The Social Background and Political Allegiance of the Political Elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. the Terminal Stage 1984 to 1991_LANE y ROSS

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and University of Glasgow are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toEurope-Asia Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

University of Glasgow

The Social Background and Political Allegiance of the Political Elite of the Supreme Soviet of theUSSR: The Terminal Stage, 1984 to 1991 Author(s): David Lane and Cameron Ross Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1994), pp. 437-463Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/152812Accessed: 26-04-2015 13:57 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 200.89.140.130 on Sun, 26 Apr 2015 13:57:13 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis

http://www.jstor.org/stable/152812

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1994, 437-463

The Social Background and Political Allegiance of the Political Elite of the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR: The Terminal Stage, 1984 to 1991

DAVID LANE & CAMERON ROSS

OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF POWER in the Soviet Union, the popularly elected soviets were

undoubtedly the weakest prior to the reforms instituted by Gorbachev. They were representative and affirmative bodies, rather than decision-making ones. Gorbachev's reforms in 1989, however, strengthened the soviets and weakened the other two pillars of power in the USSR-the party's apparat and the government executive, the Council of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet and a new body, the Congress of People's Deputies, became a springboard for radical political change and an arena for political opposition to the Gorbachev leadership. Most of the discussion of the Supreme Soviet has been in terms of the role of deputies and the rise of political factions (parties) and interest groups outside the Communist Party. And studies of the 1989 Congress and Supreme Soviet have been devoted to an analysis of the institutional power of the parliament and its law-making powers and functions.1 This article has as its frame of reference the elites of the Supreme Soviet as they developed between April 1984 and August 1991.2

Our discussion therefore focuses on two distinct time-periods: that from 1984 to spring 1989, when the traditional structures and processes were in place, and that from spring 1989 to 1991, which was a period when the Supreme Soviet became a major actor in the process of political change.3 The article considers the changes in origin and composition of the positional legislative elite in the terminal period of the USSR.

We conduct a study of the sociological composition of the elite and an analysis, through a study of voting behaviour, of its internal division. While many factors led to the collapse of the CPSU, this study illustrates that in the Supreme Soviet a new elite in terms of its generational, occupational and institutional background had replaced the professional politicians of the Brezhnev era.

Our study shows that the party maintained a large formal membership of the Supreme Soviet elite but, as its composition shifted from members of the party apparat to those from intelligentsia settings, greater fragmentation set in. Neverthe- less, on the basis of voting patterns, the Soviet elite had higher levels of internal solidarity compared with the non-elite members of the Soviet. More important, the party elite was confronted by counter-elites in the Soviet. As the Supreme Soviet had




become a major focus of legitimate decision making, this seriously weakened not only the CPSU apparat as a political force but also the capacity of President Gorbachev to secure legislative compliance.

The Supreme Soviet elite defined

In the following analysis we have examined the positions held by leading members of the Supreme Soviet and distinguish between two sets of office holders: members of the Presidium, and the chambers' elite (i.e. the standing committee chairmen and the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet). The members of both these groups we define as the Supreme Soviet elite or parliamentary elite.

Prior to the changes enacted by Gorbachev in 1989, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was composed of a chairman, a First Deputy chairman, 15 Deputy chairmen (ex officio chairmen of the Republic Presidia), 21 elected members and a secretary, a total of 39. In the chambers' elite there was a total of 44 persons: for each chamber: one chairman and four deputy chairmen, and 17 chairmen and deputy chairmen of Standing Committees.

The Supreme Soviet elected in 1989 was a smaller and more effective legislature than its predecessor, being 542 members strong, and was itself elected from a Congress of People's Deputies, a much larger body of 2 250 deputies. As in the past, it was divided into two chambers and its higher bodies were not unlike its predecessor. The members of the Presidium included its chairman, the first deputy chairman, the chairmen of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet, 15 deputy chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who are also the chairmen of the Union Republic soviets, the chairman of the People's Control Commission, and the chairmen of the eight permanent commissions and 14 standing committees of the Supreme Soviet. The chambers' elite was constituted of (for each chamber): a chairman and two deputy chairmen (a total of six) and the chairmen of commissions and committees, who from 1989 were ex officio members of the Presidium, and already counted above.4

Thus defined, over the period April 1984-August 1991 the political elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR totalled 166 people who held between them 221 posts. Between 1984 and 1989 121 members were appointed and held 125 posts (four people held more than one post). Only 15 of these were returned to office in the new parliament elected in March 1989 and thus 45 of the 60 members (75%) of the legislative elite in 1989-91 were elected for the first time and constituted a new and relatively inexperienced leadership.

What were the principal differences between the 1984-89 and 1989-91 parliamentary elites? What kind of occupational or institutional background did the legislative elite have? To what extent were they recruited from the party and government executives? Were there any significant social changes? And how did they change in the terminal period of the USSR? To answer these questions we analysed the age, ethnic and gender differences of the elites and studied what positions were held by members of the parliamentary elite when they were first elected. We then turn to consider how the incumbent members of the Soviet elite formed factions and divided according to their voting behaviour in the terminal period of the USSR.

438



THE TERMINAL STAGE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

TABLE 1

DATE OF BIRTH AND AGE OF LEGISLATIVE ELITE, 1984-89 AND

1989-91

1984-89 1989-91 Total % Total %

Born before 1920 29 23.2 2 2 1920-29 40 32.0 27 28 1930-39 42 33.6 51 53 1940-49 4 3.2 10 10 1950-59 5 4.0 4 4 1960-69 1 0.8 2 2 Unknown 4 0 Total 125 96

Changes in the composition of the parliamentary elites

The legislative elite during the whole period under consideration was predominantly male. The overall composition of women in the Supreme Soviet declined markedly, from 32.8% in 1984 to 17.8% 1989-91. This was paralleled among the Supreme Soviet elite: the share of women fell somewhat from 11.2% (14) in the earlier period to 9.3% (nine) in the latter. (For details see Appendix, Table A.)

The rapid turnover and the arrival of new members in the elite in the period 1989-91 raises acutely the question of generational change. Only 15 individuals out of the pool of 121 deputies elected to elite positions in the Supreme Soviet in 1984-88 returned to power in 1989. This is a significant level of turnover of the elite.

Table 1 and Figure 1 show a major change in the age structure of the two parliamentary elites. In the earlier body, one third of the members were born in the decade 1920-29 and one third in 1930-39, whilst a further 23% were born before 1920. Only 8% were born after 1939. Taking the age at time of appointment, there were 53 individuals aged 60 and over (of whom 14 were over 70). The oldest member, Kuznetsov, born in 1901, was 83 years old on his appointment to the post of 1st Deputy chairman of the Presidium in 1984. Only four were under 30. By comparison, in the Supreme Soviet as a whole in 1984 there were 331 deputies under 30 years of age-22% of the total.

In the 1989-91 parliamentary elite there was a significant difference in the spread of people across the political generations. The number of those born before 1920 had fallen to only 2% and there was a slight fall in the percentage of those born between 1920 and 1929-from 32% to 28%. In contrast, the percentage of those born in the period 1930-39 rose substantially, from 33% to 53%. This was the Gorbachev generation, which was now the major force in the legislative elite. Also, in 1989-91 a significant number (some 16%) had been born after 1940.

One of the distinctive characteristics of the Supreme Soviet was its federative structure, with built-in constituencies of representatives from different regional areas. In the Soviets elected between 1984 and 1989, and in distinction from other political elites in the Soviet Union, the ethnic composition of the legislative elite did not contain an overall majority of Russians. Non-Russians make up 52.4% of the

439




... ? _.. 1984-89 50- il

11 1989-91

~ 30-

40-

10-

-1920 1920-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 Date of birth

FIGURE 1. Date of Birth of Supreme Soviet Elite: 1984-89 and 1989-91

membership of the total elite. (See Appendix, Table B for details of ethnic background.) There were, however, some differences in representation in the Presidium and the chambers' elites: Russians were by far the largest group, encompassing 30 or 47.6% of the membership of the chambers and a smaller figure of 22 or 35.4% of the Presidium (which included the ex officio membership of the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of all 15 Soviet Republics). However, if we examine the total Slavic (i.e. Great Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians) composition of the total parliamentary elite then we find that the number rises to 72 or 57.6%.

Among the parliamentary elite elected between 1989 and 1991, 50% were Rus- sians, 10% Ukrainians and 7% Belorussians, giving a total Slav composition of 67%. Eighteen nationalities were represented. Over half the elite of the chambers were Russians (54.5%) but the Russians were in a minority in the Presidium (46.1%). Nevertheless, compared with the top party elite (we have in mind the Secretariat and Politburo), where many of the non-Slav republics have not been represented at all, the Supreme Soviet (and particularly its Presidium) can be seen as constituting forums where the major non-Russian ethnic groups and republican elites could participate in the political process and articulate their demands and interests to the top party and government figures from the central political institutions. Shifting the locus of

440




60-

50- 1 1984-89

1989-91

40-

30

20-

""..... : .: .

Party/Koms SupSov

I I I

Governt Profess

E h 1_

I I I I Workers Managers

Public orgs Not known

Position/occupation

FIGURE 2. Position/Occupation of Supreme Soviet Elite: 1984-89 and 1989-91

legitimate power to the Supreme Soviet, therefore, strengthened the hands of the republics and regions against the centre.

Over the period 1989-91 nationality issues began to dominate the agenda of the parliament and, as we shall show below, non-Russian members of the legislative elite became a major dissenting group in the leadership of the Soviet. The leadership could no longer count even on republic officials remaining loyal to the central party line.

The political background of the legislative elite

The institutional backgrounds of the elite were distinguished in terms of: party/Kom- somol executives; leaders of public organisations; leaders of government, officials of supreme soviets, managers, professionals (we have included in one category all persons having a professional position and the heads of non-government institutions, such as the Academy of Sciences and institutions of higher learning), and workers.

Figure 2 illustrates the occupational or institutional position of members of the Presidium and chairmen of committees/commissions in the Supreme Soviets in the two time-periods. (See Appendix, Table C for details.) We note a dramatic reduction in the number of people combining membership of the Presidium with a position in the party apparat: from 32% in 1984-89 to 21% in 1989-91. In the period 1984-89 there were a number of high-ranking members of the party apparat, including five

tn a)

E z

10

441

0

:?:;f:S?:?:-: ?'?:"?'?:?:?:? :::::::::::?: i?:?I:?:?:?:? XI::f?: Mj::r:::

?':?:?I:?:? '?'::?s:.:.: '?'?'?:5?.?'?. :?:?.?::::::. ?:?:?:?:?:?:?: : ....... ?X?:?:?: ?:'?s:.: t::i "" "-'




members of the Politburo (Chernenko, Grishin, Gorbachev, Kunaev and Shcherbit- sky); one All-Union Central Committee Secretary (Luk'yanov), five republic secretaries, seven obkom and two gorkom secretaries and two All Union Komsomol secretaries. During the period 1989-91 Gorbachev was chairman of the Presidium (until March 1990) and General Secretary of the CPSU and there were four republic party secretaries, five obkom secretaries and the First Secretary of the Ukraine Komsomol.

Politburo members in 1989-91 (in addition to Gorbachev) included Primakov (the chairman of the Council of the Union), who was a candidate member, Luk'yanov (First Deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and from 14 March 1990 Chairman), also a candidate member, and Vorotnikov (Chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet), who was a full member. In each period the Council of Ministers retained its representation of four people. In the earlier period two of these were also members of the Politburo (Demichev, who was Minister of Culture, and Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs). A third, Kuznetsov, was a First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs when appointed in 1977 to the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium.

After 1989 a sharp rise took place in the number of professionals: people who in Russian terms were members of the scientific, technical and artistic intelligentsia-in the 1989 elections their numbers rose from 3% to 27%. The representation of workers fell from 8% to zero. New to the Presidium also were seven managers of enterprises and trusts (ob"edineniya), who were all chairmen of standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet and entered the Presidium as ex officio members. Leaders of public organisations (e.g. trade unions, veterans' and women's societies) maintained a small percentage (6%).

A detailed examination of the composition of the chairmen of committees and commissions shows that members of the party apparat dominated the committees over the period 1984-89, being 60.7% of the members. This included five senior members of the Politburo and Party Secretariat (Gorbachev, Ponomarev, Dobrynin, Ligachev and Ryzhkov), ten Republic Central Committee Secretaries (the first secretaries of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, Kirigizia, Latvia, Moldavia; 2nd Secre- taries of Kazakhstan, Belorussia and Secretaries of Ukraine (two)) and 15 obkom secretaries.

A fifth of the committee chairmen were also members of the government elite-including eight republic government officials (the first deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers of Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia (two), deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers of Russia (two) and Ukraine), one USSR Ambassador (who served in Afghanistan) and a local level city official. The total membership of professionals was 11.7%, which included one president and three vice-presidents of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In addition there was one female worker (Gellert, a tractor operator in a kolkhoz) who headed the committee for women's affairs, and one enterprise director, also a woman, who lead this same commission at a different time and was a director of a textile factory in Ivanovo. Finally, came one chairman of the Uzbek Trade Union Council.

When one compares the backgrounds of the chairmen of the committees in 1989-91 with the members of the Supreme Soviet in the 1984-89 period, one notices

442




35-

30 -

F 1984-89

in 1 i25 n te nm s of mm s of te pl 1989-91

n 20- .)

E Z 15-

10-

Party Governt Profess Worker Manager Pub orgs Unknown Position/occupation

FIGURE 3. Position/Occupation of Committee Chairmen: Supreme Soviet, 1984-89 and 1989-91

a sharp decline from 60.7% to only 19% in the number of executives from the party apparat. The other major difference is the sharp rise from 11.7% in 1984-88 to 36% in 1989-91 in the numbers of members of the professional classes.

Figure 3 (showing the background of the chairmen of the Supreme Soviet's committees) illustrates clearly the shift from the party to professionals and managers. (See Appendix, Table D for full details.) Only five committees in the 1989-91 period had chairmen from the party executive: agriculture, credential, international, legislative proposals and transport. At the other end of the scale, there were two committees which had never had a prominent party person at the head: women and science.

On the basis of this detailed study of the biographies of the committee chairmen the following conclusions may be drawn. Consider the committee chairmen in 1984-89. For a number of key appointments the major criteria have been technical expertise and professional knowledge of the field covered by the committees. For instance, of the three deputies who headed the Agriculture Committee, all were senior party officials who had a qualification in agriculture: they supervised major agricul- tural regions (Mozgovoi, Secretary of Ukraine Central Committee, Razumovsky, First Secretary of Krasnodar krai and Ponomarev, First Secretary of Belogorod obkom). The two chairmen who headed the Science and Technology Committee included the Director of an All Union Scientific Research Institute and a Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Science. The three chairmen of the International Affairs Com-

443




mittee included two Secretaries for International Affairs, Ponomarev and Dobrynin, and Gorbachev, who at that time was a senior secretary also involved with the supervision of foreign policy.5

Although ministers and other members of the central executive body (the USSR Council of Ministers) were prohibited from chairing the standing committees, this did not preclude republic-level government officials from doing so. Thus, as chairmen of the most powerful and influential committee (Planning and Budget), we find Maslenikov, chairman of RSFSR Gosplan and Deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; Masol, who headed the Ukrainian Gosplan, and Kachura, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukraine. Three senior party figures also headed the important Legislative Proposals Committee: these were Ligachev-CPSU Secretary, Ryzhkov-CPSU Secretary, and Mironov-First Secretary of Donetsk obkom.

In the 1989-91 Supreme Soviet the chairmen of the committees were drawn from different constituencies: only six out of 33 were members of the party/Komsomol elite.6 In the terminal period (1989-91) the chairmen of the committees were dominated by 12 professionals with executive positions in higher education and research institutes.7 Once again there was a high degree of correlation between the occupation of the committee chairmen and the area of work of the committees. For example, Veprev, the director of a sovkhoz, headed the Committee for Agriculture; El'tsin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Construction Committee and Komarov, the General Director of a construction enterprise, were elected to chair the Committee on Construction; Aitmatov, editor in chief of Inostrannaya literatura and the chairman of the Kirgiz Writer's Union, and Stel'mashonok, chairman of the Board of Artists of Belorussia, were elected chairmen of the Culture Committee.8

Study of the occupation of chairmen and deputy chairmen of the chambers showed that for the period 1984-89, out of a total membership of 12 there were three members of the party apparat, three members of the professions and five workers (and one other). In the period 1989-91, out of a total of 10 members there were two members of the party apparat, three members from posts in the soviets and five members of the professions.9

We conclude then that the legislative elite had a high saturation of party executives before 1989 and thereafter recruited more and much younger people with professional executive backgrounds. The Soviet elite was distinguished by its multi-ethnic charac- ter and the representation of republics and regions.

Party membership in the Congress, the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet elite

In the period between 1984 and 1989 party membership of the Supreme Soviet averaged 71.3%. For its elite it was much higher: 95% of members of the Presidium were party members and so were 98% of the chambers. Gorbachev's reforms had not reduced the level of party representation: in March 1990 the overall party membership in the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was an impressive 87%, and for the legislative elite as we have defined it, 98%.1? What had changed, however, was the representation of senior party officials in the Supreme

444




140 - 1 Full

120- E Candidate

9889 19890 199

20-

0 1984-89 1989-90 1990-91

FIGURE 4. Supreme Soviet Elite by Membership of Central Committee, 1984-91

Soviet. While one quarter of the members of the Central Committee in 1990 were

deputies to the Congress of People's Deputies, their number had fallen to a mere 6.5% of the members of the Supreme Soviet.

As can be seen from Figure 4, the percentage of members of the legislative elite

deputies who were members or candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee fell dramatically from 53% in the Presidium in 1984 to 23% in 1989. (For full details of data illustrated here, see Appendix, Table E.) For the chambers the figures were 62% in 1984 and only 27% in 1989. In the latest period, 1990-91, after the election of a new party Central Committee at the XXVIII Congress and turnover in the

Supreme Soviet, there was an almost complete withdrawal of members of the Central Committee from the elite of the Supreme Soviet. Only three of the members of the Presidium were central committee members (6%) and only four members of the chambers (9%) were from the party Central Committee elite. This change represents a virtual withdrawal of the party's political elite from the Supreme Soviet.

These sociological data provide us with the necessary background information to

study the political divisions of the post-1989 Supreme Soviet elite which were to be so important in the collapse of the USSR.

Political divisions in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies

The actions of the communist leadership in weakening the hegemony of the party, encouraging the development of a 'plurality of interests' and shifting the focus of

political interest articulation to the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme

445




Soviet led to the fragmentation of the Communist Party and to the rise of factions and political groupings.

By the time of the coup in August 1991, there were three loose political groupings, which we have called 'factions', in the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: the Communist Group, the Interregional Group and Soyuz. In addition, a large number of deputies were outside these factions. These should not be considered as ideologically homogeneous political groups. Rather they were moving constellations of people and there was overlap between them. The study of these political groupings here is relevant because they influenced the formal political leadership of the Supreme Soviet by setting a political agenda and providing a base for support of counter-elites and opposition. Our purpose here is not to study the counter-elites except in so far as the incumbent elite was linked to these new forces.

The declared membership of these groupings in the Congress of People's Deputies is shown in Table 2.11 The overlapping membership of the three political factions is shown at the top left-hand side of the table: the Communist Group (CG) had the largest number of members (738), of whom 327 were also members of Soyuz (SZ) and 12 of the Interregional Group (IG); Soyuz had a total of 559 members, of whom 14 were in the Interregional group; the Interregional Group totalled 226. Of the total number of deputies (2 250), 508 were not formal members of these factions. In

percentage terms, of the Communist Group, 44.3% were joint members of Soyuz and 1.6% members of the Interregional group; of Soyuz, 58.49% were members of the Communist Group and 2.50% members of the Interregional Group; of the Interre-

gional Group, 6.19% were members of Soyuz and 5.3% members of the Communist

Group. The Interregional Group became in practice a radical opposition to the Gorbachev

leadership with a liberal-democratic orientation. It was the first faction to be established in the Congress of People's Deputies, and had five co-chairmen (G. Popov, B. El'tsin, A. Sakharov, Yu. Afanasev and V. Pal'm). Although the group fought for the introduction of a multi-party system, its leaders were not and did not intend to become a 'party'. Members of the group, however, shared some common perspectives on major political issues such as support for private property and a market economy, local self-determination and republican sovereignty.

Soyuz (Union) was formed in 1990 and led by two army officials (V. Alksnis and N. Petrushenko). Initially, the main thrust of this group's activity was the preservation of the USSR as a single entity. Most of its members supported traditional Soviet ways of doing things and sought to sustain the institutions of Soviet power: it soon became known as the 'conservative' opposition to Gorbachev and his reforms.

The Interregional Group and Soyuz were both able at different times to exert considerable influence in setting the parliament's agenda, in having resolutions adopted by a majority of parliamentary votes. They both produced (or were joined by) political leaders who, mainly through their public parliamentary activity, became well known nationwide figures, though our concern here is with the leaders of these

political movements who were in positions of responsibility in the formal structure of the Supreme Soviet (members of its Presidium and chairmen or deputy chairmen of parliamentary committees).

446




TABLE 2

MEMBERSHIP OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS, USSR CONGRESS OFPEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, 1989-91

Party factions CG SZ IG Total

Communist Group (CG) 738 (327) (12) 738 Soyuz (SZ) (327) 559 (14) 559 Interregional Group (IG) (12) (14) 226 226

No faction membership 508

Of whom, interest groups: Agrarian deputies 210 160 17 413 Workers' deputies 112 115 25 304 Life 100 87 6 215 Autonomous territories 84 84 18 231 Constructive cooperation 82 48 13 150 For public health 30 25 5 82 Motherland 71 44 3 124 Ecology 65 43 67 219 Siberia and Far East 64 53 33 190 Deputies for culture 52 31 23 194 Afghan veterans 52 9 8 52 Civil society 36 21 14 83 Scientific-technical progress 32 19 17 86 Knowledge 28 19 5 56 Science and industry 25 14 18 88 Young deputies 24 15 13 112 Academician deputies 21 11 19 86

Deputies for justice 14 5 18 39 Military reform 5 4 29 52

Notes: Brackets ( ) indicate faction subtotals. Another small party, the Social-Democrats, which had 14 members, has been omitted from the table as thirteen of them were co-members of the Interregional Group. Source: Table constructed by Otto Cappelli from INDEM (Moscow) Data Base; some of the following discussion is also based on these data.

Members of these political factions in turn were participants in various interest

groups (the major ones are cited in Table 2). These specific interests united and at the same time divided the deputies, so that the Communist Group could not count on the

unqualified support of its members-and neither could the Interregional Group which constituted the opposition.

Two relatively large groups were 'Workers' Deputies' (304 members) and 'Agrar- ian Deputies' (413 members). Affiliation here was mainly based on the deputies' occupation or profession, though these groupings proved to be relatively ineffective as political interests. The bulk of the remaining groups were single-issue or functional

groups (from 'Ecology' with 219 deputies to 'Life' with 215, which represented women's interests, to 'For a Civil Society' with 83). The 'For the Development of Scientific-Technical Progress' group were founded early in 1990, led by A. Vol'sky and A. Vladislavlev, and claimed to enjoy the support of 86 deputies. The 'Scientific-

447




Industrial' group, despite its relatively small size (88 deputies), claimed to represent the interests of an enormously large number of people (directors, managers and workers employed in industrial production, as well as scientists and research person- nel in production-related branches). From early 1991 onwards the leaders of this Soviet parliamentary group were the active initiators and leaders of the socio-political movement Obnovlenie (Renewal)-also known as the 'directors' party'. Obnovlenie, in turn, became a founding member of Civic Union, set up in early 1990 by Vol'sky and Vladislavlev.

It is against the activity of these political factions and groupings that the leadership of the Supreme Soviet conducted its activity. The leadership of the Supreme Soviet, once hegemonic, operating through the Communist Party leadership, now had to contend with division among its own members and with opposition from these autonomous groups.

It was the fragmentation of the political system which was most evident in the new Congress and Supreme Soviet. As noted above, the party political elite had withdrawn from the leadership of the new legislature and a separation took place of the party leadership clustered in the Central Committee and the state leadership under Gor- bachev legitimated through the Supreme Soviet. After the XXVIII Congress in 1990 the party had effectively lost its traditional domination of the legislature; it had been undermined by Gorbachev, though many in the party executive still thought that its hegemony could be retrieved. As Deputy V. S. Lipitsky has put it,

We now have no real channels for influencing the decisions made by our parliamentarians, since... in many cases... the soviets are not so much multi-party as non-party. Deputies there do not represent political parties but are elected to the soviets thanks to their personal qualities and feel responsibility only to the voters. I think our party already effectively finds itself in the position of constructive opposition.'2

In seeking to relocate legitimacy in the Supreme Soviet and concurrently being unable to guide it, Gorbachev seriously undermined the power of the state and weakened his own position. This partly explains why at the end of his rule he sought to strengthen the post of executive presidency.

Division among the parliamentary elite

Not only had the traditional discipline of the communists collapsed on the floor of the Congress, but also division had spread to the Supreme Soviet's legislative elite, which now had members openly joining different factions: Soyuz (SZ) and the Interregional Group (IG). Although the Communist Group (CG) remained by far the largest, with 29 members in the parliamentary elite, there were also five of its members who combined membership with that of Soyuz, and in addition there were four members of the Interregional Group. (For details of the membership see Appendix, Table F which defines the members of the parliamentary elite by political faction: Communist Group, Soyuz, Interregional Group and those who did not belong to CG, SZ or IG. Also included are brief details of their social background and position: date of birth, nationality, occupation when elected to the Supreme Soviet and post in the Supreme Soviet.)

448




Twenty-seven members of the parliamentary elite did not belong to the IG, CG or SZ. This group included senior members of the Presidium such as Gorbachev, Luk'yanov, Primakov, Laptev and Nishanov. These people belonged either to no groups or more typically to a number of the smaller interest groups which are listed in Table 2.

Of the seven women in the parliamentary elite, six were members of the Commu- nist Group and the seventh was outside all these political factions. Sixteen members of the Communist Group were non-Russians. Among Soyuz there was only one non-Russian (Iskakova, who was a Kazakh); and of the four members of the Interregional group two were non-Russians (Bisher was Latvian and Belyaev Ukrainian).

To discover what positions in the Supreme Soviet elite were held by these people, the committee chairmen have been analysed by factional allegiance as shown in Table 3. As indicated, some of the committees had more than one chairman over the period. Between 1989 and 1991 the Communist Group chaired 20 of the standing committees, four were headed by members of Soyuz, three by the Interregional Group and ten by members of other interest groups and political factions. The four members of Soyuz who were also members of the Communist Group (and were violently opposed to marketisation) chaired committees on Economic Reform and the Consumer Market in addition to Defence and Security, and Construction. The Interregional Group chaired three committees; Education, Construction, and Science and Technology. Of the ten who did not belong to any of the above three major groups, three chaired the important Committee on Legislation. Members of this diverse group also chaired committees on Agriculture, Budget, Construction, Consumer Market, Industry and Technology, Military Internationalists and the Socio-Economic Development of Republics and Territories. On the basis of this positional analysis, the Communist Group would appear to be very strongly positioned and the opposition, in the form of the Interregional Group, was weak. However, this domination of the Soviet is not borne out by an examination of political alignments.

Political alignment of the legislative elite

The extent to which the established legislative elite was itself divided is illustrated by the voting records. While we do not have the details of individual voting in the Supreme Soviet, we do have voting records in the Congress of People's Deputies.13 Here we have considered five key votes on issues proposed by the Interregional Group:

1. Not to discuss article 6 of the constitution, concerned with the hegemony of the Communist Party;

2. Support for the government's economic programme; 3. Allowing the President to be elected by Congress (rather than by direct popular

vote); 4. Imposing a moratorium on strikes; 5. Not to recognise republican declarations of sovereignty.

449




TABLE 3

BREAKDOWN OF SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEE AND COMMISSION HEADS BY

POLITICAL FACTION, 1989-91

Committees/commissions CG SZ IG No faction

Agriculture and food 1 Buget, finance and planning 1 Construction and architecture 1 1a 1 1 Consumer market 1 la Culture 1 1 Defence and security 2 la Ecology 1 Economic reform 1 la Education 1 Ethics 1 Glasnost' 1 Health 1 Industry (science) and technology 1 1 International affairs 1 Labour and social policy 1 Legislation and law 1 3 Military internationalists 1 Nationalities policy 1 Republic and territories 1 1 Transport and communications 1 Veterans 1 Youth 1 Women and family 2 Total 20 4 3 10

aAlso a member of the CG

All voters in favour of the above formulations would support the line of the Gorbachev leadership: i.e. not to discuss the clause concerning the party in the

constitution, supporting the government's economic programme, allowing the Presi- dent to be elected by the Congress. The opposition votes would all be 'against' the motions as put above. The details of how individual members of the Supreme Soviet elite voted on these five issues are shown in Appendix, Table G.

Figure 5 illustrates the voting profile of the Supreme Soviet elite. (See Appendix, Table H for voting details.) Examination of Figure 5 shows that the Supreme Soviet elite had lost its previous levels of solidarity. Only on issue 3 (on the Congress voting for a President) was there an affirmative vote of over 80%. Nevertheless, on the first two issues-hegemony of the Communist Party and economic policy, over 70%

supported Gorbachev's policy, though obviously in a Soviet context opposition by more than 25% of the elite was a serious indication of political instability. The most divisive issues, however, were the votes on banning strikes and on the recognition of declarations of sovereignty. On both issues less than 40% of the parliamentary elite was in favour of government policy.

As was to be expected, the members of the Interregional Group either abstained or voted against issues 1-5. Less expected was the dissident voting of 12 members of the CG who did not vote in favour of issue 4, and the seven who did not

support issue 5. Of the 27 members who did not belong to any of the political

450




120- F _For

"

Against

!i0::: , Abstained

80- FIGURE . Supreme Soviet Elite Voting Beha r Novote

o 60-

40-

20-

Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5

FIGURE 5. Supreme Soviet Elite Voting Behaviour on five Issues

factions, 17 did not vote in favour of issue 4 and 16 did not support issue 5; only two persons could be said to have voted consistently with the Inter-regional Group, Shet'ko (four negative votes) and Veprev (three negative votes). Generally, however, these 'non-aligned' members of the parliamentary elite were of the leadership or supportive of it.

We have defined two major factions in the Supreme Soviet: those who voted in support of Gorbachev on three or more of the above five issues and those who voted likewise against. (For full details, see Appendix, Table I). An examination of the voting behaviour shows that there was very little difference in age, educational level or CPSU membership between the two groups. (All except one had been a member of the CPSU and all had higher education). The areas where there were some major differences were in nationality, gender and occupation.

As noted above, a characteristic of the Supreme Soviet elite was the greater representation of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. Changing the fulcrum of power to the Supreme Soviet effectively gave the non-Russian nationalities a much greater role in decision making and this in turn was to be a most decisive factor in dividing the parliamentary leadership. Sixteen members of the Communist Group were non-Russians and of these seven voted against or did not vote or abstained on issue 5. Of the 15 opposition members, as defined above in Group 2, ten were non-Russians. However, we should also emphasise that a number of non-Russians, 16 of 34 in Group 1, also supported the government.

There was an even stronger correlation between gender and voting. The voting records of five of the women members of the parliamentary elite (Bazarova,

451




120- 1 For

Against


' Abstained

iiiiii:~iiiiii!iiSiiiiiiiii!iii!iiiiijii! . ......................................No.vote

................. - iiiiiiiiiiiiiii ii ?~i !iiiii!iiii i : ~!iiiii!:::::::::':::: :. . . ..

40-

20-


FIGURE 6. Congress Voting Behaviour on five Issues

Kafarova, Matvienko, Rakhmanova and Shevchenko) show that they all voted predominantly in favour of issues 1-5 and supported the Gorbachev leadership in the parliament.

We have already noted the large number of members of the scientific, artistic and professional intelligentsia who entered the parliament in 1989. Of the 15 members who opposed the government, almost half were professionals, but of the 34 who voted with the leadership only four were.14 One major difference between the groups was the large number of directors of production associations and enterprises and members of the CPSU and Komsomol apparat to be found in the group of loyalists to Gorbachev. Only one director is to be found in the opposition and there are no members of the party apparat and only one member of the Komsomol apparat.

When examined against the total votes in the Congress for these motions, one can measure the extent to which the legislative leadership was at variance with the deputies. Of the deputies, only 52.6% voted for the first issue (not to discuss the role of the party and article 6 of the constitution). And more deputies voted against issue four (37.7%) (which would have imposed a moratorium on strikes) than supported it (31.6%). On the recognition of republics' declarations of sovereignty, while only 18.5% voted against the leadership's proposals, the affirmative vote was low (41.2%) and a high proportion (28.5%) did not vote and 11.8% abstained. (See Figure 6 and Appendix, Table J.) As one might expect, deputies in the Congress were more oppositional than the members of the parliamentary elite.

452




Conclusion

The parliament that was elected in spring 1989 was very different from its predecessor, with a multiplicity of new actors and institutions given representation in the legislature for the first time. It was a much younger body: 69% of its members were under 60 years of age, compared with 42% in its predecessor. There had been a significant decline in the overlap of members with the party apparat and a significant rise in the representation of members of the scientific, technical and artistic intelligentsia and managerial strata. The formal party elite had withdrawn from the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. The power of the party in the Congress and Supreme Soviet was far less than its 87% membership would suggest and the debates and voting records of the deputies were far from predictable. No longer could the Party Group of the Supreme Soviet dictate policy to the deputies or control their voting. The deputies were able to form a number of loose political factions and interest groupings. In the Congress, the Communist Group with its membership of 738 had to operate alongside Soyuz with 559 deputies and the emerging opposition of the Interregional group with 226 deputies. There were also 20 smaller groups bringing together such diverse interests as women, farmers, industrialists, Afghan veterans and the younger deputies.

What in the traditional Supreme Soviet had been a consensual and political elite united through the party's political hegemony and sustained through its discipline now increasingly became fractured, and the Soviet's leadership was confronted by a multiplicity of interest groups. Moreover, the political leadership around the Gor- bachev leadership could not count on the unequivocal support of the Communist Group. Nevertheless, the legislative elite still maintained a relatively high level of consensus. Its political allegiance was still mainly in support of the traditional forces: it is remarkable, however, that three members of the radical Interregional Group, so strongly opposed to Gorbachev, were given places as Chairmen of Supreme Soviet committees. Gorbachev had allowed his arch-rival, and leader of the radical opposition, a place in the Supreme Soviet elite. But it was the nationality issue and what appeared to be a government attack on the working class that split most sharply the members of the Supreme Soviet elite. Although it was divided in its voting record, the elite still by and large supported the leadership of Gorbachev. The base of the radical reformers was to be found among the rank and file members of the Congress and Supreme Soviet. But their numbers in the parliamentary elite were certainly strong enough to create an alternative political leadership, especially as El'tsin was in a crucial position as a member of the Supreme Soviet elite. This was a footing from which he could unleash his opposition to Gorbachev.

El'tsin was supported by members of the liberal intelligentsia, whose numbers in the Supreme Soviet increased substantially in 1989, paralleling the sharp decline of the party apparat. Gorbachev failed to win the support of the intelligentsia deputies in 1990 and this social stratum proved to be a base of opposition to him in the parliamentary elite. His stubborn approach to the nationalities question also led to the alienation and opposition of many non-Russian deputies. However, there would appear to be no other major social division between the emerging counter-elite and the incumbent powers: all but one had been members of the party and all had received

453




higher education. One significant social difference was the support given to the Gorbachev leadership by women members of the elite.

An alliance of non-Russian deputies with members of the intelligentsia and led by the Interregional Group increasingly made it difficult or impossible for the political leadership under Gorbachev or the Communist Group to maintain control over the procedures of the parliament and its legislative output. The traditional power of the CPSU in the parliament had been broken and the formal leadership of the

Supreme Soviet now included the leaders of what must be considered a counter-elite. Gorbachev was hoist on his own petard: not only had he weakened the legitimacy of the party, but he was unable to gain a footing among the rising counter-elites. He was

opposed by the radical opposition and, perhaps just as important, by more traditional forces clustered around Soyuz. In shifting legitimacy to the Supreme Soviet and

destroying the party's hegemony there, Gorbachev opened the lid on elite confron- tation which proved to be a major factor precipitating the collapse of the USSR.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge Oberlin College

1 See, Robert T. Huber & Donald R. Kelley (eds), Perestroika-era Politics: The New Soviet Legislature and Gorbachev's Political Reforms (Westview, 1991); Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'State Institutions in Transition', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (eds), Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics (Macmillan Press, Second edition, 1992); Michael E. Urban, More Power to the Soviets (Edward Elgar, 1990); Eugene Huskey (ed), Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet State (M. E. Sharpe, 1992); Peter Vanneman, The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System (Duke University Press, 1977); Shugo Minagawa, Supreme Soviet Organs (Nagoya University Press, 1985).

2 We acknowledge that this research was financed by the British ESRC East-West initiative. 3 Elections to the new Congress of People's Deputies took place on 26 March 1989 and the

Congress met for its first session on 26 May 1989. The Congress in turn elected the Supreme Soviet on 27 May 1989. The first session of the Supreme Soviet took place in June 1989. In this study we consider the elites of the old Supreme Soviet 1984-March 1989 and the new legislative elite May 1989-1991.

4 In March 1990 some alterations were made to the Presidium, which was now composed of: * 1 Chairman (Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet); * 2 Chairmen of the chambers; * 1 Chairman of the People's Control Committee; * 22 Chairmen of the Committees and Commissions.

New representatives from local-level assemblies (including one people's deputy from each of the 15 republics, and one representative from the autonomous republics, and two from the autonomous oblasti and okruga). The Presidium was no longer made up of the 15 chairmen of the Republic Supreme Soviets, who were transferred to Gorbachev's new Federation Council. These new republic and regional members are not included in our definition of the legislative elite because they were representatives of other legislatures. 5 Other examples are as follows; The Health Committee had two party secretaries, one was director of a research institute for epidemiology and another a chairman of republic trade unions. Of the two Chairmen of the Education committees, one was Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the other was First Secretary of Kirgizia. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the Nature Conservancy chairmen was a scientist by profession: one was First Deputy chairman of the Kazakh Council 6f Ministers and three were senior party secretaries of regions and republics.

6 The six members of the party apparat were; obkom 1st secretaries; Dzasokhov, Foteev, and Sharin; Kiselev, 2nd Secretary of Kirgizia; Salykov, 1st Secretary of Karakalpak ASSR and Tsybukh, 1st Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol.

7 Aitmatov, Chairman of the Kirgiz Writer's Union; Alekseev, Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law in Sverdlovsk; Belyaev, Dean of Moscow Institute of Engineering and Physics; Borodin, Doctor of Medical Sciences; Denisov, Professor at Leningrad Polytechnic Institute; Golik,

454




Dean of Jurisprudence, Kemerovo State University; Kalmykov, head of a department at Saratov Law Institute; Kerimov, head of a department of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences; Ryzhov, Rector of Moscow Aviation Institute; Stel'mashonok, Chairman of the Board of Artists, Belorussia; Shet'ko, Lecturer, Department of Propaganda, Minsk obkom Komsomol; Vilkas, Director of the Institute of Economics, Vilnius. In addition there were two doctors of medical science.

8 Other examples are Vilkas, Director of the Institute of Economics, Vilnius, and Vologzhin, General Director of a Production Association, who were elected to chair the Economics Committee; Belyaev, Dean of Moscow Institute of Engineering and Physics, chaired the Education Committee; Kurtashin, General Director of Scientific Production Association, Lvov, chaired the Industry Com- mittee; four law academics (Alekseev, Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law, Sverdlovsk, Golik, Dean of Jurisprudence, Kemerovo State University, Kalmykov, head of a department, Saratov Law Institute, and Kerimov, head of a department in the Academy of Social Science of the CPSU Central Committee) chaired the Committee on Law; the Science Committee was headed by Ryzhov, who was Rector of Moscow Aviation Institute; the Youth Committee was headed by Tsybukh, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol; the Committee on Women was chaired by Rakhmanova, a Professor and Doctor of Medical Science, and by Matvienko, Deputy Chairman of Leningrad City Executive Committee; the Health Committee was headed by Borodin, a Doctor of Medical Science; Gritsenko, the Rector of a Higher School of the All Union Trade Union, chaired the committee on Labour and Social Policy; the Transport Committee was chaired by Tetenov, 1st deputy head of a railway administration; Dzasokhov, 1st Secretary of North Osetia obkom (later of CPSU Central Committee for foreign affairs) chaired the International Affairs Committee; the Defence Committee was chaired by Lapygin, the Director of a defence industry production association, and by Sharin, the 1st Secretary of Amur obkom.

9 Twelve people were appointed to the posts of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities over the period 1984-88. Of the three Chairmen, Tolkunov held the post of Chief Editor of Izvestiya, Voss was the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of Latvia, and Khristoradnov held the post of 1st Secretary of Gor'ky City party organisation. The Deputy Chairmen had a more mixed set of occupations: the chief of a furnace in an enterprise in the city of Karaganda (Adam-Yusupov), a kolkhoz worker from Turkmenistan (Kulova), a cotton grower from Tajikistan (Toirova), a house painter from Tashkent (Narmatova) and a teacher of maths from Belorussia (Lobacheva). The 1st Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Russian Union of Writers (Bondarev), the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of Lithuania (Grishkiavichus), and the President of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine (Paton).

There were 10 Chairmen, 1st Deputy and Deputy Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet and its Chambers over the period 1989-91: Gorbachev, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet 1989-90, General Secretary of CPSU, President of the USSR; Luk'yanov, First Deputy Chairman 1989-90, then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet from March 1990-91, who had a background in the party apparat and was 1st Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet when appointed in 1989; Bisher, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Nationalities, who was a Professor at Latvia State University; Iskakova, Deputy Chairman, Council of the Union, was head of a department at a district hospital; Klibik, Deputy Chairman, Council of Nationalities, Secretary of Presidium, Supreme Soviet of Latvia; Laptev, Chairman, Council of the Union, was previously Editor in Chief of Izvestiya; Nishanov, Chairman, Council of Nationalities, was 1st Secretary, Central Committee of Uzbekistan CP; Oleinik, Deputy chairman, Council of Nationalities, was Secretary of Writers Union, Ukraine; Primakov, Chairman, Council of the Union, was Director of IMEMO; Mokanu, Deputy Chairman, Council of the Union, was Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Moldavia.

10 Only Shet'ko, Chairman of SS Committee of Military-Internationalists, was not a member of the CPSU, when elected. But he nevertheless worked as a lecturer in Minsk obkom Komsomol. We should note, however, that some top officials, such as El'tsin, left the CPSU over the period 1990-91.

1 This table (and many of the data in this section) was constructed by Otto Cappelli on data provided in Soyuz SSSR Database, Indem (Moscow, 1992).

12 'Speech by V. S. Lipitskii at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee', Pravda, 10 October 1990, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Soviet Union, [hereafter FBIS], 1 1October 1990, p. 49.

13 These data were derived from the INDEM, Soyuz (Supreme Soviet USSR) (Moscow, 1993) data base.

14 These figures do not include the Rector of the Trade Union Institute and the head of a department in the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU in Group 1, and a lecturer in the Komsomol in Minsk obkom in Group 2, whom we would define as members of the party-government elite rather than members of the artistic and professional intelligentsia.

455




Appendix

TABLE A REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN THE CHAMBERS AND PRESIDIUM

1984-89 1989-91 A B % A B %

Presidium 5 62 8 5 52 9.6 Chambers 9 63 14 4 44 9 Total 14 125 11.2 9 96a 9.3

A = Number of women; B = total membership. aOur total for Presidium and Chambers is 96 as this includes double counting of individuals who were members of both bodies.

TABLE B REPRESENTATION OF NATIONALITIES IN LEGISLATIVE ELITE

1984-89 1989-91 1984-89 1989-91

Armenian 3 1 Latvian 4 3 Avar 1 0 Lithuanian 3 2 Azeri 3 2 Moldavian 3 2 Bashkir 2 2 Russian 52 48 Belorussian 9 7 Tatar 1 0 Cherkes 0 2 Tajik 3 1 Chukchi 1 0 Turkmen 2 1 Estonian 2 1 Ukrainian 11 10 Georgian 3 1 Uzbek 6 3 German 1 0 Unknown 3 0 Kazakh 9 5 Total 125 96 Kirgiz 3 3

TABLE C BACKGROUND OF MEMBERS OF PRESIDIUM AND CHAIRMEN OF

STANDING COMMITTEES/COMMISSIONS, 1984-89 AND 1989-91 (WHEN FIRST ELECTED)

1984-89 1989-91 P C Tot P C Tot

Party/Komsomol Public Orgs Managers Government Professionals Supreme Soviet Workers Not known Total

20 31 51 11 6 17 4 1 5 3 4 7 0 1 1 7 7 14 4 10 14 4 4 8 2 6 8 14 12 26

27 0 27 14 0 14 5 1 6 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0

62 51 113 52 33 85

P = Presidium C = Chairmen of Committees/commissions Tot = Total

456




TABLE D

457

BREAKDOWN OF COMMITTEES BY AREAS OF ACTIVITY AND OTHER POSITIONS OF CHAIRMEN, 1984-89(A) AND

1989-91(B)

Committees Number Party Gov Prof Wk Manag Publi Unknown A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B

Agriculture 3 1 3 1 Building 2 2 1 1 1 Culture 0 3 0 1 2 Credentials 3 0 3 Defence 0 2 1 Nature/Ecology 3 1 2 1 1 Economics 0 3 1 1 Education 3 1 3 - - 1 1

Energy 2 0 1 1 Ethics 0 1 - - - 1 Health 5 1 2 - - 1 1 1 - 1 -

Housing 2 0 1 1 Industry 3 1 2 1 International 3 1 3 1 Law 3 4 3 - 4

Military 0 2 - 2 Nationalities 0 2 - - - 1 - 1

Planning 3 1 1 - 2 1 Science 2 1 2 1 Services/social 5 1 2 - 3 - 1 Soviets 0 1 - 1

Transport 3 1 3 - - 1 Women 3 2 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 - Youth 3 1 2 1 1 - Total 51 33 31 6 10 4 6 12 1 0 1 7 1 4 1 0

TABLE E CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELITE

1984-91

1984-89 1989-90 1990-91 F C N F C N F C N

Presidium Chambers Total

26 7 29 11 1 40 3 0 49 36 3 24 11 1 32 4 0 40 62 10 53 22 2 72 7 0 89

F= Full Member of CPSU Central Committee C = Candidate Member N= Non-member of CPSU Central Committee




TABLE F MEMBERSHIP OF POLITICAL FACTIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELITE

Communist Group (CG) Akmatov, T. 1938 Kirgiz Chm Presid Kirgiz SS Dep Chm Presidium SS Bazarova(F), R.A. 1933 Turkmen Chm Presid Turkmen SS Dep Chm Presidium SS Borodin, Yu.I. 1929 Rus Doctor of Medicine/Academician Chm Comm Public Health Bosenko, N.V. 1918 Rus Pensioner Chm Comm Veterans/Invalids Dementei, N.I. 1931 Bel Sec Belorussia CC CPSU Dep Chm Presidium SS Denisov, A.A. 1934 Rus Prof Leningrad Polytechnic Inst Chm Comm Ethics of Deputies Dzasokhov, A.S. 1934 Oset 1st Sec of Severo-Osset Obkom Chm Comm International Affairs Foteev, V.K. 1935 Russ 1st Sec Checheno-Ingush Obkom Chm Comm Glasnost' Gritsenko, N.N. 1929 Ukr Rector Inst of Trade Unions Chm Comm Labour/Social Policy Ibragimov, M.I. 1928 Uzbek Chm Presid Uzbek SS Dep Chm Presidium SS Iskakova(F)a, B.S. 1957 Kazakh Hd Dept District Hospital Dep Chm Council/Union Kafarova(F), E.M. 1934 Azeri Chm Presid Azerbaijan SS Dep Chm Presidium SS Kalmykov, Yu.Kh. 1934 Cherkes Head of Dept Saratov Law Inst. Chm Comm Legis/Legality Kiseleva, G.N. 1936 Rus 2nd Sec of Kirgiz CC CPSU Chm Comm on the Consumer Market Komarova, Yu.T. 1934 Rus Gen Dir of Tuvasbest Kombinat Chm Comm Constr and Architec Lapygina, V.L. 1925 Rus Dir Aut Equip Prod Association Chm Comm Defence and Security Matvienko(F), V.I. 1949 Rus Dp Chm Leningrad Gorispolkom Chm Comm Women/Family Oleinik, B.I. 1935 Ukr Sec of Writer's Union Ukraine Dep Chm Council/Nat Rakhmanova(F), M.N. 1939 Rus Prof and Doctor of Medicine Chm Comm Women/Family Salykov, K.S. 1932 Kazakh 1st Sec Karakalpak Obkom Chm Comm Ecology Sharin, L.V. 1934 Rus 1st Sec of Amur Obkom Chm Comm Defence and Security Sharipov, Yu.K. 1940 Bashkir General Director Prod Assoc Chm Comm Republs/Territories Shevchenko(F), V.S. 1935 Ukr Chm Presid Ukraine SS Dep Chm Presidium SS Stel'mashonok, V.I. 1928 Bel Chm Belorussia Artists Union Chm Comm on Culture Tarazevich, G.S. 1937 Bel Chm Presidium Belorussia SS Chm Nationalities Policy Tetenov, V.A. 1947 Rus 1st Dep Hd Perm Railway Admin Chm Comm Transport/Communications Tsybukh, V.I. 1951 Ukr 1st Sec of Ukraine Komsomol Chm Comm Youth Affairs Vologzhina, V.M. 1937 Rus Dir Gen of Prod Association Chm Comm Economic Reform Vorotnikov, V.I. 1926 Rus Chm Presidium RSFSR SS Dep Chm Presidium SS

458



THE TERMINAL STAGE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET 459

TABLE F (continued)

Soyuz (SZ) (Biographical data see above under Communist Group) Iskakova, B.S. Kiselev, G.N. Komarov, Yu.T. Lapygin, V.L. Vologzhin, V.M.

Interregional Group (IG) Belyaev, V.N. 1949 Ukr Dean Moscow Inst Eng and Physics Chm Comm Education Bisher, I.O. 1930 Latvian Prof Latvia State University Dep Chm Council/Nat El'tsin, B.I. 1931 Rus Dep Chm USSR Constr Comm Chm Comm Architect and Construction Ryzhov, Yu.A. 1930 Rus Rector Moscow Aviation Inst Chm Comm Science and Tech.

Others who did not belong to the CG, IG or SZ Aitmatov, Ch.T. 1928 Kirg Chm Kirgiz Writer's Union Chm Comm on Culture Alekseev, S.S. 1924 Rus Dir Sverdlovsk Inst of Law Chm Comm on Legislation Astraukas, V.S. 1938 Lith Chm Presid SS Lithuania Dep Chm Presid USSR SS Cherkeziya, O.E. 1933 Georg Chm Pres SS Georgia Dep Chm Presid USSR SS Golik, Yu.V. 1952 Rus Dean Kemerovo University Chm Comm Legislation, Legality and Law and Order Gorbachev, M.S. 1931 Rus Gen Sec CPSU Chm USSR SS Gorbunov, A.V. 1942 Latv Chm Presid Latv SS Dep Chm USSR SS Kerimov, D.A. 1923 Azer Hd Dept Acad Soc Sci CPSU CC Chm Comm Legislation, Legality and Law and Order Klibik, V.S.(F) 1930 Latv Sec Presid SS Latvia Dep Chm USSR SS Council of Nationalities Kolbin, G.V. 1927 Rus Chm USSR People's Control Comm Mem of Presid USSR SS Kucherenko, V.G. 1931 Ukr Chm Donetsk Oblispolkom Chm Comm Buget, Finance and Planning Kurtashin, V.E. 1932 Rus Gen Dir Sci Prod Ass Kriogenmash Chm Comm Industry and Technology Laptev, I.D. 1934 Rus Ed in chief Izvestiya Chm of USSR SS Council of the Union Luk'yanov, A.I. 1930 Rus 1st Dep Chm USSR SS Chm USSR SS Mokanu, A.A. 1934 Mold Chm Presid SS Moldavia Dep Chair USSR SS Council of the Union Nishanov, R.N. 1926 Uzbek 1st Sec Uzbek CC CPSU Chm of USSR SS Council of Nationalities Orlov, V.P. 1921 Rus 1st Dep Chm RSFSR Gov Chm USSR Electoral Commission Pallaev, G. 1929 Tajik Chm Presid SS Tajik Dep Chm Presid USSR SS Pivovarov, N.D. 1931 Rus Chm Rostov Oblispolkom Chm Comm on Construction Primakov, E.M. 1929 Rus Dir IMEMO Chm USSR SS Council of the Union Ruutel, A.F. 1928 Eston Chm Presid SS Estonia Dep Chm Presid USSR SS




TABLE F (continued)

Sagdiev, M.R. 1929 Kazakh Chm Presid SS Kazakh Dep Chm Presid USSR SS Shet'ko, P.V. 1962 Belo Lect Minsk Obkom Dept Propaganda Chm Comm on Affairs of Military Internationalists Snegur, M.I. 1940 Mold Sec Mold CC/Chm Presid Mold SS Dep Chm Presid USSR SS Veprev, A.F. 1927 Rus Dir of Sovkhoz Chm Comm Agriculture and Food Vilkas, E.I. 1935 Lith Dir Inst Econ Lithuania Chm Comm Socio-economic Development of Republics Voskanyan, G.M. 1924 Armen Chm Presid SS Armenia Dep Chm Presid USSR SS

(F) = Female a = Member of Communist Group and Soyuz.

TABLE G VOTING PATTERNS OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ELITE ON FIVE CRUCIAL ISSUES

Issue:

1. Not to discuss article 6 of the constitution concerned with the hegemony of the Communist Party. 2. Support for the government's economic programme. 3. Allowing the President to be elected by Congress (rather than by direct popular vote). 4. Imposing a moratorium on strikes. 5. Not to recognise republican declarations of sovereignty.

A vote 'against' in the table below is a vote against the political leadership of Gorbachev.

Voting behaviour of chairmen of Standing Commissions/committeesa

Issue 1 2 3 4 5

Vilkas, E.I. El'tsin, B.N. (IG) Ryzhov, Yu.A. (IG) Belyaev, V.N. (IG) Denisov, A.A. (CG) Shet'ko, P.V. Stel'mashonok, V.I. (CG) Veprev, A.F. Alekseev, S.S. Aitmatov, Ch.T. Tarazevich, G.S. (CG) Borodin, Yu.I. (CG) Gritsenko, N.N. (CG) Tetenov, V.A. (CG) Vologzhin, V.M. (CG, SZ) Bosenko, N.V. (CG) Matvienko, V.I. (CG) Kalmykov, Yu.K. (CG) Kiselev, G.N. (CG, SZ) Kurtashin, V.E. Pivovarov, N.D. Sharipov, Yu.K. (CG)

AGA AGA AGA AGA AGA AGA AGA AGA AGA

F( F( F( F( F( F( F( F( F( F( F( F(

INST AGAINST tINST AGAINST AGAINST tINST AGAINST AGAINST INST AGAINST FOR INST AGAINST FOR INST AGAINST FOR INST FOR FOR INST FOR FOR tINST FOR FOR OR - FOR OR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR DR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR OR FOR FOR DR FOR FOR OR FOR

AGAINST AGAINST AGAINST AGAINST AGAINST AGAINST

abst abst

AGAINST AGAINST

abst abst

AGAINST

AGAINST AGAINST AGAINST

FOR

AGAINST abst FOR

AGAINST FOR

AGAINST

abst abst abst

AGAINST FOR FOR

AGAINST FOR FOR FOR

460




TABLE G (continued)

Foteev, V.K. (CG) FOR FOR - FOR Komarov, Yu.T. (CG, SZ) FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Golik, Yu.V. FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Tsybukh, V.I. (CG) FOR FOR FOR - FOR Lapygin, V.L. (CG, SZ) - FOR FOR FOR FOR Sharin, L.V. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Salykov, K.S. (CG) FOR - FOR FOR FOR Dzasokhov, A.S. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR Kucherenko, V.G. FOR FOR FOR FOR Rakhmanova, M.N. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR Kerimov, D.A. FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR

Voting patterns of Presidium membersb Issue 1 2 3 4 5 Gorbachev, M.S. FOR FOR FOR Luk'yanov, A.I. FOR FOR FOR AGAINST FOR Akmatov, Ch.T. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Bazarova, R.A. (CG) FOR FOR FOR AGAINST AGAINST Vorotnikov, V.I. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Voskanian, G.M. FOR FOR FOR Gorbunov, A.V. AGAINST FOR FOR Cherkeziya, L.V. FOR FOR FOR AGAINST Ibragimov, M.I. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Kafarova, E.M. (CG) FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR Ruutel, A.F. AGAINST FOR - -

Sagdiev, M.R. FOR FOR - - Snegur, M.I. FOR - FOR AGAINST Shevchenko, V.S. (CG) FOR - FOR FOR abst Pallaev, G. FOR FOR FOR AGAINST FOR Tarazevich, G.S. (CG) FOR - FOR abst abst Kolbin, G.V. - FOR FOR FOR

CG = Communist Group IG = Interregional Group SZ = Soyuz aThese individuals are also ex officio members of the Presidium. bThis includes those individuals who were only members of the Presidium and who were not also members of the chambers' elites. Astrauskas, V. was not a member of the Congress and is not recorded here. No voting records were available for Laptev, Nishanov, Primakov and Dementei.

TABLE H SUPREME SOVIET ELITE: VOTING RECORD ON FIVE CRUCIAL ISSUES

Issue For Against Abstain No Votea Ch Pr Tot Ch Pr Tot Ch Pr Tot Ch Pr Tot

1 22 15 37 9 2 11 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 24 15 39 6 0 6 0 0 0 3 3 6 3 27 16 43 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 2 6 4 11 6 17 12 5 17 4 1 5 6 6 12 5 14 6 20 5 1 6 4 2 6 10 9 19

aNo vote refers to person being absent from the proceedings Ch = Committee Chairmen Pr = Presidium Members Tot = Total. Issues 1-5 as defined above

461




TABLE I GROUP 1: PROFILE OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE WHO SUPPORTED THE

GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP (WHO VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THREE OF MORE OF THE FIVE ISSUES)a

Name Birth Nat Sex Occupation

Akmatov, Ch.T. Bazarova, R.A. Borodin, Yu.I. Bosenko, N.V. Cherkeziya, L.V. Dzasokhov, A.S. Foteev, V.K. Golik, Yu.V. Gorbachev, M.S. Gritsenko, N.N. Ibragimov, M.I. Kafarova, E.M. Kalmykov, Yu.K. Kerimov, D.A. Kiselev, G.N. Kolbin, G.V. Komarov, Yu.T. Kucherenko, V.G. Kurtashin, V.E. Lapygin, V.L. Luk'yanov, A.I. Matvienko, V.I. Pallaev, G. Pivovarov, N.D. Rakhmanova, M.N. Salykov, K.S. Sharin, L.V. Sharipov, Yu.K. Shevchenko, V.S. Tetenov, V.A. Tsybukh, V.I. Vologzhin, V.M. Vorotnikov, V.I. Voskanyan, G.M.

1938 1933 1929 1918 1933 1934 1935 1952 1931 1929 1928 1934 1934 1923 1936 1927 1934 1931 1932 1925 1930 1949 1929 1931 1939 1932 1934 1940 1935 1947 1951 1937 1926 1924

Kirgiz Turkmen Rus Rus Georg Oset Rus Rus Rus Ukr Uzbek Azeri Cherkes Azer Rus Rus Rus Ukr Rus Rus Rus Rus Tajik Rus Rus Kazakh Rus Bashkir Ukr Rus Ukr Rus Rus Armen

M Chm Pres Kirgiz SS F Chm Pres Turkmen SS M Dr Medicine M Chm War Veterans M Chm Pres Georgian SS M Ist Sec Severo-Osset Obkom M 1st Sec Chech-Ingush Obkom M Dean Kemerevo University M Gen Sec of CPSU M Rector TU Institute M Chm Pres Uzbek SS F Chm Pres Azerbaijan SS M Hd Dpt Saratov Law Inst M Hd Dpt Acad Soc Sci CPSU CC M 2nd Sec Kirgiz CC, CPSU M Chm USSR Control Comm M Gen Dir Tuvasbest Kombinat M Chm Donetsk Oblispolkom M Gen Dir Prod Assoc M Dir Prod Assoc M 1st Dep Chm SS F Dp Ch Leningrad Gorispolkom M Chm Pres Tajik SS M Chm Rostov Oblispolkom F Prof and Dr Medicine M 1st Sec Karakalpak Obkom M 1st Sec Amur Obkom M Gen Dir Prod Assoc F Chm Pres Ukraine SS M 1st Dep Hd Perm Railway M 1st Sec Ukraine Komsomol M Dir Gen Prod Assoc M Chm Pres RSFSR SS M Chm Pres Armenian SS

GROUP 2: PROFILE OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE WHO VOTED AGAINST THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP (WHO VOTED AGAINST OR ABSTAINED ON THREE OR MORE OF THE

FIVE ISSUES)


Kirgiz Rus Ukr Rus Rus Latv Eston Rus Kazakh

M Chm Kirgiz Writers' Union M Dir Law Inst Sverdlovsk M Hd Moscow Eng Inst M Prof Leningrad Polytech M Dp Chm USSR Const Comm M Chm Pres Latvia SS M Chm Pres Estonia SS M Hd Moscow Aviation Inst M Chm Pres Kazakh SS

Aitmatov, Ch.T. Alekseev, S.S. Belyaev, V.N. Denisov, A.A. El'tsin, B.N. Gorbunov, A.V. Ruutel, A.F. Ryzhov, Yu.A. Sagdiev, M.R.

1928 1924 1949 1934 1931 1942 1928 1920 1929

462




GROUP 2: (continued)


Shet'ko, P.V. 1962 Belo M Lect Komsomol Minsk Obkom Snegur, M.I. 1940 Mold M Chm Pres Moldavian SS Stel'mashonok, V.I. 1928 Belo M Chm Belo Artists Union Tarazevich, G.S. 1937 Belo M Chm Pres Belorussia SS Veprev, A.F. 1927 Rus M Dir of Sovkhoz Vilkas, E.I. 1935 Lith M Dir Econ Inst

M = Male F = Female aVoting records were not available for Laptev, Nishanov, Primakov, Dementei and Astrauskas.

TABLE J VOTING BY ALL CONGRESS DEPUTIES ON FIVE ISSUES

1 2 3 4 5

For 52.6 67.7 68.1 31.6 41.2 Against 38 18.5 16.4 37.7 18.5 Abstain 2.3 1.9 3.4 9.5 11.8 No vote 7.1 11.9 12.2 21.2 28.5

463



Documents

The Social Background and Political Allegiance of the Political Elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. the Terminal Stage 1984 to 1991_LANE y ROSS