C A N B E R R Ä Ffr^RS ON STRATEGY AMD [DEFENCE NO. 29 > /

FA MEDIANSKY AND DIANNE COURT

The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 29

The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia

F A MEDIANSKY AND DIANNE COURT

Published byThe Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

The Research School of Pacific Studies The Australian National University

and inLondon, England, Singapore and New York, USA

1984

Prin ted and Published in A ustra lia at th e A ustra lian National U n iv ers ity 1984© F .A . Mediansky and Dianne C ourt 1984

T h is book is c o p y r i g h t . A p a r t from a n y f a i r d e a l in g for t h e p u r p o s e s o f p r i v a t e s t u d y , r e s e a r c h , c r i t i c i s m , o r r e v ie w a s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r th e C o p y rig h t Act, no p a r t may be re p ro d u ce d b y any p r o c e s s w i th o u t w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . In q u ir ies should be made to th e p u b l i s h e r .

National L ib ra ry of A ustra lia C ata logu ing -in -P ub lica t ion e n t ry

M ediansky, F .A . (F ed o r A le x a n d e r) , 1942- .The Soviet Union in S ou theas t Asia.

B ib liography.ISBN O 86784 389 6. ISSN 0069 0104

1. Soviet Union - Fore ign re la t ions - Asia, S o u th -e a s te rn . 2. Asia, S o u th e as te rn - Foreign re la tions - Soviet Union. I. C o u r t , D ianne, 1945- . II. A ustra lian National U n iv e rs i ty .S tra teg ic and Defence S tud ies C e n tre .III . T itle . (S e r ie s : C a n b e r ra p ap e rs on s t r a te g y and de fen ce ; no. 29 .)

327.47059

L ib ra ry of C ongress C atalogue Num ber: 84-70872 Designed b y ANU G raphic DesignP rin ted b y A ustra lian National U n ivers ity C en tra l P r in te ry Published b y :

The S tra teg ic and Defence S tud ies C e n tre ,Research School of Pacific S tu d ie s ,The Austra lian National U n iv e rs i ty , Box 4, P .O . ,C a n b e r ra , ACT, 2601.

D is tr ibu ted b y :A u s t ra l ia : A ustra lian National U n iv e rs i ty P re s s ,C an b e r ra , ACT.United Kingdom, Middle Eas t , and A fr ic a : E u rospan L td . N orth A m erica: P u b lish e rs D istr ibu tion C e n te r , R u th e r fo rd , New J e r s e y , USA.Southeast A s ia : Information Publications Pte L td . , S ingapore .J a p a n : United P u b lish e rs Service L t d . , Tokyo.

In th i s monograph Dr Fedor Mediansky and Ms Dianne C o u r t exam ine Soviet i n t e r e s t s in S o u th e a s t A sia . T h e i r p r in c ip a l focus is on th e c o n te m p o ra ry (post-1975) period and the d iscussion is c e n t r e d more on Ind o ch in a th a n th e re s t of the region.

While th e Soviet Union’s invo lvem en t in th e region goes back to its Comintern links with local communist m ovem ents in th e 1920s, th e r e g io n has been, and remains, of secon­dary in te re s t to Moscow. The a u th o r s f ind th a t Moscow’s c o n s id e ra b le invo lvem en t with communist Vietnam s tands in c o n t r a s t to i t s more d i sc o n t in u o u s and r a t h e r m arg ina l invo lvem en t with the ASEAN s ta te s . The close relations that now p re v a i l b e tw een Moscow and Hanoi a re b a se d on a complex of f a c t o r s . Para lle l s t r a t e g i c c o n c e rn s and a measure of regional s tra teg ic in te rdependence , long s ta n d in g ideo log ica l l in k s and the isolation of both in Southeast Asia play a large pa rt in the cu rre n t rela tionship .

So f a r as th e f u tu r e is concerned, the au thors a rgue that Soviet-Vietnamese re la t io n s a re b ound to rem ain close while th e two continue to regard China as endangering the ir security and so long as Vietnam remains isolated. As f a r as th e non -com m un is t s t a t e s of the region are concerned, the authors see little prospect for a s u b s ta n t ia l c o n v e rg e n c e of Soviet and ASEAN in te re s ts .

F e d o r Med i a n s k y is a Senior L e c tu re r in th e School of P o l i t ic a l S c ie n c e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of New South Wales. He a t t e n d e d th e U n i v e r s i t y o f San F r a n c i s c o , San F r a n c i s c o S ta te U n i v e r s i t y ( B . A . G overnm ent) and Sydney U n iv e rs i ty ( P h . D . 197 2 ) . D u r in g 1974-76 he was s e c o n d e d to t h e A u s t r a l i a n D e p a r tm e n t o f D e fe n c e a n d w o rk e d on t h e National A ssessm ents S taff as A cadem ic-in -R esidence . He h a s c o n t r ib u te d widely to scho lar ly books and jo u rn a ls and ed i ted The Military and Au s t r alia 's D efence .

D ia n n e C o u r t g r a d u a t e d from th e S chool o f Political S c ie n c e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f New S outh Wales with a B .A . (H o n s . ) Class 1 in 1980. She tu to re d full-time in t h e S choo l o f P o li t ic a l S c ie n c e in 1980; s in c e t h e n s h e h a s t u t o r e d p a r t- t im e a t bo th the U n ivers ity of New South Wales a n d t h e D e p a r tm e n t o f G o v e r n m e n t , S y d n e y U n i v e r s i t y . S h e is c u r r e n t ly enro lled as a P h .D . s tu d e n t at M a c q u a r ie U n i v e r ­s i ty .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

O ur th a n k s to those who h a v e , in many w ays, a s s i s t e d o u r r e s e a r c h a n d d r a f t i n g e f f o r t s . Mr Pau l D ibb a n d Dr Robyn Lim made num erous helpfu l com m ents on th e f i r s t d r a f t o f t h e m a n u s c r i p t . D r C a r ly l e T h a y e r a ls o m ade a num ber of valuable su g g es t io n s and p rov ided us w ith s o u r c e m a te r ia l w h ich we h a d e i t h e r overlooked o r o therw ise found i n a c c e s s i b l e . While we b e n e f i t e d e n o rm o u s ly from t h e com m ents a n d s u g g e s t i o n s o f o u r co lleagues , th e r e s p o n s i ­b ility for the views e x p re s s e d h e re r e s t s en t ire ly with u s .

C a n b e r r a P a p e r s on S tr a te g y and Defence a re a se r ie s of m onograph publications which a r ise out of th e work of th e S tra teg ic and D efence S tu d ie s C e n t r e , R e s e a r c h S chool of P ac if ic S t u d i e s , A u s t r a l i a n N a tio n a l U n i v e r s i t y . P re v io u s C a n b e r r a P a p e r s h a v e c o v e r e d top ics such as th e re la t io n ­s h ip o f t h e s u p e r p o w e r s , a rm s c o n t r o l a t bo th th e s u p e r ­power an d S o u th -ea s t Asian reg iona l level, reg ional s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s and major a s p e c ts of A ustra lian defence policy . For a complete lis t r e fe r to th e las t pages of th is volume.

U n le s s o therw ise s ta t e d , publications of th e C en tre a re p re s e n te d w ithout endorsem en t as co n tr ib u t io n s to the p u b l i c r e c o r d a n d d e b a t e . A u t h o r s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e for th e i r own ana lys is and conclusions.

CONTENTS

INTROD UCT ION 1

SOVIET POLITICAL IN TERESTS 2

THE SOVIET UNION IN INDOCHINA 9

SOVIET ST R A TEG IC INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 20

THE SOVIET MILITARY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 24

THE SO VIET-VIETNAMESE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIPAND CO -O PE R A T IO N 31

SOVIET ARMS TRANSF ERS TO INDOCHINA 35

ECONOMIC RELATIONS 41

CONCLUSION 53

ENDNOTES 57

STR ATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE 65

PUBLICATIONS 67

1

INTRODUCTION

It is d i f f i c u l t to g e n e r a l i s e a b o u t Soviet in te r e s t s in S ou theas t Asia. Moscow’s d iscon tinuous p o l i t i c a l i n v o lv e m e n t a n d i t s n o m in a l econom ic i n t e r e s t s in t h e n o n -c o m m u n is t s ta te s s tan d in c o n t ra s t to the s u b s t a n t i a l , c o n t e n t i o u s a n d m o s t ly c o m p a t ib le r e la t io n s with communist Vietnam. T h u s a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e S o v ie t U nion in t h e r e g io n b eco m es u n b a l a n c e d b y t h e m ore d e t a i l e d t r e a t m e n t th a t should be g iven to S o v ie t r e l a t i o n s w ith V ie tnam in c o n t r a s t to t h e d i s c o n t i n u o u s t r e a t m e n t g iv en to i ts re la tions with th e r e s t of the S o u th eas t Asian s t a t e s . Yet, while Vietnam r e p r e s e n t s Moscow’s p r i n c i p a l in v es tm en t , i t s im portance , a t leas t un ti l t h e l a t e 1970s , was n o t so o v e r r i d i n g a s to d o m in a te Moscow’s reg iona l p e r s p e c t iv e .

T h e S o v ie t g lo b a l p e r s p e c t i v e h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e g a r d e d S o u t h e a s t A sia as be ing of seco n d ary im portance . S tra teg ic i n t e r e s t s h a v e b e e n c o n s t r a i n e d b y a com plex o f f a c t o r s w h ich in c l u d e t h e r e g i o n ’s r e m o te n e s s a n d th e co n seq u en t d i f f i c u l t i e s o f p r o j e c t in g c o n v e n t io n a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e , a s well as b y th e sizeable military deploym ents of the US and i ts allies in the re g io n . S o v ie t p o l i t ic a l i n v o lv e m e n t h a s b e e n h a m p e r e d b y t h e W e s te rn o r i e n t a t i o n o f some regional s t a t e s , while those in c l in e d to w a r d s n o n - a l ig n m e n t saw l i t t l e a d v a n t a g e in s id in g w ith Moscow in i ts s t ra te g ic competition with th e West o r i ts id eo lo g ica l c o m p e t i t io n w ith C h in a . E xcept to w ard s Hanoi and b r ie f ly D jakarta , Soviet aid and t r a d e h av e been neg lig ib le a n d t h i s too r e in f o r c e d th e ten d en c y of most reg ional s ta te s to look e lsew here .

A n u m b e r o f s t r a t e g i c c h a n g e s in t h e In d ia n a n d P ac if ic O cean r e g io n in th e la te 1960s opened new o p p o r tu ­nities to ex p an d S o v ie t i n f l u e n c e w ith r e l a t i v e ly low r i s k . T h e s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s w e re o c c a s io n e d b y th e B r i t ish w ith­draw al from ’ea s t of Suez’ and the s u b s e q u e n t US d ec is io n to limit i t s m i l i t a r y co m m itm en ts in S o u th eas t Asia. An added im portant fac to r was th e in tens if ied s t r a te g ic and id e o lo g ic a l c o m p e t i t io n w i th C h in a . Not o n ly w e re new s t r a t e g i c o p p o r tu n it ie s a p p a r e n t , b u t th e re was also a g ro w in g S o v ie t m i l i ta ry c a p a b i l i t y to e x p lo i t t h e s e . By th e e a r ly 1970s, Soviet naval power had deve loped s u f f i c i e n t ly to e n a b le i t s P ac if ic F le e t - a t l e a s t in p e a c e t im e - to pro jec t i ts forces

2

f u r t h e r from home p o r t s a n d so g iv e a t a n g i b l e lo w -c o s t ex p ress io n to Soviet in te r e s t s in th e Ind ian Ocean and in t h e S ou theas t Asian re g io n .

T h e fo llow ing d i s c u s s i o n is f o c u s s e d on Soviet in te ­r e s t s in S o u th e a s t A sia s in c e t h e m id d le 1970s. It b e g i n s w ith a s u rv e y of Moscow’s involvem ent with the re v o lu t io n a ry m o v em en ts of t h e r e g i o n . T h e n e x t s e c t io n t r a c e s t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f t h e m ajor Soviet su cc e ss s to ry in S o u th eas t Asia - it l inks with the re v o lu t io n a ry m ovem en t in V ie tn a m . T h e fo l lo w in g two sec t io n s d iscu s s th e con tem porary s t r a t e ­g ic i n t e r e s t s of t h e S o v ie t U n ion in t h e r e g io n a n d i t s m i l i t a ry lo d g e m e n t in Indoch ina . The n ex t two sec tions look at th e means by which Moscow has u n d e rp in n e d i ts s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s - b y s i g n i n g a T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o ­o p e r a t i o n w ith V ietnam a n d b y u n d e r w r i t i n g t h e m i l i t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e In d o c h in a s t a t e s . T h e f in a l s e c t io n s u rv e y s Soviet econom ic r e l a t i o n s a n d e s p e c ia l ly i t s l i n k s with Indoch ina .

SOYIET POLITICAL INTERESTS

An e x h a u s t i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e communist movements in S ou theas t Asia and the s c o p e w i th in them fo r S o v ie t ideo log ica l in f luence is ou ts ide th e ambit of t h i s p a p e r . [1] S o u th e a s t A s ian com m unism ’s d i f f e r i n g n a t io n a l fo rm s m ake g ene ra l isa t ions more than h a z a rd o u s . It is commonly ac cep ted , how ever , th a t h i s to r i c a l l y t h e r e g io n has b een low on Soviet political p r io r i t i e s .

When th e anti-colonial movements emerged in S o u th e a s t Asia in t h e 1920s, t h e S o v ie t view of them was rem arkab le for i ts confusion stemming from an in ad eq u a te u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s o c io -p o l i t i c a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f t h e re g io n . Until th e o n s e t o f t h e p o s t - ’45 d e c o lo n i s a t io n p r o c e s s , t h e r e was c o n s id e ra b le Soviet vacillation as to th e e x ten t to which local co m m u n is t p a r t i e s s h o u ld a s s o c ia te t h e m s e lv e s w ith t h e v a r io u s nationalis t m ovem ents. The main in s tru m en t of Soviet in fluence was the C o m in te rn a n d i t s d i r e c t i v e s w e re o f t e n m is in fo rm ed a n d i l l - c o n c e iv e d , a s much due to th e g e o g ra ­phical d is tan ce as it was to the n a r r o w S ov ie t p e r s p e c t i v e .

3

T he ea rly Southeast Asian revolutionary movements were also influenced by E u ropean Communist p a r t i e s o r th e C h in e se communist movement. [2]

In th e 1920s C om in tern s tra tegy in Asia derived from L e n in ’s view t h a t social r e v o lu t io n in p r e - c a p i t a l i s t Asia would be tw o - s ta g e and h ence in v o lv e alliances. After the d isas trous Soviet experience with the Kuomintang, h o w e v e r , a t th e 1928 C o n g r e s s S ta l in , as Head of th e C o m in te rn , rejected the s tra te g y of communist a lliances with n a t io n a l i s t leaders . During the 1930s Comintern s tra teg y became,

an amalgam of i n h e r i te d p r e c e p t s from th e B o lshev ik R evo lu tion in 1917, Vladimir L e n in ’s T h e s e s on th e National and Colonial Qu e s t io n s p r e s e n t e d a t th e Second C om in tern Congress in 1920, and th e e x p e r ie n c e d e r iv e d from th e abortive Chinese revolution in 1926 and 1927. [3]

In 1935, the Comintern responded to the perceived n e e d s of Soviet s t r a t e g y in E u ro p e , by g iv in g i n s t r u c t io n s fo r a popular f r o n t . H ow ever , as D u iker o b s e r v e d , ’it was one th in g to a n n o u n c e a new p o p u la r f ro n t s tra tegy and quite a n o th e r to p u t it in to e f f e c t ’. [4] In a ll , t h ro u g h o u t th e S ta l in is t p e r io d , Soviet s tra tegy for Southeast Asian revo lu ­tionary movements was not only vacillating but p resu m p tu o u s in its simplicity.

In mid-1949 S ta lin e n d o rs e d th e comm unist p a r t i e s ’ armed s trugg les in the Southeast Asian region. In do ing so , he a p p e a r s to h a v e been m otivated b y Soviet priorit ies in E u ro p e , r a t h e r th a n by th e r e g io n a l c o n d it io n s fo r th e conduct of armed s trugg les :

in fact Stalin’s p u rp o se s in g iv in g h is a s s e n t to th e A sian r e v o lu t io n s may well h av e been le s s d irected to the well-being of the local com m unists and more to th e p ro s p e c t th a t such u p r i s in g s might a b s o rb th e e n e rg ie s and t ie down th e armies of his NATO adve rsa rie s . [5]

Soviet in te res t in the emergent Third World nations increased with th e B a n d u n g C o n fe re n c e of 1955. In th e 1960s and 1970s, the Third World increasingly becam e a c e n t r a l a r e n a fo r S in o -S o v ie t com petit ion for ideological leadersh ip . Even th e n , th e r e g io n rem ained a low p r io r i ty c o n c e rn fo r

4

Moscow. T h u s , except for Vietnam and for a time Indonesia, Soviet influence in the reg ion has b e e n h is to r ic a l ly n e g l i ­gible.

The u ltim ate exc lu s ion of Sov ie t in f lu e n ce in th e In d o n es ia n comm unist p a r ty (P K I) m akes In dones ia an e m b a r ra s s in g e x p e r ie n c e for Moscow in s e v e ra l w a y s . F irs t ly , the PKI as the oldest communist pa rty in th e reg io n also grew to be the largest communist p a r ty outside the bloc prior to its destruction in 1965/66. Secondly, the PKI he ld a c e n t r a l p os it ion in th e precarious balance of political forces in the Sukarno regime. Finally, Moscow’s in f lu e n ce came to be displaced by that of Beijing.

R uth McVey[6] g ives an e x h a u s t iv e acco u n t of th e h i s to r y of th e PKI and Soviet c o n ta c t s with it from i ts b e g in n in g s . In g e n e ra l , any Sovie t d i re c t io n had l i t t le m eaning fo r th e PKI’s na tiona l c i r c u m s ta n c e s . The PKI’s s trong l in k s with Moscow via th e D utch Communist P a r ty make it ou ts tand ing in the region with respec t to the degree of Soviet influence. That influence, however, was limited by th e in a b i l i ty of th e PKI to gain c o n t ro l of th e v a r io u s factions which constituted the independence movement. J u k e s writes,

u n t i l 1935, Stalin's rejection of alliances with the non-Com munist n a t io n a l i s t s , k e p t . . . [ the PKI’s] in f lu e n c e low, and a f t e r 1935, i t s conformity to the C om in tern policy of p o p u la r f r o n t s a g a in s t fascism led it to follow the Dutch Communist Party in de-emphasising the issue of in d ep e n d e n c e from H olland , and s e p a r a te d i t from some n o n - Communist nationalists such as Soekarno.[7]

It was Sukarno who declared independence in 1945 and when in te r n a t io n a l recognition of Indonesian independence came in 1949, relationships with Moscow were cool, with no e x c h a n g e of a m b a s s a d o rs u n t i l 1954. Soviet policy after the death of Stalin continued along similar lines and consequently , ’Soviet r e la t io n s with the a c tu a l w ie lde rs of s t a t e power were as negative in Indonesia as elsewhere in Asia'. [8]

From th e mid 1950s onwards the Soviet Union directed more attention towards the newly in d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s of the r e g io n . A f te r th e B andung C o n fe re n c e , Soviet a t t e n t io n focussed on Sukarno as Moscow’s i n t e r e s t became a t t r a c t e d by h is ’anti-imperialist’ domestic and foreign policies. In 1956

5

t h e S o v ie t U n ion s i g n e d a t r a d e a g r e e m e n t with Indonesia and S ukarno v is i ted Moscow. The Soviet s u p p o r t fo r S u k a rn o in t h e West I r i a n d i s p u t e i n c l u d e d t h e o f f e r o f m i l i t a r y a s s is ta n c e , an o ffe r which S ukarno u se d as a l e v e r w ith th e U S . [9] In 1960 Moscow s u p p l i e d Indonesia with $450 million in w eapons . [10] In a ll , d u r in g th is time, ’Soviet a t t e n t i o n in In d o n e s ia a s e l s e w h e r e fo c u s e d on t h e g o v e r n in g g r o u p r a th e r th an th e local Communists’. [11] N e v er th e le ss , S u k a rn o a c k n o w le d g e d C h in a as an ideo log ica l model for h is notions of d em o cracy . [12] M o rr iso n a n d S u h r k e h a v e n o t e d S o v ie t i r r i t a t i o n with Indonesia d u r in g th e period of ’C on fro n ta t io n ’ w ith M a la y s ia . T h i s i r r i t a t i o n s tem m ed l a r g e l y from th e d a m a g e th a t C on fro n ta t io n was cau s in g to the w ider in te r e s t s of th e Soviet Union in the T h ird World. Indonesian t a r d i n e s s on d e b t re p ay m en t was an added f a c to r . Despite th e growing d iv e rg e n c e b e tw e e n th e r e g io n a l o b j e c t i v e s of Moscow a n d J a k a r t a , t h e S o v ie t U nion s t i l l r e - s c h e d u l e d some of i t s c r e d i t s in 1 9 6 3 /4 . F u r t h e r m o r e , in 1964 Moscow p u b l i c ly e n d o r s e d C o n f ro n ta t io n . [13] At th e same time, h o w ever , th e S o v ie t U nion s o u n d e d o u t M alays ia f o r an e x c h a n g e of d ip lo m a tic r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . [ 14] By t h i s t im e , t h e S o v ie t Union was d is e n c h a n te d with the p r o - B e i j i n g in c l i n a t i o n s of S u k a r n o a n d t h e PKI. By 1962 it was a p p a re n t th a t Chinese and Indonesian i n t e r e s t s h ad b e g u n to c o n v e r g e , [ 15] a t a t im e w h en C h i n a , S u k a r n o a n d t h e PKI sh a red a s t ra te g ic co n sen su s in o ppos ing an avowedly an ti-com m unis t M alay s ian f e d e r a t i o n . T h i s c o n v e r g e n c e led to a c o l l a b o r a t io n of Indonesian and C h inese in s u rg e n t a c t iv i ty in S in g a p o r e an d S a r a w a k . [16] By 1963 t h e PKI c l e a r l y s ided with China in th e S ino-Soviet d i s p u te . [17] Nogee and D o n a ld so n i n t e r p r e t t h e D j a k a r t a - B e i j i n g c o n v e r g e n c e a s th e re su l t of the PKI lean ing to w ard s th e Chinese with S u k arn o ca rr ied a long w ith i t . [18] On th e o th e r h a n d , Ju k es i n t e r p r e t s th e PKI position a s ’fo l lo w in g S u k a r n o in to p r o - C h i n e s e p o s i t i o n s , an d p e r s i s t e n c e in s u p p o r t i n g him o v e r con fron ta t ion a f te r the Soviets had b e g u n to r e g is t e r d i s i l lu s io n m e n t w ith h im , . . . [ a n d th i s ] p laced th e PKI in th e Chinese camp’. [19] Whether the i n i t i a t i v e f o r t h e d e v e lo p m e n t of t h e D j a k a r t a - P e k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w as S u k a rn o ’s o r th e PKI’s , it r e p r e s e n te d , for a time, an ex p an s io n of Chinese in f luence in I n d o n e s ia a n d , a s s u c h , a d e c i s i v e s e t b a c k fo r t h e S o v ie t U nion in i t s ideological com petition with China for in fluence with a leading non-a ligned s t a t e .

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Soviet in f lu e n c e had also been affected by the recog­nition given to China a t th e B a n d u n g C o n fe re n c e . D esp ite th e m assive Soviet military and civil aid to Indonesia, falling behind China, especially in the competition for influence with th e regional communist part ies , was not without advantage to the Soviet Union's longer term i n t e r e s t s in S o u th e as t A sia . It could h e n c e fo r th p r o s e c u te i t s S ta te i n t e r e s t s more flexibly without the constra in ts of p a r ty - to -p a r ty l in k s . The p rim acy of th e Soviet s ta t e i n t e r e s t s is re f le c te d in i t s maintenance of diplomatic relations with Indonesia even a f t e r th e m assac re of th e PKI in 1965/6 . The fall of S u k a rn o , though n u l l i fy in g c o n s id e ra b le Soviet in v e s tm e n ts , n o n e ­th e le s s r e p r e s e n t e d th e demise of an i n c r e a s in g ly p r o - Chinese regime whose reg io n a l po lic ies s tood to com plica te Moscow's r e la t io n s with Malaysia and S in g a p o re . From the mid-sixties the Soviet Union, with ve ry little influence in th e comm unist m ovem ents of the region, expanded its diplomatic ties with the s ta t e s of S o u th e a s t A s ia [20] th ough most of th e s e were c o n d u c t in g a c t iv e counterinsurgency operations against local communists. For example, G eofrey J u k e s w ro te of Moscow's relations with the Malayan Communist p a r ty :

Its su sce p t ib i l i ty to Soviet in f lu e n c e was, and rem a ins , negligible, and in Malaysia, as elsewhere in Asia, Soviet r e la t io n s h av e been e s ta b l i s h e d with th e in cu m b e n t g o v e rn m e n t on a mainly economic basis [21]

U nder th e S u h a r to reg im e, Indones ia b e g a n n e g o ­tiations for the rescheduling of its deb ts to the Soviet Union in 1966 and agreement was reached in 1970. Soviet diplomatic relations with Indonesia were renewed in 1972 and a new aid a g re e m e n t s ig n e d in 1974. In 1975 aid was provided for an alum ina sm e l te r p ro je c t and s e v e ra l h y d r o e le c t r ic power p l a n t s . N e v e r th e le s s , 'd e s p i te th is re v iv a l of activ ity . . . In dones ia has not r e c o v e re d i ts fo rm er place as a h ig h priority in Soviet policy in the Third World'. [22]

Moscow's major regional initiative, the Asian C o llec t ive S ecu ri ty Proposal, was f ir s t put forward by Leonid Brezhnev in June 1969. The p ro p o sa l was made a t a time of s e v e r e ten s io n on th e S in o -S o v ie t b o r d e r , and when W estern invo lvem en t in the r e g io n a p p e a re d to be d e c l in in g as ev inced by B r i ta in 's w i th d raw a l from 'east of Suez’ and by growing US disenchantment with i ts invo lvem en t in Vietnam

7

( a s r e f l e c t e d in t h e Guam D o c t r in e ) . T hough e x p re s s e d in b r o a d a n d a m b ig u o u s t e r m s , t h e p r o p o s a l is com m only b e l ieved to h av e b een a signal of Soviet in te re s t in th e Asian r e g io n a s well a s an a t t e m p t to e x c lu d e C h in a . With t h e e x c e p t i o n of Mongolia, how ever , no Asian s ta te e n d o rse d the p ro p o sa l. While many a n a l y s t s h a v e t e n d e d to c h a r a c t e r i s e r e g io n a l r e s p o n s e s to t h e proposa l as being uniform ly cool, su b t le v a r ia t io n s in re sp o n se in d ica te t h e i n d i v id u a l s t a t e s ’ d i f f e r i n g p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e S o v ie t U n io n . M a lay s ia , fo r in s ta n c e , e x p re s s e d no formal i n t e r e s t in t h e p r o p o s a l . [23] T h e I n d o n e s ia n r e s p o n s e n o te d t h e a m b ig u i ty o f th e p ro ­posals and q u es t io n ed w h e th e r a military pact was i n t e n d e d , a r e s p o n s e in th e view of Morrison and S u h rk e d e s ig n ed not to harm re la t io n s w ith t h e S o v ie t U n io n . [24] T h a i l e a d e r s m ore o p e n ly d i s m is s e d t h e p ro p o s a l as a ’t r ia l balloon’. [25] Although th e p r o p o s a l s w e re a m b ig u o u s , a m b ig u i ty is n o t s y n o n y m o u s w ith e m p t i n e s s . H ow ever vag u e , th e collective s e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l r e p r e s e n t e d an a t t e m p t a t a S o v ie t r e g io n a l d o c t r i n e w h ic h , a t i t s c o r e , o f f e r e d to e n d o r s e p r inc ip les long advocated b y th e r e g io n a l s t a t e s a s w ell a s C h in a - t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f p e a c e f u l coexis tence and r e s p e c t for s o v e re ig n ty . The proposa l could th u s be in te r p r e t e d as a S o v ie t a t t e m p t to a d d r e s s t h e r e g io n in i t s own te rm s by in co rp o ra t in g the p r inc ip les of nonalignm ent. It was a l s o , in t h e w o rd s o f N ogee a n d D onaldson , an a ttem pt to s ignal to ’th e world th a t th e Soviet Union co n s id ers i tse lf an A s ian as well a s a E u r o p e a n p o w e r , a n d t h a t i t i n t e n d s to p lay an ac tive role in Asian s e c u r i ty m a t te r s ’. [26]

P o s i t i v e S o v ie t ( a n d C h in e s e ) in te re s t in ASEAN was la te in coming. Until t h e l a t e 1970s, t h e S ov ie t U nion was c r i t i c a l o f ASEAN and dism issed it as merely an o rg an isa t io n to d i s g u i s e a r e g io n a l m i l i t a ry a l i g n m e n t . With t h e US m i l i t a ry w ithdraw al from Indochina in the ea rly 1970s, it was a rg u ab ly a time when the Soviet U n io n , w ith c a r e f u l d i p l o ­m acy , co u ld h a v e e n h a n c e d i t s re la t ionsh ip with th e ASEAN s t a te s . It was not, how ever, un ti l 1978 th a t the Soviet Union r e v e r s e d i t s ea r l ie r hos t i li ty to ASEAN. I ts new position was r e f l e c t e d in two P r a v d a a r t i c l e s in A ugust and O c tober of t h a t y e a r . [27] A n u m b e r of c o n s id e r a t io n s a p p e a r to have led Moscow to become more c o n c i l i a to r y , no t l e a s t o f w h ich was t h a t t h e new C h in e s e l e a d e r s h i p in th e p re v io u s y ea r h a d a d o p t e d a m ore ac co m m o d a t in g p o s i t io n to w a r d s ASEAN. [28] At t h e sam e tim e t h e r a p id l y d e t e r i o r a t i n g

8

r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n Vietnam a n d C h i n a b r o u g h t Vietnam and the Soviet Union closer t o g e t h e r . Seen in t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e S o v ie t pos it ion might well have been guided b y an a t tem pt to r e a s s u r e th e ASEAN s ta t es as well as to p r o v i d e d ip l o m a t i c s u p p o r t to Hanoi in i t s a t t e m p t s th a t y ea r to mend i t s own fences with t h e ASEAN s t a t e s . [29] In a l l , t h e d e v e l o p i n g p o l a r i s a t i o n in t h e r e g i o n b y 1978 g a v e ASEAN a new p r o m i n e n c e w h ich no e x t e r n a l p o w e r cou ld h e n c e f o r t h ov e r lo ok .

While t h e e n h a n c e d Sov ie t p r e s e n c e in Vietnam a f t e r the middle of 1978 was r e g a r d e d b y t h e ASEAN s t a t e s w i th g r e a t c o n c e r n , the i r individual a t t i tu d e s to Moscow d i f f e r ed . Nor w e r e mos t m em b er s p r e p a r e d to c a s t i g a t e t h e S o v ie t Union u n d e r t h e a e g i s of ASEAN. T h u s t h e ASEAN s t a t e s re jec ted th e Thai a t tempt to get them to jointly co n d e m n t h e S o v ie t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n [30] - t hough each s t a te did p r o t e s t u n i l a t e r a l l y . F o r i t s p a r t , t h e Sov ie t Union h a s c o n t i n u e d to s ea rc h for oppor t un i t ie s to improve i ts re la t ions wi th ASEAN as well as to e x p l o r e c l e a v a g e s w i th in t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n . Fo r e x a m p l e , in 1979 t h e Sovie t Union made r e q u e s t s to all ASEAN m e m b e r s e x c e p t S i n g a p o r e f o r a m ar i t im e ’goodw il l v i s i t ’ ; t h e s e w e r e e i t h e r i g n o r e d o r r e j e c t e d . A g a in in March 1980, in r e s p o n s e to ASEAN c o n c e r n s o v e r A f g h a n i s t a n , t h e S o v ie t Union informed the Economic an d Social Commission for Asia and Pacific ( E S C A P) t h a t i t w ou ld l i k e to s i g n ’n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t s w i th ASEAN’. [31]

On t h e w h o le , t h e ASEAN s t a t e s have kep t the Soviet Union a t arm’s l e n g t h a n d h a v e b e e n u n r e s p o n s i v e a n d a t t imes e v e n h o s t i l e to Moscow’s in te rm i t te n t ef fo r t s to e s t a b ­lish a m e a s u r e of r e g i o n a l a c c e p t a n c e . At t h e same t im e , S ov ie t e f f o r t s a re handica pped by a r a n g e of fac tors ou t s ide i t s c o n t r o l . In t h e f i r s t p l a c e , g e o g r a p h y w o r k s a g a i n s t Moscow. T h e region is remote from the Soviet Union and one in which it has always been r e g a r d e d as an alien power. The l a c k of h i s t o r i c a l l i n k s with Sou theas t Asia has also t en d ed to r e i n f o r c e t h e g u a r d e d a t t i t u d e of t h e r e g i o n a l s t a t e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , in ec onom ic t e r m s t h e S ov ie t Union is a t a d i s ad v an ta g e in tha t t h e r e g i o n t r a d i t i o n a l l y lo o k ed to t h e West f o r m a r k e t s as well a s t h e o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s o f econ omic d e v e l o p m e n t s u c h as i m p o r t e d t e c h n o l o g y a n d c a p i t a l . M o r e o v e r , t h e S o v ie t Union is i l l - e q u i p p e d to co m p e t e wi th t h e West in m e e t i n g t h e r e g i o n ’s ec onomic

9

a s p i r a t i o n s . F in a l ly , t h e S o u th e a s t A s ian s t a t e s w ith the e x c e p t io n o f V ietnam ( a n d B u rm a ) , h a v e t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e g a r d e d Moscow as prom oting a political ideology and s ta te i n t e r e s t s t h a t a r e in im ica l to t h e i r own p o l i t ic a l v a l u e s , i n t e r e s t s and a s p i ra t io n s . For i ts p a r t , th e Soviet Union has ra re ly acco rded much in te re s t to th e S ou theas t Asian r e g io n .

T h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e ASEAN s t a t e s tow ards th e Soviet Union s ta n d s in c o n t ra s t to the fa r m ore r e c e p t i v e v iew s o f t h e I n d o c h in e s e s t a t e s a n d , e s p e c i a l l y , o f V ie tn a m . T h e Soviet Union h as a cred ib le h i s t o r y as t h e m ajor s u p p o r t e r o f co m m u n is t Vietnam a n d , s ince th e la te 1970s, of Laos and Kampuchea a s w e l l . T h e t h r e e I n d o c h in e s e s t a t e s a r e now d e e p ly d e p e n d e n t on Soviet material a s s is tan ce and diplomatic s u p p o r t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d S o v ie t p r e s e n c e in th e reg ion has b ee n , and is likely to b e , p ivo ted on Moscow’s t ies with Hanoi.

THE SOVIET UNION IN INDOCHINA

M oscow’s r e l a t i o n s w ith t h e In d o c h in e s e c o m m u n is t p a r t ie s can be t r a c e d to t h e i r fo r m a t iv e d a y s , t h o u g h th e p r e c i s e n a t u r e o f the l inks remains o b s c u re . The h is to ry of i ts associa tion with the ea r ly Vietnamese movement c e n t r e on t h e p e rso n of Ho Chi M inh.[32] In 1923, Ho, as a reco g n ised l e a d e r o f t h e r a d ic a l s from th e F r e n c h c o lo n ie s , w as sum m o n ed to w o rk a t C o m in te rn h e a d q u a r t e r s . In 1925 he was g iv e n i n s t r u c t i o n s to form a M a rx is t r e v o l u t i o n a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n in V ie tn am . Ho u s e d t h e R evolu tionary Youth League a lre ad y e s tab lish ed in Canton fo r t h i s p u r p o s e . T h e L e a g u e h ad a s e c r e t i n n e r c o r e o f a h a n d f u l o f M arx is ts , des ig n ed to b e t h e n u c l e u s o f a f u t u r e C om m unis t p a r t y . V ie tn a m e s e r a d i c a l s w e re r e c r u i t e d to a sch o o l in C an to n ’w ith t h e a id o f a sm all b u t r e g u l a r s u b s i d y from th e C o m in te r n ’! 33 ] a n d as D uiker o b s e rv e d , th e school had ’the im pressive t i t le of ’Special Political T r a in i n g C o u r s e fo r t h e V ie tn a m e se R e v o lu t io n ’. [34] E a r ly V ie tn a m e se com m unism a p p e a rs to have d e r iv ed i ts appeal not only from th e e x c e p ­t io n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s k i l l s o f Ho, b u t from i ts em phasis on Vietnamese p a tr io t ism . N one the less , by 1929 tens ions em erg ed b e tw e e n rad ica ls and p a tr io ts o v e r th e place of communism in

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t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movement. This tens ion was poss ib ly e x a c e r ­ba ted b y S ta lin’s 1928 re jection of alliances with n a t i o n a l i s t s . T h is in t u r n might have co n t r ib u ted to th e sp l in te r in g of th e Vietnamese movement in to fa c t io n s . [35] T h e C o m in te r n s e n t Ho to r e u n i t e t h e movement which he did with th e formation of th e Vietnamese Communist P a r ty in 1930. With C o m in te rn p e r s u a s i o n , t h e nam e w as q u ic k ly c h a n g e d to t h e In d o ­ch inese Communist P a r ty ( IC P ) , p re s u m a b ly to ’d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t i t a l s o spoke fo r th e Laotian and Cambodian, as well as t h e V ie tn a m e s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n ts ’ . [36] Moscow’s i n f l u e n c e i s r e f l e c t e d in t h e IC P ’s em phasis on p ro le ta r ian le a d e rs h ip , an em phasis not e sp e c ia l ly a p p o s i t e f o r V ie tn a - m e se Z so c ia l a n d econom ic c i r c u m s t a n c e s . [ 37 ] C o m in te rn in s is te n ce on th e l ik e l ih o o d of r e v o lu t i o n in 1929 p o s s i b ly e n c o u r a g e d th e popu la r wave of Vietnamese s t r ik e s and a n t i ­colonial reb e l l io n s . The outcome was a d i s a s t e r fo r t h e IC P : F r e n c h r e p r e s s i o n led to 2000 d e a d a n d 51000 m i l i t a n t s a r r e s t e d , in c lu d in g th e a r r e s t of Ho in Hong K o n g . A f t e r th a t debacle th e ICP seems to have toed th e Moscow line:

in th e ea r ly 1930s more t h a n e v e r , ICP s t r a t e g y was m ade in M oscow. And Moscow was n o t y e t r e a d y to t r im i t s id e o lo g ic a l s a i l s to a d j u s t to Asian re a l i t ie s . [38]

F u r t h e r m o r e , a s D u ik e r o b se rv ed ’for th e ICP in th e 1930s, all ro ad s lead to Moscow’. [39] Sov ie t i n f l u e n c e in t h e 1930s w as l a rg e ly via th e ideological t ra in in g of League members a t the S talin school in Moscow. In 1935 th e V ie tn a m e s e com m u­n i s t s r e s p o n d e d to the d irec t iv e for a p o p u la r f ro n t ag a in s t fascism . Unlike o th e r S ou theas t Asian communist m o v e m e n ts , f o r t h e Vietnamese th e Soviet d irec t iv e had i t s b e n e f i t s . The movement i n c r e a s e d i t s m e m b e r s h ip b y m ore o p e n a c t i v i t y a n d t h e ICP co u ld r e t u r n to i t s own e a r l i e r s t r a t e g y o f seek ing b ro a d e r s u p p o r t from p ea san ts and m o d e ra te s . T h u s fo r t h e V ie tn a m e s e t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r n a t io n a l c ircum stances m ean t t h a t d e s p i t e a d h e r e n c e to S o v ie t s t r a t e g y th e c o m m u n is ts w e re a b le to e m e rg e b y t h e l a t e 1930s, as th e lead e rs of Vietnamese n a t io n a l i s m . In 1941 Ho r e t u r n e d to V ie tnam to form th e Vietminh, th e re s is ta n c e to th e Jap a n ese occupation . In w rit ing about the foundation of th e V ie tm in h , H e in z ig n o te d t h a t ’t h e f o u n d a t io n o b v io u s ly to o k p la c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f Moscow; we do n o t know w h a t t h e S o v ie t le ad e rsh ip th o u g h t abou t i t ’. [40]

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D e s p i t e t h e C o m i n t e r n ’s of ten in sen s i t iv e d i r ec t iv e s to th e ICP , t h e a f f i l i a t i o n wi th t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i s t movem en t c a n n o t b e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . As Huynh Kim Khanh o b s e r v e d , the Comintern’s r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th t h e V i e t n a m e s e C om m unis t m ovem en t was ’o n e o f l e s s t h a n w h o l e h e a r t e d s u p p o r t and of ten unw anted meddl ing’. [41] Khanh goes on to w r i t e :

as i t t u r n e d o u t , i d eo l o g i c a l d i s o r i e n t a t i o n and organ isa t iona l d i s a r r a y were p a r t of the p r i c e t h e C o m m u n i s t s of Vie tnam h a d to p a y f o r t h e i r s u b s e r v i e n c e to an in terna t i on al o rg an isa t i on . [42]

However i n a p p r o p r i a t e , V i e t n a m e s e com m unism ’s l i n k s wi th t h e S o v ie t Un ion p r o v i d e i t s h i s t o r y with a cr edible i n d e ­pende nce wi th in , ye t so lidar i ty wi th , i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c ia l i sm di rec ted from Moscow.

D e s p i t e t h e f a i t h f u l s u p p o r t g iven by the ICP to the twis ts and t u r n s of Comintern d i r ec t iv e s , Moscow n e v e r t h e ­l e s s e s t a b l i s h e d a p a t t e r n of p lacing Soviet s t r a t eg i c p r io r i ­t ies be fo re the cen t r a l aims of t h e V i e t n a m e s e r e v o l u t i o n - t h e s t r u g g l e s fo r d e c o l o n i s a t i o n a n d t h e n f o r uni f i ca t ion. He inz ig s u c c i n t l y s u m m a r i s e d t h e p a t t e r n of C o m i n t e r n d i rec t ives to Vie tnam:

In 1933 t h e C o m i n t e r n l e a d e r s recommended th a t t h e CPIC [ s i c ] f i g h t fo r i n d e p e n d e n c e fo r I n d o c h i n a . In 1936, t h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was r e t r a c t e d . In t h e w ake of t h e s i g n i n g of t h e N a z i - S o v i e t p a c t in A u g u s t 1939, Moscow a g a in ca l l ed u p o n t h e p a r t y to follow an a n t i - F r e n c h c o u r s e , t h e r e s u l t of w hi ch being th a t the CPIC was o u t l a w e d . S ov ie t s t a t e m e n t s a t t h i s t ime r e f e r r e d almost exc lus ively to Vietnam, while Laos an d C am bod ia w e r e r e g a r d e d as V i e t n a m e s e b a c k w o o d s wi th no Communist movements of t h e i r own. [43]

H a v in g m i l i t a r i l y d e f e a t e d t h e F r e n c h , t h e DRVN at Geneva a r g u a b ly received less t h a n fu l l Sov ie t s u p p o r t fo r r e u n i f i c a t i o n . It s h o u l d h o w e v e r be recogni sed th a t Soviet s u p p o r t f o r t h e p a r t i t i o n of Vie tnam was u n d o u b t e d l y i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e m i l i t a r y w eak nes s of the Vietminh forces and the co n seq u en t d an g e r s of l a rg e - sca le US in t e rv e n t io n in t h e e v e n t of t h e b r e a k d o w n of t h e G e n e v a n e g o t i a t i o n s .

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Sti l l , t h e Geneva compromise, based on Vietnam’s part i t ion, undoubtedly se rved Soviet s ecu r i ty i n t e r e s t s w h ich , at the same t ime, were fo c u s s e d on i t s Western f ron t ie r and the dangers of German r e a r m a m e n t . Having a c c e p te d p a r t i t i o n t e m p o r a r i l y a t G e ne va , the DRVN attempted to pursue the commitment for g e n e ra l e lec t ions lead ing to r e u n i f i c a t i o n . While Hanoi p r e s s e d for the elections, the Soviet Union and Bri ta in as c o -c ha i rm en of the Geneva C onfe re nc e in 1956 a p p e a r e d to ha v e ’a c c e p t e d the s t a t us quo and the implied p o s tp o n e m e n t of t h e e lec to ra l p r o v i s io n s of the Geneva a g r e e m e n t s ’. [44] In the following y e a r , the Soviet Union a p p e a r s to have b e e n even more p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t t h e part it ion of Vietnam. In response to a US p roposa l to admit Sou th Vietnam to t h e UN, Moscow ’apparent ly without pr ior consultation with the DRVN’ proposed the admiss ion of bo th Vietnams. As Carlyle Thayer has observed ,

. . . [while t h i s p roposa l ] may have been a d e l i b e r a t e tactical ploy designed to embarrass the U .S . , it also implied the e x i s t e n c e of two s o v e ­r e i g n Vie tnamese s t a t e s . From Hanoi’s po in t of view this was totally u n a c c e p t a b l e . If t h e Soviet p r o p o s a l had b e e n a g re e d to , for example , all hopes for r e -un i fy ing Viet-nam u n d e r the te rms of t h e 1954 Geneva A greem en ts would have vanished. It is not su rp r i s ing t h e r e f o r e , t h a t on J a n u a r y 25th Pham Van Dong addressed a le t ter of protest to members of the U.N. Securi ty C o u n ­cil. [45]

D u r in g th e f i r s t Indoch ina w ar , t h e limited external support g iven to Vietnamese a n t i - c o lo n ia l i s t s came mainly from C h in a . Dur ing the second Indoch ina w a r , Soviet material aid became increasingly important to North Vie tnam. In t h e e a r ly 1960s Soviet commitment to t h e Vie tnamese s t r u g g l e was low compared to C h in a ’s . The o u s t i n g of K r u s h c h e v c h a n g e d t h a t . The need for more a rm s , and e s p ec i a l l y more s o p h i s t i c a t e d e q u ip m e n t , became more p r e s s i n g with the Tonkin i n c id e n t and t h e c o n s e q u e n t escalation of the war by the US. Fortunately, Kosygin’s vi s i t to Hanoi in February 1965 coincided with the ear ly phases of US bombing and Kosygin’s presence d u r i n g an ae r i a l a t t a c k is wide ly be l i eved to have prompted the increase in military assi s tance by K r u s h c h e v ’s s u c c e s s o r s . St i l l , a t i ts p e a k ,

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S o v ie t a s s i s t a n c e was h a r d l y m ass ive when compared to i t s t o ta l a id p ro g ra m m e in t h e T h i r d W orld . [46] D u r in g th e S eco n d I n d o c h in a w a r , Soviet aid peaked betw een 1967-1970 when 80 p e r c e n t of all economic a id to t h e DRV came from t h e S o v ie t U n io n . [47] D e sp i te th e in c re a sed level of Soviet a s s is ta n c e , Moscow d isp layed caution d u e to i ts c o n c e rn t h a t escalation might lead to d irec t su p e rp o w er co n fro n ta t io n :

Soviet a s s i s t a n c e was t h u s c a lc u l a t e d to e n a b le Hanoi to h o ld i t s own in th e conflic t, ty in g down American fo rces un til W ashington’s will was b r o k e n a n d a s a t i s f a c t o r y s e t t l e m e n t co u ld b e a c h i e ­v e d . [48]

Nor was Moscow i n h i b i t e d b y s u p p o r t fo r H anoi from p u r s u i n g i t s c e n t r a l po licy i n t e r e s t s w ith t h e U S . T h e A m er ican b o m b in g o f H a ip h o n g h a r b o u r p receded P re s id en t Nixon’s 1972 Summit meeting in Moscow w here a g r e e m e n t w as r e a c h e d on a n u m b er of major q u es t io n s th a t helped to build d e te n te . T hus Moscow clearly showed th a t Vietnam would n o t i n h i b i t t h e im p ro v em en t of i ts re la t io n sh ip with W ashington. For i ts p a r t , th e United S ta te s a p p e a r s to h a v e l i n k e d th e S o v ie t i n t e r e s t to d e t e n t e w ith i t s own d es ire for d i s e n g a ­gement from In d o ch in a . H e n ry K i s s i n g e r , th e p r i n c i p a l US n e g o t i a t o r a t t h e P a r i s Peace C o n f e r e n c e , ’was co n v in ced th a t th e Soviet Union held the key to peace in V ie tnam ’. [49] With a p p a r e n t s u c c e s s , he seem s to h a v e u s e d M oscow’s in f luence in Hanoi to b r in g t h e P a r i s t a l k s to a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c lu s io n . While l i t t le is known ab o u t what p r e s s u r e Moscow applied to th e N orth V ietnam ese, b o th N ixon an d B r e z h n e v l i n k e d th e im provem ent in U S/Soviet re la tions to th e conc lu ­sion of the w a r . [50]

S o v ie t i n f l u e n c e in N o r th V ie tnam d u r in g th is per iod was u n d o u b te d ly e n h a n c e d b y s t r a i n s in H ano i’s r e l a t i o n s w ith P e k i n g . Not o n ly was C h in a fa l l in g b e h in d in t h e p r o v i s io n o f a s s i s t a n c e b u t i t a l s o took i t s f i r s t s t e p s to w a r d s n o rm a l i s in g i t s r e l a t i o n s w ith t h e U S. S h o r t l y a f te rw a rd s th e C h inese r e a s s e r te d th e i r claims to the P a ra c e l I s l a n d s by militarily expelling th e South Vietnamese. Vietnam continued i ts re liance on Soviet a s s is ta n c e a f te r r e u n i f i c a t io n w hile t h e s t r a i n s w i th C h in a a c c e l e r a t e d . For re a so n s th a t a re d iscu ssed below, by the m iddle o f 1978, Hanoi u n a m b i ­g u o u s ly s t e p p e d in to th e S o v ie t c a m p . Its commitment was given formal e x p re s s io n by joining CMEA (Council for M u tu a l

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Economic A s s i s t a n c e ) in J u n e 1978 a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t n e g o t i a t io n o f t h e F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o o p e ra t io n T r e a t y in N o v em b er 1978. Id e o lo g ic a l s o l i d a r i t y w as re f le c te d in the rh e to r ic of the T r e a t y a n d t h e V ie tn a m e s e C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1980. [51] S h o r t ly a f te r th e cementing of close re la t ions with t h e S o v ie t U n io n , o b s e r v e r s b e g a n to s p e c u l a t e a b o u t p o s s ib le s t r a i n s in t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . While some o f t h e s e s p e c u la t io n s a r e b r i e f l y o u t l in e d b e lo w , t h e y s h o u ld b e t r e a t e d w ith some c a u t io n d u e to t h e l im ited in fo rm a t io n available .

As e a r ly a s 1978, A g e n ce F r a n c e P r e s s e r e p o r t e d V ie tn a m e s e d ip lo m a ts as h a v in g a c k n o w le d g e d ’d i f fe re n c e s ’ w ith t h e S o v ie t U nion o v e r n a t io n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p ro b le m s . [52] R o b in so n g iv e s a d e t a i l e d c o v e r a g e o f t h e v a r io u s p o in t s a t i s s u e a n d in h is view by 1981 t h e s e r e p r e s e n t e d ’a d i f f e r e n c e in s t y l e s a n d g o a l s ’ and ’all th e s i g n s of a b r e a k ’. [53] S im i la r ly , t h e I n t e r n a t io n a l Herald T r i b u n e r e p o r t e d S o v ie t c o n c e r n abou t Vietnam’s t rea tm en t o f i t s n e i g h b o u r s in t h e fo l lo w in g te rm s : ’th e Soviet Union has o rd e re d Vietnam to avoid ac tions th a t w ould a la rm o t h e r S o u th e a s t A s ian n a t i o n s ’, a n d , ’t h e R uss ians h av e told th e Vietnamese to w a tch i t ' . [54] More r e c e n t l y t h e r e h a s b e e n s p e c u la t io n th a t Vietnam is concerned with th e p ro s p e c ts for th e e a s in g o f S in o - S o v ie t t e n s i o n s a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f B r e z h n e v . [5 5 ] T h e s e w idespread and r e c u r r in g specu la t ions n o tw ith s ta n d in g , to d a te th e re is no ev idence to confirm t h a t H anoi is t a k i n g s e r i o u s s t e p s aw ay from Moscow o r v ice v e r s a , o r t h a t i t h a s r e d u c e d i ts d ep e n d en ce on th e Soviet U nion in p u r s u i n g i t s i n t e r n a l g o a ls a n d i t s s e c u r i t y c o n c e rn s . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e r e is no h a r d e v id e n c e to s u g g e s t th a t Vietnam has been able to take e ffec tive s te p s to e a s e i t s t e n s i o n s w ith C h in a o r t h a t i t h a s b e e n ab le to improve i ts re la tions with th e Western w orld .

T h e p a r a m e t e r s of S o v ie t i n f l u e n c e in I n d o c h in a c o n t i n u e to b e s e t b y t h e c o m p le x i t ie s of Hanoi’s re la t ions with Vientiane an d Phnom P e n h . T h e p r im a c y of V ie tn a m ’s p o s i t io n v is a v is t h e L ao t ian a n d K a m p u c h e a n communist m o v em en ts g o es b a c k to Moscow’s C o m in te rn d i r e c t i v e o f 1930. As noted above , th e Soviet U nion d u r i n g t h a t p e r io d r e g a r d e d the Laotian and Cambodian movements as ’Vietnames backw oods’. Until the end of th e s e c o n d In d o c h in a w a r , b y w h ich t im e s e p a r a t e I n d o c h in e s e p a r t i e s h a s b e e n f o r ­med, [56] the Soviet Union d irec ted i ts a t ten t io n almost s o le ly

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to t h e V ie tnam ese p a r ty with Soviet policy tow ards Laos and Cambodia, *by the la rg e one o f g r e a t r e s e r v e ’. [57] H e in z ig goes on to say :

I n s o f a r a s t h e S ov ie t U nion e n g a g e d in a n y a c t i v i t i e s a t a l l ; t h e s e w e re a lso d e s i g n e d to d e m o n s t r a t e so lidar ity tow ards Hanoi. The overall app roach of the Kremlin l e a d e r s h ip was e v i d e n t l y b a s e d — q u i t e r i g h t l y so — on t h e c a lc u la t io n t h a t th e f a t e s o f t h e s e tw o c o u n t r i e s w ould d e p e n d on th e outcome of th e Vietnam w ar. When th is had been won b y H anoi, S o v ie t i n f lu e n c e in Laos an d C am bod ia s p r e a d , so to sp ea k , autom a­tically , c o n c o m i ta n t w ith H an o i’s g ro w in g d o m i­nance in those c o u n tr ie s . [58]

In Laos, th e S ov ie t U nion g a v e a rm s s u p p o r t to t h e P a th e t L ao . T h is d id no t h o w e v e r , d e t e r Moscow from m a in ta in in g a d ip lo m a tic m iss io n in V ie n t ia n e from 1960 o n w a r d s . C o n t in u in g th e p a t t e r n o f t h e p r im a c y g iven to Soviet s ta te i n t e r e s t s , Moscow a g reed to the n eu tra l isa t io n o f Laos a t t h e G e n e v a C onference of 1961-1962. As p a r t of th e Paris ceasef ire ag reem en t a national coalition g o v e rn m e n t was fo rm ed in April 1974 with an equal m em bership of communists and non-com m unists . In December 1975 the communists finally d i s p l a c e d th e p r e v i o u s co a l i t io n g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e Lao People’s Democratic R ep u b l ic (L P D R ) was d e c l a r e d . In a l l , t h e Soviet Union su p p o r te d th e Laotian revolu tion b u t from a p e rsp ec t iv e which saw its fu tu re as 'a b y -p r o d u c t of th e w ar in Vietnam’. [59]

S o v ie t a t t i t u d e s to t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v em en t in Kampuchea also accorded primacy to Vietnam - and o f c o u r s e to i t s own w id e r i n t e r e s t s . C o n seq u en t ly , re la tions be tw een the Communist P a r ty of Kampuchea (C P K ) an d Moscow w e re m a rk e d b y s t r a i n s a n d a good deal of h o s t i l i ty . T he Soviet Union ignored the Kampuchean in s u rg e n t s at Geneva in 1954. Moscow ( a lo n g w ith Hanoi a n d B e ij ing ) gave i ts s u p p o r t to Sihanouk r a th e r than to the CPK and c o n s e q u e n t ly all t h r e e o p p o s e d th e CPK’s 1968 armed s t ru g g le ag a in s t S ihanouk . In J u k e s ’ v iew , S ih a n o u k ’s n e u t r a l i t y r e q u i r e d l i t t l e of th e S o v ie t U n io n . [60] When th e S o v ie t U nion invaded Czecho­slovakia, th e Vietnamese s u p p o r t of t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l im ited s o v e r e i g n t y was not lo s t on th e C am b o d ian s . [61] With the overth row of Sihanouk in 1970 th e Soviet Union w i th d re w i t s

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a m b a s s a d o r b u t r e t a i n e d i t s E m b a s s y . T h u s as J u k e s has a r g u e d , ’p r o v i d e d C am bod ia r e m a i n e d n e u t r a l t h e S o v ie t Union was not c o n c e r n e d who governed i t ’. [62] In 1973 th e Soviets encou rage d a CPK compromise with Lon Nol .[63]

T h e S o v ie t a t t i t u d e to t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t y of Kampuchea f r eq u en t ly re ached the po in t of h o s t i l i t y . T h u s , in 1964, Moscow r e p o r t e d ly t r i ed to c r e a t e a r iva l communist p a r t y to t h e CPK. The K a m p u c h e a n s r e c i p r o c a t e d t h e s e s e n t i m e n t s so t h a t a CPK d e l e g a t i o n r e f u s e d to mee t t h e Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi in 1969. [64] S o v ie t a n d V i e t n a ­mes e a t t i t u d e s to t h e CPK were a p p a r e n t l y in tandem, as is ref lec ted in the r e p o r t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s g i v e n in Hanoi to o v e r t h r o w i n g t h e K a m p u c h e a n p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p in t h e 1970-72 pe r io d . [65] It is t h e r e f o r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e K h m er R o u g e d e s t r o y e d t h e Sovie t Embassy in Phnom Penh a f t e r tak ing control of the c i ty in 1975.

T h e h i s t o r y o f Moscow's l i n k s w i th t h e p a r t y in Kampuchea has been embroi led in t h e V i e t n a m e s e - K a m p u ­c h e a n c o n f l i c t . Pol Pot c la imed t h a t the Kampuchean p a r t y was f o u n d e d on 30 S e p t e m b e r 1960 a n d so d e n i e d a n y c o n t i n u i t y wi th t h e 1930 Soviet in s p i r ed ICP fo unda t ion . By c o n t r a s t , the l a t e r d i sc re d i t ed Pen S o v a n , a t t h e PRPK 4 th C o n g r e s s in 1981, a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e p a r t y to b e t h e su cces so r to the ICP, b u t cr ed i t ed Moscow a n d n o t V ie tnam wi th i t s f o u n d a t i o n . [66] The l a t t e r acknowledgement d id not es cape the Vie tnam ese a n d S o v an was r e m o v e d as G e n e r a l S e c r e t a ry .

So f a r , the d iscuss ion has shown t h a t t h e Soviet Union saw Vietnam as c e n t r a l to t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e s in I n d o c h i n a a n d d i r e c t e d i t s a t t e n t i o n a c c o r d i n g l y . In t h a t s en se , t h e h i s t o r y of t h e p a r t y l i n k s b e t w e e n t h e S o v ie t Union a n d t h e L ao t i an a n d t h e Kampuchean p a r t i e s is more app ropr i a te ly ca s t as the l inks between th e Soviet Union a n d t h e I n d o c h i n e s e co m m u n is t m o v e m e n t s . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e Soviet Union’s c u r r e n t l i n k s wi th Laos a n d K a m p u c h e a a r e b e s t d i s c u s s e d b y lo o k in g a t V i e t n a m ’s r e v o lu t io n a r y l inks with the communist movements in those s t a t e s .

V ie tnam 's r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t in Laos a r e commonly d e s c r i b e d a s ' u n c o m p l i c a t e d ' , l a r g e l y b e c a u s e t h e L a o t i a n s do not a p p e a r to have r e s i s t e d Hanoi's dominant ro le . Ng Sui Meng s u m m a r i s e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p in the following terms:

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In c o rp o ra t in g Laos in to the In do-C h inese Alliance h a s b e e n r e l a t i v e ly e a s y b e c a u s e Laos h a s a c k n o w le d g e d th e s p e c ia l r e l a t i o n s i t h a s w ith Vietnam r i g h t from th e b e g i n n i n g . L ao s ’s r e v o ­l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e o v e r t h e p a s t 30 y e a r s h a s b e e n c lo s e ly c o n n e c t e d w ith t h e V ie tn a m e se s t r u g g l e . T h e P a r t y - t o - P a r t y r e l a t i o n s , u n l ik e t h o s e b e tw e e n th e CPV a n d th e K a m p u c h e a n C om m unis t P a r t y u n d e r t h e K h m er R ouge , have always b een harm onious. [67]

The harmony of the re la t ionsh ip seems to d ra w on a h i s t o r y o f P a t h e t Lao a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e H anoi communists as th e i r rev o lu t io n a ry m en to rs . The p rec ise n a tu re of th e V ie tn a m e s e ro le in t h e g r o w th a n d s t r a t e g y o f t h e P a th e t Lao is e v i d e n c e d n o t l e a s t b y th e c l a n d e s t i n e n a t u r e o f t h e Vietnamese invo lvem ent. According to MacAlister Brown,

the heavy role of Vietnamese military and political a d v i s e r s to th e Pathet Lao was p ar tia l ly o b scu red b y th e u s e o f P .L . u n i fo rm s a n d Lao n a m e s ,N o r th V ie tn a m e s e a rm y u n i t s in Laos u s u a l l y b ivouacked away from popula ted a r e a s . [68]

In all, while th e Laotian movement c a n n o t b e c a s t as s im p ly d e p e n d e n t on th e Vietnamese, it is d iff icu lt to see it o u ts id e the co n tex t of i ts re la t ionsh ip to ex te rn a l c i rc u m sta n c e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e c o m m u n is ts ’ p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e c o a l i t io n governm ent of 1974 was ’e n h a n c e d b y th e p e r f o r m a n c e a n d p r e s e n c e of a C om m unis t n e i g h b o u r ’s a rm y ( t h e P e o p le ’s Army of Vietnam )’. [69] S in ce 1975, t h e c o u r s e fo l low ed b y th e LPD R, a t bo th s ta te and p a r ty level, has ru n in tandem w ith H an o i . T h e V ie tn a m e s e -L a o t i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p q u i c k l y d e v e lo p e d in to a model fo r t h e V ie tn a m e s e n o t io n o f a ’special r e l a t i o n s h i p ’. T h o u g h n o t fo rm a lly f e d e r a t e d , t h e p o l ic ie s of t h e two s ta te s a re closely co -o rd ina ted and given overall d irec tion b y Hanoi. T h ay e r d e s c r ib e s th e p a t t e r n of th e Laotian-V ietnam ese re la t ionsh ip a s :

e x t e n s i v e , in t h a t i t c o v e r s a wide v a r ie ty of a r e a s an d encom passes the re la t ions betw een the two Communist p a r t ie s , s t a t e s , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , a r m ie s , m ass o rg an iza t io n s and o th e r specialized

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b o d i e s , a n d i n t e n s i v e , in t h a t i t e m b ra c e s all e c h e lo n s from n a t io n a l , to p r o v i n c e a n d local leve ls . [70]

In t h e y e a r s s in c e 1975, Laos h a s r e a c h e d a n u m b e r o f a g r e e m e n t s w h ich h a v e c e m e n te d i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith V ie tn a m . A t w e n t y - t h r e e y e a r lo n g b o r d e r d i s p u t e w as s e t t le d b y c o n c e d in g t e r r i t o r y to V ie tn a m . [71] E x te n s iv e econom ic a g r e e m e n t s w ith V ie tnam h a v e b e e n c o n c lu d e d - in c lud ing th e formation of a joint V ietnam ese-Laos Economic, C u l t u r a l , S c ie n t i f i c a n d T e c h n ic a l C o-opera tion Commission a n d in 1977 a T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n . T h o u g h e x t e n s i v e l y i n f lu e n c e d b y Hanoi, Vietnam does not ap p e a r to be h e a v y -h a n d e d in the r e l a t i o n s h i p . It may well b e t h a t Vietnam’s role in Laos is fac il ita ted b y a long h is to ry of e x te rn a l in f luence o v e r Laotian a f fa i r s .

On t h e o th e r h a n d , Vietnam’s re la t io n s with Kampuchea have been fa r from uncom plicated . The Vietnamese domination o f Kampuchea has ra ised th e vexed q u es t ion of th e long-te rm aims b e h i n d i t s d r i v e fo r ’s p e c ia l r e l a t i o n s ’ w ith i t s tw o n e i g h b o u r s . F o r t h e i r p a r t , th e Khmer Rouge d em ons tra ted th e i r feelings fo r t h e V ie tn a m e se b y e x c lu d in g from t h e i r r a n k s a n y o n e w ith p r e v i o u s a s s o c ia t i o n w ith H a n o i . P ro - Vietnamese sec tions within the Khmer R ouge w e re l i q u id a t e d in 1977-78. A gain, Khmer Rouge host i l i ty to w ard s Vietnam is d e m o n s t r a t e d in t h e r e g im e ’s r e - w r i t i n g of th e p a r t y ’s h i s t o r y . In th e Livre Noir, th e role of Vietnam’s co n tr ib u tio n to t h e K a m p u c h e a n re v o lu t io n was minimised. N ev er th e le ss , t h e L i v r e N oir d o e s admit th a t th e Kampuchean co n tr ib u tio n to t h e V ie tm in h s t ru g g le ag a in s t th e F ren ch was limited and th a t t h e e m e r g e n c e o f an i n d e p e n d e n t K a m p u c h e a n p a r t y came only with the found ing of th e KCP in 1960. [72]

T h e V ie tn a m e s e /K a m p u c h e a n h o s t i l i t y e v i d e n t s in c e 1975 h a s a lo n g h i s t o r y of cu l tu ra l d i f fe re n c e s . T hese were ex a ce rb a ted by th e form of F r e n c h co lo n ia l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d b y V ie tn a m ’s m ajor ro le in t h e deco lon isa tion of Indo­c h i n a . When th e t h r e e e m e rg e d in 1975 as i n d e p e n d e n t co m m u n is t s t a t e s , h o s t i l i ty betw een Vietnam and Kampuchea c e n t r e d on th e b o r d e r d i s p u t e . N e v e r t h e l e s s H e d e r h a s s u g g e s t e d t h a t p r i o r to t h e 1978 i n v a s i o n , V ietnam u s e d m ilitary , political and diplomatic m eans to co n f irm ’a s p e c ia l r e l a t i o n s h i p ’ w ith K a m p u c h e a . E v en a t t e m p t s from w ith in , such as th o se b y pro-V ietnam ese K am p u ch ean s to o v e r th r o w

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t h e Pol Pot r e g i m e , e n d e d in f a i l u r e . He a l so p r o v i d e s a c o n c i s e d i s c u s s i o n of t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e V i e t n a ­m e s e / K a m p u c h e a n r e l a t i o n s h i p w h ich c u l m i n a t e d in t h e Vietnamese in v as io n . [73] S ince t h e n , p r o b l e m s of t h e l e g i ­t i m a c y of t h e PRK r e g im e c o n t i n u e to f r u s t r a t e H a n o i ’s e f f o r t s to e s t a b l i s h a w ide ly a c c e p t e d a n d s t a b l e ’s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ’ w i th K a m p u c h e a . D e s p i t e t h e s e p r o b l e m s , Vietnam has s teadi ly stood by i ts commitment to t h e ’s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ’ a n d t h i s commitm ent i s o n e w h ich the Soviet Union has to take in to account in i t s own d e a l i n g s wi th t h e Indochinese s t a t e s .

Sovie t l inks with the communist movements in the t h r e e Indochina s t a t e s h a v e a r g u a b l y b e e n q u i t e d i s c r e t e . V i e t ­nam 's l i n k s wi th Moscow go b a c k to Comintern days in the ea r l y 1930s. In Laos, the Soviet involvement has been closely i n t e r w o v e n w i th Vietnamese i n t e r e s t s . On the o th e r hand in Kampuchea, the Soviet Union had no i n d e p e n d e n t l i n k s wi th t h e communist p a r t y p r i o r to i t s Vietnamisat ion. As well, t h e communist p a r t y of K a m p u c h e a u n d e r t h e Kh mer R o u g e , a m o v em en t of t h e 1960s and 1970s[74] , had a s t ro n g ave rs ion to t h e Soviet Union, not leas t bec ause it saw Soviet s u p p o r t for Vietnamese ob jec t ives .

In looking a t t h e p a t t e r n of Soviet political i n t e r e s t s in S o u t h e a s t As ia , t h e fo l lowing p o i n t s ca n be made in s u m m a r y . F i r s t , t h a t t h e e a r l y S o v ie t c o n t a c t s w i th t h e r e g i o n came t h r o u g h p a r t y c h a n n e l s a n d t h e C o m i n t e r n ’s o f t e n i l l - c o n c e i v e d a t t e m p t s to g u i d e t h e local communis t m o v e m e n t s w h ich w e r e t a k i n g p a r t in t h e a n t i - c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e . S e c o n d , t h a t Moscow's c o m p lex l i n k s wi th t h e Indochina s t a t e s s t an d in c o n t r a s t w i th t h e l ack of s u c c e s s t h a t i t e n j o y e d wi th the o th e r regional nat ions . At the same time, t h e S ov ie t Union h a s s h o w n a r a t h e r d i s c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r e s t in t h e r e g i o n an d i ts in i t ia t ives have been c h a r a c ­ter is t ica l ly de s igned to s e r v e s t a t e r a t h e r than ideological o r p a r t y i n t e r e s t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , as th e region was cons idered to b e of s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c e to t h e Sov ie t U n io n , i t s p o l i c i e s o f t e n s temmed from compet i t ive i n t e r e s t s with China and the US.

One i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r in the succes s fu l forging of t ies with Vietnam is tha t the Vietnamese communist m ovem en t h a s b e e n a s i n g u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l b l e n d of communism a n d nat ional ism. T h u s t h e l e a d e r s h i p wh ich fo rmed id eo l o g i c a l l i n k s wi th Moscow in the 1970s also l a t e r took control of the

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s t a t e and b r o u g h t Vietnam in to th e so c ia l is t camp. Soviet s u p p o r t fo r r e v o lu t io n in In doch ina was c e n t r e d on th e r e v o lu t io n a ry movement in V ie tnam . By con tra s t , Moscow’s d irec t links with Laos were limited; its independent r e la t io n s with the Kampuchean revolutionary movement were even more tenuous. These arrangem ents suited th e V ie tnam ese in th a t th e y s e rv e d th e i r own d r iv e for ’so lidari ty ’ with the o ther parties and s ta tes of In d o c h in a . C o n s e q u e n t ly , th e Soviet p r e s e n c e in Indoch ina m ust n e c e s s a r i ly be routed th rough Vietnam.

T h is d iscuss ion has sought to show that the prevailing close r e la t io n s b e tw e en Hanoi and Moscow a re b a s e d on a l a r g e m easure of in terdependence. For the Soviet Union this means tha t its p re se n c e in In d o c h in a , and th a t e s s e n t ia l ly means i t s p r e s e n c e in th e S o u th e a s t Asian r e g io n , is d e p e n d e n t on V ie tnam . In t u r n , Vietnam is v e ry l a r g e ly d e p e n d e n t on Soviet s u p p o r t fo r th e r e a l i s a t io n of i ts domestic goals as well as its claims to a ’special r e l a t i o n s h ip ’ with Laos and K am puchea . The longer term development of Soviet - Vietnamese relations is difficult to p r e d i c t . For th e p r e s e n t th e a d v a n ta g e s c learly outweigh the costs to bo th . Still, it sh o u ld not be fo rg o t te n th a t the two s t a t e s have w i tn e s s e d n o ticeab le d ivergences of in te res t in the past and tha t the Soviet Union gave less than optimal political su p p o r t to Hanoi’s s trugg le for reunification.

soy IET STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

T he s tra te g ic in te res ts of any s ta te are ra re ly matched fully by its military c a p a b i l i t ie s . Yet i n t e r e s t s a re c lose ly r e la te d to m ilita ry c a p a b i l i t ie s . For p l a n n e r s , th e iden ti­fication of external in te res ts se rves to guide the context and p r io r i t i e s of fo rce d e v e lo p m en t . For external ana ly s ts , the identification of external in te res ts is useful for i n t e r p r e t i n g c u r r e n t m il i ta ry c a p a b i l i t ie s as well as for try ing to an ti­c ip a te the d i re c t io n of f u tu r e d e v e lo p m e n ts . For th e s e r e a s o n s , Soviet s t r a t e g i c in te res ts are separa te ly discussed in this section while c u rre n t m il i ta ry c a p a b i l i t ie s a re d e a l t with in the following section.

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L a r g e l y fo r r e a s o n s of g e o g r a p h y , t h e Sovie t Union h as ten d ed to r e g a rd S o u th e a s t A sia as a r e g io n o f s e c o n ­d a r y s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . Moscow’s p r im a r y c o n c e r n s lie e l s e w h e r e . T h e y a r e f o c u s s e d on r e g io n s a d j a c e n t to i t s b o r d e r s - E u r o p e , C h in a a n d N o r t h e a s t Asia, while in th e T h ird World th e prim ary focus has b e e n on th e M iddle E as t and th en on South Asia.

As d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , S o v ie t involvem ent in th e reg ion h a s been d isco n t in u o u s , sometimes i l l - c o n s i d e r e d , a n d o f t e n a r e s p o n s e to i t s a d v e r s a r i e s . T he in c reas in g ly close re la ­t ions th a t deve loped betw een th e S o v ie t Union a n d V ie tnam c a n l a r g e l y b e e x p la in e d in term s of th e o p p o r tu n i t ie s th a t r e s u l te d from Hanoi’s a d v e r s a ry re la t io n s w ith F r a n c e , t h e n t h e U S, a n d finally with C hina. O r, as Michael Leifer p u t it in the b ro a d e r co n tex t , The in te r e s t s and the policies o f t h e S o v ie t U n ion w i th in S o u th e a s t Asia h av e been g o v e rn ed by th e re la t io n sh ip s with h e r p r inc ip le a d v e r s a r i e s w h ich h a v e had th e i r focus in o th e r re g io n s ’. [75]

N either S o u th eas t A s ia ’s r e m o t e n e s s n o r th e r e g i o n ’s p la c e in S ov ie t global p r io r i t ie s should o b sc u re th e fac t th a t Moscow now h as a va luab le a l ly in V ie tn a m . H an o i’s im p o r ­t a n c e s te m s from i t s capac ity to f u r th e r a num ber of Soviet i n t e r e s t s . T hese inc lude th e lo n g s t a n d i n g p ro b le m s a s s o ­c i a t e d w ith i t s o v e r la n d t r a n s p o r t l inks with the Soviet fa r e a s t , t h e s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n w ith C h in a , an d i t s g lo b a l s t ra te g ic competition with th e US.

As i s o f t e n n o t e d , g e o g r a p h y is a m ajor s t r a t e g i c h a n d ic a p fo r t h e S o v ie t U n io n . It is a v a s t landpow er with e x t e n d e d la n d f r o n t i e r s a n d i t h a s d i f f i c u l t a c c e s s to m a ri t im e t r a d e r o u t e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t s w e s t - e a s t l a n d t r a n s p o r t s y s t e m is u n d e r d e v e l o p e d a n d t h a t p a r t w h ich r u n s c lo se to t h e C h in e s e b o r d e r is v u ln e r a b le . O ver the p a s t t h i r t y y e a r s t h e r e h a s b e e n a n o t i c e a b le a t t e m p t to d i v e r s i f y t h e S o v ie t t r a n s p o r t s y s te m a n d so r e d u c e th e re liance on ra il t r a n s p o r t . T h u s , while rail c a r r i e d a b o u t 80 p e r c e n t o f t h e nation’s f re ig h t in 1950, only 57 p e r cen t of f re ig h t went b y rail in 1980. [76] T h e d e c l in e h a s b e e n d u e to t h e g r e a t e r u s e of a i r t r a n s p o r t , l a n d p ip e l in e s a n d s h i p p i n g . E m p h a s is in g th e g ro w in g im p o r ta n c e o f s e a t r a n s p o r t , Admiral G orshkov w rote :

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t h e ro le of sh ip p in g is especially g re a t in the Far E as t a n d N o r th w h e re t h e m e r c h a n t m a r in e is p r a c t i c a l l y th e sole mode of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . . . New major p o r t s . . . o n t h e F a r E as t c o a s t a n d in t h e B lack S e a . . . w i l l s u r p a s s most major p o r ts in o u r c o u n t r y in le v e l o f e q u ip m e n t an d h a n d l in g ca p ac i ty . [77]

As n o te d in t h e l a s t s e c t io n o f t h i s e s s a y , t h e expansion of m erchan t sh ipp ing in S o u th eas t Asia has b e e n a n o ta b le f e a tu r e of Soviet ac tiv i ty in th e reg io n . T h u s access for Soviet m erchan t sh ip s to p o r t s in V ie tnam an d K a m p u ­c h e a ca n b e s e e n in t h e c o n t e x t o f a w id e r r e g io n a l programme a s well a s in th e c o n t e x t o f b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s w ith t h e I n d o c h in a s t a t e s . From M oscow's p e r s p e c t i v e , S ou theas t Asia is b o th d i s t a n t a n d r e l a t i v e l y i n a c c e s s i b l e . I n d o c h in a i s some 3000 k i lo m e tr e s from th e S ov ie t Union; land and a ir l inks s t r e t c h ac ross China and much of th e s e a ro u te is th ro u g h u n fr ie n d ly w a te rs .

In a wider s t r a t e g i c c o n t e x t , t h e S o v ie t U nion s e e s i t s e l f a s a g lo b a l p o w e r w ith i n t e r e s t s and responsib i l i t ie s th a t , b y def in i t ion , canno t be exc luded from any p a r t of th e w o r ld . T h u s i t s r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d p e r m a n e n t m i l i t a r y p re sen ce in S ou theas t Asia r e p r e s e n t s a f u r t h e r s t e p in i t s q u e s t fo r t h e s t a t u s o f a f u l ly d e v e lo p e d g lo b a l p o w e r . Within the reg io n , th e Soviet military p re sen ce a lso s e r v e s a n u m b e r o f lo c a l i s e d i n t e r e s t s . In th e f i r s t place, it demon­s t r a t e s Soviet i n te r e s t and po ten tia l . Like o th e r g r e a t n a v a l p o w e r s , t h e S o v ie t U nion a lso u se s th e Navy to p ro jec t i ts in fluence and p re s t ig e in to more d i s t a n t l o c a t i o n s . T h e u s e o f n a v a l d ep lo y m en ts for ' the p ro tec t ion of s ta te i n te r e s t s in t im es of p e a c e ' h a s o f t e n b e e n e m p h a s i s e d b y A dm ira l G o r s h k o v , who wrote th a t Soviet p o r t ca lls , especially in th e T h ird World, 's e rv e the noble p u r p o s e of im p ro v in g m u tu a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g betw een n a t io n s . . .en h an c in g th e in te rn a t io n a l p r e s t i g e o f th e h o m elan d a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g th e p o l i t i c a l i n f lu e n c e o f t h e S o v ie t U n io n ' . [78] A p e r m a n e n t reg ional n a v a l p r e s e n c e a d d s to t h e S o v ie t s t a t u r e as a m ari t im e p o w e r , a s t a tu r e p a r t ly based on a growing m erchant marine and su b s ta n t ia l netw ork of sh ip p in g ag reem en ts in S o u th e a s t A s ia . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e S o v ie t n av a l p re sen ce en h an ces i ts position in re la tion to f r ie n d s a n d a d v e r s a r i e s . It u n d o u b ­t e d ly a d d s to Moscow's c r e d i b i l i t y a s an a lly . At th e same

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t im e t h e S o v ie t n a v y h a s e s t a b l i s h e d a l im ited p e a c e t im e cap ac ity to pose a th re a t to W e s te rn s e a l in e s of co m m u n i­c a t io n in t h e r e g i o n . F in a l ly , a c c e s s to V ie tn a m e s e p o r ts p ro v id e th e Soviet Pacific Fleet with forw ard b as in g f a c i l i t i e s fo r i ts deploym ents in th e Indian O cean. It shou ld , how ever , be r e c o g n is e d t h a t e v e n in p e a c e t im e , t h e S o v ie t n a v y is s e v e r e l y d i s a d v a n t a g e d in t h e S o u th C h in a Sea a n d t h e Indian O cean. Its o pera t ions in t h e s e w a te r s a r e h a m p e r e d b y th e low le v e l of a v a i l a b le a i r c o v e r and b y th e logistic problems t h a t s tem from b e in g f a r from th e main s u p p o r t b a se s in N o rth eas t Asia.

T h e a l l i a n c e w ith V ie tnam is s t r a t e g i c a l l y u s e f u l in th a t it en h an ces th e Soviet p o s tu re in re la t ionsh ip to C h in a . T h u s Moscow’s r e g io n a l a l l i a n c e h a s a n e n c i r c l i n g e f f e c t w h e reb y Beijing’s n o r th e rn a d v e r s a ry is a llied to i t s p r i n c i ­pa l a d v e r s a r y in th e S ou th . Yet th e s e c u r i ty problem posed to China in th e South a p p e a rs to be more potential th an r e a l as t h e r e is l i tt le ev idence of la rg e co n cen tra t io n s of C hinese main force d iv is ions ad jacen t to Vietnam. The s t r a t e g i c v a lu e o f t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a ry lodgem ent in Indochina is also limited b y US d e p lo y m e n ts in t h e S o u th e a s t A s ian r e g i o n . T h u s , r a t h e r t h a n h a v in g a c h ie v e d th e e n c i r c l e m e n t o f C h in a , Moscow seems more c o n c e r n e d b y t h e a n t i - S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s h i p formed b y China, th e US and i ts reg ional allies . Moscow’s s t ra te g ic p e rsp ec t iv e in S o u th eas t Asia was r e c e n t l y r e f l e c t e d b y th e S o v ie t a m b a s s a d o r in Japan when he said th a t the expansion of th e Soviet Pacific fleet was in r e s p o n s e to th e em erging U S -C hina-Japan a x is . [79]

From a lm ost p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r e s t d u r i n g th e 1940s, S o v ie t s t r a t e g i c in v o lv e m e n t b e g a n to ex p an d in th e 1950s and 1960s and rap id ly a c c e l e r a t e d f u r i n g th e l a t e 197 0s to t h e p o in t w h e re Vietnam is now one of Moscow’s major allies in t h e T h i rd w o r ld . V ie tn a m ’s im p o r t a n c e to t h e S o v ie t p o s t u r e in t h e F a r E as t a n d t h e In d ia n O cean is l ikely to co n tinue , especially while t h e p r e s e n t p a t t e r n of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s a n d a l ig n m en ts p e r s is t in S ou theas t Asia. As Paul Dibb has a r g u e d :

V ietnam will c o n t in u e to b e t h e k e y element in Soviet reg ional policy in the 1980s, b u t V ie tn am ’s u t i l i t y to t h e U . S . S . R . is m ore t h a n j u s t a regional power b a s e . Soviet po licy r e s o u r c e s will fo c u s on In d o c h in a a s a b u l w a r k to C h in e s e

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e x p a n s io n i s m , in Sou theas t Asia and as an o ffse t to what Moscow sees as U .S . a t tem p ts to o u t f l a n k it by m ilitarising ASEAN. [80]

THE SOVIET MILITARY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

T h e p r o j e c t io n of military power in to S ou theas t Asia is d iff icu lt fo r th e Soviet Union. G eo g rap h ica l ly , t h e r e g io n is r e m o te a n d f a r from Soviet military b a se s in N o rth eas t Asia. The rem oteness of the reg io n , to g e th e r w ith t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f a c c e s s b y la n d a n d a i r , h a v e e n s u r e d t h a t t h e Soviet military p re sen ce in S ou theas t Asia con tinues to b e b a s e d on i t s maritime fo rces .

T h e S o v ie t f o r c e s in t h e F a r East su f fe r from a wide r a n g e o f l im i t a t i o n s . G e o g r a p h y a n d c l im ate a r e a b i d in g p r o b le m s . T h e p r o x im i ty o f Soviet b a se s in th e Far East to n o r th e rn la t i tu d e s imposes s ev e re clim atic c o n s t r a i n t s . Most f a c i l i t i e s a r e ice p r o n e w hile snow and a rc t ic cond itions in the w in ter h in d e r a ir o p e r a t i o n s . T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e P a c if ic F le e t a t V ladivostok face th e Sea of Jap an and sh ips u s in g the b ase must pass th ro u g h one of the s t r a i t s c o n t r o l ­le d b y J a p a n . In th e p a s t , th e lack of sh o re facilities in th e Pacific, s o u t h o f S ib e r i a , h a v e a lso im p o sed s e r i o u s lim i­ta t io n s on Soviet forces in th e Far E as t .

In term s of th e Soviet naval program me, th e e x p a n s io n o f t h e P ac i f ic F le e t h a s b e e n im p re s s iv e . It now s ta n d s as the l a r g e s t of t h e fo u r f l e e t s in t h e S o v ie t n a v y . In t h e p a s t two decades th e Pacific Fleet has been t ran sfo rm ed from a la rge ly coasta l d e f e n c e fo r c e in to o n e t h a t is c a p a b le o f p r o j e c t in g n a v a l f o r c e s well o u t to s e a . In t h e d e c a d e following the mid-1960s, the t o n n a g e of t h e f le e t i n c r e a s e d b y some 30 p e r c e n t . A f u r t h e r 30 p e r c e n t in c re a se was a c h ie v e d b e tw e e n 1977 a n d 1981. [81] A c c o rd in g to t h e C o m m a n d e r- in -C h ie f of the US Forces in th e Pacific, Admiral L o n g , ’t h e S o v ie t U nion h a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d a n d m o d e rn i s e d i t s f o r c e l e v e l s in e v e r y c a t e g o r y o f m i l i t a r y deploym ent in t h e P ac if ic d u r i n g th e p a s t te n y e a r s ’. [82] T h is e x p a n s io n s h o u l d , h o w e v e r , b e a s s e s s e d ag a in s t th e c o n s id e ra t io n t h a t m ost o f t h e F le e t h a s b e e n f a c in g b loc o b s o l e s c e n c e . F u t u r e im provem ents a re expec ted to b e more quali ta t ive th an q u a n t i ta t iv e .

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T h e P ac i f i c F le e t now h a s o v e r 720 s h i p s . T h e most notable i n c r e a s e s h a v e b e e n in t h e n u m b e r of s u b m a r i n e s i n c l u d i n g n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s a n d majo r c o m b a t a n t s . The Fleet h a s n o t i c e a b l y i m p r o v e d i t s a n t i - s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) capabi l i t ies and re cen t ly ac qu ir ed a modest amphibious a s s a u l t c a p a b i l i t y . R e c e n t add i t ions inc lude Kres ta II c r u i ­s e r s , Ka r a s and Krivak f r ig a te s and the ASW c a r r i e r Minsk. T h e Minsk ca n c a r r y 40 a i r c ra f t ( inc luding ver t ic a l t ak e - o f f a n d l a n d i n g f i g h t e r s ) a n d a n t i - s u b m a r i n e h e l i c o p t e r s . A nothe r not able a d d i t i o n is t h e l a r g e s t a m p h i b i o u s a s s a u l t s h i p e v e r b u i l t in t h e S o v ie t U n i o n , t h e Ivan R ogo v . The R ogov c a n c a r r y a b o u t 500 t r o o p s , 30 APC’s and 10 t a n k s . A c c o r d i n g to C IN C P A C , given a i r cov e r and a n t i - s u b m ar in e p r o t e c t i o n , t h e I v an Rogov would be a s igni f icant means of p r o j e c t i n g S o v ie t a n d s u r r o g a t e force g ro u n d combat power in local c o n f l i c t s a r o u n d t h e W e s te r n Pac i f i c a n d I n d i a n O c e a n , c a r r y i n g o u t com m an do o p e r a t i o n s o r b a c k i n g u p c l i e n t s t a t e s . [83] T h e n a v y a l so b e g a n deploying Backf i re b o m b e r s a r m e d wi th a n t i - s h i p c r u i s e missi les. About t h i r t y Ba c k f i r e s a r e dep loyed in the Soviet Far East with t en more e x p e c t e d . [84] While t h e r e h a s b e e n c o n t i n u o u s W e s te r n s p e c u l a t i o n a b o u t t h e dep loym en t of Backf i res in Cam Ranh B a y , t h e s e r e p o r t s have p ro ven to be in a c c u r a t e . However , according to one r e p o r t , US a i r f o rce ’e x p e r t s s a y ’ t h a t some of t h e Backf i re s in the Soviet Far East could be sen t to Cam Ranh Bay in e ight h o u r s . [85]

Along with the qual i t a t i ve i m p r o v e m e n t s to t h e F l e e t , t h e r e h a s b e e n a g r o w i n g w i l l i n g n e s s to d i s p l a y S o v ie t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y in t h e r e g i o n . T h u s s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r wa r , the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov w e r e d e p l o y e d in the South China Sea. In October 1982, the Minsk co m m en ced i t s s e c o n d o u t - o f - a r e a dep loyment . It left home w a t e r s in t h e N o r t h w e s t P ac i f i c a n d c o n d u c t e d ope­ra t ions in t h e South China Sea. It t h e n ca l l e d a t Cam R an h Bay a n d t h e r e a f t e r deployed in t h e Indian Ocean. [86] In the sam e y e a r , B a c k f i r e s s t a g e d c lo s e simulated a i r - t o - s u r f a c e a t t a c k s on two US c a r r i e r s in t h e N o r t h P a c i f i c . [87] A similar d em o n s t r a t io n was r e p o r t e d in t h e S o u t h e a s t A s ian r e g i o n in 1981 when Soviet a i r c ra f t and naval ves se ls l inked up to simulate missile a t t a c k s a g a i n s t a US c a r r i e r g r o u p . A c c o r d i n g to a US o f f i c i a l , t h e e p i s o d e m a r k e d t h e f i r s t Soviet demons t ra t ion of a n t i - c a r r i e r w a r fa r e capabi l i ty in t h e r e g i o n . T h e o ff ic ia l i s r e p o r t e d to have said tha t ’t h e same

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t h i n g they can do in th e M editerranean and the Sea of J ap a n and o th e r ocean a r e a s , they can now do in t h e S o u th C h in a Sea*. [88] While t h e s e d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o f m il i ta ry capab il i ty ap p e a r im press ive , it should be acknow ledged th a t th ey w e re u n d e r t a k e n in p e a c e t im e . The following d iscu ss io n of Soviet reg iona l c a p a b i l i t i e s a lso a s s u m e s p e a c e t im e c o n d i t i o n s . A h o s t i l e e n v i r o n m e n t w o u ld , on th e o t h e r h a n d , g r e a t l y c ircum scribe Soviet m ilitary o p t io n s in t h e r e g i o n . O u t s i d e p e a c e t im e c o n d i t i o n s , S o v ie t n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s w o u ld b e h a m p e re d b y a r a n g e o f c o n s t r a i n t s i n c l u d i n g l im i te d a i r s u p p o r t , i n a d e q u a t e b a s e f a c i l i t i e s a n d e x t e n d e d lo g i s t i c l in es .

While t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a ry p r e s e n c e in S o u th e a s t Asia c e n t r e s on Vietnam, i ts s t ra te g ic i n te r e s t s do not end t h e r e . T h e S o v ie t U nion a lso u n d e rw r i te s th e s e c u r i ty of Laos and m a in ta in s a sm all i n d e p e n d e n t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in t h a t c o u n t r y . T h e S o v ie t Union is deeply involved in th e re c o n ­s t r u c t i o n of K a m p u c h ea a n d may in t h e f u t u r e s e e k to e s t a b l i s h n av a l a c c e s s th e re as well, if only to d iv e rs i fy i ts reg iona l op tio n s . Soviet f ish ing an d n a v a l a u x i l i a r y v e s s e l s h a v e b een se rv iced and re p a ired in S ingapore since 1971 b u t th is a r ran g em en t ceased a f te r t h e i n v a s io n of A f g h a n i s t a n . A c co rd in g to officials in Bangkok, th e Soviet Union h as made o ffe rs of military a ss is tan ce to T ha iland . [89] In 1979, Moscow m ade a p p a r e n t l y i d e n t i c a l r e q u e s t s to all the ASEAN s ta te s ex cep t S ingapore , fo r n a v a l b e r t h i n g , r e s t a n d r e c r e a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s fo r two of i ts naval vesse ls on ro u te to th e Indian O cean. [90] The re q u e s t s were tu rn e d dow n.

It a p p e a r s t h a t t h e S o v ie t U nion has t r ie d to s e c u re a c c e s s to V ie tn a m e se b a s e f a c i l i t i e s , a t l e a s t s i n c e t h e c o n c lu s io n o f t h e s e c o n d In d o c h in a w a r . U n t i l 1979, how ever , Vietnam re s is te d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f S o v ie t b a s e fa c i l i t ie s on i ts t e r r i t o r y . U ndoub ted ly , Vietnam’s keen sen se of in d ep en d e n t n a t io n a l i sm was an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r in r e ­s i s t i n g w ha tever Soviet p r e s s u r e might h av e been b ro u g h t to b e a r . A n o th e r f a c to r was p r e s s u r e from C h in a a n d th e ex p re s s io n s of concern b y the US. [91]

The r e g u la r u s e o f t h e n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s a t Cam R anh Bay an d Da N ang came in th e wake of th e Chinese military in cu rs io n in to Vietnam and the conclusion o f t h e F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o - o p e r a t io n T r e a t y with th e Soviet Union. T he use of facilities began with th re e Soviet naval v esse ls calling at Cam R an h Bay in March 1979. In th e following w eeks, six v esse ls

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c a l l e d a t Da N a n g . [92] In N o v e m b e r 1979, t h r e e w a rs h ips u n d e r t h e command of Vice A dm ira l Y a s a k o v , D e p u t y C o m m a n d e r of t h e P ac i f i c F l e e t , ca l l e d a t H a i p h o n g . US in te l l igence so u rc e s c i te a t leas t one Soviet submarine in Cam R an h Bay d u r i n g t h e midd le of 1979. [93] In May 1980, it was r e p o r t e d th a t th e Soviet n a v y was d e p l o y i n g a n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e in t h e S o u t h C h i n a Sea on a r e g u la r b a s i s . [94] T h e r e a f t e r t h e S o v ie t n a v y b e g a n to u s e Cam R a n h Bay c o n t i n u o u s l y . T h e c a r r i e r Minsk ca l l e d a t t h e f a c i l i t y in S e p t e m b e r 1980 a n d a g a i n in 1982. The f i rs t ap p e a r a n c e of t h e Minsk in t h e S o u t h C h i n a Sea c a u s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e regional con cern especial ly when it sai led up the Gulf of Siam to within a h u n d r e d mi les o f T h a i n a v a l b a s e a t S a t t a h i p . T h e Minsk made a h i t h e r t o u n p r e c e d e n te d display of Soviet n a v a l p o w e r a t a t ime w h e n the Chinese Prime Minister was end ing his v is it to Thai land.

T h e Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay seems to have peaked in 1980 when abo ut 30 ves se ls u sed the b a s e . The i n c r e a s e d l e v e l of v i s i t s a p p e a r s to h a v e b e e n r e l a t e d to US-Soviet t ens ions in the Indian O cean t h a t fo l lowed t h e i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g a r e s p o n s e to V i e t n a m ’s s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h e r e a f t e r dep loyment s seem to h a v e l e v e l l e d o ff w i th *a p e r m a n e n t n a v a l p r e s e n c e of a p p r o x i ­mately f if teen w a r s h i p s a n d a u x i l i a r i e s in t h e S o u th C h i n a S e a ’. [95] T h e p a t t e r n of p o r t ca l l s a t Cam R a n h Bay s u g g e s t s t h e fo l l o w i n g . F i r s t l y , S o v ie t a c c e s s i s p a r t of V i e t n a m ’s d e t e r r e n t p o s t u r e t o w a r d s China . Secondly , th a t the ba se facilit ies now play an i n t e g r a l ( t h o u g h n o t n e c e s ­s a r i l y a v i t a l ) p a r t in t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in Sou theas t Asia. T h i rd ly , th a t the condi t ions of access to t h e f a c i l i t i e s a r e no t r e s t r i c t e d to t h e common s t r a t eg i c ob jec ­t ives of the S o v ie t Union a n d V ietnam in t h e r e g i o n , b u t t h a t t h e s e e x t e n d to t h e w i d e r S o v ie t mar i t im e p o s t u r e , inc luding its capabi l i t ies in the Indian Ocean.

From 1979 o n w a r d s , t h e Soviet Union rapidly bui l t up the ba se facilit ies at Cam Ranh Bay. Repor ted i m p r o v e m e n t s i n c l u d e d o c k i n g , r e f u e l l i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n s ( inc luding u n d e r ­g r o u n d fu e l s t o r a g e ) a n d m a i n t e n a n c e w o r k s h o p s . [96] S h e l t e r s fo r n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s have bee n bui l t , while the n e a r b y ai rf ield now r e g u l a r l y s u p p o r t s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d ASW a i r c r a f t . According to a re cen t US mili tary r e p o r t , long r a n g e ’B ea r D ( r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ) a n d F ( A n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e ) a i r c r a f t m a i n t a i n n e a r l y con t inuous deployment to

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Cam Ranh Bay f rom w hich t h e y c o n d u c t r e g u l a r o p e r a ­t i o n s ’. [97] T h e d e f e n c e s of Cam R a n h Bay h a v e b e e n i m p r o v e d with the cons t ru c t i on of u n d e r g r o u n d b a t t e r i e s for c o a s t a l d e f e n c e a n d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s u r f a c e to a i r d e f e n c e s . Cam R a n h Bay is now a l so one of t h e l a r g e s t c o m m u n ica t io n s a n d e l e c t r o n i c i n t e r c e p t f a c i l i t i e s o u t s i d e Soviet t e r r i t o r y . [98] It is

used to moni tor C h inese m i l i t a r y m o v e m e n t s , to c a r r y o u t s u r v e i l l a n c e on the U . S . Seven th fleet opera t ions and on naval a n d a i r a c t i v i t i e s a t t h e U . S . b a s e s of S u b ic Bay a n d C la rk Field in the P h i l i p p i n e s , a n d to co m m u n ic a t e wi th f l ee t h e a d q u a r t e r s a t Vladivostok. [99]

The Soviet Union also ac qu ir ed access to t h e f a c i l i t i e s a t Da Nang in 1979. H e re a g a i n , a c c e s s a p p e a r s to b e r e l a t e d to S ov ie t s u p p o r t f o r V ie t nam a g a i n s t C h i n a . In A p r i l - M a y 1979, t h e S o v ie t s a i r l i f t e d m i l i t ar y s tores to Da Nang and T a n Son N h u t , whi le d u r i n g th e same p e r i o d ’a s t e a d y s t r e a m of S o v ie t s u p p l y s h i p s unloaded at Da Nang and Cam Ranh B a y ’. [100] In t h e sam e y e a r , Sov ie t n a v a l v e s s e l s b e g a n to m ake r e g u la r po r t calls to Da Nang. Since t h e n , a ’p e r m a n e n t b a s e fo r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f l i g h t s a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y e l e c t r o n i c informat ion and naval communication and a i r t raf f ic c o n t r o l ’ f a c i l i t i e s w e r e a d d e d . [101] By t h e midd le of 1979, r e g u l a r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f l ights from Vladi­vostok to Da Nang have b e e n r e p o r t e d . [ 102] T h e s e f l i g h t s c o v e r e d H a in a n I s l a n d , t h e S o u th C h in a Sea , a n d t h e Indochina p e n i n s u l a . [ 103] T h e p r i n c i p a l m is s io n s w e r e to m o n i to r Chinese mili tary movements and the opera t ions of the US Seven th Fleet in the region .

R e c e n t e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e S ov ie t Union has b e g u n to co ncen t ra te i ts mili tary p re s en ce at Cam Ranh B a y . T h e US Commander in the Pacific (CINPAC), Admiral Rober t Long, s t a ted tha t the Soviet Union r e c e n t l y ’moved most of i t s a i r a n d n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s to Cam Ranh Bay f rom Da Nang '. [104] According to Admiral Long, consol idat ion in Cam R an h B ay , t o g e th e r with Soviet improvements to the Defence of the faci li ty, point to ' e v e r y i n t e n t i o n of p r o l o n g i n g t h e S ov ie t s t a y [ in Cam Ranh ] . . . i n d e f i n i t e l y ’. [ 105] A f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n of ' t h e i m p o r t a n c e t h e S o v ie t s h a v e p l a c e d on Vietnam a s a f o r w a r d s t a g i n g b a s e ' i s t h e d e l iv e r y of two

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new floating p ie rs to Cam Ranh Bay since November 1982. In December 1982 an 8,500 ton f lo a t in g d r y d o c k was d e l i v e r e d to Ho Chi Minh C ity . [106]

T h e s h o r e f a c i l i t i e s now o p e n to t h e Soviet Union in V ie tnam h a v e e n h a n c e d i t s p e a c e t im e m i l i t a ry p o s t u r e in S o u th e a s t A sia a n d h a v e im p ro v e d i t s w id e r o p e r a t i o n a l capabilit ies of th e P ac if ic F le e t . A c c o rd in g to a r e c e n t US naval as se ssm en t:

F o rw a rd s t a g i n g from Cam R an h p r o v i d e s t h e Soviet navy w ith t h e a b i l i ty to r e a c t r a p id l y to e v e n t s in t h a t r e g io n a s well a s f o r t h e Indian Ocean a r e a . This developm ent s h o r te n s t h e S o v ie t lo g i s t i c l i n e s , r e d u c e s fu e l c o n s u m p t io n , saves eng ine w ear and ex ten d s core l i fe of t h e n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s , w hile p r o v i d i n g t h e S o v ie t s c lo se proximity to im portan t sea lines of co m m unica t ion .With the u se of th is b a se , th e Soviets have gained the ability to rap id ly re sp o n d ag a in s t n a v a l u n i t s t r a n s i t in g to th e Indian O c e a n . . . [ 107]

Flying from Vietnam, Soviet r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t en jo y a m uch im p ro v e d r a d i u s of o p e ra t io n . From a p p a re n t ly sec u re b u t limited land s u p p o r t fa c i l i t ie s [108], th e Soviet U nion h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e fo llow ing military capabilit ies in the reg io n : improved naval c o m m u n ic a t io n s , a g r e a t l y e n h a n c e d i n t e l ­l i g e n c e g a th e r in g capab il ity , a grow ing a n t i - s u r f a c e sh ipp ing c a p a b i l i t y , t o g e t h e r w ith a l im ited ASW a n d a lso a v e r y l im ited a m p h ib io u s a s s a u l t c a p a b i l i t y . T h e S o v ie t military p re se n c e in S o u th eas t Asia is s ign if ican t when compared w ith i t s r e g io n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f e v e n l e s s t h a n a d e c a d e a g o . Since 1979, th e S o v ie t U nion h a s e s t a b l i s h e d a p e r m a n e n t m i l i t a r y p re sen ce in Indochina and i ts lan d -b a sed facilities in Vietnam have im proved i ts peacetime operational f l e x ib i l i ty in t h e S o u th e a s t A s ian r e g io n a s well a s in a d j a c e n t a r e a s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , S o v ie t n av a l p o w e r , e s p e c i a l l y o u t s i d e t h e N o r t h e a s t A s ian re g io n , remains v e ry limited. The com para­t iv e ly m o d es t c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e P a c i f ic F lee t a r e c l e a r ly r e f l e c t e d in i ts major ro le s . T hese co n c en tra te on opera t ions close to the Soviet n av a l f a c i l i t i e s in N o r t h e a s t A s ia , w ith o n ly a small p e r c e n t a g e o f s u r f a c e s h i p s deployed beyond hom e w a t e r s . T h e main m iss io n o f S o v ie t s u r f a c e s h i p s i n c l u d e s s u p p o r t fo r , and p ro tec t ion of, the subm arine force a r o u n d home b a s e s an d th e d e f e n c e o f sea la n e s in t h e

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S o v ie t F a r E a s t . [109] S econdary missions would include the e x t e n s i o n o f S o v ie t d e f e n c e s f u r t h e r o u t to s e a . Major s h o r t c o m in g s o f t h e Pacific Fleet inc lude i ts limited cap ic i ty for p ro je c t in g p o w e r a s h o r e a n d fo r p r o j e c t in g a i r pcw er b e y o n d th e r a n g e o f i t s land b a s e s . S ubm arines , especially the SSBNs, need b e t t e r p ro tec tion from th e ASW c a p a b iL t ie s o f t h e US S e v e n th F le e t . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e S ov ie t Pacific F leet’s own ASW c a p a b i l i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y on th e o p e n s s a s , a re limited.

S o v ie t c a p a b i l i t i e s also pale when compared with Ihose of th e US Seven th F leet . R ecen tly t h e US A s s i s t a n t S e 3 re - t a r y o f D e fen ce fo r I n t e r n a t io n a l S ecu r i ty A ffa irs , Ricnard A rm i ta g e , s t a t e d t h a t A m er ican m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s in t h e P h i l i p p in e s a n d e l s e w h e re enab le US fo rces in th e region to maintain :

- a c o n t i n u o u s a i r a n d n a v a l p r e s e n c e in t h e W estern P a c i f i c . . .w i th t h e c a p a b i l i t y to p r o j e c t a n d s u p p o r t a U . S . p r e s e n c e a t Diego Garcia in th e Indian Ocean.- a i r a n d n a v a l c a p a b i l i t y to m eet con tingenc ies [ b e y o n d th e r e g i o n ] . . . s u c h a s in t h e P e r s i a n G u l f , A r a b ia n S ea , E as t A f r i c a n Waters and th e Middle E ast .- o n e of th e b e s t p ro te c te d , deep w ate r h a rb o u rs available in S ou theas t Asia.- t h e l a rg e s t , most efficient sh ip re p a i r facility in th e Pacific.- la n d a n d sea b a s e d t a c t i c a l a i r a s s e t s ( b o th f ig h te r and a ir l i f t ) and the ab il i ty to d e p lo y them rap id ly anyw here in the Western Pacific.- com prehensive s u p p o r t fo r all o p e r a t i n g f o r c e s in t h e a r e a , i n c l u d i n g c o m m u n ica t io n s , log istics and m ain tenance, t ra in in g and p e r s o n n e l r e q u i r e ­m ents .- m ajor war r e s e rv e material s to ra g e for a v a r ie ty of co n t in g en c ie s . [110]

S o v ie t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s in S ou theas t Asia are also politically c i r c u m s c r i b e d , n o t l e a s t b e c a u s e t h e r e are few o p p o r t u n i t i e s in t h e r e g io n o u t s i d e I n d o c h in a th a t c tn be exploited by military m eans. In some r e s p e c t s , i t c a n e v e n b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e e n h a n c e d S o v ie t r e g io n a l m i l i ta ry p re sen ce is politically c o u n te rp ro d u c t iv e . The f e a r o f SDviet

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as well as V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y p o w e r may have d r iv en the ASEAN s ta te s closer t o g e th e r and closer to China t h a n m ig h t o t h e r w i s e h a v e b e e n t h e c a s e . In April 1980, poss ib ly with US prompt ing, the P h i l ipp ines p r o t e s t e d t h e i n t r u s i o n i n t o i t s ai r spaces of Soviet r e con nai s sance c ra f t f lying ou t of Da Nang. Again, in November 1980, Thai land p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e d e p l o y m e n t of t h e Minsk and i t s s u p p o r t vesse ls in the G u l f of Siam. T h u s , r a t h e r t h a n s u b d u i n g t h e ASEAN s t a t e s , Soviet mili tary power see m s to h a v e h a d a c o n t r a r y ef fec t .

THE SO V IET- VIETN AMESE TREA TY OF F RIE N D SH IP AND CO-OPERATION

T h e T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n bet ween the Soviet Union an d Vietnam placed the alliance r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e two s t a t e s on a more formal foot ing. In conc lu ­d i n g t h e T r e a t y , Hanoi b r o k e wi th i t s long t r a d i t i o n of r e s is t ing mi li tary al liances with g re a t powers . Th ough Moscow had proposed the T r e a t y in 1975 a n d a g a i n in e a r l y 1978, Vie tnam h e ld b a c k u n t i l i t s p r e s s in g s e c u r i ty co n c e rn s with C h i n a , t o g e t h e r w i th i t s i n a b i l i t y to make h e a d w a y wi th n o r m a l i s i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s with the US, made the T r e a t y well n i g h i n e s c a p a b l e . [ 111 ] A bove a l l , t h e T r e a t y m a r k e d V ie tn a m ’s s t r a t e g i c i s o l a t i o n a n d i t s c o n s e q u e n t s e c u r i t y d e p e n d e n c e on t h e S o v ie t U n i o n . Face d wi th w h a t i t r e g a r d e d as an a g g r e s s i v e K a m p u c h e a , b a c k e d m ore a n d more uncompromisingly by China, which in t u r n was r a p i d l y i m p r o v i n g i t s re l a t io n s with the US, Hanoi had few s e c u r i t y o p t io n s o u t s i d e a t r e a t y wi th Moscow. G a r e t h P o r t e r h a s a r g u e d t h a t Hanoi h e l d b a c k f rom c o n c l u d i n g a t r e a t y so long as t h e re was an y p rospec t of n o r m a l i s i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s wi th W a s h in g t o n . In l a t e S e p t e m b e r 1978, Foreign Minister Thach was in New York hoping to r e s u m e n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th the US and th en ,

a f t e r waiting for a month in New York for a da te for a n o t h e r m e e t i n g , T h a c h was o r d e r e d to p r o c e e d to Moscow f o r t h e f ina l t r e a t y nego t i a­t ions with the Sovie ts . [112]

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On 3 N o v em b er 1978, V ietnam s i g n e d th e T r e a t y with the Soviet Union and in the following m o n th it i n v a d e d K am p u ­chea .

T h e w o rd in g o f t h e T r e a t y does not ind ica te w he the r it changed the on -go ing n a tu re of V ie tnam ’s s e c u r i t y o r i t s p o l i t i c a l o r econom ic r e l a t i o n s w ith t h e S o v ie t Union. The T re a ty s t r e s s e s the common ideological p e rsp ec t iv e s a n d aims o f t h e two s t a t e s . In b road te rm s th e s ig n a to r ie s ag reed to co -o p era te in fo re ign policy, economic and s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s . T h e p re a m b le r e f e r s to t h e ’i r o n - l i k e d e t e r m in a t io n to co n tr ib u te to the consolidation of peace in Asia and t h r o u g h ­o u t t h e w o r ld ’, w h ile A r t i c l e 5 com m its t h e two s t a t e s to follow a foreign policy of peacefu l c o - e x i s t e n c e w ith c o u n t ­r i e s w ith d i f f e r e n t so c ia l s y s t e m s . A r t i c l e 2 p l e d g e s c o ­operation in economic deve lopm ent, s c ie n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y . A r t i c l e 6 conta ins th e p r inc ipa l s e c u r i ty provis ion and s ta te s in t e r a l ia :

In c a s e e i t h e r p a r t y is a t t a c k e d o r t h r e a t e n e d w ith a t ta c k , the two p a r t i e s . . . to t h e T r e a t y s h a l l imme­d ia t e ly c o n s u l t . . . w ith a v iew to e l im in a t in g t h a t t h r e a t , an d s h a l l t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e an d e f f e c t i v e m e a s u r e s to s a f e g u a r d p e a c e a n d t h e s e c u r i t y of th e two c o u n tr ie s .

T h e s e c u r i t y p r o v i s i o n s a re su ff ic ien tly b ro ad to allow wide ra n g in g in te rp re ta t io n . It has b e e n n o te d t h a t th e w o rd in g is w e a k e r t h a n t h a t u s e d in th e Warsaw Pact and in Soviet t re a t ie s with Mongolia and North K orea , b u t th a t it is f i rm e r t h a n S o v ie t t r e a t i e s w ith I r a q , A n g o la , E th io p ia a n d A f g h a n i s t a n . [ 113] T h e w o rd in g of th e s e c u r i t y p r o v i s io n r u n s p a r a l l e l to t h e w o rd s u s e d in t h e 1971 Soviet T re a ty with India - a s ta te which also has had i ts s e c u r i ty p ro b le m s w ith C h in a . I t h a s a lso b e e n o b s e r v e d th a t ’Vietnam got a s t r o n g e r d e f e n c e com m itm ent from Moscow th a n th e o n e T h a i l a n d h a s from th e U n i ted S ta te s u n d e r the Manila Pact of 1954’. [114] The T r e a t y d o e s n o t a p p e a r to c o v e r t e r r i ­t o r i e s in d i s p u t e b e tw e e n Vietnam and i ts n e ig h b o u rs ; th a t is th e d i s p u t e w ith C h in a o v e r t h e S p r a t l y a n d P a ra c e l I s la n d g r o u p s an d th e t e r r i to r y in d isp u te with Kampuchea. P o r te r goes f u r th e r and claims th a t th e Soviet Union s p e c i f i ­c a l ly e x c lu d e d t h e S p r a t l y a n d P a r a c e l s from th e s e c u r i ty p r o v i s io n s of t h e T r e a t y . [115] While S o v ie t - V ie tn a m e s e s t r a t e g i c i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e i n c r e a s e d co n s id e rab ly a f te r th e

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T r e a t y , t h e tw o s t a t e s s t i l l h a v e d if fe r in g p e rcep t io n s and p r i o r i t i e s in t h e S o u th e a s t A s ian r e g io n an d d i f f e r e n t e x p e c t a t i o n s o f each o th e r . N e v e r th e le s s , to d a te , s t r a te g ic co n sen su s r a th e r th an d i s c o r d h a s c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e r e l a ­t i o n s h i p . B o th h a v e re p ea ted ly signalled th a t the alliance is p r im a r i ly a im ed a t C h in a . While B e ij in g h a s a t t e m p t e d to d i s c r e d i t Moscow a s a r e l i a b l e a l l y , t h e e v id e n c e w ould s u g g e s t th a t a t leas t on s e c u r i t y - r e l a t e d i s s u e s , H anoi h a s no t fo u n d Moscow w an ting . T h u s , th e Soviet Union supp lied Vietnam with h a rd w a re th a t enabled it to in v ad e K a m p u c h e a , a n d a f te r th e Chinese a t ta c k , it p ro v id ed th e more ex p e n s iv e equipm ent needed to improve Vietnam’s co n v e n t io n a l f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s . [ 116] Moscow c l e a r l y l i n k e d i t s s u p p o r t fo r V ie tnam a g a i n s t C h in a w ith t h e T r e a t y r e l a t i o n s h i p b y w a r n in g B e i j in g to s to p i t s m i l i t a r y in c u r s io n in to Vietnam ’before i t ’s too la te ’ and s t a t in g t h a t ’t h e S o v ie t U nion will h o n o u r i t s o b l i g a t i o n s ’. [ 117] T h e Soviet Union also c a r r ied out a major military su p p ly programme d u r i n g a n d a f t e r t h e C h in e s e i n v a s i o n . I t d id n o t , h o w e v e r , s ig n a l o r th re a te n d irec t military in te rv e n t io n . [ 118] It t h e re fo re seem s a t l e a s t a r g u a b l e t h a t t h e T r e a t y im p o sed some l im its on C h i n a ’s in cu rs io n while failing to d e te r i t .

D i f f e r e n c e s a p p e a r to ex is t within th e T re a ty re la t io n ­s h i p , p o s s ib ly c a u s in g t e n s i o n s . T h e V ie tn a m e s e h a v e d i s p l a y e d p a r t i c u l a r s e n s i t iv i ty to su g g es t io n s th a t th ey a re now in the Soviet bloc and in a s u b o r d in a t e p o s i t io n s im ila r to t h a t of M oscow’s W arsaw P a c t a l l i e s . A c c o rd in g to one r e p o r t , Vietnamese diplomats have sa id :

We do n o t w ish to p la c e o u r s e l v e s u n d e r t h e S o v ie t um bre lla . We have had o u r d if fe ren ces with th e Soviet Union over n a t io n a l an d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p ro b le m s , a n d t h e s e a r e m ade k n o w n to Moscow even if th e y were n ev e r made p u b lic . [119]

Soviet l e a d e r s , h o w e v e r , h a v e im p lied t h a t t h e i r s e c u r i t y l in k s w ith V ie tnam h a v e i n c r e a s e d t h e i r i n f lu e n c e in th e re g io n . Thus on r e tu r n in g from Moscow in March 1979, T h a i P rim e M in is te r K riangsak said th a t ’th e Kremlin le ad e rs have a s s u re d us th a t as th ey a re closely assoc ia ted with V ie tn a m , T h a i l a n d need not fe a r Hanoi’. A similar a s s u ra n c e was g iven to the Malaysian Prime Minister d u r in g h is v isit to Moscow in S e p te m b e r 1979 . [120] Hanoi h a s a ls o b e e n s e n s i t i v e to su g g es t io n s th a t th e T re a ty automatically p rov ides th e Sovie t

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Union wi th r i g h t s of a c c e s s to V i e t n a m e s e b a s e faci l i t ies . Vietnam has re p ea t ed ly d i sassocia ted th e T r e a t y f rom b a s i n g r i g h t s , whi l e t h e S o v ie t Union h a s l inked th e two. [121] It a p p e a r s th a t t h e S o v ie t Union h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y l i n k e d t h e T r e a t y ( a n d t h e p r o v i s i o n of l a r g e s c a l e food a i d in late 1978) to the faci li t ies . Th us the ea r l i e r t r e a t y p r o p o s a l s b y t h e S o v ie t Union - in 1975 and ea r ly 1978 - were made along with r e q u e s t s f o r b a s i n g r i g h t s . [122] A g a in , i t h a s b e e n r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e S o v ie t Union ra ise d the i s su e d u r i n g the T r e a t y negot ia t ion s in Moscow. T h e V i e t n a m e s e r e p o r t e d l y r e s i s t e d t h e r e q u e s t ; however , u n d e r a s ec re t an n e x to the T r e a ty e i t h e r p a r t y could r e q u e s t ’mi li tary c o o p e r a t i o n ’ w h en ’i t i s d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y fo r t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e p a r t y co n c e r n e d ’. [123] Soviet officials have also l i n k e d t h e T r e a t y wi th b a s i n g r i g h t s in more r e c e n t t i m e s . T h u s the Soviet V ice -F or eign M i n i s t e r , Nikola i F i r y u b i n , s a i d in T o k y o in 1979 t h a t t h e S o v ie t Union is u s i n g m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s in Vietnam to c a r r y out i ts t r e a ty obl igat ions . [124]

T h e T r e a t y see m s to be r e g a r d e d by bo th Moscow and Hanoi as the foundation for close c o - o p e r a t i o n on e c o n o m ic , p o l i t i c a l , a s well as s ec u r i ty m a t t e r s . Th ough Vietnam joined CMEA in J u n e 1978, s u b s e q u e n t ag reem en ts on ec onom ic a n d t e c h n o l o g y mat ter s have been mostly l inked to the T r e a t y of F r i en d sh ip and Co-opera t ion r a t h e r than to CMEA. T h u s t h e U S S R - S R V ag r eem en t on F u r t h e r Development and Extend ing C o - o p e r a t i o n in Economics a n d T e c h n o l o g y was s i g n e d in Moscow a t t h e sam e t ime as t h e F r i e n d s h i p T r e a t y . T h e former t r e a t y was de sc r ib ed as an i n s t ru m en t s t e m m in g from t h e l a t t e r . [125] A n o th e r ag reement on economic and t e ch n i ­cal c o - o p e r a t i o n was s i g n e d on 24 J u l y 1981. A g a in , t h a t T r e a t y was d e s c r i b e d in t h e Vietnamese army journa l Quan Doi N h a n Dan as ’a lo g ica l d e v e l o p m e n t of the Vietnamese- Sovie t r e l a t i o n s . . . in line with t h e . . . T r e a t y of F r i en d sh ip and Co- oper a t ion ’. [126]

T h e n e t w o r k of t r e a t i e s s i g n e d b y t h e S o v ie t Union with the Indo-China s t a t e s also re f le c t s t h e d e l i c a t e b a l a n c e t h a t e x i s t s am ong t h e m . T h u s t h e S o v ie t Union h a s no t c o n c l u d e d F r i e n d s h i p t r e a t i e s w i th Laos a n d K a m p u c h e a , t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y t h e se s t a t es also sh a r e a common s t r a t e ­gic p e r s p e c t i v e with Moscow. Yet Czechoslovakia s igned s u c h a t r e a t y wi th L ao s , whi le Eas t G e r m a n y s i g n e d o n e wi th Kampuchea. Vietnam also s igned similar t r e a t i e s wi th i t s two Indochina n e ig h b o u r s .

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T h e l o n g e r t e r m p r o s p e c t s fo r S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s a r e d i f f i c u l t to a n t i c i p a t e . T h e T r e a t y r e l a t i o n s h i p r e p r e s e n t s a s t r a t eg i c coalition between Moscow a n d Hanoi t h a t is d i r e c t e d a t P e k i n g . For Moscow ' t h e S o v i e t - I n d o c h i n a a l l i a n c e s e r v e s to block China's Sou th eas t Asian ambit ions with minimal r i s k ( t hough p e r h a p s a t a h i g h econ omic c o s t ) ’. [127] For Hanoi t h e a l l i a n c e s e r v e s a s a g u a r a n t e e a g a i n s t C h i n a , t h o u g h no t w i t h o u t c o s t to i t s p o l i cy o p t i o n s in S o u t h e a s t Asia, as well as to i ts s t an d in g in in te rn a t i ona l organ isa t i ons - no t l e a s t in t h e n o n a l i g n e d m o v e m e n t . Nor h a s Moscow's political s t and ing in the region benef i ted from the all iance with Hano i , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h e K a m p u c h e a n i n v a s i o n is c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th S o v ie t s u p p o r t . Again , the S o v ie t - V ie tn am es e p a r t n e r s h i p a g a i n s t C h in a i s n o t w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s fo r b o t h p a r t n e r s . As a l r e a d y n o t e d , t h e S ov ie t Union a p p e a r s to e x c l u d e i t s m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t fo r V i e t n a m e s e c la ims to the Paracels and S p ra t l ey s . Similarly, the s t r a teg ic a t t r a c t i o n s fo r Moscow in i m p r o v i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s with Beijing might well be a s s e s s e d d i f fe ren t ly b y Hanoi. T h u s , the a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s n o t w i th o u t r e s e r v a t i o n s a n d c o s t s to both p a r t i e s . The c o s t s , however , seem accep tabl e , at leas t so long as b o t h c o n t i n u e to s ee t h e C h i n a - U S s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s h i p as e n d a n g e r i n g the i r s e c u r i t y .

SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO INDOCHINA

Arms t r a n s f e r s h a v e lo ng b e e n t h e p r i nci pa l i n s t r u ­ment of Soviet in f luence in t h e T h i r d Wor ld . C r i t i c s of t h e S o v ie t Union o f t e n a d d t h a t a r m s a r e t h e o n ly e f f e c t i v e in s t ru m en t of inf luence available to Moscow. There can be no d o u b t t h a t t h e I n d o c h i n a s t a t e s ' d e p e n d e n c e on the Soviet Union is closely re la ted to receipt of Sov ie t a r m s . H o w e v e r , as d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e in t h i s e s s a y , t h e i n s t r u m e n t s of Soviet inf luence are complex a n d c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to t h e level of arms t r a n s f e r s to Indochina .

The s e c u r i t y of t h e I n d o c h i n a s t a t e s i s now l a r g e l y d e p e n d e n t on Sov ie t military a s s i s t a n c e . This d ep e n d en ce is g reat ly e n h a n ced by the i nadequa te dom es t i c a r m s m a n u f a c ­t u r i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s of the Indochina s t a t e s . Vietnam a p p e a r s to have only a limited ca pac i ty to p r o d u c e smal l a r m s , a n d

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w ith S o v ie t a s s i s t a n c e , i t c a n m a in ta in a n d r e p a i r i t s arm am ents . [128] Laos and Kampuchea seem totally d e p e n d e n t on e x t e r n a l a rm s s u p p l i e s . Moscow m u s t b e a l iv e to t h i s w eakness b u t is d o in g l i t t l e to a l l e v i a t e i t . So w h ile l a r g e n u m b e r s of V ie tn a m e s e a r e t r a i n i n g a t Soviet in s ta l la t io n s , th a t t ra in in g does not ex ten d to arms p ro d u c tio n . [ 129]

T h e Soviet Union s u rp a s s e s China as Hanoi’s main arms s u p p l i e r b y th e b e g i n n i n g of t h e s e c o n d In d o c h in a w a r . B e tw ee n 1954 and 1975, th e Soviet Union is believed to have supp lied abou t 90 p e r cen t of Hanoi’s arm s, with the b a la n c e com ing from C h ina . [130] A nother estim ate ca lcu la ted th a t by 1975 th e Soviet U nion s u p p l i e d a b o u t 75 p e r c e n t o f a rm s im ported to Vietnam, with th e East E uropean s ta te s p rov id ing 10 p e r c e n t a n d C h in a th e r e m a in in g 15 p e r c e n t . [131] V ie tn am ’s s e c u r i ty dep en d en ce on th e Soviet Union in c reased d ram atica lly from th e l a t t e r p a r t o f 1978 fo r a n u m b e r o f c lo s e ly re la te d re a s o n s . F i r s t , Hanoi must have b een well on th e way w ith i t s p r e p a r a t i o n s to i n v a d e K a m p u c h e a a n d w ould h a v e re a l i se d th a t th is would r isk C hinese re ta l ia tio n . S econd , V ietnam h a d no o u t s i d e a rm s s o u r c e s e x c e p t t h e S o v ie t U nion a n d i t s E u ro p e a n a l l i e s . A Ja p a n e se re s e a rc h i n s t i t u t e h a s s t a t e d t h a t b y 1979, t h e S o v ie t U nion was p r o v i d i n g 97 p e r c e n t of Vietnam’s military equ ipm en t, East Germany 2 p e r c e n t , with the rem a inder com ing from P o land a n d C z e c h o s lo v a k i a . [ 132] As n e i t h e r t h e Soviet Union nor Vietnam p u b l i s h e s o f f ic ia l f i g u r e s on a rm s t r a n s f e r s , th e a v a i l a b le f i g u r e s a r e b a s e d on W este rn (and more recen t ly C hinese) es tim ates and often v a ry c o n s id e rab ly .

T h e a sy m m etr ica l n a tu re of th e s e c u r i ty re la t ionsh ip is c learly re f lec ted in th a t while v i r t u a l l y all V ie tn a m e s e a rm s came from th e Soviet Union, th ey r e p re s e n te d a ro u n d 10 p e r cen t of Soviet military e x p o r ts to th e T h i r d W orld . B e tw een 1965-75 th e v a lu e o f S o v ie t a rm s to V ie tnam h a s b e e n estim ated at ab o u t $1.9 billion, o r 8 p e r cen t of S o v ie t a rm s e x p o r t s . T h e flow o f S o v ie t a rm s in c re a sed s ign if ican tly in 1978, possib ly to s u p p o r t t h e e x p a n s io n o f t h e V ie tn a m e s e a rm y b y 50 p e r c e n t . [133] The following y e a r , in re sp o n se to th e Kampuchean invasion and the b o rd e r war w ith C h in a , S o v ie t m i l i t a ry a s s i s t a n c e is e s t im a te d a t $50 million in 1978.[134]

As V ie tn a m ’s a rm s s u p p l i e r , t h e S o v ie t U nion would seem to be in a s t ro n g position to in fluence th e u se to w h ich i t s a rm s a r e p u t . Yet th e ex ten t to which i t s in fluence does

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p r e v a i l , especially when im portan t Vietnamese sec u r i ty is su e s a r e a t s t a k e , r e m a in s u n c e r t a i n . T h e q u e s t i o n o f S o v ie t i n f l u e n c e o v e r H ano i’s d e c is io n to in v a d e Kampuchea is an in te re s t in g case in po in t. D o u g las P ike c laim s t h a t ’Moscow e i t h e r h e lp e d p l a n ’ t h e i n v a s io n ’o r knew of [it] in a d v a n ­c e ’. [135] On th e o t h e r h a n d , G a r e th P o r t e r claim s t h a t ’V ie tnam c o n s u l t e d the Soviet Union of i ts p lans to o u s t Pol Pot - not to ge t Soviet ap p ro v a l b u t to in fo rm Moscow of an i r r e v o c a b l e d e c i s i o n ’. S o v ie t l e a d e r s r e p o r te d ly e x p re s s e d r e s e r v a t i o n s b u t t h e V ie tn a m e s e ’s t r e s s e d th e n ee d fo r a b s o l u t e i n d e p e n d e n c e on t h e m a t t e r o f K am p u ch ea ’. [136] P o r t e r ’s a c c o u n t a p p e a r s m ore c r e d i b l e t h a n P ik e ’s fo r a n u m b e r of r e a s o n s . The flow of Soviet arms for most of 1978 tended to t ra i l C h in e s e m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to K a m p u c h e a . C h in e s e a s s i s t a n c e i n c r e a s e d s ig n i f i c a n t ly in F e b ru a ry and Ju ly , ye t US officials claimed th a t no in c re ase in the level of S o v ie t a rm s w as d e te c te d th ro u g h Ju ly 1978 and th a t Soviet military a d v is e r s could not be id e n t i f ie d on th e K a m p u c h e a n b o r d e r u p to A u g u s t . [137] S ov ie t r e s t r a in t ended in l a t t e r p a r t o f A u g u s t w h en S in o - V ie tn a m e s e t e n s i o n s r o s e as a r e s u l t of th e deepen ing conflict with Kampuchea. By th e end of S ep tem ber , two la rg e Soviet ca rgo vesse ls were u n lo a d in g m ore a rm s t h a n t h e S o v ie t U nion h a d p ro v id ed d u r in g the p as t two y e a r s . [138] Two m onths l a t e r , Vietnam la u n ch e d i t s in v a s io n of Kampuchea. Even th e n , Soviet s u p p o r t fell s h o r t of combat troop deploym ents o r co m b a t a d v i s e r s . [139] With t h e i n v a s i o n , V ie tn am ’s s e c u r i t y d e p e n d en ce on th e Soviet U nion g re w im m e a s u ra b ly w h ile M oscow’s s t a n d i n g in t h e ASEAN capita ls declined even f u r th e r .

Having been d raw n in to the in v a s io n , Moscow a p p e a r s to h a v e s ig n a l l e d a p re fe re n c e for a political se tt lem ent, no d o u b t in o rd e r to limit th e p o l i t i c a l d am ag e to i t s r e g io n a l s t a n d i n g . A g a in , a c c o r d i n g to P o r t e r , ’in F e b ru a ry 1979, S o v ie t d ip lo m a ts in v a r io u s c a p i t a l s w e re t e l l in g o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s t h e y w ish e d t h e Vietnamese had not gone in to Kampuchea and ind ica ted they favoured th e n e g o t i a t io n o f a coalition governm ent with Norodom S ihanouk’. [140]

S o v ie t r e s e r v a t i o n s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , Moscow h a s p ro v e d to b e a s u p p o r t i v e a l ly o f V ie tn a m . It h a s a lso becom e th e p r i n c i p a l a rm s s u p p l i e r to t h e H eng S am rin r e g im e . In J u ly 1979 t h e S o v ie t D e fen ce M in is te r , Dimitri U stinov , held ta lks with the th e n P a r t y S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l , Pen S o v a n , a n d t h e two a r e r e p o r t e d to have ag reed th a t

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t h e S o v ie t Union would ’e q u i p fu l ly t h e Kampuchean armed forces with t a n k s , g u n s , a i r c ra f t and s h i p s ’. [141] A c c o r d i n g to t h e same r e p o r t , K a m p u c h e a n p i l o t s were in the Soviet Union for t r a in ing by mid-1981. T h e r e a r e a l so w i d e s p r e a d r e p o r t s of Soviet buil t r a d a r ins ta l la t ions in Kampuchea. [141]

T h e S ov ie t Union is i n v o l v e d in some 20 c iv i l a id p r o j e c t s in K am p u ch ea . A notable fe a tu re of i ts p rograms is concent ra t ion on t r a n s p o r t facilit ies which, while r e l e v a n t to s e c u r i t y a n d econ omic d e v e lo p m e n t , also have the ef fec t of r e d u c in g Kampuchea’s dependence on V ie tn a m . C o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t see ms to h a v e b e e n f o c u s s e d on K a m p u c h e a ’s main p o r t , Kompong S o n . Work b e g a n in O c t o b e r 1980 on t h e r e p a i r a n d e x t e n s i o n of t h e p o r t ’s f a c i l i t i e s . T h e S ov ie t Union is a lso r e p o r t e d to b e r e b u i l d i n g K a m p u c h e a ’s c iv i l t r a n s p o r t ; t h i s would b re ak Air Vietnam’s p r e s e n t monopoly in ai r t r a n s p o r t in Kampuchea. [143]

T h e b u l k of Sov ie t mi l i t a ry a s s i s t an ce in Indochina is d i re c ted to Vietnam. Arms t r a n s f e r s began to r i se r a p i d l y in t h e l a s t m o n t h s of 1978 a n d c o n t i n u e d to r i s e d u r i n g and a f t e r t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e w a r . A c c o r d i n g to C IN C P A C , ’m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , s i n c e 1979 has inc luded over $2 billion s u p p o r t e d by 2,500 mili tary a d v i s e r s ’. T h e same a s s e s s m e n t c la ims tha t abou t 40 p e r cent of Soviet aid ’has been mi li tary r e la t e d ’. [144] In addi t ion to field weapons , t h e S o v ie t Union h a s b u i l t u p V i e t n a m ’s d e f e n s i v e i n s t a l l a t i o n s to b e t t e r p ro tec t i ts key facil it ies.

While m uch S o v ie t a id m u s t b e a b s o r b e d b y t h e Kampuchean war, the principal long term aim seems to re ma in t h e b u i l d i n g of V i e t n a m ’s capabi l i t ies towar ds China . T h u s , d u r i n g t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r w a r , t h e S o v ie t n a v y d e p l o y e d a s i z e a b l e c o n t i n g e n t o f f t h e South China co as t . Soviet sh ips and a i r c ra f t p r o b a b l y m o n i t o r e d C h i n e s e r a d i o t r a f f i c a n d t r a n s m i t t e d field in te l l igence to Vietnam. [145] A r a n g e o f i n s t a l l a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d to i m p r o v e V i e t n a m ’s s e c u r i t y . T h e s e i n c l u d e b e t t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s facilit ies and r a d a r in s t a l l a t io n s a lo n g t h e C h i n e s e b o r d e r . A c c o r d i n g to D o u g la s P ik e , ’t h e U . S . S . R . h a s ins t a l l ed a chain of six r a d a r c e n t r e s (50 s i t e s ) from Nha T r a n g n o r t h t h a t c a n t r a c k in co m in g a i r c r a f t at a d i s t an ce of abou t 100 m i le s ’. [146] T h e S o v ie t Union h a s a s s i s t e d wi th a i r p o r t c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e im p r o v e m e n t of h a r b o u r facilit ies and the cons t ruc t ion of mili tary ro a d s . I n s ta l l a t io n s h a v e b e e n b u i l t

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to p r o t e c t V i e t n a m ’s major p o r t s . T h e r e have been f r e q u e n t r e p o r t s of Soviet missile (SAM) f a c i l i t i e s a r o u n d t h e major t r a n s p o r t c e n t r e s at Hanoi, Haiphong and Hong Gai. [147]

All t h r e e a r m e d s e r v i c e s h a v e r e c e i v e d s u b s t a n t i a l S o v ie t e q u i p m e n t . In addi t ion to l ight arms, th e Vietnamese army, th e PAVN, with a s t r e n g t h of ju s t u n d e r o n e mi l l ion , h a s b e e n p r o v i d e d wi th a r m o u r e d v e h i c l e s , l o n g r a n g e a r t i l l e ry , a t ank force of T54s a n d T 7 6 s , t r u c k s a n d l i g h t v e h i c l e s , a n t i - a i r c r a f t l au n ch e r s and SAM-2 and SAM-3 mis­s i les . [148]

T h e a i r f o r c e h a s b e e n g r a d u a l l y b u i l t u p . P r i o r to 1969, the Soviet Union had p ro v ided a b o u t 100 MIG-15s a n d M IG -17s . S u b s e q u e n t l y , abou t 25 MIG-21s were d ep lo y ed . In all, o v e r 200 MIG f i g h t e r s ( -15, -17, -21 and -23) have b e e n d e l i v e r e d [ 1 4 9 ] , as well as t r a n s p o r t s , inc lud ing 30 hel i cop ter t r a n s p o r t s . [150] A c c o r d in g to D o u g l a s P ike S o v ie t t r a i n e d Vietnamese pilots

now f ly TU-16 B a d g e r b o m b e r s on a n t i - s h i p re co nnai s san ce and e lec t ronic w a r f a r e m i s s io n s as well a s SU-22 F i t t e r swing-wing bombers u sed for g round s u p p o r t . T h e V i e t n a m e s e A i r F o r c e h a s r e c e i v e d a t l e a s t 60 b o m b e r s from th e U . S . S . R .It has a l so g o t t e n t h e MI-24 H i n d s a t t a c k h e l i ­c o p t e r f o r u s e in K a m p u c h e a in c o u n t e r ­i n s u r g e n c y o p e r a t i o n s ; t h e MI-8 h e l i c o p t e r , t h e w o r l d ’s most h e a v i l y a r m e d ; a n d the MI-24 Haze a n d t h e KA-25 H or m one h e l i c o p t e r , u s e d in an t i - su b m ar in e p a t ro l s . [151]

The navy is the s m a l l e s t of V i e t n a m ’s s e r v i c e s . S o v ie t a id b e f o r e t h e m id -1970s was limited b u t inc luded 10 pat ro l and r e s cu e hel icopter s in 1975. Soviet naval a s s i s t a n c e i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f t e r t h e s i g n i n g of t h e F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n T r e a t y . B e t w e e n 1978 a n d 1980, n i n e s h i p s w e r e p r o v i d e d , i n c l u d i n g f o u r S h a ro n c lass t o rp ed o b o a t s , two P e t y a c l a s s f r i g a t e s [ 152], and up to ten Osa II missile a t t a c k b o a t s , t h e most a d v a n c e d o f i t s t y p e in t h e Soviet n a v y . A ga in a c c o r d i n g to P ik e , some Sov ie t s u p p l i e d warsh ips

a r e e q u i p p e d wi th SSN-3 a n t i - s h i p m i s s i l e s (21 -mi le r a n g e ) , SSN -2 S t y x m i s s i l e s (3 0 - m i le r a n g e ) a n d SS-21 F r o g and SS-23 Scud missiles,

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t h e l a s t two be ing tact ical nuc lea r weapons . T h u s t h e U . S . S . R . h a s g i v e n t h e V ie tn a m e s e N av y n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y a n d , whi le i t i s no t be l i eved tha t Vietnam is supp l i ed wi th n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s , t h a t o p t i o n o b v i o u s l y i s a l w a y s o p e n to t h e Sovie ts . [153]

Due to t h e d e p r e s s e d s t a t e o f t h e L ao t i an economy, the Soviet Union h a s bec ome i n v o l v e d in a wide r a n g e of economic a s s i s t a n c e p ro g r am s . Laos has no domestic defence i n d u s t r y and s ince 1975 the Soviet Union has become i ts so le a r m s s u p p l i e r . [ 154] It i s e q u i p p i n g t h e smal l ( 4 6 , 0 0 0 ) L ao t i an a r m y a n d h a s t r a i n e d a n d e q u i p p e d t h e a i r f o r c e ( 2 , 0 0 0 ) wi th 10 MIG-21 f i g h t e r s and with a number of o t h e r a s so r t e d c r a f t . [155] It ap p e a r s th a t Hanoi is s e n s i t i v e a b o u t e x t e r n a l m i l i t a r y a id to Laos a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y most small S ov ie t i tem s - s u c h a s , smal l a r m s an d c l o t h i n g - a r e t r a n s f e r r e d t h r o u g h V i e t n a m . T h e Soviet Union, how ever , d i rec t ly prov ides major equipment and i n s t r u c t o r s . A s e r i e s of r a d a r s t a t i o n s in t h e n o r t h a n d west of Laos hav e been b u i l t b y t h e Sov ie t Union to p r o v i d e e a r l y w a r n i n g of C h i n e s e a n d T h a i m o v e m e n t s . [ 156 ] More r e c e n t l y , a co m m u n ica t io n s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y h a s b e e n co m p l e t e d n e a r V i e n t i a n e w h ich ’p r o v i d e s reliable communications to Moscow and most ce r ta in ly connects with similar f a c i l i t i e s l o c a t e d in V i e t n a m ’. [ 157] T h e S ov ie t Union has also as s i s t ed wi th the c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e Wat ty Ai r B ase as well as h a v i n g c o n s t r u c t e d a new bas e at Phongsavane on the Plain of J a r s and is r e b u i l d i n g a m i l i t a r y b a s e a t Seno n e a r S a v a n n a k - h e t . [ 158]

T h e f o r e i g n ( V i e t n a m e s e a n d S o v i e t ) t r o o p s in Laos a re almost equal in numbers to t h e Laotian forces . Un der t h e 1977 T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n wi th L ao s , Vietnam has maintained a f luc tuat ing number of t roops t h e r e , r e c e n t l y e s t i m a t e d to be a r o u n d 50,000. [159] These t ro ops a re re p o r t ed ly d e p e n d e n t on S o v ie t t r a n s p o r t a n d l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t . [ 160] Vie tnam is a l mos t s o l e l y re spons ib le for the t ra in ing of th e Lao Army and h a s a s s i g n e d po l i t i ca l c a d r e s e x t e n s i v e l y t h r o u g h o u t the r a n k s of the LPLAF.[161] Under a long term ag reem en t , the Soviet Union re p o r ted ly main ta in s an i n d e p e n d e n t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e w hich is c e n t r e d on n o r t h e r n Laos nea r the b o r d e r with China and Burma. [162]

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V ie tn a m ’s need for la rg e am ounts of in c reas in g ly costly and s o p h is t ic a te d e q u ip m e n t to m eet i t s s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e ­m en ts in K a m p u c h ea a n d a g a i n s t C h in a , t o g e t h e r with its limited domestic in d u s t r ia l capab il i t ies , inev itab ly re n d e re d i t m ore d e p e n d e n t on th e Soviet Union. A f u r th e r considera tion is the unbalanced n a tu re of th e Vietnamese fo rce s t r u c t u r e . While t h e a rm y c a n , e s p e c ia l ly w ith e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t , conduct major o p e r a t i o n s , t h e n a v a l a n d a i r f o r c e s re m a in l im i te d , e x t e r n a l l y d e p e n d e n t , and not capable of p ro jec ting force fa r beyond Vietnam’s b o r d e r s . T h u s , n o t w i t h s t a n d in g th e s u b s t a n t i a l im p ro v e m e n ts to t h e V ie tn a m e se fo rc e s in re cen t y e a r s , Hanoi’s military capab il i t ies , even more t h a n in the p a s t , remain d ep e n d e n t on Soviet s u p p o r t .

Yet Soviet political in fluence is more limited than m ig h t a p p e a r a t f i r s t g l a n c e . In Laos a n d K a m p u c h e a , i t is co n s tra in ed by the fab r ic of V ie tn am ’s s p e c ia l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w hich in c lu d e th e deploym ent of sizeable military co n t in g en ts in the two Indochina s t a t e s . In Vietnam, the limits o f S o v ie t i n f lu e n c e a r e r e f l e c t e d in t h e a p p a r e n t in ab i l i ty to d irec t Hanoi’s s ec u r i ty policies. An added r e s t r a in t lies in t h e n e e d fo r Moscow to a c t so as n o t to e n d a n g e r th e s t r a t e g i c concessions g ra n te d to i t b y H a n o i. In a l l , w hile s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s b e tw e e n t h e USSR a n d V ie tnam rem ain asymmet­rica l, they a re now a r g u a b l y m ore i n t e r d e p e n d e n t t h a n in th e p a s t .

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

With th e e x c e p t i o n o f In d o c h in a S o v ie t econom ic in te re s t s in the reg ion have been limited. O verall , S o u th e a s t Asia r a t e d th e lo w e s t in S o v ie t econom ic a s s is ta n c e to the var ious non-com m unis t r e g io n s of t h e T h i r d World fo r th e p e r io d 1 9 5 4 -7 9 .[ 163] P r io r to t h e m id -1 9 7 0 s , t h e o n ly regional s ta te to rece iv e a s i g n i f i c a n t le v e l o f econom ic a id was In d o n e s ia , a m o u n t in g d u r i n g th e S u k a rn o y ea rs to an estimated $US 1.6 b illion . [164] In t h e w ake of t h e a b o r t i v e 1965 c o u p , Moscow lo s t w h a te v e r po li tica l in fluence it still enjoyed in Djakarta and su ffe red i ts ’f i r s t big se tback in t h e T h i r d W orld’. [165] T h e in a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h an economic p r e s e n c e in S o u th e a s t Asia is p a r t l y d u e to t h e a n t i ­com m unis t o r ie n ta t io n of most s ta te s in th e reg io n . F u r t h e r -

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m o r e , t h e m a r k e t e conom ies of t h e a r e a , t o g e t h e r with the w e s te rn or ienta t ion of th e i r economic p r o g r a m m e s , h a v e led t h e ASEAN s t a t e s to r e g a r d Soviet economic t ies as i n a p p r o ­p r i a t e an d e v e n u n d e s i r a b l e . At t h e same t im e , W e s t e r n economic i n t e r e s t in S o u t h e a s t Asia has grown to th e point where the region is now r e g a r d e d as a v e r y a t t r a c t i v e p l a c e for inves tm en t . [166]

Sovie t t r a d e a n d i n v e s t m e n t h a v e b e e n limited for a nu mber of r e a s o n s . Soviet m an ufa ct u red goods a r e g e n e r a l l y below world s t a n d a r d s a n d so t h e y ar e u n a t t r a c t i v e to the non-communist market s of Sou theas t Asia. S ov ie t p r e f e r e n c e f o r b a r t e r t r a d e and i ts re fu sal to g r a n t p re fe re n t i a l access to Thi rd World e x p o r t s h a v e a l so p r o v e n to b e i m p o r t a n t o b s t a c l e s to t r a d e . T h a i l a n d ( s e e T a b l e 1) i s a p a r t i a l except ion to an o therw ise un im pre ss ive Soviet t r a d i n g r e c o r d wi th t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . While Soviet t r a d e wi th Thai land g o es b a c k to 1948, it fa i l ed to a c h i e v e s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s d u r i n g t h e fo l lowing two d e c a d e s . T r a d e , h o w e v e r , d id e x p a n d a f t e r t h e two s t a t e s s i g n e d an a g r e e m e n t on co m m erce in December 1970. [167] Between 1976 and 1980 the vo lume of t r a d e i n c r e a s e d more t h a n f i v e f o ld o v e r t h e p r e v i o u s f i v e y e a r p e r i o d . T r a d e is r u n n i n g h e a v i l y in Thai land’s favo ur due to the r ap id growth of i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s . More r e c e n t l y , Moscow is s h o w i n g s i g n s of some headway in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . D u r i n g t h e 1982 v i s i t of Mrs Marcos to Moscow, a s c i e n t i f i c a n d t e c h n i c a l c o - o p e r a t i o n ag reement was s igned and ’a p r e l i m i n a r y a g r e e m e n t fo r t h e USSR to b u i l d a c e m e n t p l a n t in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . T h i s p r o j e c t i s f a r from r e a l i s a t i o n , b u t i f c o m p l e t e d i t w ould r e p r e s e n t t h e f i r s t S o v i e t - b u i l t i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t in t h e r e g io n ’. [168] The value of S o v ie t t r a d e wi th o t h e r ASEAN s t a t e s r e m a i n s m o d e s t a n d d id no t e x c e e d $US 1 billion in 1980. T h e most s u c c e s s f u l v e n t u r e in t h e r e g i o n is in s h i p p i n g . T h e S o v ie t Union h a s e s t a b l i s h e d joint sh ipp ing v e n t u r e s with Thai land, Singapore an d , more r e c e n t l y , w i th t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . T h e r e m a i n i n g e n t e r p r i s e to n o t e i s t h e Narodny Bank in Singapore .

A f t e r i t s s e t b a c k wi th I n d o n e s i a in 1965, Moscow t u r n e d i t s r e g i o n a l a t t e n t i o n i n c r e a s i n g l y t o w a r d s N o r t h V i e tn a m . In d o i n g so , i t s e f f o r t s w e r e no t f r u s t r a t e d b y fac to rs tha t worked again s t it in the non-communis t s t a t e s of

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S o u t h e a s t A s i a . With a cen t r a l ly p lanned economic a p p a r a t u s and few l inks to t h e West , N o r t h Vietnam p r o v e d to b e a more re cep t ive economic p a r t n e r .

The ana lys is of Sovie t -Vietnamese economic r e l a t i o n s i s h a m p e r e d b y t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of official s t a t i s t i c s . F u r t h e r ­m o r e , t h e e v a l u a t i o n of ec onom ic t r a n s f e r s i s made more co m p lex b y h i d d e n fo r m s w h ich include b a r t e r ag r eem en ts , t r a d in g on an a c c o u n t c l e a r a n c e b a s i s a n d t e r m s of t r a d e t h a t a r e a r t i f i c i a l l y s e t to r e d u ce t r a d e def ic i t s . [169] Such f i g u r e s as a r e a v a i l a b l e o f t e n do n o t s p e c i f y w h e t h e r r e f e r e n c e is s im p ly to S o v i e t , o r more b r o a d l y to b loc t r a n s a c t i o n s . T h u s a n a l y s i s o f t e n fa l l s b a c k on W e s te r n es t imates which a re d e r iv ed from var ied d a t a .

Soviet as s i s t ance to North Vietnam c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 s . It was a p p a r e n t l y moti­vated by the inc re ased role assumed by the US in I n d o c h i n a a f t e r t h e G e n e v a a c c o r d s . T h e Fi rs t S e c r e t a r y of t h e P a r t y , Le D u a n , s p o k e of t h e g e n e s i s of S o v ie t a i d in t h e fo l lowing t e r m s : ’especial ly d u r i n g t h e w a r of r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t A m er ic an a g g r e s s i o n , you, comrades . . . r e g a r d e d s u p p o r t and aid to o u r c o u n t r y as a command of your h e a r t , as a mat te r of consc ience ’. [170]

According to D i e t e r H e in z ig , from 1955 o n w a r d s t h e S ov ie t Union T>egan to en gage in cont inual ly expand in g t r a d e with Hanoi and to r e n d e r economic aid on an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g s c a l e ’. [171] H e in z ig q u o t e s W e s t e r n es t imates of Soviet aid between 1955-64 as being abo ut $US 500 million[172] - a b o u t t h e same l e v e l as a id from C h i n a . In t h e next decade the S o v ie t Union a p p e a r s to h a v e p r o v i d e d s l i g h t l y more a id (43%) t h a n C h i n a (36%). [173] T h e e s t i m a t e of S ov ie t a id b e t w e e n 1965-75 is $US 1,600 m i l l i o n . [ 174] A f t e r h a v i n g w r i t t e n o f f V i e t n a m ’s d e b t s in 1973, Moscow t h e r e a f t e r became Vietnam’s major donor and s u r p a s s e d C h i n e s e a id b y a considerable margin .

In A u g u s t 1975, Vietnam and the Soviet Union s igned a protocol on the co-ordinat ion of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e econ omic p l a n s fo r t h e p e r i o d 1976- 80. T h e t e x t of t h e S o v i e t - Vietnamese declara t ion gives some indicat ion of the r a n g e a n d c o m p l e x i t y of t h e econ omic l i n k a g e s t h a t w e r e es t ab l i shed between the two s t a t e s . The protocol s t a t e s t h a t ’t h e S o v ie t Union a n d t h e DRV will f a c i l i t a t e t h e f u r t h e r development

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a n d im p ro v e m e n t o f eco n o m ic , s c i e n t i f i c a n d t e c h n i c a l c o - o p e r a t i o n , b o th on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s an d w i th in t h e framework of the socialist c o u n tr ie s ’ multilateral co -o p e ra tio n , including the co -ord ina tion of n a t io n a l econom ic p l a n s , t h e a s s ig n m e n t of h igh ly qualified spec ia l is ts and the t ra in in g of n a t io n a l c a d r e s fo r v a r io u s f i e ld s of V ie tn am 's e c o n o m y , s c i e n c e , t e c h n o lo g y a n d c u l t u r e ’. [ 175] The ag reem en t also announced a Soviet d e c is io n to g r a n t ’s id e c r e d i t ’ on p r e ­f e r e n t i a l t e rm s to b e u s e d fo r t e c h n i c a l a s s is ta n c e and to su p p ly ’in th e forthcoming f iv e y e a r p e r io d v a r io u s i n d u s ­t r i a l , c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l equ ipm ent, m ach ine ry , means of t r a n s p o r ta t io n , metal, petro leum p r o d u c t s , c o t t o n , fo o d s tu f f s and o th e r commodities'. [176] The agreem ent s ta te d t h a t t h e t r a d e t u r n o v e r b e tw e e n th e USSR an d th e DRV w ould i n c r e a s e in th e nex t five y e a r period by more th a n 50 p e r c e n t . [177]

T h e d ec la ra t io n b r ie f ly r e f e r r e d to Soviet a s s is ta n c e to Laos and Cambodia and placed Soviet e f fo r ts s q u a r e ly w i th in th e con tex t of Moscow's re la tions with Hanoi:

T h e U . S . S . R . a n d th e DRV will c o n t in u e to g iv e t h e L ao t ian p eo p le the n e c e s s a ry su p p o r t and a s s is tan ce in th e i r s u p p o r t a n d a s s i s t a n c e in t h e i r e f f o r t s to c a r ry out th e i r fundam ental national a s p i ra t io n s .

T h e S o v ie t a n d V ie tn a m e se l o n g s t a n d i n g h o s t i l i t y to t h e Khmer R ouge l e a d e r s h i p n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s t a t e d t h a t ' the U .S .S .R . and th e DRV a re fully re so lved to c o n t i n u e to s t r e n g t h e n a n d d e v e lo p re la tions of f r ie n d sh ip and com prehensive co-opera tion with Cambodia’. [178]

D u r in g th e m id d le 1970s close economic links w ere b y no means a foregone conclusion , at least so fa r as Hanoi was c o n c e r n e d . A c c o rd in g to G a r e th P o r t e r , Hanoi p la c e d considerab le hopes on opening th e Vietnamese economy to t h e West. C on seq u en tly ,

T h e 1973 n e g o t i a t i o n s in t h e U n ited S ta t e s - N o r th V ietnam J o in t Economic C om m ission w e re c o n d u c te d w ith u tm o s t s e r io u s n e s s b y Hanoi and w e re c lo se to f in a l a g r e e m e n t w hen H e n ry K i s s i n g e r s t o p p e d them in J u l y , 1973. Had th e ag reem en ts been s ig n ed , Vietnam would have b e e n o b l ig a t e d to p u r c h a s e 85 p e r c e n t o f g o o d s

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f in an c ed b y the aid program in th e United S ta tes , which would have become Vietnam’s c h i e f s u p p l i e r of technology and sp a re p a r t s . [179]

It a p p e a rs t h a t V ie tn a m e se c a lc u l a t io n s c lo s e ly l in k e d th e n o r m a l i s a t io n o f r e l a t i o n s w ith t h e US to s u b s e q u e n t A m er ican econom ic a s s i s t a n c e . T h u s th e May 1977 U n i te d S ta te s /V ie tn a m m eetings in Paris on diplomatic re la tions seem to h a v e e n c o m p a s s e d th e p r o v i s io n o f U n i te d S ta t e s a i d . T h e s e h o p e s w e re d a s h e d b y the US C o n g ress which vetoed th e C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s p r o p o s a l s fo r h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s is ta n c e . [180]

H anoi w as m ore s u c c e s s f u l in e s t a b l i s h i n g m o d es t econom ic l i n k s w ith o t h e r W e s te rn s t a t e s . By 1975 i t i n ­c r e a s e d i t s e f f o r t s to ta p a s s i s t a n c e from a n u m b e r of Western c o u n t r ie s . It has been re p o r te d th a t ’Hanoi o f f ic ia l s to ld th e F r e n c h E m b a ssy t h a t V ie tnam w a n te d to b a la n c e co n tr ib u t io n s from socialist c o u n t r ie s w ith a id from W e s te rn E u r o p e , t h e U n i te d S t a t e s , C a n a d a , A u s t r a l i a a n d J a p a n ’. [181] D esp i te S o v ie t p r o t e s t a t i o n s , Pham Van D ong w en t to F r a n c e in April 1977 and r e tu r n e d with new aid and inves tm en t p led g es . [182] In an a t tem p t to g e n e r a t e g r e a t e r W e s te rn f o r e ig n i n v e s t m e n t , H anoi in 1977 a n n o u n c e d ’a re la tive ly l ibera l foreign i n v e s t m e n t c o d e ’ fo r th e d e v e l o p ­m ent o f V ie tn a m ’s e x t r a c t i v e r e s o u r c e s . [1 8 3 ] By 1979 a num ber of joint v e n tu re s w e re in p r o s p e c t a n d W e s te rn oil co m p an ie s were involved in nego tia t ions . T hese e f fo r ts w ere , how ever, b lo c k e d b y US e m b a r g o s on th e t r a n s f e r o f t h e n e c e s s a r y e x t r a c t i v e techno logy . The US move was a s e v e re economic blow to V ie tnam . It b lo c k e d th e e x p lo i t a t io n o f a com m odity w hich co u ld h a v e co v e red the costs of Vietnam’s import r e q u irem en ts from the W est. F u r t h e r m o r e , it f o r c e d V ietnam to h a n d o v e r to th e Soviet Union the exploitation of i t s m ost a t t r a c t i v e e x p o r t com m odity an d t h u s r e n d e r e d Hanoi t h a t m uch m ore ec o n o m ic a l ly d e p e n d e n t on Moscow. [184] Finally, Vietnam also a ttem pted to d i v e r s i f y i t s econom ic l i n k s d u r i n g th e mid-1970s by joining a num ber of in te rn a tio n a l ag en c ie s . In 1976 it joined t h e I .M .F . an d th e World B a n k , t h e A s ian D evelopm ent Bank and la te r sev e ra l o th e r in te rn a t io n a l o rg an isa tio n s i n c l u d i n g ESC P, FAO, a n d WHO. T h e s e s t e p s , h o w e v e r , failed to g en e ra te s u b s tan t ia l new so u rces of a id . F u r th e rm o re , the invasion of K a m p u c h ea r e d u c e d t h e l im ited flow of b i l a t e r a l a id from W e s te rn

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C o u n t r i e s . In 1982 th e IMF re jec ted a Vietnamese r e q u e s t for an a d d i t i o n a l $US 150 million to e a s e i t s b a la n c e of p a y ­m en ts . [185]

T h e u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t s to d i v e r s i f y econom ic re la tions with the West were p a r t ly aimed a t e a s in g r e l i a n c e on th e S o v ie t U nion - a r e l i a n c e t h a t becam e th e m ore p r e s s i n g a s V ie tn a m ’s r e l a t i o n s w ith C h in a d e t e r i o r a t e d . C h in e s e a id was d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e d in th e mid-1970s as a r e s u l t of the growing d iv e rg e n ce be tw een Hanoi a n d P e k i n g . C a r ly le T h a y e r has succ inc t ly summarised the rap id rundow n of Chinese aid in th e following te rm s:

Since 1975 C h ina’s d i s p l e a s u r e w ith Vietnam h a s m a n i f e s te d i t s e l f in a v a r ie ty of w ays. Long-term n o n - r e f u n d a b l e g r a n t a id was no lo n g e r m ade a v a i l a b le . All m i l i t a r y a n d t e c h n i c a l cooperation with th e VPA was en d e d . No em ergency fo o d s tu f f s w e re p r o v i d e d w h en V ie tnam e x p e r i e n c e d p o o r h a rv e s t s in 1977. In ea rly 1978 Chinese p r e s s u r e s i n t e n s i f i e d : in April half of th e aid p ro jec ts were s u s p e n d e d , in J u n e th e r e m a i n d e r w e re c lo sed dow n a n d all t e c h n i c a l s p e c ia l is t s w ithdraw n and f in a l ly , t h e oil p ip e l in e to V ie tnam was s h u t . C h in a ’s p o l ic ie s m ean t t h a t V ie tnam n o t o n ly su ffe red economic dislocation b u t a lso t h e lo s s of one th i rd of all fo re ign a s s i s ta n c e . [186]

As Hanoi’s major s p o n s o r , Moscow e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n w ith V ie tn am ’s e f f o r t s to d iv e rs i fy i ts economic re la tions with the West. [187] While th e Soviet Union had u rg e d V ietnam to jo in CMEA d u r i n g th e s e c o n d I n d o c h in a w a r , Hanoi had limited i t s fo rm al l i n k s to o b s e r v e r s t a t u s s in c e 1961. Moscow c o n t i n u e d to p re s s Hanoi a f te r the war b u t i ts p r e s s u r e was re s is te d while Vietnam exp lored i ts W estern o p t i o n s . In May 1977, it d i d , h o w e v e r , join CMEA’s In terna tional Inves tm ent Bank for Economic C o-operation [ 188] - a t a time when i t a lso jo in e d a n u m b e r o f o t h e r m u l t i l a t e r a l a g e n c i e s . V ietnam ’s ex trem e domestic economic c i rc u m sta n ces , its lack of s u c c e s s in t h e West a n d i t s d e c l in in g r e l a t i o n s w ith C h in a t h u s p reced ed its e n t ry in to CMEA in Ju n e 197 8. C h in a im m e d ia ­t e ly r e s p o n d e d b y c a n c e l l in g i t s r e m a in in g p r o j e c t s a n d recalling i ts e x p e r t s .

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In j o in in g CMEA V ietnam n o t o n ly e x t e n d e d i t s economic d ep e n d en ce on th e Soviet Union an d h e r a l l ie s b u t i t a l s o co m m itted i t s e l f to a long-term program of economic in teg ra t io n with th e Soviet bloc. By the time V ietnam jo in e d CMEA, i t s m e m b e r s ’ econom ic p l a n n in g was c lo s e ly c o ­o rd in a ted with t h e g r o u p ’s p ro g ra m fo r i n t e g r a t i o n as s e t o u t in t h e C o m p r e h e n s iv e Program m e for Socialist Economic In te g r a t io n a n d in t h e C o - o r d i n a t e d P lan fo r M u l t i l a t e ra l I n t e g r a t i o n M e a s u r e s . T h u s , fo r e x a m p le , t h e Soviet five y e a r plan for 1976-80 was des ig n ed to r e a l i s e CMEA com m it­m e n ts for in te g ra t io n d u r in g the same p e r io d . Reflecting th is em phasis on in te g ra t io n , one Soviet publication d iscu ssed th e 1976-80 commitment to:

a d e e p e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l d iv i s io n o f l a b o u r in the leading economic s e c to r s , sc ience and t e c h n o lo g y ; t h e l a u n c h i n g o f m ajor p ro jec ts for the manufac­tu re of some essen tia l p ro d u c ts ; h ig h e r g ro w th in m u tu a l t r a d e ; and a b ig g e r p ro p o r tio n of goods to be supp lied u n d e r th e a g r e e m e n t s on p r o d u c t i o n specia lisa tion and co -o p e ra t io n . [189]

T h e n e x t fo rm a l s t e p in V ie tn a m ’s econom ic i n t e g r a t i o n fo llow ed f o u r m o n th s l a t e r w h en H anoi s igned a T re a ty of F r ien d sh ip and C o-opera tion with Moscow. T h e T r e a t y m ade a d d e d p r o v i s i o n s fo r t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f c lo se econom ic r e l a t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , a lo n g w ith t h e T r e a t y , a n o t h e r a g r e e m e n t , t h e U S S R -S R V A g re e m e n t on F u r th e r Develop­ment and E x tend ing C o-operation in E co n o m ics , S c ien ce a n d T e c h n o lo g y , was also co nc luded . This agreem ent focussed on a s s is tan ce to Vietnam’s e n e rg y program mes and r e f e r r e d to a h y d r o - e l e c t r i c p o w e r s t a t i o n on th e Da R iver, the He Tam coal mine, th e 500 m egaw atts Phai Lai thermal power s t a t i o n , and a ss is tan ce in oil and gas ex p lo ra t io n . [190]

In the su b s e q u e n t y e a r s Soviet economic a ss is tan ce h as come to p la y an e v e r i n c r e a s i n g p a r t in Vietnam’s economic developm ent. As a re s u l t of the 1980 a g re e m e n t on econom ic a n d t e c h n ic a l c o - o p e r a t i o n fo r 1981-85, it is expected th a t Soviet aid will con tinue to in c re a se a n n u a l ly t h r o u g h o u t t h e p e r i o d . A US r e p o r t es tim ates th a t in 1981 th e Soviet Union p rov ided 90 p e r cen t of Vietnam’s food im ports , all of i ts o i l , a b o u t 70 p e r c e n t of i ts f e r t i l i s e r , almost 90 p e r cent of i ts c o t to n an d 80 p e r c e n t o f i t s m e ta l s . In th e same y e a r , a g r e e m e n t was r e a c h e d on a num ber of major p ro jec ts . The

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tw o c o u n t r i e s h a v e a lso r e p o r t e d l y es tab lished jo in t exp lo ­ra tion agreem ents to develop Vietnam’s o f f - sh o re oil a n d g a s r e s o u r c e s . [ 191 ] T h e sam e r e p o r t e s t im a te s th a t , Tsy 1985, the exchange of goods betw een th e Soviet Union and Vietnam will almost double th e amount of five y ea rs e a r l ie r ’. [ 192]

In c o n t r a s t to V ie tnam a n d K a m p u c h e a , L a o s , a f t e r 1975, m an ag e d to a t t r a c t m ore d i v e r s e aid s o u rc e s . A ss is ­tan ce from China and North Korea was, how ever, s u s p e n d e d in 1978. Beijing heav ily d ep e n d en t on ex te rn a l aid has meant th a t Laos is in a weak position to d irec t the p r io r i t i e s o f i t s d o n o r s . T h u s fo r e x a m p le , C h in a c o n c e n t r a t e d on a major road build ing programme in th e n o r th which was not w i th o u t s t r a t e g i c v a lu e to B e i j in g . S im i la r ly , t h e co n cen tra t io n of Soviet aid on h ig h ly v i s ib le p r o j e c t s a r o u n d V ie n t i a n e h a s b e e n l in k e d to M oscow’s e f f o r t s to im p re s s t h e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s . [ 193] S o v ie t econom ic c o n t r a c t s w ith Laos i n c r e a s e d in 1976 soon a f t e r t h e Lao P eo p le ’s D e m o c ra t ic Republic was ins ta l led in V ientiane ; th ese con tac ts in te n s i f ie d in 1978. A b i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t on economic a s s is ta n c e was s igned in J a n u a ry 1976. E a r ly S o v ie t p ro g ra m m e s c o n c e n ­t r a t e d on im m ed ia te re q u ir e m e n ts su ch as food, hea lth ca re and t r a n s p o r ta t io n . A t ra d e t r e a ty was s ig n ed in A p r i l 197 6 a n d t h i s o p e n e d th e w ay fo r an i n c r e a s e d flow o f S ov ie t goods on concessional t e rm s w hile a t t h e same tim e m ak in g p r o v i s io n s for Laos’ d eb t re p ay m en ts . Soviet e x p o r ts seem to c o n c e n t r a t e on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o g r a m m e s , w h ile it is e x p e c t e d t h a t Laos will r e p a y i t s d e b t s b y s e n d i n g th e Soviet Union ag r ic u l tu ra l p ro d u c ts a n d t im b e r . In F e b r u a r y 1979 t h e two s t a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d an I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l C om m ission on Econom ic, S c ie n t i f i c an d T e c h n ic a l C o­o p e r a t i o n . [ 194] T h e commission meets periodically to review economic re la t ions and it also a p p e a rs to b e a m ajor i n s t r u ­m en t for developing economic in te g ra t io n . Economic l inks with Laos seem to follow the p a t te rn of those e s ta b l i s h e d b e tw e e n Moscow a n d H an o i. T h u s , S o v ie t g o o d s a r e o f f e r e d on c o n c e s s io n a l t e rm s in th e c o n t e x t o f a n e tw o r k o f w id e - r a n g i n g a g r e e m e n t s w h ich in c l u d e p rov is ions for long term d e b t repaym ent mainly t h r o u g h e x p o r t s b a c k to t h e S o v ie t U n io n . T h e lo n g te rm aim is economic in teg ra t io n b y e s t a b ­lish ing a g re a te r m easure of in te rd e p e n d e n c e .

S o v ie t econom ic p ro g ra m m e s in K am p u ch ea c a n b e c h a ra c te r is e d as re lie f programmes r a th e r than t r a d e even on c o n c e s s io n a l te rm s . ’F ra te rn a l a s s i s ta n c e ’ began in ea r ly 1979

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- in t h e w ak e of t h e V i e t n a m e s e i n v a s i o n . I n i t i a l r e l i e f e n c o m p a s s e s a wide v a r i e t y of g o o d s w hi ch r a n g e d from r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i t em s s u c h a s c e m e n t , m otor v e h i c l e s , oil p r o d u c t s to Thread p r o d u c t s ’ ( g r a i n ) , p a p e r , m e d ic in e a n d e v e n d i s h w a r e . In D e c e m b e r 1979, a K a m p u c h e a n t r a d e delegation vis i ted Moscow to d i scu ss Soviet re lief p ro g r am m e s a n d s i g n e d a r a n g e of a g r e e m e n t s a imed a t ’e x t e n d i n g a l l - round r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e S o v ie t Union a n d K a m p u ­c h e a ' . [195] The ag reem en ts cove red re l ief goods that were to be del ivered in 1980 as well as a g r e e m e n t s o n : c u l t u r a l a n d s c i e n t i f i c c o - o p e r a t i o n ; economic and technical co-opera t ion ; a t r a d e ag reem en t which p ro v id ed r e c i p r o c a l m o s t - f a v o u r e d n a t i o n (MFN) s t a t u s . At t h e same t im e , a p r o t o c o l was s igned on the es tab l i shment of the USSR T r a d e R e p r e s e n t a ­t i o n in K a m p u c h e a . The USSR is now committed to a ss i s t ing wi th a wide r a n g e of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o g r a m m e s w h ich i n c l u d e t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of power gene ra t ion and o th e r ut i l i ­t ies , a g r i c u l t u r e , publ ic educat ion and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . T h e a t t e n t i o n g i v e n to t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of K a m p u c h e a ’s communicat ions a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i s n o t e ­w o r t h y . As n o t e d a l r e a d y , S o v ie t e f f o r t i s going into the r e b u i l d i n g of t h e p o r t of Kompo ng Son , while t h e MFN p r o v i s i o n s e x t e n d to merchan t s h i p p in g . Th ough the Soviet Union is Kampuchea’s main economic sp o n s o r , it n e v e r t h e l e s s a p p e a r s to b e s e n s i t i v e to t h e n e e d f o r p r e s e n t in g i ts aid within the wider contex t of f r a t e r n a l a s s i s t an ce p r o g r a m m e s . T h i s s e n s i t i v i t y to Vie tnam was a g a i n r e f l e c t e d b y He ng Samrin when he e x p r e s s e d his appreci a t ion for S ov ie t a id to Moscow t e l e v i s i o n whi le p l a c i n g t h e a id in t h e b r o a d e r f r a te rna l c o n te x t : ' t oge the r with Vietnam and Laos the Soviet Un ion h e l p s o u r p e o p le h ea l t h e w o u n d s i n f l i c t e d b y t h e Chinese ex p a n s io n i s t s ’. [196]

D e s p i t e t h e h i g h l e v e l of S o v ie t a s s i s t a n c e , Vietnam has been u n s u c c e s s f u l in a l l evi a t ing e v e n i t s most p r e s s i n g economic p r o b l e m s . Among t h e s e problems a r e chronic food s h o r t a g e s , mount ing d e b t s , sh o r t a g e of foreign ex ch an g e an d t h e a d d e d i r o n y , t h a t t h e o n ly t h r i v i n g s e c t o r in t h e economy is the b lack m ark e t . [197] Western e s t i m a t e s in 1982 g a v e a t o t a l h a r d c u r r e n c y deb t of $US 1.3 billion and total foreign d eb t s of approxima te ly $US 3 b i l l i o n . [ 198] V i e t n a m ’s e x p o r t p e r f o r m a n c e h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d a s ’miserab le ’; i t s e x p o r t s a m o u n t to a b o u t 15 p e r c e n t of t h e v a l u e of i t s impor ts . [ 199]

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V ie tn am ’s l im ited econom ic c a p a b i l i t i e s h a v e b e e n s e v e r e l y s t r a i n e d b y th e h e a v y b u r d e n s p lace d u p o n i t . T h e s e d e m a n d s i n c lu d e th e s u p p o r t of a la rg e m ili tary , th e req u irem en ts of re co n s t ru c t io n and the econom ic i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e s o u th as well a s t h e com m itm ents in Kampuchea and L a o s . S t r a i n s on th e econom y h a v e b e e n c o m p o u n d e d in r e c e n t y e a r s b y n a tu ra l d i s a s te r s . The management of th ese p ro b lem s h a s b e e n m ade m ore d i f f i c u l t b y th e p a u c i t y of t r a i n e d p e rso n n e l . The lack of economic e x p e r t i se is a t least p a r t l y d u e to V ie tn a m ’s p r o lo n g e d m o b i l i s a t io n w h ich h a s r e s u l t e d in the co n cen tra t io n of i ts b e s t o rgan isa tiona l skills in the a rm y . [100] Paul D ibb h a s n o te d t h e S o v ie t c o n c e r n with Vietnamese ineff ic iency and w aste :

a Soviet delegation which v is i ted Vietnam in J u n e 1980 c o n c lu d e d t h a t V ie tnam d id no t h a v e t h e p ro p e r management capability to a b s o r b a d v a n c e d Soviet equ ipm en t. [201]

N o w h ere in Sovie t-V ietnam ese re la tions is th e ev idence o f t e n s io n m ore e v i d e n t t h a n in th e c o n d u c t of econom ic m a t t e r s . Writing of th e ea r ly post-1975 per io d , T h ay e r noted th a t ’f r i c t i o n ’ h ad d e v e lo p e d p a r t l y b e c a u s e o f ’V ie tn a m ’s g ro w in g t i e s w ith W e s te rn g o v e r n m e n t s and p r iv a te e n t e r ­p r is e s and b ecau se of Vietnam’s massive t r a d e im balance w ith t h e S ov ie t U n i o n . . . ’ as well as b ecau se ’the Vietnamese a re re q u ire d to pay for var ious items with an i n c r e a s i n g vo lum e of f o o d s tu f f s and raw m ater ia ls’. [202] A ss is tan t S e c re ta ry of S ta te , Rodger H oldridge, told the US Senate th a t he d o u b te d w h e th e r Moscow w ould f u r n i s h a s much g ra in in 1980 as it had prov ided the p r e v io u s y e a r . H o ld r id g e a d d e d ’a n d we u n d e r s t o o d , to o , t h a t t h e r e is some d i f f e r e n c e b e tw e e n Moscow and Hanoi o ver the level of Soviet a s s is ta n c e ’. [203] A l a t e r s u g g e s t i o n of fr ic tion was re f lec ted in th e r e p o r t of a Soviet demand fo r a 50 p e r c e n t p r i c e i n c r e a s e fo r oil b y 1981. T h o u g h th is p r ice was still below world r a te s , Vietnam n ev e r th e le s s re sp o n d ed th a t oil p r i c i n g s h o u ld b e r e g a r d e d a s a s s i s t a n c e . [204] F u r th e r ev idence of d isco rd is su g g e s te d in the re p o r t th a t in 1981, Moscow was a t te m p t in g to e s t a b ­l i s h d i r e c t a id l i n k s to Phnom P e n h . T h is i n c l u d e d th e s ta tion ing of Soviet e x p e r t s in Kompong Son and the d e l iv e ry of civilian p a s s e n g e r a i rc ra f t to K ampuchea. [205]

51

E v i d e n c e of t e n s i o n o v e r econ omic i s s u e s n o t w i t h ­s t a n d i n g , i t would a p p e a r t h a t b o t h s i d e s h a v e so f a r m a n a g e d to conta in th e i r d i f f e ren c es . When tens ions received some public e x p r e s s io n at t h e 5 th C o n g r e s s of t h e V i e t n a ­mes e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y in 1982, P r e m i e r Pham Van D o n g ’s s t a tement can be de sc r ib ed as m u t e d :

We must t r y ou r b e s t to obtain maximum v a l u a b l e a i d f rom t h e Soviet U n i o n . . . and most ef fec tively ut ilise th is a id . Meanwhile, we must s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i m p le m e n t o u r o b l i g a t i o n s on t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e c i p r o c i t y a n d no t in an a r b i t r a r y a n d s u b ­se r v ie n t m a n n e r . [206]

In t h e p o s t - 1 9 7 5 p e r i o d , V i e t n a m ’s inab i l i t y to make headway with i t s p re s s in g economic problems and i ts i so la t ion f rom n o n - S o v i e t s o u r c e s of economic a s s i s t an ce have led it towards an ev e r incr eas ing dep e n d en ce on t h e Sov ie t Un ion a n d i t s Europe an al lies. The role of East European a s s i s t an ce has i n c r e a s e d s o m e w h a t in r e c e n t y e a r s . For e x a m p l e , in1980, V i e t n a m e s e i m p o r t s from Romania have been es t imated a t $US 145 mill ion - c o m p a r e d t o $US 125 mill ion f rom J a p a n . [207] N e v e r t h e l e s s , with the par t ia l except ion of the GDR, the East European s t a te s provide limited a s s i s t an ce .

Economic r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e a re s e t to c o n t i n u e a lo n g t h e p a t h of i n c r e a s i n g V i e t n a m e s e d e p e n d e n c e on t h e S o v ie t b l o c . T h u s , t h e F iv e Y e a r Agreement on c loser economic c o - o p e r a t i o n , s i g n e d in J u l y1981, p r o v i d e s fo r a 90 p e r c en t in c re a se in the volume of CMEA g o o d s to V ie tn a m . As wel l , p r o v i s i o n is made fo r c o n c e s s i o n a l l o a n s a n d f o r a s s i s t a n c e w i th h e a l t h c a r e , technology a n d e d u c a t i o n . [ 2 0 8 ] T h e 1981 a g r e e m e n t , a l so o b l i g e s Vietnam to d i rec t i ts s l en d e r e x p o r t ea rn in g s back to the Soviet b loc. As noted b y F ra nk F ro s t : ’much Sovie t b loc a id is p ro v ided in the form of concess ional loans and it is to b e r e p a i d b y a v i r t u a l m onopoly on V i e t n a m e s e e x p o r t s . Almost all V i e t n a m e s e c a s h c r o p s will b e grown for Soviet c a p i t a l g o o d s t h e r e b y r e s t r i c t i n g V i e t n a m ’s a c c e s s to conver t ib le c u r r e n c y m ark e t s ’. [209]

As t h e t r a d e f i g u r e s in T a b l e 1 s h o w , S o v ie t t r a d e wi th t h e I n d o c h i n a s t a t e s h a s e x p a n d e d dramat ica lly s ince 1975, while t r a d e with the ASEAN s t a t e s ( e x c e p t T h a i l a n d ) has increas ed only modest ly .

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53

V ie tn am 's d e p e n d e n c e on CMEA e n a b l e s t h e S o v ie t U nion to e x e r c i s e an e v e r g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e on H a n o i ’s d o m e s t i c economic p r o g r a m m e s as well as on i t s l imi ted opt ions for commercial l inks outs ide the b l o c . As t h e S o v ie t U n ion b ec o m e s more a n d more i n v o l v e d in V ie tnam ’s major i n d u s t r i a l a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l p r o g r a m m e s , so t h e S o v ie t v o i ce b eco m es more am p l i f i ed in t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e p r io r i t ie s and d i r ec t ion of Hanoi’s economic deve lopment .

CONCLUSION

T h e S o v ie t Union is o f t e n d e s c r i b e d as an incomplete s u p e r p o w e r . Th e des c r i p t i on is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p o s i t e fo r i t s r o l e i n S o u t h e a s t A s ia , w h e r e i t s p o l i t i c a l , economic a n d m i l i t a r y i n t e r e s t s o u t s i d e I n d o c h i n a r e m a in l i m i t e d . I t s p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e in t h e ASEAN s t a t e s r e m a i n s low for a nu m b er of re a s o n s and not leas t bec ause of Moscow’s s u p p o r t f o r t h e V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in Kampuchea and i t s associa ted mili tary lodgement in V ie tnam . At t h e same t im e , S o v ie t i d eo l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e in the non -I nd och ina communist movements is almost total ly e c l i p s e d b y t h a t of C h i n a . T h e a t t e m p t to e x p l o i t t h e ASEAN s t a t e s ’ r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t C h i n a r e m a i n s l a r g e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . I n d e e d , t h e ASEAN s t a t e s a r e now in c lo se r accord with Moscow’s a d v e r s a r i e s - China and the US - than at any time in t h e p a s t . To d a t e , t h e r e is l i tt le ev idence to s u g g e s t th a t the ASEAN s t a t e s a r e p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t a major S o v ie t ro l e in t h e s e a r c h f o r regional o r d e r .

T h e l i m i t a t i o n s on Moscow’s p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e a r e p a r t l y due to i t s a lm os t n e g l i g i b l e economic l i n k s wi th t h e n o n - c o m m u n i s t s t a t e s of the re g io n . Despi te the i n te rm i t te n t a t t em pts to improve economic re la t io ns , Soviet t r a d e wi th t h e ASEAN s t a t e s , e x c e p t Thai land, remains low. Th e p r o s p e c t s for improvement in the fo res eeab le f u t u r e do n o t look p r o ­m i s i n g . As a l r e ad y d i s cu s s ed , the r a n g e of qual i ty of Soviet e x p o r t s , i t s t e r m s o f t r a d e a n d t h e l a ck of c o n c e s s i o n a l t r a n s f e r p r o g r a m m e s o f f e r e d , make t h e S ov ie t Union a n u n a t t r a c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e to ASEAN's f a s t g r o w i n g ec onom ic l inks with the West.

54

While t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e h a s e x p a n d e d subs tant ia l ly in the r e g io n , it h a s a d d e d l i t t l e to Moscow’s r e g i o n a l i n f l u e n c e . I n d e e d , t h e Soviet military p re s e n c e in Indochina has been c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e in t h e s e n s e t h a t it h a s d r i v e n ASEAN into a c loser s t r a t eg i c a lignment with the US and China than might o therwise h a v e b e e n t h e c a s e . On t h e who le , t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in V ie t nam is of limited s t r a t eg i c value . While it has undou bted ly c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e S o v ie t n a v a l p o s t u r e in t h e I n d i a n O cean a n d th e South C h in a Sea , t h e f a c i l i t i e s a r e b y no m eans v i t a l fo r t h e s e d e p l o y m e n t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , g iven the mi li tary ca pab i ­lities of the US in the region, t h e S o v ie t Union wou ld f i n d l i t t l e v a l u e in Cam R an h Bay o u t s id e peacetime condi t ions . Still, the facilit ies in Indochina have e x t en d e d a n d i m p r o v e d t h e S ov ie t r e g i o n a l p o s t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t to i ts s u r v e i l l a n c e , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d e l e c t r o n i c i n t e l l i g e n c e capabi l i t ies .

On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Moscow’s m i l i t a r y - s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th Vie tnam is most c e r t a i n l y a major new f a c t o r in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l poli tics of Southeas t Asia. Since 1978, an e x t en s iv e S ov ie t p r e s e n c e h a s b e e n i n j e c t e d i n t o t h e econom ic , m i l i t a r y a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l i fe of Vietnam. H an o i ’s i s o l a t i o n a n d i t s s e v e r e l y d e p r e s s e d economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a v e made it heavily dep e n d en t on Soviet and e a s t E u r o p e a n a s s i s t a n c e . T h i s in t u r n h a s c u r t a i l e d V ie tn a m ’s l imi ted o p t i o n s to d i v e r s i f y i t s economic re la t ions beyon d the Soviet bloc. Similarly, Vietnam’s s e c u r i t y i s now e x t e n s i v e l y d e p e n d e n t on t h e Sovie t Union. Th e T r e a ty of F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n h a s u n d o u b t e d l y e n h a n c e d Hano i ’s d e t e r r e n t p o s t u r e . The ex t en s iv e post-1978 mili tary aid programme has sub s tan t i a l ly improved the c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e V i e t n a m e s e f o r c e s b u t i t h a s a l so made them far more d ep e n d en t on the con t inued flow of Soviet a s s i s t ance .

T h i s d i s c u s s i o n h a s s o u g h t to show t h a t whi le t h e Hanoi l eade rs hip has long r e g a r d e d i t sel f as a member of t h e s o c i a l i s t c am p , i t h a s b e e n s e n s i t i v e to b e c o m in g o v e r l y d e p e n d e n t on S o v ie t s u p p o r t . T h u s , d u r i n g t h e s e c o n d I n d o c h i n a w a r , i t a t t e m p t e d to b a l a n c e i t s e x t e r n a l d e ­pen dence between Moscow and B e i j i n g . When r e l a t i o n s wi th C h in a d e t e r i o r a t e d , Hanoi e x p l o r e d t h e p r o s p e c t s fo r normal ising i ts re la t ions with the US, not l e a s t to o f f s e t i t s i n c r e a s e d d e p e n d e n c e on t h e S o v ie t U n io n . Only a f t e r i t s a t t e m p t s to b r e a k o u t of i t s g r o w i n g i s o l a t i o n fa i l ed d id

55

Vietnam ta k e th e h i s to r ic s te p s of a security trea ty with a g r e a t pow er and of g r a n t in g m il i ta ry c o n c ess io n s on i ts te r r i to ry .

While th e Soviet ro le in Indochina has increased as a r e s u l t of V ie tnam ’s iso la tion as well as i ts economic and s e c u r i ty dependence , the level of Moscow’s political influence remains c i r c u m s c r ib e d . The l im ita tions stem from the r e ­s t r a i n t s p laced on Soviet relations with Laos and Kampuchea by v irtue of Hanoi’s insistence on a special r e la t io n sh ip with th e s e two s t a t e s and b y the concession of military facilities made to Moscow b y Hanoi. T h u s while S ov ie t-V ie tnam ese re la tions a re more asymmetrical than at any time in the pas t, they are also charac te r ised by a g r e a t e r m easu re of i n t e r ­dependence.

T his d i s c u s s io n has shown t h a t , while Vietnam was unsuccessful in its efforts to check i ts g row ing d e p e n d e n c e on th e Soviet Union, that dependence has not resulted in an overriding Soviet political influence in Hanoi. The p r o s p e c t s fo r th e f u t u r e of th e r e la t io n s h ip a re d i f f ic u l t to a sse ss . Evidence of s tra in s in the relationship have been n o te d , b u t i t a p p e a r s t h a t Moscow and Hanoi have managed to contain their d ifferences in the in te res ts of their com patib le s t r a t e ­gic i n t e r e s t s in th e r e g io n . T hese i n t e r e s t s how ever are compatible r a th e r than being the same. Thus Soviet s u p p o r t has b een g u id e d b y its objectives which are formulated in a context tha t encompass in te res ts far beyond S o u theas t A sia . T h u s , while th e reg io n rem ains of secondary importance to Soviet s tra teg ic in te re s ts , it must remain the p r im a ry focus of V ietnam ’s c o n c e r n s . In th e e n d , th e c u r r e n t l y c lose re la tionship is one of c o n v en ien ce for Moscow and one of n e c e s s i ty fo r V ie tnam . From V ietnam ’s s ta n d p o in t i t will u n d o u b te d ly rem ain a n e c e s s i ty a t l e a s t so long as i ts W estern o p t io n s c o n t in u e to be shu t off and while it conti­nues to feel a th rea t from China.

57

ENDNOTES

1. For a concise discussion, see Justus M. van der Kroef, Communism in South East Asia, Macmillan, 1981, ch. 1.

2. Ibid., p .7.3. William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,

Westview Press, Colorado, 1981, pp.34-35.4. Ibid., p .52.5. Joseph L. Nogee, Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign

Policy Since World War II, Pergamon, 1981, p.73.6. Ruth McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Cornell

U.P., 1965.7. Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, Angus and

Robertson, 1973, p.156.8. Ibid., p.162.9. Nogee and Donaldson, op.cit., p.170.10. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of

Survival, University of Queensland Press, 1978, p.206.11. Jukes, op.cit., p.164.12. See speeches given by Sukarno in October 1956, cited in

Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), Indonesian Political Thinking, Cornell U.P., 1970, p.82.

13. Morrison and Suhrke, op.cit., pp.210-211.14. Jukes, op.cit., p.170.15. Justus M. van der Kroef, 'The Sino-Indonesian Partnership',

Orbis, Summer, 1964, 332-356.16. Ibid., p.343.17. Ibid., p.344-5.18. Nogee and Donaldson, op.cit., p.170.19. Jukes, op.cit., p.169.20. The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with

Malaysia in 1967. Talks began with the Philippines in 1968 with relations normalised in 1976.

21. Jukes, op.cit., p.146.22. Nogee and Donaldson, op.cit., p.171.23. Morrison and Suhrke, op.cit., p.159.24. Ibid., p.223.25. Ibid., p.132.26. Nogee and Donaldson, op.cit., p.173.

58

27. Greame Gill, 'The Soviet Perspective on Southeast Asia',Dyason House Papers, Vol. 5, No.3, March 1979, pp.3,4.

28. See 'Communists Compete in Southeast Asia', International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), 2 October, 1978, p.5.

29. In 1978 Vietnam sought political and economic ties with ASEAN. In July 1978 Phan Hien, on a visit to ASEAN countries, stated that ASEAN was primarily concerned with economic development. See Allan Gyngell, 'Looking Outwards: ASEAN's External Relations' in Alison Broinowski (ed.) Understanding ASEAN, Macmillen, 1982, p.131.

30. Justus M. van der Kroef, 'The Indochina Tangle: TheElements of Conflict and Compromise', Asian Survey, Vol. XX, No.5, May 1980, p.488.

31. Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980, Tokyo, p.159. References to various editions of this publication are hereafter simply referred to as Asian Security 19...

32. Ho used various names. For the sake of clarity here he is referred to throughout as Ho Chi Minh.

33. Duiker, op.cit., p.181.34. Ibid., p.18.35. The Indochinese Communist Party, the Annamese Communist

Party, the Indochinese Communist League.36. Van der Kroef, op.cit., p.36.37. Duiker, op.cit., p.32.38. Ibid., p.145.39. Ibid., p .50•40. Dieter Heinzig, 'The Role and Interests of the USSR in

Indochina', Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 1981, p.143.

41. Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1982, p.104.

42. Ibid., p.105.43. Heinzig, loc .cit., p.143.44. Carlyle A. Thayer, The Origins of the National Front for

the Liberation of South Viet-Nam, PhD Thesis, Department of International Relations, ANU, 1977, p.250.

45. Ibid., p .561•46. Heinzig, loc .cit♦, p.147.47. Ibid., p.146.48. Nogee and Donaldson, op.cit♦, p.172.49. Ibid., p.245.50. Ibid., p .246-247.

59

51. Asian Security 1981/ p.51.52. Agence France Presse (Paris) November 4, 1978, cited in

Sheldon W. Simon, 'The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals and Constraints', Orbis, Spring, 1981,p . 60.

53. Thomas W. Robinson, 'The Soviet Union and Asia in 1981', Asian Survey, January 1982, pp.21, 22.

54. IHT, 29th-30th December 1979.55. See Nayan Chanda, 'As Moscow's Ardour Cools Hanoi Looks

Elsewhere', FEER 16th April, 1982, p.18.56. Heinzig, loc .cit. p.143.57. Ibid., p.150.58. Ibid.59. Jukes, op.cit., p.179.60. Ibid., p.180.61. Stephen Heder, 'The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict',

Southeast Asian Affairs 1979, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Heinemann, Asia, 1979, p.170.

62. Jukes, op.cit., p.181.63. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

Sub-committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Indochina, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 21 August 1978, p.213.

64. Milton Osborne, Aggression and Annexation, Kampuchea's Condemnation of Vietnam, Working Paper No. 15, ANU, Canberra 1979, p.9. A summary of the Pol Pot government's Livre Noir with commentary and annotations.

65. Heder, loc .cit., p.171.66. Nayan Chanda, 'The bigger brother', FEER, June 5-11, 1981,

p . 24.67. Ng Shui Meng, 'Vietnam in 1980', Southeast Asian Affairs

1981, p.354.68. MacAlister Brown, 'The Communist Seizure of Power in Laos'

in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.), Contemporary Laos, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1982, p.24.

69. Ibid.70. Carlyle Thayer 'Laos and Vietnam: the Anatomy of a Special

Relationship' in Stuart-Fox, op.cit., p.255.71. Ibid., p.254.72. Osborne, op.cit., pp.27-29.73. Heder, loc .cit., p. 157-186.74. Ibid., p.169.

60

75. Michael Leifer, 'Conflict and Regional Order in South East Asia' , Adelphi Papers, no.162, IISS, London, pp.20-21.

76. James T. Westwood, 'The Soviet Navy and the Southern Sea Route', Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb, 1982, p.57.

77. Quoted in ibid., p.60.78. Nogee and Donaldson, op.cit., p.149.79. The Times, 8 May, 1980.80. Pauld Dibb, 'The Interests of the Soviet Union in the

Region: Implications for Regional Security' in T.B. Miliar(ed.), International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region, UQP, St. Lucia, 1983, p.68.

81. Asian Security 1982, p.6.82. U.S. Information Agency (hereafter USIA) Wireless File,

16 June, 1983.83. CINCPAC, Soviet Activities in Southeast Asia, typed

mongraph, 11 May 1983, made available through the USIA, p.4.84. SMH, 15 February, 1983.85. The Bulletin, 19 April 1983, p.85.86. CINCPAC, Soviet Activities, op.cit., p.4.87. The Australian, 10 November, 1982.88. SMH, 18 October, 1982.89. U.S. Congress, Senate. A Report to the Committee on

Foreign Relations. Indonesia, Thailand, The Philippines and Taiwan, Washington DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, April 1980, p.9.

90. The Guardian, (London), 18 September 1979.91. Les Buszynski, 'The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia Since

the Fall of Saigon', Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, May 1981, pp.544-45.

92. Dibb, loc .cit., p.65.93. IHT, 11 May, 1979.94. Asian Security 1980, p.147.95. U.S. Department of Defence, Soviet Military power,

U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, 1983, p.97.96. See Buszynski loc.cit., p.545; U.S. Congress House of

Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military Posture 1982, February-March 1982, p.1038;Asian Security 1981, p.57.

97. CINCPAC, Soviet Activities,op.cit., p.2.98. Hearings, Military Posture, op.cit., p.1038.99. Dibb, loc .cit., p.65.100. Asian Security 1979, p.45.101. Dibb, loc .cit♦, p.65.

61

102. The Age, 21 May, 1979.103. Asian Security 1979, p.45.104. Hearings, Military Posture, op.cit., p.1039.105. Ibid., p .1038.106. CINCPAC, 'Soviet Activities', op.cit., p.3.107. Ibid., pp.2-3.108. Soviet vessels still depend more on fleet supply tenders

than on shore facilities in Cam Ranh Bay.109. Asian Security 1981, pp.77-79.110. U.S. Information Agency, Wireless File, 17 June, 1983.111. For a detailed discussion of events leading Hanoi to the

signing of the Treaty, see Gareth Porter, 'Vietnam's Soviet Alliance: a Challenge to U.S. Policy', Indochina Issues,May 1980.

112. Ibid., p .4.113. Dibb, loc .cit., p.49.114. Porter, loc.cit., p.4.115. Ibid., pp.4-5.116. Douglas Pike, 'Vietnam, A Modern Sparta', Pacific Defence

Reporter, April 1983, p.38.117. IHT, 19 February 1979, p.1.118. Ibid.119. Quoted in Simon, loc.cit., p.60.120. Buszynski, loc .cit., p.542.121. See for example, Michael Leifer, 'Conflict and Regional

Order in Southeast Asia', Adelphi Papers, No. 162, IISS, London, pp.22-23.

122. Porter, loc.cit., p.4.123. Quoted in ibid. Douglas Pike has also claimed that at

least one, and possibly two, secret annexes are in existence. See Douglas Pike, 'The USSR and Vietnam: Intothe Swamp', Asian Survey, Vo.XIX, December 1979, p.1163; see also Asian Security 1981, Tokyo, p.57. Other scholars however have expressed general scepticism about the existence of secret annexes to the Treaty.

124. Japan Times 15 May 1979.125. International Affairs (Moscow), January 1979, pp.5-6.126. FEER, 21 August 1981, p.48.127. Simon, loc .cit., p.56.128. Huisken, R. Defence Resources of South East Asia and the

South West Pacific: A Compodium of Data, SDSC, AustralianNational University, Canberra, 1980, p.80.

129. Asian Security 1981, p.71.

62

130. Ibid.131. Pike, loc.cit., p.1165.132. Asian Security 1981, p.55.133. Simon, loc.cit., p.73.134. Asian Security 1981, p.55.135. Pike, 'Vietnam, a Modern Sparta', loc .cit., p.38.136. Porter, loc.cit., p.5.137. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,

Sub-committee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 95th Congress, Hearings on 21 August 1978, p.26.

138. Stephen Heder, loc.cit., p.184.139. Whilst speaking with U.S. Congressmen, Vice-Premier Deng

Xiaoping claimed that Cuban combat troops and Soviet advisers were deployed in Kampuchea. See, U.S. Congress, H. of R., Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Delegation to the People's Republic of China, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12-22 April, 1979,p.184.) According to Thai reports, the Soviet Union has provided transport and logistic assistance to Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. See, the Bangkok Post, 26 August 1979, p.3.

140. Porter, loc.cit., p.5.141. FEER, 5 June 1981, p.24.142. See for example, Asian Security 1980, p.146.143. FEER, 5 June 1981, p.24.144. CINCP, 'The Soviet Activities', op.cit., p.1.145. Simon, loc.cit, p.74.146. Pike, 'Vietnam, A Modern Sparta', loc.cit., p.34.147. See for example, Pike, 'The USSR and Vietnam...' loc.cit.,

p.1166; Japan Times and Bangkok Post reports of 8 June 1978.

148. Asian Security 1981, p.56; SMH 28 July, 1982; The Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1982, pp.49-51.

149. Asian Security 1981, pp.55, 56.150. SMH 28 July, 1982.151. Pike, 'Vietnam, A Modern Sparta', loc.cit., p.35.152. Asian Security 1981 pp.55, 56; Straits Times, 11

October 1979, p.28.153. Pike, 'Vietnam, A Modern Sparta', loc .cit., p.35.154. Huisken, op.cit., p.73.155. Ibid., p .72.156. Martin Stuart-Fox, 'National Defence and International

Security in Laos', in Stuart-Fox (ed.) op.cit., p.230.

63

157. CINCPAC, 'Soviet Activities', op.cit., pp.6-7.158. Stuart-Fox, loc.cit., p.231.159. Ibid., p .230.160. SMH, 28 July 1978.161. Stuart-Fox, loc.cit, p.230.162. Dibb, loc .cit., p.61.163. Simon, loc.cit., p.70.164. Dibb, loc .cit., p.48.165. Ibid.166. Hans Christoph Rieger, 'Southeast Asian Economic

Developments 1981. An Overview', Southeast Asian Affairs 1982, Singapore, 1982, pp.44-46.

167. Yuri Mikhailov 'Soviet-Thai Trade', The Foreign Trade of the USSR, (Moscow) No.10, 1981, p.43.

168. Thomas P. Thornton, 'The USSR and Asia in 1982: The End ofthe Brezhnev Era', Asian Survey, Jan. 1983, p.19.

169. Oil pricing is an important example. For a discussion of some of the forms of exchanges see 'Soviet Policy in Asia', Asian Security 1981, pp.58-61.

170. 'North Vietnam's Le Duan in Moscow', The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No.44, p.7.

171. Heinzig, loc.cit., p.145.172. Ibid, p.146.173. Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Viet Nam's External Relations: An

Overview', Pacific Community, Vol.9, January 1978, p.216.174. Heinzig, loc.cit., p.146.175. 'Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration', The Current Digest of the

Soviet Press, Vol.XXVII, No.44, p.9.176. Ibid.177. 'Five Year Trade Pact', The Current Digest of the Soviet

Press, Vol. XXVII, No.44, p.9.178. For the text of the declaration, see ibid., p.10.

Emphasis added.179. Porter, loc.cit., p.2.180. Ibid.181. Ibid.182. Ibid.183. Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Building Socialism: South Vietnam

Since the Fall of Saigon', Vietnam Since 1975 - Two Views From Australia, Centre for the Study of Australian/Asian Relations, Research paper No.20, Griffith University, August 1982, p •24.

184. Ibid.

64

185. Peter Hastings, 'Vietnam's debt forces it deeper into the Eastern bloc', SMH, 28 July, 1982.

186. Thayer, 'Building Socialism: South Vietnam Since the Fallof Saigon', loc.cit., p.33.

187. Porter, loc.cit., p.2.188. Ibid, p .3.189. A. Shulman, 'The CMEA Countries Cooperation in Planning'

Foreign Trade of the USSR (Moscow) No.10, 1979, p.15.190. 'Unity of Brothers', International Affairs, Moscow, 1,

1979, p .4.191. CINCPAC, Soviet Activities in Southeast Asia, op.cit.,

pp.4-5.192. Ibid., p.6.193. T.M. Burley, 'Foreign Aid to the Lao People's Democratic

Republic' in Stuart-Fox (ed.) op.cit., pp.136-137.194. O. Vladimirsky, 'USSR-Laos: Socialist Trade and Economic

Relations', Foreign Trade of the USSR, No.5, 1981, p.22.195. Ibid.196. Ibid.197. Rieger, loc.cit., p.28.198. Hastings, SMH 28 July 1982.199. Rieger, loc.cit., p.28.200. Hastings, SMH, July 1982.201. Dibb, loc.cit♦, p.62.202. Thayer 'Viet Nam's External Relations:', loc.cit., p.217.203. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on

Foreign Affairs. Hearings, Subcommittee on Asian andPacific Affairs. The New Era in Asia. May 19, 20, 28;June 3, 10; and July 16, 1981. Washington DC: U.S.Government Printing, 1981, p.357.

204. Asian Security 1982., p.38.205. FEER, 5-11 June 1981, p.25.296. FEER, 16 April 1982, p.18.207. Rieger, loc.cit., p.28.208. FEER, August 21-27, 1981.209. Frank Frost, 'The Conflict Over Cambodia: Implications of

the Khmer Coalition Agreement', The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Basic Paper No.14, 1982, p.21.

210. Figures supplied in February 1983 by the office of the Trade Representative of the USSR in Australia, Canberra and based on 'Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSR'. Ministry of Foreign Trade, Publishing House, Moscow.

65

STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE

The aim of th e S tra teg ic and D e fen ce S tu d ie s C e n t r e , w h ic h was s e t u p in t h e R e s e a rc h School of Pacific S tudies in T he A u s t r a l i a n N a tio n a l U n i v e r s i t y , is to a d v a n c e th e s t u d y o f s t r a t e g i c p ro b le m s , p a r t i c u l a r l y th o se re la t in g to t h e g e n e r a l r e g io n o f t h e In d ia n a n d P ac if ic O c ean s an d S o u t h - e a s t A s ia . P a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e C e n t r e ’s ac tiv i t ies is not limited to members of th e U n iv e rs i ty , b u t i n c l u d e s o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d p r o f e s s i o n a l and P arliam entary g ro u p s . R esearch in c lu d es not only m ilitary , b u t political, economic, s c i e n t i f i c a n d t e c h n o lo g ic a l a s p e c t s . S t r a te g y , for the p u rp o se of the C e n t re , is def ined in t h e b r o a d e s t s e n s e o f e m b ra c in g no t o n ly t h e c o n t r o l a n d a p p l i c a t io n of military fo rce , b u t also t h e p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of d i s p u t e s w h ich co u ld c a u s e v io lence .

T h i s is t h e o n ly ac ad em ic b o d y in A u s t r a l i a w h ich sp ec ia l ises in th ese s tu d ie s . C e n t r e m em b ers g iv e f r e q u e n t l e c t u r e s a n d sem inars for o th e r d ep a r tm en ts within th e ANU and o th e r u n iv e rs i t ie s . R egu lar sem inars and c o n f e r e n c e s on t o p i c s o f c u r r e n t im p o r ta n c e to t h e C e n t r e ’s r e s e a rc h a re h e ld , and the major defence t ra in in g i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e J o in t S e r v i c e s S ta ff College, and th e N avy, Army and RAAF S taff Colleges, a re heavily d ep e n d en t u p o n SDSC a s s i s t a n c e w ith th e s t r a te g ic s tu d ie s sec tions of th e i r c o u r s e s .

Since its inception in 1966, th e C e n t r e h a s s u p p o r t e d a n u m b er of Visiting and R esearch Fellows, who have u n d e r ­tak en a wide v a r ie ty of in v e s t ig a t io n s . Recently the em phasis o f t h e C e n t r e ’s w ork h a s b e e n on p ro b le m s posed for the peace and s tab il ity of A u s tra lia ’s ne igh b o u rh o o d ; the d e f e n c e o f A u s t r a l i a ; a rm s p r o l i f e r a t i o n a n d arms con tro l ; decision m ak in g p r o c e s s e s of t h e h i g h e r l e v e l s o f t h e A u s t r a l i a n D e fe n c e D e p a r tm en t ; management s tu d ie s and th e role of the M inister in A ustra lia ’s defence policy making; and the s t r a t e ­g ic im p l ic a t io n s of d e v e lo p m e n ts in S o u t h - e a s t A s ia , t h e Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific A rea.

T h e C e n t r e c o n t r ib u te s to th e work of th e D epartm ent o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e la t io n s t h r o u g h i t s g r a d u a t e s t u d i e s p rog ram m e; and th e Departm ent re c ip ro ca te s b y a ss is t in g the

66

C e n t r e in i t s r e s e a r c h . A compre hens ive collection of r e f e ­r e n c e mater ia ls on s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y from t h e p r e s s , l e a r n e d j o u r n a l s a n d g o v e r n m e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s , i s mainta ined b y the C en t re .

T h e C e n t r e a l so c o n d u c t s s e m i n a r s a n d c o n f e r e n c e s which have led to severa l volumes of publ ished p r o c e e d i n g s .

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Missile Decisions of the Kennedy Administration, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980.

______ A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Instal­lations In Australia, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1980.

______ (ed.) Strategy and Defence: Australian Essays, GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd, Sydney, Australia, 1982.

Ball, Desmond J. and Langtry J.O. (eds.) Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia, Phoenix Defence Publications,Canberra, 1980.

Millar, T.B. The East-West Strategic Balance, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1981.

______ (ed.)International Security in the Southeast Asian andSouthwest Pacific Region, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1983.

O'Neill, Robert J. Australia at the Crossroads: Our Choices to the Year 2000, (with Wolfgang Kasper, Richard Blandy, John Freebairn and Douglas Hocking), Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Sydney, 1980.

_____ (ed.)New Directions in Strategic Thinking, (withD.M. Horner), George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1981.

______ (ed.) Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s, (withD.M. Horner), University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1982.

* Out of print

76

Department of International Relations,Research School of Pacific Studies,The Australian National University.P.0. Box 4, CANBERRA, ACT 2601.

The Department of International Relations publishes and distributes a series of monographs and working papers parallel to and associated with the Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence and The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre's Working Papers.Orders should be directed to the above address.

Canberra Studies in World Affairs:

NO. TITLE $AUST1. President Carter and Foreign Policy: The

Costs of Virtue,by Coral Bell. 5.00

2. Contemporary Alliances,by T.B. Millar. 5.00

3. Refugees: Four Political Studies,by Milton Osborne. 5.00

4. The Fall and Rise of the Modern International System,by F.H. Hinsley. 5.00

5. Nuclear Issues: International Control and International Co-operation,by D.A.V. Fischer. 5.00

6. Academic Studies and International Politics,(Conference Proceedings). 5.00

7. Host Countries and Multinationals: Case Studies from Ireland, Papua New Guinea and Zambiaof Negotiations with Mining Corporations, by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh. 6.00

8. Ideology and Foreign Policy: Some Problems of the Reagan Administration, by J.D.B. Miller.

9. (Reserved)6.00

77

NO. TITLE $AUST10. Crises and Policy-Makers,

by Coral Bell. 6.0011. Ethnic Minorities and Australian Foreign Policy,

Studies by Coral Bell, Hugh Collins,Jaimes Jupp and W.D. Rubinstein 7.00

12. Australia and the European Communities in the 1980s,by Alan Burnett. 10.00

13. Parliament and Foreign Policy,by John Knight and W.J. Hudson. 7.00

Plus packaging and postage

Working Papers

NO. TITLE $AUST1. Indochinese Refugees as a Security All one

Concern of the ASEAN States, 1975-81, priceby Tim Huxley. at

2. US Policy in the Horn of Africa Since 2.001974, plusby Samuel Makinda. packaging

andpostage