THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

The Tibetan Struggle

IT is not widely real ised t h a t the rel igious and pol i t ica l boun­

daries of T ibet are not ident ica l . W i t h i n the 580.000 square miles of the area of T ibet cont ro l led by the Da la i L a m a and his governors, there are a lmost cer ta in ly fewer t han two mi l l i on T ibetans and pro­bab ly not m a n y more t h a n one m i l ­l ion . Bu t i f one includes those fo l ­lowers of the lamais t f a i t h l i v ing outside the present boundaries of T ibet in Bhu tan , S i k k i m , Kashm i r and the Chinese provinces of Shi-kang, Sh inK iang and Mongol ia who owe rel igious al legiance to the Da la i L a m a and the Panchen L a m a , then the number of the f a i t h f u l is probably nearer four mi l l ion . The m a j o r i t y of supporters of the lamais t f a i t h therefore l ive outside the boundaries of modern Tibet under the pol i t ical cont ro l of' other countr ies, especially China. I t is thus of impor tance to the Da la i L a m a as a rel igious leader to have good relat ions w i t h China as the m a j o r i t y of his "sub jec ts ' l ive outside the boundaries of his pol i ­t i ca l domain. Th is explains w h y the Tibetans were prepared to sign a t rea ty w i t h China af ter the inva­sion of T ibet , wh ich appeared to be so unequal to the outside wo r l d .

The pr inc ipa l feature of the lamais t rel ig ion is the establ ishment of monasteries to wh ich a cer ta in propor t ion of local v i l lagers are admi t ted as monks . The monas­teries are also impor tan t as a store of foodgra ins against bad seasons, as a m i l i t a r y establ ishment in which v i l lagers can take shelter in t ime of wa r and as centres of learn ing th rough wh i ch v i l lagers can a t ta in h igh r a n k in the State and in re l i ­g ion. L i t t l e admin is t ra t i ve cont ro l is exercised by any one monastery on another and the success or fa i lu re of the monastery depends upon the character of the monks and the degree of local support fo r the order. There are as m a n y lamais t monaster ies outside the boundaries o f T ibet as w i t h i n i t The fo l lowers of the f a i t h inside and outside T ibet are l inked toge­ther by a common sp i r i tua l a l leg i ­ance to the Panchen L a m a and to the Da la i L a m a . The re lat ive i m ­portance of these two d ignatar ies has var ied in d i f ferent periods of T ibe­tan h is to ry but a t the present t ime

William H Newell

the power of the Panchen L a m a is probably weaker as he has been b rough t up by the Chinese on Ch in ­ese t e r r i t o r y and has no pol i t ica l power to accompany his sp i r i tua l eminence. A l though the rel igious leaders of T ibe tan Buddh ism wish fo r pol i t ica l power to accompany the i r sp i r i tua l power, the i r success or fa i lure as rel igious leaders does not depend on thei r cont ro l of the State. The nearest para l le l is per­haps the Pope, whose impor tance does not rest on the area of land he contro ls in the Va t i can .

Political Relationship with China

The Chinese a t t i tude towards Tibet is a clear one. Th is is tha t T ibet is po l i t i ca l ly par t of Ch ina as result of m i l i t a r y conquest in the past and that it is only because of the diff icult ies tha t China had to go th rough in the last f i f t y years tha t Tibet has become independent. Th is independence has been en­couraged by imper ia l is t in t r igues, especially by B r i t a i n . This v iew is held as much by the K u o m i n t a n g

. in Ta iwan as by the C o m m u n i s t s The T ibetan at t i tude is tha t large numbers of supporters of the lamaist f a i t h l ive in the confines of the Chinese empire and tha t it is of impor tance to the supremacy of Lhasa as a rel igious centre tha t there should a lways be peaceful re lat ions between the celestial em­pire and the Dala i L a m a . Thus as long as the Dala i Lama 's sp i r i tua l in tegr i t y remains unaffected the Chinese and Tibetans may co­operate. Th is in tegr i t y was threat ­ened by his reported at tempted ar­rest by the Chinese. To look upon the present dif f icult ies of the Chinese Government in T ibet as merely the dif f icult ies of con t ro l l i ng a back­w a r d people wou ld be to overs im­p l i f y the s i tuat ion. I t is essential ly a rel igious problem.

The pol i t ica l re lat ionships between T ibet a n d China have a long his-to ry . There are recorded instances of S ino-Tibetan relat ionships p r io r to the 3rd contury BC, but i t was d u r i n g the T a n g and Sung dynas­ties (7 th to 13th centuries A D) t h a t the Tibetans (who were then k n o w n as the Tu r fans ) became so power fu l t h a t they invaded China. A t t h a t t ime the i r empire stretched f r o m the Kansu-Shensi border in

the nor th , to Ind ia in the south and to the T a t u r i ver on the Sh ikang-Szechuan border in the east. Th is was the period of the T ibetans ' greatest spread and du r i ng the eleventh century they invaded and sacked Chengtu, the capi ta l of Szeehuan. Bu t a lmost immediate ly a f te rwards they began to s ink in importance threatened by the new NanChao empire in the east and the ShiHsia Empi re in Kansu and Shensi (983-1277).

Long Hlstory of War

D u r i n g the Chinese Mongo l Yuan dynasty they retained thei r inde­pendence (as the Yuan rulers were lamais t by re l ig ion) a l though they were loosely included w i th in the Mongol dominions. A f t e r the col­lapse of the Yuan dynasty in China the Mongols st i l l retained contro l over the western region. In 1643 the Mongol , Gusr i , organised a lamais t state w i t h four separate regions, Kokonor ( C h i n g H a h . Bu l -k a m (Shikan'g), Wei (Western T ibet ) and Tsang (Eastern T ibe t ) . Remnants of this admin is t ra t i ve organisat ion remained up to the nineteenth century. In 1637 af ter the conquest of C h i g H a i , Gusri sent a messenger and t r ibu te to the new Manchu ruler of China. In 1653, a f te r the to ta l conquest of Tibet, the Manchu ruler off ic ial ly appointed Gusr i as the governor for the Chinese court . He died three years later. This period of h is tory is impor tan t in order to unders ta rd how the Manchus la id c la im to rule Tibet . The conqueror of Tibet, Gusr i , became also the liege of the Manchu Emperor . Thus i t is argued Tibet also became a province of China.

This is w h y when in 1719 the Manchu Emperor , K a n H s i ordered a Mongol ian general to enter Ch ing-H a i w i t h 25,000 men to quell a. T ibetan rebell ion organised by the Da la i L a m a , the Emperor o f China considered tha t th is was not a w a r between two sovereign states but a rebel l ion by contumacious subjects. F r o m 1719 to 1792 the h is tory of Sino-Tibetan relat ions became no­t h i n g but a series of wars. Bat t les or wars were fought in 1700, 1719-20, 1723, 1728, 1730, 1745. 1776, 1778 and 1791. The zenith of Chinese imper ia l power over the T ibetan government

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at Lhasa was reached in the per iod 1792 to 1894 when a v iceroy took up imper ia l residence a t L h a s a and consul ted w i t h the D a l a i L a m a about admin i s t ra t i ve appointments. The f ina l choice was made by the imper ia l court . (There are detai ls about h o w th is system operated in M Hue's 'Trave ls in T a r t a r y , Th ibet and China ' , London , 1856.) It is perhaps i m p o r t a n t to observe that even d u r i n g th is period the Chinese government d id not t r y to remove the Da la i L a m a complete ly because of his rel ig ious importance but t r ied to cont ro l h im. A new Da la i L a m a could not become re incarnated in to a new body w i thou t the permission of Ch ina and in any case relat ives or the previous Da la i L a m a were excluded f r o m the succession.

Counter-offensive by Lhasa W i t h the g r o w i n g weakness o f

Ch ina towards the end of the last century the power of the Chinese to cont ro l the T ibe tan government also became weaker. The Chinese took over the complete admin is t ra ­t ive cont ro l of Sh ikang p lac ing Chinese off icials in cont ro l instead of the previous K h a m b a chief ta ins. The Lhasa government t r ied to dr ive the Chinese completely out of Sh i kang and recover i ts admin is ­t r a t i on and wars or batt les were fought in 1894, 1905, 1906, 190S, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1918, 1930 and 1932 w i t hou t any m a r k e d success.

Th is counter-of fensive by the Lhasa government was made possi­ble by a new fac to r on the scene, the g r o w i n g interest of the B r i t i s h Government in I nd i a in T ibe tan af fa i rs . In 1871 a Russian Colonel cal led Pre jeva lsky entered T ibet by i ts eastern border t h rough K h a m and reached w i t h i n 500 mi les of Lhasa, He was forced to re tu rn the w a y he had come but the B r i ­t i sh government a t th is t ime were very concerned about a possible i n ­vasion of I nd i a by Russia. In 1906 they sent an expedit ion under Younghusband whose a i m wag to discover whether there was any route by wh i ch the Russians could invade Ind ia . The T ibetans, how­ever, considered th is to be an inva­sion and the Da la i L a m a f l ed f r o m Lhasa f o r safety. I n the l ong run , however, th is invas ion proved to be a blessing in disguise to the T ibe­tans because they were able to p lay off the B r i t i s h aga ins t the Chinese to the i r o w n advantage. I t i s per-haps w o r t h no t i ng however t h a t th is has been the on ly Impo r tan t Invasion

in to T ibe t ever to have t a k e n place f r o m the sou th ( i f one excludes t h e invas ion o f L a d a k h by the S ikhs i n the n ineteenth century and the Nepal i invasions) and t h a t i t i s Ch ina wh ich has been the T ibetan 's t r ad i t i ona l enemy. I n d i a has been the t r ad i t i ona l exporter of re l ig ious ideas to T ibe t ; Ch ina the exporter o f po l i t ica l con t ro l . The s t reng th ­ening of the government of Ch ina and the change of a t t i tude by the government o f I nd i a has resulted in the re tu rn o f T ibe t to the s i tuat ion as it was pr io r to 1894.

'Great Han Chauvinism'

The m a j o r i t y o f fore ign v is i tors to T ibet have taken a s t rong ly a n t i -Chinese a t t i tude when they have expressed any opin ion. The Abbe The, F o r d , the rad io officer who was captured by the Chinese on the invas ion of T ibet , and Bel l , the B r i ­t i sh Consul in Lhasa, are three a m o n g many . The only extreme supporter of the Chinese pol icy to­wards T ibet was the F rench woman , Mme. A lexand ra Dav id-Neel . I n her t w o Penguin books and in some of her subsequent books publ ished in France, she considers t h a t Ch ina had a du ty to completely r e f o r m the ant iquated T ibe tan po l i t i ca l system. She fe l t t ha t the m a i n reason why th is was not accom­plished ear l ier was the pol icy of B r i t i sh in I n d i a in seal ing off the T ibe tan f ron t ie rs and t h a t i f only T ibet had been opened up ear l ier by China, much of the present d i f f i ­cult ies could have been avoided. Speaking as a B u d d h i s t she c la imed t h a t remova l o f Lhasa 's po l i t ica l power could do no th ing but good to the sp i r i t o f t rue lama is t Buddh ism. I f th is were rea l ly the case, then one wou ld have expected t h a t those T ibetans w h o were sincere Buddhis ts wou ld have welcomed the a r r i v a l o f the i r Chinese co-rel ig ionists even in a Communis t guise. Bu t f a r f r o m th is be ing the case, the Chinese Commun is t Government seems to have fa i led to ga in the al legiance of even the m i n i m u m number of T ibetans necessary to set up a semi-autonomous republ ic as they have succeeded in do ing in other par ts of Ch ina w i t h the i r minor i t ies . There is no ment ion of T ibet in the last f ive year p lan publ ished by the Chinese last year o ther t h a n a s tate­ment t h a t no th i ng is to be done w i t h i n those f ive years;

The t r u t h o f the m a t t e r appears to be t h a t in spite of the s t r ong economic t ies j o i n i n g T ibet to

Ch ina (See Chen H a n Seng's study of the tea t rade between C h i n a and T ibe t ) , the character is t ics of the Chinese and T ibetans are ve ry much opposed, Rober t K E k v a l l , the son of a miss ionary a m o n g T ibetans, who spoke perfect T ibe tan and Chinese f r o m b i r t h a n d who inter­vened as a peace-maker in many disputes between the two races, gives m a n y examples of the dif ference in a t t i tude in his 'T ibetan Skyl ines' (London, Gollanez, 1952) and in his ear l ier works . Wh i le the Chinese despise the T ibetans f o r the i r bar­bar i sm and disorganised habi ts , the T ibetans in the i r t u r n resent the i n ­tolerance and the super ior i ty of the Chinese about the i r own c iv i l i sa t ion . 'Great H a n chauv in ism' as Mao Tse- tung cal ls i t , does not die out jus t because the Chinese become Communis t .

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