The Threat of Ethical Accountants an Application of Foucault's Concept of Ethics to Accounting Education and Some Thoughts on Ethically Educating for the Other 1999 Critical Perspectives

8/9/2019 The Threat of Ethical Accountants an Application of Foucault's Concept of Ethics to Accounting Education and Some

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( )Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1999 10, 833 866Article No. cpac.1998.0277Available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

THE THREAT OF ETHICAL ACCOUNTANTS: AN

APPLICATION OF FOUCAULTS CONCEPT OFETHICS TO ACCOUNTING EDUCATION AND

SOME THOUGHTS ON ETHICALLY EDUCATINGFOR THE OTHER

K EN M C P HAIL

Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Glasgow,Glasgow, UK

There are an increasing number of papers within the accounting litera -ture which are concerned with the relationship between acc ounting edu -

( )cation and the ethics of accountants see, e.g. Gray, 1994 . This paperattempts to contribute to this literature. It draws on the work of MichelFoucault to argue that ethical accountants may pose just as great athreat to society as unethical ones. The paper initially explains Foucaultswork on power/ knowledge and delineates his novel perspective on howpower may operate through an individuals sense of moral identity. It isargued that the way accountancy is taught may predispose accountantsto discipline themselves in such a way that they behave in a mannerwhich serves the interests of capitalism and subjugates opposition to it.However, the paper also draws on Foucaults notion of resistance toexplain how accounting education might be able to produce studentswho could represent a threat to this hegemony.

1999 Academic Press

This Is Not A PoemA Poem By David Hume

Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow.It is profitable for us both that I should labour with you today,and that you should aid me tomorrow.

I have no kindness for you, and know that you have little for me.I will not, therefore, take pains upon your account;and should I labour with you upon my own account,in expectation of a return,

Address for Correspondence: Ken McPhail, Department of Accounting & Finance, 65-71Southpark Avenue, Glasgow G12 8LE, UK. e-mail: k.mcphail @ accfin.gla.ac.uk

Received 10 June 1997; accepted 28 June 1998

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1045-2354/99/060833+34 $30.00 /0 1999 Academic Press


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I know I should be disappointed,and that I should in vain depend upon your gratitude.

Here then I leave you to labour alone:you treat me in the same manner.

The seasons change; and both of us loose our harvestsfor want of mutual confidence and security.

Preamble

This elegy is an extract from a text by David Hume. It was notoriginally in the form of a poem nor was it intended to be onealthough it is undoubtedly poetic. It was part of an argument in whichHume lamented how people had come to think about one another. Thisextract has been included, in this particular format, because it embodies

( )two issues central to Humes moral philosophy see MacIntyre, 1967 ,two issues which are also central to this paper. The first issue relatesto the sentiment of Humes soliloquy, that is, the importance of otherpeople and the significance of how we think about them. One of theobjectives of this paper is to consider the impact that accounting educa -tion may have on the way in which accountants think, ethically, aboutthemselves and other people. The second issue relates to the nature of

(Humes argument. In this instance he argues poetically as opposed to)rationally . Dilthey explains what poetic thinking involves when he says,

Poetry is not the imitation of a reality which exists prior to it; nor is itthe adornment of truths or spiritual meanings which could have beenexpressed independently. The aesthetic capacity is a creative power forthe production of a meaning that transcends reality and that could neverbe found in abstract thought. Indeed, it is a way or mode of viewing

( )the world. Dilthey, Poetry and Experience , in Ferguson, 1995

Hume appeals to sentiment rather than reason because he firmly

believed that moral judgement did not essentially depend on reason but(rather that it was grounded on feelings and passions see MacIntyre,)1967 . This paper is premised upon Humes assumptions. It suggests

that accounting education may engender an overly rationalistic view of ethics and may even be partially responsible for constructing danger -ously rational and threateningly ethical accountants.

Introduction

This introductory section outlines the problem addressed within thepaper, the perspective adopted and finally the structure of the paper.

The Problem

The ethics of business is currently a high profile issue. This may be


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due both to increased social pressure on companies to adopt a socially( )responsible approach to doing business Evans, 1991; Malachowski, 1992

and, more specifically, how media coverage of some quite sensationalbusiness collapses like Poly Peck, Sock Shop, Coloroll and BCCI seem toindicate that accountants are failing to meet these expectations. Detailed

analysis of these events has subsequently lead to the questioning of the(morality of business men and women in general see Touch Ross & Co,

) (1988 and accountants in particular Beets & Killough, 1990; Ponemon,)1990, 1992; Schlachter, 1990; Denham, 1991 ; Stanga & Turpen, 1991 .

( )Hauptman and Hill 1991 , for example, conclude that it is professionalaccountants, those specialists who purport to have the public interest at

( )heart Gaa, 1990; AICPA, 1988; Waples & Shaub, 1991 , who have beenthe main contributors to the decline in ethical standards in b usiness(see Modic, 198 7 in Davis & Welton, 1991; McCabe et al ., 1991; Stanga

)& Turpen, 1991 .In the light of growing concern over the apparently low moral stan -

dards of some accountants, an increasing number of academics aresuggesting that the education system should bear some of the blame(Booth et al ., 1988; Lehman, 1988; Gray et al ., 1994 and by implication

) ( )Power, 1991 . Merritt 1991; see also Zeff, 1989 for example contendsthat,

business schools have not done an adequate job of preparing studentsto respond ethically to the complex issues that arise in the work envi -ronment.

Indeed, while the evidence is still inconclusive, a growing body of research suggests that rather than contributing towards students moraldevelopment, compared with other professions, accounting education mayactually inhibit stude nts progression to higher levels of moral reasoning

1 ( )and ethical awarenes s see Gray et al ., 1994 . It has consequently beensuggested that we need to re-examine the type of educational systemthat produces accountin g professionals who, consciously or otherwise,

2 (appear to act une thically see Goodman & Crawford, 1974 in Kraft andSinghapakdi, 1991 ; Lehman, 1988; Loeb, 1991; Mahoney, 1990; Kraft &Singhapakdi, 1991; Loeb & Rockness, 1992; Gray et al ., 1994; Maklin,

)1980; Rosen & Caplan, 1980; Patten & Williams, 1990 . Davis and Welton( )1991 for example argue that,

Part of the long-term solution to improving professional ethics is toaddress the area as it relates to educating future business professionals,i.e. college students.

While the evidence from both the business press and the business(ethics literature see, e.g. Armstrong, 1987; Gavin & Klinefelter, 1989;

)Ponemon, 1990, 1992 ; McCabe et al ., 1991; Stanga & Turpen, 1991appears, to some extent, to substantiate Merritts conclusion 3 , this paperattempts to present an alternative, although not entirely incongruous,Foucauldian analysis of the relationship between accounting education


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and ethics. The paper contends that there may be a more fundamentalbut less obvious ethical dilemma to be addressed.

It was suggested above that it is professional accountants who seemto be amongst the main contributors to the decline in ethical standards

(within business Modic, 1987 in Davis & Welton, 1991; McCabe et al .,

)1991; Hauptman & Hill, 1991 . However, while the unethical behaviour of some accountants presents a major challenge to the profession andeducationalists alike, this paper will argue that the greater problem andindeed threat to the cohesiveness of society may actually come, notfrom the minority of accountants who behave unethically but ratherfrom the majority of accounting professionals who appear to behave

( )ethically! Let me explain. A study by Ulrich and Thielemann 1993 hasshown that the, prevailing thinking pattern among managers is notethical opportunism or cynicism, as perhaps some of the media often

[ ]implies, but economism that is ... the ethical conviction that economi -cally appropriate action in itself is ethically good as such. Reilly and

)Kyj, 1990 , see also H enderson, 1991, Maunders & Burritt, 1991 suggestthat accountants in particular are taught to share similar convictions.They argue that,

marketing, finance and accounting personnel learn that proper be -haviour is defined in terms of its impact on the profits of the firm.

Given that our prevailing system of accounting is based upon(marginalist economics Boland, 1982 in Lehman, 1992; Tinker et al ., 1982;

Tinker, 1985, 1991; Lehman, 1988; Reilly & Kyj, 1990; Lewis et al ., 1992;)Gray, 1992a,b accountants will inevitably be taught that economically

appropriate action is that which maximises company profits and conse -quently that morally good actions are concomitant with economicallygood actions.

There is a well established argument within the critical accountingliterature that accounting serves capitalism because of the function itperforms in society and because of the processes intrinsic to accounting( )see, e.g . Tinker et al ., 1982; Tinker, 1985, 1991; Lehman, 1988 . Thispaper draws on this literature and attempts to contribute to this debateby suggesting that accounting education in particular, contributes to thedominance of capitalism because it engenders a particular kind of ethicalidentity within students which they subsequently use to discipline them -selves. It will be argued that this form of ethical identity helps tomaintain the dominance of the kind of instrumental rationality uponwhich capitalism is based. It will be contended that capitalism maintainsits pre-dominance within society not because it overtly forces individualsto behave in a particular way but rather because it creates the circum -stances under which individuals exert power against themselves anddiscipline themselves to behave in such a way that allows the hege -

( )mony of capitalism, along with its concomitant injustices Gibson, 1984 ,(for example the exploitation of children; workers; the environment Gorz,

)1989; Atkinson, 1991 and third world economies, to continue unchal -lenged. Indeed, it will be suggested that individuals discipline themselves


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because they believe that by doing so they will be acting in a properand ethical way.

The paper argues that this process poses a threat to social cohesion,or community, primarily because of the way in which it represents otherhuman beings. However, the paper also contends that accountants could

( )become more of a threat to this hegemony see McPhail & Gray, 1996if ethics education were able to re-structure ethical subjectivity based ona collective, we consciousness. Thus, accounting education is viewedas a dialectic which may have the potential to empower as well assubjugate individuals.

The Perspective

While the interest in and concern over accounting education appears to(be growing see, e.g. Lewis et al ., 1992 ; Gray et al ., 1994; Owen et al .,)1994 , as yet, there seems to be little theoretical analysis of the political

(nature of this process although see Lehman, 1988; Power, 1991 as two) (notable exceptions . This paper contends that education in general see,

e.g. Althusser, 1971; Bernstein, 1976; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Williams,)1977 ; Giroux, 1983, 1996; Gibson, 1984 and accounting education in

particular is a powerful and political process. It draws on Michel Fou -caults work on ethics in order to consider how power may be seen to

operate through the discourse of accounting education in a hegemonic(and threatening way Mouffe, 1979; Mercer, 1980; Poster, 1984; Smart ,)1994 .

While the accounting literature contains a number of studies which(draw on the work of Foucault see, e.g. Hopwood, 1987; Neimark, 1990;

)Armstrong, 1994; Grey, 1994; Hoskin, 1994 , there appears, as yet, to berelatively little application of his work on ethics to accountancy. This isperhaps because Foucaults conceptualisation of ethics is the least devel -oped area of his work as he died before he was able to complete it.

The paper draws on Foucaults work on ethics to argue that it maynot just be that accounting education stultifies and constricts studentsmoral development but that it may actually be instrumental in construct -ing a sense of moral identity which not only covertly serves capitalism

(but also the kind of ins trumental rationality upon which it is based see)McPhail & Gray, 1996 . The paper suggests that accounting education

may implicitly provide students with an ideal model of the ethical andjust individual which they subsequently use to discipline themselves inorder to behave properly and remain as close to that ideal as possibl e 4.

( )As such, it will be argued that, while Merritts 1991 observation isundoubtedly true, there may be a sense in which business educationdoes prepare students for responding to ethical issues because it effec -tively constructs their moral identities. It will be contended that account -ing education in particular can be seen to be involved in complexhegemonic processes where power and control are effected in societynot by one group on another in an overt way, but rather by individuals


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( )upon themselves Mouffe, 1979; Mercer, 1980; Smart, 1994 . As Hoskin( )and Macve 1986 suggest, the means of social control have shifted

from an older punishment on the body to a disciplining of the person( )and its correlative reflexive form, self-discipline .

Within this paper, Foucaults work on power and ethics is used to

investigate the role that accounting education may play in providingstudents with a particular kind of economic identity which may servethe interests of capital. This application of Foucaults work can beviewed as a development of both Antonio Gram scis notion of hege -

(mony Gramsci, 19 71; Mouffe, 1979; Mercer, 1980 ; Poster, 1984; Neimark,) (1994; Smart, 1994 and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School see,

)e.g. Wolin, 1992; Morrow & Brown, 1994 . Indeed, Foucault situated hisown agenda firmly in line with the Critical Theorists. He says,

...this form of philosophy, that from Hegel, through Nietzsche and MaxWeber, to the Frankfurt School, has founded a form of reflection in( )which I have tried to work. Foucault, in Wolin, 1992

( )Wolin 1992 also contends that of all the poststructuralist philo -sophers, Foucaults project seems closest to that of the early CriticalTheorists. He says,

Foucault and the early critical theorists share not only a common setof methodological concerns, but share other concerns as well, particu -larly the mechanisms of domination and power.

Foucault suggested that there was an affinity between his method of genealogy and the critique of instrumental reason that Horkheimer,Adorno and Marcuse had been involved with. However, while he at -tempted to develop the Frankfurt Schools critique of instrumental reason( )and the possibility of resistance there are some important and quitefundamental differences between the two perspectives. Foucault, for ex -ample, changed the focus of analysis from the study of the negative

(effects of power i.e. rationality as domination in Horkheimer and)Adornos emancipation/domination dialectic , away from the notion of

reason as repression, and developed a Nietzschein view of power as a( )formative force that constituted individuals Poster, 1984 .

The Structure of the Paper

The paper is split into three sections and takes its structure from thedialectic described above. Section one explains Foucaults work onpower/knowledge and ethics, and attempts to apply his ideas to ac -counting education in order to show how ethical accountants may posea threat to society. Section two attempts to provide a link betweensection one and section three. One aspect of Foucaults thesis on ethicsis that conventional modalities of moral identity are characterised bywhat he calls a rationalistic mode of subjection . The second section


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discusses some of the moral philosophy literature in an attempt to showthat this rationalistic mode of subjection is only one of a number of possible modalities. In particular, section two discusses the debatebetween those moral philosophers who contend that ethical dilemmascan be recognised and resolved just through the application of reason

and those who contend that some form of emotional or ethical sense isrequired as well. This study is intended to provide the basis for arguingthat the prevailing rationalistic mode of subjection within accountancy ishegemonic and subjugates other aesthetic and emotional forms of ethi -cal knowledge. The section is also intended to provide the grounds fordeveloping an understanding of Foucaults notion of resistance.

While Foucault may provide us with the basis for an insightful analy -sis of the way in which power operates through accounting education,does he provide any basis for a course of action for resisting the

negative effects of power? From the literature, it would seem that many(accounting academics believe that he does not see, e.g. Neimark, 1990;)Tinker, 1992; Armstrong, 1994 . Section three attempts to present an

alternative view of Foucaults notion of resistance and calls for a formof opposition founded on subjugated emotional/aesthetic knowledge. Inparticular, this final section discusses a possible course of action for

( )concerned accounting educators which is based on Baumans 1993postmodern ethic of the other.

Section One: Foucault, Power Knowledge & Ethics

This section introduces Foucaults notion of power and explains how itrelates to the study of ethics. The section provides a general basis forconsidering how power may operate within accounting education throughthe construction of ethical identity and subsequently how ethical accoun -tants may represent a threat to society. The section contains an intro -duction to Foucaults modes of analysing power; a discussion of his

concept of power/ knowledge; and finally, a delineation of the character -istics of his form of ethical analysis.

Domains of Analysis in Foucaults Work

Three main domains of analysis can be found in Foucaults work: ananalysis of systems of knowledge; an analysis of power; and an analysis

(of the way in which individuals discipline themselves Davidson, 1994;)Prado, 1995 . Foucault used three different modes of analysis to study

each of these three domains: archaeology , for analysing systems of knowledge; genealogy , for analysing power; and ethics , for analysing

(how individuals construct t hemselves as ethical subjects Foucault in)Rainbow, 1994; Smart, 1985; Davidson, 1994 .

Initially, Foucault employed an archaeological approach in order tostudy how individuals were constituted as subjects of knowledge within


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the social sciences. This was followed by genealogy which focused onhow individuals constitute themselves as subjects acting on others( )Foucault in Rabinow, 1994 . Finally, Foucault turned his attention toethics in order to study the disciplinary power that individuals exert on

( )themselves Prado, 1995 . Foucault argued that looking at his work

(retrospectively, one could observe three domains for genealogy: truth in) ( ) ( )archaeology power in genealogy and ethics Simons, 1995 . Truth,

refers to the kinds of knowledge the human sciences generate aboutindividuals. Power, relates to, the relationship between subjects as theyact upon each other, and incorporates, political structures, systems of rules and norms, techniques and apparatuses of government. Finally,ethics involves the relationship to oneself, or, ethical self understand -ing, but this is not detached from the other two areas of study( )Foucault in Rabinow, 1994; Simons, 1995 . Thus, after Foucault had

studied the way in which the social sciences construct individuals asboth objects and subjects, his attention turned to focus more specifi -cally on how individuals construct and discipline themselves as ethical

( )subjects see Davidson, 1994; Hacking, 1994; Hoy, 1994 .

Introducing Foucaults Notion of Power Knowledge and its Relevance to the Study of Hegemony

(The issue of power was thus paramount in Foucaults work Dreyfus &)Rabinow, 1982; Smart, 1985 and his work on power is particularly

important for the insights it provides into the ways in which poweroperates in multifarious and covert ways within societies like ours that

(appear to be d emocracies, f ree from opp ression and control Dreyfus &)Rabinow, 1982; Megill, 1985; Smart, 1985 . Indeed Foucault suggests that

the movement from overt forms of power and coercive force to covertforms of government and discipline, in other words hegemony, were,

( )contemporaneous to the emergence of capitalism Smart, 1994 .Foucault uses the term power/ knowledge to explain his ideas on how

power operates within society. However, in the same way that Nietzscheclaimed that his concept of, the will to power, was only hypotheticaland not a fact , so Foucault uses his notion of power/knowledge as aheuristic for studying power relationships within society. As the termimplies, Foucault employed this notion to convey the relationship

( )between power and forms of knowledge Hoy, 1994 .Foucaults notion of power/ knowledge is quite different to other con -

( )ceptualizations of power see Robson & Cooper, 1989 ; Perks, 1993 . Oneof the biggest distinguishing f eatures of his analysis i s that he doe s notthink of power as something that a particular group de ploys for its own

(interest over another group Robson & Cooper, 1989 ; Perks, 1993; Hoy,)1994; Smart, 1994 . This distinction reflects a wider debate within the

(social sciences between those who see power as exercised by individ -)ual or institutional agents on other individuals and subordinate groups,


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and those w ho believe that power is a structural characteristic of the5 ( )social system Hoy, 1994 .

In his development of historical materialism Marx suggested that power(was an inherent characteristic of the economic system Perks, 1993; Hoy,

)1994 . However, he also suggested that the economic structure reflected

the interests of one particular group in society: the capitalists. Foucaultdeparts from the classical Marxian model of power which reduces con -

(trol and domination to a direct correlation between the base the sys -) ( )tem of production and the super-structure ideology as reflected in the

( )economic interests of one particular class of individuals Hoy, 1994 . Heargues that this model fails to adequately address more basic questions.For example, how it is possib le for the human body to be constituted

( )as labour power? Hoy, 1994 . Foucault argued that, the human bodycould only have been constituted as labour power only if there were a

( )technology or knowledge of the body to make it possible Hoy, 1994 .In his genealogical analysis Foucault conceptualized power in terms of conscious and unconscious forms of knowledge which, he argued, had

(become embodied in many local forms of material practice Smart, 1985;)Prado, 1995 . Thus, where Marxist theory begins at the, macro-level,

and starts with power at the centre of society, emanating from oneidentifiable source: the economic system of production, Foucault beginsat the, micro-level 6 , and views power as working through many differ -ent locations, such that it coalesces to serve the inte re sts of the bour -

7

(geoisie in a more haphazard and less deterministic wa y Foucault, 1978;)Smart, 1985; Roberts & Scapens, 1990 . In Foucaults analysis, powercannot be attributed to a specific kind of economic system neither canit be viewed as the property or possession of any particular group. Theeffects of power do not arise, according to Foucault, from the deploy -ment of power by particular individuals who have power upon those

( )8who do not Smart, 1985; Hoy, 1994 .The Frankfurt Schools notion of power was based on the assumption

that the interests of a particular group within society were really differ -

( )ent to what they consciously took them to be Hoy, 1994; Smart, 1994 .However, Foucault represents a departure from this kind of interpretationwhich associates power with the reprodu ction of ideology or false con -

( )sciousness see Morrow & Brown, 1994 . He argued that knowledge isnot an instrument which is used by those in power to further their ownends. He also argued against the contention that a new body of knowledge brings about a new class of people or institutions that canexercise a new kind of power. These two assertions parallel two oppos -ing thesis about ideology: firstly, that a ruling class generates ideologyconducive to its own interests and alternatively, that a new ideology

( )creates a niche for a new ruling class see Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991 .Foucault suggested that what had been understood as the reproductionof a particular ideology is better understood in terms of an interplay of

( )different creative forces in the Nietzschean sense . For Foucault, theidentification of power with false consciousness misses the point that

( )power is involved in the creation of truth as well as falsity Hoy, 1994 .


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Foucault suggested that power/ knowledge was ubiquitous. He saysthere is, no social existence without power relations. Thus, Foucaultargued that power is a characteristic of modern society which engulfs

( )everyone Smart, 1985 . He contended that all subjects are engaged inthis, economy of power, arguing that,

power is employed and exercised through a net like organization...individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in a position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power. They are not only itsinert or consenting targets; they are always also the elements of its

( )articulation Walzer, 1994, see also Poster, 1984 .

However, while such a pervasive concept of power may seem pes -( )simistic and oppressive Said, 1994 , it is important to point out that

power/ knowledge was initially a value neutral term. Power /knowledge isessentially a value neutral label which Foucault used to describe thepractices and processes through which new objects and subjects arecreated. Whereas Marxist theory seems to present power in negativeterms as domination, coercion, manipulation, authority and repression,the Nietzschean influence in Foucaults work means that he believed that

( )power had positive as well as negative effects Hoy, 1994 . There aretwo issues here: firstly, power/ knowledge is positive in the sense thatFoucault believed that it could engender desirable effects. Power/

knowledge is not intended to convey the idea that the exercise of ( )power is purely oppressive see Hoy, 1994 . For example, in his book,( )Discipline and Punish 1977 Foucault explained how, within hospitals,

new forms of knowledge contributed towards better health care and yetalso, narrowed the possibilities for subjectification, such that patientswere treated like objects. Foucault thus suggests that the results of power can be both positive and negative and that it may therefor bepossible to conceive of situations where power/knowledge produces so -cially desirable results 9.

Secondly power/ knowledge is positive in the sense of being formativeand creative. Foucault was particularly interested in the way in whichindividual subjectivitys are constructed through power as it is enactedwithin specific, local discourses. As such, Foucault moves away from theEarly Critical Theorists notion of power as that which operates onsubjects, to a view of power as that which constructs subjects. Accord -ing to Foucault, this involves processes of production and transformationrather than control. He says, power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of, making up, citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom. This position is more radical thanthe Marxist notion of false consciousness. In contrast to the EarlyCritical Theorists views on ideology, Foucault suggests that conscious -ness is created through power and not simply deluded by it. He sug -gests that individuals are formed, form themselves and become compre -hensible, through the practice of power. Foucaults work thus displacesthe concept of ideology through which Gramsci sought to theorise,


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questions of intell ectual and m oral leadership, central to the achieve -( )ment of hegemony Smart, 1994 .

This perspective on power can be interpreted as a, radical re-theo -(risation, of Gramscis work on hegemony Foucault, 1978; Hoy, 1994;

)Smart, 1994 . However, as I have attempted to show above, whereas

Gramscis analysis was grounded in Marxism and as such economismand ideology, Foucaults work, prises open the problem of hegemony,( )Smart, 1994 and takes us beyond economic determinism. He alsoprovides us with an analysis of ideology not in terms of false con -sciousness, but rather in a more s ophisticated analysis of the relation -

( ) ( )ship between power and knowledge Smart, 1994 . Smart 1994, p. 160explains,

It is in the work of Foucault that an analysis of the various complex

social techniques and methods fundamental to the achievement of arelationship of guidance, leadership, or hegemony is to be found. Hege -mony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not throughforce or coercion, nor necessarily through consent, but most effectivelyby way of practices, techniques, and methods which infiltrate minds andbodies, cultural practices which cultivate behaviours and beliefs, tastes,desires, and needs are seemingly naturally occurring qualities and

( )properties embodied in psychic and physical reality or Truth of thehuman subject.

Foucault explicitly addresses the issue of hegemony in his History of ( )Sexuality 1978 . He says,

Emphasis on the sexual body should undoubtedly be linked to theprocess of the establishment of bourgeois hegemony: not because of themarket value assumed by labour capacity but because the cultivation of its own body could represent politically, economically and historically,the present and future bourgeoisie. Its dominance was in part depen -dent on that cultivation; but it was not simply a matter of economy orideology, it was a physical matter as well.

Introducing Foucaults Form of Ethical Analysis

Thus Foucault suggested that there was a close relationship betweenpower and knowledge and indeed believed that both were co-extensive.However, in his analysis of ethics, Foucault turned his attention to aparticular kind of knowledge, the individuals knowledge of themselves.

Foucault was concerned with a level of ethics below that of conven -( )tional moral philosophers MacIntyre, 1967 . He was not concerned with

what is right and wrong, rather he was concerned with how notions of right and wrong develop; how they become embodied within an individ -uals self understanding; how they are used by individuals; and theinterests they serve. Foucault believed that the ethical self was notdetermined by nature, or self conscious decision making processes, butrather that it is determined through a discourse which arises from, and


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(reflexively helps to maintain, a particular, system of thought Hoy,)1994 . His argument can be viewed as an extension of Hegels analysis

of ethics. Hegel criticized Kant for looking only at explicit moral rules.He suggested that the underlying ethic that allowed moral codes tofunction was of equal importance. Both Hegel and later Foucault sug -

gested that this underlying ethic consisted of a, shared background of understanding, that connects the individual to the community of whichthey are a part, or, to put it another way, their idea of what it means

( ) ( )to be a good member of the community Hoy, 1994 . Hacking 1994explains this in simple terms as the things we worry about if we aremoral individuals, or the kind of people we aspire to be. Foucault thussuggested that the way in which individuals construct themselves asethical subjects may be related to their understanding of their positionin society.

10

(Foucaults concept of ethics had four major characteristics see)Davidson, 1994 .

1. The means by which we change ourselves in order to become ethicalsubjects : Our self imposed discipline.

2. The Telos : the type of person we aspire to be when we behavemorally.

3. Ethical Substance : that part of ourselves which is taken to be therelevant domain for ethical judgment.

4. The Mode of Subjection : the way in which individuals are incited torecognize their moral obligations. For example, some obligationsmay be engendered by divine law; others by reason; and yetothers by convention.

The remainder of this section attempts to apply each of the character -istics of Foucaults analysis of ethics to accountancy in order to studyhow accounting education may serve capitalism through constructing aparticular kind of moral identity within students.

Self Discipline

The first issue in Foucaults analysis of ethics is self discipline. I havealready commented on the possibility that accounting may be implicatedin this process, however, it may help to clarify the argument a littlefurther.

From Foucaults work, it may be possible to identify two senses inwhich accountancy may be seen to engender disciplinary power. Hoskin

( )and Macve 1986 discuss the relationship between accountancy andtechniques developed within education for the, surveillance of stu -dents. They present a genealogy of the development of the examination

( )as a technology of power. Hoskin and Macve 1986 also suggest thatthere may be a tenuous link between these developments and theformation of, modern corporate managerialism. In a similarly vain,


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( )Roberts and Scapens 1990, see also Miller and OLeary, 1987 have(discussed the way in which management accounting techniques like

)performance evaluation and the budget process may predispose individ -uals to discipline themselves. In an article entitled, Accounting as Disci -

( )pline , Roberts & Scapens, 1990 they draw parallels between accoun -

tancy and Benthams notion of the Panopticon in order to explore, nothow accounting information is used as an instrument of domination, butrather how accounting information emerges from and operates within

( )relations of power/ knowledge see also Grey, 1994 . They seem to implythat accountancy, like Benthams Panopticon, creates a, field of visibil -ity, which, subjugates those caught within its omnipresent disciplinarygaze. They suggest,

To know that one is observed by an eye that one cannot see, that oneis seen without being able to engage that eye, to be dependent uponthe judgment of that eye; these are the ways that invisibility becomes asource of power. Ones own visibility gives knowledge to the other, butthe other cannot be interrogated, cannot be reduced to the subject,never engages you as the subject. It induces a state of subjection.

In both these papers, the pressure to control ones actions seems tobe external, although it is anonymous. However, in Foucaults later workon ethics there seems to be a shift of emphasis, such that individuals

are seen to discipline themselves based on an internal, thoughnever-the-less constructed, moral identity. The metaphor for the disci -plinary gaze may be conceptualised as shifting from Benthams Panopti -con to The Early of Shaftesburys notion of the, Inner Eye 11 . Also,both sets of authors imply that disciplinary power is facilitated through,

( ) the new micro-technology of calculability, Hoskin & Macve, 1986 by,substituting for individuality of the memorable man that of the calcula -

(ble man, Foucault, 1977, in Hoskin & Macve, 1986; see also Miller &) ( )OLeary, 1987 . Hoskin and Macve 1986 , for example talk about the

role of examination marks in the disciplinary process. However, it issuggested in this paper that self discipline, as well as the motivatingforce to discipline, may come from within the individual such that theyregulate their behaviour not because the micro-technology of calculabilityconstrains them to do so, but rather because their sense of Telos means they want to.

The Telos

This brings us to the second characteristic of Foucaults conception of ethics: the Telos , or the type of individuals we aspire to be when webehave morally.

If, as I argued above, accountancy is conventionally taught within the( )rubric of marginalist economics Tinker et al ., 1982 then it would seem

at least possible that the accountants sense of Telos might be influ -


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K. McPhail846

enced by the kind of profit maximising, rational, economic man withinthat system.

In the conventional marginalist economic model of ethics, the corpora -tion is seen to be responsible to society only to the extent that it

( )maximises its own wealth and efficiency Friedman, 1982 . Rational

economic decisions are justified in terms of their impact on profit ratherthan on whether they can be defended morally, even though the appealto profitability is itself a moral argument. By assimilating the good withthe profitable the issue of ethics is reduced to a narrow form of

( )economic consequentialist utilitarianism Gray et al ., 1994 .It may therefore be of little surprise that the, prevailing thinking

pattern among managers is... the ethical conviction that economicallyappropriate action in itself is ethically good as such Reilly and Kyj( )1990 see also, Henderson, 1991; Maunders & Burritt, 1991 suggest that

this worldview extends to accountants as well. They argue that,

marketing, finance and accounting personnel learn that proper be -haviour is defined in terms of its impact on the profits of the firm.

The economically appropriate action is that which maximises companyprofits. However, because of the objective, technical and uncritical natureof the majority of accounting degrees, most accountants do not seem tobe aware of the economic and moral philosophy wh ich underpin their

12 ( )ethics, let alone capable of critically appraising them Gray et al ., 1994 .Thus, again due to the way in which accountancy is indiscriminately

taught within the rubric of marginalist economics, there may be a sensein which accounting education influences the type of people accountantsaspire to be when they behave morally.

The sense of Telos discussed here highlights two further issues: firstly,because of the technical way in which accounting is taught and becauseof the way the issue of ethics is resolved in marginalist economics,then it may be that the question of ethics rarely enters the part of

students lives in which they are accountants. The second issue relatesto the rationalistic subjectivity which accounting education promotes.Both these issues are considered below.

Ethical Substance

The third characteristic in Foucaults conception of ethics is ethical substance , that is, those areas of our lives which we take to be therelevant domain for ethical judgement, or to put it another way, theparts of our lives which engage our moral reasoning.

Recent evidence suggests that accounting education may affect stu -dents sense of ethical substance in that it may encourage them to viewthe accountant part of their lives, in contrast to other parts of their lives,

(as an area where ethical issues need not be considered see McPhail &)Gray, 1996 . It may be that the acquisition of roles may begin, or at


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Ethical threat 847

least be maintained through accounting education, as students learn toevaluate issues presented within an accounting context in a particular

( )way Gleb & Brien, 1971 in Merritt, 1991 even though this may lead todecisions which conflict with values they hold in other domains of theirlives.

As a scientific and objective construct, conventional economics sepa -( )rates the facts from their concomitant values see King, 1994 . Maunders

( )and Burritt 1991 for example, suggest that the reason why companiesbehave badly,

...has to do with systematic thought: economics excludes ethics as aconsideration in the process of decision making. By starting from thepoint at which preferences are already assumed to be defined, economicsof whatever variety has no explicit involvement in issues of morality( )Maunders & Burritt, 1991 .

If this is true, then there may be a sense in which accountingeducation influences that part of students selves which is taken to bethe relevant domain for ethical judgments. The role of subjectivity withinbusiness decisions may be lost as students make decisions in a techni -cal and programmed way unaware of the fact that underneath theconventional mode of accounting analysis that informs business deci -

(sions lies a whole system of moral beliefs and values see, e.g. Donald -)son, 1988; Dillard & Bricker, 1992 .

The Mode of Subjection

The final issue in Foucaults analysis of ethics is the mode of subjection ,or the way in which individuals are induced to recognise their moralobligations. Foucault studied how different individuals come to compre -hend similar moral codes in different ways, for example, as divine rules,

( )natural laws, or as rational choices Foucault in Rabinow, 1994 . David -

( )son 1994 provides us with an example, he says,

faithfulness to ones spouse may be imposed as a requirement of reason or as a consequence of a certain aesthetics of existence.

Within the kind of theory which underpins accountancy, moral rulesand obligations are engendered primarily through rational analysis asopposed to religious maxims or feelings and emotions. As such, conven -tional modes of subjection may be seen to subjugate alternative formsof aesthetic knowledge. Indeed, Foucault argued that the whole of mod -ern, western society was characterised by a rational and instrumentalmode of subjection. He contended that while any particular era will

( )display a whole range of competing discourses Hoskin, 1994 , contem -porary Western society is dominated by one particular hegemonic, ratio -

( )nalistic discourse Mouffe, 1979; Mercer, 1980; Smart, 1994 .(In his book, Critique of Economic Reason, Andre Gorz 1989 see also,


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K. McPhail848

)Power, 1992; Rossouw, 1994a argues that within contemporary westerncultures, thinking has been reduced to technique and that this hasallowed economic calculation to emerge as a substitute for value judge -ment. This may be particularly true within accountancy. It may be thatcalculation and the accuracy of calculation have become inordinately

important factors within accounting education such that when studentsare taught about investment decisions and cost allocation techniques,emphasis is placed on the accuracy of the calculations, for example, onensuring that the proper discount rate is used or that the number of years that cash flows are discounted over is correct. They may be ableto rationally defend the technique and how they have used it, andindeed this may be seen as sufficient justification for their actions initself. The values underlying the decision and the consequences of thedecision may be neglected. As such, it may be that within accounting

education, business decisions are, to some extent, constructed as techni -cal tasks, or at least significantly informed, or justified by, or ratio -

(nalised as, procedures for example as Cost Benefit Analysis, Net Pre -sent Value or Internal Rate of Return Calculations, Linear Programming

)and so on . To the extent that this is true, obligations may becomeassimilated into and resolved within technical and calculative processes.As such, there may be a sense in which some or all of the responsibil -ity for decisions is divested from the individual accountants and con -ferred upon the calculations so that the students on ly perceive them -

( )selves as responsible for getting the calculations right. Donaldson 1988 ,in a similar vain, talks of the way in which the technical rationality of conventional economics,

[ ]shift s the blame for decisions made by people to impersonal mecha -nisms such as, immutable, economic laws which, of course are un -able to answer for themselves, convenient but mute Dei ex machina ( )Donaldson, 1988 .

In particular accounting education may promote the idea that theresolution of accounting problems requires only the proper application of reason.

This section has attempted to do two things: firstly, to introduceFoucaults analytic of power/knowledge and ethics; and secondly, toapply Foucaults ideas to accountancy to see how ethical accountantsmight be considered to be threatening. This section has argued thatFoucault was interested in the formative role of power/ knowledge andin particular was concerned with the way in which an individualsknowledge of themselves, i.e. their ethical self understanding, could beconstructed through discourse and how these subjectivitys may come toserve the interests of one predominant rationality. If we apply Foucaultsnovel perspective on power/ knowledge to accounting education then itmay be possible to suggest that the threat of ethical accountants comesfrom the possibility that their ethical identities have been constructed insuch a way that they discipline themselves to behave in a manner


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Ethical threat 849

conducive to the interests of capitalists and the continued predominanceof the rationalistic mode of subjection upon which it is based. It wasargued that this form of rationality may threaten the cohesiveness of society because of the way in which it excludes ethical analysis frombusiness decision making.

The following section attempts to provide a link into the concludingpart of this paper. It focuses on the mode of ethical subjection engen -dered within accountancy in an attempt to show how accounting maybe seen to subjugate other forms of ethical knowledge.

Section Two: Ethics Emotion & Reason

This section attempts to further elaborate on Foucaults notion of power

and provides the basis for thinking about how the negative effects of ( )power might be resisted. Hoy 1994 explains that,

Foucault insists that saying there is no social existence without powerrelations does not entail that particular, oppressive power relations arenecessary. The field of possibilities that gave rise to such current injus -tices as Foucault perceives in the carceral society also contained, histori -

(cal analysis brings out, alternatives that were not acted upon Hoy ,)1994 .

Foucault, as the historian of the present not only points out that thingscould have been different, but that our understanding of history asprogress may be misguided, and therefore by inference that things

( )could be better Hoy, 1994 .This section draws on Alasdair Macintyres Short History of Ethics

( )1967 in order to highlight an alternative mode of subjection that hasnot been acted upon. It argues that the prevailing rationalistic mode of subjection within accounting is not innocuous and may be anti-social tothe extent that it actively subjugates other 13 , emotional, sympathetic

knowledge of human beings. This section provides a basis for consider -ing how emotional knowledge might be used as a way of locallyresisting the hegemony discussed in the previous section.

The American political and moral philosopher Alasdair Macintyre con -( )tends in his Short History of Ethics 1967 that Hobbes was wrong to

suggest that the state was able to maintain order only because individu -als feared the punishment that could be imposed upon them if theycontravened the social contract. Thus, for example, he suggested thatnot all an individuals actions are determined by the possibility of beingsent to prison, or more precisely, by reasoning out the consequences of their actions. Within moral philosophy, it seems that the debate over theform of ethical decision making has been between those who contendthat reason can be used to distinguish between go od and bad andthose who suggest that some kind of moral sens e 14 is involved alongwith, passions and emotions.

( )According to MacIntyre 1967 , Kant marks a dividing point in the


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K. McPhail850

history of ethics. Kant exemplified enlightenment rationality and, as15 ( )such, strongly believed in the power of reason MacIntyre, 1967 . Kant

took the existence of moral consciousness as a given and attempted todiscover universal principles, or laws, o f moral reasoning. He sought toground morality in the nature of reason 16 expostulating that we not only

use reason theoretically to find out what the world is like, but that wealso use re ason practically t o find out how we should behave in the

( )world see MacIntyre, 1967; McNaughton, 1988 . This kind of ethicalperspective can be seen to follow in a similar tradition to that of Hobbes and Locke who believed that morality was rational and capable

( )of demonstration in a similar way to mathematics MacIntyre, 1967 . Inhis analysis of this line of moral philosophy, Bauman argues that,

Morality was cast fairly and squarely in the unfeeling domination of

reason. Appointing reason as the sole faculty relevant to the moralevaluation of action pre-emptied the questions of morality as rule gov -( )erned and rules as heteronomous. Bauman, 1993

( )Bauman 1993 suggests, and I concur, that within contemporary west -ern societies, the criteria of morality has gravitated towards mereproceduralism. As I argued in section two, this seems to be particularlytrue within accoun tancy, due to its bases in neo-classical economics( )Donaldson, 1988; Gorz, 1989; Power, 1992; Rossouw, 1994b . Nielsen

( )1989 argues that this rationalistic view of ethics has become so en -trenched that there is a, danger that it is assumed that to reason is tobe ethical and to be unethical is to reason inadequately.

However, Locke was challenged by his pupil, the Earl of Shaftesbury( )MacIntyre, 1967 . Shaftesbury argued that moral obligations were recog -nised and resolved using a moral sense rather than by reason. Heconceptualised this idea in terms of an inner eye that was able todistinguish between the equitable and the odious. He says,

A moral judgement is thus the expression of a response of feeling tosome property of an action... just as an aesthetic judgement is theexpression of just such a response to the properties of shapes and

( )figures MacIntyre, 1967 .

Thus Shaftesbury, like his successor, Francis Hutcheson, assimilated( )ethics and aesthetics see Audi, 1995 .

Hume followed Shaftesbury in his rejection of rationalist ethics. Hecontended, for example, that virtue was not something that could beexhibited by facts but is rather a feeling. Hume argued that becausereason is concerned with matters of fact, moral judgements cannotdepend on reason because reason does not lead us to act. He con -tended that we are moved to act not by the knowledge of the facts but

( )by the prospect of pleasure or pain MacIntyre, 1967 . As such, heargued that it is passion and not reason which is the guiding factor in

( )moral judgements. As MacIntyre 1967 says,


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Ethical threat 851

Hume wishes to show that moral conclusions cannot be based onanything that reason could establish, that it is logically impossible thatany genuine or alleged factual truth could provide the basis for morality

The moral sense theorists have no explanation for why notions like

charity and honesty are preferable to self-interest and avarice theysimply contend that they are.

( )These two opposing views on morality the rational and emotionalreflect a wider and more polemic debate in contemporary moral philoso -phy. This debate is between cognitivist theorists and non-cognitivist

( )theorists McNaughton, 1988 . The non-cognitivists believe that value( )involves something more than reason and cognition McNaughton, 1988 .

(Following a similar argument to Hume see MacIntyre, 1967; Berlin,)1993 they contend that reason, on its own, can never determine whether

something is or is not moral. They suggest that the individual has tochoose which values to accept and which to reject, regardless of theamount of factual evidence available to them. If we accept this line of thinking then it becomes apparent that the requirement to choose ismissing from accounting decision making. As I have already argued insection two, accounting may implicitly confer the responsibility for ethi -cal choices upon apparently objective and innocuous calculations andtechniques. As such, students may not even recognise the ethical choicesthey have made, let alone be able to critical evaluate the various ethical

criterion that could be used as a basis for making ethical decisions.It is important to point out that non-cognitivists still think that reasonis an important element in moral decisions. They contend that reason

(provides the facts which can inform an individuals decisions See Mc -)Naughton, 1988 . However, reason itself is not neutral. It may be that

reason provides only specific and partial information and indeed maydetermine which facts will be considered in order to resolve moral

( )dilemmas and which will be ignored McNaughton, 1988 . Thus, it maybe that reason cannot be viewed as something which stands outside

morality and simply and objectively informs it. Rationality is alwaysalrea dy based on a particular view of reality and a particular set of 17 ( )value s see MacIntyre, 1967 in Francis, 1990 . Accounting, through the

application of a particular kind of rationality, provides accountants a ndother business men and women with only a specific set of facts 18 .Indeed, accounting constructs the facts upon which decisions are based.This of course is not to suggest that emotions are any different, it issimply the recognition of the subjective, partial and essentially sociallyconstructed nature of both.

So far, this paper has suggested that it is possible that ethics cantake on the form of a mechanism of control. The paper has consideredFoucaults work on ethics and in particular the role that moral identitymay play in controlling an individuals behaviour. It has been suggestedthat accounting education may be seen to provide students with amoral identity which they may subsequently draw on to decide on aparticular course of action. It has also been suggested that the mode of


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K. McPhail852

subjection which characterises accounting students moral identities maybe such that they are incited to recognise and resolve their moralobligations primarily through the application of reason, as they areassimilated in the techniques they employ. The final section of thispaper draws on the distinction between rational and emotional modes of

subjection and uses it as a basis for considering Foucaults notion of resistance, to see whether it provides any help for formulating a courseof action. It will be suggested that accounting education should attemptto resist the subjugating rationalistic modes of subjection through con -structing an emotional sense of obligation towards, the other, that is,

( )it should endeavour to transform the individual I consciousness of ( )conventional accounting rationality into a collective we identity/ empathy

( )see Nielsen, 1991 .

Section Three: Educating the Emotions & Empathising with the Other

So far this paper has argued that power may operate within accountingeducation through the construction of ethical subjectivity and a rationalmode of subjectification in particular. However, while Foucault providesus with a pithy analysis of power, whether he also provides us withany system for resisting the negative effects of power or indeed, anyreason for wanting to do so, is a moot point. This section begins toconsider how the hegemony described above could be challenged andis structured around the following issues:

1. The possibility of resistance;2. The method of resistance;3. The apparatus of resistance;4. The modality of resistance;5. The basis for resistance;

6. An example of resistance.

The Possibility of Resistance

Foucaults critics have argued that his concept of power is so pervasive( )that it seems that all attempts to oppose it would be futile Hoy, 1994 .

( )Indeed, when his book, The Order Of Things 1970 was published, itwas initially viewed by many as right wing. It was heavily criticised by

(the French Marxist party who actually band it from party circles Eribon,)1989 . Jeannette Colomel expressed concerns then which have been

(reiterated in some o f the critical accounting literature more recently see,e.g. Neimark, 1990; Tinker, 1992 ; Armstrong, 1994; but see also Grey ,

)1994; Hoskin, 1994 . She attacked Foucault, contending that his workwas conservative and promoted the status quo. She says,


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Ethical threat 853

Foucault presents the world as a spectacle and as a game. His is aninvitation to a m agical attitude....which co ntributes to maintain the es -

19 ( )tablished ord er Colomel, in Eribon, 1989 .

Foucault is thus criticised for his ubiquitous view of power, yet he isonly arguing, that to live in society is to be involved in powerrelations... and that the notion of society without power relations is only

( )an abstraction Hoy, 1994 . As such, he sounds like the paragon of common sense.

It is important to point out firstly that although he believed thatpower was ubiquitous, Foucault never-the-less argued that individualshad some degree of free will. Foucault believed that although poweroperated to constitute subjects in particular ways, the way in whichthose subjects could subsequently act was not controlled or determined

(by any laws of causality or economic determinism although their ac -)tions may be delimited . As I explained above Foucault focuses on the

creative as opposed to the control aspect of power. Control is when thepossibility for acting contrary to the influence of others is not possible( )i.e. when a state of domination exists . In Foucaults analysis of power,individual subjectivity is constantly being constructed. Foucault contendedthat power is a relationship between people and groups of people inwhich the direction of influence is constantly contestable and open tochange and reconstruction , although he a ccepted that power relation -

20 ( )ships were asymmetric al Rabinow, 1994 . Foucault explains,

we are in a struggle with the government, and the government is in astruggle with us. When we deal with the government, the struggle, of course is not symmetrical, the power situation is not the same; but weare in this struggle, and the continuation of this situation can influencethe behaviour or non-behaviour of the other. So we are not trapped. Weare always in this kind of situation. It means that we always havepossibilities, there are always possibilities of changing the situation. Wecannot jump outside the situation, and there is no point where you arefree from all power relations. But you can always change it. So whatIve said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we arealways free-well any way, there i s always the possibility of changing( )Foucault in Rabinow, 1994, p. 192 .

( )In his article, The Subject and Power 1992 Foucault stresses thatpower is precisely the ability to act. Indeed, it is because Foucault viewspower as ubiquitous that individuals have the potential to resist subjuga -

( )tion. Hoy 1994 see also, Smart, 1985 explains this point when he saysthat Foucault conceptualises freedom as both, the condition and theeffect of power. It is the form because power is exercised on freeindividuals and it is an effect because there are many instances when

( )power meets with resistance Hoy, 1994 ; Rabinow, 1994; Walzer, 1994 .

The Method of Resistance

Given that Foucaults concept of power is so diffuse, his method for


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K. McPhail854

tackling the negative effects of power obviously has to be different fromMarxist notions of revolution, where the oppressed over throw those in power . When Foucault says, the king is headless, what he means isthat the political world does not have a centre from which powerradiates. The implication is that there cannot be a seizure of power if

( )there is nothing at the centre to seize Neimark, 1990 . If, as Foucaultsuggests, power is exercised in many d iff erent local contexts then it hasto be challenged point by point, locally 21 . As such, Foucault advocates a

(plurality of resistance rather than a revolution Hacking, 1994; Walzer ,)1994 . However, this resistance takes place without any overarching

( )totalising theory. As Hoy 1994 explains, For Foucault, neither compre -(hending the world nor changing it depends on grasping in either the

)theoretical or practical sense the totality.

The Apparatus of Resistance

Foucault argued that resistance was possible because the process of normalisation was never fully complete. He suggested that k no wledge isnever fully co-opted and that there will always be subjugated 22 forms of ( )power/ knowledge that can be used to resist prevailing and hegemonic

( ) ( )forms of power/ knowledge see Megill, 1985 . It may be helpful topause here and attempt to clarify how this relates to the argument insection two. The second section attempted to argue that accountingprovides a rationalistic mode of subjection which subjugates other emo -tional forms of ethical knowledge. This section argues that it may be

(possible to use subjugated knowledge as a basis for resisting or threat -)ening the hegemony of the predominant mode of subjection within

accountancy. Foucault argues that the aim of his form of resistancewas,

not to attempt to emancipate truth from every system of power, butrather detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social,

economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time( )Hacking, 1994; see also Smart, 1994 .

The Modality of Resistance

Thus, while Foucaults opponents often contend that his no tion of po wer( )is too general and diffuse to be politically threatening see Hoy, 1994 , I

would argue that he actually provides us with a much more radicalconcept of power. Foucault, influenced by Nietzsche, advocates resistanceas a way of life rather than a one-off event. He says,

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is danger -ous...If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.

(So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper-activism Foucault,)1984 in Simons, 1995; see also Megill, 1985 .


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Ethical threat 855

Foucault views emancipation as, an antagonism a reciprocal contest,where each incites and struggles with the other in a permanent provo -

( )cation Hoy, 1994 and this is based on his assumption that resistanceis the manifestation of freedom. Foucault attempted to provide a morepractical and direct connection between political action and theory. In -

deed, he implies that through his work he attempted to provide ananalytical instrument for political action. He says,

I think that a rigorous, theoretical analysis of the way in whicheconomic, political, and ideological structures function is one of thenecessary conditions for political action, in so far as political action is away of manipulating and possibly changing, drastically, and transformingstructures.... l do not consider that structuralism is exclusively an arm -chair activity for intellectuals; I think it can and must be integrated with

( )practice Eribon, 1989 .

The Basis for Resistance

Thus, far from supporting the status quo, Foucaults histories of the(present were written with the aim of destroying the status quo Megill,

)1985 . However, this is a problem in itself as Foucault does not provideus with any moral basis for challenging the status quo or any newsystem to construct in its place. Habermas criticised Foucault for failingto admit that his analysis of society is based on the modern political

( )and moral values of liberty and justice Hoy, 1994 and I think he is( )probably right. As Michnik 1990 in Giroux, 1991 points out, battling

this system requires a conscious appeal to morality and an inevitableinvolvement in politics. Without this moral basis, Foucaults, shrillattack on the carceral society, may be only, a bitter and ineffectual

( )rage, Hoy, 1994 nihilistic and devoid of the prospect of human happi -ness. Yet emancipatory myths, as the first generation of critical theo -rists realised, have long nourished the nobler utopian impulses of hu -

( )mankind, Wolin, 1992 a nd driven them to action. Foucault does pro -vide us with fictions, however, these are nihilistic anti-histories of re -gression, rather than heroic legends. Perhaps his attempts to put thingsinto crises are intended to frighten us into action but he also is indanger of engendering an apathetic and fatalistic complacence. Whybother?

( )It is therefor important for me at least to point out that this paper ispremised upon the belief that accounting education should not onlyendeavour to develop students critical and creative capabilities but alsotheir emotional capacities as well. This assertion is grounded only in mybelief that,

to suppress what we find in favour of the apotheosis of only one of our faculties capacity for rational analysis is a self mutilation whichcan only lead to a perversion of nature and distortion of truth. Fleshhas been given us, and passions; they do not sin by existing; they can


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K. McPhail856

be perverted, but the seducer is always cold reason, which desires to(assert its own authority and usurp that of the other faculties Berlin,

)1993 .

( )As such, this paper is firmly grounded in my notions of justice,

radical democracy, equity and beauty.

An Example of Resistance

The paper concludes by combining the various issues discussed aboveinto a possible mode of action. The form of resistance elaborated hereis primarily based on Baumans analysis of postmodern ethics and hisnotion of, the other. This may seem a strange place to begin to thinkabout an alternative perspective for developing ethical sensitivity amongstaccounting students, as many contemporary social theorists blame post -modernity for the prevailing ethical malaise. However, I concur with

( )Rossouw 1994b when he says that, ethical descensus is the end of modernity, not the product of postmodernity. In a similar vain, Bauman( )1993 argues that despite the, hot-headed triumphalism, of somepostmodernists, the postmodern perspective on ethics is not relativist.

( )On the contrary, Rossouw 1994b argues that postmodernism has notinvalidated the discussion of values but rather has reintroduced it as alegitimate concern in areas which were previously closed and taken for

granted.( )Bauman 1993 argues that postmodernity, brings a re-enchantment of

the world after the protracted and earnest, though in the end inconclu -sive, modern struggle to dis-enchant it. I believe that postmodernismneed not necessarily be viewed as an attempt to completely abolish theachievements or aspirations of the enlightenment, but rather that it can

(be used to draw attention both to its restrictions Cahoone, 1988 ;)Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991 and to the fact that its goals, despite what

( )we may think, have not been realised. Rossouw 1994b e xplains,

Its aim is to develop a broader rationality which will render rationaldiscourse possible in those areas traditionally excluded from discoursesuch as positivism. The implication of this project is the acknowledge -ment of alternative criteria for meaningful statements. Not only thosestatements that meet the demands of empirical verifiability will be ac -cepted as meaningful. Narratives which make a contribution towardsunderstanding culture, religion and ethics are also considered to belegitimate means to convey knowledge of our world in its multifaceted

( )reality Rossouw, 1994b .

( )Baumans 1993 perspective on postmodern ethics is based on twoissues: firstly, it a dvocates the unmasking of the power behind morality( )or the forces tha t create ethical subjectivity ; and secondly, it attemptsto develop the e motional and moral sensibility of individuals throughthe notion of the other .

( )Bauman 1993 suggests that a postmodern attitude to ethics would


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Ethical threat 857

involve, above all, the tearing off of the mask of illusions, in order toreveal the sources of morality hidden deep within moder n societies. He

(initially conce ptualises mor ality as a political question Giroux, 1991;)Mouffe, 1992, Vinten, 1992 and suggests that we need to appreciate the

nature of the relationship between power and ethics in contemporary

society. Section one of this paper has attempted to employ Foucaultswork on ethics in order to unmask the way in which power operateswithin accountancy and if Baumans advice were implemented withinaccounting education, the first task of ethics education may involveencouraging students to do the same through critically analysing thevalues implicit within what they are taught.

Bauman also suggests that a postmodern approach to ethics wouldinvolve the development of the emotional and passionate elements inmoral judgements. This attempt to re-construct, citizens identities is

( )identified by Mouffe 1992 as, one of the important tasks of demo -cratic politics, due to the, crisis in class politics, and the, need fora new form of identification around which to organise the forces strug -

( )gling for a radicalisation of democracy Mouffe, 1992 .( )Loeb 1988 , in his recommendations for the development of ethics

teaching in accounting, suggests that, each individual must develop asense of moral obligation. There is certainly no doubt that withinaccou ntin g education the development of moral sense has been ne -

23 ( )glecte d . However, as Bauman 1993 says,

The mistrust of human spontaneity, of drives, impulses and inclinationsresistant to prediction and rational justification, has been all but replacedby the mistrust of unemotional, calculating reason. Dignity has beenreturned to emotion; legitimacy to the inexplicable, nay irrational, sym -pathies and loyalties which cannot explain themselves in terms of their

( )usefulness and purpose Bauman, 1993 .

Bauman attempts to asseverate and conceptualise the emotional ele -

ment in moral decisions through the notion of the other . Wyschogrod( )1980 defines, the other as the, touchstone of moral existence... not aconceptual anchorage but a living force. While The other essentiallyincorporates anything other than, the self, and may include the envi -ronment, God, society and animals, Baumans argument focuses primar -ily on the other in terms of other people.

Bauman commences his argument from the premise that, to live isto live with others is obvious to the point of banality. He suggests thatalthough we may not be aware of it, the basic knowledge that mostindividuals have, is the knowledge of existing with other human beings( )Bauman, 1993 . Indeed, the notion of ethics can be perceived as thesphere of relations between the individual and the, other, individualsthey live with in their community. For example, in Callahans collectionof essays on, Ethical issues in professional life, morality is defined asthat which, takes us beyond mere self interest by requiring that wetake the rights and interests of others into account when we act. In a


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with categ orical attributes , not passionate, feeling individuals. Francois( )Perroux in Marcuse, 1991 seems to capture the kind of poverty stricken

view of other human beings that accountancy engenders when he says,

The slaves of developed industrial civilisation are sublimated slaves, but

they are slaves. Slavery is determined, neither by obedience nor byhardness of labour but by the status of being a mere instrument, andthe reduction of man to the state of a thing.

The remoteness of acc ounting processes renders the face of the other( ) ( ) ( )people indistinguishable Bauman, 1993 . As Bauman 1993 says,

The absolute nakedne ss of a face, the absolute defenceless fa ce, with -out covering, clothing or mask, is what opposes my power ov er it, myviolence, and opposes it in an absolute way, with an oppositi on which

( )is opposition in itself Bauman, 1993 .

Within accountancy, the face of the other does not confront us,identity, personality and humanity remain un-visibalised. The knowledgethat accounting provides tends to categorise and classify individuals insuch a way that their identity is lost and, as a consequence, we mayfeel little or no moral obligation towards them.

One possible mode of resisting the de-humanisation of accountingmay be to try and develop within students, through a form of ethicseducation, an imagination that is capable of empathising with the other.Samuel Coleridge compared the kind of education of the imaginationthat I am proposing, to the poetic power of synthetic integration that

( )reveals the depths of meaning Megill, 1985 . In a similar vain, Megill( )1985 suggests that through the provision of stories and metaphors, theimagination enables us to interpret reality and to infer obligations. Hesays,

By calling on personal experience.... Imaginative discernment.... entails a

process like the artists perception of a landscape, creatively portrayingfrom ma ny perspectives a holistic view in which the myriad details fit( )together Megill, 1985 .

There are, no doubt, many ways in which this kind of imaginativecreativity could be engendered, however, two issues in particular havebeen identified within the medical ethics literature which may be helpful.The first involves encouraging students to reflect on their own personalexperiences, feelings and emotions. The second involves using literature(Baylis & Downie, 1991; Weisberg & Duffin, 1995 ; Chaplan, 1996; Shep -

) ( )24 ( )ard et al ., 1997 and film Green et al ., 1995 . Gaustafson 1970 sug -gests that both these techniques can have a significant impact on anindividuals emotional development primarily because of their potential toprovide an insi ght into how others feel within particular circumstances.

( )Carson 1994 f or example explains that careful reading of imaginativeliterature teaches, attentiveness to the feelings of other human beings.


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To a large extent the aim here is not to prescribe a specific mode of action but rather to call for some creative thinking from accountingeducators on how the pedagogy of accounting could engender a senseof, fellow feeling, or compassion. This call for creativity is essentiallya reaction against the, regulation, certification and standardisation of

( )teacher behaviour, which Hoskin and Macve 1986 imply is increasinglycolonising pedagogy in general and accounting education in particular.

Conclusion

For many youths, the experience of schooling becomes synonymouswith the disciplining of the body and the policing of knowledge. AsJohn Fiske points out, school graduates are not just knowledgeable andtalented, they are disciplined. Schools produce... docile bodies. Largelytechnical and behavioural in its focus and effects, pedagogy historicallyhas embraced the practical at the expense of the theoretical and subor -dinated politics and ethics to questions of management and control. Farfrom employing neutral educational techniques, schools exercise disci -

(pline in both controlling what people know and how they behave Giroux ,)1996 .

This paper has attempted to study the relationship between power andethics in accounting education. The paper has provided an outline of Foucaults work on ethics and it has attempted to apply his perspectiveto accounting education in order to study how power may operatethrough the discourse of accounting by constructing the ethical identitiesof accounting students. It was suggested that accounting education mayoperate in a hegemonic way by constructing individuals who exertcontrol against themselves such that their actions come to serve theinterests of capital. It has also been suggested that accounting identityis characterised by an instrumental and rational mode of subjectionwhich may subjugate other forms of knowledge and suppress the emo -tional development of students, particularly in relation to the way inwhich they view other individuals. The paper concluded by drawing on

(some postmodern ethical theory as a possible basis for resistance in)the Foucauldian sense and suggested two practical ways in which

concerned accounting educators could begin to conceptualise how theymight be able to challenge the hegemony of rationality within account -ing education. At its most ambitious level, this paper has attempted to,reclaim the importance of critical pedagogy as an eminently political

( )discourse and practice Giroux, 1996 .

Notes

1. This may be due to the way in which accounting education has conventionally(focused on, techniques acquisition see, e.g. Gynther, 1983; Sikka, 1987 ; Lehman,

)1988 .2. While I am primarily concerned at the moment just with unethical behaviour in terms

of that which contravenes the relevant social criteria of justice and is therefore


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presented as socially unacceptable or even unlawful in the media, this is not to saythat the current practice of accounting is ethical bar these misdemeanours. Indeed,this paper argues that the normal, uncontroversial and everyday practice of account -ing, although it appears to be ethical and innocuous, may actually be more threaten -ing to social cohesion than these more obvious misdeeds because of the way inwhich it represents other people. This of course is not to say that embezzling $1

(million from a program designed to help poor families obtain housing Stanga &)Turpen, 1991 is unimportant.

3. Indeed I dont want to disagree with Merritts argument.4. This may not be an explicit or self conscious process. What it means to behave

ethically may be taken for granted and may be embedded within practices.5. Both Weber and Althusser, for example, stress the importance of structure over

( )human agency in their analysis of power Hoy, 1994 .6. This characteristic is particularly important when it comes to thinking about how

power could be resisted.7. This perspective reflects Focuaults suspicion of all encompassing totalising theories.8. While Foucault does not deny that there are individuals and organisations that rule

over other people, he does suggest that the power which characterises contemporarywestern society is so multifarious and diffuse that those in power dont fully under -stand how they remain in power. Indeed, Foucault contends that they do remain inpower only bec ause subordinated individuals continue to play their part in the process( )Hacking, 1994 .

9. Having said this however, it is important to point out that Foucault was primarilyconcerned with the negative effects of power. Foucault was particularly interested inhow, the way in which individuals are constructed as subjects, comes, unintentionally,to serve a particular set of interests. Indeed, to some extent, Foucault reaches thesame conclusions as Marxists and the Critical Theorists. He concludes that the way inwhich individuals are constructed servers the interests of capitalism. However, as Ihave tried to explain, the way in which Foucault arrives at this conclusion is entirelydifferent.

10. As well as these four characteristics, Foucault was also interested in the role thatphysical actions play in developing and maint aining ethical i dentity, for example, the

( )act of confession and giving an account see Francis, 1994 .11. Shaftesbury suggested that an individuals ability to distinguish between good and bad

was based on a moral sense. He conceptualised this idea in terms of an inner eye .12. This, of course is our fault not the students.13. The word, other is used in the sense of opposite.14. This paper is based on the belief that accounting education should attempt to

enhance students ability to responde emotionally as well as rationally to the situationat hand. As such, it is contended that ethics education should attempt to develop anethical sense within students. This does not necessarily imply that there is a naturalsensibility that just has to be enhanced, but rather that a moral sensibility can becreated through thinking about individuals in ways other than conventional economicterms.

15. Kant argued that this was not due to the nature of the world but rather to the way( )in which we think about the world MacIntyre, 1967 .

16. He focused on the motives and intentions of the individual in his attempt to discoverwhat it was that made an action good, contending that moral laws should befollowed without regard to there consequences.

( )17. In their book, The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer 1997argued that western reason was partly to blame for this impasse. Their argument wasbased on Max Webers notion of, the paradox of reason. Weber believed that, ourincreasing degree of instrumental mastery over the natural and social world, hadbeen achieved at the cost of freedom. Adorno and Horkheimer represented the

( )enlightenment tenet of progress as increasing domination. As Wolin 1992 says,Benjamins notion of history as the incessant process of ruination and declineappears to be a determinant influence on the thinking of Adorno and Horkheimer.Adorno and Horkheimer argued that liberation could only be realized through a

( )complete break from western instrumental reason Roderick, 1986 .18. For example accounting generally provides information on events which can be

modelled in monetary terms.(19. This is the way many postmodernists interpret Foucaults work see, e.g. Muldoon,

)1990 and, as such, perhaps the criticism is valid.


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20. Of course states of domination do exist. Foucault recognised that, in a great manycases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical

( )and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom, Foucault in Rabinow, 1994 .21. When Foucault talks a

Documents

The Threat of Ethical Accountants an Application of Foucault's Concept of Ethics to Accounting Education and Some Thoughts on Ethically Educating for the Other 1999 Critical Perspectives