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Book reviews
The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The ‘‘Costs’’ of Managed Competition
Dale E. Lehman and Dennis Weisman (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2000. pp.
x + 128)
In this book, the authors ask whether the implementation of the US Telecommunica-
tion Act of 1996— the first comprehensive telecommunications reform legislation in the
US since 1934—has achieved its declared goals. These goals included the removal of
barriers to entry and other restrictions, ‘‘. . . to promote competition and reduce reg-
ulation in order to secure lower prices. . .’’ in a competitive free-for-all US telecom-
munications market.
Although the 1996 Act fundamentally changed telecommunications regulation, mainly
by removing the outdated barriers that protected monopolies from competition, the authors
focus on the regulatory implementation that has thwarted the Act’s vision, and argue that
‘‘regulators have replaced regulated monopoly with managed competition— the antithesis
of true competition’’. Thus, the Act’s implementation has been inconsistent with its
declared goals as set out by Congress.
The authors provide evidence of the still nascent state of competition in the US
telecommunications market today, almost 5 years after the passage of the 1996 Act.
They conclude that the Act has failed to produce meaningful efficiency-enhancing
regulatory reform, partially due to the jurisdictional divide between state and federal
(FCC) regulators, and the various incentives of those charged with implementing the Act.
As a result of these jurisdictional and regulatory forces, artificially low wholesale prices
can be set, which can be expected to reduce incentives for facilities-based local entry (a
primary goal of the Act), competition and efficiency at the market level. The only thing
that can be expected to thrive due to this process, the authors argue, is the regulatory
process itself. They also criticize the FCC and the state regulators for adopting an
implementation program that focused on an unprecedented degree of micro-management,
which was at odds with the regulatory reform that has taken place in the last decade in
the US.
After their introductory chapter, the authors show, in the second chapter, how the
telecommunications industry in the US has been regulated and structured, focusing on
trends (mainly consolidation and vertical integration) and events that have transpired since
the passage of the 1996 Act. They examine how the market has been fragmented by
service and by technology, and explore the regulatory mix and its pricing implications.
They forecast a gloomy future for the US telecommunications industry, which in their
view, may fall victim to political opportunism and regulatory moral hazard, which will end
up in a legal morass.
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
European Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 18 (2002) 209–213
Chapter 3 explores coordination failures between Congress and the FCC, by reviewing
stock market reaction to the major legislative and regulatory events. In this way, the
authors reveal a serious disjunction between the legislative and regulatory bodies in the
case of the telecommunications sector in the US.
In the fourth chapter, the authors provide a jurisdictional model that reveals how the
shared regulatory jurisdiction of the FCC and the States may result in setting intercon-
nection prices below cost. In their view, there is a structural problem due to mixed
jurisdiction, even when the FCC’s goal is economic efficiency, and the principal-agency
problems become even more pronounced, according to the extent to which FCC objectives
differ from those of Congress.
In Chapter 5, the authors provide a theoretical analysis of the FCC’s efficient-firm cost
standard, and show that the FCC’s interpretation of cost does not rest on solid theoretical
foundations, and that it may actually tend to weaken incentives for innovation.
In their sixth chapter, the authors search for the theoretical prescription for ‘‘costs’’ that
serve as the foundation for determining wholesale prices, and highlight how misguided
regulatory implementation has played a major role in the failure of the 1996 Act to actually
bring about deregulation. In Chapter 7, the authors review the Act’s implementation at the
state level, while their final chapter provides conclusions concerning the possible future
outcomes resulting from misguided implementation of the 1996 Act.
To sum up, this book is a thought-provoking critique of the 1996 US Telecommuni-
cation Act and its future prospects, and should be read by all those who are interested in
the issues of market, government, and regulatory failure.
Eli Goldstein
Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University,
52900 Ramat Gan, Israel
E-mail address: [email protected]
Without a Map. Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia
by Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman. (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000) pp. ix+223.
ISBN: 0-262-19434-1
The literature on Russia, Russian business people and politicians is at present, copious
and expresses differing opinions and views regarding their roles in this challenging
country. This literature is enriched by the contribution of Shleifer and Treisman, who
perceive Russia’s reforms in terms of the vastness of its territory, the conflict between
power groups, and the variety of political tactics and compromises. This book analyses the
reforms of the 1990s and the complex cobweb of affairs and power groups that have
dominated Russia’s panorama from both inside and outside the Kremlin. In this respect,
they offer a very innovative and proper interpretation of the past, ‘‘what has been done,
what has not been done, and how well has it been done’’ (p. 19), which in my view, can
also be of use to understand Putin’s perspective.
PII: S0176 -2680 (01 )00037 -4
Book reviews210