The Unionist Party and Ireland, 1906-10

Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd

The Unionist Party and Ireland, 1906-10Author(s): J. R. FanningSource: Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 58 (Sep., 1966), pp. 147-171Published by: Irish Historical Studies Publications LtdStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30005504 .

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The unionist party and Ireland, I906-Io

The years 1906 to 9 Io which form the chronological limits of

this study bear witness to a decline in the importance of the Irish question in English politics. The nature of the legislative

proposals of the liberal government during the earlier part of this period and the consequent vigorous reaction of the unionist opposition, culminating in the rejection of the budget of 1909 by the house of lords, ensured the temporary eclipse of home rule. The constitutional crisis arising out of the deadlock between the two houses of parliament continued throughout 191o and 1911, and it is only in 1912, with the introduction of the third home rule bill, that Ireland once more assumes a pre-eminent place in English politics. The really decisive year, however, for the interpreter of the Irish policy of the unionist party is 19Io.

The general election of that year lost the liberals their overall majority in the house of commons and restored home rule to the realm of practical politics. The fate of the union was indissolubly bound up with the fate of the house of lords, and the campaign to destroy the veto of the lords was also, at least for Redmond and his followers, a campaign to make home rule a practicable legislative proposition. No one realised this more clearly than the unionists. Any compromise on the question of the house of lords would involve a compromise on Ireland. Nor did the party lack men to urge the search for such a compromise; and I910 saw the growth of a movement among some unionists in favour of a federal solution to the Irish question. Insofar as the possibility of a new departure in Irish policy was ever considered, it was considered in this year within the context of the constitutional conference and of the secret proposals for a coalition of the two major parties made by Lloyd George. In both these cases the decisions reached by the unionist leaders precluded the possibility of compromise and so ensured the continued inflexibility of the unionist opposition to the third home rule bill. These are but some of the reasons why an analysis of unionist attitudes towards Ireland in 91go forms a crucial part of this study; but before

147



148 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, I906-JO

attempting such an analysis it is necessary to survey the party's Irish policy during the preceding years in opposition.

In the general election of I9o6 the liberals gained their first and last overall majority in the house of commons since Gladstone's conversion to home rule.1 The magnitude of their victory relieved them of the incubus of Ireland which had for so long bedevilled their fortunes and absorbed their energies. The way was now clear for them to introduce legislation in other long-neglected fields. The remarkable gains of the labour party emphasised the urgency of such a task. This is not to say that the members of the new government no longer favoured the principle of home rule, but merely that their enthusiasm for it was less than fervent. Such a state of mind, manifested, for example, by Rosebery's much publicised utterances against home rule, had preceded their triumph at the polls.

Although Rosebery had failed to gain the support he had hoped for from Asquith, Grey or Haldane, he echoed the feelings of many liberals in his Bodmin speech2 when he objected to any measure of home rule because, as he said, 'it impairs the unity of the free trade party, and it indefinitely postpones legislation on social and educational reform on which the country has set its heart'. Asquith's real attitude was in fact very similar, but the necessity of preventing a party split at a time when the fruits of office were ripe for plucking, deprived Rosebery of his support. Yet a month before Rosebery's Bodmin speech, Asquith had written:

If we are to get a real majority in the next house of commons, it will only be by making it perfectly clear to the electors that . . . that it will be no part of the policy of the new liberal government to introduce a home rule bill in the new parliament.

Everybody knows that this is the actual state of the case and no one intends ... to devote either the second or third or any session to framing and carrying a bill which will be at once chucked out by the house of lords, and will wreck the fortunes of the party for another twenty years."

Lord Crewe was one of the many prominent liberals who shared these views; shortly afterwards he wrote to Campbell-Bannerman pointing

'This departure from the pattern of previous elections caused one conservative to write of the 'hideous abnormality of a liberal government independent of the Irish'. Willoughby de Broke, The passing years (1924), p. 249.

2 On 25 Nov. 19o5; cf. R. R. James, Rosebery (1963), p. 454- 1 Asquith to Herbert Gladstone, 22 Oct. 190o5 (Viscount Gladstone Papers, B.M.Add.MS. 45, 989, ff. 131-2).



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-IO 149

out that 'more than ever before the liberal party is on its trial as an engine for securing social reforms ', and doubting whether such a programme was compatible with any initiatives in the direction of home rule.'

Liberal disinterest in home rule posed new problems for the unionists. Defence of the union had been the main theme of their two previous periods in opposition when they had been faced with the challenge of Gladstonian home rule. The unionists had stressed the same theme in their election campaign in i9o6,' but the ensuing debacle indicated that the electorate cared little for Ireland. In fact it seems likely that 'the unionist leaders made a disastrous error of judgement. . . in believing that anti-radical opinion could be rallied in in 19go6 over the cry of the union in danger '." These factors, coupled with the nature of the government's legislative proposals between 190o6 and 1909, caused this traditional unionist posture to appear somewhat irrelevant; and such irrelevance was in no way lessened by the tariff reform controversy.

The tariff reform campaign headed by Joseph Chamberlain had caused endless faction among unionists since Igo3," and the dissension it induced continued to hamper the party in opposition. It was, moreover, the declared intention of Chamberlain and his followers to devote the years in opposition to making tariff reform the central policy of the unionist party. Such a radical objective and the consequent violent quarrels engendered within the party caused most other issues, excepting those which were the subject of party conflict, to lose much of their practical political importance. And the Irish issue was no exception.

The Irish unionist branch of the party, represented in the shadow cabinet by Walter Long and the marquess of Londonderry, resented any suggestion that the claim of Ireland to the attention of their party had been in any way diminished. In particular they resented the

4 Crewe to Campbell-Bannerman, 19 Nov. 1905 (Campbell-Banner- man Papers, B.M.Add.MS 52, 521, ff. 428-31).

5 Austen Chamberlain, for example, said in his election manifesto that Ireland was the first great issue before the electors; cf. C. Petrie, The life and letters of Austen Chamberlain (i939), i. 172-4. " This is the conclusion of A. K. Russell, 'The general election of 19o6' (an unpublished doctoral thesis in the Bodleian Library; MS D.Phil.d. 28oi, p. 528); cf. also pp. 207-22, 253, 255--

7 A. M. Gollin, Mr Balfour's burden (1965) provides a comprehensive account of the early history of the split.



150 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906--IO

fervour with which Chamberlain and his disciples promulgated their fiscal doctrine, and Londonderry was merely reflecting the disquiet felt by many of his fellows when he wrote to Balfour saying that 'you consider the fiscal question is the most important question of the day. While recognising its importance as I do most fully . . . I consider the maintenance of the union (for which the unionist party was formed) the most important plank of our platform '.' Although tariff reform and Irish unionist principles were by no means incompatible,9 Irish unionists clearly saw that any wholesale conversion of the party to the new fiscal creed would involve the adoption of a new set of political priorities in which Ireland would no longer hold pride of place. Irish unionists were apprehensive of the alleged indifference of the fiscal reformers to any issue other than tariff reform, and relations between the two factions were not always harmonious. In February 19o09, for example, when there was a disagreement within the shadow cabinet on what should be given priority in a proposed amendment to the king's speech, Balfour, supported by the Irish unionists, suggested an amendment deploring the government's administration in Ireland. Austen Chamberlain demanded an amendment on tariff reform, and argued that the state of Ireland could be remedied only if a unionist government were returned at the next election. This, he said, could best be accomplished by fighting the election on tariff reform which 'was the only thing the country cared about '."

Nor was it the tariff reformers alone with whom the Irish unionists differed on the question of attracting attention to Ireland. In i907 the Union Defence League was founded under the chairmanship of Walter Long. This body aimed at informing electors, by working at constituency level, of the liberal threat to the union and, more particularly, at 'educating' the younger electors on the home rule

* Londonderry to Balfour, 5 Nov. 1905 (Balfour Papers). Readers of the Balfour Papers, which are in the British Museum, are specifically instructed 'to give full particulars of the nature, date, etc., of documents cited and not to rely on the present volume and folio number', and this is the principle of reference here followed.

9 Unionism, which is the cement binding our party together, is not constructive whereas fiscal reform is'. Col. Edward Saunderson to Austen Chamberlain, 8 Feb. 19o6 (Austen Chamberlain Papers AC 7/2/8). The Austen Chamberlain Papers are in the library of Birmingham University.

10 Cf. Austen Chamberlain, Politics from inside (1936), pp. I40-1; hereafter cited as Politics.



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, I906-IO 151 question."' Its attempts at intervention during bye-election campaigns in English constituencies frequently roused the ire of both candidates and party agents, and won no sympathy from the Central Office. If the home rule issues were played down there was always the possibility of unionist candidates gaining Irish nationalist and catholic votes on the education issue. Such opportunism greatly irritated Long who complained to Balfour that ' on more than one occasion offers of assist- ance in the way of speakers, missionaries, etc., have been declined on the ground that they might prejudice the prospects of the candidate '.12 His demand that Balfour intervene on what he felt was a matter of high policy was refused. Balfour held that it was for the candidate and his local association to decide who should be asked to put the unionist case in any particular constituency,"' and the Union Defence League remained a rather ineffectual symbol of Irish unionist anxieties. It maintained ' a steady - though not extensive - propaganda and educational campaign "' until the prolonged debate over the budget of igog monopolized the attention of both parties.

For the greater part of the years I9o6 to i9o9, however, one is constrained to agree with Austen Chamberlain that ' just now, for an Englishman at any rate, a speech on home rule is like flogging a dead horse '." Ireland was the subject only of peripheral and sporadic concern and that, as we have seen, was largely confined to Irish unionists. In one important instance, however, this indifference was abandoned: the brief re-emergence of the Wyndham-MacDonnell controversy in the late summer of 19o6 centred discussion on Irish affairs; and we must now consider the nature of this controversy.

The 'Wyndham-MacDonnell imbroglio '160 spanned the period I902 to 19o6, and thus concerns, in large part, the historian rather of Balfourian government than of Balfourian opposition. Chrono- logically it may be conveniently divided into three sections: first the appointment, and circumstances of the appointment, of Sir Antony

" Cf. W. Long, Memories (1923), P. 194. 12 Long to Balfour, 17 July 19o8 (Balfour Papers). '" Cf. Sandars to Balfour, 20o Sept. 19o8 (Balfour Papers). "* Long, Memories, p. 196. "5 Politics, p. 39- " Cf. Blanche Dugdale, 'The Wyndham-MacDonnell imbroglio,

190o2-90o6' (Quarterly Review, Jan. 1932); also, F. S. L. Lyons, 'The Irish unionist party and the devolution crisis of 1904-190o5' (Irish Historical Studies, vi. 1-22 (Mar. 1948)); J. W. Mackail and Guy Wynd- ham, Life and Letters of George Wyndham (1925), i. 91-107, and ii, appendix A.



152 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, i906-IO MacDonnell as permanent under-secretary for Ireland in October I902; next, the devolution crisis which broke in August 1904 and lasted until May I9o5; and finally the re-emergence of the affair between August and November 1906, which is the object of our present concern.

Irish unionists had never been satisfied by the Irish administration under Balfour's government, and they were especially dissatisfied with MacDonnell's appointment. It was commonly believed 'that he was entirely in sympathy with the roman catholic majority, and also held strong views in favour of home rule '. When MacDonnell's name was linked with the report of the Irish Reform Association"8 published in September 1904, which incorporated a proposal for the devolution to Ireland of extra powers of local government, Irish unionist dis- content became manifest. Although George Wyndham, chief secretary for Ireland, immediately repudiated such proposals and MacDonnell, complying with his chief's attitude, disassociated himself from the proceedings of the Irish Reform Association," the damage had been done. Irish unionist anger mounted during the following months and, when parliament reassembled in February, they immediately launched a prolonged and bitter attack on MacDonnell's conduct and on the Irish policy which had made such conduct possible: to what extent, they demanded to know, had MacDonnell's policy been endorsed by Wyndham or by the cabinet. In March their pertinacity was rewarded by the resignation of Wyndham on grounds of ill-health; he was replaced by Walter Long. The crisis seemed finally to have come to an end when, in May 1905, a motion, seeking the publication of whatever correspondence would enable the House to consider both the government's Irish policy and MacDonnell's conduct, was defeated in the commons.

On 29 August 19o6, however, Walter Long suddenly reopened the dispute in a speech to an Irish Unionist Alliance meeting in Dublin. He did so, he said, because of persistent rumours that MacDonnell's dismissal had been prevented only by his threatening to publish certain letters in his possession which related to his appointment, the publication of which would embarrass the then unionist

1" Long, Memories, pp. '43-4. "' Cf. Dunraven, The outlook in Ireland (1907), for the origins and programme of the association; see especially appendix I.

19' Without resigning I cannot go on helping the Assoc. [sic]'. MacDonnell to his wife, 4 Oct. 190o4 (MacDonnell Papers, Bodl.MS Eng. Hist.e. 216, f. 68).



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-1o 153

government. Long believed that the mistrust induced by such rumours had spread throughout the party, and that it could be stilled only by the publication of the correspondence in question; and, in particular, of a letter from Balfour to Wyndham 'pointing out the dangers and risks which you (Balfour) believed to be attendant upon the course he (Wyndham) proposed to take ',20 and of a further letter from MacDon- nell to Wyndham 'in which he states he is not a home ruler and openly derides the home rule policy '.21

It was not MacDonnell, however, with whom the Irish unionists were really concerned. Their party had now been out of office for the better part of a year22" and were consequently quite unable to effect his dismissal. Much larger issues were at stake, as Long indicated when he stated that

there is great justification for Irish unionists to look back on some parts of the immediate past with profound dissatisfaction and grave mistrust, and there is abundant reason for many Irish unionists to ask in tones of bitter indignation, why were these things done in the- name of the unionist cause? Why, when the unionists flag was flying, were principles adopted which were not consonant with unionist principles?23

Such questions were a direct attack not merely on Wyndham's Irish policy but also on the cabinet and leadership, which might have sanctioned, if it had not inspired, that policy. The hostility engendered by the latter stages of Wyndham's Irish administration among Irish unionists, especially in Ulster, can scarcely be exaggerated. One observer noted that he had 'not seen anything exceeding the virulent passion, the personal hatred, displayed . . . by respectable looking Ulster members denouncing a unionist chief secretary, accused of

having trafficked with the accursed thing, home rule '.24 Wyndham himself believed that the main reason why the question

had been reopened was 'to discredit what the Ulster unionists call "conciliation". It is a continuation of the attacks from that quarter

20 Long to Balfour, 2 Oct. 190o6 (Balfour Papers). 21 Ibid. 22 Balfour commented that 'we are all being very ill-used at having

to deal with this silly and sordid controversy when we are not being paid £5,ooo a year for our labours!' Balfour to Wyndham, 5 Sept. 19o6 (Balfour Papers).

28This passage, from The Times report of Long's Dublin speech (30 Aug.. I9o6), is quoted in a copy of a letter from Wyndham to Long of the same date which the former sent to Balfour (Balfour Papers).

2' H. W. Lucy, The Balfourian parliament, I9oo-o5 (190o6), p. 362.



154 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-10

on Gerald (Balfour), Horace Plunkett and myself '."2 Balfour's private secretary, Jack Sandars, shared this opinion, and suggested that 'all this trouble is engineered by a malevolent cabal. The Times,26 Ardilaun,27 and other spirits of mischief . . .have

other ends in view than clearing up a (sic) MacDonnell mystery'." Both Wyndham and Sandars believed Long to be the unwitting if sincere dupe of his Irish acquaintances who deplored the reformist and conciliatory aspects of recent unionist Irish policy.29 Long's reasons for wishing that Wyndham's Irish regime be discredited were largely personal. He had succeeded Wyndham in Ireland and felt acutely the absence of 'any clear cut indication whether George's policy or mine was

accepted by the leaders of our party '.o He also referred to rumours,

25 Wyndham to Balfour, I6 Sept. 190o6 (Balfour Papers). Both Gerald Balfour as chief secretary for Ireland from I895 to Igoo, and Plunkett as president of the I.A.O.S. and vice-president of the department of agriculture and technical instruction for Ireland (1899-1907), had incurred Irish unionist displeasure.

'What seems to be forgotten in all this controversy is that devolution is merely an episode. The revolt of neo-unionism manifested itself long ago - at any rate from the time of Gerald Balfour. Objections to you were entertained before devolution was heard of. The question is whether the new unionism - the unionism of mere negation - will absorb all unionist sentiment'. Dunraven to MacDonnell, 12 Sept. I906 (MacDon- nell Papers, Bodl. MS Eng. Hist. c. 350, ff. 136-7).

28 'A Cecilian government has never been quite popular at Printing House Square . . . on Irish politics The Times is Orange and since A.J.B.'s (sic) departure from the chief secretaryship it has never approved the Irish policy of the government except for the brief period of Walter Long's reign'; from a memorandum of E. B. Iwan-Muller, a leader writer for the Daily Telegraph and a personal acquaintance of Balfour's, 13 Feb. I9o6 (Balfour Papers).

Lansdowne, commenting on the hostility of The Times towards MacDonnell, suggested that 'on their staff must be an ex-Indian official who suffered under MacDonnell's rule in Bengal or the N.W. Province. M. (sic) was a hard master and would not tolerate shirkers'. Lansdowne to Austen Chamberlain, 15 Oct. I9o6 (Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 7/4/24)-

27The first baron : Sir Arthur Edward Guinness. 28 Sandars to Balfour, 7 Oct. 19o6 (Balfour Papers). 29 Ibid.; also Wyndham to Balfour, I6 Sept. 9go6 (Balfour Papers). so Long to Balfour, 2 Oct. I906 (Balfour Papers). Long was always

highly sensitive about any matter which he felt impugned his personal honour. Balfour, he wrote, 'cannot defend George without by inference condemning me'. Long to Austen Chamberlain, 7 Oct. 9go6 (Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 7/4/14)-



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-io 155

especially prevalent in Ireland, that Balfour was 'really to blame for the mistakes in Ireland and that George was made the scapegoat '." Such rumours had no foundation in fact.

Some years later, writing of the circumstances of MacDonnell's appointment, Balfour said that he personally had done all he could to dissuade Wyndham from making that appointment, not because he had any doubts about MacDonnell's integrity or ability, but because he

felt the gravest fears lest the appointment of a roman catholic home ruler would weaken George's hand in dealing with one set of politicians without strengthening them (sic) in dealing with another. But he got Lansdowne and George Hamilton82 (both of them Irish, both of them officially acquainted with Sir Antony's work in India) to back him up. He himself was bent on the appointment; and I felt that it was impossible to ask a man to undertake a difficult task and refuse him the instruments which he asked for in order to carry it out.8S

The correspondence relating to MacDonnell's appointment bears out Balfour's exposition of his own attitude in almost every particular."8 His initial disquiet caused him to ask Wyndham to consult Lans- downe about the wisdom of the projected appointment; not only did Lansdowne know MacDonnell in India but he, 'himself an Irish landlord ', would have been aware of the prejudice which would prevail among Irish unionists were a man of MacDonnell's sympathies to be appointed to such a post.85

Lansdowne's responsibility for the appointment and, consequently, for the crisis which later followed, has never been sufficiently appreci- ated; it was he who overcame Balfour's misgivings" and confirmed Wyndham's resolve to appoint MacDonnell. Although the latter's

8 Long to Balfour, a Oct. rgo6 (Balfour Papers). * Hamilton was secretary of state for India at the time of the appointment, and was asked by Wyndham whether he would agree to second MacDonnell from the Indian civil service.

88 Balfour to Wilfrid Ward, 2 Oct. 1913 (Balfour Papers). SCf. Mackail and Wyndham, op. cit., ii, appendix A; see in par-

ticular Balfour to Wyndham, 26 Aug. zIgo: 'I have heard nothing but good of Sir A. MacDonnell as a man and as an administrator: but is he not a home ruler'? (p. 752).

"5 Ibid. " Lansdowne believed, and stated publically in a speech at Notting-

ham on I2 Oct. 190o6, that if Balfour were to blame in any way for what later happened it was 'only for having accepted our recommendn [sic] of MacDonnell for the under secretaryship'. Lansdowne to Balfour, 13 Oct. I9o6 (Balfour Papers).



156 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-IO

considerable administrative ability was enhanced by an engaging personality, it was strange that Lansdowne, a sometime resident Irish landlord, failed to see that MacDonnell, a liberal, who had gained his administrative experience in India, where he acted largely on his own initiative, was not a suitable choice for an important administrative post under a unionist government in Ireland - a post for which Irish unionists would rate compliance a far higher qualification than initiative."1

Lansdowne's personal acquaintance with, and high regard for, MacDonnell blinded him to the dangers inherent in the latter's

appointment as under-secretary."88 Whether in or out of office, Balfour made no claim to override his senior colleagues in areas where they were adjudged especially competent. In this instance, moreover, Lansdowne's opinion had been canvassed at Balfour's express wish.

This, and the fact that the appointment was made during the summer recess of parliament when 'the cabinet was scattered far and wide

. . . (and) it would have been impossible to assemble them for any cause less than a European crisis '," virtually compelled Balfour to

accept his colleague's view. Under these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that Balfour

reacted violently to Irish unionist suspicions as represented by Long. He disliked the idea of publishing the relevant correspondence, as he felt such a step, involving the disclosure of private confidences between

'7 The distinction between the Indian and Irish environments is vital : MacDonnell 'had all the faults of a strong self-made man who had spent all his official life administering a country not under direct parliamentary control, it was his frequent failure to realise the finesse that is necessary to get anything done by parliamentary methods that so constantly irritated him, he never felt the pulse of the political world .... He had no experience of the English code which prevents civil servants from meddling even indirectly with politics'. Murray Hornibrook to Blanche Dugdale, 16 Jan. 1932 (Balfour Papers). Homibrook was Wyndham's principal private secretary from 1903 to 1905-

88 'I look back wistfully to my five years in India, and there is no chapter of my Indian experience to which my thoughts turn with more satisfaction than that which brought me into close relations with your husband. There was no one with whom I liked better to work.' Lans- downe to Lady MacDonnell, 14 June 1925 (MacDonald Papers, Bodl. MS. Eng. Hist. d. 238, f. 36).

89 From an undated and unsigned letter or memorandum in Balfour's hand, which is minuted by Lansdowne; possibly written in mid-March 19o5 (Balfour Papers).



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, I906-IO 157

cabinet colleagues, would 'set a very evil precedent '." Instead he

proposed to draft 'a long letter on the whole subject as a possible alternative '.41 This draft was circulated on the 2nd and 3rd October 19o6 among Balfour's senior colleagues, who unanimously advised against its being made public. Their advice was accepted, but its circulation even among that limited group was to prove of conse- quence.42

In a letter remarkable for Balfour in its scorn and invective, the unionist leader took no pains to disguise his contempt for the insinu- ations of his Irish subordinates that there had been a 'trafficking on the part of the late government, or some members of it, with anti- unionist influences', and for their allegations that it was necessary for the party leaders 'to clear ourselves in order to reestablish the

tottering confidence of Irish unionists '.4 After reminding the reader of his frequent repudiations of devolution in the past he goes on to suggest that

If such professions of faith are a mere cloak for political intrigue, then, no doubt I am quite unworthy to lead the Irish unionist party: but I must be permitted respectfully to add, if the Irish unionist party regard this as a possible hypothesis, then, in my opinion, they are quite unworthy to be led by me.

Surely Irish unionists may occupy themselves more profitably than in debating how far the oft-repeated professions of their leaders are to be trusted. This way lies certain disaster. Proneness to suspicion is not only the most contemptible of failings, it is also one of the most dangerous."

Balfour's colleagues were quick to point out the dangers inherent in such harsh language. Even Wyndham, with whose protection Balfour had been concerned, objected to the letter as 'too long and argumentative '" and said that both Lansdowne - who wrote to Balfour in similar terms on the same day" - and Sandars,j7 with

40 Cf. Dugdale, op. cit., pp. 32-33. ~' Ibid. 42 The draft was seen by Lansdowne, Salisbury, Wyndham, Long,

Gerald Balfour, Austen Chamberlain and Sandars, Balfour's private secretary; and possibly by other of his colleagues.

"8 Dugdale, op. cit., p. 34. 44 Ibid. " Wyndham to Balfour, 4 Oct. 19o6 (Balfour Papers). 46 Lansdowne to Balfour, 4 Oct. 19o6 (Balfour Papers). 47 An interesting illustration of Sandar's importance: Austen Cham-

berlain wrote that he 'was glad to hear that Jack Sandars . . . agreed that it would not do. So there is some hope of altering it.' Chamberlain to Long, 5 Oct. 19o6; cited in Petrie, Austen Chamberlain, i. 188-go.




whom he had discussed it, agreed with him. Long's reaction, not surprisingly, was even more critical: he believed that the letter 'will undoubtedly be interpreted as being a defence and justification of George's policy and administration, and therefore, of necessity, a condemnation of mine..... It will certainly be regarded as expressing very strange views about the action of Irish unionists '."

Nothing could have been calculated to irritate Balfour more profoundly than the faintest suggestion that his views on the importance of the union were not unexceptionable; and to understand his intransigence, one must appreciate his contempt for the Irish extremists and his sense of outrage at their suspicion.4" He thought the demand for a reaffirmation of faith in the basic principles of Irish policy quite unnecessary. It was otherwise in the fiscal dispute, where he did accept the need, in the interests of party unity, occasionally to define and to justify his own position as leader. But, although Balfour's insistence on the orthodoxy of his Irish policy was in fact justifiable, Irish unionist uneasiness was somewhat easier to understand than their leader was prepared to allow.

Certainly this was the opinion of Austen Chamberlain, who

suggested that Balfour's proposed course of action indicated 'a com- plete failure to grasp the serious nature of the situation and an entire want of appreciation of what is being said and thought in unionist circles everywhere '." Not even during the heat of fiscal controversy does Chamberlain presume to criticise his leader in such trenchant terms. He accepted the burden of Irish unionist criticism of Wynd- ham's Irish administration as valid," and he further believed that Balfour's attitude betrayed his readiness to put his friendship for Wyndham before the good of the party. The feeling that, for Balfour, 'leadership is simply the expression of his family affections and personal preferences '" was common among unionists, and the hostility towards what was derided as the leadership of the 'Hotel

48 Long to Balfour, 7 Oct. 19o6 (Balfour Papers). 49 'A most insolent and unworthy suspicion, but extremely demon-

strative of the Irish mind. I remember it making me very angry at the time.' Balfour to Cawdor, 7 Jan. 1909 (Balfour Papers).

50 Chamberlain to Balfour, 7 Oct. I906 (Balfour Papers). 51 He urged Long not to 'be too susceptible as to your own position.

You are and must remain our spokesman on Irish affairs.' Chamberlain to Long, 5 Oct. 19o6; cited in Petrie, Austen Chamberlain, i. I88-go.

52 Arnold Foster to Bonar Law, 24 Apr. Igo6; cited in R. Blake, The unknown prime minister (1955), p. 54-



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-1o 159 Cecil' was considerable. It is this sort of hostility that motivated Chamberlain's criticism of his leader. 'Given Arthur's character and friendship for W(yndham)', he wrote to Long, 'it is certain that Arthur will do his utmost to protect him. We must not allow Arthur to ruin the party in an effort to shield a friend '." Chamberlain's was a shrewd assessment of the motives behind Balfour's continued refusal to agree to publication of the letters in question; 54 he was determined to avoid having to 'take any step which could bear the interpretation that he was endeavouring to free himself from suspicion at G(eorge) W(yndham)'s expense'." Balfour rejected Chamberlain's charge that he was underestimating the gravity of the crisis, but his insistence that it was relevant only within the context of Irish unionist disloyalty 56 suggests that he failed to appreciate its wider ramifications. His

contempt for, and anger at, Irish unionist suspicions caused this failure: he felt that 'the whole charge is so utterly silly that perhaps I have never been able to take it sufficiently seriously '."

The final phase of the Wyndham-MacDonnell affair attests the singular strength of feeling which the Irish issue could provoke among unionists at a time when it was not even a subject for inter-party debate. The Irish unionists, though they failed to gain their immediate end, could look back on the affair with a certain satisfaction. They had vigorously reasserted Ireland's claim to a prior place among the issues demanding the attention of the party; and they had emphasised the dangers for party unity that attached to any new departure in

53 Petrie, op. cit. Cf. also a letter in similar terms from Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 26 Sept. 19go6 (Austen Chamberlain Papers. AC 7/4/4).

54 Chamberlain and Lansdowne, when the affair was in the open once more, favoured Long's demand for publication; nor was Wyndham wholly hostile to the idea. Balfour was supported by Salisbury, his first cousin, and Sandars, his private secretary.

" Gerald Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, 2 Oct. 1906 (Austen Chamberlain Papers AC 7/4/10). Ironically Balfour's reluctance to publish the letters in question has been misinterpreted, both by contem- poraries and by students of the period, as illustrating his willingness to sacrifice Wyndham in order to conceal his own complicity in the affair; cf., e.g., R. C. K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (1936), pp. 359-60.

56 Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, 8 Oct. 19go6 (Balfour Papers). Sandars reflected his chief's attitude when he wrote that, if it were not for Long's agitation, 'I don't believe that beyond the members of the Kildare Street Club there was any body of respectable unionists who were troubling their heads over the MacDonnell mystery'. Sandars to Balfour, 7 Oct. 19o6 (Balfour Papers).

57 Balfour to Lansdowne, 16 Oct. 19o6 (Balfour Papers).



I60 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-IO

unionist Irish policy: and here it must be borne in mind that any deviation from what Irish unionists considered orthodox policy in defence of the union was liable to cause a worse split than that which had been caused even by tariff reform.

The innumerable gradations of unionist belief in tariff reform tended to discredit the importance of unanimity in the more traditional party policies. With such latitude permitted in one corner of the

political arena why should not a similar latitude be allowed elsewhere - in the realm of Irish affairs for instance ? The devotees of the new fiscal creed were alleged to affect a cavalier disregard of considerations that more traditionally-minded unionists deemed important. 'It is

quite clear', wrote the earl of Cawdor, 'that Joe (Chamberlain) considers things as " dust in the balance" which we consider to be of much importance - e.g. education, and the Church, and possibly he would put home rule in his dust heap too. He seems tired of considering that subject '.8 Austen Chamberlain followed in his father's footsteps: in a lengthy and elaborate programme which he drew up and hoped that the party would adopt, the Irish question did not gain even a single mention."5 Sir Joseph Lawrence, a prominent tariff reformer in the politics of the City of London, also observed that:

I have noticed in recent years a class has grown up, and it finds its reflex largely in our organisations, of men who are lukewarm or indifferent on questions that, twenty years ago used to hold the first place in our affections. . . . Even in such matters as the unity of the empire, the more material or commercial aspects of the question appeal to them more strongly than the aspects which called forth the outburst of opposition to home rule in Ireland.60

As long as home rule remained in the background this relative indifference to the preservation of the union was of no great importance, but the first general election of I9Io made it a live issue once

58 Cawdor to Balfour, 8 Feb. 19go6 (Balfour Papers). -5 Austen Chamberlain to Balfour, 24 Oct. I907 (Balfour Papers). 60 Lawrence to Balfour, 6 Feb. 1907 (Balfour Papers). Such indiffer-

ences was not confined to the tariff reformers: Lord Robert Cecil, one of the most prominent of the unionist free traders, writing of the wide range of beliefs which he felt could be accommodated within the ranks of one party, said that although 'home rule is no doubt in a rather special position because it is the question on which the unionist party was founded . . . even there I would vote for a good tory who favoured, let us say, devolution'. Cecil to Northcliffe, 3 Aug. I909 (Cecil of Chelwood Papers, B.M.Add. MS 51, 159).



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-10 16I

more, and provided a strong incentive for a more flexible Irish policy; for the result of that election meant that whichever party the Irish members supported could govern. It was as simple as that.

Nor in the minds of some tariff reformers was some sort of under- standing with the Irish wholly improbable.6" They believed that the widely known hostility of Redmond and his followers to the licensing clauses of Lloyd George's budget, the rejection of which had been the occasion of the election, might cause a split between the Irish and the government. It would of course be necessary, they realised, to offer some measure of home rule to Redmond before he would contemplate an alliance with them. Rumours of such a projected alliance reached Walter Long, and he wrote to Balfour asking him to deny that the party might do a deal with Redmond; not, of course, said Long, that he believed it possible, but his Irish unionist colleagues would 'like to know that you thought it worthy of refutation in their interests '. Balfour himself complained to Lansdowne of 'already getting a certain number of letters urging an arrangement with the Irish on the basis of sacrificing the union (more or less completely) in the interests of tariff reform'."6 J. L. Garvin, editor of The Observer, had, for one, urged a reappraisal of unionist Irish policy.64 There is no evidence that Redmond ever considered deserting the liberals; not only were they more likely to bring forward a home rule bill, but it was also probable that they would introduce legislation to deprive the lords of their power of veto - hitherto a major obstacle in the path of home rule. Bearing in mind, also, the unlikelihood of the unionist party as a whole accepting such a volte-face, any such arrangement as Long referred to was most unlikely to come to fruition; and Balfour refused to believe 'that this particular form of

61The tariff reformers had long desired such an arrangement: Redmond told Wilfrid Blunt 'as a great secret that when Dudley was lord lieutenant he had sent for him, Redmond, and had proposed that he should join the tories on tariff reform. Redmond said that he was quite willing but would want home rule in exchange. Whereon Dudley said it was no good going on with the argument.' W. S. Blunt, My diaries (0932), p. 703, entry for 13 Feb. I91o. Dudley was lord lieutenant of Ireland from 19o2 to 19o5.

62 Long to Balfour, Ii Jan. I9ro (Balfour Papers). 63 Balfour to Lansdowne, 29 Jan. 19Io (Balfour Papers). "4Cf. Garvin to Sandars, 27 Jan. 19io (Balfour Papers); see also

A. Mi Gollin, The Observer and J. L. Garvin 19o8-i914 (196o), pp. 171-3.

D



162 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906--I

" rot " has penetrated, or is likely to penetrate the party organism '." Nevertheless, the exhortations he mentions indicates the decay of traditional party loyalties, and the growth of a new readiness to compromise in Irish affairs.

The spirit of compromise gained a fresh impetus with the opening of the constitutional conference of I9Io. Edward VII had died on May 6th in the middle of the most serious constitutional crisis since 1832. The government had recently introduced a parliament bill which aimed at depriving the lords of their power of veto. In the event of that bill being rejected, as the budget of 19o09 had been rejected, by the upper house, the government intended, before going to the country, to ask the king for a guarantee that, in the event of their being returned to office, he would create a sufficient number of peers to enable any further resistance on the part of the upper house to be overcome. George V, therefore, 'was faced, immediately on his accession, with an unprecedented constitutional problem of which he had little previous knowledge and in which he was accorded no consistent guidance '." Under these circumstances, both major parties willingly deferred to the new king's wishes to seek a compromise which might prevent, and would at least postpone, his becoming involved in the party political struggle.

The constitutional conference first met on June 17 and concluded its proceedings on November

xo; there were in all twenty-two sittings

with a prolonged interval, for the summer recess, between the thir- teenth meeting on July 28 and the fourteenth on October I I." The objects of the conference as formulated by Asquith and accepted by Balfour"s were

I to secure a second chamber which shall be so constituted as to exercise the functions appropriate to such a body fairly as between the two great parties in the state;

2 to provide machinery which will ensure that, in the event of disagreement between the two houses, the opinion and will of the people shall prevail.69

"5 Balfour to Lansdowne, 29 Jan. 191o (Balfour Papers). 86 H. Nicholson, King George V (1952), pp. 129-30. 67 Cf. Austen Chamberlain's contemporary notes on the constitutional

conference - hereafter cited as Chamberlain Notes (Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 10/2/35-85).

68 Cf. a memorandum written by Balfour for George V, 22 June 19Io (P.R.O. CAB 37 / 10o2/23).

69 From a similar memorandum from Asquith to George V, 28 May 1910 (P.R.O. CAB 37/102/20).



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-10 163 But Balfour, while accepting these terms of reference, strongly hinted in his memorandum at that unionist conviction which was ultimately to contribute largely to the failure of the conference. He directed attention to the already great powers of the commons, and pointed to the absence of any constitutional machinery in the English system for differentiating between ordinary legislative proposals and legislative proposals of a kind which fundamentally affected the constitution itself. ' If the British constitution errs at all', he wrote, 'it errs on the side of making fundamental changes too easy'. It was to be the unionists' contention throughout the conference that such 'organic' measures 'must be subject to special safeguards, ensuring that, if the two houses disagreed, the nation should be consulted before they became irrevocable '."

The organic measure with which the unionist delegation - Balfour, Austen Chamberlain, Lansdowne and Cawdor - was prin- cipally concerned was home rule. In the last meeting before the summer recess, the unionists realised that the government were determined 'that questions like home rule, disestablishment and franchise can have no special safeguards . . . this is an ultimatum - give up home rule or we break off '." Although it was agreed to resume the conference in October, this seemingly irreconcilable difference of opinion made the unionist delegates highly dubious about the possibility of reaching agreement.72 Towards the end of September Balfour and Lansdowne were already discussing the tactics to be adopted if the talks failed. Should they break on home rule or on reform of the house of lords ? Balfour 'would rather have it on home rule; among other reasons because we are all agreed about home rule, but by no means agreed about the best mode of effecting a reform of the house of lords '." Lansdowne, although acknowledging that 'a rupture over home rule would suit our book well enough', thought that the unionist case in an ensuing election 'could be a good deal strengthened if we were able to show that our opponents had shirked

70 Chamberlain, Politics, p. Igo. 71 From a note handed by Chamberlain to Balfour during the confer-

ence sitting of 28 July I9Io (Chamberlain, Notes, AC 10/2/47). 72 Chamberlain thought that 'the conference will conclude its labours

within a week of the resumption of its sittings'. Chamberlain to Balfour, 23 Sept. 191o (Balfour Papers).

'7 Balfour to Lansdowne, 20 Sept. 1910o (Balfour Papers).




the question of the house of lords' reform '." The distinction was solely tactical; a reformed house of lords, for the unionists, was one which would above all else retain the power of resisting home rule. Lord Salisbury made this clear when, urging that the party should reject the policy of concession in the matter of reform of the lords, he said '"we are fighting not for our hereditary privileges, but for the union, and we are prepared to make even the greatest sacrifices ,.75

In the meantime a certain uneasiness was stirring among unionists. The proceedings of the conference were secret, and the consequent reticence of the delegates caused 'suspicions that the conference is a " put-up job" between the leaders to silence their followers and damp down all activity '." But however strict the secrecy of the conference, it required little perception to realise that the problem of Ireland was by far the most likely cause of any irreconcilable disagreement. The inclination, which has already been observed, of some unionists to seek a drastic reappraisal of their party's Irish policy was now reflected in 'a restless movement of the young men who are anxious to rid themselves of the shackles of old party traditions and blind obedience to staff orders' and who 'will not allow their big ideals of empire, defence, trade, and social reforms to be sacrificed to tenacity in the matter of an old creed '."' One old-style conservative, Henry Chaplin, felt that there was 'a kind of plot in the party - on some questions - in the 1900oo Club 78 of which I am a chairman . . . there were i young candidates on Wednesday night - the secretary tells me 8 out of the x I in favour of home rule '."

74 Lansdowne to Balfour, 24 Sept. 1910 (Balfour Papers). Lansdowne's contributions to the proceedings of the conference were notable for the stress he laid on this question of lords' reform. Cf. (Chamberlain Notes, AC 10/2/41-5).

75 Salisbury to Lansdowne, 6 Sept. 1910; taken from a copy of part of this letter made by Lansdowne and forwarded by him to Balfour, 16 Sept. 1910. The italics appear to be Salisbury's (Balfour Papers).

76 Chamberlain to Balfour, 23 Sept. 19Io (Balfour Papers). 77 Sandars to Esher, 27 Sept. 191o (Balfour Papers). 78 The 1900oo Club was set up by a number of unionist M.P.s who were

not standing for reelection in 190o6, and who sought a forum for the continued discussion of political affairs. It was founded in the spring of 1906, and 'conditions of membership were soon extended to include not only peers and prospective candidates, but "such other persons as the committee think suitable for membership by reason of their services to the conservative cause in the universities or constituencies" '. C. Petrie, Chapters of life (1950), pp. 304-5-

71 Chaplin to Balfour, 3 Oct. 910o (Balfour Papers).



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906--IO 165 By October 19 1 o a movement advocating a federal solution of the

Irish problem had gained many supporters within the party."8 The political atmosphere seemed peculiarly conducive to such a solution, partly because of the constitutional conference, and partly because of Lloyd George's revolutionary proposals for a coalition of the two major parties.

The original memorandum si in which these proposals are laid down devoted little space to Ireland, but concentrated on outlining possible compromise solutions for the great social and economic problems of the day. Only at the conclusion of his survey, under the

heading 'Imperial Problems ', does the author suggest that 'in this connection the settlement of the Irish question would come up for consideration. The advantages of a non-party treatment of this vexed problem are obvious. Parties might deal with it without being subject to the embarrassing dictation of extreme partisans, whether from Nationalists or Orangemen '.82

The subsequent discussion between Balfour and Lloyd George of the possibility of the memorandum providing a basis for a liberal- unionist coalition were highly secret, and were wholly distinct from the

proceedings of the constitutional conference."8 It was some time before Balfour even informed his unionist colleagues in the conference of the existence of the memorandum." Nevertheless, in the talks between

so Such a solution involved the setting up of a series of regional parlia- ments which would deal with all matters of purely local import, but which would be otherwise subject to an imperial parliament at Westminster.

"8 Lloyd George's memorandum, dated 17 Aug. I9go, has been printed as appendix I in Petrie, Chamberlain, i. 38I-8. 82 Ibid. i. 388. " 'No word as to these secret and extraneous negotiations was ever spoken in the conference by any of the eight who sat there. All conver- sations in regard to them were held between Balfour and George alone, and in the conference we all acted by common accord as if nothing of the kind were in progress.' Chamberlain, Politics, p. 293-

"8 Cf. Austen Chamberlain's memorandum on the coalition proposals, 29 Jan. 19I5 (Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC I3/2/2). Balfour was probably shown the Lloyd George memorandum of I7 Aug. I9Io in the first or second week of the following October. Chamberlain and the other unionist delegates knew of it by October 20 (cf. Chamberlain, Politics, pp. 286-7), and may have known of it as early as October 4 : cf. Cham- berlain to his wife, where he writes mysteriously of 'strange happenings of which I don't think I can say a word to anyone ', 14 Oct. 1910 (Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 6/1/8o). On the difficulty of estab- lishing an exact chronology for these happenings see Gollin, Garvin, p. 2 9; and Chamberlain, Politics, p. 294-



166 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-io Balfour and Lloyd George, as in the more formal conference, the Irish issue seems to have been of crucial importance. Lloyd George, quick to appreciate the support which might be forthcoming from the federal unionists, laid far greater emphasis upon the Irish aspects of his proposals than he had done in his initial memorandum. Austen Chamberlain noted this development and recorded that Lloyd George, according to F. E. Smith,

puts in the forefront of his programme the settlement of the Irish question on the basis of devolution, federal home rule, or whatever you like to call it, and he (Smith) had left Bonar Law"s under the impression that the conference was in danger of breaking off because we on our side refused to consider any such propositions. This is of course quite untrue.8"

Lloyd George's tactics were aimed at heightening federal unionist suspicions that a compromise on Ireland was at hand and was being concealed by their party leaders. He had, for example, shown his memorandum to Garvin,87 who, both as editor of The Observer and in his private capacity, did all he could, short of actually revealing his knowledge of the initiative, to prepare the ground for the acceptance of the federalist solution."8

Throughout October the pressure upon Balfour to accept such a solution became increasingly great. One of the most important and articulate of the federal unionists was F. S. Oliver; a friend of both Austen Chamberlain and Milner, he had already, in May and June of 191o, contributed to The Times under the pen-name Pacificus a series of letters which urged the need for some sort of constitutional conference, and discussed the terms under which such a conference might be set up. In October 19gIo he used the same pseudonym and the same newspaper as a medium for advocating a federal solution of the Irish problem.89 He was not content, however, merely to express his opinion in the public press; and some time before the first of this

85 The existence of the memorandum had been revealed to Bonar Law by Smith with the permission of Lloyd George; cf. Birkenhead, F.E. the life of F. E. Smith 1st earl of Birkenhead (2nd edt. 1959), p. 155; and Chamberlain, Politics, p. 291.

88 Chamberlain to Cawdor, 21I Oct. 19go; Chamberlain, Politics, pp.

286-7. 87 D. Lloyd George, War memoirs (1936), i. 36. 88 Cf. Gollin, Garvin, ch. vii. 89 Both series of letters were collected and published together in book-

form: Pacificus, Federalism and home rule (I9Io), hereafter cited as Pacificus.



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, I906-1io 67 second series of letters appeared in The Times"9 he sent Balfour, and other unionists, a copy of a lengthy memorandum on the same subject." By October 17 Oliver had discussed his proposals with both Balfour and Chamberlain."2

On October i6 Alfred Lyttelton, one of Balfour's oldest and most intimate friends, wrote to him to draw attention to the existence of 'a very great sympathy with local federalism among our younger intellectuals '." Lyttelton suggested that Balfour should not reject any proposals which the liberals had already, or might in the future, put forward at the conference. On the same day The Observer came out in favour of federalism and, a day later, Garvin wrote privately to Balfour along similar lines.4

The rapid growth of federal unionist influence, however, is best indicated by the fact that even Sandars, Balfour's private secretary, wrote to his chief asking 'Is home rule exactly where it was? In other words, is home rule - Parnellite home rule - the issue and

nothing else? If the larger question of federation is in any way a matter for consideration and debate, is it not possible to get on to this new ground'? He went on to point out that in the past even such a man as Joseph Chamberlain had been willing to consider a similar notion, and to stress the need to avoid an 'early repetition' of the election of the previous January. 'I realise', he said, 'that you have skilfully picked the cause of difference if the conference is to break up : but I think we shall hug a delusion if we imagine that home rule will alarm the average voter of 19 11 as it did in 1886 and 1895'-5

This brief survey of the federal unionist campaign indicates the weight of opinion in favour of a radical shift in unionist Irish policy. The campaign was conducted moreover, contemporaneously with the discussion of the Lloyd George proposals and the proceedings of the constitutional conference; and both these series of negotiations looked

90 The letters appeared on 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, and 31 Oct.; and 2 Nov. 191o.

91'The conference and its consequences', 28 Sept. I9Io (Balfour Papers).

92 Cf. Gollin, Garvin, p. 211. Oliver's visit to Whittinghame to see Balfour caused something of a stir within the party; and Lord Cromer even suggested to Strachey, the editor of The Spectator, that it indicated 'that the federation idea has been seriously discussed' (Cromer Papers, P.R.O., F.O. 633/ x 9/ff.212-3).

93 Lyttleton to Balfour, 16 Oct. 191 o (Balfour Papers). '4 Gollin, Garvin, p. 209 and p. 213. 5 Sandars to Balfour, 18 Oct. 191 o (Balfour Papers).



168 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-o10

like breaking down because of the traditional unionist opposition to home rule. Balfour was fully aware of the strength of feeling with which he had to contend. 'You do not stand alone', he told Garvin, ' among strong unionists, constitutionalists, and imperialists. Many of the best of our young men are leaning towards federalism. The government are manifestly moving in the same direction.'9" Balfour himself, however, remained wholly unmoved; 'his whole history forbade his being a party to any form of home rule, though younger men less involved in the controversies of '86 and '93 might be free to contemplate what he could not accept '." His refusal to accept any meaningful alteration of the traditional basis of unionist Irish policy sealed the fate, not only of the federalist campaign, but also of the Lloyd George proposals and of the constitutional conference.

There are two basic reasons why Balfour acted as he did: first, his firm conviction that the federal solution was quite incompatible with the preservation of the union in any form which the unionist party would deem acceptable. The fundamental weakness of the federalist position, he felt, was that it lacked effectual deterrents of further secessional moves by the federalised states. 'Was it not', he asked, 'in the nature of things that in such cases incomplete concessions (and provincial powers are necessarily incomplete) only increase the appetites they are intended to satisfy, while they provide new instruments for extorting more'."" All successful federal schemes cited by Garvin were stages 'in the progress from separation to unification'; in the United Kingdom the opposite would be true. Ulster, he pointed out, would react violently to any federal scheme, and, even if all parties were to accept it, the future demands of Irish separatists could not be restricted. If ' Irish loyalists and protestants' in the eighteenth century had sought an independent parliament on the grounds that 'anything less is inconsistent with Irish freedom . . . is it going to be forgotten by nationalists and Roman Catholics, merely because Redmond, in order to obtain an instalment of what he considers England's debt to Ireland, promises on behalf of posterity that the instalment shall be forever accepted as payment in full'? There was only one realistic answer to these doubts and queries: as long as the

" Balfour to Garvin, 22 Oct. 191 o (Balfour Papers). 17 So he told Chamberlain : cf. Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 26 Aug.

1912. Chamberlain, Politics, p. 293- 98 Balfour to Garvin, 22 Oct. I9Io (Balfour Papers). This letter, parts

of which are published in Gollin, Garvin, pp. 215-18, is a comprehensive statement of unionist Irish policy as Balfour conceived it,



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-Io 169

Unionist party believed that the union with Ireland was sufficiently valuable to warrant maintaining, they would not accept such measures of devolution as Garvin and his fellow federalists favoured. Even Garvin himself, although standing by his original arguments, admitted that he felt 'certain the extremists of the (sic) Sinn Fein and the Gaelic League would form at once an Irish assembly, an anti-English party fighting for an extension of powers '." That, feeling as he did, he could advocate federalism eloquently attests his inability to compre- hend, let alone influence, Balfour's Irish policy.

The second, and even more important, reason why Balfour refused to admit a new departure in Irish policy was his conviction that he would be unable to carry a united party with him in support of such a change. The preservation of party unity was, for Balfour, the most

importance principle of party leadership. For seven years he had

struggled to hold together a party which at times had seemed peril- ously close to disruption on the fiscal issue. The defence of the union was the one great principle about which some sort of party unity seemed assured. The advantages to be derived from fighting the liberals on home rule rather than on the lord's issue were manifest and considerable. Yet he was now being asked to forego these advantages and, by so doing, to split his party irrevocably.'00 Many years later he reflected upon the difference between himself and Lloyd George which made it possible for the latter to propose coalition. After emphasising that Ireland was the cause of his finding the plan unacceptable,'0 he went on to say how typical it was of Lloyd George to expect him to compromise his party's long-standing Irish policy:

Principles mean nothing to him - never have. His mind doesn't work that way. It's both his strength and his weakness. He says to himself at any given moment: 'Come on now - we've all been squabbling too long,

9 Garvin to Balfour, 25 Oct. i91o (Balfour Papers). This is merely an elaboration of an earlier letter of 17 Oct.; it was equally ineffective. Balfour commented that he did 'not know that his original sketch becomes more attractive as the details are filled in'. Balfour to Chamber- lain, 27 Oct. 191Io (Chamberlain, Politics, p. 289).

100 Whether or not the party would have actually split in the event of their leaders adopting the federal solution must remain hypothetical. Certainly Balfour believed it would have done so.

ID' There is no evidence whatsoever in support of Lloyd George's contention that Balfour came close to accepting his plan, or that he rejected it, again as Lloyd George contends, only on the advice of Akers- Douglas; cf. Lloyd George, War memoirs, pp. 36-8.



170 THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-io

let's find a reasonable way out of the difficulty !' - but such solutions are quite impossible for people who don't share his outlook on political principles - the great things.'02

During the course of the federalist overtures Balfour had been reminded of these principles: on October 27 he sent Chamberlain 'a pair of Irish unionist letters - the first drops in the storm that will assuredly break over us if any new departure be admitted '. V0

The concepts of party and of party tradition to which Balfour adhered came under heavy attack in I910. The subsequent careers of the three men with whom the idea of a coalition originated -

Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and F. E. Smith - bear ample witness to their opinions of such concepts. Individualists in tempera- ment as in style, they found the trappings of party merely a hindrance to their political endeavours. An even lower regard for the entire

party system was the hall mark of the Milner kindergarten, the intellectual home of so many of the federal unionists.'04 When F. S. Oliver dedicated the collected volume of his Pacificus letters to

'young men who see visions', he thereby demonstrated the impro- bability of his converting a party which was noted neither for vision nor youth.

In the event, by Io November I910 all three opportunities for

compromise on Ireland - provided by the conference, the Lloyd George proposals and the federal unionist campaign - had passed.'05

102 Blanche Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London 1936), ii. 77. 108 Chamberlain, Politics, p. 289. Carson expressed his apprehensions

to Balfour in a letter of 25 Oct. 19Io (Balfour Papers). 104 Milner himself wished 'to help to shape opinion and not to do the

hackwork of opposition or of office '. A. M. Gollin, Proconsul in politics (1964), p. 1 I5 105 The immediate cause of the breakdown of the conference was the inability of the delegates to agree upon the strength of the lords' repre- sentation in a joint sitting committee of both houses of parliament which, it was proposed, would be the final court of appeal in the event of deadlock between the houses. But by this stage the attempt to agree upon a definition of 'organic' legislation, which the unionists insisted was a pre- requisite of any legislation altering the powers of the lords, had already failed: 'the organic change which provided the main text of these discussions was home rule'; Balfour's memorandum for George V, 'The constitutional conference', to Nov. I91o (P.R.O. CAB 37/104/6o). Austen Chamberlain observed in a letter to his wife, 2 Nov. 9gIo, that 'the wider issue is put on one side. The narrower issue will, I think, destroy the conference. Neither side can get over the "home rule fence"'. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 6/ 1 /82.



THE UNIONIST PARTY AND IRELAND, 1906-IO 171

The effects of Balfour's stand were profound. He refused to accept that 'the unionist party must face the new phase of the Irish question ... [or] ... to recognise that one phase of the Irish question is closed forever, and that a new phase is opened '.06 His refusal was derived from his conviction that such an action would destroy the union in which he believed and the party which he led. 'No man ', he believed, 'has a right to destroy the property of which he is a trustee [or] to throw over its [his party's] strongest convictions '.'07 And so he closed the door finally against any realignment of party attitudes on Ireland.

There were to be no further opportunities for such a realignment. The unionist defeat in the general election of December 19Io was their third in succession. The mood of exasperated frustration it induced, and the growing bitterness of party politics arising out of the prolonged struggle for the parliament bill were not conducive to compromise. Ireland appeared to offer the unionists their sole chance of regaining power. Balfour had always thought it the issue which promised his party's best chance of success at the polls; but he had been succeeded by Bonar Law as leader in the commons before it finally emerged as the issue which was to continue to dominate English politics until the outbreak of war. Ironically enough both Law and F. E. Smith, one of his most active lieutenants in the anti-home rule campaign, had both favoured Lloyd George's federalist scheme,x0s which Balfour had rejected as being against his party's interest. Whether such a rejection was in the national interest may, perhaps, be doubted, as Lloyd George doubted it;109 but it did enable Balfour to bequeath to his successor a party united as it had not been for almost a decade upon the major political issue of the day. On this head we must allow that Balfour, by the standard of party leadership he set himself, was undeniably successful.

J. R. FANNING

106 The view expressed in The Observer, I6 Oct. Igio; cf. Gollin, Garvin, p. 209.

107 Dugdale, Balfour, i. 344. 108 Cf. Chamberlain, Politics, p. 193; and Birkenhead, Life of F. E.

Smith, pp. 156-7. '0O Cf. Lloyd George, War memoirs, i. 4o-I.



Documents

The Unionist Party and Ireland, 1906-10