The thematic inspection of major crime

MAJOR CHALLENGE

THE THEMATIC INSPECTION OF MAJOR CRIME

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary – Major Challenge

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Contents

Contents

Executive Summary 2

1. The Threat Posed by Major Crime 6

2. National Capability 12

3. Force Capability 18

4. Recommendations 24

Appendix 26

Endnotes 27

CONTENTS

2 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary – Major Challenge

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1. Majorcrimecomprisesthemostseriousincidentsofviolenceanddeathinvestigatedbypolice.Suchincidentshaveadevastatingimpactonvictims,familiesandcommunities.Buthowcommonaresuchincidentsanddothepublicgetthequalityofservicetheydeserve?

2. HerMajesty’sInspectorateofConstabulary(HMIC)inspectedforcesbetweenJulyandSeptember2008andfoundthat,whilethereismuchprogresstoreport–notablyonhomicide–someforcesremainunabletodeliveraconsistentandeffectiveservicetovictimsandfamiliesaffectedbymajorcrime.Suchdeficienciesneedtobeaddressedurgentlyiftheconfidenceofthepublicistoberetained.

3. HomicideinEnglandandWalesfellby26%overthepreviousyear,followingconsistentreductionsoverthelastfiveyears.1ThelatestavailableinformationshowsthatthehomiciderateinEnglandandWaleshasfallenslightlyto1.41offencesper100,000population.2Toputthisincontext,thisremainshigherthanSpain(0.77),Germany(0.88)andItaly(1.06)butlowerthanIreland(1.59)andtheUSA(5.62).

4. Whilethetrendforhomicideisbroadlypositive,thereremainareasofchallengeacrossmajorcrimepolicing:

• Themostrecentrecordedcrimedatashowsthatmostseriousviolence3roseby44%inthe12monthsto1April2009;1however,initialanalysisindicatesthatmuchofthisrisemaybeduetofurtherguidanceissuedtoforcesontherecordingofassaultallegations.

• Theimpactofknifecrimeoncommunities,andonyoungpeopleinparticular,hasreceivedconsiderableattentionthroughanumberoftragicincidents.Whileoveralltheuseofknivesasaweaponinviolencehasremainedsteadyat6–7%foroveradecade,itsadlyremainsthecasethatyoungpeoplearefourtimesmorelikelytobevictimsofviolencethanthenationalaverage.4

• Reportedincidentsofkidnappingroseby1%lastyearandthenatureoftheseincidentsisbecomingmoreseriousandcomplex,ofteninvolvingorganisedcrimegroups.5

• Thenumberofreportedrapeoffencesroselastyearbyalmost4%despitebroadrecognitionthattheunder-reportingofoffencestopoliceisstillaconcern.RapewillbesubjecttoaspecificHMICinspectionnextspring.

5. HMICinspectionresults

HMICfoundthatthemajorityofforcesmettheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)standardfordeliveringservicetovictims,familiesandcommunitiesaffectedbymajorcrime.Thebestfourperformingforceswerelarger,metropolitanones(GreaterManchester,Merseyside,MetropolitanandWestMidlands).Theseforcesdemonstratedthecapacity,capabilityandleadershiptoexceedtheexpectedstandard.Thisdoesnotmeanthateveryriskcanbeperfectlycoveredbuttheyhaveastronginfrastructureandsomeverygoodpractices.Thefourforcesthatdidnotattainthestandard(CityofLondon,Cumbria,

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Executive Summary

LincolnshireandNorthYorkshire)weresmallerwithlessrelativethreatbutwerechallengedintheseaspects.

6. TheoverallallocationofHMICgradingfromourinspectionisshowninTable1below.

Table 1: The major crime inspection grades (based on the ACPO standard)

Exceeds the Meets the Fails to meet standard standard the standard

4 35 4

7. Strengths

Theservicehasmadesignificantprogressinhomicideinvestigationandmanyoftheinspectionfindingswereencouraging.Mostforces(39of43)wereabletodemonstratethattheyhadproceduresinplacetorespondquicklytomajorcrimeincidents,withthesupportofpartnerswhereneeded.Theydemonstratedthattheywerecompliantwithnationalguidelinesonresourcinganddeliveringmajorcrimeinvestigations,includingoversightbyseniorandchiefofficers.Thisprogress

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYshouldberecognisedbutalsotemperedbyfindingsthatthereislessconsistencyandscrutinyofinvestigationsinsomeareas,notablyintheareaofdomesticandserioussexualviolence.ThisareashouldbeconsideredasapriorityforforcesandACPOtoaddress.

8. Publicexpectation

Thepublicareentitledtoexpectthatallpoliceforces,asaminimum,shouldbecapableofrespondingtoincidentsofmajorcrime.Thechallengeforforcesistoprovideanenhancedservice,movingbeyondsimplya‘response’roletowardsproactivelyunderstandingthethreatfromseriousviolenceandtakingtheearly,decisiveactionneededtopreventpublicharm.Thismustbethegoalifthepublicaretobeprotected.

9. Areasforimprovement

Ourfindingssuggestthatsomeforcesareunabletoadoptsuchaproactiveapproach,aslackofinvestmentinintelligencemeanstheydonotfullyunderstandthethreatfrommajorcrimewithintheircommunities.Table2overleafshowssomecriticalareaswhereforceswerefoundnottobemeetingACPOstandardsinthisregard.


Executive Summary

10. Byunderstandingemergingthreats,policeresourcescanbedirectedtowardsaddressingtheunderlyingdriversofviolencewithincommunities.OperationAllianceisanexamplewherepoliceandpartnersinLondonhavetargetedtheproblemsofgang-relatedcriminality,contributingto2,0296fewervictimsofyouthviolenceinthecapitallastyear.Thereisscopeforotherforcestoadoptsuchend-to-endstrategiestoreducepublicharm.HMICwelcomesthedirectionprovidedthroughpartnershipinitiativessuchastheTacklingKnivesActionProgramme(TKAP)andTacklingGangsActionProgramme(TGAP).HMICisawareofongoingdevelopmentworkledbytheACPOHomicideWorkingGrouptosharethislearningwithforces,andfurtherguidancetoforcesonmajorcrimepreventionprogrammeswouldbebeneficial.

11. Forcesmanagemajorcrimeindifferentways,influencedbylocalthreat,prioritiesandresources.Someforcesmanagethisissuecentrally,throughdedicatedstaff;otherforcesrelyonlocalstafftoleadtheirresponse,ortobolstercentralteamsattimesofhighdemand.Whileperformanceoutcomes(forexample,sanctioneddetections)aremeasuredatbothlocalandnationallevel,thereiscurrentlylittleinformationavailableonwhichmodelmayofferthebestdealforthepublicinmanagingcostandrisk.ResearchconductedbyHMICindicatesthatthehighestspendingforcespendsalmostthreetimesasmuchonthededicatedstaffingofahomicideasthelowestspendingforce.7Thisresearchisonlyindicativeofvariationincostandapproach;however,theavailabilityofsimilaraccurateandcomparable

Table 2: Inspection findings

Summary of inspection area Forces not achieving standard

Theforcehassufficientdedicatedanalyticalresourcestomeettheidentifieddemandsfrommajorcrime.

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Theforceprofilesvulnerablelocationsandcommunities.Futurerisksandthreatsareidentifiedinatimelyway.

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Theforcemonitorstheimpactofpreventativeandenforcementactivity.Communitypolicingassetsareusedtohelpunderstandlevelsofharminthecommunity.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Executive Summary

informationacrossforceswouldbenefitpolicingleaders,andthepublic,inassessingwhethertheirlocalservicescouldbemademoreeffectiveorefficient.TheHMICreportGet Smart: Planning to Protect,publishedinFebruary2009,offeredaplanningmodeltohelpforcesunderstandthreatandmakebestuseoftheirresourcestoreducerisktocommunities.ThisisanareathatrequiresfurtherdevelopmentandHMICwelcomestheongoingworkbytheACPOHomicideWorkingGrouponcommonperformanceinformationintheseareas,whichisduetobesharedwithforcesinautumn2009.

12. Inthecurrenteconomicclimate,forcesmustconsiderwhethertherearealternativewaystooffersuchhigh-costandspecialistassets

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYwithoutimpactingonvisiblefront-linepolicingresources.Collaborationbetweenforces,suchasthejointMajorCrimeUnitforHertfordshireandBedfordshirePolice,mayofferthisopportunity.ThebenefitsofcollaborationbetweenforceshavebeenexploredbyHMICinGetting Together,whichwaspublishedinJune2009.HMICbelievesthattheestablishmentofanationalcollaborationstrategy,theInformedChoiceModel,could–ifadopted–providepoliceleaderswithtimely,credibleinformationonhowjointworkingmayoffsetrisksandthecostsofprovidingexpensivespecialistoperationalandsupportservicestoimproveservicesforthepublic.

13. ThisreportmakesthreerecommendationsandthesecanbefoundinSection4.


Region Homicide 2003–08

Rape 2003–08

Kidnapping 2003–08

South West

South East

London

Eastern

East Midlands

West Midlands

Wales

North West

Yorkshire andHumber

North East

High demand

Medium demand

Medium/high demand

Low demand

THREAT AND MAJOR CRIME1. The Threat Posed by Major Crime

1.1 MajorcrimecanbedefinedasanycrimerequiringtheappointmentofaSeniorInvestigatingOfficerandthedeploymentofspecialistresources.Thiswillincludenotonlyhomicide,attemptedhomicideandmanslaughterbutalsomaypotentiallyencompasssexualassaultsandotherseriousoffences.Inassessingthethreatpresentedbymajorcrime,HMIChasusedperformancedatafortheseoffencesandhasdrawnuponinformationavailablefromtheSeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency(SOCA),individualforces,NationalPolicingImprovementAgency(NPIA)andACPO.

Homicide and most serious violence

1.2 Figure2(seepage8)providesanoverviewofrecordedmajorcrimelevels.Thefigureshowsthathomicidehasfallensteadilyoverthelastfiveyearsfrom868offencesin2004/05to645in2008/09,atotalreductionof26%.Thedownwardtrendformostseriousviolencehaltedin2008/09withrecordedoffencesrising44%from16,939in2007/08to24,448in2008/09.Initialanalysisindicatesthatmuchofthisrisemaybeduetofurtherguidanceissuedtoforcesontherecordingofassaultallegations.Theimpactofknifecrimeoncommunities,andyoungpeopleinparticular,hasreceivedconsiderableattentionthroughanumberoftragicincidents.Whileoveralltheuseofknivesasaweaponinviolencehasremainedsteadyat6–7% foroveradecade,itremainsthecasethatyoungpeoplearefourtimesmorelikelytobevictimsofviolencethanthenationalaverage.1

Reportedincidentsofkidnappingroseby1%lastyearandthenatureoftheseincidentsisbecomingmoreseriousandcomplex,ofteninvolvingorganisedcrimegroups.5

Rape

1.3 Reportedcrimefor2008/09showsariseof4%inrecordedoffencesofrape(13,111comparedwith12,654in2007).Theunder-reportingofsexualviolenceandhighattritionrateforrapeprosecutionsremainsa

Table 3: Regional demand based on the percentage contribution to total demand8

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concernandforcesmustcontinuewitheffortstoenhanceperformanceinthisarea.TheACPORapeWorkingGroupisshortlyduetopublishguidancetoforcesonrapeinitialresponseandinvestigation,whichshouldproveofassistanceinaddressingthisareaofconcern.ThestandardofrapeinvestigationswillbeassessedbyHMICthroughathematicinspectioninspring2010.

1.4 Theimpactofmajorcrime,particularlyhomicide,onforceresourcesissignificant.Thelownumberofhomicidesinmanyforceareaschallengestheneedfordedicatedresourcestobeallocatedtothiscrimetype;however,qualityandreputationalconsiderationsmaketheargumentfordedicatedresourcescompelling.Collaborativearrangementsareincreasinglybeingusedtobridgethisresourcinggap,withforcesrealisingthesynergiesofferedbysharingspecialistcapacityandcapability.Theinspectionfoundabroadrangeofcollaborationsinplacewithsignificantvariationintheirstructureandarrangement.Someforcesrelyoninformalunderstandingswithneighboursformutualsupportintimesofhighdemand.Otherforceshaveadoptedformalisedagreementsorsharedunitswithdedicatedstaffandresources.Whereforcesseektoaddressgapsincapacitythroughcollaboration,theymustensurethatsucharrangementsaresufficientlyrobustandresilienttomitigatethethreat.

Section 1. The Threat Posed by Major Crime

Figure 1: Indicative map of regional demand for resources in relation to major crime

THREAT AND MAJOR CRIME

High demand

Medium demand

Medium/high demand

Low demand


Figure 2: Recorded crime – most serious violence rates

THREAT AND MAJOR CRIME1. The Threat Posed by Major Crime

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

Volu

me

Violent Crime Comparison: 2004/05 to 2008/09Data sourced from Crime in England and Wales 2007/08; Home Office, and Crux Matrix for 2008/09 figures

2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09MSV 21,705 20,972 19,150 16,939 24,448Kidnapping 2,814 2,799 2,367 2,000 2,020Rape 14,013 14,443 13,774 12,654 13,111Homicide 868 766 759 784 645

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Drivers of major crime

1.5 ThemosteffectiveforcesrecognisekeydriversofmajorcrimeintheirForceStrategicAssessments,includingvulnerablepeople,OrganisedCrimeGroup(OCG)activity,violentanddangerousoffendersandhigh-risklocations.Theserisksaremitigatedthroughtacticalinterventions,oftenusingproblem-solvingapproaches.Anumberofforces,particularlythelarger,metropolitanforcesfacingahigherlevelofthreat,havedevelopedend-to-endprocessestocounterspecificchallenges,includingseriousyouthviolenceandguncrime.PartnershipapproachessuchastheMetropolitanPoliceOperationAlliance(seecasestudyonpage10)aretobewelcomedandreflectcurrentgovernment-ledactivityonnationallyco-ordinatedprogrammes,suchastheTKAPandTGAP.

1.6 Allforces,however,havescopetodeepentheirunderstandingofmajorcrimeandtoenhancetheroleofviolencereductionstrategiesintacklingthisthreat.ResearchcommissionedbytheACPOHomicideWorkingGroupintohomicidescommittedwithintheMetropolitanPoliceareafoundthat342opportunities9hadarisenfortheseincidentstobepreventedbyinterventionsfromfamily,friends,policeandotherpublicagencies.Ifmajorcrimestrategiesaretobeeffective,theymustrecogniseandfullyincorporatethecontributionthatlocalpartnerships,aswellasspecialistresources,canmakeinaddressingthedriversofhomicideandseriousviolence.By

THREAT AND MAJOR CRIMEdevelopingunderstandingatalllevels,includingNeighbourhoodPolicing,forceswillbothimprovetheirintelligenceonmajorcrimeandincreaseopportunitiesforeffectivepreventativeintervention.Todeliversuchanapproachrequiresthatforcesensuremajorcrimeisfullyembeddedwithinperformance,intelligenceandtaskingregimes.HMICisawareofongoingdevelopmentworkledbytheACPOHomicideWorkingGrouptosharethislearningwithforces,andfurtherguidancetoforcesonmajorcrimepreventionwouldbebeneficial.

Performance and risk

1.7 Theinclusionofthedomain‘SeriousCrimeandProtection’intheAssessmentofPolicingandCommunitySafety(APACS)performancemanagementframeworksinceApril2008recognisestheimpactofmajorcrimeonvictims,familiesandcommunities.Despitethehighlevelofscrutinythepoliceencounteronmajorcrime,thereremainfewwaysinwhichtocomparetheeffectivenessandefficiencyofforcearrangements,asidefromstatutoryperformanceindicators.Forcesmanagemajorcrimeindifferentways,influencedbylocalthreat,prioritiesandresources.Someforcesmanagethisissuecentrally,usingdedicatedstaffoninvestigationandpreventionactivity;otherforcesaremorereliantonlocalresourcestoleadthisresponseorbolstercentralteamsattimesofhighdemand.AsampleofmajorcrimebudgetsfromsixforcesconductedbyHMIC


1. The Threat Posed by Major Crime

Case study: Operation Alliance, Metropolitan Police

THREAT AND MAJOR CRIMETocounterariseinhomicidesinvolvingyoungpeopleandtheharmassociatedwithstreetgangsinSouthLondon,OperationAlliancewasdevelopedto:

• deliversustainablereductionsingang-relatedviolence;

• removecriminalgangsorsignificantlyreducetheirimpactonseriousviolence;and

• workwithvoluntaryandstatutorypartnerstopreventfurtheryouthinvolvementingang-relatedviolence.

Theprojectfocusedco-ordinatingenforcement,preventionandeducationalactivityacrossfiveboroughstowardshigh-riskindividuals,gangsandvenues.AdedicatedintelligencestructurewasestablishedwhichlinkedtotheMetropolitanPoliceServiceandpartnerassetsthroughtheforcetaskingandco-ordinationsystem.

AcomprehensiveassessmentofthreatandexistingresourceswasundertakenwhichenabledtheMetropolitanPoliceServicetoidentifygapsincapacityandcapability.Thesegapswereaddressedthroughmoreeffectivedeploymentofresources,theinnovativetaskingofadditionalresourcesintheaffectedBasicCommandUnits(BCUs),andtheengagementofpartnersandsupportingagencies.Partnershipactivityiscentral,withpreventativeandeducationalinputsbeingcriticaltothesustainabilityofthework.Theengagementofeducationalestablishmentsandinformation-sharingagreementshasbeenparticularlyimportant.

Thisinitiativehasbeencriticalinachievingtheongoingreductionsingun-enabledcrimeandshootings,notablythoselinkedtolicensedpremises,thedisruptionofgangsthroughimprisonmentandincreasesinstatutorycontrol(bailandlicenceconditions).

FORCE CONTACT: SuperintendentDavidChinchen:[email protected]

foundthatthehighestinvestingforcehasaspendinglevelondedicatedstaffofalmostthreetimesasmuchasthelowest,allowingfordifferencesinthreatlevels.7Thelimitedsamplesizemeansthatthesefiguresarepurelyindicative;however,currentlythereisnowayforpolicingleaders,andthepublic,toobtainaccurateinformationoncostandriskacrossforcesiftheywishtoassesswhethertheirlocalapproachoffersvalueformoney.HMIC’sreportGet Smart: Planning to Protect,

publishedinFebruary2009,offeredaplanningmodeltohelpforcesunderstandthreatandmakebestuseoftheirresourcestoreducerisktocommunities.ThisisanareathatrequiresfurtherdevelopmentandHMICwelcomestheongoingworkbytheACPOHomicideWorkingGrouponcommonperformanceinformationintheseareas,whichisduetobesharedwithforcesinautumn2009.

mailto:[email protected]

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THREAT AND MAJOR CRIME


2. National Capability

2.1 Theanalysisintheprevioussectionscopedthecurrentthreatfrommajorcrime,andthissectionwillconsidertheeffectivenessofserviceresponsetoaddressingthisthreat.

2.2 Figure3belowshowstheresultsfromthe43forcesinspected.Theinspectionidentifiedareasofconsiderableprogressfortheserviceintacklingthethreatofmajorcrime;however,thereremain

inconsistenciesbetweenforcesinkeyareasandscopeforfurtherimprovement.Ifforcesaretocontinuetoimproveperformance,theserviceneedstoensure:

• acleargovernancestructureprovidingagreedstandards;

• embeddingofmajorcrimeintoforceintelligenceandtaskingregimes;

Figure 3: Summary of grades, HMIC major crime inspection, 2008

NATIONAL CAPABILITY

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Fails to meet the standard

Meets thestandard

Exceeds thestandard

Num

ber o

f for

ces

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Section 2. National Capability

• greaterfocusonthecostofmajorcrimecapacityandcapabilitybenefitsofferedbycollaboration;and

• aperformanceregimethatfocusesonthequalityofservicedeliverytovictims,familiesandthecommunity.Thiswouldincludeevaluationandreviewofinvestigationsandtheeffectiveuseofresources.

Governance and standards

2.3 Theservicehasmadesignificantprogressinhomicideinvestigation,meetingACPOstandardsforMajorInvestigationManagementandMajorIncidentRoomStandardAdministrativeProcedures(MIRSAP).TheclearleadprovidedbytheACPOHomicideWorkingGrouphasbeenimportantinraisingawarenessofthesestandardsthroughitscontributiontodoctrineanddisseminatingofbestpractice.Thereisscopeforthelessonslearntwithinhomicidetobetransferredintootherareasofmajorcrimewherecompliancewithstandardsismorevariable.

2.4 Thedevelopmentofskilledinvestigatorsremainsfundamentaltoensuringaneffectiveresponseonmajorcrime.TheProfessionalisingInvestigationProgramme(PIP)isacriticalpieceofworkfortheserviceinthisregard.TheaimofPIPistodeveloptheinvestigativeskills,knowledgeandpracticeofallpoliceofficersandstaffwhoserolesentailconductingormanaginginvestigations.

NATIONAL CAPABILITYTheprogrammehasdefinedaseriesoflevelsofinvestigation,rangingfromvolumeandpriority(level1)throughtoSeniorInvestigatingOfficersformajorinvestigations(level3),andalignedlearninganddevelopmentprogrammestoprofessionalpracticeandnationaloccupationalstandards.ThemostrecentNPIAreviewofPIPimplementationfoundthat,whileallforceshadsystemsinplacetodevelopeffectivelevel3accreditedstaff,onlyeightforcescouldsatisfythestandardofprofessionaldevelopmentrequiredbyPIP.10Likewise,therewasscopeinmostforcestoenhanceknowledge,systemsandsupportfunctions.

2.5 Theinspectionfoundthatin-forceACPOgovernanceisgenerallyvisibleandwellestablished.Despitemanyforceshavinglimitedmajorcrimeexperiencewithintheircommandteams,thereisanexpectationthatanACPOleadwillperformtheroleofOfficerinOverallCommand(OIOC),settingstrategyanddirectingactivityforthemosthigh-riskandcomplexinvestigations.Theinvestigativeandstrategicfunctionsarecriticalcomponentsofaneffectivepolicingresponseandrequiredifferentskillandexperiencesets.TheongoingdevelopmentbytheNPIAofanewPIP4accreditationwillseethedirectinvestigativeaspectofthisrolepasstoaseniorinvestigator,whileACPOwouldretainoverallresponsibilityasGoldcommandersettingstrategyandco-ordinatingresourcesandpartnershipsupport


fortheinvestigation.HMICbelievesthatthiswouldprovideclarityofroleandresponsibilityandoffergreaterresilienceforthesefunctions.

Intelligence and tasking

2.6 Majorcrimefeaturedinalmostallforcestrategicintelligenceproducts.Mostassociatedanalysiswasnarrowlyfocusedonspecificthreatssuchasgunorknifecrime,ratherthanconsideringhowpreventativeinterventiontargetingtheunderlyingdriversofviolenceandserioussexualoffendingmaybeprogressed.Thebestperformingforcesdemonstratedaclearunderstandingofthecomplexitythatthethreatfrommajorcrimepresentsandhadmatureprocessestodirectsufficientspecialistresourcestocounterkeyelementsofthisthreat.Theseprocessesmustincludeaco-ordinatedresponse,inconjunctionwithpartners,tomanaginghigh-risklocationsandoffendersandensuringeffectivesupportforvulnerableindividuals.

2.7 Targetingthedriversofthemostseriousviolencecanonlybeenabledthroughaclearunderstandingofthethreatmajorcrimepresentstocommunities.Theinspectionfoundscopetoraisetheprofileofmajorcrimewithinintelligenceandtaskingregimesanddevelopgreaterintegrationwithotherpolicingfunctionsandpartnershipagencies.TheinvestmentmadeinNeighbourhoodPolicingTeamsofferssignificantopportunitytodevelopaninformed


NATIONAL CAPABILITYpictureoftheimpactviolencehasonparticularcommunities.MerseysidePolicehaveembracedthisapproachthroughtheir‘TotalPolicing’model,withHQandBCUIntelligencefunctionsfocusedtowardscommunityintelligenceasameansofdevelopingarichpictureonkeyprioritiesofmajorcrime,guncrimeandcounter-terrorism.NeighbourhoodPolicingTeamsadoptaproblem-solvingapproach,workingwithpartnersandcommunitiestosupportvulnerableindividuals,suchasrepeatvictimsofdomesticabuse.Thereisopportunityforthisco-ordinatedapproachtobeadoptedbyotherforces,toenhancehowtheyco-ordinatealloftheirassetstomitigatethethreatfromseriousviolentcrimeandserioussexualoffences.

Complexity and cost

2.8 Thetrueeconomicandsocialcostofmajorcrimeishardtoquantifyandanalyse.ThegrowthofdedicatedMurderInvestigationTeamswithinmanyforcesmeansthatfinancialcostsareincreasinglycollatedatforcelevelbutvariationsinpracticeandcostingmodelsmakenationalcomparisondifficult.Researchcommissionedbyoneforce11foundthecurrentaveragefinancialcostofhomicide,excludingforensicsubmissions,tobe:

• CategoryA–£3,127,825.66

• CategoryB–£434,849.91.12

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Section 2. National capability

theUKdatabasecurrentlygenerates3,500matchesamonthforfurtherpoliceinvestigation.ThefullimpactonthedatabaseoftherecentrulingbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsiscurrentlyunclear;however,itremainsavaluableresourceformajorandvolumecrimeinvestigation.

2.12 TheNationalBallisticsIntelligenceService(NABIS),launchedinNovember2008,andtheNationalFirearmsIntelligenceCell(NFIC)shouldprovetobevaluableassetstoinvestigators.Theaimistoprovideacomprehensiveforensicsandintelligenceservicewhichwillassistforcesinmitigatingthethreattocommunitiesfrommajorcrimeandthoseinvolvedinthecriminaluseoffirearms.Forcesshouldensurethattheyhavetheproceduresandpoliciesinplacetofullyutilisethissignificantresource.

2.13 Whileforensicadvances,suchasfamilialprofiling,havegreatlyenhancedinvestigation,theincreasingrangeoftechniquesavailablefromestablishedandemergingsuppliersofforensicservicesrequiresthatforcescarefullyconsiderhowbesttomanagethisarea.Thistestmustbalancepotentialevidentialbenefitwithcost,qualityandaccreditationofsupplier.Therecentappointmentofthepostofforensicregulatorshouldinformforcesinmanagingperformanceintheseareas.

2.9 Categorisationisnotnecessarilyaneffectivepredictivetoolforassessingthecostofinvestigations,asinitialassessmentofriskwillvarybetweenforcesandmaysubsequentlybereviewedandchanged.However,ifthefinancialcostsabovewerereplicatedacrossthecountry,assumingthat5%ofhomicidesareCategoryA,thefinancialcostofinvestigatingthe6451murdersin2008/09wouldbeapproximately£367million.Thescaleofthisexpenseandlackofstandardisedcostingdatalimitopportunitiestoidentifybestpracticeforfinancialmanagementinmajorcrimeandshouldbeaddressedwithinabroaderperformanceframework.

2.10 Whiletheaspirationoftheservicemustbetopreventmajorcrime,thereisadutytoensureaneffectiveresponsewhentragediesdooccur.Thecomplexityofthisresponsehasincreasedoverrecentyears,asdevelopingtechnologyhasofferedinvestigatorsgreateropportunitiesandnewchallenges.

Forensic science and DNA

2.11 Forensicsciencehasalwaysbeencentraltoinvestigations;therapidpaceofdevelopmentsinthisfieldnowoffersinvestigatorsaraftofnewevidentialopportunities.DevelopmentsinDNAanalysismeanthatthenationalDNAdatabasehasbecomeavitalresourcetomajorcrimeinvestigation.Withinexcessof4.3millionprofiles,

NATIONAL CAPABILITY



Telecommunications

2.14 Thepervasiveroleoftelecommunicationsinsocietyhasgreatlyimpacteduponmajorcrimeinvestigation,withanalysisoftelephoneandinternetdataofferingpotentiallycompellingevidencetoinvestigators.Enquirieswithforcesindicatethattelephonyspendcanrangefromanapproximateaverageof£15,000perinvestigationrisingtoover£100,000forparticularlycomplexinquiries.13Whileinvestigatorswillmakeinformeddecisionsbalancingthecostofanalysisagainstpotentialevidentialbenefit,theexpansionofsourcesofelectronicinformationinevitablymeansthatthisisagrowingareaofexpenseforforces.

Family liaison and community engagement

2.15 Majorcrimehasadevastatingimpactonfamiliesandthebroadercommunity.Aneffectivepoliceresponsetosuchincidentsiscriticalinmaintainingconfidenceandmanagingthefearofcrime.Progresshasbeenmadeinthisarea.Allforcesretainanddeploytrainedfamilyliaisonstaffandthebestperformingforcesensurethatcommunityengagementisembeddedwithintheirresponse,throughindependentadvisorygroupsandneighbourhoodkeyindividualnetworks.Thedirectcostofthisworkmaybedifficulttoquantify;however,thebenefitsintermsofqualityofserviceandcommunityconfidenceareclear.

Collaboration

2.16 Theshortandmedium-termfinanciallandscapeforpolicingischallenging.TheHomeOfficedrivetocapthegrowthofforcebudgetsandrequirepolicingtodelivercash-releasingefficiencysavingsof9.3%overthethreefinancialyearsfrom2008/09meansthatforcesmustconsiderwhethertheyarebestmanagingresources.Torespondeffectivelytothethreatofmajorcrimerequiresacomplexrangeofspecialistskillsandassets.Thecostofmaintainingsuchassetsishigh,andregionalornationalcollaborationpresentssignificantopportunitiesforsomeforcesfacingalimitedthreatfrommajorcrimetorealisecostandcapacitybenefits.

2.17 TheinspectionfoundgoodpracticeemergingthroughcollaborationatACPOregionallevelandinbilateralagreementsbetweenforces.Thescopeandgovernanceofcollaborationvariedsignificantly.Somematurepartnerships,suchasthejointBedfordshireandHertfordshireMajorCrimeTaskForce,areformalisedwithcleararrangementsandprotocols.Otherarrangementsaremoreinformalanddrivenbyworkingrelationshipsthathaveestablishedorganically.Therangeofcollaborativeframeworksadoptedandthelackofresilienceinmanyoftheseagreementsareofconcern.ThebenefitsofcollaborationbetweenforceshavebeenexploredbyHMICinGetting Together,areportpublishedinJune2009.HMICbelievesthattheestablishmentofanationalcollaborationstrategy,theInformedChoiceModel,could–ifadopted–providepoliceleaderswithtimely,credibleinformationonhowjointworkingmayoffsetrisksandthecostsofprovidingexpensivespecialistoperationalandsupportservicestoimproveservicesforthepublic.

NATIONAL CAPABILITY

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Section 2. National Capability

NATIONAL CAPABILITY


3. Force Capability

3.1 Theoverviewprovidedbythisinspectionidentifiessomegoodpracticebutalsomarkedgapsinprovision.TheinspectionconfirmedthatthemajorityofforcesinEnglandandWalesaredeliveringtoanacceptablestandardagainstthethreatofmajorcrime.Asmallnumber,mainlythelarger,metropolitanforcesexposedtothehighestthreatfrommajorcrime,exceededthenationalstandardset.TheseforcesareGreaterManchester,Merseyside,MetropolitanandWestMidlands.Thesehigh-performingforcesdemonstratedprocessesthatunderstandspecificthreatsfrommajorcrimeandareabletorespondeffectivelywithdedicatedresourceswhencalledupon.

3.2 Fourforceswereunabletomeetsomekeyaspectsofthenationalmajorcrimestandard.TheseforcesareCityofLondon,Cumbria,LincolnshireandNorthYorkshire.

Response, investigation and governance

3.3 Forceshaveimprovedtheirunderstandingofthethreatfrommajorcrimeandhavedevelopedarrangementstoensureatimelyandeffectiveresponsetoincidentsthatoccur.Theinspectionfoundthatallforceshadanunderstandingof‘goldenhour’principlesandtheimpactofinitialresponseoninvestigativesuccessandcommunityconfidence.Forceshavepublishedclearandwell-understoodguidancetofirstrespondersintheeventofmajorcrime,andestablished‘on-call’arrangementsto

FORCE CAPABILITYensureinvestigativecontrolandcontinuity.Thebestperformingforceshaveenhancedtheirservicebyensuringthatdedicatedspecialistsareavailableatalltimestooverseeinitialresponsetomajorcrime.Inthelarger,metropolitanareas,thisincludesdedicatedteamstoassesspotentialmajorcrimeincidents,whilemanyotherforcesensurethataSeniorDetectiveOfficerisalwaysondutytoleadinitialresponse.Allforcesshouldconsideradoptingtheseapproaches,dependentonthelevelofthreattheyface.

3.4 Allforceshave,orareintheprocessofdeveloping,‘fastalert’arrangementswithpartnerstoidentifyandshareinformationonsignificantchangestothemajorcrimethreat.Arangeofcontingencyplansandsupportingmeasuresflowfromthesearrangements.Inanumberofforces,theseagreementsareinformalandadhoc,withlittleoverarchinggovernanceandco-ordination.Resilienceisthereforeamatterofconcernandconsiderationshouldbegiventoformalisingsucharrangements,toensureorganisationaloversightandunderstanding.

3.5 Theinspectionfoundthatforceshadmadeconsiderableprogressinensuringtheprofessionalismandresourcingofmajorcrimeinvestigation.AllforceswereassessedtobecompliantwiththeMurderInvestigationManual(MIM)andACPO(2005)GuidanceonMIRSAP.Whileprogressinhomicidehasbeenmade,thereremainsscopefortheselessonstobeappliedtotheinvestigationofrapeandserioussexualassault,wherepracticeremainslessconsistent.

19

Section 3. Force Capability

3.6 Theinspectionfoundthatforcesconsiderrelevantprofessionalstandardsissuesintheoperationalplanningformajorcrimework.Allforceshavevettingpoliciesinplacetoensurethatstaffareappropriatelyvettedcommensuratewithexposure.Allforceshavepoliciesforphysicalandoperationalsecurity.Implementationofthesepolicieswasbroadlyfoundtobeeffective,withthebestperformingforcesproactivelytestingvulnerabilityaccordingtoidentifiedrisk.TherewasevidencethatsomeforceshavedifficultyinensuringsufficiencyofvettedPoliceAuthoritycontactsandexternalorcommunitystakeholdersforsensitiveenquiries.Thisisakeyareainassuringpoliceresponseandforcesshouldensuretheresilienceoftheirarrangements.

3.7 ThecomplianceofforceswithMIMandMIRSAPistestamenttotheworkoftheACPOHomicideWorkingGroupinframingstandardsofinvestigationandgovernance,aswellasprovidingpracticalguidanceandsupporttoforcesrespondingtochallengingincidents.TheinspectionfoundthatthemajorityofforceshadrigorousACPOLeadandPoliceAuthoritygovernancearrangementsinplace,withappropriateliaisonthroughsecurityvetting.ThesearrangementscoveredbothdynamicinvestigativesupervisionandbroaderoversightarrangementsformanagingstrategicrisksthroughForceRiskRegisters.Inaddition,forceshadmature

FORCE CAPABILITYordevelopingarrangementstoestablishGoldsupportgroupsattheearliestpracticablestage,asmajorinvestigationsdeveloped,toensurethatappropriateconsiderationwasgiventocommunityviewsandconcerns.

Partnership engagement and involvement

3.8 Forceplansgenerallyrecognisedthekeyrolethatpartnersandcommunitystakeholdersplayinimprovingunderstandingofthethreatfrommajorcrimeandundertakingjointactivitytomitigatethisthreat.Theyalsohaveestablishedstronglocalarrangementstorespondeffectivelytoincidentsofmajorcrimeandprovidepublicreassurance.Thebestperformingforceshavematureandwell-supportedpublicprotectionandcommunitysafetyprocesses,withestablishedinformation-sharingprotocols.Thereisevidenceofjointstrategicassessmentandpartnershiptaskingandactivitytotacklemajorcrimeunderviolenceandhomicidereductionstrategies.Inotherforces,partnershipinvolvementwaslesswellestablished,withinformalarrangementsdrivingactivity.Thereisscopefortheseforcestoimprovethegovernancearrangementsoftheirpartnershipactivity,toensurethatitissupportedbyformalisedagreementsandprocesseswhichprovidegreaterresilienceandco-ordination.


3. Force Capability

Community and independent advice

3.9 Theinspectionfoundthatforceshadmadeprogressinrealisingthebenefitofcommunityadviceandguidanceinmajorcrimeresponseandinvestigation.AllforceshadprocessestoinformtheirservicedeliverythroughIndependentAdvisoryGroups(IAGs)andviaNeighbourhoodPolicingmeetingsandnetworks.Therewasclearlyunderstoodguidanceontheirfunction,outcomesandcomposition.Thiswassupportedbyeffectivediversitytrainingformajorcrimestaff,tailoredtotheirspecialistroles.IAGswereprovidedwithrelevantandregulartrainingandpracticalinputs,toensureaclearunderstandingofpoliceresponse.Thebestperformingforcesmaximisedtheeffectivenessofthesepartnershiparrangementswithstructuresatforceandlocallevel.TheMetropolitanPoliceService,forexample,hasestablishedIAGsoneachBCU,toprovidemeaningfulcontributiontocriticaldecisionmakingatlocallevel.Less-effectiveforcesfailedtomaximisethebenefitattainablefromIAGsandKeyIndividualNetworks(KINs)byonlyseekingtheircontributioninabroadlyconsultativeroleonissuesofstrategy,withlimitedregularengagement.Compositionandskillswererarelyreviewedandrefreshed,andoutcomeswerelesstangible.

FORCE CAPABILITYThe growth of regional and bilateral collaboration

3.10 Thereisanimprovingunderstandingofthechallengeforcesfacetodeliveraneffectiveresponsetomajorcrimeandotherprotectiveservices.Thisisnot,however,alwaysreflectedintheirplanningprocesses.Forforcesfacingarelativelylowthreatfrommajorcrime,collaborationpresentstheopportunitytoretainspecialistcapacityandcapability,whilesharingthecostofspecialistresources.Tothisend,theGovernmentisfunding13demonstratorsites,involving34forces,totestarangeofapproachesanddisseminatethelessonslearnt.Theevaluationoftheseprojectsshouldbecompletedbyautumn2009.Elsewhere,collaborativeactivityisdevelopingmoreorganically,withsomearrangementsmorematurethanothers.Ascollaborationgrows,thereisaneedforforcestoreviewtheirbusinessplanningprocessesand,atservicelevel,thetripartitepartnersneedtoformaliseandrationalisearrangements,ifresilienceandvalueformoneyistobedelivered.

Review

3.11 Theinspectionfoundthatallforcesundertakereviewsofmajorcrimeinvestigations,withthemajorityattainingorexceedingthestandard.Forcesexceedingthestandardwerenotthosefacingthehighestdemand,butratherthosewithcleardirectionsetbytheACPOLeadandwithawillingnesstoinvestsufficientdedicatedstaffandresources.Thebest

21

Section 3. Force capability

performingforces,bothlargeandsmall,haveastructuredreviewpolicyandformalprocessestoensurethatinvestigationsofmajorcrimeareefficient,effectiveandeconomical.Theseprocessesaredesignedtoidentifyorganisationallearningandinformfuturetrainingneeds,creatinga‘virtuouscircle’ofcontinuousimprovement.Theremaybeanopportunityforthoseforcesthatarenotperformingaswelltoexplorethislearning.Allforcesmayalsoconsiderthepotentialofregionalorbilateralcollaborationtodeliverthiscriticalfunctioninamoresustainableway.

Gaps in provision

Governance and standards

3.12Whiletheprofessionalismofhomicideinvestigationhasimproved,thereremainsawidevariationinhowforcesrespondtoallegationsofseriousassaultandwounding.Inthelarger,metropolitanforceswheredemandfromsuchincidentsishigh,investigativeresponsibilitywillrestwithinthecaseloadofrelativelyjuniorandinexperiencedofficers.Incontrast,forcesfacinglessdemandmayallocatesuchincidentstoadedicatedMajorInvestigationTeam.Inpractice,thedifferencebetweenanincidentbeingoneofseriousassaultratherthanhomicidemaybethespeedofinitialmedicalresponse.Thereisscopetobuildonthelessonslearntinhomicidetodeliverconsistentstandardsintheinvestigationandadministrationincasesofseriousassault.

FORCE CAPABILITYIntelligence and tasking

3.13 Theinspectionhighlightedconsiderablevariationbetweenforcesonhowsuccessfullymajorcrimeactivityisinformedanddrivenbyintelligenceandtasking.Mostforceshaveinvestedsufficientlyintheirintelligencecapacitytounderstandthethreatpresentedbymajorcrimeandexploresomeofthedriversofthisactivity.Sixforces(Cheshire,CityofLondon,Cumbria,Lincolnshire,NorthYorkshireandWiltshire)werefoundtolackthededicatedanalyticalsupportnecessarytoinformstrategicandtacticalintelligenceproducts.Themosteffectiveforces(Cambridgeshire,Merseyside,PoliceServiceofNorthernIrelandandWestMidlands)haveembeddedananalyticalapproachwithintheirmajorcrimestructure,supportingdailyactivityandproactivelydevelopingintelligenceandidentifyingpatternsandtrends,toinformabroaderpartnership-basedapproachtohomicideandviolencereduction.

3.14 Recognisingtheinterdependenciesbetweenmajorcrimeandlocalisedpolicingisvitalifforcesaretoeffectivelyreducemostseriousviolenceandfearwithincommunities.Thisrequireseffectiveintelligenceexchangeandarobusttaskingprocessatforceandregionallevel.Whilethemajorcrimefunctionfeaturesinallforcetaskingprocesses,thereremainsconsiderableopportunityforforcestoimproveco-ordinationinthisarea.Muchtaskingofspecialistresourcesoccursoutsidetheformaltaskingprocessandthismayrelyonincomplete


3. Force Capability

analysisorappreciationofotheravailableresources.Thisapproachlimitsintelligenceflowsbetweenpolicingfunctionsandpreventsarichpictureofmajorcrimebeingdeveloped.Theinspectionfoundthat,in13forces,therewasinsufficientunderstandingofthethreatwhichmajorcrimepresentedtolocationsandcommunities.Inmanycases,thiswascompoundedbyalackofappreciationofthecontributionthatNeighbourhoodPolicingTeamscanmakewhenrespondingtomajorcrimeincidents.Intotal,15forceswereunabletodemonstrateaneffectivesystemtomonitortheharmcausedtocommunitiesbymajorcrimeandtheimpactoftheirresponse.

3.15 Thereremainsscopetoimproveinteroperabilitybetweenintelligencesystemsbothwithinandbetweenforces.TheinabilityofthecurrentHOLMESsystem(v13/14)tolinkautomaticallywithforceintelligencesystemsremainsanobstacleformanyforces.Whilemostforceshaddevelopedmanualsystemstobridgethisproblem,theseareoftensubjecttodelay,incompletenessandhavelimitingopportunitiesforfast-timetasking.HOLMES20/20shouldaddressthisweakness;however,itisnotdueforreleaseuntil2013,soforcesmustensurethatcurrentpracticeiseffective.TheNPIAisworkingtoprovideforceswithbestpracticeinthemeantime.

FORCE CAPABILITY3.16 Progresshasbeenmadeoninteroperabilityofintelligencesystemsbetweenforcesandregions.Themosteffectiveforceshaveestablishedformalintelligence-sharingprotocolswithpolicingandotherpartnersinresponsetothethreattheyface;however,elsewhere,arrangementsremaininformalandad/hocattheworkinglevel.OCGactivityremainsakeydriverofmajorcrime,andthecross-bordernatureoftheiroperationsmeansthatforcesmustbesatisfiedthattheirintelligencearrangementsaresufficientlyco-ordinatedandresilienttobeeffective.Thereisaneedtoensureintelligence-gatheringandprovisionarrangementswithinforcessupportexistingstakeholdersatlevels2and3.

Organisational learning

3.17 Theinspectionfoundscopeforforcestoenhancetheextenttowhichlessonslearntintheinvestigationofmajorcrimecouldbecapturedandusedtoinformsubsequentactivity.Fewforcescouldevidenceasystematiclinkingofthelearningpointsarisingfromreviews,debriefingandresultsanalysis,withstafftrainingandorganisationaldevelopment.Manyforcesalsodemonstratedalackofawarenessofthepotentialbenefitstobegainedfromgeneratingnewlearningopportunitiesbyencouragingexternalreviewofmajorcrime.Forces,particularlythosethatinfrequentlyconductmajorinvestigations,shouldconsiderthebenefitsofsuchexternalsupport.

23

Section 3. Force capability

Policies and practice

3.18 Somegapsinprovisionrelatetotheabsenceof,orinadequate,policyframeworks,inparticularthefollowing.

‘Threat to life’ policies

3.19 Therequirementthatforcesreactproportionatelytoacrediblethreattoanindividual’ssafetyhasledtoaraftofpoliciesandprocedurestoraiseawarenessandpromptofficerstotakethenecessaryactionwhenathreatisidentified.HMIChasfoundthatauthoritylevelsdifferacrossthecountry–high-riskcasesgenerallyreceiveACPOattention,butforcesshouldreviewtheirpoliciestoensuretheappropriatelevelofoversight.Ofparticularconcernisthefailureofmanyforcestorecord,monitorandqualityassuretheissueof‘Osmanwarnings’.Whilenoevidencewasfoundthatadministrationof‘threattolife’warningshadplacedanyindividualatrisk,forcesneedtobevigilantinensuringthatprocessesinthisareaaresuitablyintrusiveandrobust.

FORCE CAPABILITYStaff vetting

3.20Vettingtoappropriatelevelsisessentialincounteringtheever-presentthreatofcorruptiontoofficerswhomaybetargetedbyOCGs.Someforcesuseafive-yearcycleofsecurityclearanceforofficersandpolicestaffinsensitiveposts–thismaybeinadequateandshouldbesubjecttoregularriskassessmentinformedbyexpertadvice.Thelevelofthreatfrominfiltrationmeansthatforcesshouldconsidermanagementvettingatmoreregularintervalswhereofficershaveroutineaccesstoconfidentialmaterial.Thisshouldalsoapplytostakeholderswhoseerestrictedmaterialorreceiveconfidentialbriefings.Professionalstandardsdepartmentsshouldleadinthepolicyandpracticeofoperationalsecurity.


4. Recommendations

1. Collaboration

(i) TheNationalProtectiveServicesBoard,inlinewiththenationalstrategyforcollaboration(theInformedChoiceModel),shouldidentifywhethercollaborationandjointworkingmayofferopportunitiestoimprovetheservicetothepublicintermsofreducedcostorrisk,andfacilitateguidanceandsupporttoforcesandauthoritieswhereappropriate.

(ii) Forcesandauthoritiesnotattainingthestandard,orwithsignificantidentifiedneeds,shouldseekopportunitiestoimproveservicesthroughcollaborationwithpolicingpartners.

2. Developing consistent practice on major crime reduction

Thepublicwillbebestservedbyforcesthatunderstand,andseektoprevent,thedriversofmajorcrimewithincommunities.ACPO/NPIAshoulddevelopandpublishguidanceonpreventativeactionthatforcescantaketoreducehomicideandothermajorcrimes.

RECOMMENDATIONS3. Performance management of major crime

(i) ThereisaneedforACPO/NPIAtodevelopconsistentperformancemeasuresformanaginghomicideperformance,includingissuesofcost,qualityandpublicconfidence.Comparableinformationwillenablepolicingleadersandthecommunitytoassesswhethertheyaregettingagooddealfromlocalservices.

(ii) ClearguidanceongovernanceandstandardsofrapeandseriousassaultinvestigationsneedstobeprovidedtoforcesbyACPO/NPIAtoensurequalityandconsistencyofservice.ThestandardofrapeinvestigationswillbeassessedbyHMICthroughthematicinspectioninspring2010.

25

Section 4. Recommendations

RECOMMENDATIONS


Appendix

Context for the inspection

ThePoliceService’sresponsetomajorcrimebenefitsfromdirectionbytheGovernment,ACPOandtheAssociationofPoliceAuthoritiesassetoutinthefollowing:

• The National Policing Plan 2005–08(www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/national-policing-plan/policing-plan-2008.html)madereductionofviolenceandconfidenceofcommunitieskeypolicingpriorities.

• TheNationalProtectiveServicesAnalysisTool(NPSAT)bringstogetherarangeofindicatorstoinformassessmentsofthedemandarisingfrommajorcrime.Theseindicatorsincludehomicide;rape;andkidnapping.

• The ACPO National Strategic Assessment for2007(www.acpo.police.uk)confirmedtherequirementtofilltheidentifiedgapintheprovisionofprotectiveservices,withatri-lateralfocus.

APPENDIX• The ACPO Core Investigative Doctrine(www.acpo.police.uk)providesguidancetopoliceforcesontheconductandadministrationofmajorcrimeinvestigation,includingguidanceonMIRSIPandtheMIM.

• HMGovernment’s National Community Safety Plan 2008–11(www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/national-policing-plan/national-community-safety-0609)declaredtheHomeSecretary’skeystrategicprioritiesfor2008/09,includingafocusonmoreseriousviolence.

• HMGovernment’s Action Plan for Tackling Violence 2008–11(www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/violent-crime-action-plan-08/)declaredtheHomeSecretary’skeyprioritiesonviolencereduction,includingfocusonguncrime,violentcrimeandsexualviolence.

http://www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/national-policing-plan/policing-plan-2008.html

http://www.acpo.police.uk

http://www.acpo.police.uk

http://www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/national-policing-plan/national-community-safety-0609

http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/violent-crime-action-plan-08/

27

Endnotes

Endnotes

Endnotes

1. DatasourcedfromCrime in England and Wales 2007/08;HomeOffice,andCruxMatrixfor2008/09figures.

2. TenthUnitedNationsSurvey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, coveringtheperiod2005–06(2008);UNODC.

3. TheHomeOfficedefinitionfor‘mostseriousviolence’coversarangeofviolentoffences:homicideandchilddestruction;attemptedmurder;woundingwithintent;grievousbodilyharmwithoutintent;anddeathbydangerousdriving.

4. Crime in England and Wales Update(December2008);HomeOffice.

5. DatasourcedfromCrime in England and Wales 2007/08;HomeOffice,CruxMatrixfor2008/09andtheSOCA Annual Report 2008/09;SOCA.

6. MPS Crime Statistics Annual for Youth Violence 2008/09;www.met.police.uk(lastaccessed16April2009).

7. FindingsarebasedonanHMICtelephonesurveyofsixforces(June2009)ofthe2008/09investmentindedicatedmajorcrimestaffingbudgetcomparedwiththree-yearaveragehomicidelevels.

8. DatadrawnfromACPO,NationalProtectiveServiceAssessmentTool(NPSAT),April2009.

ENDNOTES9. GreenawayK,SullyPandReevesS(2001)‘TheSuppressionofMurder’.Police Review,109(5643):26–28.

10. NPIAPIPPeerReview(February2008);NPIA.

11. HomicideData2006–08;MerseysidePolice.

12. CategoriesofhomicidearedefinedinACPO’sguidancetoforces,Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures(2005).Category AAhomicideorothermajorinvestigationwhichisofgraveconcernorwherevulnerablemembersofthepublicareatrisk,andwheretheidentityoftheoffender(s)isnotapparentortheinvestigationandsecuringevidencerequiressignificantresourceallocation.Category BAhomicideorothermajorinvestigationwheretheidentityoftheoffender(s)isnotapparent,thecontinuedrisktothepublicislowandtheinvestigationorsecuringevidencecanbeachievedwithinnormalforceresourcingarrangements.

13. DataprovidedbyMerseysidePoliceinDecember2008.

http://www.met.police.uk

The report is available in alternative languages and formats on request.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of ConstabularyAshley House2 Monck StreetLondon SW1P 2BQ

This report is also available from the HMIC websitehttp://inspectorates.justice.gov.uk/hmic

Published in July 2009.

Printed by the Central Office of Information.

© Crown copyright 2009

ISBN: 978-1-84726-965-2

Ref: 297377

http://inspectorates.justice.gov.uk/hmic

Documents

The thematic inspection of major crime