?], Mnit'udei, 29 March2010; and An nbyl and Song Hogyun, Ch'nanham hammi ch'ujng mulche palgynhaegun anin mingan sni choich'o tamji [Presumed Cheonans rear part discoveredprivate fishing boat, not Navy, discovers it first], P'resian, 29 March 2010.

2. Although the military announced that Warrant Officer Han Chuho, a veteran underwater de-molitionteammember, died duringthesearch forthe missing sailors near where thefrontpart

of theship landed, KBSnewsreportedthat Hanwas operatingat a third locationdifferent fromwhere thefrontand rear partswere found.muni che3i pupyowoe?[Suspiciousthirdfloaterwhy?],KBSnyusu9,9 April2010.Available on-lineat news.kbs.co.kr/tvnews/news9/2010/04/07/2076673.html. (All websites in this article were accessed on 5 July 2010).

USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group and ROK Navy ships steam in formation during the an-nual Foal Eagle military exercise. ROK naval vessels were engaged in such an exercisein March 2010 in the vicinity of the Cheonan, but they took no part in the search andrescue. (Credit: U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class [AW/SW] Aaron Burden, March 2007)


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ered. The still missing sailors were declared dead and a period of nationwide

mourning began.What actually caused the naval vessel to break up and sink is a matter of dis-pute, as wewill see, but other events related to the sinking raise even more per-plexing questions. Takethesefour, forexample. A national audit revealed that atthe time of the incident the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I Sangi, wasout on a late-night drinking binge and could not be reached to be informed ofthe ships sinking.3 The military proved surprisingly incompetent at the rescueand salvage operation, failing to locate the sunken ship even with the aid of theKNTDS (Korea Naval Tactical Data System) and despite the fact that the ship wasresting in rather shallow waters. Several naval ships were in the vicinity en-

gaged in a joint field exercise, Foal Eagle, with the U.S. Navy but it was theCoastGuard that rescued thesurvivingsailors. Moreover, it was a private fishingboat that located the sunken ship, even though the Navy was equipped withstate-of-the-art sonar andradar. Finally, MNDofficialscreated confusionby leak-ing contradictory bits and pieces of information during the rescue operationand changing its storyline along the way.4

After almost two months of investigation, the ROK government released aninterim report that was filled with twisted logic and contradictory pieces of evi-dence.5 Nonetheless, the government used this report as the basis on which to

announce stern punitive measures against the Democratic Peoples Republicof Korea (DPRK) and South Koreas president, Lee Myung-bak, chose the

Suh / Race to Judge 405

3. Kwon Hykchl and I Yongin, Ch'nanham sago tangsi hapchamijang poktanju manchui [Chairmanof JCSdrunkat time ofCheonanincident],Hangyresinmun,11June2010.

4. The MND changed the estimated time and location of the accident many times, fueling specu-lation that it was trying to hide something.

5. Thereport releasedbythe ROK on20May was actually an interim report; itplans to issue its fi-nal report by the end of July 2010. Not only did the ROK government rush to judgment on thecauseoftheCheonan incident, asweargue in this article,but ithas also rushedtoadvocatepu-nitivemeasuresagainst theDPRK, includingurgingtheUN Security Council to acton thebasis

of the interim report. The Korean-language version of the report is available on-line at www.mnd. go.kr/mndMedia/temp/20100520/1_8652.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=4; theEnglish-languageversion, entitled Investigation Result on theSinkingof ROKS Cheonan,is available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/WhatsNew/RecentNews/.

Images on the left show the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan before and after it was ripped inhalf by an explosion on 26 March 2010. The JIG presented the image on the right to illus-trate the damage a torpedo explosion would have caused to the ship.


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Yongsan War Museum in Seoul as the venue for announcing these measures. Atthe trilateral summit meeting with Chinese and Japanese leaders several dayslater, President Leeescalatedmatters with this saber-rattlingremark: We donotfearwar, althoughwedonot desire it either.6 Thepresidents pronouncementsratcheted up the already tense inter-Korean relations. What began as the myste-

rious sinking of a naval corvette and the tragic loss of forty-six sailors graduallybecame an intense domestic political struggle, engendering war hysteriathroughout the peninsula and causing an unexpected turn in regional politicsin Northeast Asia.

This article critically reviews theROK governmentshandling of the Cheonanincident and describes how the incident and its aftermaths have affectedinter-Korean relations and regional politics in Northeast Asia. In the first part,we subject the evidence in the governments report to scientific analysis to as-certain the validity of the governments conclusion that the Cheonan was sunkby a North Korean torpedo. The analysis will reveal a number of internal incon-sistencies as well as disconnects in the physical evidence presented in the re-port. These problems call the reports conclusion into question and raise thetroubling possibility that some of the reports data may have been fabricated tofit the conclusion. The second part of the article situates the Cheonan incidentand the governments report in the context of South Koreas domestic politics.We ask why the government raced to produce such a faulty report and thenrushed to act on it. The article concludes with an analysis of the regional impactof these events.

We argue, in conclusion, that in order to restore public confidence the ROK

government should form a new team to start the investigation all over again. Wealso suggest that the international community should continue to insist on anobjective andthorough investigation while reiterating its commitment to peaceand stability on the Korean peninsula.

Disconnects and Inconsistencies in the Report

For almost two months after the incident, the Joint CivilMilitary InvestigationGroup (JIG), made up of twenty-two military experts, twenty-five experts fromten military-related research institutes, and three civilian experts recommended

by the Parliament,

7

conducted an almost CSIlike scientific investigation

8

that in-volved a test explosion, a computer simulation, and scientific analyses such aselectron-dispersive spectroscopy (EDS) and x-ray diffraction (XRD). The in-terim report the JIG released at a press conference on 20 May cited three main


6. Chng Yonggwan, Haniljung chngsanghoedam chnjaeng durywoanchiman wonchidoannnda [Korea-Japan-ChinaSummit, neither fearwar, nordesire war],Dongailbo,31May2010.

7. Despite its name the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group the absolute majority of theGroups members, sixty-five out of seventy-four, work for the Ministry of National Defense orMNDrelated think tanks and institutes. One of its two heads, Pak Chng-I, was a three star

general at the time of the investigation; after the release of the report, he was promoted to afour star general.

8. CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) is a popular U.S.TV series that depicts police use of advancedforensic and scientific techniques to investigate and solve crimes.


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findings: (1) the Cheonans sinking was caused by an explosion outside theship; (2) the explosion was that of a torpedo; and (3) the torpedo was manufac-tured in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Based on thesefindings, theJIGcharged that NorthKoreawasresponsible forthesinking of theCheonan. This is indeed a logical conclusion, but only if the JIGs three findingsare all correct.

After a careful analysis of the JIGs report and evidence and our own physicaltesting, however, we find that the JIG has failed (1) to substantiate its claim that

there was an outside explosion; (2) to establish any causal linkage between theCheonans sinking and a torpedo; and (3) todemonstrate that the torpedo,pre-suming one was involved, was manufactured by the DPRK. We argue that theJIGs findingsarebased onevidence that isnot credibleandthat contradicts andis inconsistentwith the facts. The findingsare so flawed, in fact, that they renderthe JIGs charge that the Cheonans sinking was caused by a DPRK-manufac-tured torpedo unsustainable. Furthermore, there is a suspicion that the JIGSEDS and XRD data may have been fabricated.

Finding 1

We examine the JIGs three findings in order. First, the JIG claimed that an out-side explosion caused the ship to break up and sink. The JIG argues in its re-port that the pattern of the ships deformation and severance is consistent with


Images presented to the media by the Joint CivilMilitary Investigation Group (JIG) illus-trate the damage said to be caused by a gas bubble and shock wave that would accom-pany the explosion of a torpedo near a ship. (Clockwise from top left): (1) Underwaterexplosion: Gas bubble (inner circle) and shock wave (outer circle); (2) expansion of thebubble; (3) contraction of the bubble; and (4) collapse of the bubble. The JIG claimed thatits evidence showed that the Cheonan was damaged in such a manner by a torpedo ofNorth Korean origin.


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damage caused by a bubble effect from an outside explosion.9Yet, we contendthatthereisnoevidencetosupportthisclaim.TheJIGdidproduceasimulationthatshowedhowabubblemighthave been formedbyanunderwater explosionand how such an explosion mighthave crippled the Cheonan, but this simula-tion had not been completed at the time the JIG released its report. On 24 May,

Yun Tkyong, co-chair of the JIG, informed the Parliaments Special Committeeon the Cheonan: We are continuing our simulation and the final result of thesimulation will come out in July. He added: The simulation is not yet com-pleted to showthe water column [which the bubble effect would allegedly haveproduced], but it will all be shown when the simulation is completed.10 Thesimulationthe JIG presented at its 20May press conferenceshows onlya bubblebeing formedand hitting the bottomof the ship, deforming the shipand slightlyrupturing thehull.11 Nowhere does thesimulation demonstrate that the bubblesevered the ship in the middle, as the JIG report claims it does.

When questions were raisedabout the effect of the bubble,Dong-a Science, aSouth Korean science publication published by the conservative Dong-A mediaconglomerate, released additional information about the simulation, presum-ably courtesy of data supplied or leaked by the JIG.12Astonishingly, the updatedsimulation still failed to showhow the bubble might havesevered the Cheonan.The simulation revealed only that the bubble hit the ship and caused a smallrupture in the hull, but the bubble then began to shrink and show signs ofbreaking up. In all the time since the JIG released its report on 20 May, the ROKDefense Ministry, speakingon behalfof theJIG investigation, hasyet to producea bubble simulation consistent with the information presented in the JIG re-

port. Onwhatgrounds, then, did the JIG argue that the Cheonanwas severed intwo by the bubble effect?


9. Whena torpedo explodes underwater without touchingan object, the hot gas from the explo-sion forms a large bubble typically three to ten meters in diameter and with high internalpressure. The bubble then goes through a cycle of expansion and contraction until it pops onthesurface of thewaterordies outunderwater. As thebubble expands andcontracts, itpushesthe target ship up and down, producing a high level of stress. If the resulting stress is highenough, it may break the ship apart; a bubble can only sever a ship, however, with the aid of ashock wave, which causes more damage.

10. Pak Jngi, another co-chairman, added that the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials[which is in charge of the simulation] said it would complete the simulation by July 15th. KimNamgwon and Kim Pmhyn, Kimgukpang, Puk, simnijn konggykhamyn chkkaktaeng[Defense Minister Kim, Will immediately respond if Northattacks [our] psychologicalwarfare], Yonhap News, 24 May 2010. The latter quote is from Chanhamtkwi, mulgi-dung chonjaeybu nonnan [Cheonan Special Committee, Controversyover presence of wa-ter column], Yonhap News, 24 May 2010.

11. The JIGs simulation results are available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mndMedia/temp/20100520/1_8652.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=4. Although the ROK defense ministry has up-dated the simulation, as of 2 July 2010 it still fails to show how the Cheonan was severed.

12. Jae-Jung Suh, Bblhyogwann bsstta [There was no bubble effect], Presian, 27 May2010. Available on-line at www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=401005270059

49&section=05. Chn Tonghyk, Pokbalhu 1chokkajichnanham paemit irtke jjigr-jytda [Upto a secondafter explosion. TheCheonans bottom deformed this way],Dong-asains [Dong-A Science], 28 May 2010. Available on-line at news.dongascience.com/html/News/2010/05/28/20100528100000185442/201005281000001854420118000000.html.


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Moreover, further analysis reveals that the JIG simulation is not consistentwith the pattern of the ships damage. If the bottomof the ship was hit bya bub-ble, it should show a spherical concave deformation resembling the shape of abubble, as the JIGs own simulation suggests, but it does not. The bottom of thefront part of the ship is pushed up in an angular shape, as the images in the JIGreport show. This type of damage is more consistent with a collision with a hardobject. The tear line in the JIG simulation has a circular shape because the hullshows a tear in the area that was hit by the spherical bubble, but the bottom ofthe shippart that was supposed tohavereceived the direct impact of the bubbleshows no circular tear. Equally important, if an outside explosion of 250 kg of

explosives produced thebubble jeteffect, as theJIGargues, then that explosionshould have produced an immediate pre-bubble shock wave whose strengthwould havebeen at least 5,000 pounds per square inch (psi) when it hit the bot-tom of the Cheonan.13Yet, the bottom and ruptured surface of the ship betrayno sign of such a large shock,14 the internal instruments and parts remain intactin their originalplace, and noneof the crew members suffered the kinds of inju-ries that would have been expected from such a shock. Given that an underwa-


Slides from the JIG media presentation show damage to the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan.(Clockwise from upper left): (1) stack-demist; (2) front portion (port side) of ship showingthe break point; (3) water pressure marks on the hull bottom; (4) front half of the Cheonanas it is lifted from the sea on 24 April 2010.

13. A calculation is based on the formula published in Reid 1996.14. The Ministry of National Defense initially stated that 70 percent of a torpedos explosive en-

ergy will be a shock wave effect. After Suhs article (see note 12) asked why the Cheonan be-trays no signs of shock wave damage, the MND decreased the ratio to 54 percent and 46percent. The ratio varies depending on the kind of explosive and the mix of other ingredients


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ter explosion producesboth a bubble effect and a shock wave with the shockwave usually being about six to ten times as destructive as the bubble effect the condition of both the ship and the crew is not consistent with the damageexpected as a result of an outside explosion.15

In short, the JIG failed to show that an outside explosion caused the ship to

break in half. At the time of its press conference on 20 May the JIG had not evencompleted a computer simulation to show how a bubble mighthave affectedthe ship. The parts of the simulationthe JIG did present to the media failed to il-lustrate how a bubble formed by an outside explosion could have severed theCheonan. Furthermore, their simulation showedthat thebubblewoulddeformthe ship in a different way than the Cheonan was actually damaged. Finally, thesmall circular tear that the simulation shows does not appear onthe body of theCheonan. The JIGs first finding, therefore, has to be judged a mere allegation.The JIGs own evidence is groundless and has been contradicted by at least oneother analysis of underwater explosions in the military literature.16 Even if theJIG could produce a simulation demonstrating that a bubble effect crippled theCheonan, there is still no proof that the bubble effect itself was caused by an ex-plosion. Establishing this connection would involve showing a pattern of shipdestruction that is consistent with a bubble effect simulation.

Finding 2

The JIGs second finding alleged a causal link between the Cheonans sinkingand a torpedo. Even if the JIG succeeded in demonstrating that an outside ex-plosion occurred something, we contend, it failed to establish it would

still need to show that the explosion was caused by the torpedo the JIG recov-ered.17 The JIG presented two pieces of evidence to support this finding. First,it alleged that white compounds18 found on the torpedo match those found onthe surfaces of the Cheonan ship; and, second, that the compounds resultedfrom an explosion.19 The EDS and XRD analysesdoneby the JIG unambiguously


such as aluminum powder. For the MNDs initial position, see Kim Byngnyun, roi kiroi,sujungpokbaliwiryk[Torpedo andseamine, thepower of underwater explosion],Minis-try of National Defense, 28 April 2010. Available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mndMedia/mndNew/mndPlanManage/20100428/1_-12168.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=5. For its newernumbers, see Kim Byngnyun, roi sujungpokbal chungbykpa bblhyogwaro snchepagoe [Torpedos underwater explosion destroys ship with shock wave and bubble effect],Ministry of National Defense, 22 May 2010. Available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mnd Me-dia/mndNew/mndPlan Manage/20100522/1_-12372.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=5.

15. Reid 1996, 1.16. Reid 1996.17. The JIG claimed that it retrieved the torpedo parts near the alleged explosion site on 15 May,

just five days before it announced its conclusion. A pair of trawlers under contract to the JIGswept the bottom of the sea with a specially designed net and pulled up parts of a torpedo.Nothing else was found before the sweeping operation was terminated on 20 May.

18. Described as adsorbed materials (AM) in the JIGs report. (Adsorbed refers to a chemicalprocess of gas forming a thin film on a solid surface.) The term adsorbed materials does notappear in the English-language version of the JIGs report, but it does appear as an English in-

sertion in the Korean version, which is the report we analyzed.19. S.-H.Lee, Comments onthesection AdsorbedMaterialAnalysis,of theCheonanReport made

by theSouth Korean Civil andMilitary Joint Investigation Group (CIVMIL JIG),ArXiv, 6 June2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v2.


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establish that the atomic composition and chemical structure of the white com-pounds found on the ship (AM-1)20 and the torpedo (AM-2) are identical. We ac-cept this piece of evidence. But the second piece of evidence has no basis inscientific fact. An explosion produces alumina, Al2O3, and to make its case theJIG would have to demonstrate that the intensity ratio of the oxygen and alumi-

num peaks of the AM-1 and AM-2 compounds are similar to that of the aluminaAl2O3. The JIGs EDS analyses failed to show this, however, and we concludefrom this that the AM-1 and AM-2 samples have nothing to do with any explo-sion. The AM-1 and AM-2 samples are most likely the rust on the aluminum thatresulted from exposure to moisture or water over a long period of time ratherthan the alumina, Al2O3, that the JIG alleged was formed from an explosion.

21

An independent scientist, Dr. Yang Panseok, a member of the University ofManitobas Department of Geological Sciences, has found that the EDS inten-sity ratio of hydrogen and aluminum in the compounds matches that of alumi-num hydroxide, Al(OH)

3, found in nature commonly as aluminum rust or

gibbsite.22 His finding strengthens our conclusion that the AM-1 and AM-2 com-poundsfound onthe shipand the torpedo are not associatedwithanexplosion.

Furthermore, thex-ray diffraction pattern of theAM-3 compound,whichwasproduced in the JIGs test explosion, is completely different from the x-ray pat-terns of the AM-1 and AM-2. The main difference is that the AM-3 taken from theJIGs test explosion shows sharp peaks corresponding to un-oxidized alumi-num in its crystalline form whereas neither AM-1 nor AM-2 produce peaks re-lated to any aluminum-related compounds, much less un-oxidized aluminum.Lees laboratory experiment, which reproduced the physical and chemical

transformation of aluminum during an explosion, produced the same un-oxi-dized aluminum crystalline as theJIGs test explosion did, addingconfidence toour conclusion that AM-1 and AM-2 did not result from an explosion. 23 The JIGclaimsthat thecompounds have differentcrystal structures because thereal tor-pedo explosion produced a higher temperature and experienced a more rapidcooling by the sea water thanthe JIGs testexplosion,and asa result, almost100percent of the Al was oxidized and almost 100 percent of the oxidized aluminabecameamorphous. However, several scientific experimentshave been done to


20. AM-1, AM-2, and AM-3 are designations created by Seunghun Lee in a scientific paper heauthored that discusses the JIGs analysis of the adsorbed materials.

21. Kang Yanggu, Chanham deit chimyngjk oryualuminyumn kjitmal anhae [TheCheonan data has fatal flawsaluminum does not lie], Presian, 24 June 2010. Availableon-lineat www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=60100623153324&section=05.

22. After careful analysis of the JIGs EDS data, Yang Panseok suspects that the AM-1 and AM-2 arenot aluminum oxides but more likely aluminum hydroxide, Al(OH)3, found in nature com-monly as gibbsite. Kang Yanggu and Hwang Chunho, Isanghan narai chnanhamalu-minium sanhwamuln bsstta [The Cheonan in Wonderland. There was no aluminumoxide],Presian, 30 June2010.Available on-line at www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?ar-ticle_ num=60100630132420&section=05; andHankyere, 30 June 2010, available on-line atwww.hani.co.kr/arti/ISSUE/72/428236.html.

23. Testing also showed that the un-oxidized Al remains in its crystalline form, while in the AM-1

andAM-2 compoundsnosignal related to anyAl-related compoundswasobserved. SeunghunLee, Comments on the section Adsorbed Material Analysis, of the Cheonan Report made bythe South Korean Civil and Military Joint Investigation Group (CIVMIL JIG), ArXiv, 6 June2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v2.


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approximate a real explosion and these show that the resulting Al-related com-pounds are both crystalline alumina, called -Al2O3, and amorphous alumina,called -Al2O3.

24 Lee Seunghun has performed a laboratory test in which an alu-minum sample was heated above its melting temperature and then was rapidlycooled by water, mimicking the conditions of an explosion. When the resulting

materials were examined using EDS and x-ray, it turned out that only a fractionof the aluminum had oxidized, and the resulting compound contained un-oxi-dized Al and -Al2O3, both crystalline. This is consistent with earlier scientificstudies and indicates that experimental heating and cooling of Al resembles areal explosionat leastqualitatively, ifnotquantitatively. In fact, theJIGx-raydataof the AM-3 sample (the JIGs test experiment data) shows strong crystalline Alsignals and weak crystalline-Al2O3, consistent with Lees experimental results.When the media reported our experimental results and the inconsistencies be-tween the AM-3 and the other two samples, the ROK Ministry of Defense re-sponded that the crystalline Al signal found in the AM-3 sample was due to anexperimental mistake, which we believe is a plain lie.25

To summarize, our scientific analysis and experiment lead us to concludethat (1) JIGs AM-1 and AM-2 samples did not result from an explosion, and (2)some of JIGs data, most likely the AM-3 EDS data, may have been fabricated.26

Thus, the critical evidence presented by the JIG to link the Cheonan sinking tothe alleged explosion of the torpedo is scientifically groundless and perhapsfabricated.

Finding 3

The JIGs third finding alleged that the torpedo parts recovered from the area ofpresumed explosion were of DPRK origin, thus linking the explosion to NorthKorea. An independent investigation, however, revealed a serious inconsis-tency that casts doubt on the integrity of the JIGs evidence related to the tor-pedo. The outer surface of the torpedo propulsion unit that was found andshown to the media was greatly corroded, presumably because the coat of paintthat would have protected the metal had been burnt off during the explosion.The paint burn-off and resulting metal corrosion are consistent with a highheatexplosion commonly found in bombs and torpedoes. And yet the blue ink

marking of Hangul 1bn in Korean was still visible on the torpedo de-spite the fact that ink has a lower boiling point, typically around 150 degreesCelsius, than paint, typically 350 degrees Celsius, and thus should have burnt


24. S.-H. and P. Yang, Was the critical evidence presented in the South Korean official Cheonanreport fabricated? 28 June 2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v4.

25. ISnghn,Chnanham habjodanigyljngjk chnggnnchojaktoetta [TheJIGs criti-cal evidence is fabricated], Presian, 16 June 2010. Available on-line at www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=40100614152149&section=05. Ministry of National De-fense. Mo intnetmaechees pododoen isnghnkyosuchujang(1)e daehan dapbynim-nida [Response to Professor LeeSenghuns allegation (1) reported in an internet media], 21

June 2010. Available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/ mndMedia/mediaElucidation/20100621/1_-12672.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=14.

26. S.-H. Lee, and P. Yang, Was the critical evidence presented in the South Korean officialCheonan report fabricated? 28 June 2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v4.


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away just l ike theouter paint. Ina situa-tion like this a tor-pedo would havebeen subjected to

heat of at least 350degrees Celsius andquite l i ke ly over1,000 degrees, highenough to burn thepaint and the blue inkmarking as well .There is no scientificexplanation for thisinconsistency thehigh heat tolerantpaint was burnt, butthe low heattolerant

ink was not and thus the JIGs finding in this regard is baseless. 27 Further-more, any Korean, North or South, would be able to write the Korean letter1bn, and thus the mark cannot be cited as evidence of exclusive North Ko-rean writing.28 Finally, the JIG alleges that it possesses a North Korean pamphletand CD and that their description and drawing of a torpedo match the recov-ered torpedo parts, but it has refused to release them for examination, citing

national security reasons.In summary, the JIG had the burden of demonstrating beyond reasonable

doubt all three of its findings in order to substantiate its charge that a DPRK tor-pedo destroyed and sank the Cheonan. But we have shown that each of thethree findings contains serious inconsistencies inconsistencies that the JIGhas been unable to explain away. While we emphatically stress that our findingsdo not prove that North Korea did nottorpedo the ship, we insist that the JIGsso-called critical evidence fails to prove the opposite, namely, that North Korea


27. The JIG argues that when the torpedo exploded it produced heat higher than 3,000 degreesCelsius and that aluminum powder in the explosive material melted and transformed intoamorphous aluminum oxides that bonded with the propeller of the torpedo. Aluminum ox-ides in powder form, however, cannot bond with another metal; it must be in liquid state.Given that aluminums melting temperature is 660 degrees and aluminum oxides meltingpoint is 2,000 degreesCelsius, therear part of thetorpedomust have beensubjectedtoheat ofat least somewherebetween660and2,000degrees Celsius, if theJIGclaimis correct. Whether660, 2,000,or 3,000 degrees Celsius, it cannotbe scientifically explainedthat none of this heataffected the ink marking.

28. The ROK Defense Ministry reported on 29 June that the ink is made of solvent blue-5. Ac-knowledging that this is a common ingredient used in markers worldwide, the ministry con-ceded that it might be difficult to conclude that the ink is made in North Korea. A militaryofficial added that the result of the ink analysis will not be included in the final report on theCheonan incident due to be completed by the end of July. 1bn ingks solbentblu5sngbun gmchul [Solvent blue-5 detected from 1bn ink], Yonhap News, 29 June 2010.Available on-line at www.yonhapnews.co.kr/issues/2010/06/29/1202380000akr20100629090900043.html.

Slide from media briefing by ROK Ambassador Han Duk-soopurports to show evidence of a DPRK marking (circled) on atorpedo recovered near the site of the Cheonan sinking.


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did attack and sink the Cheonan. Moreover, the seriousness of the inconsisten-cies described above casts doubt not only on the validity of the JIGs conclu-sions but also on the integrity of its investigation. Given the suspicions raisedabout someof the EDS data the JIG usedasevidence, wecontend thatan impar-tial board should be formed to probe the integrity of the JIG data.

Domestic and Regional Politics of the Cheonan Report

In order to understand whytheJIGraced to produce itsproblem-ridden report,we need to examine subtle but important shifts in the handling of this incidentand situate those shifts in the context of domestic politics in South Korea. Forthe first few weeks after the sinking, the Blue House was careful not to jump toany conclusion about the cause of the sinking. Meanwhile, the ROK Navy wasmaking one blunder after another in its rescue and salvage operations and theMinistry of National Defense was releasing bits and pieces of information thatwere contradictory. In the early weeks after the loss of the ship, Defense Minis-ter Kim Taeyng openly admitted that there were no signs of North Koreas at-tack at the time, and he speculated that a North Korean sea mine [could have]floated in [the ships path].29

A subtle change in the governments tonecould beseenon16April whentheJIG released its first progress report and suggested that an outside explosioncould have caused the sinking. That same day Defense Minister Kim issued astatement in which he called the sinking of the Cheonan a grave national secu-rity incident and declared the need to implement resolute responses. Hisstatement strongly insinuated that the North was implicated. In his regular ra-

dio address on 19 April, President Lee voiced his determination to unearth thecause of the sinkingand resolutely respond, but he declined to name a per-petrator, noting that the investigators hadnot yet reached anyconclusion aboutthe cause.On25April, the JIG statedthata non-contactoutside explosionwasresponsible for the sinking of the Cheonan and strongly implicated the Northwithout explicitly naming any culprit.

The governments reluctance to cast blame evaporated on 20 May when theJIG released its interim report. The governments turnabout and the rushedmanner of the JIGs investigation were both curious. As we have seen, the JIG

had not yet completed many of its analyses. Its bubble effect simulation, for in-stance, had progressed only to one second, too short a time to establish withcertainly that such a bubble might have severed the ship.30 In addition the tor-pedo parts that the JIG paraded as unassailable proof of DPRK involvement hadbeen recovered only five days earlier than the 20 May presentation, and thismeantthattheJIGhadnothadenoughtimetoanalyzethedata,muchlesstode-


29. Defense Minister Kim Taeyngs testimony before the Parliament National Defense Commit-tee, 29 March 2010.

30. TheKorea Instituteof Machineryand Materials(KIMM),whichhadbeensimulating thebubbleeffect of a torpedo explosion, made only limited progress. When the JIG showed the simula-tionat the press conference, it could show how the bubble effect would have affected the shipduring the first 0.5 seconds. By the JIGs own admission, the KIMM would need until mid-Julyto complete its simulation.


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termine the origin of the ink used forthe 1bn marking. The gas turbineroom, which would have been di-rectly hit by an outside explosion,was retrieved only the day before the

press conference, giving investigatorsno time to examine and analyze thecrucial bits of evidence that the tur-bine room would have contained.But these issues and questions nolonger seemed to matter to the gov-ernment. Defense Minister Kim de-clared that the JIG had accumulated98 percent of the evidence necessaryto reach a conclusion and no addi-tional facts would change the govern-ments conclusion. JIG co-chair YunTkyong expressed his confidencethat thesimulation, when completed,wouldshowwhatheexpectedtosee.

The release of the JIGs report on20 May happened to coincide with the official start of campaigns for local gov-ernment elections. It was also three days before the first-year commemorationof the late President Roh Moo-hyuns death, an event that would rally oppo-

nents of the current regime.31 The day after the commemoration which drewtogether an estimated 200,000 mourners in events throughout the nation, de-spite rain and the security scare PresidentLee took to the War Museum to an-nounce stern countermeasures against the North as if to counter the rise of hisopponents.

Domestic Politics of the Cheonan Incident

Successfully using the national security threat to contain the opposition at theRoh commemorative event,LeeMyung-baks administration began a systematic

drive to silence critics and weaken opposition. Several current and former gov-ernment officials, for instance, were charged with defamation: Sin Sangchl,one of the three civilian members of the JIG and the only one recommended bythe opposition Democratic Party, had openly raised the possibility that theCheonan sankbecause ithad run aground.The Navyresponded bychargingSinwith defamation.32 Pak Snwon, a former official with South Koreas NationalSecurity Council (NSC) in the Roh administration, was charged by Kim Tae-


31. Minjuji wansng, unmyngida nomuhyn 1jugi chnguk chumo [Completing democ-

racy is our fate, nation mourns on Roh Moo-Hyuns first commemoration], Kyonghyang-sinmun, 23 May 2010.

32. Kim Kwign, Haegun, sinsangchlwiwon myngyehoeson hymi koso [Navy chargesShin Sang-Chul of defaming it,] Yonhap News, 19 May 2010.

In the early weeks after the loss of the ship,Defense Minister Kim Taeyng [picturedhere] openly admitted that there were nosigns of North Koreas attack at the time,and he speculated that a North Korean seamine [could have] floated in [the shipspath]. (Credit: Wikipedia, undated)


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yng, Minister of National Defense, with defaming him for allegedly claimingthat the U.S. military must have had some intelligence about the incident andwas keeping it secret. Seven colonels on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) leveleddefamation charges against I Chnghi, a parliamentarian from theprogressiveDemocratic Labor Party, because she claimed on the Parliament floor that the

JCS had watched a TOD (Thermal Observation Device) recording of the inci-dent the JCS had in its possession and she insinuated that the JCS was hidingsomething by not releasing the recording to the public. In addition, the policebegan to investigateotherswho were spreadingalternativehypotheses andrais-ing questions about the government announcements. These maneuverings allhad a chilling effect on public discourse.

Silencing potential critics of the governments handling of the Cheonan inci-dent was critical to the ruling Grand National Party (GNP), which was then fac-ing an uphill battle in the upcoming local government elections. Two years ear-lier, the GNP had won a landslide victory, but its success in2007 was short lived.Scandals swirling aroundcabinet appointments caused theGNPs popularity tosag. The GNP hit bottom when it rashly decided to open the beef market to U.S.imports and faced a public backlash with candlelight protests in the summer of2008. The party managed to rebuild some public support, only to quickly undoall its successes by its own actions. In January 2009, for example, the public wasappalled by actions the Seoul Metropolitan Police took to end a sit-in protest inYongsan over eviction issues. Four protesters and one Special Operations offi-cer were killed and scores of participants were injured in the crackdown.33 InMay2009, formerpresident RohMu-Hyun committedsuicide because of the in-

tense pressure the incoming Lee government was putting on him and his sup-porters. His suicide elicited a national outpouring of condolences. Threemonths later, former president Kim Dae-Jung passed away, feeding public anxi-eties that something was wrong with the current administration.

President Lee added to the growing discontent against his government byforcefully pushing to implement one of his pet projects, the Pan Korea GrandWaterway (or, Grand Canal Project), a 540-kilometer-long canal connecting Se-oul and Busan, two of South Koreas largest cities.34 Lee also decided to scuttlethe previous regimes project to build an administrative capital in Sejong City.

These were both highly controversial issues. In March 2010, an even more vola-tile controversy erupted over GNP majority leader An Sangsus alleged involve-


33. TheSeoulMetropolitanPolice mobilized over 300officersandanunknown number of SpecialOperations Group forces to disperse about 30 evictees who were staging a sit-in on top of abuilding. The evictees, who had been forcefully removed from their business locations tomake room for the gentrification of the Yongsan area, were demanding fair compensation. Inthe middle of the operation, a fire broke out and four protesters and one Special OperationsGroup officer were killed. Twenty three were injured. Yongsan chlgminpmgukmindaechaekwiwonhoi, Yongsan chlgmin salinjinabi chinsil[The truth about themurderoussup-pression of the Yongsan evictees], Seoul, February 2009. Chakasnn 6.9, Chigm naerisil

ykn yongsanchamsaykimnida [The station you are getting off at is the Yongsan disaster

station]. Seoul: Silchnmunhaksa, 2009.34. The canal would run diagonally across the country connecting the Han River, which flows

through Seoul into the Yellow Sea, to the Nakdong River, which flows through Busan into theKorea Strait.


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mentinanefforttoremovetheVener-able Myngjin, an outspoken critic,from his temple.35

The governments efforts todampen public discontent and si-

lence its opponents had an unantici-pated result. The public was growingresentful at what they began to per-ceive to be a regression in the demo-cratic progress Korea had made dur-ing the Roh administration. Thepublic perception was vindicatedwhen Han Myngsuk, prime ministerin the Roh administration, was de-clared innocent of the embezzlementcharges that had been made againsther on 9 April. The court trial, meantto tarnish and convict Han, trans-formed her into a symbol of opposi-tion and, ironically, into a viable chal-lenger to Seouls incumbent mayor, O Sehun, the GNP candidate who was untilthen considered invincible. Os predicament symbolized what other conserva-tive candidates would face in the 2 June election. Conservatives, once consid-ered a sure bet, found themselves caught in the wave of rising anti-incumbent

sentiment. Seizing this opportunity, opposition parties and civic organizationscombined forces behind a single consensus candidate in many localities.

At this critical moment, the sinking of the Cheonan and the governmentssubsequent attempts to implicate North Korea in the tragic event came to theGNPs rescue. By May, about a month before the election, the Cheonan eventwas eclipsing controversial issues such as the Grand Canal and the Sejong Cityprojects, which had been proving disadvantageous for the GNP.36 The JIGcharge that the Cheonan had been destroyed in a North Korean torpedo at-tackprovedtobemorechillingthananythingelsetheGNPhadtried.Theop-

position was immobilized by the fear that any criticism of the governmentmight lead to charges of undermining national security. At the same time the


35. Representative An hadreportedly called Venerable Myngjin a leftist at a meeting in Novem-ber 2009 with the secretary general of the Jogye Order, the largest denomination of KoreanBuddhism,andconspired to removehimfrom his temple in an attempt to disempower andsi-lence him. When VenerableMyngjin made Ans allegation public andKim Yngguk, whohadarranged the November meeting, confirmed the allegation at a press conference in March2010, the scandal revealed the extent to which the government was trying to exert its influ-ence: even religion was no longer free from the governments meddling.

36. The Grand Canal was the most salient issue for voters in polls in April, but the Cheonan inci-dent replaced it in May. For earlier polls, see Tupyo ynhyang choedae isyunn 4daegang

29% [The most influential issue is the Grand Canal Project with 29 percent] Kynghyangsinmun, 14 April 2010. For a May poll, see Pyosim hndnn chnanhamposu chinbomodu che1bynsu [The Cheonan shaking up voters mindnumber one issue for both con-servatives and progressives] Seoul sinmun, 10 May 2010.

Han Myngsuk, prime minister in the Rohadministration, pictured here visiting OsanU.S. Air Force base in December 2006.(Credit: USAF / Airman 1st Class Chad Strohmeyer)


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governments national security gambit rallied conservative support behindtheruling party andsolidified President Lees hold over the GNP, dealing a fa-tal blow to the growingly popular conservative challenger Park Geun-hye.The conservative media, which had been promoting the North-Korea-did-itcharge even before the JIG released its findings, now felt free to unleash an

all-out attack not only on critics but also on skeptics. Leading the charge to putaside questions and doubts was the Dong-a Daily, which, for example, ran afront page story entitled What countrys citizens are those who say [they] can-not believe the Cheonan report?37

Thenationalsecurity campaignbegan tohave its intended effect. Theconser-vative candidates in South Koreas big three cities Seoul, Incheon, andKyonggi were able to beat back rising challenges and widen their lead in thepolls. If the Cheonan incident was found to have resulted from government in-competence, this could have proved disastrous for the ruling party. But theblame-the-DPRK story completely turned the GNPs fortune around. It buriedall other issues in national discourse and put political challengers on the defen-sive. The conservatives could not have asked for more.

The election outcome, however, was anything but what was expected. Thepopular GNP incumbents were able to defeat their challengers in Seoul andKyonggi, but they did so only by a hairs breadth, contrary to projections aboutan easy victory. Incheon fell to the opposition Democratic candidate. So manyother local government positions went to the opposition that the Korea mediaquickly calledtheoutcome a landslidefortheDemocratic Party. Thenationalse-curity campaign and their efforts to silence critics made voters afraid to voice

their true preference even in anonymous opinion polls before they casttheir ballot. Underneath the publics seeming acquiescence lay a deeper andmore widespread disenchantment with the conservative government, but thiswas not being expressed in public. The campaigns in fact backfired: the youngweresoaggravatedbywhattheysawhappeningthattheymadeanefforttogotothepollsandthemiddleclasswassoworried about the potentiallynegativeeco-nomic impact of these tactics that they voted against the ruling party.

Impacts on Regional Politics

If NorthSouth relations in Korea had been deteriorating since Lees assump-tionofpower inFebruary 2008, they reached a criticalpoint inmid 2008 whenaSouth Korean tourist who was visiting the Kumgangresort in the North was shotand killed. In the early hours of 11 July 2008, the tourist strayed out of the per-mitted visitor zone and crossed into a militarily sensitive area. A North Koreansoldier, spotting an unidentified individual in the patrol area and watching herturn to flee upon being discovered, fired a shot and killed the woman beforeshe could return to the tourist zone. The tragic accident quickly escalated intoa wrangling between the North and South governments. The ROKs Ministry


37. Chnanham palpyo motmitgettani daeche nnara kungmininga [What countrys citizensare those who say [they] cannot believe the Cheonan report?], Dongailbo, 24 May 2010.


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of Unification immediately halted the entire Kumgang tour and stipulatedthree conditions forresuming the tour:DPRK officialswouldhave to allow theSouth Korean government tobecome involvedin investigating theincident; theDPRK government had to apologize for the killing; and the DPRK and ROKs rel-evant ministries would have towork out safetymeasures for future tourist visits.

The DPRK rejected these demands, claiming that its Tourism Bureau had al-ready cooperated with the tour organizer, Hyundai-Asan,38 to investigate the in-cident, had offered its apology, and had a safety rule in place. The incident,DPRK officials insisted, was caused by the tourist who violated the rules.

The wrangling over the tourism business was sparked by the tourists killing,but the differences between the ROK and DPRK governments had a deepercause, and that was what to do about the agreements made earlier at the twointer-Korea summits in 2000 and2007. TheLee government, consistent with itsAnything-But-Roh policy,39 refused to honor the agreements, whereas the KimJong-Il government made them a cornerstone of itsSouth policy. Thedeteriora-tion accelerated when the Lee government used the shooting of the tourist as away to force Pyongyang to accept Seouls refusal to accept the summit agree-ments. If Kim Jong-Ils government objected they faced the termination of tour-ism business from the South, a cash cow that brings in $65.00 per tourist.40

Pyongyang stuck to its position despite the high economic cost, and relationstook a turn for the worse as a result.

The deterioration that began on the east coast, with the shooting of the tour-ist, spread to the west in December 2008 when the DPRK military restrictedtransportation across thedemilitarized zone (DMZ) and halted a Gaesung tour-

ist visit in the west. Eight months later the Ministry of Unification allowed theGaesung tour to resume, but with the same three demands ithad made after theKumgang incident. Pyongyang upped the ante by threatening to review all thebenefitsprovidedtothe South side and demanding that the wages ofNorth Ko-rean workers and the rent costs of North Korean properties in the Gaesung In-dustrial Complex(GIC)41 had to be renegotiated. By early 2010, all communica-tion channels, contacts, and exchanges between the two Koreas ceased.42

Tension was mounting.The increased tension fueledspeculation that theNorths armed forceswere

behind the sinking of the Cheonan. Early media reports pointed to the Dae-chong Naval War as the proximate reason why the Norths military might have


38. Hyundai Asan Co., an affiliate of South Korean conglomerate Hyundai Group, has operatedtours of Mt. Geumgang on North Koreas eastern coast since 1992. Since 2003 it has been incharge of developing the Gaesung Industrial Complex. It has operated the Gaesung tourismbusiness since 2007. Gaesung, an old capital of the Koryo Dynasty, is about thirty-eight milesnorth of Seoul on the western coast.

39. Styled after George Bushs ABC (Anything-But-Clinton) policy.40. Close to 2 million tourists visited the Kumgang resort by the time the tour was halted in

mid-2008. Kim Minhyng, Hyndae asan kmgangsan kwan gwang sap 10tol [HyundaiAsan Kumgang tourism business enters its tenth year], Sulgyngje, 18 June 2008.

41. For a solid scholarly treatment on the Gaesung Industrial Complex and the tourism, see Son2006.

42. The GIC remainedthe onlyexception,but itwas operating at a reduced level and facinganun-certain future.


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launched an attack against the Cheonan. In the Daechong clash, which tookplace in November 2009, ROK naval ships fired thousands of shells at a DPRKnaval ship, all but destroying it. Several soldiers aboard the ship were reportedto have been killed. About a month later, in his address to the Korea Institute ofDefense Analysis, I Sangi, then chairmanof theJCS,warnedabout thepossibil-

ity ofa retaliatory strikeby the North.After the Cheonan incident, Korean mediapicked up on I Sangis warning to speculate that the North attacked theCheonan in revenge for its defeat in November 2009.43 The media speculation,and I Sangis warning itself, was based on the Souths own assessment, not onthe Norths. The DPRK, in fact, had claimed that its Navy beat back the Southsaggression in the Daechong Naval War, and it even showcased two sailors whodetailed in a TV program last December how they achieved their victory. TheNorths alleged motive for attacking the Cheonan out of revenge was thus con-tradicted by the fact that the North did not consider the Daechonga defeatat all,but conservative media nonetheless continued to accuse the North of sinkingthe Cheonan to revenge their defeat last November. They concoctedscenariosabout the Norths military sneaking around the far side of Baekryong Island, fir-ing a torpedo that severed the ship, and escaping without being detected. Theconservative Chosun Daily became even more creative, speculating that a hu-man torpedo zoomed underwater to destroy the Cheonan.44

The conservative drumbeat increased in volume after the JIG pointed to theNorth as the perpetrator, supposedly confirming what they had believed fromthe beginning. Cho Kabche, a leading conservative writer, argued that theCheonan incident taught the lesson that South Koreas nuclear armament was

the ultimate solution.45 Kim Chin, an editor of the Choongang Daily, a conser-vative newspaper owned by Samsung, argued that the U.S.ROK combinedforces had the capability for a limited military retaliation; he quoted an un-named leader who declared that a war can be wonif the public endures itfor only three days.46

President Lee added fuel to the fire by proclaiming in his address on 24 Maythat the North will pay the price corresponding to its action.47 The Ministry ofNationalDefense followed up with itsownmeasures, includingtheresumptionof its psychological warfare using loudspeakers and flyers. The day after Lees

address, the Army staged an exercise (in an undisclosed location), and on 26May, the Navy engaged in an antisubmarine exercise in the West Sea.Never a docile or passive onlooker, the North Korean military responded

with threats of their own: if the ROK military started its loudspeaker broadcasts,they threatened to fire at them and destroy the speakers. The Souths defenseminister, KimTaeyng,raisedthestakesby threatening a proportionate retalia-


43. An Chngsik, Pukhan taechnghaejn igyttasngunjngchi snggwa snjn? [NorthKorea won Taechong battlepropaganda for military first politics achievement?], SBSnyu-

s, 25 December 2009. Available on-line at news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?news_id=N1000689082.

44. Chu Yongjung and Yu Yongwon, Puk inganroe chosimhara haegun olcho tongbobattada[WatchtheNorthshuman torpedoNavywarned early thisyear], Chosnilbo,22April2010.


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tion if the North fired on their loudspeakers. The North escalated the war ofwordson12 Junewhen its joint chiefs of staff raised the possibility ofan all outmilitary strike that would not be proportional to the Souths use of force butwould create a sea of fire in Seoul.48 By this point, there was so much badblood between Seoul and Pyongyang and so few communication channels left

open that little could be done to defuse the tension and a lot could happen accidentally or otherwise to escalate the conflict.

If few anticipated the Cheonans sinking would heighten inter-Korean ten-sions as much as it has, no one expected the repercussions in Northeast Asianregional politics to be as serious. One of the first casualties in this regard wasJapanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyamas campaign pledge to move theFutenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station out of Okinawa. Just three days afterSouth Koreas JIG officially identified North Korea as the alleged culprit behindthe Cheonans sinking,Hatoyamausedthe JIGs chargeasanexcusetorenegeonthis pledge. Hatoyama told Okinawa governor Hirokazu Nakaima that given se-curityconcernsinEastAsiasuchas the situation onthe KoreanPeninsula,hehadno choice but to keep the Futenma base on the island.49

When the U.S.Japan Security Consultative Committee issued a joint state-ment on 28 May making the agreement to leave the Futenma base in Okinawaofficial, it also referred to tensions in the Korean peninsula, noting that recentdevelopments in the security environment of Northeast Asia reaffirmed the sig-nificance of the alliance.50 The United States reiterated its unwavering com-mitment to Japans security and both sides insisted that the U.S.Japan Treatyof Mutual Security and Cooperation remains indispensable not only to the de-

fense of Japan, but also to the peace, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacificregion. To this end, a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Ja-pan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities neces-sary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability.51

The Cheonan incident thus reminded Koreans and Japanese alike of secu-rity concerns in East Asia and the indispensable alliance that the UnitedStates represents in the region. The U.S. administration of Barack Obama,


45. Kim Tonghyn, Cho Kapche Hanguk, tokchajk haekmujanghaeya [Cho Kapche, Koreamust acquire own nuclear arms], Views&News, 5 May 2010.46. Kim Chin, Kungmini 3ilman chamajumyn[Only if the public perseveres for three days

], Chungangilbo, 23 May 2010.47. LeeMyong-Bak, Taekungmintamwha [Address to thenation],24May2010.Availableon-line

at www.bluehouse.go.kr/kr/president/speech/speech_view.php?uno=441&article_no=52&board_no=P04&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&order_key1=1&order_key2=1&cur_page_no=1&cur_year=2010&cur_month=.

48. Son Wonje and Sin Soyng, Puk 16nynmane sul pulbada kynggo [The North warns seaof fire in Seoul after sixteen years], Hangyresinmun, 12 June 2010.

49. Takashi Hirokawa and Sachiko Sakamaki, Hatoyama says Japan has no choice, [but] to keepU.S. Marine base within Okinawa, Bloomberg, 23 May 2010.

50. The Committee consisted of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Defense SecretaryRobert Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada, and Minister of Defense Toshimi

Kitazawa.51. All quotations are from the Joint Statement of U.S.Japan Security Consultative Committee.

28 May 2010. Available on-line at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.html.


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which had been pushing the Hatoyama cabinet to uphold the 2006 agreementto move Futenma to another location in Okinawa, got its wish thanks to theCheonan. When the Hatoyama cabinet collapsed on 2 June 2010 due in partto its decisiononFutenma its ambitious desire tobuild anEast AsiaCommu-

nity sank with it. In an oped piece in the New York Times Hatoyama had pro-posed to work toward building an East Asia Community under the principle offraternity so that East Asia could develop its regional currency integration andpermanent security frameworks.52 His article fueledspeculation, andworries inWashington, that Hatoyamas Asianist turn and emphasis on multilateralismmight weaken the bilateral alliance as the central pillar of Japans postwar secu-rity policy. Three months later, he recognized the U.S.Japan alliance as thelinchpin of Japanese foreign policy, as if to allay Washingtons concern, but henonetheless emphasized the initiative foran East Asian communityas themain

pillar of Japans diplomacy in his address at the APEC summit defiantly titledJapans New Commitment to Asia.53 Behind the six months of the wranglingover Futenma lay thetug-of-warbetween the alliedgovernments over the largerstrategic issue of Japans foreign policy orientation and priority. The Futenmadecision, seen in this larger context, reflects the outcome of the war thatHatoyamas aspiration to make an Asianist turn sank under the weight of theCheonan incident as the U.S.Japan bilateral alliance resurfaced as the recon-


52. Yukio Hatoyama, A New Path for Japan,New York Times, 26 August 2009. Available on-line at

www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html.53. Yukio Hatoyana, Japans New Commitment to Asia: Toward the Realization of an East Asian

Community, 15 November 2009, Singapore. Available on-line at www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html.

[left] U. Joy Ogwu, permanentrepresentative of Nigeria to theUN and president of the Secu-rity Council for July, reads astatement on behalf of the UNSecurity Council deploring the26 March sinking of the Cheo-nan but declining to hold theDemocratic Peoples Republicof Korea responsible for theloss of the ship and the lives ofits crew members. The state-ment encouraged the settle-ment of outstanding issues onthe Korean peninsula by peace-ful means to resume direct dia-logue and negotiation throughappropriate channels as earlyas possible, with a view to

avoiding conflicts and avertingescalation. See www.un. org/News/Press/ docs/2010/ sc9975.doc.htm.

(Credit: UN Photo/ John McIlwaine)


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firmed hub of the security architecture in the region. The Futenma relocation within Okinawa is after all an integral part of the bilateral RealignmentRoadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Ja-pan and transform Guam, the western-most sovereign territory of the UnitedStates, into a hub for security activities in the region. The U.S.Japan alliance

emerged out of the six months of wrangling between the allied governments asthe reconfirmed hub of the security architecture that the United States hadmaintained in the region.54

While the Obama administration prevailed over the Hatoyama cabinet in itsinsistence that the Japanese government had to honor the agreement made bythe previous administration, it sang a different tune with the Lee government inSouth Korea. Obama agreed to change the agreement that the administrationsof George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun had made to transfer the wartime opera-tional command to the Korean military by 2012. On 26 June the U.S. and ROKleaders agreed to postpone the transfer until 1 December 2015. The Cheonanevent proved chameleonic: it provided a convenient cover for a significantchange inKorea while in Japan it served asa reason nottochange. But the effectwas the same: both the change in Korea and the refusal to change in Japanhelpedsolidify thealliances that theUnitedStatesmaintains in the region. Soonafter President Obama agreed to keep the command control over the Koreanmilitary beyond 2012, as Korean conservatives had been wishing, the ROK mili-tary unit Oshino and a South Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)began operations in Afghanistan on 1 July, as if to reciprocate the Americangoodwill to honor the conservatives desire to have the United States keep com-

mand control over the Korean military.The arrival of the Korean military unit and PRT in Afghanistan, however, was

greeted with rocket attacks, portending an ominous future for South Koreanmilitary involvement in the conflict. Nor does the sudden collapse of the Hato-yamagovernment bode well for thefutureof the government that honors Amer-ican wishes in spite of popular sentiments to thecontrary. Finally, the June localgovernment elections in South Korea should serve as a warning: the govern-ments successful pursuit of national insecurity politics may in the end under-mine its own position.

Conclusion

The complete truth about the corvette Cheonans sinking may not be known inthe near future. Future historians may gain access to the documents and testi-monies that weare not privy toat this time and these may revealwhatwedonotknow now. What we do know, however, is that the ship sank, taking the lives offorty-six sailors, and in its wake a political drama unfolded onthe peninsula andin the region. In the drama that unfolded, the truth of the incident was not ascritical as what was made of the incident. While we cannot rule out the possibil-


54. All quotations are from the Joint Statement of the U.S.Japan Security Consultative Commit-tee. 28 May 2010. Available on-line at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.html.


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ity that the JIGs conclusion was correct despite flawed evidence and twistedlogicwe can see that the JIG playeda central role inthe drama and thatthe in-terim report it released on 20 May took events in an unexpected direction. TheCheonan drama was not staged in a sterile theater but in the powder keg that isKorea. Moreover, the escalating tensions and saber-rattling meshed seamlessly

with a plot that involved political parties caught up in local election campaigns.Finally, the Cheonan theme also reverberatedthrough thereinvigorationof U.S.alliances in the region.

Despite all the war mongering the Cheonan incident triggered, a glimmer ofhope can be seen in the drama. Voters in South Korea did not fall for the na-tional insecurity hysteria. In fact, a majority voted against it. Their vote of confi-dence inreasonand peace helpeddefusethe Koreanpowderkeg whenthe rele-vant governments involved abandonedtheir responsibility to protect in favor oftheir interest to perpetuate insecurity.

Much remains to be done to consolidate the fragile peace carved out by theJune 2010 vote. First and foremost, there must be a period of cooling off. Southand North Korean governments need to stop their war of words and refrainfrom taking any action that could trigger an uncontrollable chain of events. Theinternational community, including the UN Security Council, must take a stepback from getting entangled in the escalation of tension and create a positive at-mosphere in which the two Koreas can come together to dialogue and ex-change views. In themeantime, theROK government must reopenits investiga-tion into the sinking of the Cheonan with a new, and more objective, team ofinvestigators. Finally, the Korean Parliament should open a separate investiga-

tion into the JIG investigation itself in order to critically assess the integrity ofthe investigation, the tests it conducted, and the data it publicized.

In the United States the Obama administration should support and assist anobjective and thorough investigation of the Cheonan incident, while making aclear commitment to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Korean pen-insula.

An investigation that is as thorough, objective, andscientific as humanly pos-sible is needed to get to the bottom of the Cheonan incident. After all, forty-sixlives were lost and the peace and securityofKorea and Northeast Asia is at stake.

The dead sailors deserve such a report. So does the international community.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Disconnects and Inconsistencies in the Cheonan Report is arevised and edited version of an article coauthored with Seunghun Lee and publishedon-line in the July 2010 edition of theAsia Pacific Journal, Rush to Judgment: Inconsis-tencies in South Koreas Cheonan Report: www.japanfocus.org/ -JJ-Suh/3382.

ReferencesDepartment of Defense 2010.Quadrennial Defense Review. February Available on-line at www.de-

fense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.Reid,Warren D.1996.The response of surface ships to underwater explosions. Melbourne,Victoria,

Australia: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Department of Defence.Son,Key-young. 2006.South Korean engagement policies and North Korea: Identities, norms and

the sunshine policy. London: Routledge.

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Documents

The Sinking of the Cheonan and the Politics of National In Security