‘The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance

‘The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance,

but the silent force of greed’1

Critically examine this claim by comparing and contrasting two civil wars in which

resources played a substantial role

Introduction

Paul Collier penned the above statement in 2002, in a chapter dedicated to the superiority of the greed

theory when analysing the causes of civil war. In doing so, he rejected the notion of grievance as a likely

cause, clearly stating that ‘conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by

grievance’2. In this essay I will argue that even though greed plays a major role in civil wars in resource

rich areas, it is important to factor in other mechanisms that will likely lead to said greed. Thus, the

grievances of the rebels should not be discounted. After examining Collier’s analysis on the greed versus

grievance debate, I will explore the views of scholars who either contradict or add to his views. Further to

this, I will look into the different perspectives on conflict depending on the nature of the resource

involved in causing or fuelling it, with an emphasis on oil and diamonds. In his study on civil wars,

Collier focuses on the rebels’ intentions and aspirations. I feel that it is also necessary to examine the

government they are rebelling against, and the reasons why an insurgency takes place. Concepts such as

Rentierism and Clientelism are commonly associated with resource rich countries. The two case studies

that I will focus on will exemplify how governments that suffer the effects of the resource curse turn to

corruption and to a neo-patrimonial rule. This invariably inflicts further grievance on the countries’

citizens, and in my opinion pushes them towards rebellion. This is particularly true of Sierra Leone, but

perhaps not totally accurate in the case Angola, where as I will discuss, government and rebel UNITA

forces appeared to be inspired to fight by greed and prospects of power respectively. In examining these

two wars I will conclude that analysing governments actions is key to the study of conflict, and grievance

should not be dismissed when analysing its causalities.

1 Collier, P., (2000). Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In Berdal, M, and Malone, D. M., (eds.) Greed and

Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil War. London: Lynne Rienner Puplichers, Inc. P.1012 Ibid. P.91

1

Collier’s theory

Collier has co-authored various articles and studies on the causes of civil war, and more specifically,

the economic causes of civil war, with Anke Hoeffler. Their studies have been praised by many, and

as Collier himself claims, taken seriously and frequently cited3. After analytical research, they

concluded that a lower per capita income and a larger population increase the risk of war, and

stated that the common political explanation for civil war - ethnic violence, is wrong 4. Furthermore,

it was their view that the incentive for rebellion increased with the probability of victory and with

the gains conditional upon victory, emphasising the importance of the economic incentive5. In a

later study they furthered their analysis. They discussed the highly significant effect of primary

commodity on conflict risk6, and explored the notion that rebellion needs both motive and

opportunity7. In doing so, they came to the conclusion that opportunity is a satisfactory explanation

of rebellion as greed motivated, since the grievances that motivate rebels are disconnected from the

social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic and religious identity8. Consequently, the

rebels’ grievances are relegated to mere greed.

This view seems somewhat reductionist, however. Whilst violent protest often leads to civil wars

entailing terrible atrocities, society should aim to understand the reasons that have led groups of

individuals to take up arms. As David Keen expresses in his critique of Collier’s greed theory, the

greed discourse can lead to the delegitimisation of all kinds of political violence, and without

interest in understanding grievance or listening to rebel groups, there is a risk of delegitimising

protest in general9. Furthermore, there should be a strong focus on the government of whose

country’s conflict is being studied. In most cases, before they become rebels, insurgents are simple

citizens of a state, but the grievances they can no longer endure lead them to fight. These grievances

are often inflicted on them by irresponsible and corrupt governments who are too concerned with

enriching themselves through the rents provided by primary resources to care about their citizens’

3 Collier, P., (2008). The Bottom Billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.19

4 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., (1998). ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol 50, no.4. P.571

5 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., (1998). ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol 50, no.4. P.571

6 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol 56, no.4. P.580

7 Ibid. P.563

8 Ibid. P.589

9 Keen, D., (2012). ‘Greed and Grievance’. International Affairs. Vol.88, no.4. Pp 767-768

2

rights or wellbeing. I therefore agree with Keen’s view that by only focusing on the rebels when

analysing the causes of civil war, the focus is taken away from abusive states and government

armies10. In both the Angolan and Sierra Leonean cases this will be furthered explored.

Other perspectives

Before I examine how resources affect the performance of governments, I need to explore further

the mechanisms involved in the causes of civil war in resource rich countries. According to Philippe

Le Billon, factors involved in the outset of conflict cannot be limited to the availability of resources

and the greed or grievance that results from them. He argues that history, political culture and

institutions, as well as the personality of individual leaders and the availability of weapons are

equally influential11. Le Billon is not comfortable with reducing the basis for the outset of war to a

single factor. He believes that with the ‘finger pointing of greed-driven thugs looting resources, (…)

broader contexts, scales and interconnections have been overlooked’12. This supports my view that to

focus solely on greed is an oversimplified explanation of conflict. Michael Ross pushes the debate

further in his study on how natural resources influence civil war. He disputes the greed – grievance

debate, as his research concludes that neither looting (greed) nor grievance, appear to be valid

mechanisms. He finds no evidence that looting of natural resources or extorting funds from

resource firms helps fund the start-up costs of rebels, nor do his findings show evidence of

grievances over land, environmental degradation, unemployment or labour migration contributing

to the outbreak of conflict13. In a later section of this essay this view will be disputed, however. My

case studies will illustrate how in Angola UNITA rebels did fund their rebellion through the sales of

diamonds, and in the case of Sierra Leone the initial protests that preceded the civil war were a

result of clear grievances held by the majority of civilians.

Despite being more supportive of the greed side of the argument, Indra de Soysa’s work supports

the view that grievance may be present at the outset of conflict. He does declare that greed is the

10 Ibid, p.768

11 Le Billon, P., (2004). ‘The Geopolitical Economy of Resource Wars’. Geopolitics. Vol 9, no.1. P.7

12 Le Billon, P., (2007). ‘Geographies of War: Perspectives on “Resource Wars”’. Geography Compass ½. P.178

13 Ross, M.L., (2004). ‘How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases’. International Organisation.

Vol. 58, no.1. P.62

3

more potent driver of conflict14, but doesn’t dismiss grievance as irrelevant. According to his

research, grievance gains ascendency based on who is able to organise violence effectively first 15,

hence whoever takes up arms first is able to establish the grievances they are fighting for. This may

be problematic, since many rebel recruits whose only interest is profiteering from the war will

easily claim they are fighting for an ideology when in truth they are solely motivated by greed. This

is common case in conflict, particularly in poor developing countries. As a result, as de Soysa in my

view correctly states, ‘to put it succinctly, there are fewer martyrs than there are opportunists’16.

Perhaps the most contrasting view to Collier’s greed theory is found in the work of Frances Stewart.

She supports the opposing grievance theory, and believes that large-scale violent mobilisation is

unlikely in the absence of serious grievances, and it is them, and not greed that will be a primary

motivation17. In her study of horizontal inequalities (HIs) and conflict, she divides HIs into political

participation, economic aspects, social aspects and cultural status18. Stewart argues that the

presence of high value natural resources is an important cause of HIs which subsequently lead to

conflict. An example of this is when populations of regions rich in natural resources suffer from low

standards of living resulting from the misdistribution of ‘their resources’ to the rest of the

country19. The regional inequality in the Niger Delta, which has led to violent conflict, illustrates

this, showcasing Stewart’s view. However, she does not reduce conflict to HIs alone, and

emphasises that greed can also play a part. I feel that her analysis is comprehensive, and it proves

consistent with the evidence of the case studies I will evaluate. Furthermore, HIs are in most cases a

direct cause of government mismanagement, as I will now move on to analyse.

The Resource Curse and governmental corruption

Developing countries rich in natural resources are commonly associated with the resource curse.

As a result of a high dependency on the export of oil, gemstones and minerals, they suffer from slow

14 De Soysa, I., (2002). ‘Paradise in Bazaar? Greed, Creed and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99’. Journal of Peace Research.

Vol.39, no.4. P.398 15

Ibid. P.39716

Ibid. P.39817 Stewart, F. (ed) (2008). Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Understanding Group Violence in Multi-Ethnic Societies. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. P. 1218

Ibid. P.1319

Ibid. P.22

4

economic growth, high poverty rates, high corruption levels and authoritarian governance20.

Whether combined or as a single entity, these factors undoubtedly contribute to the outbreak of

civil war. Moreover, these are likely to result in the grievance of civilians whose livelihood is

directly affected by them. Hence, grievance and civil war outbreak are inexorably linked by the

resource curse.

Mineral wealth is often associated with conflict through the detrimental economic and political

consequences of the ‘Dutch Disease21’, which suggests that resource availability has a damaging

effect on the incentives to allocate capital, labour, and innovative energies to other sectors22.

Furthermore, in a resource rich economy, resource rents risk leading to political instability and

conflict – if resource revenues are monopolised by a corrupt government, and squandered by

mismanagement, this will feed the grievances of marginalised groups23. When governments turn

their countries into ‘rentier states’, the harm caused is undeniable. De Soysa accurately describes

the effect rentierism as a result of resource dependence has: ‘in the long run (rentierism) leads to the

decline of the state capacity, the subversion of formal institutions, and the withholding of the public

goods that can ensure economic development and social peace’24. This is evident in the case of

Angola’s MPLA government, as I will discuss in a later section. Moreover, with the breakdown of the

state, patrimonial regimes develop, as the case of the Sierra Leonean government before and during

the civil war will show. Clientelism becomes the order of the day in the shadow state that emerges,

widening the gap between the ruling elites enriching themselves through manipulation of the

diamond industry, and the ordinary citizens, thus increasing their grievances.

When governments become so detached from the frustrations endured by their people, they need

to be held responsible. If the above-described symptoms are suffered by the state, the people have a

right to protest. However, marginalised groups may find that violence becomes the only means of

20 Ross, M.L., (2004). ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?’ Journal of Peace Research. Vol.41, no.3.

P.35021

De Soysa, I., (2000). The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity? In Berdal, M. and Malone, D., (eds.) Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil War. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. P.11422

Ibid. P.12023

Le Billon, P., (2004). ‘The Geopolitical Economy of Resource Wars’. Geopolitics. Vol 9, no.1. P.624

De Soysa, I., (2000). The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity? In Berdal, M. and Malone, D., (eds.) Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil War. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. P.126

5

political action, economic accumulation, or simply survival25. This inevitable turn to violence seems

only natural when a corrupt state fails to listen to its people. This violence becomes highly

problematic however, when it loses its political meaning and turns purely into profit seeking.

Diamonds and Civil War in Sierra Leona

States typically collapse after the outbreak of war. In the case of Sierra Leona, the provision of

health, education and security services had however come close to collapse in advance of outright

civil war26. This was a direct result of what Le Billon refers to as a diamond curse, dating back to the

predatory institutions created by the British mining company Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST)27.

This had a negative impact on the livelihood and survival of local mining communities who no

longer had the right to make a living from diamonds. After riots took place, artisanal mining was

legalised again, but this freedom for local communities was put to an end with the election of Siaka

Stevens, of the All People Congress (APC) party in 1967.

Stevens nationalised SLST and pushed diamond production towards clientelised operations,

marginalising local opponents and consolidating a shadow state where diamonds were in the

private sphere of rulers, and formal institutions and bureaucracies were marginalised28. This

resulted in political collapse and state recession29. When in 1985 General Joseph Momoh succeeded

Stevens, he inherited a neopatrimonial state in severe crisis with little remaining legitimacy30. The

situation in the country was dire to say the least. With rising rural inequalities, cuts in government

spending on health and education and raging inflation, it is not surprising that protests broke out.31

The initial protests were motivated by aspirations of political change. They were challenging an

authoritarian regime under stress, which was losing its fiscal capacity and had moved the economy

25 Le Billon, P., (2001). ‘The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict’. Political Geography. P.569

26 Berdal, M. and Keen, D., (1997). ‘Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications’. Millennium –

Journal of International Studies. Vol.26. P.81527

Le Billon, P., (2008). ‘Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Vol.98, no.2. P.35628

Ibid. P.35729

Boas, M., (2001). ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone – dead ringers? The logic of neopatrimonial rule’. Third World Quarterly. Vol.22, no.5. P.69730

Ibid. P.70931

Keen, D., (2005). Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. New York: James Currey. P.27

6

underground32. It wasn’t greed that pushed them to protest, but a longing for justice. Moreover,

those leading these uprisings with demands for multiparty democracy were teachers, lawyers and

university students33. However the students quickly influenced the disgruntled youths, who were

unemployed and undereducated, many of whom had worked part-time as thugs34. When the state

used repression to quell the insurgency of the intellectual movement, it was this youth culture,

known for their antisocial behaviour that took over the revolution35. It was in this way that the

uprising took a vital turn and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) took over the fight against the

government.

The RUF officially launched its war against the APC in March 1991, encouraged and supplied by

Liberia’s Charles Taylor36. Taylor’s support was undeniably motivated by greed, since he hoped to

secure access to diamonds once the RUF rebels controlled areas rich in the resource37. Even though

their looting and the atrocities committed against civilians made them lose all legitimacy, they

initially did carry a strong political message in which they expressed their grievances. RUF’s early

objective was to overthrow the government and establish a multiparty democracy38. Ridding the

country of the APC’s and the elite’s corruption was a repeatedly expressed ideological goal39.

Furthermore, complaints of resource exploitation were part of their propaganda, as they

condemned the ‘raping of the countryside to feed the greed and caprice of the Freetown elite and their

masters abroad’40. Such condemnations even though true, became questionable as an ideology when

the RUF’s actions undermined their claimed political objectives. Soon they were committing

constant abuses against the civilians they were in theory representing41. In addition, Foday Sankoh,

the RUF leader, swiftly began recreating similar patronage networks to those of the APC. Becoming

32 Weinstein, J. M., (2005). ‘Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Vol.49, no.4. P.60833


Silberfein, M., (2004). ‘The Geopolitics of Conflict in Sierra Leone’. Geopolitics. Vol.9, no.1. P.21835

Weinstein, J. M., (2005). ‘Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol.49, no.4. P.61536

Boas, M., (2001). ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone – dead ringers? The logic of neopatrimonial rule’. Third World Quarterly. Vol.22, no.5. P.71437

Le Billon, P., (2008). ‘Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Vol.98, no.2. P.36138

Ibid. P.71339 Keen, D., (2005). Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. New York: James Currey. P.3940

Ross, M.L., (2004). ‘How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases’. International Organisation. Vol. 58, no.1. P.5141


7

a warlord like Taylor, he offered recruits the opportunity of part taking in these new patronage

networks, consequently the RUF becoming a vehicle for personal enrichment42.

Such activity not only undermined their political objectives, but it also led to what Weinstein refers

to as a ‘rebel resource curse’43. With profits to be made from diamonds and economic endowments

opportunists likely to be ill suited to long-term political goals, joined the rebel force 44. In the case of

Sierra Leone diamonds not only served as a means to sustain the conflict through financing the

rebel movement, but they obviously also served as an incentive for greed driven youths to join in

the fight. To complicate matters further, government troops were similarly driven by the same

force of greed. Fighting for the RUF in defence of the government by day, part taking in illicit looting

activities by night, and implausibly cooperating with the rebels to divide the profits made by war,

they have often been referred to as ‘sobels’45. With such profits to be made in wartime, peace

unsurprisingly became a threat to illicit diamond mining and profiteering to both the military and

the rebels. The presence of diamonds in Sierra Leone not only corrupted the government the RUF

were fighting, but the military and the RUF themselves.

Such tales of greed may lead to the conclusion that Collier’s greed theory is undisputable. He is not

wrong in claiming that rebels are bound to disguise their greed behind a series of grievances, but I

strongly disagree with his view that because they may be a façade they should be ignored, since

they ‘provide no informational content to the researcher as to the true motivation for rebellion’46. I

believe that it is grievances that push groups towards initial insurgency, and they may evolve into

greed in the process of revolt. There will always be opportunists that will join the fighting, but even

then I question why an individual would choose to fight and commit atrocities of the kind carried

out by the Sierra Leonean rebels. It is necessary to look at the conflict within political, social,

economic and historical perspectives. The APC abused the country’s resources and marginalised

the majority of citizens, leaving them to live in extreme poverty. Subsequently the people developed

42 Weinstein, J. M., (2005). ‘Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Vol.49, no.4. P.61643

Ibid. P.59944

Ibid. P.60045

Silberfein, M., (2004). ‘The Geopolitics of Conflict in Sierra Leone’. Geopolitics. Vol.9, no.1. P.22146

Collier, P., (2000). Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In Berdal, M, and Malone, D. M., (eds.) Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil War. London: Lynne Rienner Puplichers, Inc., p.92

8

strong hatred and resentment towards the elites. Morten Boas’s view that there was more to the

war in Sierra Leone than greed and hatred and therefore it should be read as part of a larger drama

of social exclusion is one that I wholeheartedly agree with47.

Oil and diamonds in Angola

The civil war in Angola is an altogether different experience to the one in Sierra Leone. The fighting

began with the struggle for independence, which finally ended in 1975 with the signing of the Alvor

Accords. However, peace was not to proceed in the country. The coalition government quickly

collapsed, and once again fighting rapidly took over the country. As Le Billon describes, greed and

economic agendas were not the only driving force behind conflict, with geo-strategic and

ideological agendas motivating foreign countries siding with one of the two warring sides48. The de-

facto government, the ‘Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola’ (MPLA) was supported by the

Soviet Union and Cuba, and the ‘Uniao Nacional para a Independencia’ Total de Angola (UNITA),

were backed by the US, South Africa and Zaire. However, it was in the third and last phase of the

war, once both sides had lost support from their foreign allies that the country’s resource revenues

became key to the struggle49.

In 1992 following the Bicesse Peace Accords, UNITA failed to recognise the defeat suffered at the

elections, and launched yet another war against the election victor, President Jose Eduardo Dos

Santos’ MPLA. Given that UNITA controlled about 70% of Angola’s diamond production from 1992,

with revenue of US$3.7 billion, funding the extended war effort was no issue50. In what was to be a

decade of fighting, ideology or ethnic grievance completely disappeared from the core of the

conflict. The existence and resistance of UNITA allowed the MPLA to justify their part in the war,

47 Boas, M., (2001). ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone – dead ringers? The logic of neopatrimonial rule’. Third World Quarterly. Vol.22,

no.5. P.71948

Le Billon, P., (2001). ‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000’. African Affairs. Vol.100, no.398. P.5649

Le Billon, P., (2007). ‘Drilling in deep water: oil, business and war in Angola’. In Kaldor, M., Karl, T-L. and Said, Y., (eds.). Oil Wars. New York: Pluto Press. P.10150

Gamba, V and Cornwell, R., (2000). Arms, Elites, and Resources in the Angolan Civil War. In Berdal, M, and Malone, D. M., (eds.) Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil War. London: Lynne Rienner Puplichers, Inc., p.166

9

and MPLA’s corruption was the basis of UNITA’s justification to keep fighting51. Such reasoning led

to the assumption that this was a senseless war motivated by greed and power thirst. Greed on the

part of the government, and a thirst for power in the case of UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi.

Nicholas Shaxon paints a very accurate picture of the effects oil can have on politicians: ‘Oil can be

like heroin: the injection of cash from each cargo delivers a feeling of well-being, but the effect over

time is addiction. (…) Politicians in oil dependent countries lose interest in their fellow citizens, as they

try to get access to the free cash52’. This is particularly true of President Dos Santos and his rule in

Angola. The country showed clear signs of the Dutch disease, with inflation leading to an incredibly

high cost of living, and the underdevelopment of industries such as agriculture. Furthermore, Dos

Santos created a shadow state, in which oil revenues, which should have been enough to address

the needs of Angolans, were solely utilised in the pursuit of the wellbeing and enrichment of the

elites, and to secure arms for the war53.

With the remittances from oil rents and the corruption deriving form them, MPLA ruled as a fully-

fledged rentier state. To further damage the Angolan situation, the government mortgaged future

oil reserves via oil-backed loans, to secure arms payments54. This was all possible with relative

ease, as the oil sector thrived during the war whilst the rest of the country was being devastated.

Most of the Angolan oil is found offshore – 95% of the total production, hence it being insulated

from the conflict55. The government never stopped profiting from the lucrative benefits of its oil

production. In fact, in 1976 MPLA founded Sonagol, the state owned oil company, which Shaxon

adeptly describes as a ‘black box – the basis for a vast, invisible budget that bypassed parliament and

the treasury, and flowed instead through offshore structures at the behest of the president’56. This

level of corruption can only be motivated by greed.

51 Le Billon, P., (2007). ‘Drilling in deep water: oil, business and war in Angola’. In Kaldor, M., Karl, T-L. and Said, Y., (eds.). Oil

Wars. New York: Pluto Press. P.10452

Shaxon, N., (2007). Poisoned Wells, The Dirty Politics of African Oil. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P.553





10

Even though UNITA controlled the majority of diamond mining areas, Savimbi has often been

described as not being motivated by greed. Whilst President Dos Santo’s thirst for power is clearly a

means to access the wealth that comes with it, Savimbi appears to be purely a megalomaniac, who

simply wants power for the sake of power, and not the wealth that can derive from it57. His

propaganda claimed that UNITA’s fight was leading real Africans in the struggle against the oil-rich

urban elites58. His claims did not seem to be false, as profits from diamonds seemed to be invested

in the buying of arms and lengthening of the conflict, but not in self-enrichment. According to Le

Billon, the greed as a motivation theory did not match the reality of starving UNITA commanders

with emaciated faces59. This further highlights that whilst governments of resource dependent

countries show true signs of greed, insurgents are not always solely motivated by it, especially at

the outset of conflict.

A smaller and slightly sidelined conflict in Angola was the case of Cabinda. This region produces

more than half of Angola’s oil and is the country’s most oil rich province. Wealth from oil revenues

has not improved the welfare of Cabinda’s people and therefore they fight for separatism60. Once

again, this area is fighting for justice and against the unfair corruption of the Angolan state. Even if

economics are involved, in my view this separatist conflict is not driven by greed, but by genuine

grievances resulting from a lack of justice. The government’s greed and UNITA’s thirst for power

ensured that this area of strategic importance would never attain their goals of separation.

What is clear from the actions of both the MPLA and UNITA, regardless of the fact that their fight

was driven by different motivations, is that neither of them cared for the wellbeing of their country

and its people. The continuing oil and diamond revenues served as an incentive to prolong the war

for as long as possible. This is particularly true of the government forces, which were accused of

selling war supplies to their rivals61. The length of war was of no issue to them, since it meant their

57 Le Billon, P., (2007). ‘Drilling in deep water: oil, business and war in Angola’. In Kaldor, M., Karl, T-L. and Said, Y., (eds.). Oil

Wars. New York: Pluto Press. P.10458



Le Billon, P., (2001). ‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000’. African Affairs. Vol.100, no.398. P.6661


11

corruption could thrive, and offshore oil production was undisturbed by it. The fact that nine out of

the thirteen million Angolans were living on less than a dollar a day62 and about half a million

people died in the conflict appeared as irrelevant factors in their pursuit of power and wealth63.

Conclusion

Collier dismissed grievance as a non-relevant factor in the study of conflict. This is in my view too

simplistic, as it is the complex grievances of civilians that lead them to rebellion in the first place.

This is particularly true of countries that are heavily dependent on resource revenues, despite the

greed theory being mostly applied by Collier in this instance. It is important to look at various other

mechanisms that may influence conflict. Social, political and economic factors can influence the

outset of conflict, as can leader’s personalities, the availability of weapons and the horizontal

inequalities described by Stewart. Moreover, rebel recruitment and attitudes should not be

analysed independently of the governments that they are rising up against. It is often the corrupt

actions of governments, manipulating natural resource revenues for their own purposes, which

inflict grievances upon their people and lead them to rebellion. The case of Sierra Leona highlighted

this. Even though opportunists joined in the fight, grievances pushed the rebellion forward, despite

greed taking on a major role. The case of Angola stresses the negative effect of government

corruption and rentierism had on its people, but also illustrates that rebel forces may not be

motivated by either greed or grievance, with thirst for power in this case becoming the key

incentive for fighting. Grievance and greed are in my view the two key mechanisms leading to civil

war, and shouldn’t be separated from each other in the study of conflict. There are exceptions to

every rule however, and thus every possible variable should be considered when evaluating a

specific case.

62 Le Billon, P., (2001). ‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000’. African Affairs.

Vol.100, no.398. P.6063


12

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Documents

‘The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance