The Strange Case of Mr. Bloom

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Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vo l. 30 N o . 2 1996

The Strange Case of Mr BloomJ. R MUIR

The intention of this paper is to suggest that the educationalphilosophy of Allan Bloom merits renewed consideration and thatsuch consideration reveals major failings in contemporaryeducational philosophy. A prerequisite of such consideration is anexamination of the ways in which his ideas have been misinterpreted.n particular Bloom is neither a political conservative nor aneducational traditionalist nor an advocate of the Great Booksprogramme. Blooms recovery of the Socra tic or classical politicalrationalist approach to education both reveals enormousshortcomings in the dominant concep tions of the nature of philosophyof education and revitalises an alternative conception already widelyaccepted among classicists and political philosophers.

In his Preface to the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts Rousseau offers adisturbing insight into the nature of human beings.There will always be men destined to be subjugated by the opinions of their centurytheir country their society. A man who plays the freethinker and the philosophertoday would for the same reason have merely been a fanatic at the time of theLeague.

Rousseau refers here to the Holy League of Henri, third Duc de Guise,established in 1576and dedicated to the suppression of Protestantism in France.Rousseau observed, in other words, that men are freethinkers in regimes wheredemocratic principles are dominant for precisely the same reason that they arereligious bigots in regimes where theological principles are dominant. The samereason is, in Rousseaus view, that most people are conformists, content toadhere to, or slightly radicalise, the dominant opinions of their time and place.The danger is that such conformism inevitably comes to dominate theinstitutions of civil society, particularly in education.This danger is manifested in the peculiarly hostile academic responses to theeducational philosophy of Allan Bloom. As Rousseaus observation wouldlead us to expect, these responses conform to the more conventional academicopinions, and it is in this context that the intention of this paper must beunderstood. This intention has two intimately related and equally importantcomponents. The first intention is to recover the substance of Bloomsarguments by critically examining the ways in which those arguments have beensystematically misrepresented by his critics, who for the most part attack onlythe unorthodoxy of opinions which they themselves have formulated and

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198 J . R Muirattributed to him. Such a critical examination is also intended, secondly, toexpose real inadequacies in the dominant conception of educational philosophywithin Educational Studies.

THE POLITICAL CATEGORISATION OF M R BLOOMA strategem which might be called the Categorisation Dodge is commonlyemployed against Bloom. It is a familiar strategem used in order to avoid adetailed examination of arguments which fall outside conventional academicopinion. When confronted with such an argument, the conventional academicfirst places it into a more familiar category, where such a category constitutes aconventionally repudiated opinion. The academic then proceeds by marshallingthe conventional arguments against the conventionally repudiated category,thereby side-stepping any confrontation with the substance of the argumentitself. One thinks, for example, of the Right-wing strategem of convertingmoderate arguments for principled equality into a nightmarish vision of a drab,uniform social order in which all evaluative distinctions between people havebeen eliminated. Those using this strategem then proceed to argue (quiterightly) that such a social order would be unjust and tyrannical, thereby (quitewrongly) side-stepping the arguments which are actually made for principledequality.The Categorisation Dodge has been applied with revealing eagerness in thecase of Allan Bloom, and particularly The Closing of the American MindC A M ) . Perhaps the most popular category into which Blooms ideas havebeen placed is that of Political Dogmatism. This category has twocomponents, Conservative Dogmatism and Left-wing Nihilist Dogmatism,and Blooms ideas have been placed in both. This sort of contradictory politicalcategorisation is a common means of responding to the Straussian school ofpolitical philosophy, out of which Bloom arose.2Early reviews of C A M coming from the Left were very favourable, whilereviews coming from the conservative Right were sharply ~ritical.~riters onthe conservative Right placed Bloom in the category of Left-wing Nihilist,although there was no argument to show that Blooms ideas constitute orimply left-wing political commitment. As Bloom and others have observed,however, subsequent attempts by conventional academics to categorise him asa conservative quickly hardened into the orthodox academic opinion.6 Bloomwas categorised as a cultural conservative7 or academic f~ndamentalist.~The conventionally radical (and therefore radically conventional) academicssimply declared that Bloom could be fitted into the Conservative Dogmatistcategory, and was therefore susceptible to the conventional refutations ofconservatism. Each dogmatic constituency attempts to push Blooms ideas asfar as possible into the opposite political category, in order to demolish themmore easily.9Blooms educational ideas are not based on political doctrine. In the classicalpolitical rationalist view advocated by Bloom, education is an enterprise whichproceeds in two mutually interdependent stages, corresponding to elementaryand higher education. The first of these stages is, as a matter of contingenthistorical experience, moral in emphasis and often to some degree dependent on

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The Strange Case of M r Bloom 199political doctrine. Bloom is primarily concerned with higher education, or thesecond, dialectical, stage. This stage constitutes a good life in itself which isindependent of political doctrine or circumstance.I0 A full explication of thisview of the nature of education would take us beyond the scope of the presentpaper. Its best known and most powerful formulation originates with LeoStrauss, who, in the words of a sympathetic critic,

gave more thought to the subject of liberal education than did any other majorpolitical thinker of the twentieth century.The Straussian view of educational and political philosophy, upon whichBlooms arguments are constructed, has been richly articulated by others.I2Weshall concentrate here on the specific question of whether Blooms educationalideas are derived from any particular political doctrine.

In Western Civ, Bloom reminds us that he is not a conservative eo- orpaleo-, not in any current sense a liberal,I3 and not a left-wing nihilist. Bloomwas equally critical of political figures on the Right and the Left,14 and wascritical of the American left-wing student radicals of the 1960s to the sameextent, andfor the same reasons, as he was of the German right-wing studentradicals of the 1930s.Is He was critical of class distinctions within theuniversities, which still exist, poisonously, in Eng1and.l6 Although he doesacknowledge that he has always been a supporter and a beneficiary ofmovements towards practical equality,17 it is not his intention to deriveeducation from a political doctrine. On the contrary, Bloom intends to defendthe theoretical or philosophical life1* gainst the contemporary manifestation ofthe permanent tendency to doubt the sincerity of the theoretical life, namely, thepoliticisation of thought and scholarship increasingly dominant within theuniversities.The permanent human tendency is to doubt that the theoretical stance is authenticand suspect that it is only a covert attachment to a party. And this tendency is muchstrengthened in our time when philosophy is itself understood to be engage, the mostextreme partisanship. The necessity of parties in politics has been extrapolated to thepoint where it now seems that the mind itself must be dominated by the spirit ofparty.19

If Bloom had been writing in the Middle Ages, he would have argued againstthe invasion of education by theology, or the Church. Bloom seeks to protecteducation and the theoretical life from politicisation, which is the form of thethreat to the autonomy of education and the theoretical life peculiar to ourtime. In either situation, it is inevitable that he would be categorised as a hereticby all parties.In Blooms view, the equilibrium of political categorisation and criticism ofhis ideas, by those on the Left and on the Right, is evidence of both the currenttendency to politicise the theoretical stance, and the successfully non-politicalnature of his own arguments in favour of higher education orientated towardsthe theoretical life.*O Each political party, finding that Blooms educationalideas are contrary to its own, and presupposing that educational ideas must beQ The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1996


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200 J . R . Muirbased on a political commitment, could only conclude that Bloom was amember of the opposite party. The idea that an educational thinker could bedefending education and the theoretical life against the immoderate elements ofall the political parties is no longer recognisable to the contemporary academicmind. That is one reason why Blooms perspective needs to be confronted withthe serious open-mindedness that it deserves.

THE TRADITIONALIST CATEGORISATION DODGEThe implausibility of attempts to politicise Blooms ideas leads to theirtraditionalisation. It is said that even if Bloom is not overtly a (political)conservative, his alleged attempt to strengthen traditional educational ideas isnevertheless inherently conservative. An engagement with the arguments heactually presents is then avoided in favour of the easier and more fashionablesport of exposing the heresy of traditionalism. Two typical attempts to placeBloom in the category Traditionalist are those by Susan Mendus and RuthJonathan, in recent issues of this Journal.The first attempt to categorise Bloom as a traditionalist is the assertion ofMendus and Jonathan that Bloom feels that the universities have failed becausethey have forgotten their role as guardians of Jonathan providesnothing whatever in support of this assertion. Mendus offers a fragmentedquotation from Bloom. In reproducing this quotation I shall restore anditalicise the section which Mendus omitted.

The university now offers no distinctive visage to the young person. He finds ademocracy of the disciplines hich are there either because they areautochthonous or because they wandered in recently to perform some job that wasdemanded of the university. This democracy is really an anarchy, because there areno recognized rules for citizenship and no legitimate titles to rule. In short there is novision, nor is there a se t of competing vkion s, of what an educated human being is. Thequestion has disappeared, f o r to po se it would be a threat to the pe ac e. There is noorganization of the sciences, no tree of knowledge. Out of chaos emergesdispiritedness, because it is impossible to make a reasonable choice.22When we restore the omitted section, we see that Mendus misrepresentationnot only attributes to Bloom precisely what he is rejecting, but suppresses theargument he actually develops. Far from conceiving the universities asguardians of tradition, Bloom complains that the disciplines which currentlystructure the curriculum do so merely because they are traditional(autochthonous) or relevant in some ephemeral way. Blooms alternativeargument for the use of fundamental questions as the foundation of reasonedordering principles in education, and his rejection of the current reliance ontradition and utility, is misrepresented by both Mendus and Jonathan as anargument for reliance on tradition.Jonathan also attributes to Bloom a more specific allegiance to the traditionof liberal education. Having categorised Bloom in these terms, Jonathan offersa definition of traditional liberal educational thought and practice,23 andasserts that it is inadequate for three reasons. Most importantly, the tradition of

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The Strange Case of M r Bloom 201liberal education conceives the educational enterprise as self-referential, andtherefore fails to account for the relation between education and s0ciety.2~Liberal education is also faulted for being individualistic, and predominantlycognitive in its approach to morak25

Jonathan criticises traditional liberal education by inventing her ownconception of it, attributing that conception to Bloom, and then exposing itsinadequacies.26She provides no evidence to show that Bloom (or anyone else) hasever adhered to her definition of liberal education or educational thought, and,furthermore, contradicts her own (unargued) assertion that this tradition isinadequate. For example, having dismissed Bloom and the tradition of liberaleducation for failing to account adequately for the relation between educationand society, Jonathan goes on to recommend Plato or Rousseau, Kant orDewey he tradition of liberal education ecause they take better accountof the relation between education and s0ciety.~7Furthermore, Bloom not onlydoes not adhere to Jonathans definition of liberal education, but emphasises therelation between education and society,28 emphasises the centrality of love andfriendship over individualism n education,29 and emphasises the importance ofart and music in the education of non-cognitive moral capacities.30 Jonathancriticises her own version of the category traditional liberal education, andignores the ideas and the arguments Bloom actually presents.31THE ABUSES AND ADVANTAGES OF HISTORYAfter nearly a century of serious discussion,32 the now merely fashionablecrisis of the fragmentation of values has become one of the hot topics of theday among educationists. Blooms critics simply assume, quite wrongly, that hetoo shares these fashionable concerns, and they all reconstruct his argument interms of a cultural crisis33 or a fragmentation of values. But these phrases,which Bloom never uses, signify little more than the somewhat self-satisfiedcliches of the educationists who are just now catching up with it all: behind alltheir rhetoric about values being fragmented, they conform in a quiteunfragmented way to the values of egalitarian democracy. What I wish to focuson here is not the vacuity of such rhetoric fragmentation of valuesaddressed by reflective consciousness within the new pluralism of theself35 ut the absence of historical study underlying so much of thecriticism directed against Bloom. The question of what history has to teach us isnear the centre of Blooms educational thought, as well as underlying the morecommon misrepresentations of that thought.The Myth of the FallBlooms critics attribute to him the opinion that solutions to our educationalwoes are to be found in some sort of return to the golden age of the past.36Not one of the educationist critics provides any evidence or argument tosubstantiate this attribution. We must therefore concentrate on Susan MendusMyth of the Fall, because it is the only version of this attribution for whicheven the semblance of argument is provided, and therefore the only version withwhich one can engage in any instructive way.

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202 J . R MuirAccording to M e n d ~ s , ~ ~loom is concerned with the cultural breakdown orfragmentation characteristic of modernity. He allegedly compares this moderncondition with a previous golden age of cultural integration and sharedstandards, and, as a result, suffers from nostalgia for a past golden age to

which he wants to return. Mendus surreptitiously shifts our attention awayfrom Blooms arguments, and towards the psychological condition which is saidto be the cause of them.Mendus provides no evidence to show that Bloom is concerned with a goldenage, or with any nostalgic onging to return to the past. Indeed, in light of thebrief summary of Blooms historical ideas which I will provide in a moment, thesuperficiality,of an attempt to attribute such ideas to him will be obvious. Forthe moment it is sufficient to observe that Bloom explicitly denies that it iseither possible or desirable to return to the past. As Bloom wrote,Every age has its problems, and I do not claim that things were wonderful in the past.I am describing our present situation and do not intend any comparison to the pastto be used as grounds for congratulating or blaming ourselves but only for the sakeof clarifying what counts for us and what is special in our ~ituation.~*

Blooms rejection of the idea that the past is preferable to the present is equallyexplicit in his discussions of specific problems. For example, in his discussion ofthe nature of the family and relations between the sexes, Bloom saysI am not arguing here that the old family arrangements were good or that we shouldor could go back to them.39

The assertion that Bloom believes the past to be superior to the present, andthat solutions to present problems are therefore to be found in a return to thepast,40 s not only unsubstantiated by Mendus, but explicitly contradicted byBloom. Using the Categorisation Dodge, Mendus attributes to Bloom opinionsconcerning the goodness of the past, and places these opinions in the categoryMyth of the Fall. She then completely disregards his arguments, andconcentrates instead on a refutation of the category.The Myth of the Fall which Mendus deploys against Bloom is a simplifiedversion of an idea derived from Bernard Williams. Williams defines this idea inthe following terms.

Still less should we believe that up to a certain point there was in the Western worldan integrated, concrete, familiar, community life that was shattered by somethingwhich, according to taste, is identified with 1914 the Industrial Revolution, Galileo,the Reformation, or some yet earlier item. These various versions of the Fall areequally mythical and equally expressive of a yearning for a state of absolute identitywith the environment, a yearning for something dimly remembered.41

In the context of our discussion of misrepresentations of Bloom, it must beobserved that Williams provides no evidence to show that anyone has ever heldthis view, particularly in the rather extreme version implied by his use of theword absolute. One may reasonably argue that the imperfect but serviceablebonds of community life in Europe were loosened by the events of 1914, withoutThe Journal o the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1996


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The Strange ase of M r Bloom 203implying that they had ever been absolutely integrated. Similarly, it wouldrequire extensive historical and philosophical argument to show that the Fall isin fact mythical. This is a question to which we will return below, withreference to Stefan Zweig and Hermann Broch.

A summary of part of Blooms argument will illustrate the way in which heholds a view of the relation between ideas and history, and of the desirability ofthe past, which is the opposite of that attributed to him in the Myth of the Fall.It must be emphasised that we can only summarise the conclusions of Bloomsargument here, and that the reader concerned with an elaboration and defenceof these conclusions must return to Blooms books.Bloom argues that the most serious educational (and political) problems weface are not the consequences of such sociological phenomena as thefragmentation of values, or of such historical phenomena as the war of1914, as the Myth of the Fall implies.Our petty tribulations have great causes. What happened to the universities inGermany in the thirties is what has happened and is happening everywhere. Theessence of it all is not social, political, psychological or economic, but phi lo sop hi^.^^

The problems with which Bloom is concerned have their roots in the history ofphilosophical thought, and particularly in the philosophical confrontation betweenthe first principles of Socrates and the first principles of Nietzsche and Heidegger.43To repeat, the crisis of liberal education is a reflection of a crisis at the peaks oflearning, an incoherence and incompatibility among the first principles with whichwe interpret the world, an intellectual crisis of the greatest magnitude, whichconstitutes the crisis of our civilization.44

To the extent that Bloom is concerned with a crisis, it is not a crisis of cultureor of values but of civilisation: that is, of Nietzschean culture versus Socraticcivilisation.Those who chose culture over civilization, the real opposition, which we haveforgotten, were forced to a position beyond good and evil, for good and evil areproducts of culture. The really great thinkers who thought through what the turn toculture means, starting from power, said that immoderation, violence, blood, andsoil are its means. I am inclined to take the views of men of such stature seriously.45

Bloom does not respond to this observation by yearning to return to a pastgolden age of Socratic rationalism. On the contrary, Bloom believes thatSocratic knowledge of ignorance is the beginning point of all philosophy,46and he therefore responds with a fundamental philosophical question to whichhe does not pretend to know the answer.Western rationalism has culminated in a rejection of reason. Is this result necessary?47

The only philosophical response to such a philosophical question is a carefulre-examination of both the (post) modern principles of Nietzsche and theclassical principles of the Socratics ialectic, not dogmatism.The Journal of the Philosophy of Education S ociety of Great Britain 1996.


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204 J . R MuirThe method of such a re-examination is predetermined by the nature of the modemprinciples. They were evolved in opposition to, and by way of transformation of,the principles of classical philosophy. Up to the present day no adherent of themodern principles has been able to assert them with any degree of definitenesswithout explicitly and more or less passionately attacking the classical principles.Therefore a free examination of the modern principles is necessarily based on theirconscientious confrontation with those of classical p h i lo ~ o p h y . ~~

Whether is it Blooms Socrates or Nietzsche? or Alasdair MacIntyres lesssubstantive but more popular Nietzsche or Aristotle?,49 the only seriousphilosophical responses to the crisis in education are essentially the same: wemust thoroughly study what the greatest classical and modern thinkers havealready said if we are to be in any position to understand the most fundamentalquestions we face, to examine honestly our own presuppositions, and only thento embark on a credible search for our own solutions.This review of one of Blooms historical arguments demonstrates how absurdit is to attribute to Bloom, as his critics d0,5O the view that our educationaltroubles are a product of the American student rebellions of the 1960s. All tothe contrary, the radicalismof these students was the outcome of the history ofthe philosophical thought originating with Nietzsche and the principles ofculture and value commitment.

History always repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. TheAmerican university in the sixties was experiencing the same dismantling of thestructure of rational enquiry as had the German universities in the thirties. No longerbelieving in their higher vocation, both gave way to a highly ideologized studentpopulace. And the content of the ideology was the same alue commitment. Theuniversity had abandoned all claim to study or inform about value nderminingthe sense of the value of what it taught, while turning over the decision about valuesto the folk, the Zeitgeist the relevant. Whether it be Nuremburg or Woodstock, theprinciple is the same.51

The radicalism of the 1960swas not the cause of the decline of education, butone of the lesser educational consequences of a bowdlerised remnant ofNietzsches philosophical thought.The Socratic tradition of political and educational thought, however flawed itmay be, attempted to find rational grounds for political life in ideas such as freedomand equality, and the human rights derived from them. The far broader structure ofrational enquiry and education underlying this tradition was dismantled in favourof the view that culture is the primary political category and creativityor valuecommitment he primary educational intentions. The incompatibility of these twoconceptions of philosophy and political thought, and the way in which the principleof culture undermines democratic principle in favour of authoritarianism, isrecognised by Bloom in contemporary e~ents.5~s the endless discussions ofSalman Rushdie, arranged marriages, or female circumcision illustrate,

we do not know from moment to moment what we will do when there are conflicts,which there inevitably will be, between human rights and the imperatives of theculturally sacred.53

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206 J . R Muirshattered a widespread moral consensus. One need only look to chapters suchas Eros Matutinus or Universitas Vitae, however, to see that Zweig was wellaware that the moral order of Europe was not perfect. Although Zweig was notso nake as to believe in a golden age, he was aware that a progressivelyhumane, and comparatively integrated, concrete, familiar community life6oexisted, and was shattered, only to be replaced by a community life with a lesshumane future. Recent historical studies support his view.6IThe same observation was made by the great artist and philosopher,Hermann Broch. A s Broch observes, the bourgeoisie in particular were cut offfrom the moral traditions which had sustained them and, perhaps more thanany other group,

were destined to take power, for in this group the disintegration of values broughtabout by the defeat of 1918 had gone furthest, culminating, it is not exaggeration tosay, in a total value vacuum. And since in such a vacuum no one can hear hisneighbour, relations between man and man invitably came to be based on power ofthe most naked, ruthless, and, moreover, most abstract kind.62

Broch and Zweig portray the ways in which an integrated community life didindeed exist, and did disintegrate under the pressure of historical events. Theydo not, however, believe anything so absurd as the notion that thisdisintegration has left us with a fragmentation of values. Rather, thefragmented morals of the old consensus were replaced with a new consensusof a most abstract and menacing kind. The new moral langauge of thatconsensus is centred on culture and values, and founded upon thephilosophical thought of Nietzsche, which arose independently of thehistorical events. In spite of the rhetoric about fragmentation, such critics ofBloom as Mendus and Jonathan illustrate this new consensus: only those whopresuppose the ideas of culture or values will frame the problem offragmentation in those terms. The central educational intention of Bloomsbook is not to dwell on such petty tribulations as fragmentation ornostalgia, but to revive serious study of the historical evolution andphilosophical adequacy of the underlying moral consensus embodied inculture and ~alues.~3is critics have not engaged with the challenge suchstudy represents.In abstractions such as the Myth of the Fall we see not only a whollyirrelevant response to Bloom, but an example of the increasing narrowness anddogmatism of academic study. Without evidence or argument to show thatanyone has ever held so abstract a view, it is declared to be analytically rue inadvance of historical research, dignified with a sophisticated title, and declaredto be a delusion caused by nostalgia from which, almost miraculously, thedominant academics are immune. The niceties of any serious historical studyare condescendingly declared to be overly fastidious, unnecessary in the face ofwhat everyone knows is the Myth of the Fall. As Nietzsche foresaw so clearly,modern academics no longer turn to substantive historical study because theyhave discovered reasons why it is more philosophical to know nothing than tolearn ~omething.~~he Myth of the Fall is our postmodern narcissismmasquerading as theoretical insight. Blooms approach to educational

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The Strange C ase of M r Bloom 201philosophy through study in the history of thought offers a much neededalternative to, and corrective for, the current educational orthodoxy.BLOOM ON EDUCATION: SOME CENTRAL IDEASWe shall continue to take misrepresentations of Blooms thought as our pointof departure, because they expose the political prejudices which underlie thedistortion of his thought. Bloom is currently categorised with T.S. Eliot as acultural conservative.65 It is instructive to recall in this context that Zliot wascategorised by the comparably avant-garde opinion of his own day as a literaryb o l~h ev ik ,~~nd, more decisively, that Bloom explicitly rejected theconservatism and superficiality of Eliots political ideas.67While educationistsassume that the Great Books programme is an artifact of klitist conservatism,those who advocate it, and their informed critics, regard it as a triumph ofdemocratic egalitarianism.68Bloom is accused of wishing to return to the canonof great Yet for decades Bloom has rejected the very idea ofcanonicity,70 an idea he regards as both logically and historically untenable.71Blooms critics often categorise him as an advocate of the Great Bookscurriculum,72 naware that Bloom not only does not advocate the Great Booksprogramme, but has been a severe critic of it for decades. Bloom writes,

I am perfectly well aware of, and actually agree with, the objections to the GreatBooksThe Great Books programme was devised and championed by figures such asMortimer J. Adler. Adlers recent defence of the Great Books programmesingles out Bloom as pre-eminent among its In Blooms view, theGreat Books programme is an offensive P.T. Barnum-like form~lation,7~business gimmick of Adlers,76 and a superficial source of footnotes to theopinions we already have.77 Adlers programme is a simplified extension of theeducational legacy of Isocrates. Bloom advocates a recovery of the Socraticview, and an awareness of the Isocratic-Socratic debate that is the source ofserious educational thought.78What is alleged to be Blooms Great Books programme is often criticised onthe grounds that we have no uncontroversial way of selecting great books .79Those making this criticism appear to be unaware that Bloom himself makes avery similar criticism of the Great Books programme.80Alasdair MacIntyre (asquoted by Mendus) declares that

there is no way of either selecting the list of books to be read or advancing adeterminate account of how they are to be read, interpreted and elucidated whichdoes not involve taking a partisan stand in the conflict of traditions.81

It is difficult to know how seriously to take such an unargued objection, or theexceptionally partisan stand it implies. If there are conflicting traditions, thenone may select books from each of them, as MacIntyre himself did in ThreeRival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Similarly, after proclaiming that there is noway of selecting Great Books, Mendus selects Hu ckleb erry Finn, and MacIntyreThe Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Brirain 1996.


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208 J . R Muirselects Nietzscheor Aristotle, all of which are in the Great Books curriculum.82The criterion by which MacIntyre and Mendus make these selections is neitherthe Socratic principles recommended by Bloom, nor the standard of traditionattributed to Bloom, but conformity to the academic convention of the day. InA Short History of Ethics MacIntyre opts for those selected texts which formthe core of the study of moral philosophy in most British and Americanuniversities.83 When Mendus selects a list of books on toleration, she adopts thesame standard, referring the reader to contemporary academic liberalinterpretations of the Great Books of Locke and Mill.84If the criticism madeby Mendus and MacIntyre against the Great Books programme is valid, thenthey (and all literate education) are equally condemned by it.In contrast, Bloom presents at least four criteria according to which booksmay be selected for the curriculum that is the centre of the education herecommends.85 Critics such as Mendus and MacIntyre address none of Bloomscriteria, but rather criticise criteria which they have invented, use themselves,and attribute to Bloom. I shall consider two of Blooms criteria, consensus andfundamental questions, both of which are summarized in the followingquotation.

A second and sounder criterion is what the thinkers say about one another. Spinozaspraise of Machiavelli turns us to reflections on Machiavelli as well as teaching ussomething important about Spinoza. Hobbess attack on Aristotle shows us thatAristotle is the man to attack. It is always the case that serious men look to seriousopponents and go to the roots of that which they wish to destroy. And following thissame road, one finds writers neglected by us because the limitation of our viewsmakes them seem slight or irrelevant. Machiavelli and Rousseau had the highestopinion of Xenophon; for us he is nothing. That difference or change in taste canpoint the way to fundamental problems, such as the different value once set onmoderation even by the apparently immoderate Machiavelli and Rousseau. Thisprocedure results in a relatively small number of classic books, a list established notsubjectively by means of current criteria, but generated immanently by the writersthemselves. I argue that there is a high degree of agreement among the writersthemselves as to who merits serious consideration. The writers of quality know thewriters of quality. Moreover, from this internal dialogue between the books emergesa high degree of agreement about the permanent questions as opposed to thequestions of the day.86

Turning first to the criterion of consensus, we could select any contemporarybook, from any tradition: Franz Fanon criticises liberalism. To determinewhether his criticism is valid, one would have to turn to see if he has fairlyinterpreted the spokesmen for it, such as Locke. Locke cannot be interpretedwithout an understanding of Hobbes. Hobbes in turn cannot be understoodwithout knowledge of Thucydides and Aristotle. In After Virtue, MacIntyreoffers us a choice between Nietzsche and Aristotle. In order to understand this,one must study Nietzsche and Aristotle. John Rawls Kantian contractualismis a combination of the social contract of Locke and Kants ethics, andtherefore directs us to Kant and Locke. Carol Gilligan directs us to Freud.Freud took many of his ideas from Nietzsche and, hence, one is directed toNietzsche. Regardless of the tradition from which we begin, the same list of,The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1996


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The Strange Case of M r Bloom 209for example, Nietzsche, Locke, Aristotle, Kant emerges. Likewise, Bloomdirects us to the same books as Fanon, Rawls, Gilligan or MacIntyre, as well asto those of other traditions, read in the original languages. Leo Strauss,Blooms teacher, wrote on Maimonides, al-Farabi, and the Kuzari, all read inthe Arabic, and observes that they too direct us to Plato and Aristotle. If weignore the rhetoric which declares that there are no criteria for the selection ofbooks, and look instead to what the rhetoricians actually do, a consensus aboutwhich books are most important very quickly emerges which transcends thesupposed rivalries of traditions.If this first criterion suggests a tenuous similarity between the Great Booksprogramme and Blooms educational ideas it is because, in Blooms view, thehalf-articulated concerns of the Great Books advocates place them unawares,at one with some of the profoundest philosophical thought of the pastcentury.87The radical difference between Blooms ideas and the Great Booksprogramme may be clarified by an examination of Blooms use of fundamentalquestions as a criterion by which books are selected.The culture and values jargon which is used almost universally bycontemporary educationists precludes engagement with most other traditions.Middle Eastern scholars have argued for decades that the concept of culture isabsolutely relative to European thought, and systematically distorts any othertradition to which it is applied. If Moses, Jesus or Mohammed received arevelation from God, then at least one of Judaism, Christianity or Islam is TheTruth, not one culture among many. Culture theory presupposes that thismost fundamental premise of these other traditions is false; the act of definingthem as culture constitutes a denial of the very belief by which they definethemselves. (we reach the ultimate absurdity when religion is defined as partof ones primary culture, a fashionable re-wording of the Victorian idea ofnatural loyalties.) This presupposition directs us to one of the permanent,fundamental questions: What is the relation between reason and revelation?This question is universal, and not relative to traditions. The answers that havebeen given to this question are relative to, and even constitute, traditions. InBlooms view, it is above all the questions, not the answers (or traditions)which select the books to be read. The current Western view of reason andrevelation derives from the Englightenment revision of Aquinas. But Aquinaswas not the only medieval theist to confront the challenge of pagan rationalism.The Muslim al-Farabi and the Jew Maimonides also confronted Aristotlesrationalist challenge to revelation, but drew different conclusions to Aquinas.The question of the relation between reason and revelation selects (at least) thebooks of Aquinas, al-Farabi and Maimonides (and therefore requiresknowledge of Latin and Arabic), and reading them could commit one to theSocratic theoretical life that is a common feature of all three traditions. Thisbrings us to the intentions with which Bloom would have us read such books.From the point of view of the political community such an educationalprogramme, confronting as it does the vast diversity of ideas and the awesomeresponsibility of choosing among them, fosters the development of moderation.Moderation is an intellectual and political virtue, and the primal point ofbalance between apathy and fanaticism which is inseparable from justice.Blooms understanding of the complex relation between education and the

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21 J . R Muirregime seeks to justify the autonomy of education on the secondary groundsthat such education will indirectly serve the unending human struggle toconstruct the best regime.Blooms primary intentions in reading great books can be instructivelycontrasted with those of educationists. John Darling advocates a return tothe history of philosophy of education,88while Ruth Jonathan advocates areturn to the great books of the past as a radical broadening of philosophyof education.89 Such advocacy illustrates, above all, what others have calledthe narrowness and orthodoxy, and the continuing relative isolation ofEducational Studies.% It is only the educationists who believed, withTibble, that philosophy of education originated only within the last decade[1960-1 970 ].91 Political philosophers and classicists such as Bloom have beeninterpreting the great educational works with renewed enthusiasm for morethan a century: they required no radical broadening because they neversuccumbed to the debilitating narrowness of Educational Studies.A measure of the extent to which educationists have been isolated from sucheducational scholarship is the intentions with which they turn to the olderworks of educational thought. Jonathan, for example, regards the great booksof the past merely as illustrations of her assumption that education isdetermined by its economic, political and moral context.9* She treats thecontemporary notion of contextualisation as one that is absolutely true, andapplicable to all people, at all times. Yet many of the great educational thinkersof the past, such as R o u s s ~ ~ u , ~ ~iddle Eastern followers of Socrates such asal-Farabi or al-Razi, and Plato es, Plato contrary to the Victorianinterpretation which is still educationist orthodoxy rgued that educatorsmust understand their context in order to ensure that higher education was notcontextualised. s Bloom observed,

When Averroes and Thomas Aquinas read Aristotle, they did not think of him asGreek and put him into his historical context. They had no interest in Greek Civ buttreated him as a wise man, hence a contemporary at all times.94Bloom reminds us, as Darling does, that contemporary philosophy of educationis a derivative of

a school which thinks that it invented philosophy. Its adherents never approach anAristotle or a Kant in search of the truth or open to the possibility that these oldthinkers might have known more than they do.95Bloom would have us turn to the great books in full awareness that theychallenge our own presuppositions. He does not argue that great books docontain the truth, but that we ought to be open to the possibility that thethinkers of the past may have understood something that we do not. Headvocates turning to such great books in an effort to understand what theirwriters believed to be important and true, rather than picking over them insearch of whatever can be made to appear to confirm us in the contextualprejudices we already have. For that we have newspapers, and other institutionsof the free market.QThe Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society o Great Britain 1996.


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The Strange Case of M i Bloom 21 1One common method of attacking Bloom consists of categorising his ideasin terms of a particular moral view, followed by an attempt to refute thatview. Jonathan attributes to Bloom the intention of using books to enforce akind of value-quarantine,96 while Mendus attributes to him the intention of

inculcating the morally inspiring character of the books.97 Theseunsubstantiated attributions are contradicted by Bloom, whose intentionsare quite the reverse.It is the theoretical life I admire, not some moralism or other, and I seek to defend itagainst the assaults peculiar to our time.98

Mendus and Jonathan attribute to Bloom precisely the educational intentionshe seeks to combat, and to which he provides a desperately needed alternative.Self-consciousness, self-awareness, the Delphic know thyself seems to me to be theserious business of education. It is, I know, very difficult to know what that means,let alone achieve it. But one thing is certain. If ones head is crammed with ideas thatwere once serious but have become cliches, if one does not even know that thesecliches are not as natural as the sun and the moon, and if one has no notion thatthere are alternatives to them, one is doomed to be the puppet of other peoplesideas. Only the search back to the origins of ones ideas in order to see the realarguments for them, before people became so certain of them that they ceasedthinking about them at all, can liberate us.99

Blooms use of the word puppet is an allusion to Platos Cave, now known as ~ u l t u r e . ~ ~ietzsche and Heidegger are the puppeteers, while educatorscommitted to the principles of culture theory are the puppets used to project theimages of culture on to the cave wall at which their students gaze. In otherwords, the cultural theory of education no longer encourages students todiscover for themselves what is good, but merely confirms them in the values oftheir culture of origin.10 Only those students who are enabled to turn aroundand search back t o the origins of these images and ideas can be liberated. This isespecially true of the idea of culture itself. Such a search leads us away fromboth our unquestioning conformity to the clichks of culture theory and ourincipient fragmentation and individualism, and towards a renewal of a deeperunderstanding of education as true friends in common pursuit of knowledge ofthe good, regardless of the accidents of their origins or culture.When we recognize the Phaedrus and the Symposium as interpreting our experiences,we can be sure that we are having those experiences in their fullness, and that we havethe minimum of education. Rousseau, the founder of the most potent of reductionistteachings about eros, said that the Symposium is always the book of lovers. Are welovers any more? This is my way of putting the educational question of our times.02

Blooms reformulation of Socratic education carries us far beyond theideological intentions and ephemeral jargon that exhaust the horizon withinwhich so many of his critics operate. Blooms ideas may be flawed, but a seriousengagement with them will at least compel us to look, together and withThe Journal of the Philosophy of Education S ociety of Great Britain 1996


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212 J . R Mu i rrenewed vision, to the philosophical legacy that all of us share. Nothing couldbetter serve the educational intentions he had.

CONCLUSIONI do not agree with all of Blooms ideas. But it seems to me that the goal ofeducation is to help us to understand, in their integrity, the real alternatives weface. Properly understood, Blooms writings can revitalise this perspective, andso carry us far beyond the transient concerns and historical parochialism ofmost contemporary educational thought. As a glance at history will show, weacademics are always and everywhere ephemeral, if not a hindrance tointellectual life, whenever we fail to give our students an opportunity to reachbeyond the presuppositions of the day, and towards all those great books whichembody some of the highest and greatest of human achievement. In the end,educators can provide to others only what they possess themselves.Correspondence: J . R. Muir, St Edmunds College, Cambridge CB3 OBN, UK.NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Mendus, S. 1992) All the kings horses and all the kings men: justifying higher education, Journal ofPhilosophy of Education, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 173-182; Jonathan, R. 1993) Education, philosophy ofeducation and the fragmentation of value, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 27, No. 2,pp. 171-178; Lippencott, M. S. 1989) Review of The Closing of the American Mind and Critical Pedagogyand Cu ltural Power, Interchange, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 68-73; Nyberg, D . 1988) What has Alan Bloomtaught us? Teachers College Record, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 293-301; Aronowitz, S. and Giroux, H. A. 1988)Schooling, culture, and literacy in the age of broken dreams: a review of Bloom and Hirsch, HarvardEducational R eview, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 172-194.2. Strauss, L. 1989) The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism ed. T. L. Pangk) Chicago, University ofChicago Press), pp. ix-xi.3. Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , p. 17.4. Jaffa, H. V. 1988) Humanizing certitudes and impoverishing doubts: a critique of The Closing of the

5. Bloom 1990) op. cit . , pp. 18-19.6. Mansfield, H. C. Jr., 1988) Straussianism, democracy, and Allan Bloom, 11: Democracy and the Great7. Aronowitz and Giroux, op. ci t . , pp. 173, 174.8. Nyberg, op. ci t . , p. 298.9. Bloom 1990) op. cit., p. 17.

American Mind. Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1 pp. 11 1-123.

Books, The New Republic, 4 April, pp. 33 37, a t pp. 33-34; Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , p. 17.

10. Bloom 1987) op. c i t . , p.381; Pangle 1992) op. c i t . , Part IV.11. Schram, G.N. 1991-1992) The place of Leo Strauss in a liberal education, Interpretation: A Journal ofPolitical Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 201-216, at p. 201. Cf. Bloom 1990), op. cit., Leo Strauss.12. e.g. Strauss, L. 1989 119681) Liberalism Ancient and Modern New York Cornell University Press);Brann, E. T. A. 1979) Paradoxes of Education in a Republic Chicago, University of Chicago Press);Nicgorski, W. 1985) Leo Strauss and liberal education, Interpretation: A Journal of Politica l Philosophy,Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 233-250; Pangle 1992) op. c i t .13. Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , p. 17.14. Bloom- 1987) op. ci t . , pp. 32, 331, 324, 289; Bellow 1987) op. ci t . , pp. 17, 18.15. Bloom 1987) op. c i t . , p.314.16. Ibid., p. 82.17. Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , p. 16.18. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , pp.43, 380-382; Bloom 1990) op. c i t . , pp.18, 20.19. Bloom 1990) op. cit . , p. 17.

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The S t r a n g e Case of M r Bloom 21 320. Ibid., p. 19.21. Mendus 1992) op cit., p. 174; Jonathan 1993) op. cit., pp. 171-172.22. Mendus 1992) op. cit., p. 174. Cf. Bloom 1987) op. ci t , pp. 337, 338, 346; Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , p.352.23. Jonathan op. ci t . , p. 175.24. Ibid., p. 173.25. Ibid.26. This is a familiar procedure. See Muir, J. R. 1994) The Isocratic idea of education and the irrelevance of

the state vs. market debate, Papers oft he Annual Conference, Philosophy of Education Society of GreatBritain, 8-10 April, pp. 22-23; Tooley, J. 1992) The prisoners dilemma and educational provision: areply to Ruth Jonathan, British Journal of Educutionaf Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 118-133.27. Jonathan op. ci t . , pp. 177-178.28. Bloom 1987) op. cit., pp. 177-178.29. Bloom 1987) op. c i t . , p. 381; Bloom, A. 1993) Lo ve and Friendrhip New York, Simon and Schuster).30. Bloom 1987) op. cit., pp.68-81.31. Bloom 1990) op. cit., p.344. In light of the fact that Bloom is criticised for what is alleged to be hisnostalgic desire to return to the tlitism of the past, it is ironic that Jonathan recommends the currentAmerican fashion for Critical Theory as an alternative. As Lesek Kolakowski has cogently argued,

Critical Theory offers, at most, nostalgia for the pre-capitalist culture of an elite. See Kolakowski, L.1978) Ma in Cur ren ts ofMurx irm, Vol . 3: The Breakdown Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 395.32. Bloom 1987) op. cir., p. 367. Cf. Kafka, F. 1963) Short Stories Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 24;Laqueur, W. 1979) A Continent Adrift: Europe 197G1978 New York, Oxford University Press), p. v.33. Aronowitz and Giroux, op. ci t . , p. 175; Nyberg, o p . cit. pp. 2 9 4 2 9 5 .34. Mendus, o p . c i f . ,p. 171.35. Mendus, op. c i t . , p. 173, 182; Jonathan, op. cir., p. 173.36. Lippencott, op. cit., pp. 6 8 4 9 ; Aronowitz and Girow, op. cir., p. 176; Nyberg, op. ci t . , p. 296; Mendus,37. Mendus, op. cit., p. 175. Cf. Standish, P. 1994) Knowledge, practice and truth, Journal of Philosophy of

38. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , p. 22.39. Ibid., p. 130.40. Jonathan, op. cir., p. 171.41. Williams, B. 1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London, Collins/Fontana), p. 163. Cf. Mendus

op. ci t . , p. 176.42. Bloom 1987) op . c i t ., p. 312.43. Ibid., pp. 309-312.44. Ibid., p. 346.45. Bloom 1990) o p . c i f . ,p. 30. Cf. Bloom 1987), op. ci t ., p. 240.46. Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , p. 18.47. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , p. 240. Cf. Bloom 1990) op. c i t . , p. 241.48. Strauss, L. 1946) On a new interpretation of Platos political philosophy, Social Research, Vol. 13,

No.3, pp. 326-367, at pp.327-328. Cf. Bloom 1987) o p . c i f . ,pp. 240, 310-312.49. MacIntyre, A. 1981) After Virtue Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press), Ch. 9. Bloom andMacIntyre wrote in complete independence of each other and they have, so to speak, nothing in common.50. Mendus, op. ci t . , p. 175; Lippincott, op. cir., p. 72; Nyberg, op. cir., pp. 293; Aronowitz and Giroux, op.cit., pp. 173, 175.

51. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , pp.313-314 original emphasis). Cf. Bloom 1990) op. c i t . , pp.29-30.52. Bloom 1987) op. c i t . , p. 143.53. Bloom 1990) op. ci t . , pp. 22-23.54. Jonathan, op. c i t . , p. 171; Lippincott, op. c i t . , p. 72; Aronowitz and Giroux, op. ci t . , pp. 172, 175; Nyberg,55. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , p. 141 original emphasis).56. Bloom 1990) op. cit., p.30; Rosen, S 1987) Hermeneutics us Politics New York, Oxford University57. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , p. 238.58. Jonathan, op. c i t . , p. 173.59. Zweig, S. 1944) Die Welt von Gestern Stockholm, Berman-Fischer Verlag).60. Mendus, op. cit., p. 176.

op. c i t . , pp. 175-176; Jonathan, op. ci t . , p. 172Education, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 245-255, at p. 250.

op. ci t . , pp. 2 9 4 2 9 5 .

Press), p. 6.

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214 J . R Muir61. Mann, G. C. 1974) The History of Germany since 1789 London, Penguin), p.607, 9.10; Fussell, P.1977) The Great War and Modern M emory London, Oxford University Press); Eksteins, M. 1989)

Rites of Spring London, Bantam Press); Fukuyama, F. 1992) The End of History and the Lust M a nLondon, Hamish Hamilton), pp. 331 f f62. Broch, H. 1990) The Guiltless trans. R. Manheim) London, Quartet Books), p. 290, Broch, H. 1965)

Die Schuldlosen Miinchen, Deutscher Taschenbuch), p. 288. Cf. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 30.63. Bloom 1987) op. cit. p. 312; Orwin and Forbes, op. cit. p. 124.64. Nietzsche, F. 1983) Untimety Meditations trans. R.J. Hollingdale) Cambridge, Cambridge University65. Mendus, op. cit. p. 175; Jonathan, op. cit.66. Leavis, op. cit. p. 76.67. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 291.68. Bloom 1992) op. cit. p. 5; Adler, op. cit. Prologue; Leavis, op. c i t .69. Mendus, op. cit. pp. 174, 175.70. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 303.71. Ibid. pp. 2629 .72. Mendus, op. cit. p. 175; Nyberg, op. cit. p. 297.73. Bloom 1987) op. c i t . p. 344.74. Adler, op. cit. Prologue.75. Bloom, A. 1992) Hutchinss idea of a university, Times Literary Supplement 7 Feb., pp.4-5, at p.4.76. Bloom 1987) op. ci t . , p. 54.77. Bloom 1990) op. c i f . ,pp. 302-303; Bloom 1987) op. cit. p. 344.78. Bloom 1987) op. cit. p. 274; Marrou, H . 4 . 1948,7th ed.) Histoire de 1Education duns lhtiquitk Paris,79. Mendus, op. cit. p. 175.80. Bloom 1987) op. cit. , p. 344.81. Mendus, op. cit. p. 175.82. Mendus, op. cit. p. 180; Maclntyre, op. cit. p. 238, Ch. 9; Adler, op. cit. pp. 335, 342.83. MacIntyre, A. 1966) A Short History o Ethics New York, Macmillan Press), p.vii.84. Mendus, S. 1989) Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism London, Macmillan Press), pp.2 r-21,85. Bloom 1987) op. cit. p.21; Bloom 1990) op. cit. pp.295314. Cf. Pangle 1992)op. cit. Ch. 10; Straws,L. 1989 [1968])Liberalism Ancient and Modern New York, Cornell University Press), Chs 1 2; Brann,E. 1993) The canon defended, Philosophy and Literature Vol.17, No.2, pp. 193-218.

Press), p. 188. Cf. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 293.

Editions du Seuil), 1.7.

163-164.

86. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 303.87. Bloom 1992) op. cit. p. 5.88. Darling, J. 1993) Rousseau as progressive instrumentalist, Journal of Philosophy o Education Vol.27,No. 1, pp. 27-38, a t p. 27.89. Jonathan, op. cit. p. 177.90. Cooper, D. E. ed.) 1986) Education Values and Min d London, Routledge and Kegan Paul), pp. 4, 5.91. Tibble, J. W. ed.) 1971) An Introduction to the Study of Education London, Routledge and Kegan92. Jonathan, op. cit. p. 177.93. Kendall, W. 1985) How to read Rousseaus Government o Poland in Rousseau, J.-J. The Government94. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 27.95. Ibid. p. 345.96. Jonathan, op. cit. p. 176.97. Mendus, op. cit. p. 181.98. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 18.99. Ibid. p. 20.

Paul), p. 5.

of Poland trans. W . Kendall) Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co.).

100. Plato, Republic 514a.101. Bloom 1990) op. cit. p. 25, n. 2.102. Bloom 1987) op. cit. Cf. Bloom 1990) op. cit. pp. 25, 27.

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The Strange Case of Mr. Bloom