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T H E S T R U G G L E F O R S C H O L A R L Y R E C O G N I T I O N

The Development of the Closure Problematic in Sociology

RAYMOND MURPHY

The inegalitarian nature of contemporary societies and their historical trans- formation have been analyzed almost exclusively in terms of stratification and class and the frameworks of stratification theory and Marxist theory of which these concepts form a part. The sociological imagination has been bounded by these two concepts and scholarly effort restricted to their formulation, with debate centered on the merit of the various formulations of one or the other or of some mixture of the two.l This monopoly of sociological thought has been so pervasive and penetrating that it has been largely taken for granted.

There is nonetheless another important concept which, although it was suggested at least as early as the turn of the century by Weber, has not yet enjoyed such a deployment of creative energies directed toward its theoreti- cal elaboration. The concept is that of social closure, which focuses attention on mechanisms and practices of monopolization and exclusion. Until recent- ly there had been no effort to analyze its theoretical implications and possibilities.

Now, however, the concept of social closure has been resurrected in spectac- ular fashion from the cemetery of dead and forgotten concepts by Frank Parkin, who has packaged his own development of neo-Weberian closure theory within a humorous and loudly sarcastic expos6 of the folly of contem- porary Marxist theory. Parkin's need to abandon the solemn and weighty style characteristic of virtually all sociological writing 2 and to resort to the subversive strategy of satire is itself eloquent testimony to the present state of monopolization of sociological thought by stratification theory and Marxist class theory. The struggle to force scholarly recognition of a new problematic

Department of Sociology, University of Ottawa

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in a structured field of monopolistic closure involves political strategies to transform the scholarly power structure and the principles underlying its operation. At issue in this scholarly struggle is the power to impose the criteria of scholarly excellence themselves and thereby to close off the field to those who do not meet the dominant criteria. Although the field of scholar-

ship and more particularly sociology has specific characteristics which dis- tinguish it from other social fields, it is nonetheless a social field and there is no a priori reason to believe that the closure problematic is inappropriate for its analysis. If the closure problematic is to be of value it must, like any other general sociological problematic, help us to understand the relationships and

processes in the field within which it arose.

In this article I will turn the closure problematic back on itself and on its own field of struggle for scholarly recognition in order to demonstrate that the closure problematic does have such a reflexive property. To do this I will first show that the work not only of Weber and Parkin but also of Collins forms a

coherent whole - an overall closure problematic - and that an important analysis of the scientific field by Bourdieu shares the conceptions of the closure problematic and can be integrated therein with ease. I will clarify the relationship of closure theory to Marxism (a clarification made particularly necessary by Parkin's violent attack on contemporary Marxism) and stratifi- cation theory and analyze, using a closure problematic, the strategies adopt-

ed by closure theorists against their theoretical rivals as well as the changing field of forces which has generated those strategies in the struggle for

scholarly recognition.

The Closure Problematic

On the surface Weberian closure theory hardly appears to be a unified approach. Contemporary closure theorists have worked independently to the extreme of even ignoring each other's publications. They have built their theories on different parts of Weber's writings 3 and have developed some- what different aspects of closure theory. A major contributor to closure theory, Collins, has not even used the term "closure" and instead refers to his approach as conflict theory. It is nonetheless clear that the source of all their approaches is to be found in Weber's discussion of monopolization of opportunities and that their development of his seminal ideas creates a basic

unity of their contributions.

Weber conceived closure as the monopolization by members of an interest group of social and economic opportunities by closing off those opportuni- ties to outsiders. 4 Any convenient and visible characteristic, such as race,

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language, social origin, religion, or lack of a particular school diploma or

credential, can be used to declare competitors as outsiders. Weber's discus-

sion of closure is related to his later discussion of status groups, which are

conceived as real groups - although often of an amorphous type, that make

an effective claim to social esteem and social honor. Status groups are seen as the bearers of specific conventions and can be formed on the basis of race,

ethnicity, or other forms of hereditary prestige, formal education or occupa-

tion. Weber argued that stratification by status is associated with a monopo-

lization of ideal and material goods and opportunities: "material monopolies

provide the most effective motives for the exclusiveness of a status group;

although, in themselves, they are rarely sufficient, almost always they come

into play to some extent . . . . With an increased closure of the status group,

the conventional preferential opportunities for special employment grow

into a legal monopoly of special offices for the members. ''5

Weber conceived of relationships based on property and social class in terms

of closure in a way that is parallel to his conception of closed relationships

among status groups. Thus he argued that the unequal distribution of

property "excludes the non-wealthy from competing for highly valued

goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to acquire

such goods. ''6 This is because those who own goods are not forced to enter into market exchange in order to exist. They are free to accept or reject the

terms of the exchange and therefore have power over the propertyless who

are forced to sell their labor or its products on the terms dictated by the

owners in order to have the means to subsist. 7 The power position of owners

thereby enables them to monopolize the opportunities for profitable deals in

the market and to monopolize the transformation of property as wealth into

property as capital, where Weber means by the latter the chance to become entrepreneurs and to obtain further returns on property. What appears to be

free competition eventually leads not to the absence of monopolies but rather

to a particular form of monopoly - capitalistic monopolies based on the

power of property in the market. "Capitalistic interests thus favor the continuous extension of the free market, but only up to the point at which

some of them succeed, through the purchase of privileges from the political

authority or simply through the power of capital, in obtaining for themselves a monopoly for the sale of their products or the acquisition of their means of

production, and in thus closing the market on their own part. "8

The concept of closure enabled Weber to analyze the monopolization of opportunities in the market by property classes as well as other forms of

monopolization, such as monopolization of opportunities by status groups, in terms of one coherent overall problematic. Classes and status groups can,

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of course, only monopolize opportunities if they have the power to do so. Thus Weber's theory of monopolization, closure, class and status groups is in fact a theory of power and domination. 9

Parkin has continued the ambitious Weberian attempt to develop a general overarching model for the analysis of all forms of domination, regardless of their official legitimations, to He states that the closure "theory" he advances is not really a theory but rather a package of concepts for making things intelligible (this, he claims, being true of Marxist "theory" as well). 11

Parkin suggests that there are two principal and reciprocal modes of closure - exclusion and usurpation- both being means for mobilizing power in order to enhance or defend a group's share of rewards or resources. The main

difference between these two modes is that exclusionary closure involves the exercise of power in a downward direction through a process of subordina- tion in which one group secures its advantages by closing off the opportuni-

ties of another group beneath it that it defines as inferior and ineligible, whereas usurpationary closure involves the exercise of power in an upward direction in order to bite into the advantages of higher groups. Usurpation thereby constitutes a potential threat to the stratification order. The limita- tion of access to resources - whether they be land, arms, means of produc- tion, or knowledge - to a restricted circle of eligibles is, in Parkin's concep-

tion, based on the same generic kind of process that constitutes exclusion. The acceptance of all forms of exclusion from positions, rewards, resources, and opportunities is inherently problematic, hence all forms of exclusion have the potential to provoke usurpation practices by the excluded groups. Usurpationary closure is the direct response of excluded groups to their status as outsiders. The structural fault of exclusion is thus the source of moral and ideological struggle. The intended scale of usurpation can range from marginal redistribution to the complete dispossession of the dominant class. Usurpationary closure implies different standards of distributive jus- tice than those embodied in exclusionary closure. For example, usurpation- ary practices of trade unions deny the appropriateness of scarcity (the criterion justifying the reward distribution in market societies) as a distribu- tive standard and substitute instead the criterion that a group's functional importance in society and hence distributive merit can best be indicated by the disruption resulting from the withdrawal of its services.

Collins t2 has developed the Weberian problematic further by focusing on academic knowledge as the content of a particular status culture - an intellectual culture, on educational credentials as the basis of status group exclusion, and on the reaction to such exclusion. He uses the term "political

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labor" to refer to the attempts to impose one's own definition of reality on

others, to impress others with allegedly superior knowledge, and to form

alliances. The power of status groups having esoteric skills is conceived as being as much a social as a technical phenomenon. Collins argues that members of a status group share a common culture and a sense of identity based on status equality. They feel it normatively legitimate to exclude from their own status group those who lack the ingroup subculture. Since power, prestige, and wealth are scarce goods, the desire of some individuals for more than their equal share sets in motion a counter-struggle by the remainder to escape subjection, disesteem, and dispossession. This struggle is primarily between rather than within status groups because their cohesiveness is an

important resource in the struggle. Complex organizations are central to the struggle, with the organizational elite attempting to strengthen its power

position by choosing key personnel from its own status group and by

recruiting lower-level workers who have been socialized to respect its cultural superiority. The monopolization of organizational positions is one of the objects at stake in the struggle among status groups or "consciousness communities" as Collins 13 calls them. He uses his Weberian approach to develop a theory to explain the rise of credentialism as job requirements and barriers of exclusion, and to explain the expansion of the educational system.

Closure theory was developed by Weber and elaborated by Parkin and Collins in order to analyze domination in society and the countervailing

struggle such domination provokes, that is, in order to analyze stratification, class, class struggle, and communal struggle. Closure theory contains in addition suggestive implications for the analysis of domination in the scho- larly field itself. I would suggest that the field of scholarship can be conceived in accordance with the closure problematic as follows.

A Closure Problematic for the Scholarly Field

The fields of scholarship and science are characterized by closure based on particular types of knowledge. Those who share that knowledge are the bearers of specific conventions, share a sense of identity, and make a claim to social esteem and social honor; hence they constitute a particular type of

status group. Those who do not hold the knowledge are declared inferior outsiders who are deemed ineligible for specific opportunities. This is essen- tially a process of subordination and mobilization of power by which scho- larly status groups monopolize particular types of opportunities, such as access to academic and research positions and learned journals, access to resources necessary to enhance one's knowledge and make a contribution to knowledge - in short, access to positions and resources which enable effective

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claims to be made to social esteem and social honor. The acceptance of scholarly and scientific forms of exclusionary closure is, like exclusionary closure based on credentials, race, sex, and property monopolies, inherently problematic and has the potential to provoke usurpation practices by those who are declared outsiders. The object of this counter-struggle is to escape subjection and disesteem and to bite into the advantages and scholarly esteem of the dominant groups. What appears as a structured field consists of sedimented forms of patterned relationships which have resulted from pre-

vious practices and strategies of exclusionary closure and usurpation.

This closure problematic can be used to analyze relationships between the scholarly community at large and the remainder of the population, or relationships among scholarly disciplines, or relationships within scholarly

disciplines. I will focus on the latter in this article.

The imposition of a paradigm on a field is an example of intra-field closure.t4

Those who do not accept the paradigm are in effect excluded from the field. The transformation from one paradigm to another, or scientific revolution as Kuhn calls it, ~5 is the result of usurpation strategies that successfully mobilize power and challenge the assumptions and practices which had until that time been at the foundation of the discipline. The resistance to such a transformation and the struggle that the transformation necessitates reveal

the vested interests attached to the former paradigm as well as its nature as an

instrument of exclusionary closure.

In disciplines where there is no consensus concerning the acceptance of one all-embracing paradigm, there is struggle among groups to impose their preferred perspective on the discipline and to avoid subordination to a different perspective. Witness the struggles between functionalism and Marxism in sociology. There can also be struggle among proponents of a perspective to impose a particular version of that perspective, as for example, manifested in the bitter conflict among proponents of the economistic inter- pretation of Marx, the structuralist interpretation of Marx, and the socialist- humanist interpretation of Marx. t6 The exclusionary closure exercised by the dominant perspectives is experienced most acutely by proponents of new or marginal perspectives, and these outsiders respond by attempting to usurp the territory of the dominant perspectives.

The aim of usurpation strategies can vary from a marginal redistribution of social esteem in the field to the complete replacement of one problematic and its adherents by another. The struggle consists of impressing others with allegedly superior knowledge and can involve conflict over the definition of

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the very standards by which scholarly excellence is to be judged and over the moral and ideological implications of those standards. 17 These are the stan- dards according to which exclusion from recognition of personal intellectual worth, and associated exclusion from publication of work in learned jour- nals and books and from entry into academic and research positions and promotion therein, are determined. Since these standards are the basis of scholarly exclusion, it is not surprising that they become the targets of usurpation strategies. TM

One important analysis of the scientific field, that of Bourdieu, 19 shares the conceptions and assumptions of the closure problematic, even though Bour- dieu himself has not made the connection. At the root of closure theory is the perception of the parallel between the processes of monopolization (and exclusion) based on capital in the market and other processes of monopoliza- tion and exclusion, such as those based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, Communist Party, credentials, and knowledge. Bourdieu too has formed his theories on the basis of that perception. He generalizes the concept of capital from its usual economic meaning to an enlarged conception which also includes cultural and scientific subtypes. He argues that scientific authority is a particular kind of social capital - what he calls scientific capital or the capital of scientific recognition. Like property capital, scientific capital can be accumulated and converted into other kinds of capital and it confers power in its particular field.

Bourdieu argues that scientific journals and other instruments of circulation determine what deserves to be called science and exercise a de facto censor- ship by selecting articles according to the dominant criteria of scientific authority. The fields of science and scholarship are indeed fields of exclusion in Bourdieu's theory. He introduces the concept "habitus," and in particular scientific habitus, to refer to predispositions to perceive, appreciate, and act which in turn govern the selection of problems, their solution, and the evaluation of solutions.

Bourdieu suggests that the structure of the distribution of scientific capital provokes not only strategies for the conservation of that structure by those whose interests are linked to it, but also strategies for its subversion and transformation by others, often newcomers, which is equivalent to the postulate of closure theorists that exclusionary closure provokes strategies of usurpation by outsiders. Two types of strategies are available to new entrants to the field: succession strategies (which are essentially a type of conservation strategy) based on limited innovations within authorized limits, and the more hazardous subversion strategies which will not bring the subverters "the

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profits accruing to the holders of the monopoly of scientific legitimacy unless they can achieve a complete redefinition of the principles legitimating domi-

nation. ''20 Bourdieu contends that the structure of the distribution of scientif- ic capital is the resultant crystallized outcome of previous struggles and that transformations of the field are the result of the struggle between strategies for conservation and strategies for subversion, the efficacy of these strategies depending on the structure of the distribution of scientific capital. This is the same conception of a dialectical relationship between structures and creative action as in the attempt by closure theorists to take into account both the prevailing structure of power and creative strategies, rather than reducing

analysis to either structuralist determination or subjectivist voluntarism.

Bourdieu claims that there is no point in creating a distinction between strictly scientific determinations and strictly social determinations. The scientific field is, like any other field, the locus of a political struggle involving monopolization and subversion. The success of claims to legitimacy depends on the relative power of the groups involved. The scientific field does nonetheless have its own specificity. In the scientific field "the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity and social power, or, to put it another way, the monopoly of scientific competence, in the sense of a particular agent's socially recognized capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e., in an authorized and authoritative way) in scientific matters. TM At stake in this struggle is the power to impose

the very definition of science, that is, the designation of the field of problems, theories, and methods which are deemed scientific.

Bourdieu suggests that when a field is divided into powerful opposing camps, their very opposition sets the terms of debate in such a way that new alternative problematics are excluded: "control or censorship are not effect- ed by any specific institution but by the objective relationship between

opposing accomplices who, through their very antagonism, demarcate the field of legitimate argument, excluding as absurd, eclectic, or simply unthink- able, any attempt to take up an unforeseen position. ''22

Bourdieu's analysis can best be regarded as a special theory of closure - the analysis of the special case of the scientific field in terms of a closure problematic, just as Collins's analysis can best be regarded as a special theory of closure - the analysis of the special case of educational credentials in terms of a closure problematic. Both are restricted versions of the overall concep- tual package that Weber and more recently Parkin have attempted to develop into a general closure problematic. 23

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Bourdieu ends his analysis by stating that this political game of struggle and strategy governs that choice of strategy of each sociologist and warns that it is

liable to have an insidious effect on their sociology unless they go beyond the use of strategies to discredit their rivals and examine the overall game as such. 24 1 would suggest that this is at least as true for problematics as it is for

individual scientists and sociologists. The closure problematic in particular risks having its potential for development stunted unless the strategies of its proponents in the overall struggle for scholarly recognition are seen as such.

The logical relationship of the closure problematic to the two dominant perspectives in sociology during the 1960s and 1970s, stratification theory and Marxism, has been interwoven with, and obscured by, the strategies adopted by closure theorists to usurp the position of dominance of these rival perspectives.

Strategies and Relationships between Closure Theory, Marxist Theory, and Stratification Theory

Closure Theory's Recent Attack on Contemporary Marxism

At first glance it would be easy to have the impression that Weberian closure theory has been developed primarily as an attack on Marxist theory. Such an impression has been created particularly by Parkin, 25 who envelops his important contribution to Weberian closure theory within a stridently sar- castic critique of contemporary Marxist theory and especially Marxist struc-

turalism.

For example, concerning the reluctance of Marxists to study existing "social- ist" societies (such as the Soviet Union, Poland, China, Cambodia, and

Cuba) as indicative of the outcome of Marxist theory and the tendency of Marxists to affirm that such societies are based on a variant of capitalism, Parkin has the following to say. "Since the capitalist mode of production reigns everywhere supreme it naturally follows that the theory of the classless society remains unscathed by history. Of such stuff is Marxist science made. ''26 He adds later that since "Western Marxists of many breeds and

dispositions have been just as disparaging of state socialism as any mere l iberal . . , the western working class . . , might also reasonably wonder why, if all known versions of Marxist society are so seriously flawed, and their revolutions always betrayed, the result next time should be any different. "27 "As for the credibility of Marxist class theory, it would seem that the advent of socialist society is about the worst thing that could have happened to it. ''28

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Parkin observes that notions of control, supervision, the division between mental and manual labor, work autonomy, the criterion of wage-labor as well as pay, job security, and market position are now being used by Marxists to define social class 29 and he concludes that the "fact that these normally alien concepts of authority relations, life-chances, and market rewards have

now been comfortably absorbed by contemporary Marxist theory is a handsome, if unacknowledged, tribute to the virtues of bourgeois sociology. Inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out."30

He argues that contemporary western Marxism is the creation of the new professoriate that resulted from the expansion of the universities in the 1960s and suggests that its adherents are more concerned with respectability than

with revolution. "Certainly no-one could possibly accuse the Marxist profes- soriate of spreading the kind of ideas likely to cause a stampede to the barricades or the picket lines. Indeed, the uncomplicated theory that has

traditionally inspired that sort of extra-mural activity is now rather loftily dismissed as 'vulgar' Marxism - literally, the Marxism of 'the common people'. This is not necessarily to suggest that the new breed of Marxists are less dedicated than the old to the revolutionary transformation of society; their presence at the gates of the Winter Palace is perfectly conceivable, pro- vided that satisfactory arrangements could be made for sabbatical leave. ''31

In reply to Giddens's review of his book, Parkin writes that "Giddens' own observations certainly do not encourage me to revise my judgement that this version of marxism [the structuralist version of Althusser and Poulantzas] is empty metaphorical wordplay contributing nothing of substance to social analysis."32

Collins has also recently criticized Marxist theory, saying its "result has been either the untenable strategy of explaining all other conditions as correlates

of economic ones, or the unfruitful one of leaving them unexplained entirely. The traditional Marxian model founders in the face of ethnic, racial, and religious divisions, political parties that do not coincide with economic groupings . . . . as well as the phenomenon of social mobility. These matters can, of course, be discussed in a Marxist perspective, but tend to be explained away rather than to be explained systematically. ''33 He adds the following criticism which becomes the basis for his own approach. "Here, I think, is where the Marxist tradition falls short. The need of capitalism for control is only one of two major sources of inequality; the organizational weapons of the members of the propertyless upper-middle class in a bureaucratic, and especially a multicultural, industrial society make them a second major force. TM Thus Collins proceeds to study the United States as a "credential society."35

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The two main contemporary contributors to Weberian closure theory, Par-

kin and Collins, have thus forcefully distinguished Weberian closure theory

from Marxist theory. Parkin in particular has chosen the usurpationary strategy of using biting wit to expose in the most sensational way possible and draw attention to all that Marxists have swept under the proverbial rug. He has accomplished his aim so effectively that he has established his reputation as the only comic writer in contemporary sociology. It must be

recognized that some of Weber's work and much of the work on the development of stratification theory, which also derived its principal inspira- tion from Weber, was carried out in conscious reaction to Marxism. The danger in all this is that closure theory may be written off as nothing but

another in a long line of attempts to use Weber to refute Marx, with Parkin's literary skills providing mere comic relief for the bourgeois academic mind suffering under the weight of Marxist truth. The very success of the strategy adopted to draw attention to the deficiencies of Marxist theory, as well as the entertainment value of that strategy, may deflect attention away from the

true nature of the Weberian closure problematic and away from its potential for development into a general and powerful explanatory framework. For example, one of his Marxist reviewers has stated that Parkin has carried out

against a very carefully chosen band of Marxists "a beautifully written, savage and supremely witty attack. I haven't laughed so much since eth- nomethodology. . . As a piece of satire Marxism and Class Theory has few equals in its sociological literature. Above all it is clever - real crkme brul~e,

Taylor' 49 and a stroll through the deer park stuff. At the end of the day, however, it doesn't deliver the goods. TM

It is a mistake to assume that Weberian closure theory originated in reaction to Marxism or that its only or even main opposition is Marxism. Although Weberian closure theory is evidently an alternative to Marxist theory and although they are opposed on many points, there is nonetheless considerable overlap between them.

The Overlap of Closure Theory and Marxism

The typical response of closure theorists to Marxist analysis is not utter rejection. Collins argued in his first article that his approach takes into account the principal phenomena emphasized by Marxist theory. 37 In a later book in which he gave a more detailed exposition of his conflict theory of stratification, Collins stated: "I have used a conflict paradigm taken from Weber and Marx "3s and the"path pursued [by Collins] is a version of Weber, which incorporates the main thrust of the Marxian fundamentals. "39 In his review of Bowles's and Gintis's Marxist analysis of schooling in America, 40

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Collins concluded that "this analysis, as far as it goes, strikes me as true. "41

His criticism was not so much that Marxist analysis is untrue as that it

constitutes a restricted and all-too-narrow analysis. Echoing Weber, he stated that "my argument does not substitute a cultural conflict theory for an

economic one, but it does put the two on more of an analytic par. ''42 For

example, Collins explains inequality in wealth in terms of monopolistic

restraints in the market - restraints based on credentials, ethnicity, race, sex,

religion, and social origin as well as on property. 43

In his latest article Collins concludes that "there is considerable convergence,

as well as complementarity, between Weber's last theory of the origins of

capitalism, and the mature Marxian theory [of Wallerstein and of contem- porary Marxists who have moved the state to the center of their analysis]

which is now emerging. T M He adds that Weber was almost entirely con-

cerned with the origins of capitalism and therefore that Weber's theory is

unfinished and must be made complete by a theory of the operation of

mature capitalism and of its possible demise and that these are precisely the

concerns of Marxist theory. Collins argues, however, that Weber's theory of

the origins of capitalism together with Collins's own supplement to Weber's

theory to explain the operation of mature capitalism are superior to Marxist

theory - not in that they refute Marxist theory, but rather in that they

incorporate the principal contributions of Marxist theory yet go beyond

Marxist theory.

One of the earliest applications of Weberian closure theory was that by

Neuwirth who used it to analyze Black ghettos and the Black Power move-

ment in the United States in the 1960s. She began her analysis with the

following affirmation. "Max Weber's investigations concerned with the

origin of capitalism and the sociology of religion are generally interpreted as

a refutation - rather than a modification and continuation - of Marx's

sociological orientation. Such interpretations are ultimately unacceptable and at best misleading: much of Weber's work is concerned with the impact

of power (in its various economic political, and social forms) upon the

emergence and structure of social relationships, as well as with the manipula- tion of ideas by those in power to 'legitimize' the existing order and their own domination. ''45 Neuwirth interprets the Weberian orientation in terms of a

modification and continuation, rather than a refutation, of Marx's sociolog- ical orientation. It is worthy of note that Parkin used Neuwirth's analysis as an element of the base from which he launched his recent elaboration of Weberian closure theory. 46

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That brings us to Parkin, the only closure theorist who is blatantly anti-

Marx, or so it seems in his latest book. However, the tone of that book

must be distinguished from its content; Parkin's relationship to Marx must be distinguished from his relationship to contemporary Marxists and espe-

cially Marxist structuralists. Parkin takes these theorists as his targets; the

virulent tone of his attack recalls a similar reaction to Marxist structuralism on the part of socialist-humanists who referred to it as an orrery of errors. 47

The difference is that socialist-humanists claim to be Marxists whereas

Parkin does not. The dismissive attitude of Marxist structuralists towards

other approaches within and outside of Marxism has provoked an equally

firm dismissal of Marxist structuralism on their part.

If one looks at the content of Parkin's theory, however, one finds that,

surprisingly in light of the tone of the book, it is heavily indebted to Marx.

Parkin's indebtedness to Marx is indicated by the central role of property in

Parkin's theory. "The case for restoring the notion of property into the centre

of class analysis is that it is the most important single form of social closure common to industrial societies. ''48 Parkin distinguishes sharply between

property as possessions (ownership of a toothbrush) and property as capital

(ownership of an oilfield) and argues that only the latter is pertinent to

closure theory. "Property as capital is, to paraphrase Macpherson, that

which 'confers the right to deny men access to the means of life and labor'. ''49

Not only is property seen by Parkin as the most important single form of closure but also he defines property in a way that is very similar to the

Marxist definition based on the ownership of the means of production and

resulting necessity for non-owners to sell their labor in exchange for the

means of subsistence. Parkin interprets Weber as being in full agreement with Marx when Weber insists that "property" and "lack of property" are the

basic features of all class situations) 0

Parkin decisively rejects the confounding of property as possessions and

property as capital by authors such as Parsons together with its implication that property is benign because everyone is an owner to some extent. 5t

Parkin also rejects the argument of authors such as Dahrendorf that proper- ty should be replaced by authority in the analysis of class. Parkin argues that

authority and managerial command derive not from the logic of organiza-

tion but rather from the legal guarantees by the state concerning, in particu- lar, private property. He says this is revealed on the dramatic occasions that organizations are incapable of handling, when managerial authority is re-

stored by the intervention of state powers dedicated to the protection of property rights. He argues, moreover, that authority only exists with respect to this or that particular organizational setting, that it is fragmented, and that

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it therefore fails to capture the generalized impact of social structures in the

way that the Marxist concept of property does. "In Marx's schema, the

propertyless are a class in the full sense in so far as the entire weight of the

political and legal apparatus bears down upon them in whatever work situation or social setting they are found . . . . Marx's proletariat has no hiding

place because the effects of property cannot be confined within restricted social zones any more than the effects of the market can. ''52 Parkin in

addition sees defective class analyses which focus exclusively on inequalities resulting from the division of labor or on inequalities surrounding the

occupational order 53 as well as analyses which define the dominant class

solely in terms of the new professional and technical experts in a "post-capi-

talist" period 54 because such analyses ignore the crucial role of private

property.

Parkin argues against the idea that property can and need be the basis of bodies which counteract the power of the state and contends that property is

a very inadequate guarantee of liberty. He conceives of the state as a

dependent variable that responds to, and as a mirror that reflects, class and

communal forces in society. "The nature of the state can, in other words, be

'read offf from the balance of forces in civil society. ''55 Except for the

introduction of "communal forces" this is an exact replica of Poulantzas's

conception of the state as "a 'resultant' of the relations of power between classes within a capitalist formation. "56 In spite of Parkin's disdain for the

notion of the relative autonomy of the state advanced by Marxist structural-

ists, his conception of the state and theirs are virtually identical.

Weberian closure theory is of course not based only on property, and closure

theory is not reducible to Marxist theory. Even Parkin, however, admits that

there is a good deal of overlap between the two theories: "the conceptual

categories of exclusion and usurpation are not altogether synonymous with

the more familiar distinction between capital and labor. Although there is a considerable overlap in their u s age . . , the Weberian schema directs atten-

tion to certain issues that are not easily brought into the Marxist embrace.'57

The tone of Parkin's critique of contemporary Marxism has led him and

closure theorists generally to be interpreted as being anti-MarxP 8 The fore- going examination of the relationship of closure theorists to Marx's work demonstrates that such a conclusion is very misleading. Closure theorists argue that Marx has provided an incomplete basis for the analysis of social closure in the contemporary world (a world whose class structure has changed over the last 130 years, a world which now includes societies which call themselves socialist and whose official ideology has been derived from

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the work of Marx and Lenin, and a world in which other forms of monopoli-

zation in addition to property are important); but closure theorists are

heavily indebted to Marx for many of their ideas and they see their work in terms of using Weber to go beyond, rather than to refute, Marx. Weberian closure theory reaffirms the central role of concepts which are at the center of Marxist theory, such as property as capital.

Parkin's Explanation of the Spread of Academic Marxism Since the Late 1960s

Some of Parkin's comments about the growth and appeal of academic Marxism since the late 1960s have also been torn out of context and thereby misinterpreted. For example, Giddens writes that "much of the strength of marxist theories, and their continuing importance, derives not from the sort of appeal Parkin suggests they hold for gullible student audiences, but from their direct relevance to the critical analysis of capitalist society in Marx's

sense - a society in which the capital/wage labor relation is fundamental. "59 Critics such as Giddens have drawn unwarranted conclusions from two

sentences written by Parkin. "Contemporary western Marxism, unlike its classical predecessor, is wholly the creation of academic social theorists - more specifically, the creation of the new professoriate that rose up on the wave of university expansion in the 1960s. The natural constituency of this Marxism is not of course the working class, but the massed ranks of undergraduates and postgraduate students in the social sciences; its content and design mark it out exclusively for use in the lecture theatre, the seminar

room, and the doctoral dissertation. "60 The only accusation that could be made against Parkin here is that of stating the obvious, and open-eyed Marxists have made similar observations. 61

The above quotation from Parkin describes the association between the wave of university expansion in the 1960s and the development and appeal of Marxist theory in academia but it does not explain why the new professoriate and the students turned to Marxism rather than to some other theory. He does nonetheless suggest an explanation in other parts of his book. The importance and meaning of property as capital in Parkin's closure theory implies that he too holds that they turned to Marx because of the relevance of

concepts, such as property, developed by Marx to the critical analysis of capitalist society in which the capital/wage labor relation is fundamental. Parkin suggests that the new professoriate and their students turned to Marxist theory because it was the only theory available at the time which gave sufficient emphasis to the obviously important role of property as capital in capitalist society, most of stratification theory having either denied

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a role to property or having attributed to it a much too restricted role. Thus

Parkin states that "it is unsurprising that the sociological model of class should seem to have few friends and that many social theorists should turn to that alternative tradition that places property at the very centre of its analysis, and which treats class relations as manifestations of power. ''62 It is astonishing that Parkin's critics ignore this point since he frequently repeats it. "The persistent attractions of Marxist class theory have almost certainly been boosted by the less than inspiring alternative offered by academic sociology. ''63 Weberian closure theory as developed by Parkin and others seeks to continue the tradition that places property at the center of analysis

and that treats class relations as manifestations of power and yet it also seeks to use Weber to go beyond both Marxist theory and the "uninspiring alternative" offered by Weberian stratification theory.

Closure Theory's Attack on Stratification Theory

Weberian closure theory conceives of the relationship between classes as one of permanent tension and mutual antagonism which are not necessarily impossible to manage. Hence Parkin argues that closure theory is as opposed to liberal stratification theory, which postulates a contractual relationship between classes based on mutual interest and harmony, as it is to Marxist

theory, which assumes the existence of irresolvable class contradictions that become fatal to the capitalist system. 64 For example, both have tended to regard ethnicity as a spent force under the homogenizing effects of industrial-

ization and capitalism (although he contends that some recent stratification theories commit the opposite error of focusing on ethnicity to such an extent that class is largely ignored) and both have failed to produce a theory capable

of integrating intra-class divisions based on such factors as ethnicity with inter-class divisions. 65

Weberian closure theory in fact arose much more in reaction to functional- ism and stratification theory than in reaction to Marxist theory. Parkin

originally presented his closure theory in order to integrate in a single conceptual vocabulary the analysis of class divisions and communal divi- sions (those based on for example ethnicity, race, language and religion). To do so he enlarged the meaning of exploitation from its restricted Marxist usage, as the appropriation of surplus value by capitalists from workers, to include all practices by which one group maximizes its own rewards and opportunities by closing off those available to others. He thereby rejected the implication of much of functionalism and stratification theory that the transition from ascription to achievement values is a sign of moral progress. He argued that this transition involved changes in the character of exclusion

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practices and changes in the political and legal foundations of exploitation

rather than its elimination. 66

In an even earlier book that cleared the way for his closure theory Parkin presented a perceptive critique of stratification theory, which he concluded had trivialized Weber's key propositions concerning class and status. He argued that it was stratification theorists who, in misinterpreting Weber, had

singled out power (instead of political parties as Weber did) as a separate dimension of stratification rather than conceiving power as the basis of all the dimensions of stratification (as did Weber). He contended that their emphasis on the subjective aspects of stratification in order to refute Marx has led to a misunderstanding of the relationship between the material and normative components of class inequality. Parkin was very prudent in his

conclusions concerning the usefulness of Weber's ideas: "the Weberian perspective cannot be adopted for the analysis of a modern class system without certain qualifications . . . . Enthusiastic acceptance of the multi-

dimensional model has blinded many writers to certain serious flaws and ambiguities in Weber's treatment of the problem [of the relationship between class and status]. ''67 Parkin even stated that "Marx, although he was little

concerned with matters of status as such, would appear to be a more useful guide than Weber" to explain the factual distribution of social honor. 68

Neuwirth presented her early version of Weberian closure theory in opposi- tion, not to Marxism, but to the ecological approach to the analysis of communities used in American investigations at that time. This ecological approach assumed the shared interests and solidarity of members of a community as a result of their common residence. 69

Collins argued in his first article that functionalists such as Parsons do "not so much directly misinterpret Weber's political sociology as to overlook it. "70

Collins then outlined a Weberian approach to political sociology which he presented as a contrast with functionalist analysis. He developed his Weber- ian closure theory, referring to it as conflict theory, in a second article in which he concluded that his theory provided a more adequate explanation of educational stratification and of the increased schooling required for em- ployment than technical-function theory. 7~ Collins saw the technical-func-

tion theory of education that he opposed as a particular application of the functional theory of stratification and of the functional perspective in general which assumes that the needs of society determine the rewards and behavior of its members. He argued that the functional perspective failed to provide an adequate explanation of the continuing importance of social origins and ascriptive factors and of the growing importance of educational credentials

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in occupational success. It is clear that Collins developed his Weberian

closure theory in reaction to functionalism in both these articles.

In a later book Collins distinguished his approach from both functionalism

and Marxism. His reaction to these two perspectives was, however, far from being identical. Whereas he saw his own version of Weberian theory as

incorporating and developing the main thrust of Marxian fundamentals

(although opposing particular elements of Marxism), 72 he saved his most

damning comments for functionalism. He contended that the focus of

functionalism on assumed needs of society rather than on the conditions and

social forces which produce particular arrangements has led to tautology and

to "pseudoexplanation: in effect, an after-the-fact rationalization for what- ever exists. ''73 He argued that mobility research and the categorization of

societies into ascribed versus achievement systems have been based on

functionalist and evolutionist assumptions and have "been permeated with

efforts to extol a particular kind of idealized social order . . . . What most of

this boils down to is a form of national self-congratulation; for what evolu-

tionist ever places his own society anywhere but at the peak of human

advance? Such theories have been used as excuses for imperialism and racism, as well as more subtle forms of justifying cultural domination by

whatever group one happens to belong to. ''74 Like Parkin, Collins argued

against the assumption of stratification theorists and functionalists that the

transition from stratification based on ethnicity to stratification based on

school diplomas can be taken as a sign of moral progress from ascription to

achievement. Collins instead argued that education should be treated as

"pseudoethnicity," in that it involves the imposition of a particular ethnic or

class culture, and the educated class should be treated as a "surrogate ethnic

group, setting up job requirements in its own favor and discriminating against those who do not use its vocabulary and do not refer to the same

literary classics or technicist ideals . . . . The interaction of status group

cultures with occupational classes and political power is the main dynamic of

stratification in all societies; whether status groups are organized around

families, ethnic communities, or education is a set of variations on a common theme."75

In his latest book on the increased importance of educational credentials, Collins continues to attack what he calls the myth that this increase reflects the technical and functional needs of society. "Whichever way we look at

i t . . . the technocratic interpretation of education hardly receives any sup- port. The same is true if we test the functional theory of stratification, of which the technological theory is a particular application. "76

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The Development of Closure Theory as the Usurpation of Theoretical Territory

Closure theory in fact originated as a reaction to other interpretations of Weber, particularly functionalism and stratification theory, and not in reac- tion to Marxist theory. 77 The typical response of closure theorists to Marx- ism is not to dismiss it outright but rather to argue that Weberian closure

theory incorporates Marx's principal insights but that it goes beyond them. Even Parkin's latest book, so seemingly dismissive of Marxism, attempts to incorporate Marx's most fundamental ideas into his own original theory based primarily on Weber.

Why, then, has Parkin dramatized the opposition between contemporary Marxism and Weberian closure theory at the end of the 1970s through an especially sarcastic attack on the former whereas he and other closure theorists aimed their heavy critical artillery at stratification theory and functionalism at the beginning of the 1970s? I would suggest that this shift involves not a change in the nature of closure theory but rather a modifica- tion of strategies in the usurpationary struggle for scholarly recognition. This

readjustment of strategy can be understood in terms of the underdeveloped nature and unnoticed status of Weberian closure theory and in terms of the transformation of the structure of power and exclusionary closure which has occurred in the field of sociology during this period.

Until the early 1970s the dominant approach, often referred to as main- stream sociology, to the study of social inequality in Anglo-Saxon sociology,

was what I have called stratification theory, which was strongly associated with the more general and abstract perspective of functionalism. Nisbet, for

example, writing in 1966, stated that the "spell of Marx" had ended in sociology and he characterized sociology in terms of"the gradual superses-

sion of'class' by'status' as the key concept in sociological studies of stratifica- tion. Today, as a sociological concept, class is dead. ''78 Stratification theor- ists and functionalists drew selectively from the writings of Weber, choosing to ignore his concept' of closure and his discussion of monopolization and choosing to de-emphasize the central role Weber attributed to power in the creation, maintenance, and legitimation of inequalities.

Unfortunately for Nisbet, he made his comment on the eve of the dramatic resurrection ofthe"spell of Marx" and of the concept"class" in the sociology of the 1970s. The visible practices of capitalist societies - in particular the spectacles of the American role in Viet Nam, the repression of the May 1968 demonstrations in France, and the increasing inequalities between the West

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and the Third World - led many young theorists to seek a critical analysis of

inequality and to become dissatisfied with stratification theory and function- alism. Most turned to Marxism and attempted to re-orient Marxist theory away from the economism with which it had become impregnated. A few

theorists who were particularly interested in inequalities among racial, eth- nic, sexual, religious, and linguistic groups as well as in the growing impor- tance of inequalities based on educational credentials found, however, little in Marxist theory that would help them analyze these phenomena. 79 Further- more, these were precisely the theorists who were unwilling to restrict the implications of their analyses to societies which have retained the legal basis of the private ownership of the means of production and who were willing to examine the exclusionary praxis that has resulted from the official adoption

of Marxist theory in society. These theorists saw the Marxist focus on the private ownership of the means of production as an important, but circum- scribed, element toward the explanation of the sources of social inequality.

They sought a more general explanation, within which they could incorpo- rate the Marxist emphasis on property, of the sources of inequality in

different contexts. The basis of a more general explanation was found in that part of Weber's writings that stratification theorists and functionalists had ignored, the part that emphasized closure and power as the source of

inequality. Thus closure theorists state that "the most powerful development on Marx, however, is still the work of Max Weber, ''s0 a claim that would astound both Marxists and stratification theorists. Logically the principal opponent of Weberian closure theory from the beginning was the opposite interpretation of Weber which formed part of the foundation of stratification theory and functionalism, whereas Marxism was viewed by closure theorists

with mixed feelings since they were partly indebted to Marx.

There were other related reasons why closure theorists chose to emphasize their opposition to stratification theory and minimize their differences with Marxist theory in the late 1960s and early 1970s. New and little known approaches which suggested new directions for research but had not yet

produced a systematic perspective nor an extensive body of concrete investi- gations all adopted the same tactic of taking the mainstream perspective of stratification theory and functionalism as adversaries to be dismissed in the most strident manner possible in order to attract attention to their suggested new directions. Ethnomethodology, phenomenology, and symbolic interac- tionism as well as Weberian closure theory, or conflict theory as Collins called it, all criticized mainstream sociology in the loudest possible way. Some of these new approaches even attempted to present themselves as an emergent paradigm that would replace the reigning functionalist-stratifica- tion theory paradigm. 81

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These strategies were quite different from those adopted by Marxists. Marx-

ist theory already had a long and important tradition in social theory.

Whereas Marxists could engage in internal struggles to recover what is best in Marx in order to understand contemporary capitalism, leaving the dismis- sal of stratification theory and functionalism as a secondary concern, propo- nents of the new approaches had to attack mainstream sociology directly and explicitly in order to make known their existence and to arouse interest in

their development of a novel tradition. In fact, for Weberian closure theor- ists, recovering what was best in Weber necessarily implied an attack on what

was seen as the faulty interpretation of Weber given by stratification theorists and functionalists.

Closure theorists (as well as theorists of other persuasions) were quite successful in their critique of stratification theory and functionalism, raising a host of very fundamental questions. Closure theorists were also making slow but steady progress in developing their own theoretical perspective based primarily on a different interpretation of the work of Weber. By the late 1970s, however, there was little indiction that they had attracted much of

a following. Closure theorists could make no claim that theirs was an emergent paradigm because they could find little evidence that anyone had taken notice of the emergence of their new perspective.

Marxist theory, on the contrary, experienced a spectacular take-off in terms of a growing number of academic adherents during the same period. By the

late 1970s Marxist theory was as established and as mainstream in academic sociology as were stratification theory and functionalism, with Marxist structuralism having become the most established and main stream of Marxism. In fact, stratification theory and especially functionalism were in the process of becoming remarkably disestablished. One had to search to find a sociologist who dared to present himself or herself openly as a

functionalist. There certainly were sociologists who were functionalist in their orientation, but they had largely gone into hiding. Closure theorists had lost their old adversary, in part because their own critiques had been so successful. This success at undermining the adversary had nonetheless failed to produce the desired result of attracting a following to closure theory. With the crumbling of the castle of functionalism, sociologists had turned to the already established and elaborate Marxist fortress for a criticial theory based on property and conflict without noticing the theoretical edifice in the prototype stage being constructed by closure theorists. It was as if sociolo- gists had found it easier to remodel an old fortress than to build a new one from scratch.

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Parkin was the first closure theorist to remark the dilemma, s2 Continued attacks on stratification theory and functionalism would have no more effect than that of beating a dead horse. The principal adversary was now contem- porary Marxism, the most successful usurper of the territory formerly held

by stratification theory and functionalism, s3 Closure theory had to demon- strate its superiority not just to stratification theory and functionalism, but especially to Marxism in the late 1970s. It had to usurp the ground recently gained by the neighboring usurper. Parkin's solution was to de-emphasize

his indebtedness to Marx, to demarcate closure theory as sharply as possible from contemporary Marxist theory, and to point out the flaws in the latter not only as logically but also as dramatically as possible, while at the same time continuing to construct his alternative closure theory. Although Parkin uncovered many pertinent problems which have been ignored by contem- porary Marxism, the tone of his attack was as much related to the under- developed nature of his own closure theory and the paucity of empirical research guided by his theory to date s4 as it was to the failings of Marxist

theory. Moreover, Parkin's recent neglect of stratification theory and func- tionalism is as telling as any critique he could have made. He has attempted to redefine debate and restructure the power struggle in sociology in terms of Weberian closure theory versus contemporary Marxism, with stratification theory and functionalism being excluded as unthinkable and absurd.

Although Parkin's particular subversion strategy creates the possibility of high gains, it is also a high risk strategy. It could result in a fundamental misunderstanding of closure theory characterized by an exaggerated impres- sion of its opposition to Marxist theory. The demolition strategy used by Parkin against contemporary Marxist theory could well set the terms of subsequent theoretical reflection as "for or against Marx" rather than as "for the development of closure theory." Moreover, the amusement value of Parkin's literary tactics may be effective in leading others to take notice of Parkin but be counter-productive in encouraging them to take seriously what the Weberian closure problematic has to offer in its own right. I have attempted to diminish those risks by pointing out the common ground between Marx and closure theorists and by exposing the strategies in the struggle for scholarly recognition with a view to focusing attention beyond the strategies to the theory the strategies were designed to promote. 85

Conclusion

Parkin is not the only contemporary sociologist to contribute to the elabora- tion of a Weberian closure problematic, even though he is the only one to use the term "closure" and the one who has made a contribution at the most

653

general level. The work of Collins and Bourdieu has been undertaken from

essentially the same closure problematic, with Collins limiting himself to credentials as a basis of closure and Bourdieu restricting his analysis to the scientific field. 86 Despite the fact that these three contemporary authors have

totally ignored each other's work, that work can be integrated into one coherent and general closure problematic, with each author having contrib- uted special closure theories for the analysis of specific areas and cases. Thus

there already exists a growing body of theoretical reflection and empirical research of impressive quality that can easily be integrated to form the basis of a potentially powerful and general framework for understanding monop-

olization in all its forms as well as the subversive practices such monopoliza- tion provokes.

The closure problematic is in addition particularly appropriate for the analysis of the conditions underlying its own existence and for the advance- ment of a reflexive sociology. 87 Closure theorists cannot avoid conceiving their own strategies as they conceive the strategies of others - in terms of usurpation and subversion, monopolization, exclusion, and conservation - in short, in terms of closure. The awareness of the position of the closure problematic in the changing structure of closure in the field of sociology and the explicit recognition of the strategies adopted by the proponents of the

closure problematic to modify that position and modify the structure of closure in the field serves to deepen our understanding of the closure proble- matic and of the dynamics of the field of sociology itself.

The nature and timing of Parkin's recent attack on Marxist theory cannot be understood solely in terms of the inherent opposition between Marxist theory and closure theory. There is in fact a substantial overlap in the two theories. The nature and timing of his attack can only be understood as strategies in the struggle for scholarly recognition, strategies whose selection is strongly dependent on the context of the changing structure of closure in sociology. Parkin's attack on contemporary Marxist theory in the late 1970s, in stark contrast to his and other closure theorists' attacks on stratification theory and functionalism in the early 1970s, results from a shift in choice targets. It faithfully reflects the quasi-monopolistic position of stratification

theory in the earlier period followed by the successful usurpation of that position to the benefit of Marxist theory. During that interval stratification theory and functionalism lost a large part of their following whereas Marx- ism gained an impressive number of academic adherents. An accompanying transformation occurred in the standards of what constitutes excellence and personal intellectual worth.

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The deve lopmen t of scholarship and of science can not be reduced to the

unve i l ing of its i m m a n e n t logic, whether the process be that of the progres-

sive a c c u m u l a t i o n of knowledge or tha t of a l t e rna t ing per iods of n o r m a l

deve lopmen t and revo lu t ionary pa rad igm t r ans fo rmat ion . Nor can its de-

v e l o p m e n t be reduced to an objective an d necessary d e t e r m i n a t i o n by forces

externa l to scholarship a n d science. 8s Ra the r its deve lopmen t has to be seen

in terms of a power struggle a m o n g scholars and scientists themselves

conce rn ing what cons t i tu tes good scholarship a n d bad scholarship, t rue

science a n d false science, with strategies be ing chosen in l ight of the way the

field has been s t ruc tured by the o u t c o m e of the scholar ly power struggle of

the past. The field of scholarship an d in par t icu la r sociology is the batt lefield

for a relatively (bu t n o t complete ly) a u t o n o m o u s power struggle over the

very m e a n i n g of good and bad scholarship , t rue and false science. The

accepted and seemingly i m m a n e n t logic of the field is the historical pa t te rn of

ou tcomes of this struggle of m o n o p o l i z a t i o n an d usurpa t ion .

N O T E S

1. The literature concerned with stratification and class is massive. For examples of the formulations of stratification and class see W. Lloyd Warner, editor, Yankee City Series, 5 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941-1959); K. Davis and W. E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," American Sociological Review, Vol. 10 (1945), 242-249; Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, editors, Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, II1.: Free Press, 1953), 92-128; C. C. North and P. K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evalua- tion," Opinion News, Vol. 9 (1947), 3-13; O. D. Duncan, "A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations," in A. J. Reiss, Jr., et al., editors, Occupations and Social Status (New York: Free Press, 1961), 109-138; P. M. Blau and O. D. Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: Wiley, 1967); John H. Goldthorpe and Keith Hope, The Social Grading of Occupations: a New Approach and Scale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); and see the current Marxist debate concerning the conceptualization of class, especially Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978); E.O. Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," New Left Review, Vol. 98 (1976): 3-41; Alan Hunt, Class and Class Structure (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977); G. Carchedi, "On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class," Economy andSoeiety, Vol. IV/No. 1 (1975); and Harry Braverman, Laborand Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974). Some stratification theorists use the concept "class" and some Marxist class theorists make use of the concept "stratification." These two concepts are not mutually exclusive, but they have resulted in the exclusion of third alternatives. Stratification theory and Marxist theory are not merely theories of specific subfields, like the "new sociology of education." Rather stratification theory (and its associate, functionalism) and Marxist theory have been at the very center of the field of sociology, penetrating its various subfields.

2. This stylistic paradigm has known few exceptions. For one exception see Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Mentor, 1953 [1899]).

3. For example, Randall Collins, "Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratifi- cation," American Sociological Review, Vol. 36/December (197 I), 1002-1019, based his conflict theory primarily on Max Weber's Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 926-939, discussion of the distribution of power, and of class, status, and party. Gertrud Neuwirth, "A Weberian outline of a theory of community: its application to the 'Dark Ghetto'," The British JournalofSociology, Vol. 20/2 (1969), 148-163 took her community closure theory from Weber's Economy and Society, 339-355 and 385-398, chapters on the economic relation- ships of organized groups and ethnic groups respectively. Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory." A Bourgeois Critique (London: Tavistock, 1979), attempted to integrate Weber's, Economy and Society, 341-343 discussion of open and closed economic relation- ships with Weber's discussion of power.

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4. I only have the space here to give the barest essentials of the approach of each author necessary to support my argument that they are all working from and developing the same closure problematic and necessary to develop a reflexive problematic. A more elabo- rate statement of the closure problematic, its propositions and methods, in the form of a generalized model will have to wait a paper that is presently being prepared.

5. Weber, Economy and SocieO', 935. 6. Ibid., 927. 7. Weber's evident indebtedness to Marx in his discussion of property suggests that the

amount of overlap between closure theory and Marxism is far from being negligible. 8. Ibid., 638. 9. For an analysis and development of Weber's conception of power see Raymond Murphy

"Power and Autonomy in the Sociology of Education," Theoo, and Society I I (1982): 179 203.

10. Parkin has published his most elaborated contribution to the Weberian closure problem- atic in Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, especially chapters 4, 5, and 6. Earlier statements can be found in Parkin, "Strategies of social closure in the maintenance of inequality," unpublished paper presented to the Eighth World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, 1974, and in Parkin, "Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation," in Frank Parkin, editor, The Social Analysis of Class Structure (London: Tavistock, 1974). Also of interest is his defense of his theory in "Reply to Giddens," Theory and Society, Vol. 9 (1980), 891 894 and his earlier critical analysis in Frank Parkin, Class lnequalio, and Political Order (Frogmore: Paladin, 1972 [1971]) which led to the development of his closure theory.

I I. Hence 1 am. using the expression "closure problematic" rather than "closure theory." 12. For Collins's contributions to the development of a Weberian closure problematic, or

conflict theory as Collins calls it, see the following: Randall Collins, "A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology," in Reinhard Bendix, editor, State and Society (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), 42-67; Collins, "Functional and Conflict Theories of Educa- tional Stratification"; Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science, (New York: Academic Press, 1975); Collins, review of "Schooling in Capitalist America" by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 46/2 (1976), 246-251; Randall Collins, The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification (New York: Academic Press, 1979); Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization," American Sociological Review, Vol. 45/December (1980): 925 942.

13. Randall Collins, The Credential Society. 14. For a fascinating first-hand account of the struggle among individuals to elaborate the

paradigm that dominates a field in the natural sciences see James D. Watson, The Double Helix (New York: Signet, 1969), concerning the solution of the structure of DNA.

15. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

16. For an indication of this interpretative struggle among Marxists see Simon Clarke, "Socialist Humanism and the Critique of Economism," History Workshop Journal, Vol. 8/Autumn (1979), 137-156; Richard Johnson, "Edward Thompson, Eugene Genovese, and Socialist-Humanist History," History Workshop Journal, Vol. 6/Autumn (1978), 79-100; Richard Johnson, "Culture and the historians," in John Clarke, Chas Critcher and Richard Johnson, editors, Working-Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory (Lon- don: Hutchinson, 1979), 41-71; Johnson, "Three problematics: elements of a theory of a working-class culture," in Clarke, Critcher and Johnson, Working-Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory, 201 237; Nicos Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review, Vol. 95 (1976), 63-83; E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory & other essays (London: Merlin, 1978).

17. See Charles C. Lemert, "Reading French Sociology," in Charles C. Lemert, editor, French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal Since 1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 3-32, for an examination of the struggle in French sociology and the rest of his reader for examples of the struggle itself.

18. A common usurpation strategy is to decry as scientism and mathematical mystification approaches which make use of statistical techniques. See for example the critique of Goldthorpe and Halsey's Oxford Mobility studies by Otto Newman, "Class Matters," Sociology, Vol. 14/4 (1980), 631-636. Another usurpation strategy is to denounce as obfuscation works which use an esoteric language and which are written in a way that makes their intelligibility depend on the prior knowledge of the equally esoteric work of a selective series of other authors. See for example the critique of Giddens's latest work in John Rex, "Towards an understanding of society," New Society, Vol. 50 (1979), 200-202. Although esoteric mathematics, vocabulary, syntax, or references are often an important part of exclusionary closure in academic disciplines, closure can also occur in terms of a non-mathematical, readily comprehensible paradigm which nonetheless excludes from the field those who do not accept the paradigm.

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19. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason," Social Science Information, Vol. 14/5 (1975), 19 47.

20. Ibid., 271.21. Ibid., 257.22. Ibid., 282. 23. The fact that Bourdieu does not use the word "closure" should not blind us to the

theoretical affinity between his analysis and the closure problematic any more than the absence of the word "closure" from Collins's writings should lead us to fail to notice that Collins's analysis is a form of the closure problematic.

24. Such an insidious effect is evident in much of Bourdieu's own work. For example, his effort to discredit empirical sociology has led him to a profound ignorance of methods of systematic documentation and to an unconvincing documentation of his own ideas. It would be erroneous to assume that Bourdieu has realized his ideal of examining the overall game and field of sociology. What is remarkable about Bourdieu's criticisms of his rivals is that they so often apply rigorously to his own work. For example, his criticism of Theory and Society as the journal of "critical sociologists" identifying with a sort of vague antipositivi~st humanism is a particularly apt comment on Bourdieu's own intellectual endeavour.

25. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. 26. Ibid., 45.27. Ibid., 199.28. Ibid., 24. 29. See Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital(New York: Monthly Review Press,

1974), chapter 18, and J. Westergaard and H. Resler, Class in a Capitalist Society (London: Heinemann, 1975), 92 and 346.

30. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique,25. 31. Ibid., x. 32. Parkin, "Reply to Giddens," 894. 33. Collins, Conflict Sociology, 49. 34. Collins, review of "Schooling in Capitalist America," 251. 35. See Collins, The Credential Society. 36. Gavin Mackenzie, review of "Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique," The

British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 31 / 4 (1980), 582-583. 37. Randall Collins, "A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology." 38. Collins, Conflict Sociology, 533. 39. Ibid., 45. See also pages 58 and 289. 40. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic

Books, 1976). 41. Collins, review of "Schooling in Capitalist America," 249. 42. Ibid., 250. 43. See Collins, The Credential Society. 44. Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism" 940. 45. Neuwirth, "A Weberian outline of a theory of community," 148. 46. See Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 45. 47. See Thompson, The Poverty of Theory. 48. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 53. 49. Ibid., 53. 50. See Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 48 and Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in

Sociology, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 182.

51. See Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 50 and Talcott Parsons, The Social System (London: Routledge, 1951), 119.

52. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 51 53. See Ibid., 14-15. Parkin quietly slips in here an unadmitted autocritique of his own earlier

book, Class Inequality and Political Order. In that work he claimed that the line of cleavage which distinguishes the two principal classes occurs between the manual and non-manual occupational categories. Curiously, it was the greater inequality resulting from property that led Parkin to choose to focus on occupation rather than on property, arguing that property ownership is not the primary source of reward for the bulk of the population since it is so concentrated in the hands of so few. Parkin has moved more explicitly toward Marxist theory at the very time of his bourgeois critique of Marxism, whereas he was closer to stratification theory in his earlier book in which the principal target of his criticisms was none other than stratification theory. Strategies of criticism intended to promote one's ideas can be relatively autonomous from the content of those ideas.

54. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 58. 55. Ibid., 139. See also 140. 56. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left

Review, Vol. 95 (1976), 73. 57. Ibid., 89. 58. See Anthony Giddens, "Classes, Capitalism, and the State," Theory and Society, Vol. 9

(1980), 877-890. 59. Ibid., 890. 60. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, ix. 61. See Thompson, The Poverty of Theory.

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62. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theoo,, 15. 63. Ibid., 11.64. See ibid., 112. 65. See ibid., 30-31, 36. 66. See Parkin, "Strategies of social closure in the maintenance of inequality" and Parkin,

"Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation." 67. Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, 29. 68. Ibid., 41. 69. Neuwirth, "A Weberian outline of a theory of community." 70. Collins, "A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology," 47, footnote 17. 71. Collins, "Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification." 72. Collins, Conflict Sociology, 45, 58. 73. Ibid., 6. See also 421. 74. Ibid., 525. See also 434. 75. Ibid., 86-87. 76. Collins, The Credential Socieo,, 7-8. 77. The various interpretations of Marx have also arisen not so much in reaction to other

perspectives as in reaction to other interpretations of Marx: Marxist structuralism was developed in opposition to the economistic and humanistic interpretations of Marx; socialist-humanism grew out of the attempt to correct both the economistic and structural- ist readings of Marx; the wage-earner non-owner conception of the working class and the concept of contradictory class location were advanced to rectify what was seen as the much too narrow identification of the working class in the structuralist interpretation of Marx, etc.

78. Robert Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 216. See also Robert Nisbet, "The decline and fall of the concept of social class," Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 2 (1959).

79. See Collins, Conflict Sociology, 49, and Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory for explicit statements to this effect.

80. Collins, Conflict Sociology, 50 ft. 8 I. See Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, "Educational Research: A Review and an Interpre-

tation," in Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, editors, Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1-85, esp. 51-60, for a perceptive analysis of the strategy used in the sociology of education to attempt to replace the reigning paradigm, which was essentially functionalism-stratification theory, with a new paradigm called the '~new" sociology of education.

82. Parkin clearly recognized the exclusionary closure in the process of being accomplished by contemporary Marxism as well as the nature of the exclusionary barriers being used. For example, he wrote the following in "The Academicizing of Marxism," Dissent, Spring (1980), 179. "As if to secure its newly won respectability, professorial Marxism, in the manner of all exclusive bodies, carries out its discourse through the medium of an arcane language that might have been especially designed to deter the uninitiated."

83. This does not imply that contemporary Marxism has become a dominant shared paradigm in sociology. The successfull usurpation of stratification theory and functionalism has resulted in a decentralization of sociological theory, with a multitude of new approaches - interaction theory, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, structuralism, critical theory, conflict theory, etc. staking their claim to scholarly recognition. Marxist theory was nonetheless the claimant to greater scholarly recognition which had the most success in academic circles during the 1970s, both in terms of its increased number of academic adherents and in terms of its influence on other approaches. That the British closure theorist Parkin noticed the changing structure of scholarly closure before the American closure theorist Collins is not surprising given the greater usurpation of stratification theory and functionalism to the benefit of Marxism in Britain than in the United States.

84. For an example of an empirical study guided by an early version of closure theory see Raymond Murphy "Teachers and the Evolving Structural Context of Economic and Political Attitudes in Quebec Society," The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthro- pology 18/2 (May 1981): 157 182.

85. I am currently working on a critical analysis and elaboration of the substance of closure theory centered around two elements: the structuration of exclusion and the concept of class in closure theory.

86. This is true of Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason." Bourdieu has also examined the field of knowledge in a wider sense as well as the questions of cultural reproduction and of the transmission and legitimation of inequalities by the school system. He has, however, manifested a peculiar intellectual development. Some of his earlier work, such as Pierre Bourdieu, "L'~cole conservatrice: Les in+galit6s devant l'6cole et devant la culture," Revue Fran~aise de Sociologie, Vol. 7 (1966), 325-347, made use of an essentially functionalist mode of analysis in order to carry out a critical examination of school and society that is very untypical of functionalists. Some of his mid-career work, for example Pierre Bourdieu and

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87.

88.

Jean-Claude Passeron, La Reproduction (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1970) appears to have been influenced by the Althusserian structuralism popular in France at the time, the latter also being characterized by functionalist overtones. It is especially Bourdieu's later article "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason" that has been undertaken from a closure problematic unrecognized as such. I would suggest, nonetheless, that much of the remainder of his work can be profitably integrated into the closure problematic with the removal of his functionalist conceptions of the imperatives and equilibrium of society. For a critical assessment of Bourdieu's analysis of the educational system see Raymond Murphy, Sociological Theories of Education, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979)and Raymond Murphy,"Powerand Autonomy in the Sociology of Education." For a classic statement of the need for a reflexive sociology see Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970), esp. Chapter 13. This is not to deny the important effect on scholarship and science of forces which have an existence external to scholarship and science. It is, however, to conceive of those forces in a particular way. It is to conceive of them in terms of the penetration of the scholarly and scientific fields, and in the ease examined here, the field of sociology, by the structure of closure in all the forms (property, credential, Communist Party, sexual, racial exclusion and resulting usurpation) in which it exists in the wider societal context. This penetration influences the nature of the internal struggle for scholarly recognition and the closure of both the exclusionary and usurpationary kind within the field itself. The penetration nonetheless occurs through and is mediated by scholars and scientists themselves - through their acceptance of resources and constraints on their work, and mediated by their predispositions (habitus) and career interests. That there is not a simple determination and one-to-one correspondence between scholarship and forces external to it is illustrated by the recent importance of professorial Marxism in capitalist social formations, a brand of Marxism which owes its material existence in academia neither to the class domination of the bourgeoisie nor to the class struggle of the working class and the labor movement.

Theory and Society 12 (1983) 631-658 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands