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The Soviet media and Indianpublic opinionHoward M. Hensel aa Associate Professor and Co‐ordinator, Soviet and EastEuropean Studies , Monterey Institute of InternationalStudiesPublished online: 15 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Howard M. Hensel (1985) The Soviet media and Indian publicopinion, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 74:295,240-255, DOI: 10.1080/00358538508453705

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240 The Round Table (1985), 295 (240-255)

THE SOVIET MEDIA ANDINDIAN PUBLIC OPINION

HOWARD M. HENSEL

FOR OVER A GENERATION, the Soviet Union has, through its controlledmedia attempted to shape the attitudes and opinions of the peoples of the

Indian Ocean regarding the regional power configuration. The purpose of thisstudy is to attempt to ascertain the degree to which the Soviets have beensuccessful in attaining that objective. Toward that end, the study will reviewsome of the overall themes developed in the Soviet media generally concerningthe great power configuration in the Indian Ocean area. It will then assess theattitudes of the peoples of the most populous littoral state, India, toward thatconfiguration, and identify the degree to which the Soviet media has beenresponsible for shaping these attitudes. Finally, the study will analyse thevarious roles played by the media as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

Soviet media coverage

During the last 20 years, the Soviet media has developed a number of themes inits assessment of the power configuration in the Indian Ocean region. In themost general sense, Soviet analysts accuse the USA, assisted by Great Britain,of utilizing its military, air, and naval power to consolidate its political,economic, and strategic positions in Asia. Indeed, the Soviets feel thatWashington's objective is to make the Indian Ocean 'an American lake'.1 Theyclaim that the 'imperialists' have four main objectives in establishing a presencein the Indian Ocean basin. These are:

• directly to threaten the USSR and the other socialist states;• the protection of the sea lanes and communications lines which pass

through the Indian Ocean;• the protection of the interests of 'neocolonialism', and• expansion of the arms race.2

Dr Hensel is Associate Professor and Co-ordinator, Soviet and East European Studies, MontereyInstitute of International Studies, on leave 1983-85 as Visiting Professor of National SecurityAffairs, US Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA. This studywas prepared as part of a larger project on perceptions of national security related issues conductedat the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, under the direction of ProfessorPatrick Parker. The author would like to thank Professor Parker for his help and encouragement.The views expressed, however, are solely those of the author and should not be construed asrepresenting those of the US government or any of the above named institutions.

0035-8533/85/295240-16$03.00 © 1985 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd

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In order to promote these objectives, the USA has allegedly adopted a regionalstrategy calling for the establishment of a 'military-strategic triangle' of basesin the Indian Ocean area. The Soviets contend that these bases, in turn, providethe foundation for a permanent 'imperialist' military, air, and naval presence inthe region. The vortex of the triangle is said to be the Diego Garcia atoll. SouthAfrica lies at the western tip of the triangle, with Australia occupying theeastern-most position. Indeed, Soviet commentators claim that South Africaand Australia have been assigned particularly important roles in this strategysince they serve as the principal 'guards' at the western and eastern entrances ofthe Indian Ocean respectively. Forward bases and 'intermediary links'supposedly supplement and reinforce this triangle. For example, within thiscontext, the Soviets discuss US-Pakistani relations at great length.3 In thefinal analysis, however, Diego Garcia is said to be the main bastion of USpower in the basin. Indeed, Diego Garcia's proximity to the oil-rich PersianGulf region would allow the USA to maintain a presence through regular visitsby US naval ships deployed in the Indian Ocean. Thus, Soviet analysts concludethat even if the 'imperialists' should be forced to cease a direct presence in thePersian Gulf area, 'the "gunboat diplomacy" formerly practised with regard tothe Persian Gulf countries' would be continued.4

Another important aspect of Soviet propaganda concerning the 'threat'posed to the USSR and the littoral states is Moscow's assessment of Chineseobjectives and strategies in the Indian Ocean basin. Soviet commentators havedescribed the foreign policy of the PRC as 'provocative', aimed at the'domination' of an Asia 'enslaved and weakened by conflicts'. They cite twokey factors in understanding Chinese policy. First, Chinese foreign policy issaid to reflect 'a clear attempt to resurrect the expansionist lust of the Chineseemperors who dreamed of making China the center of the earth'. Thus, thePeking leaders reportedly regard the states of south and southeast Asia as'China's vassals'. Second, the Soviets claim that Chinese policies 'stem directlyfrom the great-power ambitions and hegemonic plans which Peking is reluctantto abandon'. Thus, the Chinese leaders are said to 'consider the Near East andthe Indian Ocean area as part of the strategic area of their infiltration'.5

In examining Chinese policy in the Indian Ocean region, the Soviets point tocooperation between the People's Republic of China and Washington,designed, in turn, to advance their 'coinciding interests'. Indeed, they havespeculated that the Chinese have 'reached a sort of tacit agreement with somerepresentatives of the imperialist circles about the division of the Pacific andIndian Oceans into spheres of influence'. This, however, is described as merelya continuation of the PRC's 'hegemonistic and expansionist' policies. Inaddition, the Chinese are said to hope that support for 'imperialist plans' to'militarize' the Indian Ocean will be 'an asset to them in future deals with theWest'. From the Western perspective, Sino-Western collusion to keep theUSSR out of the Indian Ocean basin while, simultaneously, dividing that samearea into 'spheres of influence', supposedly represents another aspect of theWest's efforts to protect its 'imperialist interests' in the region. In the largestsense, however, Soviet analysts claim that, in strategic terms, a 'deal' betweenthe Western powers and the PRC would allow both to threaten the SovietUnion and the littoral states for mutual gain.6

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Assessing Peking's alleged strategy in the basin, Soviet writers claim that theChinese have undertaken a policy designed to intensify the expansion of theChinese navy. Indeed, in Moscow's eyes, China may 'become one of theworld's naval powers in the near future'. It is in this context that the Sovietsaccuse Peking of formulating plans 'to send Chinese warships to the ArabianSea'.7 They claim that the Chinese have geared their relations with Pakistantoward future expansion into the Indian Ocean basin. They charge that Chineseaid projects to Pakistan emphasize the construction of 'strategic roads linkingthe western borders of China with the Pakistan shore', which, in turn, make it'possible to reach the coast of the Arabian Sea directly from China'. Inaddition, the Chinese are reported to have approached several littoral states inan attempt to establish naval bases on their territory.8

In examining the 'Chinese naval buildup', Soviet writers note that the'consensus' of observers is that the rapid growth of the Chinese Navy 'is acovert threat to its Asian neighbors'. Indeed, they feel that naval forces willeventually become 'an indispensable tool for the Chinese leaders in exertingpolitical and military pressure on the countries against whom territorial claimsare made'. In the final analysis, however, Soviet commentators stress that theChinese leaders intend to reconfigure Asia based upon 'memories of the timesof the Central Empire, when the waves of the Indian Ocean washed the shoresof China's vassal territory'.9

Conversely, the Soviet media has endeavoured to demonstrate that there is amassive, popular littoral opposition to the 'militarization' of the Indian Oceanbasin by either the 'imperialists' or the Chinese. For example, Soviet analystshave consistently stressed that US policy 'shows a complete disregard for thedesire of the countries of that area to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace'.They emphasize that the expansion of old bases and the creation of newAmerican bases in the Indian Ocean region violates the UN resolutions whichseek to transform the region into a peace zone. Moreover, incursions ofAmerican warships into the Indian Ocean are said to be additional violations ofthese resolutions. Indeed, according to the Soviets, American policy in theIndian Ocean basin makes 'the need for creating the zone of peace in the regionmore obvious'.10

In this context, Moscow has favourably commented on the efforts of some ofthe Indian Ocean powers to strengthen their defences against the 'imperialistthreat'. For example, the Soviet media has often reported that the Indiangovernment regards the creation of an American base on Diego Garcia as a'threat' to India's 'national security'. In view of this, Soviet commentatorsexpress sympathy for New Delhi's desire to create 'a strong navy in order tostrengthen the country's defenses'."

In the largest sense, however, the Soviets have applauded those littoralelements seeking the elimination of both an 'imperialist' and Chinese presencein the Indian Ocean area. This strategy, of course, serves to promote the Sovietobjective of eliminating, or at least containing and undermining, the Westernmilitary/naval/air presence in the basin. It also serves to reduce the chances forthe establishment of a Chinese military/naval presence in the area. The Sovietmedia attempts to do so by leaving a series of impressions which, whencombined, create a self-reinforcing circle of opposition to the 'militarization'

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of the Indian Ocean area.First, the Soviets have attempted to demonstrate that there is a popular

groundswell among the regional countries to 'demilitarize' the region. Second,they have tried to leave the impression that the USSR is conscious of thatgroundswell. Third, the Soviets portray themselves as having given activesupport to this sentiment by calling on the West to join it in taking steps whichwould contribute to regional 'demilitarization'.12 Fourth, Moscow hassuggested that there are elements within the West who also recognize theexistence of this groundswell and, consequently, are attempting to change thedirection of Western policy in the area. According to the Soviets, one of theprincipal sources of Western opposition to 'imperialist plans' in the IndianOcean basin is centred in Washington itself. They have stressed that 'prominentAmerican foreign policy experts' are joined by 'a number of Senators andCongressmen' in opposing the maintenance of a US presence in the IndianOcean basin.13 Similarly, Soviet commentators have periodically taken note of'realistic and constructive approaches' posited by individuals and groups fromthe USA's regional and NATO allies. In short, the Soviets try to convey theimpression that America's 'dangerous course' in the Indian Ocean 'is being setby a small group of people' in Washington whose machinations allegedly evenextend to concealment of their 'aggressive designs' from their own people andallies.

Each of these impressions reinforces and strengthens the others, in the effortto accelerate opposition to American policy in the basin. The Sovietsapparently hope that by creating the impression that there is a populargroundswell of opposition to US policy among the regional countries, they canproduce a feeling of isolation among those elements indigenous to the basinwho view Western plans in the area favourably. In addition, the Soviets expectto reinforce anti-American feelings in the basin by publicly endorsingindigenous efforts to establish a 'zone of peace' in the basin. Finally, Moscowseems to hope that by citing and exaggerating indigenous Western opposition to'imperialist' policy in the area, those regional elements who support the presentWestern position will come to feel that even significant portions of the Westernpolicymaking elite are having second thoughts about the advisability ofcontinuing the present American policy in the basin.

Similarly, the Soviets apparently hope that these impressions will alsoaccelerate Western opposition to US policy in the region. By stressing themagnitude of littoral resistance, combined with emphasis on the alleged Sovietwillingness to 'demilitarize' the basin, the Soviets appear to be attempting toprovide those elements in the West already convinced of the 'shortsightedness'of American policy with arguments which might be used in policy debates inWestern capitals. Furthermore, Moscow seems to feel that the web ofimpressions described above will serve to increase the ranks of opponents to'imperialist policy' in the Western states. In short, the Soviets apparently seekto create a 'bandwagon effect' which will acquire a momentum of its own. Theyundoubtedly hope that the impression of large opposition to US policy in theIndian Ocean basin will itself serve to enlarge and accelerate that opposition.

Regarding their own activities in the region, the Soviets maintain that theUSSR is 'an enormous maritime nation', which has a right to send ships into the

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Indian Ocean. They assert that their presence in these waters is strictly in accordwith 'the principle of the right to travel in international waters', which, in turn,was 'established in an international agreement adopted at the Geneva Con-ference on Maritime Rights in 1958'. Indeed, they cite Mrs Gandhi as havingstated that, 'the Soviet Union is not the first country to send warships to theIndian Ocean'. Consequently, Soviet commentators conclude that, 'incomplete compliance with international law of free navigation . . . the Sovietfleet is cruising in every corner of the international waters'. Moreover, theynote that, since the high seas 'belong to nobody', Soviet ships 'will continue tosail the expanses of the world's oceans'.14

The Soviets claim that the USSR has a particularly strong case for maintain-ing a presence in the Indian Ocean, inasmuch as that body of water is the onlyice-free sea route linking the European and Asiatic shores of the Soviet Union.In addition, they cite increasing commercial contacts between themselves andthe countries of the Indian Ocean as another reason for maintaining amaritime presence in these waters. Indeed, they assert that such trade and aidhelps 'to increase the capability of the Asian peoples to make a successful standagainst the attacks of world imperialism'. At any rate, Soviet commentatorsconclude that 'it stands to reason that the build-up of Western "militarypresence" in the Indian Ocean imperils Soviet sea communications'. Sovietobservers also contend that the USSR has important fishing interests in theIndian Ocean. They emphasize, however, that 'Soviet fishing operations ininternational waters are in strict compliance with international law'. Indeed,they insist that 'the fishery resources are the common wealth of all mankind'.15

Concerning their naval presence, the Soviet media states that the USSR'snavy 'is a symbol of the fraternity of peaceloving peoples'. Moreover, 'as acarrier of international ties', the Soviet navy allegedly fulfills the mission of'strengthening friendship between peoples'. In performing this 'internationalistduty', the Soviet sailors are said to have been 'welcomed as honored guests,sincere friends, as envoys and defenders of peace'. They also have reportedlybrought 'the truth' about the USSR to other peoples. Thus, according toMoscow, naval visits to foreign ports perform 'an honorable mission'. Inaddition, Soviet analysts maintain that 'maneouvers and exercises' by theSoviet Navy serve as a symbol of 'the ever increasing might of the USSR as a seapower'. They hasten to add, however, that the USSR has no bases in the IndianOcean and 'the Soviet Navy has never made any threats against any country'.Instead, it is characterized as simply a guardian of 'the cause of peace and inde-pendence of peoples'. Soviet writers note that their ships 'perform an importantinternationalist mission' by providing 'a powerful force capable of reliablydefending the cause of peace', as well as guarding Soviet 'state interests in anyregion of the world's oceans'. Not only do they claim that their fleet guards the'interests of all peaceloving countries, of freedom of navigation and the securityof nations', the fleet also exercises 'a bridle on the imperialists who want to usetheir fleets as a police force in the struggle against democratic and nationalliberation movements'.16 Finally, Soviet analysts claim, since US policy in theIndian Ocean basin is 'directed first of all against the socialist states', suchaction 'cannot fail to provoke any appropriate response on the part of theUSSR'. Hence, the Soviets argue that they are justified in sending Soviet naval

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ships into the Indian Ocean and providing their sailors with knowledge aboutheretofore unfamiliar waters.17 Area familiarization also involves geographicresearch, but the Soviets insist that this not only assists Soviet naval vessels, italso helps facilitate fishing and commercial operations.18

The impact on Indian public opinion

Reflecting upon these various themes developed by the Soviet media regardingthe power configuration in the Indian Ocean area, it seems clear that Sovietcommentators have made full use of time-honoured propaganda techniques inorder to make that configuration appear as a struggle between the forces ofgood and evil, the forces of peace and war. These techniques include:

• use of partial truths—selective exaggeration and suppression;• use of background information and extensive description to imply con-

clusions for which there was actually little or no direct evidence;• appeals to emotions and/or ideals, such as freedom, self-determination,

etc;• use of jargon, selective quotations from belligerent and neutral sources,

appeals to international law, etc, in order to lend an aura of authority;• simplicity—avoidance of qualifying terms which only dilute the impact of

the message; and• repetition.19

The use of these techniques is especially evident when one compares Sovietmedia images of US interests and naval missions in the Indian Ocean area to theinterpretation set forth in Western literature. The same is true for Soviet versusWestern interpretations of the USSR's interests and naval missions in theregion.20 Finally, Soviet use of the above mentioned propaganda techniques isevident when the media image of the superpower efforts at naval force stabiliza-tion/limitation and the interpretation of Soviet-American attitudes to the'zone of peace' concept is compared to the record. In short, Soviet mediacoverage must be viewed as a vehicle for Soviet propaganda, itself aninstrument designed to advance the USSR's interests, objectives and strategies.

To what extent have the Soviets been successful in inculcating these desiredthemes in the minds of those audiences which Moscow hopes to shape and,ultimately, influence? In an effort to approach a partial answer to this question,a wide body of Indian opinion was sought regarding their assessment of thepower configuration in the Indian Ocean basin generally and south Asia, par-ticularly. During the summer of 1984, conversations (both in English and insouth Asian languages, ie Hindi, Telugu, etc) were held with a cross-section ofIndians ranging from high ranking governmental officials, to members of thecivil service and other professional elites, journalists and academics, as well asordinary citizens from all walks of life.

Most 'average Indians' appeared to be totally unconcerned with inter-national politics. Indeed, even their concern for the national politics of Indiaappeared to be rather limited. Instead, they were primarily interested in localand regional (state) affairs. This is not to say, however, that they lacked animpression of the USA or the Soviet Union. But these impressions rarely

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extended beyond vague general images, ie 'America is the land of riches andopportunity', the 'United States is the inheritor of the British colonial positionin the world', the 'Soviet Union is a dictatorship'. At most, and then quiterarely, they reflected a sketchy knowledge of Soviet and US policy in southAsia. Finally, virtually none of these 'ordinary' citizens had ever heard of theIndian Ocean 'zone of peace' concept.

Only a relatively small percentage of the Indian population, perhaps 5—10per cent, ie the Indian political, administrative, professional, and academicelite, were concerned with and informed about national and, to a much lesserextent, international affairs. Even among these elements, however, there wasvery little evidence of detailed knowledge about the Indian Ocean peace zoneidea. Generally, a majority of this elite seemed to accept the power rivalry in theIndian Ocean basin, as a whole, and south Asia, particularly, as a fact of inter-national life. This, in combination with what was viewed as the realities of thepolitical configuration among the south Asian states, yielded the presentbalance of power in the region. The starting premise for most was the historicaltension between India, on the one hand, and the Chinese, Pakistanis, and mostrecently Sri Lankans, on the other. Then, in their eyes, the US decision tosupport Pakistan and the PRC as a counterbalance to the USSR, produced asituation in which India and the Soviet Union inevitably gravitated together,based upon a community of interests. When asked to compare Indo-Americanrelations with Indo-Soviet relations, most responded that they were sure that,while the USSR might not actively support and assist India in a confrontationwith India's perceived enemies, it was unlikely to adopt policies which woulddirectly clash with those of New Delhi, either. Conversely, however, there wasless certainty regarding the US attitude; they were inclined to feel that, undercertain circumstances, it was quite probable that Washington would not onlyside with, but actively assist India's perceived enemies. In short, the majority ofthose members of the Indian elite 'interviewed' saw Washington as a potentialindirect and perhaps even direct threat to India's security, whereas Moscow wasviewed as benevolently neutral or friendly toward India in potential crisissituations.

Three qualifiers, however, should be attached in characterizing this majorityelite viewpoint. First, those expressing this majority elite position did not reflectany detailed knowledge of the dynamics of the Soviet political or economicsystem. They were, however, quite hostile to what they did know of the Sovietpolitical process. Furthermore, on a more abstract level, they did not appear topossess any empathy with the Soviet people or culture. Indeed, on thecontrary, many specifically stated that they felt uncomfortable with thoseSoviet citizens whom they had met.21 Conversely, they observed that they feltmuch more comfortable with Westerners generally and Anglo-Americans inparticular. This, they speculated was because of linguistic, cultural andhistorical ties. Second, the commitment to democracy in India is very high andthe democratic process appeared to be functioning quite effectively. No oneamong either the elite or the ordinary citizens with whom I talked felt that therewas a 'communist threat' within India. Finally, those holding these views didnot assume that the present regional power configuration was permanent. Onthe contrary, especially the younger members of the political and professional

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elite felt that there was at least the potential for change in the political alignmentpattern.

Apart from the majority elite opinion, there did emerge a minority view-point. This minority was usually composed of academics or individuals with astrong academic background. These people condemned what the majority ofthe elite accepted as the 'facts of international life'. Many expressed dismay andincomprehension regarding US support for authoritarian governments, such asPakistan and the People's Republic of China. Conversely, they were often quitecritical of Washington's lack of support for the 'world's largest democracy',India. In the largest sense, however, these individuals were most vitriolicconcerning the overall thrust of US foreign policy. Many commented to theeffect that, 'the Russians act the way we expect them to act, but we expect morefrom the Americans given the ideals they claim to represent'. In any case, whilethose holding this minority elite view joined their majority counterparts inbelieving that no dramatic changes in the international configuration could beexpected in the near future, many expressed the hope that there would be afuture reorientation of US foreign policy, so as to permit closer political tiesbetween India and the USA.

In short, while the average Indian citizen appeared to be totally consumed bylocal and regional (state) issues and reflected little or no knowledge of orinterest in international issues, representatives of the political, administrative,and professional elite did reflect strong views concerning the regional powerconfiguration and the foreign policies of the superpowers. Indeed, very oftenthe thrust, but not necessarily the specific details of these views coincided withthe themes developed in the Soviet media.

But, to what degree is the Soviet media responsible for the coincidence ofviews. Most Indians familiar with Soviet written material, such as the monthlyInternational Affairs, or the weekly, New Times, regard these publications asmerely 'propaganda' and appear rarely to consult them. The ordinary Indiancitizens with whom I talked were totally unaware of the existence of thesepublications. Given the larger short-wave radio audience in India, as comparedto the USA, however, one might expect that Radio Moscow broadcasts would bean effective vehicle for delivering the Soviet propagandist's message to a cross-section of Indian society. Irrespective of class or occupational background,however, the overwhelming majority of those with whom I talked had neverheard a Radio Moscow broadcast. Indeed, only a few individuals admitted tohaving listened to these broadcasts 'once or twice'. Instead, notwithstandingperceptions of Great Britain as a 'colonial power' and sometimes even'oppressor', those individuals who listen to short-wave broadcasts regularlyexpressed a clear preference for the BBC. Several reasons for this weresuggested. First, there was a conviction that the BBC news coverage wasbalanced, unbiased, comprehensive, and timely. Indeed, many stated that theycould obtain information from BBC news broadcasts which was not obtainableelsewhere. Second, many intellectuals particularly expressed a preference forthe types of feature programmes broadcast over the BBC. Third, some specu-lated that part of the popularity of the BBC was that, to the Indian ear, theBritish accent was more familiar and, hence, more comprehensible.

In short, one must conclude that only a small elite minority of the Indian

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population are interested and, in varying degrees, knowledgeable about thecomplexities of the power configuration in south Asia and the Indian Oceanbasin. These individuals often hold views which, to some degree, coincide withthe thrust of the themes developed by the Soviet media. This limited coin-cidence of viewpoints, however, appears to reflect conclusions independentlydrawn by the Indians themselves, based upon their own analysis of the regionalconfiguration and does not appear to be the result of internalization of Sovietpropaganda, which is viewed as a biased instrument of Soviet foreign policy.For propaganda to be effective, the audience must have a predisposition tolisten and believe. In the case of the Indian audience, a predisposition to evenlisten to the message presented by the Soviet media, to say nothing of a pre-disposition to believe, appears to be absent. At most, and even this may be tooverstate the case in view of the apparent lack of an audience, Sovietpropaganda merely serves to reinforce predetermined conclusions, inde-pendently drawn. Soviet propaganda does not appear to have any impact inshaping these conclusions. Moreover, the coincidence of views between thoseIndians informed about international issues and the themes put forth in theSoviet media does not extend beyond the realm of foreign policy and certainlydoes not seem to reflect any affinity for the Soviets or their political process.Finally, whereas the Soviets interpret 'imperialist' policy as unchanging in itsinterests and objectives, most Indians feel that the present regional configura-tion should not be regarded as permanent, but is merely a function of thecurrent policies of the superpowers and the regional states.

Why then do the Soviets persist in allocating resources for the disseminationof information to India? Several reasons might be suggested. First, the Sovietleaders may feel that the maintenance of a 'media presence' through writtenmaterial (books, journals, etc) and radio broadcasts beamed to the sub-continent will symbolically show that the USSR is interested in events bothwithin and around India. Indeed, Moscow may feel that this type of symbolicpresence is part of showing that it is a superpower, particularly when publishedmaterial and radio broadcasts from the West are so readily availablethroughout the region.

Second, the Soviets may feel that a Soviet 'media presence' will provide thoseleft-wing oriented Indian politicians, journalists, and academicians who areinterested in or inclined toward the Soviet viewpoint easy access to the Sovietperspective on contemporary issues and events. Thus, while the Sovietsprobably recognize that they are not 'getting through' to the mass of Indiancitizens or even the bulk of the Indian elite, they also probably feel, or at leasthope that they are, or will eventually influence the opinions of at least a fewindividuals who, in turn, are now, or in the future may be, in positions toinfluence the opinions of others, and thereby, either directly or indirectly shapeIndian policy along lines desired by Moscow. In this sense, the Soviets may feelthat there is a long term 'payoff in maintaining a prolonged 'media presence'even if the immediate effects appear to be discouraging.

Third, the Kremlin may sustain its 'media presence' because it provides theSoviet leaders with a low cost, little or no risk way of expressing either supportor disapproval for individuals, movements, littoral governments and theirpolicies, or the positions of external powers within the region. In doing so, the

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Soviets are able to gain 'credit' for publicly speaking out, but simultaneouslyare able, if they choose, to refrain from backing words up with tangible policyinitiatives. Of course, there have been occasions when the maintenance of a'media presence' has placed the Soviets in the position of having to commenton events about which they would have preferred to have remained silent.Usually this involves a conflict beween two political actors (movements,governments, etc), each of which Moscow seeks to court. In these cases, theSoviets have been careful to preserve a balance for as long as possible, but if theselection of sides becomes unavoidable, the Soviets usually do so in such a wayas to avoid permanently alienating the side deprived of Soviet support.22 Inshort, notwithstanding occasional awkward situations, the Soviet leadersprobably view their 'media presence' as a low cost, low or no risk instrumentwith which to show public support or disapproval for regional developmentsand/or the policies of the regional actors.

Fourth, the Soviet leaders may feel that a sustained 'media presence' is usefulas a vehicle with which to signal shifts in Soviet state policy to both regional andexternal policy makers, as well as to analysts of regional affairs. Indeed, asoftening, hardening, or alteration in the tone of Soviet media coverage ofregional developments has often accompanied and even preceded changes inMoscow's official position regarding regional issues and/or events. Thus, evenif no one is persuaded by the Soviet media to adopt the Soviet viewpoint, theKremlin leaders may still feel that a 'media presence' provides them with avaluable instrument of foreign policy.

Finally, bureaucratic politics may also help explain the persistent main-tenance of a Soviet 'media presence', despite the apparent absence of a large,and perhaps even a medium or small audience. Behind the flood of publicationsand radio broadcasts from the USSR stands a large, mass media bureaucracy.Notwithstanding the existence of cleavages within this bureaucracy, its indi-vidual members and component elements collectively have an understandableinterest in broadcasting and undoubtedly exaggerating the impact of the Sovietmass media in influencing the attitudes of peoples, both within and outside theUSSR. Not to do so, to say nothing of admitting relative failure to attain thegoal of influencing public opinion along desired lines, would not only bepsychologically crippling for those within that bureaucracy, it would probablylead to a significant reduction in the amount of resources allocated by theregime to the media, with accompanying staff reductions, etc. In short, in thestruggle for scarce resources and bureaucratic importance within the Sovietsystem, the media bureaucracy is undoubtedly willing and able to defend its turfby exaggerating the significance and impact of its efforts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Soviet media campaigns directed at audiences abroad often serveas a valuable instrument of Soviet foreign policy. In the most obvious sense, theSoviet media may serve as an instrument for the inculcation of desired messagesin the minds of the target audiences. In some cases, such as in the Indianexample studied above, the 'propaganda' message generally complementspopularly held attitudes, whereas, in other cases, the message is designed to

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change the views of the target audience. The rate of success will obviously varydepending upon the situational context. In some instances, where Sovietliterature and media broadcasts are popularly read and/or listened to, themessages may be internalized by the target audience. In other contexts,however, as in the Indian example, while Soviet material is readily accessible,the Soviet message may be dismissed by the target audience as merely'propaganda' and generally ignored.

From Moscow's perspective, however, the importance for Soviet'propaganda' to successfully impact upon the target audience probablydepends upon a series of factors. First, success in geographic areas of highpriority to the Kremlin is probably more important than success in low priorityregions. Second, undoubtedly Moscow prioritizes the various themesdeveloped in the media, with those repetitiously developed presumably havinggreater importance than those only intermittently presented. Third, inevaluating the impact of Soviet 'propaganda' efforts toward an area such asIndia where popularly held perceptions of certain policies and events, such asthe great power regional configuration, essentially coincides with the imagepresented by the Soviet media, the impact directly attributable to Soviet mediaefforts in shaping these popular attitudes is probably less important to theKremlin. Conversely, when popularly held views are diametrically opposed tothose of the Soviet Union, then it may be more important in Moscow's eyes forthe Soviet media to get its message through.

Beyond the propaganda aspect to Soviet media efforts abroad, however,there are other ways in which the Soviet media serves as an importantinstrument of Soviet foreign policy developments in a particular region, toproviding sympathetic individuals abroad with convenient access to the Sovietviewpoint, to expressing low-cost approval or disapproval for various situa-tional developments, popular movements, and/or governmental policies,finally, to providing a channel for semi-officially signalling shifts in Sovietgovernmental policy to the international community.

Thus, while analysis of the Soviet media's impact upon popular attitudesmay be important depending upon the situational context, even where Soviet'propaganda' does not appear to be particularly effective, it should still becarefully scrutinized. It provides analysts with a useful insight into tonalpatterns of change and continuity in Soviet foreign policy generally, as well aswith respect to particular regions within the international system.

Notes and references

1 A. Baryshev, 'The Indian Ocean and Pentagon strategy', Sovetskava Rossia, 13May 1971, p 3: Current Digest of the Soviet Press (cited hereafter as CDSP),Vol XXIII, No 19, p 34; U. Pustov, 'The Indian Ocean is not an American lake—where is the aircraft carrier Enterprise heading and why', Krasnaya Zvezda, 16December 1971, p 3: CDSP, Vol XXIII, No 50, p 10; A. Chernyshov, 'Peace andsecurity for the Indian Ocean', International Affairs, No 12, 1976, pp 42-50;A. Sergeyev, 'Indian Ocean—tension area or peace zone', New Times, December1976, pp 22-24; S. Vladimirov, 'Indian Ocean: dangers and hopes', New Times,No 29, July 1977, pp 18-20; D. Volsky, 'A strategy without a future', New Times,

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No 33, August 1978, pp 4-5; N. Mishin, 'Towards an Indian Ocean zone ofpeace', International Affairs, No 6, 1979, pp 87-91; A. Alexeyev and A. Fial-kovsky, 'Peace and security for the Indian Ocean', International Affairs, No 9,1979, pp 51-56; A. Alexeyev. and A. Fialkovsky, 'For a peaceful Indian Ocean',International Affairs, No 2, 1981, pp 85-91; S. Vladimirov, 'The struggle for apeace zone', New Times, No 8, February 1981, pp 13-15; S. Vladimirov, 'Crucialjuncture', New Times, No 22, May 1981, pp 18-20; S. Irodov, 'India and theIndian Ocean problem', New Times, No 26, June 1981, pp 12-13; A. Ladozhsky,'The USSR's efforts to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace', InternationalAffairs, No 8, 1981, pp 40-46; L. Zhegalov, 'Make it a peace zone', New Times,No 18, May 1982, p 7; M. Zaripov, 'Plots and bases', New Times, No 16, April1982, pp 24-25; A. Usvatov, 'For an Indian Ocean peace zone', New Times,No 36, September 1982, p 11; D. Nikolayev, 'For peace and security in the IndianOcean', International Affairs, No 9, 1982, pp 57-64; E. Rumyatsev, 'For a peacezone', New Times, No 41, October 1982, pp 7-8; Radio Moscow, 4 December1983: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union (cited hereafter asFBIS) 234, 5 December 1983, CC 15-16.

2 Ibid; A. Leontyev, 'NATO waves in the Indian Ocean', Krasnaya Zvezda, 29September 1974, p 3: FBIS, 194, 4 October 1974, A 10-13; M. Goryanov, 'TheImperialist threat in the Indian Ocean', International Affairs, No 6, 1980, pp 101 —105; D. Volsky, 'A doomed policy', New Times, No 33, August 1980, p 21; Yu.Kovalenko, 'A Beijing's hegemonist ambitions', Izvestiya, 15 January 1981, p 5;FBIS, 14, 22 January 1981, B 1-2; Y. Nikolayev, 'Two contrary lines', New Times,No 31, July 1982, pp 10-11; Y. Lugovskoy, 'A peaceful future for the IndianOcean', International Affairs, No 9, 1983, pp 107-120. For a sample of RadioMoscow broadcasts in English to south and southeast Asia see: Radio Moscow, 13January 1975: FBIS9, 14 January 1975, B 4-5; Radio Moscow, 11 February 1975:FBIS 30, 12 February 1975, B 6-7; Radio Moscow, 31 January 1977: FBIS 21,1 February 1977, J 1-2; Radio Moscow, 5 February 1977: FBIS 28, 10 February1977, B 11; Radio Moscow, 10 March 1977: FBIS 49, 14 March 1977, B 19-20;Radio Moscow, 31 January 1979: FBIS 22, 31 January 1979, J 1; Radio Moscow,13 March 1979: FBIS 51, 14 March 1979, B 1. For English language broadcasts toAsia generally, see: Radio Moscow, 8 April 1975: FBIS 69, 9 April 1975, A 2-3;Radio Moscow, 13 June 1975: FBIS 117, 17 June 1975, B 3-4; Radio Moscow, 1September 1975: FBIS 170, 2 September 1975, J 1-2; Radio Moscow, 3 October1975: FBIS 196, 8 October 1975, B 2-3; Radio Moscow, 12 December 1975: FBIS243, 17 December 1975, J 5; Radio Moscow, 7 May 1976: FBIS 91, 10 May 1976,F 4-5; Radio Moscow, 16 June 1976: FBIS 138, 16 June 1976, B 6-7; RadioMoscow, 18 August 1976: FBIS 162, 19 August 1976, J 5-6; Radio Moscow, 9February 1977: FBIS 29, 11 February 1977, B 7-8; Radio Moscow, 14 February1979: FBIS 33, 15 February 1979, B 1-2.

3 Ibid; Yu. Popov, 'Plans of aggression', Izvestiya, 29 December 1970, p 2: CDSP,Vol XXII, No 52, p 31; A. Baryshev, 'The Indian Ocean and the Pentagon'sstrategy', Soviet Russia, 13 May 1971, p 3: FBIS 95, 17 May 1971, B 5-6; D.Volsky, 'The Indian Ocean needs lasting security', New Times, No 47, November1974, pp 12-13; G. Svyatov and A. Kokoshin, 'Naval power in the US strategicplans', International Affairs, No 4, 1973, pp 56-62; B. Teplinsky, 'Imperialiststrategic schemes', New Times, No 14, April 1971, pp 22-24; A. Baryshev, TheRobinsons are preparing to jump', Soviet Russia, 24 December 1970, p 3: FBIS252, 30 December 1970, A 35-36; B. Teplinskiy, 'The world ocean and US militarystrategy', USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No 10, October 1972, pp 15-24:Joint Publications Research Service (cited hereafter as JPRS) 57398, pp 15-27;V. F. Daydov, 'Anglo-American military and political cooperative east of Suez',

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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No 11, November 1971, pp 67-72: JPRS54676, pp 99-105; V. Kudryavtsev, 'A false-bottomed policy', Izvestiya, 18January 1972, p 4: FBIS 16, 24 January 1972, B 1-4; M. Kosova, 'Pentagonshadow over the Indian Ocean', International Affairs, No 1, 1980, pp 142-143;V. Kozin, 'Building up military muscle', New Times, No 15, April 1980, pp 24-25.For additional examples of Radio Moscow broadcasts in English to south andsoutheast Asia, see: Radio Moscow, 16 February 1975: FBIS 35, 20 February 1975,B 7-8; Radio Moscow, 4 June 1975: FBIS 108, 4 June 1975, A 11-12; RadioMoscow, 1 December 1975: FBIS 232, 2 December 1975, B 7-8; Radio Moscow,20 March 1976: FBIS 56, 22 March 1976, K 3-4; Radio Moscow, 4 May 1976:FBIS 88, 5 May 1976, C 1; Radio Moscow, 13 September 1976: FBIS 180, 15September 1976, B 12-13; Radio Moscow, 15 September 1976: FBIS 181, 16September 1976, B 7-8; Radio Moscow, 3 October 1976: FBIS 195, 6 October1976, K 3-4; Radio Moscow, 14 October 1976: FBIS 201, 15 October 1976, J 1;Radio Moscow, 14 October 1976: FBIS 202, 18 October 1976, K 2-4; RadioMoscow, 11 December 1976: FBIS 241, 14 December 1976, A 5-6; Radio Moscow,11 January 1977: FBIS 8, 12 January 1977, B 14-15; Radio Moscow, 24 August1977: FBIS 165, 25 August 1977, K 1-2; Radio Moscow, 17 March 1978: FBIS 55,21 March 1978, B 4-5; Radio Moscow, 13 February 1979: FBIS 32, 14 February1979, J 3; Radio Moscow, 16 December 1982: FBIS 243, 17 December 1982,CC 1-2; Radio Moscow, 9 April 1983: FBIS 73, 14 April 1983, D 2-3; RadioMoscow, 12 May 1982: FBIS 94, 13 May 1983, D 4.

4 Ibid; V. Pustov, 'Diego Garcia in the Pentagon's plans', Krasnaya Zvezda, 13February 1974, p 3: FBIS 36, 21 February 1974, B 4-6; Yu. Tomilin, 'The IndianOcean in imperialism's aggressive plans', Mirovaya Ekonomika i MezdunarodnyyeOtnosheniya, No 8, 1971, pp 19-29; V. Mikhailov, 'Security—its friends andfoes', Pravda, 20 December 1970, 1: CDSP, Vol XXII, No 51, p 26; V.Kudryavtsev, 'Shadow over Diego Garcia', Izvestiya, 15 March 1974, p 2: FBIS54,19 March 1974, B 5-7; V. Skvortsov, 'Stolen island', New Times, No 1, January1981, pp 12-13. For additional examples of Radio Moscow broadcasts to Asia,see: Radio Moscow, 2 November 1975: FBIS 217, 10 November 1975, J 2-3; RadioMoscow, 23 March 1976: FBIS 58, 24 March 1976, 2976, J 1; Radio Moscow, 11February 1978: FBIS 30, 13 February 1978, B 6-7; Radio Moscow, 14 January1981: FBISU, 16 January 1981, D 1; Radio Moscow, 18 June 1982: FBIS 119, 21June 1982, D 1-2.

5 V. Pavlovskiy, 'Collective security—the path of peace in Asia', MezhdunardonayaZhizn, No 6, pp 30-36: FBIS 121, 21 June 1972, C 1-8; Yu. Lugovskoy, 'Theropewalkers from Peking', Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 July 1974, p 3: FBIS 144, 25 July1974, C 1-4; V. Pavlovskiy, 'Peking's intrigues in Asia', Selskaya Zhizn, 13September 1974, p 3: FBIS 184, 20 September 1974, C 1-3; Volsky, 'A strategywithout a future', op cit, pp 4-5; Mishin, op cit, pp 87-91; Alexeyev and Fial-kovsky, 'For a peaceful Indian Ocean', op cit, pp 85-91; D. Nikolayev, op cit,pp 57-64. For some examples of English language radio broadcasts, see: RadioMoscow, 7 May 1976: FBIS 91, 10 May 1976, C 2; Radio Moscow, 28 May 1976:FBIS 107, 2 June 1976, B 4-5; Radio Moscow, 4 August 1976: FBIS 153, 6 August1976, C 1; Radio Moscow, 27 August 1976: FBIS 169, 31 August 1976, C 2-3.

6 Ibid; O. Borisov, 'Wither the "Torrent"', New Times, No 41, October 1974,pp 26-27; Kosova, opcit, pp 142-143; Goryanov, op cit, pp 101-105; Kovalenko,op cit, B 1-2; Vladimirov, 'Crucial juncture', op cit, pp 18-20; Radio Moscow, 5December 1974: FBIS 239, 11 December 1974, B 9-10; Radio Moscow, 20 March1974: FBIS 56, 21 March 1974, C 3-4; Radio Moscow, 7 February 1974: FBIS 30,12 February 1974, C 6-7; Radio Moscow, 20 August 1974: FBIS 165, 23 August1974, C 1-2; Radio Moscow, 25 September 1974: FBIS 188, 26 September 1974,

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A 6-8; Radio Moscow, 31 May 1975: FBIS 108, 4 June 1975, A 11-12; RadioMoscow, 1 December 1975: FBIS 232,2 December 1975, B 7-8; Radio Moscow, 4May 1976: FBIS 88,5 May 1976, C1; Radio Moscow, 28 October 1977: FBIS212, 3November 1977, C 1; Radio Moscow, 15 May 1978: FBIS94, 15 May 1978, B 7-8;Radio Moscow, 14 February 1979: FBIS 33, 15 February 1979, B 1-2; RadioMoscow, 13 March 1979: FBIS 51, 14 March 1979, B 1; Radio Moscow, 4December 1980: FBIS 236, 5 December 1980, D 2.

7 S. Kulik, 'Peking's maritime ambitions', Investiya, 9 May 1974: FBIS 92,10 May1974, C 1; S. Kulik, 'Maritime ambitions of Peking', Robitnycha Hezeta, 9 May1974, p 3: FBIS 100, 22 May 1974, C 5; Radio Moscow, 20 June 1974: FBIS 121, 21June 1974, C 3; Radio Moscow, 20 August 1974: FBIS 165, 23 August 1974, C 1-2;Radio Moscow, 1 September 1974: FBIS 172, 4 September 1974, C 2; V.Yoltukhovskiy, 'Beijing's naval ambitions', Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 September 1979,p 3: FBIS 184, 20 September 1979, B 1-2; Irodov, op cit, pp 12-13; RadioMoscow, 17 August 1976: FBIS 169, 31 August 1976, C 2-3; Radio Moscow, 4December 1980: FBIS 236, 5 December 1980, D 2.

8 S. Chugrov, 'A dangerous deal', Izvestiya, 19 November 1980, p 4: FBIS 230, 26November 1980, A 4; Kovalenko, op cit, B 1-2; Irodov, op cit, pp 12-13;Ladozhsky, op cit, pp 41-46; Radio Moscow, 29 November 1973: FBIS 231, 30November 1973, C 4; Radio Moscow, 5 December 1980: FBIS 237, 8 December1980, D 7.

9 Ibid; Yoltukhovskiy, op cit, B 1-3; Radio Moscow, 1 September 1974: FBIS 172, 4September 1974, C 2; Radio Moscow, 1 December 1975: FBIS 232, 2 December1975, B 7-8; Radio Moscow, 7 May 1976: FBIS 91, 10 May 1976, C 2; RadioMoscow, 28 May 1976: FBIS 107, 2 June 1976, B 4-5; Radio Moscow, 24September 1976: FBIS 187, 14 September 1976, B 8; Radio Moscow, 4 December1980: FBIS 236, 5 December 1980, D 2.

10 For example, Ref 4.11 Radio Moscow, 1 March 1974: FBIS 44, 5 March 1974, J 1; Radio Moscow, 15

March 1974: FBIS 52, 15 March 1974, J 1.12 For example see: Kosova, op cit, pp 142-143; Zaripov, op cit, pp 24-25; Y.

Nikolayev, op cit, pp 10-11; Goryanov, op cit, pp 101-105; Mishin, op cit,pp 87-91; Vladimirov, 'Indian Ocean: dangers and hopes', op cit, pp 18-20; S.Vladimirov, 'Zone of Peace Conference: a step forward', New Times, No 34,August 1979, pp 4-7; Chernyshov, op cit, pp 42-50; Volsky, 'A strategy without afuture', op cit, pp 4-5; Alexeyev and Fialkovsky, 'For a peaceful Indian Ocean',op cit, pp 85-91; D. Nikolayev, op cit, pp 57-64; Ladozhsky, op cit, pp 40-46;Alexeyev and Fialkovsky, 'Peace and security for the Indian Ocean', op cit,pp 51-56; Vlaaimirov, 'The struggle for a peace zone', op cit, pp 13-15;Lugovskoy, op cit, pp 107-120; Rumyantsev, op cit, pp 7-8; Vladimirov, 'Crucialjuncture', op cit, pp 18-19.

13 This theme was especially prominent in the Soviet media prior to 1978. Forexample, see: V. F. Daydov, 'American strategy in the Indian Ocean', USA:Economics, Politics, Ideology, No 6, June 1972, pp 70-72: JPRS 56522, pp 95-100; Radio Moscow, 15 March 1974: FBIS 54, 19 March 1974, B 2-3; RadioMoscow, 7 September 1974: FBIS 176, 10 September 1974, A 7; Radio Moscow, 20May 1975: FBIS 98, 20 May 1975, B 3; Radio Moscow, 13 June 1975: FBIS 117, 17June 1975, B 3-4; Radio Moscow, 28 July 1975: FBIS 147, 30 July 1975, B 1;Radio Moscow, 1 October 1975: FBIS 193, 3 October 1975, B4-5; Radio Moscow,5 November 1975: FBIS 229, 6 November 1975, B 7; Radio Moscow, 26 January1976: FBIS 19, 28 January 1976, B 6-7; Radio Moscow, 25 January 1976: FBIS 18,17 January 1976, B 8; Radio Moscow, 2 May 1977: FBIS 85, 3 May 1977, B 5-6;Vladimirov, 'Indian Ocean: dangers and hopes', op cit, pp 18-20.

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14 Moscow Radio, 1 September 1972: FBIS 173, 5 September 1973, D 4-6; V.Kudryavtsev, 'Shadow over Diego Garcia', Izvestiya, 15 March 1974, p 2: FBIS 54,19 March 1974, B 5-7; A. A. Grechko, 'The fleet of our homeland', MorskoySbornik, No 7, July 1971: FBIS 155, 11 August 1971, M 1-6; R. Bichev interviewwith Naval First Deputy Chief of Staff, Admiral V. N. Alekseyev, and cruiserCaptain A. A. Chumichev, 'The ocean watch', Nedelya, No 8, 15-21 February1971, p 9: FBIS 41, 2 March 1971, M 1-3; Radio Moscow, 19February 1971: FBIS39, 26 February 1971, E 10; Radio Moscow, 1 September 1972: FBIS 173, 5September 1972, D 4-6; Radio Moscow, 15 May 1974: FBIS 96, 16 May 1974,C 2-3; Radio Moscow, 13 March 1974: FBIS 51, 14 March 1974, B 2-3; RadioMoscow, 28 August 1974: FBIS 170, 30 August 1974, C 2-3; Chernyshov, op cit,pp 42-50; A. Stepanov, 'Taking up a point', New Times, No 47, November 1979,p. 31.

15 V. Kudryavtsev, 'The Indian Ocean in the plans of imperialism', InternationalAffairs, No 11, November 1974, pp 114-118; V. Kudryavtsev, 'Shadow overDiego Garcia', Izvestiya, 15 March 1974, p 2: FBIS 54, 19 March 1974, B 5-7; V.Pavlovsky and Y. Tomilin, 'Indian Ocean: confrontation or security', New Times,No 10, March 1974, pp 4-5; Chernyshov, op cit, pp 42-50; Sergeyev, op cit,pp 22-24; Vladimirov, 'Indian Ocean: dangers and hopes', op cit, pp 18-20;Volsky, 'A strategy withnout a future', op cit, pp 4-5; Vladimirov, 'Zone of PeaceConference—a step forward', op cit, pp 4-7; Alexeyev and Fialkovsky, 'Peace andsecurity for the Indian Ocean', op cit, pp 51-56; Alexeyev and Fialkovsky, 'For apeaceful Indian Ocean', op cit, pp 85-91; Vladimirov, 'The struggle for a peacezone', op cit, pp 13-15; Ladozhsky, op cit, pp 40-46; Zhegalov, op cit, p 7; D.Nikolayev, op cit, pp 57-64. Moscow Radio, 1 September 1972: FBIS 173, 5September 1972, D 4-6.

16 Grechko, op cit, M 1-6; Interview with Fleet Admiral S. Gorshkov, 'On the seasand oceans', Pravda, 30 July 1972, p 2: FBIS 149, 1 August 1972, p 5; Interviewwith Fleet Admiral S. Gorshkov, 'An ocean, nuclear and missile fleet', Pravda, 25July 1971, p 2: FBIS 144, 27 July 1971, M 2-5; Fleet Admiral S. Gorshkov, 'Battleson the seas', Izvestiya, 17 February 1970, p 3: FBIS 42, 3 March 1970, E 1-4;Bichev, op cit, M 1-3; Sergeyev, op cit, pp 22-26; Volsky, 'A strategy without afuture', op cit, pp 4-5; Vladimirov, 'Zone of Peace Conference—a step forward',op cit, pp 4-7; Stepanov, op cit, p 31; Ladozhsky, op cit, pp 40-46; Zhegalov, opcit, p 7; N. Nikolayev, op cit, pp 57-64; Radio Moscow, 11 August 1982: FBIS156, 12 August 1982, CC 1; Rumyantsev, op cit, pp 7-8; Lugovskoy, op cit,pp 107-113, 120.

17 Gorshkov, 'Battles on the seas', op cit, E 1-4; Bichev, op cit, M 1-3; Admiral V.Alekseyev, 'Bases for aggression', Izvestiya, 8 March 1972, p4: CDSP, Vol XXIV,No 10, pp 18-19; Interview with Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov, RadioMoscow, 29 July 1972: FBIS 148, 31 July 1972, M4-5. Sergeyev, op cit, pp 22-24;Vladimirov, 'Zone of Peace Conference—a step forward', op cit, pp 4-7;Stepanov, op cit, p 31; Vladimirov, 'The struggle for a peace zone', op cit,pp 13-15; Alexeyev and Fialkovsky, 'For a peaceful Indian Ocean', op cit, pp 85-91; Vladimirov, 'Crucial juncture', opcit, pp 18-20; Ladozhsky, opcit, pp40-46;Zhegalov, op cit, p 7; D. Nikolayev, op cit, pp 57-64; Rumyantsev, op cit,pp 7-8; Lugovskoy, op cit, pp 107-113, 120.

18 Captain 2nd Rank Q. Baronov, 'The world ocean and international cooperation',Red Star, 8 January 1970, p 3: FBIS 8, 13 January 1970, A 61-63; Radio Moscow,6 January 1971: FBIS A, 7 January 1971, A 61-63; Chernyshov, op cit, pp 42-50;Ladozhsky, op cit, pp 40-46; D. Nikolayev, op cit, pp 57-64.

19 H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War, pp 33-40, cited in Howard Hensel, 'TheSoviet perspective on the Falklands War', The Round Table, October 1983, p 395.

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20 Howard M. Hensel, 'Superpower interests and naval missions in the IndianOcean', Naval War College Review, Vol XXXVIII, No 1, January-February1985, pp 53-74.

21 For an earlier study concerning this subject see Stephen Clarkson, 'Non-impact ofSoviet writing on Indian thinking and policy', Economic and Political Weekly,Vol VIII, 15, 14 April 1973, pp 715-724.

22 For example, see: Howard M. Hensel, 'Asian collective security and the Irano-Iraqi border dispute: the Soviet view', Journal of South Asian and Middle EasternStudies, Vol 1, No 1, Fall 1977, pp 44-64; Howard M. Hensel, 'Soviet policytoward the Kurdish question', Soviet Union, Vol 6, Pt 1, 1979, pp 61-80; HowardM. Hensel, 'Soviet policy toward the rebellion in Dhofar', Asian Affairs, Vol XIII,Pt 2, June 1982, pp 148-159.

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