The Tablet - Ontological Argument

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God's existence: the ontological argument

Over the centuries a large number of philosophers and theologians have tried to argue thatGod's existence is somehow necessary. Descartes argued that the mere fact that we can talkabout a supremely perfect being implies that that being exists, because perfection and

existence somehow go together. Others such as Kant reject this kind of 'ontological'argument on the grounds that 'existence' is not a property of something in the way that,

say, redness is. Yet the ontological argument is still explored–

partly, some say, more as ameditation than a purely philosophical exercise.

There is only one major argument for God's existence that is a priori, deductive, and that was calledthe Ontological Argument by Immanuel Kant, though several versions of it predated Kant by centuries.

St Anselm – anybody who doubts God's real existence is a fool

The origins of the Ontological Argument are usually seen in the writings of St Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm's "argument" in Proslogion 2 was a reflection or prayer rather than aformal piece of philosophy. He tightened up his thoughts in two developed arguments foundin the Monologion (written before the Proslogion, though it did not appear until later) and

Proslogion 3. In Proslogion 2, Anselm began with a quotation from Psalm 14:1 and thenreflected on its truthfulness. Anselm defined God "aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit ", orthat than which no greater can be conceived. This a priori being accepted, he observes that

anybody who doubts God's real existence is a fool ... It is always greater to exist in reality(in re) than just in the mind (in intellectu) [this claim is often discussed in terms of therelationship between formal and intentional existence]. The doubter must have a concept of God in the mind to doubt or reject. If the concept of God is that of the greatest conceivablebeing it must be of a formally, really existing being ... The doubter is essentially saying"God, who exists, does not exist" – they are asserting a straight contradiction. As Anselm

wrote???

The word ontological was first used to describe deductive, analytic arguments for the existence of Godby Kant in the Critique of pure reason. The word "ontological" is derived from ontos, the present

participle of the Greek verb einai to be; it literally means "being", so the argument is that God'sexistence

follows from the nature of being, existence, itself. There are many ontological arguments, some moresophisticated than others, but they share the characteristics of being deductive, analytic, and a priorior propter quid arguments. They attempt to demonstrate that existence is part of God's nature orbeing and do not depend on observations.

Gaunilo's riposte 'on behalf of the fool'

The simple argument in Proslogion 2 was reduced to absurdity by Anselm's fellow Benedictine, Gaunilo,in a witty reposte entitled Liber pro Insipiente or "On behalf of the fool". Gaunilo ignored the fact thatAnselm had already published a tighter version of the argument in Proslogion 3 and focused on the

claim that God's nature as the greatest conceivable being must include existence. He used the exampleof a perfect island, observing that if a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that thisperfect island truly exists, "either I should believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to

regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he shouldsuppose that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island."

Gaunilo suggested that the ontological argument, if it is to work in proving God's existence, should alsoprove the existence of all other perfect things - islands, women, unicorns – which we all know don't

exist in the real world. To put it simply, no amount of believing or arguing is going to change the factthat when you get to your paradise island there will be cockroaches in the bathroom and nothing youcan say about the love of your life will stop her from aging, having PMT and occasionally nagging about

leaving the loo seat up!

Anselm's next move – the necessary existence of God

Anselm wasted no time in refuting Gaunilo's criticism. He developed the existing argument in Proslogion 3 into a more substantial piece of philosophy in the Responsio. Anselm stuck with his

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definition of God as the greatest conceivable being and still observed that it was greater to exist in rethan just in intellectu but he went on to ask whether it is greater for a being to have contingentexistence (i.e. existence which can be conceived not to exist) or to have necessary existence (i.e.existence which cannot be conceived not to exist). Naturally, necessary existence is greater and thusmust be a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being, of God. "For it is possible to conceiveof a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived

not to exist. Hence if that than which nothing greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist, itis not that..."

The property of necessary existence is only a property of the greatest conceivable being - only Godmust exist, necessary existence is his nature - existence is only part of the natures of other things.

Thus the argument cannot be applied to other things even if they seem to share in the perfectionwhich is God's nature as well. In other words, God's greatness is not like the greatness of other things- they can be more or less great but God is greatness itself - they can contingently exist but only God

necessarily exists.

De re necessity and de dicto necessity

In order to understand the ontological argument it is necessary to understand the term "necessary". Inthe cosmological argument God's "necessary" existence entails his self-sufficiency as the prime mover,

uncaused causer and sustaining non-contingent entity which gives rise to our reality. As such God is de

re necessary - he depends on nothing, is outside time and space, having no potential, wholly simple,perfect etc. In the ontological argument God's existence, admittedly entailing some or all of the

characteristics of the de re necessary god of the cosmological argument, is demonstrated to be dedicto necessary - true from the word, or definition of God. When Anselm and later other advocates of ontological proofs, speak of God's existence being "necessary" they mean that existence is aninescapable part of the concept of God.

St Thomas Aquinas argued that God's de re necessity could be demonstrated through inductive naturaltheology but that God's de dicto necessity could never be known in this life. He observed that allontological arguments depend on an a priori definition of God which he felt to be impossible. ForAquinas all claims about God are analogical - they share some meaning with similar claims made about

created things but should not be understood to be univocal. We can move from experience to the

conclusion that God exists and from that conclusion to making claims about the nature of his existenceas a necessary being - but the sense of our understanding of God's nature is too limited to allow for a

definition to be analysed for a de dicto proof of His existence. Aquinas denied the univocal use of language which Anselm's proof assumed - and thus undermined the ontological approach to provingGod's existence. As he wrote "Because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition ‘God exists'is not self-evident to us." Aquinas objected to the whole idea of a deductive ontological argument for

God because this type of argument starts with a definition which can then be analysed - somethingwhich is not possible in the case of God.

John Duns Scotus' definition of God

John Duns Scotus agreed with Aquinas that we can only prove theexistence of God by an argument quia ( from effect to cause) and not byan argument propter quid (from essence to characteristic) and furtherthat we cannot know the full nature of God in this life. Scotus was more

positive about the possibility of defining God univocally though anddoes not subscribe to Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. As for Aquinas, ???for Scotus our concept of God is framed in language based on temporalexperience. But as this experience derives from God, and we must thusbe able to talk about him as a result of experience, our language mustbe applicable to God. Scotus works from a distinctive definition of Godas an infinite being. He argued that this is a much better way of

understanding God's nature than the Thomist definition of God aswholly simple. Aquinas' definition is negative - God is not bounded by

the limited contingencies of time and space. Scotus' definition is positive - God possesses all pure

perfections, all those qualities which are better to have than not, in infinite degree, as an infinite being.



Descartes' calculation

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) proposed several versions of the ontological argument, the clearest of which is contained in his fifth Meditation and develops Anselm's argument in Proslogion 3.

1. I have an idea of a supremely perfect being2. Necessary existence is a perfection

3. Therefore a supremely perfect being exists

For Descartes the concept of God entails existence in the way that the concept of a triangle entailsthree sides, three angles and 180 degrees, in the way that the concept of a hill entails valleys. God de

dicto exists. Essentially Descartes argument tries to demonstrate equivalence between the words"‘God", "perfection" and "existence". In the same way that the number 4 can be written alternativelyas 1+1+1+1, 2+2 or 2x2, for Descartes the ontological argument just shows that the three terms

necessarily relate. Note that Descartes starts from the confident assertion that one can know theessential nature of God.

On some occasions Descartes claims that his "argument" is simply a self-evident axiom, graspedintuitively by a mind free from philosophical prejudice. Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremelyperfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And myunderstanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the

case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature.' One interestingquestion is to consider what Descartes really means by existence. As a rationalist philosopher, he seestruth being reached through the operations of the mind and dismisses sense data as potentially flawedand limited. God exists for Descartes in the way that a number exists - I can't photograph the number2 in the wild but I can see how it applies to other things and I can reasonably say that the number is

real or exists. God, the principle of supreme perfection, is as undeniable as any mathematical truth -but I can't see or touch (or photograph) it in itself. For Descartes that idea of God is a necessary

feature of our understanding which makes other judgments possible.

Descartes, like Anselm, concludes that denying God's existence is denying an

essential predicate of his nature. The atheist is a fool because he/she asserts"God, who exists, does not exist" - as nonsensical as talking of two-sided

triangles or flat hills. This claim, that existence can be seen as an essentialpredicate of anything, is the focus of the criticisms of the classical argumentlevelled by Kant and later Russell.

Leibniz's principle of non-contradiction

In the early eighteenth century, Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) attempted to fill

what he took to be a shortcoming in Descartes' view. Descartes' argumentfocused on a psychological question, whether the idea of God entailed hisexistence, whether a clear and distinct understanding of God would make

accepting His existence inescapable. Leibniz' argument focused instead on the logical possibility of God's necessary existence. According to Leibniz, Descartes' arguments fail unless one first shows thatthe idea of a supremely perfect being is coherent, or that it is logically possible for there to be asupremely perfect being.

Leibniz set himself the task of proving that there is no contradiction within the concept of a supremelyperfect being. Leibniz developed "the principle of non-contradiction", that is that a concept is valid,possible, true and real if it does not contain contradictions. For example the concept of a marriedbachelor is nonsensical, or a square circle. Square circles are impossible and not real. He made adistinction between what he took to be flawed concepts, such as the highest number and the greatestspeed, and those concepts of perfection which he maintained to be possible. He argued that allpossible perfections are simple, unanalyzable, and thus ultimately compatible. They can all be drawn

together within a single possible concept of supreme perfection.

Leibniz argued that existence is a perfection and that supreme perfection would entail infinite

existence. Leibniz, like Descartes, was a rationalist. He believed that ultimate reality is metaphysical.His argument sought to demonstrate that God's necessary existence, as a concept, contained no

contradictions and thus is logically possible. If the idea is possible and the idea relates God's naturewith formal existence, then God must formally exist.



Kant: God surpassing definition

The epistemology of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) prevented him from deriving a proof of God'sexistence from an a priori definition of his nature. For Kant, knowledge is based on experience andwhat can be induced or deduced from it. Knowledge of God and of "necessary existence" is beyond ourexperience and thus it would be impossible to develop a definition strong enough to be the subject of

analysis. This criticism is similar to that put forward by Aquinas. Kant allows for the objection to thiscriticism, voiced earlier by Scotus (above), by arguing that certainly experience indicates regularity,order, laws but that we cannot prove the existence of the God, the supreme good, which most

probably explains them - we can only postulate the existence of such a being. Language is based onexperience and can be used to explore it and indeed to arrive at evidence to support the postulate of God - but it cannot be used to provide proof in itself.

Kant first distinguished between synthetic and analytic statements - the first referring to existence and

the second making a claim about the relationship between concepts.1. Synthetic: this ball is red2. Analytic: unmarried men are bachelors

Kant observed that Descartes moved from the analytic claims "perfection entails existence" and"supreme perfection entails necessary existence" to synthetic claims, "perfect things exist" and "thesupremely perfect being exists". Though Kant accepts that these analytic statements are not self-

contradictory and thus possibly real by Leibniz's definition of reality, he does not accept Leibniz'sdefinition of reality.

For Kant reality is not just about logical plausibility, it is what we experience. He notes that making asynthetic claim is a different matter from making an analytic one. There are no instances of perfect

things or supremely perfect beings to refer to so we cannot conclude that they exist. Kant criticised theargument's concept of "necessary existence". He noted that to argue that there is a necessary being isthe same as to say that to deny its existence is self-contradictory, remember, saying "God, who mustexist, does not exist" makes you a fool according to Anselm. If this was the case then it would mean

that at least one analytic statement must be synthetically true - God exists. But Kant argues that it islogically impossible for any synthetic, existential proposition to be logically, analytically necessary. ForKant, every synthetic, existential proposition must contain the possibility of it being otherwise - this

ball may or may not be red, may or may not exist. The concept of necessary existence is thus acontradiction, a "miserable tautology"

Russell's criticism

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) made a similar criticism of the ontological argument in his article On

denoting (1905). He distinguished between two types of propositions - predicative (those which add tothe concept) and existential (those which claim a reference between a concept and a state of affairs)Russell argued that everyday use of language makes it possible to talk about non-existent things with

apparent meaning. Although we should say "are there things which match the description of cows?"before talking about cows, in fact we just start talking about cows. He used the example of "thepresent King of France" - as soon as I start talking about this meaningless entity, even if to state thatit does not exist, I imply that the concept is a valid one. For Russell, statements can only be true orfalse if they refer to a meaningful concept. There is no way that I can affirm the existence of anyinstance of "necessary existence" before embarking on an ontological argument which seeks toconclude the God's necessary existence is necessary - therefore the whole enterprise is meaningless.

Existence as perfection

Kant also criticised the assumption, made by Descartes, Leibniz and Anselm for that matter, thatexistence is a perfection – i.e. they had all claimed that it is better to exist than not to exist and thusthat the most perfect being would have to exist. Kant rejected this because he argued that existence is

a necessary ground for any other perfection to be meaningful rather than just another in a list of perfections. Imagine a job interview. The panel look through the CVs of two well qualified candidates -it turns out that candidate A exists and candidate B is made up. There is no real contest between the

two. Candidate B never really had any of the qualities the CV claimed and was nonsense all along.Candidate A's existence is not just another qualification which tips the balance in her favour! Kantmakes the point that a statement about existence is not the same as a statement about otherperfections of an object thus it is inappropriate to argue that "existence is a perfection, therefore the



supremely perfect being must exist." Note that Kant's concept of existence is rooted in experience - itappeals to common sense but does not engage with the rationalist argument on equal terms.

Kant criticised Descartes and Leibniz for seeing existence as a predicate of God. Descartes and Leibnizdefined God's perfection in terms of a list of attributes - just as a perfect flower would be colourful,scented, have petals and leaves etc, the supremely perfect being would be all-powerful, all-knowing,have necessary existence. He added existence as another attribute of the object but Kant argued that

this is flawed. Existence adds nothing to the concept of the flower; it merely refers to whether thereare instances of the concept. Existence is not a predicate; to use it as one is simply bad grammar.

Predicate and subject

Kant made a specific criticism of Leibniz, saying, "If I reject the predicate while retaining the subject,

contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if wereject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then left that can becontradicted ... the same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is

rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can thenarise." He did not accept Leibniz's principle of non-contradiction; although influenced by Leibniz's workas a young man, Kant later came to refer to Leibniz as "dogmatic" and claimed that reading Hume"awoke me from my dogmatic slumbers". For Kant, ultimate reality was not accessed by pure reason

and truth was not demonstrated by the coherence of its conceptual parts. God's existence could not be

proven by showing that the concept of God as a supremely perfect, necessarily-existing being is non-contradictory.

Real and imaginary

What is the difference between a real hundred pounds and an imaginary hundred pounds? Kantobserved that the concept in question is identical whether the notes are in my pocket or not. There is adifference between claiming something about a concept and claiming that a concept exists. He

concluded that... "The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by the famous ontologicalargument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend ourstock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas than a merchant can better his position by adding a fewnoughts to his cash account."

Essentially then, for Kant:– Whatever adds nothing to the concept of an essence is not part of that essence,– Existence adds nothing to the concept of an essence– Existence is not part of the essence of a thing, it is not a perfection.

Experience and semantics

Whereas Descartes argued that the conceptual relationship between perfection and existence withinthe idea of God rendered his necessary existence de dicto necessary, Kant observed that such analytictruths are simply semantic. Certainly the relationship between "unmarried man" and "bachelor" isundeniable but the sort of undeniable truth that it is extends only to how language should be used. ForKant, synthetic claims, claims about existence such as "this ball is red", must refer to a state of affairs

which can be experienced if they are to be meaningful. It is the experience of seeing the ball thatcarries the meaning, not the words we use to describe that experience. If I look at the ball and say"that ball is red" and Francois, having the same experience says "ceci, c'est rouge!" we know we meanthe same thing because we are experiencing the same thing. Analysing statements about things we

cannot experience does not really get us anywhere. For Kant all synthetic propositions can either betrue or false in relation to an actual state of affairs, a state of affairs within our experience. There canbe no analytic demonstrations concerning the existence of anything.

Findlay's paradox

John Niemeyer Findlay's 1948 article "Can God's existence be disproved?" tightened the criticismslevelled by Kant and Russell and attempted to provide an ontological proof of God's impossibility.

Findlay began by agreeing with Anselm's point in Proslogion 3, that only a necessary being would reallybe the greatest conceivable, really be God and thus really worthy of worship. He then claimed "it wasindeed an ill day for Anselm when he hit upon his famous proof. For on that day he not only laid baresomething that is of the essence of an adequate religious object, but also something that entails its

necessary non-existence."



Simply, building on Kant's dismissal of "necessary existence" as a contradictory proposition, hedeveloped what Hartshorne later called "Findlay's Paradox"

1. a contingent being would not deserve worship2. a necessary being is a logical absurdity

This could be seen as an ontological proof of God's non-existence! However, Charles Hartshornecriticised Findlay on two counts: 1. If it makes sense to talk about God's necessary nonexistence then

it makes just as much sense to talk about his necessary existence (Russell's argument in "Ondenoting" which ??? would see both discussions as equally meaningless!) and 2. Findlay, like Kant andbefore him, Hume, assumes that all existential propositions are contingent. Hartshorne points out thatthis is not a universally accepted assumption.

Malcolm and 'language games'

Norman Malcolm agreed with Hartshorne on his second point. A pupil of Wittgenstein, he saw thatmeaningful propositions are not restricted to the analytic or synthetic, but that meaning is derivedfrom the usage of language. Rather, he accepted Wittgenstein's "language games" theory - and onceagain shifted the truth/reality framework in which the argument is played out. Malcolm asserts thatwithin a religious form of life the concept of necessary existence has real meaning, its effect can be

seen in the lives of believers. Therefore Findlay's neat extension of Kant's critique should not beaccepted lightly. "In those complex systems of thought, those ‘language games', God has the status of a necessary being. Who can doubt that?... I believe we may rightly take the existence of thosereligious systems of thought in which God features as a necessary being as disproof of the dogma,affirmed by Hume and others, that no existential proposition may be necessary."

Malcolm then returned to Anselm's argument from Proslogion 3 and developed it:

1. God, as the greatest conceivable being, cannot be a limited being.2. Therefore, if God does not exist he cannot come into existence.

3. Similarly, if God does exist he cannot cease to exist.4. If 2, then if God does not exist his existence is impossible, and if 3, then if God does exist his

existence is necessary.5. Either God does exist or he does not exist.6. Therefore God's existence is either impossible or necessary.7. God's existence is not impossible [see Leibniz - there is no contradiction within the concept of necessary existence - Kant did not contest this; he just asserted that the coherent concept could be

altogether rejected.]8. Therefore God necessarily exists.

Hick's critique of Malcolm

John Hick (b 1922) claimed that Malcolm confused two different concepts of necessary being - factuallynecessary being and logically necessary being. Factually necessary being equates to de re necessity, toaseity, to Anselm's notion of a being "which cannot be conceived not to exist" - logically necessarybeing equates to de dicto necessity, to analytic truth. Hick claims that Malcolm, like Anselm, Descartes

and other proponents of the ontological argument, has fallen into the trap of moving from logicalnecessity to factual necessity. He noted that proposition 6, "God's existence is either impossible ornecessary", is where Malcolm shifts from talking about God's de re, factual necessity, to talking abouthis logical, de dicto necessity. Like Kant, he observes that there is no contradiction in rejecting the

whole concept of God as a factually, de re necessary being and argues that proposition 6 should read ‘God's existence is either impossible or eternal' - hence there is no need to accept necessity for fear of accepting a contradiction.

Hick, like Malcolm, is not trying to use the ontological argument in the same way that Anselm,Descartes and Leibniz were. Many twentieth-century writers have focused on the argument as alogical/meditative exercise rather than as a proof. Broadly speaking, Hick is broadly a reformed

epistemologist - he is not interested in proving God's existence through argument - or in disproving it.He sees that his job as a philosopher of religion is to pre-empt criticisms which could be used as"defeaters" to undermine belief and show either that religious people don't accept the flawedarguments or that there are ways around them. However unsatisfactory the amended arguments may



be as a basis for faith - at least they stand up as logical defences of faith that exists independently of them.

Alvin Plantinga: God's 'maximal greatness'

Alvin Plantinga is another reformed epistemologist whose more complex ontological argument isdesigned to evade the classic criticisms and show that belief can be defended through the argument -if not based on it: "what I claim for this argument therefore, is that it establishes not the truth of

theism, but its rational acceptability." Plantinga dismissed Malcolm's version of the argument, noting

that Malcolm has shown that it is possible that a logically necessarybeing exists but not that it is necessary that God is a logically necessary being. He suggested a morecomplex argument instead:

1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in everypossible world"2. Maximal excellence entails omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence.

3. Maximal greatness is possible as there is nothing contradictory in this claim, hence we can claimthat there is a possible world in which it exists4. There is a world W and an essence E5. For any object X, if X has exemplified E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in

every possible world"

6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"7. If world W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified

8. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every possible world9. So this being must exist in this world...

Plantinga, for all his complex logic, goes back to Leibniz and makes the old assumption that whatever

is non-contradictory must be possible and that whatever is logically necessary must then be factuallynecessary; though you might be forgiven for missing the assumptions through being blinded with

jargon!

Iris Murdoch: God as goodness

Iris Murdoch (1919-99) is best remembered as a novelist and through the story of her struggle withAlzheimer's, which was told in the film Iris with Kate Winslet and Judi Dench. She was, however, also arespected philosopher and literary critic, holding the unusual position of being a modern Platonist. Shemaintained that ideals such as goodness, beauty, truth have a real existence - though she stoppedshort of ascribing them to any definite ‘world of the forms' outside the mind. Although no obvioustheist, she was fascinated by the ontological argument as she saw in it a way of reaffirming theconnection between well-known concepts of power, knowledge, love etc. and the concept of god as

supreme perfection. As she saw, it the ontological argument is primarily a faith-exercise which helpsthe individual to accept the reality and coherence of goodness, of God, within their own lives. In Themetaphysics of morals Murdoch recounted a story of believers praying to a relic that was, in fact, a

dog's tooth. Through the veneration it is given by the sincere villagers, the tooth begins to glow, itbecomes the miraculous relic they think it is. "Here we may make sense of the idea of loving good. Atits highest point, love is a determination to create the being which it has taken for its object." Hereindeed we come back to the Ontological Proof in its simpler version, a proof by perfection, by a

certainty derived from love. The good artist, the true lover, the dedicated thinker, the unselfish moralagent solving his problem: they can create the object of love. The dog's tooth, when sincerelyvenerated, glows with light."

Murdoch takes the same theme in her novel The Sea. The worshipper endows the worshipped objectwith power, real power not imaginary power, that is the sense of the ontological proof, one of the mostambiguous ideas clever men ever thought of. God is all-powerful and all-knowing in that he definesevery aspect of our understanding and by applying our understanding we affirm his existence in every

thought. "There is no plausible 'proof' of the existence of God except some form of the ontologicalproof, a 'proof' incidentally which must now take on an increased importance in theology as a result of the recent 'de-mythologising'."

If considered carefully, however, the ontological proof is seen to be not exactly a proof but rather a

clear assertion of faith (it is often admitted to be appropriate only for those already convinced), whichcould only be confidently be made on a certain amount of experience. This assertion could be put invarious ways. The desire for God is certain to receive a response. My conception of God contains the



certainty of its own reality. God is an object of love which uniquely excludes doubt and relativism. Suchobscure statements would of course receive little sympathy from analytical philosophers, who woulddivide their content between psychological fact and metaphysical nonsense ...

A question of existence

The central question which the ontological argument raises is, appropriately enough, that of existence.What does it mean to exist? For Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz existence is metaphysical while for

Hume and Kant it is primarily physical. For Malcolm, Plantinga, Hick and Murdoch to exist is to make a

difference in the life of an individual or community. Clearly, an argument which seeks to demonstratethat God exists is affected by the definition of existence just as much as by the definition of God. Theclassical ontological argument makes a series of assumptions, each of which can be challenged:

1. We can define God2. It is better to exist formally (in "reality") than to exist intentionally (just in the mind),3. Existence is a perfection

4. Existence is a predicate5. Necessary existence is possible6. Whatever is possible possibly exist,7. Logical necessity can entail factual necessity

Although Arthur Schopenhauer referred to the ontological argument as a "sleight of hand trick", as a

"charming joke" and although, more recently, Graham Oppy concluded that ontological arguments forGod's existence are "completely worthless", it retains value. As a logical exercise the argument

demonstrates a great deal about language, and as a meditative exercise the argument has the powerto affirm personal faith. Perhaps, as GE Moore once remarked, "The lot of critics is to be rememberedby what they failed to understand."

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