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TheWarsAreHere:

HowtheUnitedStates’Post-9/11WarsHelpedMilitarizeU.S.Police

JessicaKatzenstein1 BrownUniversity

September16,2020

SixyearsafterthegerminalUnitedStatesprotestsagainstanti-Blackpoliceviolence

inFerguson,MO,andmonthsafter the2020policekillingsofGeorgeFloydandBreonnaTaylor,policeinmine-resistantvehicleshaveonceagainoccupiedboththestreetsandmasspublic attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi-automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—promptedactivistsandpoliticianstocomparetheSt.LouissuburbtooccupiedGaza,Ukraine,orIraq.2Duringthesummerof2020,astheU.S.witnesseditslargestpublicuprisingssincethe1960s,policemilitarizationagaincameunderscrutiny.TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityflewsurveillanceaircraftoverprotestsin15cities,asofficersonthegrounddeployedflash-banggrenades,soundcannons,rubberbullets,andteargasagainstpeacefuldemonstrators.3Sinceprotestsbegan,atleast14locallawenforcementagenciesin10stateshavereceivedfreemine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers haverevived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are

1JessicaKatzensteinisaPhDcandidateinAnthropologyatBrownUniversity.TheauthorwouldliketothankYueshanLi(Aubrey),aCostsofWarinternatBrownUniversity,forherassistancewithquantificationandgraphics;NetaCrawford,AllegraHarpootlian,CatherineLutz,HeidiPeltier,andStephanieSavellfortheireditingwork;andtheparticipantsinBostonUniversity's"20YearsofWar"workshopfortheirhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.2Palumbo-Liu,D.(2014).FergusonandGaza:TheDefinitiveStudyofHowTheyAreandAreNotSimilar.Salon.https://www.salon.com/2014/08/22/ferguson_and_gaza_the_definitive_study_of_how_they_are_and_are_not_similar/3Kanno-Youngs,Z.(2020).U.S.WatchedGeorgeFloydProtestsin15CitiesUsingAerialSurveillance.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protests-surveillance.html4Icalculatethisnumberusingpubliclyavailabledataforthe1033Program(discussedbelow).5Edmondson,C.(2020).LawmakersBeginBipartisanPushtoCutOffPoliceAccesstoMilitary-StyleGear.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/police-military-gear.html;Edmondson,C.(2020).SenateKillsBroadCurbsonMilitaryGearforPolice,ThwartingPushtoDemilitarize.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/politics/senate-police-military-equipment.html

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advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armoredvehiclesandcamouflageuniforms.6

Inthismomentofpotentialtransformation,wemustanalyzeboththedeeprootsandtherecentupsurgeofpolice“militarization”inordertograspwhatcallsfor“demilitarizing”thepolicecouldmean.Thispaperarguesthattoday’shighlevelofpolicemilitarizationisoneofthecruel,complexdomesticcostsofrecentAmericanwarsabroad.PolicemilitarizationisinasenseasoldasU.S.policingitself,yetithasexplodedsinceSeptember11,2001andits intensificationmustbecountedamongthecostsofthiscountry’spost-9/11wars.7

Thesewarshaveofferedanewseriesofjustificationsforpolicemilitarization,whichis to say the continuous flow of military equipment, funding, personnel, surveillancetechnologies, trainings, concepts, and strategies to domestic police. After 9/11, the U.S.government poured money into law enforcement in the name of counterterrorism andhomelandsecurity.Preparednessfordomesticterrorismshottothetopofpolicepriorities.TheStateDepartmentexplainedthat“thiscapacitymustbeconsideredasmuchastapleoflawenforcementoperationsascrimeanalysis,criminalintelligence,andcrimeprevention.”8Police departments raced to develop counterterror systems; meanwhile, the scale andprofitsofmilitary-industrialcorporationsmushroomedastheU.S.invadedAfghanistanandthenIraq.9Theseforcesconvergedwiththegrowthofspecializedpolicetrainingandtacticstocombattherisingnumberofmassshootings,10andwithmorerecentmilitarydrawdownsfromactivewarzones,tovastlyinflateanexistingpipelinefromthemilitaryandthefederalgovernmenttolocalpolice.11

6Demilitarization.CampaignZero.RetrievedJune26,2020,fromhttps://www.joincampaignzero.org/demilitarization7“Post-9/11wars”referstoU.S.-ledmilitaryoperationsthathavegrownoutoftheU.S.andcoalitionforces’invasionsofAfghanistanin2001andIraqin2003,andPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’s“GlobalWaronTerror.”8U.S.DepartmentofState.(2005).MoneyLaunderingandTerroristFinancing—AGlobalThreat.CitedinDavis,L.M.,Pollard,M.,Ward,K.,Wilson,J.M.,Varda,D.M.,Hansell,L.,&Steinberg,P.(2010).Long-TermEffectsofLawEnforcement’sPost-9/11FocusonCounterterrorismandHomelandSecurity.TheRANDCorporation.https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232791.pdf9Hartung,W.D.(2011).TheMilitary-IndustrialComplexRevisited:ShiftingPatternsofMilitaryContractinginthePost-9/11Period.CostsofWaratBrownUniversity.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/The%20Military-Industrial%20Complex%20Revisited.pdf10AccordingtoTheWashingtonPost,thepaceofmassshootings(narrowlydefined)hasquickenedfromanaverageofoneevery84daysbetween1999and2015,tooneevery47daysbetween2015and2019.Berkowitz,B.,Blanco,A.,Mayes,B.R.,Auerbach,K.,&Rindler,D.(2019).MoreandDeadlier:MassShootingTrendsinAmerica.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/05/more-deadlier-mass-shooting-trends-america/?arc404=true11TheU.S.militaryhasalsocross-trainedwithandgainedtacticsfromdomesticpolice,particularlySWATteams.SeeKraska,P.(2007).MilitarizationandPolicing—ItsRelevanceto21stCenturyPolice.Policing,1(4),501-513.https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/1/4/501/1440981?redirectedFrom=fulltext;Musa,S.,Morgan,J.,&Keegan,M.(2011).PolicingandCOINOperations:LessonsLearned,StrategiesandFutureDirections.CenterforTechnologyandNationalSecurityPolicy&TheCombatingTerrorismTechnicalSupportOffice.https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a546677.pdf;Ifocusinthispapermainlyonlocalpolice,the

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Thedomesticcostsofthisexpandingpipelinehavebeenmomentous—evenforpolicedepartments that have gratefully accepted supplies ranging from laser printers and filecabinets tomine-resistant vehicles.From apurely economic standpoint,maintainingcomplexmilitaryequipment,surveillancesystems,andSWATteamsisexpensivefortaxpayers and local governments. Furthermore, police reformers argue that overtmilitaristicspectaclesinprotestpolicing—suchasduringtherecentGeorgeFloydprotests—compromisepolicelegitimacyandfurtherdamageciviliantrustintheideathatpolicingisdesignedto“protectandserve.”12

Moresignificantthancoststothepublicpurseandtotheinstitutionofpolicinghavebeen the costsof intensifiedmilitarization forBlack,Brown, Indigenous,andpoorcommunities.PolicemilitarizationhasalwaysechoedAmericanwarsabroad,whichhaveofteninvolvedterrifyinghomeraids,andwhosebombsraintheheaviestdestructiononwhatarealmostinvariablyracializedcommunities.Thedomesticeffectsofthesewarsoverseas are a version of what Aimé Césaire in Discourse on Colonialism called the“boomerangeffectofcolonization”:Americanimperialism,perpetuallyreturningtohauntitsownpeople.Militarizationunderscoresandintensifiestheoccupying,repressiverolepoliceplay in hyperpoliced communities like Ferguson.13 Invasive surveillance systems tend totarget oppressed minorities, further entangling them in the criminal justice system.HistoricallyintheU.S.,themostbrutalformsofprotestpolicinghavebeenleveledagainstlabororganizersandBlackandIndigenousliberationmovements.Meanwhile,SWATteams,whichderivetacticsandequipmentfromthemilitary,aredisproportionatelyusedagainstBlackandLatinxpeopleinraidsliketheonethatkilled7-year-oldAiyanaStanley-JonesinDetroit, Michigan in 2010.14 More recently, in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic,plainclothes police in Louisville, Kentucky raided the home of 26-year-old emergencymedicaltechnicianBreonnaTaylorandshother8times,killingher.15

This paper traces U.S. police militarization from its colonial and anti-Black rootsthrough its intensificationafter9/11,demonstratinghow today’smine-resistantvehiclesandteargasemergefromadeeplineageof“militarized”policing.ItthenchartshowpolicemilitarizationhasexplodedinthewakeofU.S.-ledpost-9/11wars,specificallyexaminingthe flows of military equipment to police, the burgeoning surveillance and intelligence

mainfrontlinecontactwithcivilians,althoughfederalandstatelawenforcementagencieshavealsobeenaffectedbythetrendsdiscussedbelow.12SeeforinstanceFinalReport.(2015).ThePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf13Césaire,A.(2000[1955]).DiscourseonColonialism.MonthlyReviewPress.14Themilitaryhasalsoderivedtacticsfromdomesticpolice,especiallysince9/11.Seefootnote9above;Latinxisagender-neutraltermforpeopleofLatinAmericanheritage.SeeMorales,E.(2019).Latinx:TheNewForceinAmericanPoliticsandCulture.Verso.https://www.versobooks.com/books/3036-latinx;WarComesHome:TheExcessiveMilitarizationofAmericanPolicing.(2014).AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU).https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police;Hackman,R.(2015).“SheWasOnlyaBaby”:LastChargeDroppedinPoliceRaidThatKilledSleepingDetroitChild.TheGuardian.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/31/detroit-aiyana-stanley-jones-police-officer-cleared15Oppel,R.A.Jr.&Taylor,D.B.(2020).Here’sWhatYouNeedtoKnowAboutBreonnaTaylor’sDeath.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html

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infrastructure,andpolicedepartmentshiringmilitaryveterans.Thepaperconcludeswithasurveyofthemanydifferentcostsofpost-9/11policemilitarization.

WhatisPoliceMilitarization?

Bothin2014afterFergusonandtoday,manycriticalcommentatorshavedecriedthearmoredvehiclesandpoliceinfullriotgearrollingthroughAmericanstreets.Scholarsofpolice militarization, however, consider the concept to encompass muchmore than thebuildup of military-grade equipment. “Militarization” also includes departments’ use ofmilitarylanguageandcounterinsurgencytactics,thespreadofpoliceparamilitaryunits,andmilitary-derivedideologiesaboutlegitimateandmoralusesofviolence.16Indeed,allofthesethingshaveintensifiedsince9/11.Butitisfirstimportanttonotethatwhattodaywecallpolicemilitarizationemergedfrommucholderandintertwinedhistoriesofanti-Blackandcolonialstateviolence,whichremainthebedrockofmilitarizationtoday.

TherootsofpolicemilitarizationarelacedthroughoutAmerica’s400-yearhistoryofBlackoppression.17PolicedepartmentsintheAmericanSouthdevelopedfromslavepatrolsand colonial-era militias, both of which overlapped in various roles with the federalmilitary.18Alllaboredtorepressuprisingsandterrorizeenslavedpeopleand,later,Blackpeople living under Jim Crow. There has never been a pre-militarized “time zero”whendomestic police embodied an Officer Friendly ideal distinct from military models andmilitaristicoperations.19

“Militarized”policinghasalwaysbeenarealityforBlackAmericans,particularlypoorBlackpeopleandBlackliberationactivists.20Inthe1960s,whiletheU.S.militarywasfightinginVietnam,policedrewonmilitaryexpertisetodevelopcounterinsurgencytacticsagainstBlackliberationandanti-warmovements.Forinstance,LosAngelespoliceinspectorDarylGateschampionedthenation’sfirstSWATteamafterconsultingwithlocalMarines.21Gatessawthe1965WattsUprisinginLAas“guerillawarfare,”akintoVietnameseinsurgencyandrequiringmilitarytrainingandequipmenttosuppress.22Later,underPresidentNixonandespeciallyPresidentReagan,theWaronDrugsauthorizedpoliceuseofmilitarytacticslike

16Kraska,“MilitarizationandPolicing—ItsRelevanceto21stCenturyPolice”;seealsoLutz,C.(2002).MakingWaratHomeintheUnitedStates:MilitarizationandtheCurrentCrisis.AmericanAnthropologist,104(3),723-735.17Nopper,T.K.&Kaba,M.(2014).ItemizingAtrocity.Jacobin.https://jacobinmag.com/2014/08/itemizing-atrocity/18Archbold,C.A.(2012).Section1:TheHistoryofthePolice.Policing:AText/Reader.SagePublishing.https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/50819_ch_1.pdf19Bernazzoli,R.,&Flint,C.(2009).FromMilitarizationtoSecuritization:FindingaConceptThatWorks.PoliticalGeography,28(8),449–450.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.08.00320Baldwin,J.(1966).AReportfromOccupiedTerritory.TheNation.https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/report-occupied-territory/21Haberman,C.(2014).TheRiseoftheSWATTeaminAmericanPolicing.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/us/the-rise-of-the-swat-team-in-american-policing.html22Balko,R.(2013).RiseoftheWarriorCop:TheMilitarizationofAmerica’sPoliceForces.PublicAffairs.https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/radley-balko/rise-of-the-warrior-cop/9781610392129/

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no-knockraids(whichallowpolicetobreakintoahomeunannounced).23ThesetacticshavebeendisproportionatelyusedagainstBlackcivilians.24In1985,U.S.policeevendroppedasatchelbombonthecompoundofMOVE,aBlackliberationgroupinPhiladelphia,PA.Thebombandsubsequentblazekilledfivechildrenandsixadults,anddestroyedthehomesofover250people.25

Somecommentatorshavecalledmilitarizedpolicinga“cancer”spreadingthroughthebodypolitic,butsuchanalyseseraseitsorigins.“Militarizedpolicing”hasalwaysdemarcatedwho is subject to SWAT raids and satchel bombs, and who is not.26 Similarly, policemilitarization is historically inseparable fromAmerican colonial and imperialist projectsabroad.Northerncities’firstformalpolicedepartmentswerepatternedontheBritishmodelofpolicing,whichdrewitsorganizationandhierarchyfromthemilitary.ThearchitectoftheBritishmodel,SirRobertPeel,developedhisfamousprinciplesofpolicingwhileoverseeingBritain’soccupationofIreland.Peelfoundthat“peacepreservation”policeforcescouldquellrebellious crowds and undermine anticolonial resistance more effectively than couldoccupyingtroops.27ColonialmanagementisbuiltintothetenetsofAmericanpolicing,whichwidelycitesPeel’sprinciplestoday.28

TheU.S.militaryanddomesticpolicealsoopenlyshared ideas longbefore federalprogramsformalizedtheirexchange.29For instance,prominentAmericanpolicereformerAugustVollmerservedinthePhilippine-AmericanWarandimportedmilitarytacticsintomodern U.S. policing.30 He developed new record-keeping systems that tracked andpredictedcriminalactivity,justastheU.S.militaryattemptedtoidentifyinsurgentactivityduringitsoccupationofthePhilippines.31“I’vestudiedmilitarytacticsandusedthemtogoodeffect in roundingupcrooks,”Vollmeronce toldanaudienceofAmericanpoliceofficers.“Afterallwe’reconductingawar,awaragainsttheenemiesofsociety.”32

23Baum,D.(1996).SmokeandMirrors:TheWaronDrugsandthePoliticsofFailure.Little,BrownandCompany.24WarComesHome.25Norward,L.(2019).TheDayPhiladelphiaBombedItsOwnPeople.Vox.https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/8/8/20747198/philadelphia-bombing-1985-move26Harwood,M.(2014).HowDidAmerica’sPoliceGetSoMilitarized?MotherJones.https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/america-police-military-swat-ferguson-westcott-tampa/;Gamal,F.(2016).TheRacialPoliticsofProtection:ACriticalRaceExaminationofPoliceMilitarization.CaliforniaLawReview,104(4),979–1008.http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z385P1R27Vitale,A.(2017).TheEndofPolicing.Verso.https://www.versobooks.com/books/2426-the-end-of-policing28SirRobertPeel’sPolicingPrinciples.LawEnforcementActionPartnership.RetrievedJune26,2020,fromhttps://lawenforcementactionpartnership.org/peel-policing-principles/29Schrader,S.(2020).Yes,AmericanPoliceActLikeOccupyingArmies.TheyLiterallyStudiedTheirTactics.TheGuardian.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/08/yes-american-police-act-like-occupying-armies-they-literally-studied-their-tactics30Go,J.(2020).TheImperialOriginsofAmericanPolicing:MilitarizationandImperialFeedbackintheEarly20thCentury.AmericanJournalofSociology,125(5),1193–1254.https://doi.org/10.1086/70846431McCoy,A.W.(2009).PolicingAmerica’sEmpire:TheUnitedStates,thePhilippines,andtheRiseoftheSurveillanceState.TheUniversityofWisconsinPress.https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4454.htm32Go,“TheImperialOriginsofAmericanPolicing.”

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Everyattack in thenameofnationalsecurityonBrownandBlackcountries intheGlobalSouth,everymassive injectionofpublic taxdollars intotheU.S.military,hasbothravagedcommunitiesabroadandreboundedonAmericansubjects—particularlythemostmarginalized. Indeed, Indigenous peoples, the original (and ongoing) victims of NorthAmerican settler colonialism, remain the racialized group most likely to be killed inconfrontationswithU.S.police.33IntheU.S.aswellasCanada,policehaveoftendeployedmilitary-style equipment and tactics to violently suppress Indigenous and First Nationsclaims to land, water, and environmental justice, as was most visible in the 2016-2017DakotaAccessPipelineprotestsatStandingRock.34

Police militarization, in other words, is no recently invading cancer but ratherembeddedintheDNAofU.S.policing.Thestakesofgraspingthisargumentarehigh:iftherewasnopre-militarized“timezero,”thenmilitarizationisnotaswitchthatcanbeturnedoffbysimplyshuttingdownequipmenttransferprograms.Nordoesitmapneatlyontoaspectrumfromlesstomoremilitarized,muchlessfitwithinsimplebinarieslike “foreign/domestic” and “civilian/military.”35 The point is certainly not thatdemilitarization efforts aremeaningless. Rather, theymust be informed by a reading ofhistoryandarecognitionthattheconceptualdivisionbetweenpolicingandthemilitaryisa“vanishinghorizon,”asthepoliceandmilitaryhavealwaysbeenintertwined.36Thishistoryalso helps explainwhy the post-9/11 surge of police militarization mobilizes especiallyagainstBlack,Brown,Indigenous,andpoorpeople.

Post-9/11PoliceMilitarization

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. military invaded Afghanistan, then Iraq. As theAmericansecuritystatemetastasized,thefederalgovernmentopenedafree-flowingspigotof military equipment and expertise to local law enforcement. Billions of dollars inequipment and grant funding gushed to the police in the name of combating domesticterrorism.Dozensof fusion centers, hubs for sharing intelligence across all levelsof lawenforcement, popped up around the country. The newly established Department ofHomelandSecurity(DHS)andotheragenciesbeganofferingpolicetrainingsonbioterrorismandimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs).Officersstartedattendingcounterterrortrainings

33AccordingtoaCNNreviewofCentersforDiseaseControlandPreventiondata,from1999to2015,2.9outofevery1millionNativeAmericanswerekilledeveryyearbylawenforcement.Thatmortalityrateis12percenthigherthanforAfricanAmericansandmorethan300percenthigherthanforwhitepeople.Hansen,E.(2017).TheForgottenMinorityinPoliceShootings.CNN.https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/10/us/native-lives-matter/index.html;seealsoWoodard,S.(2016).ThePoliceKillingsNoOneisTalkingAbout.InTheseTimes.http://www.inthesetimes.com/features/native_american_police_killings_native_lives_matter.html34See#NoDAPLArchive–StandingRockWaterProtectors.RetrievedAugust15,2020,fromhttps://www.nodaplarchive.com/35Schrader,S.(2019).BadgeswithoutBorders:HowGlobalCounterinsurgencyTransformedAmericanPolicing.UniversityofCaliforniaPress.https://california.degruyter.com/view/title/571652?language=en36Seigel,M.(2019).AlwaysAlreadyMilitary:Police,PublicSafety,andStateViolence.AmericanQuarterly,71(2),519-539.

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in other countries, particularly Israel.37 The federal government dramatically expandedimmigration enforcement infrastructure, claiming that the 9/11 attacks “injected newurgency” into border security.38 This presumptive urgency underwrote the formation ofImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement(ICE),whichbegancoordinatingwithlocalpolice.39Surveillancesystemsdesignedforthemilitarybegantricklingintolocaldepartments.Manyadopted“intelligence-ledpolicing”tacticsintheirday-to-daywork,gatheringandsharinginformation—sometimeswithstateandfederalagencies—inordertopreventratherthanrespondtocrimeandpotentialterrorthreats.40UnderPresidentObama,millionsofdollarsin federal funding incentivized police departments to hire post-9/11 veterans, furtherenmeshingmilitarytrainingandoutlooksindomesticpolicing.

Unprecedentedinscaleandscope,theseinvestmentsdrawlocalpolicingintotightercollaboration with the military and federal agencies such as ICE, outfitting cops withotherwise inaccessibleaircraft andarmored trucks, and training them to thinkof countydamsandpumpkinfestivalsaspotentialtargetsforterrorism.41Manypolicedepartmentshaveabsorbedthecounterterrormandateandnowseethemselvesasworking“atthefrontlinesof thedomestic fightagainst terrorism.”42Policeoftencontendthatmilitarizationispurelydefensive,allowingthemtobetterprotectthemselvesandtheircommunitiesagainstvariousthreats.Criticsarguethatithasintensifiedpoliceviolencebyframingmarginalizedpopulationsas internal enemies.Reckoningwith the costsofmilitarization first requiresunderstandinghowresourceshaveflowedtopolice,andwhotheirtargetshavebeen.

HereIhighlightthreemainthemesamongmany:theexpansionofsurveillanceandintelligence,policedepartmentshiringveterans,and,especially,militaryequipmentflowstopolice.

EquipmentFlowstoPoliceDepartments

The U.S. military directly transfers military materiel to law enforcement via theDepartment of Defense’s (DoD’s) 1033 Program, the most widely recognized avenue of

37Speri,A.(2017).IsraelSecurityForcesAreTrainingAmericanCopsDespiteHistoryofRightsAbuses.TheIntercept.https://theintercept.com/2017/09/15/police-israel-cops-training-adl-human-rights-abuses-dc-washington/38Post-9/11.(2019).U.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices.https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/post-91139CelebratingtheHistoryofICE.(2020,September8.)U.S.ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement.https://www.ice.gov/features/history40Price,M.(2013).NationalSecurityandLocalPolice.TheBrennanCenterforJustice.https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf41Swanson,A.(2015).StatePoliceHaveReceivedBillionsofDollarsofMilitaryEquipment.Here’sWhereItAllWent.WashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/16/state-police-have-received-billions-of-dollars-of-military-equipment-heres-where-it-all-went/;seealsoO’Keeffe,K.(2014).JohnOliveronFerguson:NoPoliceDepartmentNeedsGiantMilitaryVehicles.TheAtlantic.https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2014/08/john-oliver-knows-no-police-department-needs-giant-military-vehicles/378668/42Price,NationalSecurityandLocalPolice.

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police militarization. This program functionally recycles excess military equipment bydistributingunneededpropertytopolicedepartments—includingcampus,school,andparkpolice—forfree,minusthecostofshipping,maintenance,andstorage.Launchedin1990,the program formalized and expanded an already existing pipeline of surplus material,includingboth“non-controlled”itemslikeofficesuppliesand“controlled”itemslikesemi-automaticrifles.Around8,200federal,state,and local lawenforcementagencies from49states and 4 U.S. territories currently participate in the program.43 The 1033 Programexcludescertainovertlymilitaryitemssuchastanks,armeddrones,large-caliberweapons,body armor, and explosives; President Trump revoked President Obama’s additionalinjunctionontrackedarmoredvehicles,grenadelaunchers,andbayonets(whichthe1033Programclarifiesaremerely“utilityknives”).44Theprogramprioritizescounter-drugandcounterterror requests, incentivizingpolice todescribe theirneed forequipment in suchterms.However,itdoesnotallowdepartmentstosimplystockpileincaseofanemergency.Instead,theymustcertifythattheywilluseallpropertywithinoneyearofreceiptorelsereturnittotheDoD.45Thusevenifdepartmentsoriginallyclaimedtoneedarmoredvehiclesandsniperrifles todefendagainstvanishinglyrareterroristattacks, theymustoften findotherrationalestodeploysuchitems,orelserisklosingfreeequipment.

I found that the 1033 Program has transferred at least $1.6 billion worth ofequipment to law enforcement agencies since 9/11, compared to at least $27millionbefore9/11.46Thisisthemostupdatedandcomprehensiveaccountingofpost-9/111033Programequipmenttransferstodate.OtheranalysesfocusonshortertimeframesandtendtopivotaroundFergusonin2014.47

431033ProgramFAQs.U.S.DefenseLogisticsAgency.RetrievedJune26,2020,fromhttps://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramFAQs.aspx441033ProgramFAQs.45Review:FederalSupportforLocalLawEnforcementEquipmentAcquisition.(2014).ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident.https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law_enforcement_equipment_acquisition.pdf;seealsoWarComesHome.46Seebelowforcaveatstothedataonwhichourcalculationsarebased.Creditandthanksforthesecalculations,andtheonesbelow,gotoYueshanLi(Aubrey),aCostsofWarinternatBrownUniversity.47Forinstance,NationalPublicRadiochartedtransfersbetween2006andearly2014,findingover$1.5billionworthoftransfersinthetop10categoriesalone:Rezvani,A.,Pupovac,J.,Eads,D.,&Fisher,T.(2014).MRAPsAndBayonets:WhatWeKnowAboutthePentagon’s1033Program.NationalPublicRadio.https://www.npr.org/2014/09/02/342494225/mraps-and-bayonets-what-we-know-about-the-pentagons-1033-program;seealsoRadil,S.,Dezzani,R.,&McAden,L.(2015).TheRoadtoFerguson:GeographiesofU.S.PoliceMilitarizationandtheRoleofthe1033Program.ResearchGate.https://doi.org10.13140/rg.2.1.2589.3604.Morerecently,BuzzFeedfoundthattheprogramhastransferredover$850millionworthofequipmentsinceFergusonin2014,andthatasofMarch2020,localpolicearsenalsnationwideincluded494mine-resistantvehicles,over6,500rifles,andatleast76aircraftacquiredsinceFerguson:Templon,J.(2020).PoliceDepartmentsHaveReceivedHundredsofMillionsofDollarsInMilitaryEquipmentSinceFerguson.BuzzFeedNews.https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/johntemplon/police-departments-military-gear-1033-program

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Figure1.1033ProgramEquipmentTransfersbyAcquisitionValue, January2001 -June202048

Asshownintheabovegraph,1033Programtransfersrepresentalaggingindicatorfor U.S. military demobilization, particularly after the drawdown from Iraq in 2010.Beginningaround2009,thetotalvalueoftransferssteadilyrampedupasthe1033Programbeganfunnelingmoreexpensiveitems,likemine-resistantvehiclesandhelicopters,tolawenforcement.

Thetotalquantityofitemstransferredfurtherdemonstratestheprogram’spost-9/11expansion.Ifoundthatthe1033Programtransferrednearly520,000individualitemstolawenforcementafter9/11,comparedtonearly17,000itemsbefore9/11(seeFigure2,below).Themajorityoftheseitemswerenon-controlledequipmentsuchasofficesupplies.49

48AllgraphsinthispaperwerecreatedbyYueshanLi(Aubrey).49Forinstance,the1033Programreportedthat92percentofpropertyissuedin2019wasnon-controlled—althoughitfailedtonotethatcontrolleditemsmadeupmostofthetransfers’dollarvalue.See1033ProgramFAQs.

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Figure2.1033ProgramEquipmentTransfersbyQuantity,January2001-June2020

Thesepost-9/11transfersincludedatleast1,114mine-resistantvehicles,valuedatapproximately$300,000-$850,000eachandover$755millionoverall.Mine-resistantvehicle transfers began in 2009, with Texas receiving the most since then, followed byTennessee,Florida,California,andOhio.

Figure3.TopFiveStateRecipientsof1033ProgramMine-ResistantVehiclesthroughJune2020

State Mine-ResistantVehiclesTotalQuantity

Mine-ResistantVehiclesTotalAcquisitionValue

Texas 116 $78,885,221

Tennessee 86 $59,041,829

Florida 72 $47,541,844

California 54 $36,512,080

Ohio 43 $30,125,720

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The1033Programbegantransferringunmannedvehiclesandrobotequipmenttolaw enforcement even earlier, starting in 2005. The U.S. military has relied heavily onunmannedvehiclesafter9/11,mostprominentlyviaitsvariousdronewarfarecampaigns.50While the 1033 Program does not transfer armed drones, it does transfer unarmedunmannedvehicles, oftenused for reconnaissanceandhandlingbomb threats.The1033Programhastransferredover1,000individualrobotitemstolawenforcement,valuedatover$77milliontotal.51

Figure4.RobotEquipmentTransfersbyAcquisitionValue,January2001-June2020

These figures should all be considered proxies for a recent upsurge. Trackingequipmenttransfersthroughtheprogramiscomplex,despiteitsrelative(andrecent)publictransparency.52Forone,reportedequipmentvaluesareonlyestimates.Theyreflectwhatthemilitaryoriginallypaidfortheitem,notthecurrentdepreciatedvalueintoday’sdollars.Furthermore, while equipment like mine-resistant vehicles and weapons remain DoDproperty in perpetuity, more ordinary items like office supplies become part of policeinventoryafteroneyearandthusfalloffthebooks.Returnedordisposed-ofitemsarenot

50SeeforinstanceTheDronePapers.(2015).TheIntercept.https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/;Feroz,E.(2020).DeathbyDrone:America’sViciousLegacyinAfghanistan.ForeignPolicy.https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/27/afghanistan-drones-america-legacy-taliban/51Todeterminethenamesofrobotequipmentin1033Programdata,wereliedonthecomprehensivedatacompiledinGettinger,D.,&Michel,A.H.(2016).LawEnforcementRobotsDatasheet.CenterfortheStudyoftheDroneatBardCollege.https://dronecenter.bard.edu/law-enforcement-robots-datasheet/52LESOwasonlyrequiredtobeginpostingquarterlyrecordsin2016.Ontrackingequipmenttransfers:Musgrave,S.(2014).HowWeGotthePentagontoRevealWhatGearTheyGaveCops.MuckRock.https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2014/dec/09/how-we-got-pentagon-reveal-what-gear-they-gave-cop/

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publiclytrackedeither.MyanalysisonlyincludestheDoD-trackeditemsinpolicearsenalsasofJune30,2020.

All of these issues certainly make my figures an underestimate. The DoD’s LawEnforcement Support Office (LESO), which operates the program, reports that it hastransferred$7.4billionworthofequipmentsincetheprogram’sinceptionin1990.53Thus,over$5.7billionworthofequipmenttransferredsince1990haseitherbeendisposedoforreturnedorhasbecomepolicepropertyand,eitherway,cannotbetracked.

The1033Programhascomeunderthemostscrutinybyfar,butmanyother,moreopaquefederalprogramstransfermilitary-styleequipmenttopolice,providegrantstobuynewmaterial,orallowlocallawenforcementtoenjoythefederalgovernment’sdiscountsonnewequipment.54DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)fundingforsuchprograms,forinstance,eclipsesthetotalvalueofequipmenttransferredthroughthe1033Program.

In2003,DHSinstitutedagrantprogramdesignedtoensure“asecureandresilientnation”bychannelingover$1billionperyeartolowerlevelsofgovernment,whichcanthenuse the funding for preparedness training, equipment such as helicopters (although notweapons),oreventransportandstoragecostsof1033Programequipment.55EventhoughDHSspecifiesthatonly25percentofitsHomelandSecurityGrantProgram(HSGP)fundingmust be used for law enforcement counterterror efforts, it continues to dole out grantfundingonthebasisofterrorismriskassessments.56Theagencyinvestsinprojectsthathaveademonstrated“nexustoterrorismpreparedness,”whileacknowledgingthatproposalscansimultaneously support “enhanced preparedness for other hazards unrelated to acts ofterrorism.”57Inotherwords,DHSbothrequiresagenciestospeakinthespecificallypost-9/11languageofcounterterrorismandallowsthemtouseupto75percentoffundsfornon-terror-relatedactivities,suchasrespondingto“majordisasters”likehurricanes,orto“pre-operationalactivityandothercrimesthatareprecursorsorindicatorsofterroristactivity.”58DHSmadeover$1.1billionavailablethroughHSGPinfiscalyear2020.59

531033ProgramFAQs.54Review:FederalSupportforLocalLawEnforcementEquipmentAcquisition.55TheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency’sRequirementsforReportingHomelandSecurityGrantProgramAchievements.(2012).U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity:OfficeofInspectorGeneral.https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-92_Jun12.pdf;Review:FederalSupportforLocalLawEnforcementEquipmentAcquisition.56FiscalYear(FY)2019HomelandSecurityGrantProgram(HSGP)FrequentlyAskedQuestions(FAQs).U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity:FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA).RetrievedAugust15,2020,fromhttps://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1555008515875-3e335349f5d330de3f265af17c7e3409/FY19_HSGP_FAQ_FINAL_508.pdf57FEMAPreparednessGrantsManual.(2020,February).FEMAGrantProgramsDirectorate.https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/fema_preparedness-grants-manual.pdf58DHSAnnouncesFundingOpportunityforFiscalYear2020PreparednessGrants.(2020).DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/02/14/dhs-announces-funding-opportunity-fiscal-year-2020-preparedness-grants59HomelandSecurityGrant.FEMA.RetrievedAugust15,2020,fromhttps://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/homeland-security

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Federalprogramsaside,departmentsalsobuynewequipmentdirectlyfromprivatecompanies.60Manyof theseexpendituresareextremelydifficult to track.Electedofficialsoverseeing department budgets can allocate funding to purchase this equipment.Alternatively,departmentscanbuynewequipmentusingtheproceedsfromassetforfeiture,alesstransparentprocessthatallowslawenforcementtoseizeandprofitfromthecashandpropertyofpeopleconvictedorevenmerelysuspectedofacrime.Since9/11,policeacrossthecountryhaverampeduptheiruseofcivilassetforfeiture,whichallowsseizureswithoutsearchwarrantsorindictments.61WashingtonPostinvestigationsfoundthatstateandlocalpolicegainedover$1.7billionthroughfederalcivilassetforfeiturebetween9/11and2014;policeusedthatfundingtobuyarmoredvehicles,snipergear,andelectronicsurveillanceequipmentsuchascellphonetrackers.62Civilassetforfeitureisatoolsoripeforabusethattwoofitsarchitectscalledit“unreformable”:“havingfailedinbothpurposeandexecution,itshouldbeabolished.”63However,itremainsapowerfulandoftenmurkymeansbywhichpolice can obtain the kinds of equipment provided by the Departments of Defense orHomelandSecurity.

Surveillance&IntelligenceExpansions

Asinformation-sharingbetweenU.S.agenciesbecameamajordomesticpriorityinthe wake of the 9/11 attacks, local police took up a novel role in the counterterrorintelligenceinfrastructure:asthefirstlineofhomelanddefense,theon-the-groundexpertsequippedtospotnascentterrorthreats.LocallawenforcementbeganjoiningFBI-runJointTerrorism Task Forces and federally funded fusion centers, of which there are now 80,includingatleastoneineverystate.64Meanwhile,manylargerdepartmentsbeefeduptheirdesignated intelligence units. This process was epitomized by the New York PoliceDepartment’s Muslim surveillance program. Over more than a decade, this infamousprogramsecretlyspiedon,mapped,criminalized,andunderminedthefreedomandsafety

60Departmentsthatcanaffordtodosomaypreferpurchasingnewequipment,whetherwithassetforfeiturefunds,federalgrantmoney,orcitybudgetaryallocations,over1033Programequipmenttransfers—whichcanbedecadesold.PrivatecompanieslikeLenco,whichproducesarmoredvehiclessuchasBearCats,providefreegrant-writingassistancetopolicetoencouragepreciselythischoice;seeGrantHelp.LencoArmoredVehicles.RetrievedJune26,2020,fromhttps://www.lencoarmor.com/grant-help/61Underbothstateandfederalcivilassetforfeiture,lawenforcementcanseizeassetssuspectedofbeingusedtocommitcrimesorobtainedthroughcriminalmeans.Evenifthepropertyownerisneverconvictedoforevenindictedforacrime,thegovernmentcankeeptheirassetsunlesstheownercanprove,throughanonerousandexpensivelegalprocess,thattheirpropertywasacquiredlegally.62Sallah,M.,O’HarrowJr.,R.,Rich,S.,&Silverman,G.(2014).StopandSeize.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/?hpid=z3;O’HarrowJr.,R.,Rich,S.,&Tan,S.(2014).AssetSeizuresFuelPoliceSpending.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-spending/63Yoder,J.,&Cates,B.(2014).GovernmentSelf-InterestCorruptedaCrime-FightingToolIntoanEvil.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/abolish-the-civil-asset-forfeiture-program-we-helped-create/2014/09/18/72f089ac-3d02-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_story.html64FusionCenterLocationsandContactInformation.(2020,April16).U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information

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ofMuslim communities in the name of counterterrorism—apparentlywithout producingevenasinglelead.65

Surveillance technology too has flowed to local police. For instance, Bloombergreportedin2016thattheBaltimorePoliceDepartmenthadbeensecretlyworkingwithacompany called Persistent Surveillance Systems (PSS) to broadly surveil majority-BlackWestBaltimore,usingwide-anglecamerasmountedonasmallplane.66PSS’sfounderandpresidentoriginallydesignedthistechnologytoprovideaerialsurveillanceofFallujah,IraqforinvadingU.S.Marines.67ThesurveillanceplaneprogramreturnedtoBaltimorethisyearforacontroversialsix-monthtrialrun.68Somelocalpolicehavealsogainedaccesstofacialrecognitionsoftwareandmasscellphone-trackingtechnologylikeStingraydevices.69OthershaveworkedwithICEtotrackandidentifysuspecteddeportableimmigrants.70Duringtherecent George Floyd protests, local police departments alongside federal agencies likeCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)usedmilitary-developedtoolslikePredatordronestotrackandtargetactivists.71

Whilepolicesurveillanceofprotestersandracializedgroupsisnothingnew,thepost-9/11influxofintelligencefunding,organization,andtechnologydramaticallyintensifiedthesweep of police power.72 These systems also represent immense potential for futuresurveillance.Somestateshaveacknowledgedthisdangerandpreemptivelybannedtheuseoffacialrecognitiontechnologyinpolicebodycameras,whileAmazonandMicrosoft,under

65Shamas,D.,&Arastu,N.(2013).MappingMuslims:NYPDSpyinganditsImpactonAmericanMuslims.TheMuslimAmericanCivilLibertiesCoalition(MACLC),CreatingLawEnforcementAccountability&Responsibility(CLEAR),&TheAsianAmericanLegalDefenseandEducationFund(AALDEF).https://www.law.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/page-assets/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf;Goldman,A.,&Apuzzo,M.(2012).NYPDMuslimSpyingLedtoNoLeads,TerrorCases.TheAssociatedPress.https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypd-muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases66Reel,M.(2016).SecretCamerasRecordBaltimore’sEveryMoveFromAbove.BloombergBusinessweek.https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/67Mims,C.(2019).WhenBattlefieldSurveillanceComestoYourTown.TheWallStreetJournal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-battlefield-surveillance-comes-to-your-town-1156480539468Prudente,T.(2020,September11).SpyPlanesProvideModestHelptoBaltimoreCrimeFightOverThreeMonths,ResearchersFind.TheBaltimoreSun.https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-cr-spy-plane-study-20200911-wzd3nhyp6vg3blejk3rjz7dxza-story.html69StingrayTrackingDevices:Who’sGotThem?(2018,November).AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU).https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them70HowICEUsesLocalCriminalJusticeSystemstoFunnelPeopleIntotheDetentionandDeportationSystem.(2014).NationalImmigrationLawCenter.https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/localjusticeandice/;Rivlin-Nadler,M.(2019).HowICEUsesSocialMediatoSurveilandArrestImmigrants.TheIntercept.https://theintercept.com/2019/12/22/ice-social-media-surveillance/71Heilweil,R.(2020).MembersofCongressWanttoKnowMoreAboutLawEnforcement’sSurveillanceofProtesters.Vox.https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/29/21274828/drone-minneapolis-protests-predator-surveillance-police72Marcetic,B.(2016).TheFBI’sSecretWar.Jacobin.https://jacobinmag.com/2016/08/fbi-cointelpro-new-left-panthers-muslim-surveillance

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pressureduringtherecentuprisings,haveannouncedmoratoriumsonpoliceuseoftheirfacialrecognitionsoftware.73

VeteranHiringintoPoliceDepartments

Personnelfrompost-9/11warshavealsoflowedtopolicedepartments,particularlyunderPresidentObama.Today,whilenopublicdatabase collectsnationaldataonpoliceveteranstatus,analysessuggestthatbetween19percentand28percentofpoliceofficershave current or prior military service, compared to about 7 percent of the generalpopulation.74

Figure5.VeteransinPoliceDepartmentsVersusintheGeneralPopulation

In 2012, the Department of Justice provided over $100million to hire post-9/11veterans into law enforcement positions as part of an effort to address these veterans’unemployment rate, then at 12 percent.75 State-level veterans’ preference laws also

73Metz,R.(2019).CaliforniaLawmakersBanFacial-RecognitionSoftwarefromPoliceBodyCams.CNNBusiness.https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/tech/california-body-cam-facial-recognition-ban/index.html;Heilweil,R.(2020).BigTechCompaniesBackAwayfromSellingFacialRecognitiontoPolice.That’sProgress.Vox.https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/10/21287194/amazon-microsoft-ibm-facial-recognition-moratorium-police74TheMarshallProjectestimatesthat19percentofallpoliceofficersareveterans,whilePewResearchCenterestimatesthatthisnumberis28percent.SeeWeichselbaum,S.,&Schwartzapfel,B.(2017).WhenWarriorsPutontheBadge.TheMarshallProject.https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/30/when-warriors-put-on-the-badge;Morin,R.,&Mercer,A.(2017).ACloserLookatPoliceOfficersWhoHaveFiredTheirWeapononDuty.PewResearchCenter.https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/08/a-closer-look-at-police-officers-who-have-fired-their-weapon-on-duty/;ForthepercentageofveteransintheU.S.population,seeCensusBureauReleasesNewReportonVeterans.(2020,June2).UnitedStatesCensusBureau.https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020/veterans-report.html75TheDepartmentofJusticespecifiedthatallnewlawenforcementpositionsfundedthroughits2012grantsmustbefilledbyveteranswhohadservedatleast6monthssince9/11.Fortheannouncementoffundstohirerecentveteransintolawenforcementpositions:WhiteHouse,JusticeDepartmentAnnounceLawEnforcementGrantsforHiringofVeterans.(2012).U.S.DepartmentofJustice:OfficeofPublicAffairs.

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encourage civil service agencies like police departments to give hiring advantages toveterans.AstheMarshallProjectdocuments,thesepreferencescanobstructeffortstohirepeopleofcolorand/orwomen:91percentoftheveteranpopulationismalecomparedto48.5percentofthegeneralpopulation,and77percentisnon-Latinxwhiteversus63percentofthegeneralpopulation.76

Therecent legacyofveterans inpolicing isacomplexone.Somedatasuggest thatveterans, trained in rules of engagement that teach them towait for overthostile intentratherthanuse-of-forcepoliciesthatallowformuchgreaterlegaldiscretion,arelesslikelyto needlessly shoot civilians in fear.77 In this framework, the military imposes harsherliabilityformisdeeds(althoughonemightrecallAbuGhraibandotherlargelyunpunishedU.S.militaryatrocities)andmandatesmoreextensivede-escalationtrainingthandopolicedepartments.78Ontheotherhand,otherdataindicateveteran-officersaremorelikelythannon-veteranstohavefiredtheirserviceweaponsatleastonceintheircareers,79andthattheyreceivemorecomplaintsfromcivilians.80Onerecentstudyofasinglepolicedepartmentfound that even after controlling for deployment status, length of military service, anddemographicvariables,veteran-officersweremorelikelythannon-veteranstohaveshotacivilianwhileinpoliceuniform.81

Law enforcement leaders have long recognized the ambiguous place of veterans,particularlycombatveterans,inpolicing.Ontheonehand,accordingtoa2009studybytheInternational Association of Chiefsof Police, police departments value veterans for theirtechnicalandfirearmsskills,physicalfitness,discipline,andtacticaltraining.Ontheother,thestudyfoundthatveterans’mentalhealthstrugglescan“createalowtoleranceforcitizencomplaints.”Itrecommendedagenciestrainveteransin“differentiatingbetweenhostilewarzones and local community environments, and [retrain them in] the use-of-force https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/white-house-justice-department-announce-law-enforcement-grants-hiring-veterans;Fortheveterans’unemploymentrate:BuildingJobOpportunitiesforReturningVeterans.(2013).U.S.Congress:JointEconomicCommitteeDemocraticStaff.https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/368731bc-cc81-48ea-915d-abd605064b51/building-job-opportunities-for-returning-veterans---final.pdf76Weichselbaum&Schwartzapfel,WhenWarriorsPutontheBadge.;VeteranStatus.(2018).UnitedStatesCensusBureau.https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=S2101&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S210177Lawrence,Q.,&Kaste,M.(2016).Military-TrainedPoliceMayBeLessHastyToShoot,ButThatGotThisVetFired.NPR.https://www.npr.org/2016/12/08/504718239/military-trained-police-may-be-slower-to-shoot-but-that-got-this-vet-fired78Hersh,S.M.(2004).TortureatAbuGhraib.TheNewYorker.https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib;Boal,M.(2011).TheKillTeam:HowU.S.SoldiersinAfghanistanMurderedInnocentCivilians.RollingStone.https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-kill-team-how-u-s-soldiers-in-afghanistan-murdered-innocent-civilians-169793/;Tecott,R.,&Plana,S.(2016)MaybeU.S.PoliceAren’tMilitarizedEnough.Here’sWhatPoliceCanLearnfromSoldiers.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/16/maybe-u-s-police-arent-militarized-enough-soldiers-are-better-trained-to-deescalate/79Morin&Mercer.80Weichselbaum&Schwartzapfel.81ReingleGonzalez,J.M.,Bishopp,S.A.,Jetelina,K.K.,Paddock,E.,Gabriel,K.P.,&Cannell,M.B.(2018).DoesMilitaryVeteranStatusandDeploymentHistoryImpactOfficerInvolvedShootings?ACase–controlStudy.JournalofPublicHealth,41(3),e245–e252.https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdy151

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techniques.”82 Notably, Derek Chauvin, the former Minnesota police officer charged inGeorgeFloyd’sdeath,servedforeightyearsasamilitarypolicemanintheArmyReserve.83

TheCostsofIntensifiedPoliceMilitarization

Economic. Militarization is expensive. Most notably, grant programs that funnelgovernmentmoneythroughpolicedepartmentstoprivatecompaniesthatsellmilitary-styleequipmenthavecost,atminimum,tensofbillionsoftaxpayerdollarssince9/11.84Outcomesaremurky,evenintermsoftheprograms’owngoals.Forinstance,DHS’sOfficeofInspectorGeneralnotedin2012thattheHomelandSecurityGrantProgramhadnosystemtoassessfunding effectiveness, did not know the amount of funding required to “achieve neededpreparedness and response capabilities,” and did not require states to report theirprogress.85Evenforprogramslikethe1033Programthatpurporttosavetaxpayermoney,localpolicesometimespaytomaintainandstoremilitaryequipmentthatisrarelyorneverused for its declared purpose. All levelsof government also spenduncountable sumsonpolicecounterterrortrainingsandsurveillancetechnologies.86

Furthermore,astheCostsofWarprojecthasshownwithmilitaryspending,thepriceofpolicemilitarizationentailsmassiveopportunitycosts.87Investmentsindrones,armoredvehicles, and surveillance systems are dollars denied to education, infrastructure, andrenewable energy. Militarization sits alongside other elements of current massivegovernmentoperations—includingprisons, themilitary, immigrationenforcement, etc.—thatinvolvespendingonpunishment,racializedcontrol,andprofitforprivatecompanies.

Erosion of police legitimacy.What is obtained for the public in exchange for theseexpensesandopportunitycosts?Militarizationcertainlycurrieslittlepublicfavor.88Visibly 82EmploymentReturningCombatVeteransasLawEnforcementOfficers.(2009,September).InternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice,BureauofJusticeAssistance,&KleinAssociates.https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/IACPEmployingReturningVets.pdf83Thayer,R.L.(2020).Ex-MinneapolisCopChargedinGeorgeFloyd’sDeathServedEightYearsinArmyReserve.StarsandStripes.https://www.stripes.com/news/us/ex-minneapolis-cop-charged-in-george-floyd-s-death-served-eight-years-in-army-reserve-1.63245684Ackerman,S.(2014).USPoliceGivenBillionsfromHomelandSecurityfor‘Tactical’Equipment.TheGuardian.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/20/police-billions-homeland-security-military-equipment;Parlapiano,A.(2014).TheFlowofMoneyandEquipmenttoLocalPolice.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/23/us/flow-of-money-and-equipment-to-local-police.html85TheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency’sRequirementsforReportingHomelandSecurityGrantProgramAchievements.(2012,June).DepartmentofHomelandSecurityOfficeofInspectorGeneral.https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-92_Jun12.pdf86Thesheerdistributionofhomelandsecurityspendingacrossfederalagencies,stateandlocalgovernments,andprivatecompaniesmakescounterterrorspendingparticularlydifficulttotrack.87SeeforinstanceGarrett-Peltier,H.(2017).JobOpportunityCostofWar.CostsofWaratBrownUniversity.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/Job%20Opportunity%20Cost%20of%20War%20-%20HGP%20-%20FINAL.pdf88Lieblich,E.,&Shinar,A.(2018).TheCaseAgainstPoliceMilitarization.MichiganJournalofRaceandLaw,23(1&2).https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol23/iss1/4;Mummolo,J.(2018).MilitarizationFailstoEnhancePoliceSafetyorReduceCrimebutMayHarmPoliceReputation.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,115(37),9181–9186.https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805161115

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militaristic tactics and imagery breed fear and mistrust, particularly among poor andhyperpolicedcommunitiesofcolor.Thiscanerodepolicelegitimacy—aproblemforthosewhosupportthebroadgoalsofpolicing.Theracializedaggressioninherentinmilitarizationcanobstructcrime-solvingbyrenderingcivilianslesslikelytocooperatewithinvestigators,andcanunderminecommunitypolicingeffortsbymakingpeoplelesslikelytotrusttheirlocalpoliceofficers.

Increasedpoliceviolenceandracializedcontrol.Militaryequipmentmayencouragepolice aggression and violence. One study found that even when controlling for civiliandemographics,violentcrimerates,andratesofdruguse,1033Programtransferscorrelatedwith increased police killings of civilians.89 Police aggression must also be understoodrelativetohowitisused.Policeoftenjustifyintimidating“controlledequipment”—thekindthat attracts accusations of militarization—on the basis of preparedness for threat,particularlyterrorism.Inpractice,itismoreoftenusedintheroutinecounter-drugworkofSWATandnarcoticsteamsand,aswehaveseenrecently,forprotestpolicing.

A CNN analysis in the wake of the George Floyd uprisings found that the 1033Programhastransferredover$5.3millionworthofpotentiallyprotest-relatedgear,suchasriotshields,tolawenforcementnationwidesinceAugust2017.90Whilepoliceclaimtheiruseofsuchgear,alongwitharmoredvehicles,isasimplematterofofficersafety,protestersoftenciteitasintimidating,frightening,andescalatory.Whileitisimpossibletoquantifyagainstwhommilitaryequipmentisused,itisquiteclearfrompoliceresponsestoprotestsrangingfromWattsin1965toStandingRock,Ferguson,andBaltimorein2014-2017:mine-resistantvehicles, tear gas, and heavy weapons are consistently rolled out against Black- andIndigenous-ledmovements, while theywere nowhere to be found at themajority-whiteWomen’sMarch.91Thisisnoaccidentbutadirectoutgrowthofhowprotestpolicinghasalwaysoperated.

ControlledequipmentalsoflowstoSWATteams,whichusebodyarmorandarmoredpersonnelcarriersforprotectionandintimidation,primarilywhileservingsearchwarrantsfordruginvestigations.Thepost-9/11floodofresourcestoparamilitaryunitshasworkedintandemwiththebroaderexpansionofSWATbegunduringtheWaronDrugs.Thenumberof search warrant raids, particularly for drugs, has dramatically escalated across thecountry.92(A2014ACLUreportfoundthat79percentofSWATdeploymentsinthereport’s

89Delehanty,C.,Mewhirter,J.,Welch,R.,&Wilks,J.(2017).MilitarizationandPoliceViolence:TheCaseofthe1033Program.ResearchandPolitics,4(2).https://doi.org/10.1177/205316801771288590Tolan,C.,&Hernandez,S.(2020).AsDemandforPoliceReformGrows,MilitaryEquipmentProgramFacesNewScrutiny.CNN.https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/politics/protests-police-reform-military-supplies-invs/index.html91Taylor,A.(2016).WaterCannonsUsedAgainstDakotaPipelineProtesters.TheAtlantic.https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/11/water-cannons-and-tear-gas-used-against-dakota-access-pipeline-protesters/508370/;Ramanathan,L.(2017).WastheWomen’sMarchJustAnotherDisplayofWhitePrivilege?SomeThinkSo.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/was-the-womens-march-just-another-display-of-white-privilege-some-think-so/2017/01/24/00bbdcca-e1a0-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html92Kraska,“MilitarizationandPolicing—ItsRelevanceto21stCenturyPolice”;Norwood,C.(2020).TheWaronDrugsGaveRiseto‘No-Knock’Warrants.BreonnaTaylor’sDeathCouldEndThem.PBSNewsHour.

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samplewereforwarrants,usuallyfordruginvestigations.)93Heretoopeopleofcolorsuffermost:theACLUfoundthat42percentofthoseaffectedbyaSWATsearchwarrantwereBlackand12percentwereLatinx.Moreover,policeweremorelikelytouseparamilitarytacticstoexecute a searchwarrant against groups composed exclusivelyof people of color versuswhitepeople(84percentversus65percent).Asmanyhavealsodocumented, theriseofSWAT teams—with their battering rams, explosives, and no-knock raids—represents aparticulardangertobothciviliansandofficersinacountrywhere4in10Americansliveinahomewithagun.94

Around9,000U.S.lawenforcementagenciesnowhaveSWATteams.95Nationwide,theseteamsdeployapproximately60,000timesperyear,ornearly165timesperday—anumberthatdoesnotincluderaidsconductedseparatelybynarcoticsunits,federalagencies,orordinarypolice.96Accordingtoonerecentstudy,thisSWATexplosionhasneitherloweredcrimeratesnorpromotedofficersafety.97Ithas,however,producedaseriesofdisastrousanddeadlybotchedraids,suchaswhenaGeorgiasheriff’sofficeconductedano-knockSWATraid,detonatingaflash-banggrenadeintheplaypenof19-month-oldBounkham(BouBou)Phonesavanh.BouBou,whowasseverelyburned,wasplacedintoamedicallyinducedcomaandhassinceundergoneaseriesofover25surgeriesthatcosthisuninsuredparentsover$1million.98

At a deeper level, SWAT raids and militaristic protest policing intensify statesurveillanceandcontrolofracializedcommunities,whiledivertingattentionandresourcesfrom themorebroadly impactfulwhite-collar crime.Black,Brown, Indigenous, andpoorpeoplehavehistoricallyfaceddowntheteargasandarmoredvehiclesofAmericanpolice,both on the streets and in their homes. This structural reality endures today,making it https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/the-war-on-drugs-gave-rise-to-no-knock-warrants-breonna-taylors-death-could-end-them93WarComesHome.94SeeMichaels,S.(2020).BreonnaTaylorIsOneofaShockingNumberofBlackPeopletoSeeArmedPoliceBargeIntoTheirHomes.MotherJones.https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/05/breonna-taylor-is-one-of-a-shocking-number-of-black-people-to-see-armed-police-barge-into-their-homes/;Dolan,B.(2019).ToKnockorNottoKnock?No-KnockWarrantsandConfrontationalPolicing.St.John’sLawReview,93(1).https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7117&context=lawreview;Sack,K.(2017).Door-BustingDrugRaidsLeaveaTrailofBlood.TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entry-warrant-drug-raid.html;FordataonAmericangunowners,see:Gramlich,J.,&Schaeffer,K.(2019).7FactsAboutGunsintheU.S.PewResearchCenter.https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/22/facts-about-guns-in-united-states/95Mummolo.96MacDonnell,T.C.(2016).WhenMoreisLess—SWATandProceduralJustice.WashingtonandLeeJournalofCivilRightsandSocialJustice,23(1).https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1428&context=crsj97Mummolo.98Sullum,J.(2015).WhenDrugWarriorsBurnaBaby,Who’stoBlame?Forbes.https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2015/07/23/when-drug-warriors-burn-a-baby-whos-to-blame/#6a0ca11f1ea4;Pransky,N.(2020,July6).Cops’LoveforSWATMayBePuttingYourCommunityinDanger.NBCLX.https://www.lx.com/community/cops-love-for-swat-may-be-putting-your-community-in-danger/15029/.In2016,afederaljudgeawardedBouBou’sparents$3.6millioninsettlementpayments;seePenny,A.(2016).Parentsof“BabyBouBou”Awarded$3.6Million.Fox5Atlanta.https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/parents-of-baby-bou-bou-awarded-3-6-million

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impossible toseparatemilitarization fromracismandwhitesupremacy.Militarized forcepresumesan intense, evenexistential, threat, thusreinforcing the idea thathyperpolicedcommunitiesofcolorareinternalenemies.99Inthepost-9/11world,wherepolicehavemoreresourcesattheirdisposalthanever,theiruseofsuchresourcestoenforceracialcontrolhasbeennormalized.

Obstructingcriticalanalysis.Finally,thesheerspectacleinvolvedinpublicdisplaysofpolice militarization serves another function: it narrows the terms with which we canunderstandourcurrentsituation.Forone,manywidelycirculatingcritiquesofmilitarizationrelyonanunspokenagreementthatsomepoliceviolenceisacceptable:“Theproblemwithcastingmilitarizationastheproblemisthattheformulationsuggestsitistheexcessagainstwhichwemust rally.Wemust accept that the ordinary is fair, for an extreme to be theproblem.”100 The seeming extremity of “tanks” on American streets galvanizes publicoutrage,whilemakingitseemasifratchetingbackracializedpoliceviolenceisprimarilyaquestionoflimitinghowmanyarmoredpersonnelcarriersdepartmentscanobtain.Intruth,the history of police militarization reveals that such violence runs much deeper thanequipmenttransfers.

The sheer spectacle ofmilitarization can further narrow the terms of analysis byimplicitly legitimizingU.S.military interventions. One gesture progressive commentatorsoftenmakeduring“militarized”policingofU.S.protestsistomarktheirvisualsimilaritytoageneric“ThirdWorld”country,aswesawinFerguson.This,theyargue,shouldnothappenathome,implyingthatstaterepressionandU.S.militaryviolenceelsewherearesimplytobeexpected.Theseanalysesservetonaturalizethedestructionofnon-AmericantargetsoftheU.S. military—from Afghanistan and Iraq to Yemen and Somalia—and to obscure theconnectionsbetween racist stateviolence in theU.S. andabroad.AsCésaire said, tactics,equipment,andexpertisedevelopedduringcolonialinterventionsreboundbackontothatempire’sowncitizens.Inthiscase,thepost-9/11expansionoftheU.S.counterterrorstatehasintensifiedthemilitarizationofapoliceforcefoundedin,andinextricablefrom,whitesupremacyandtheviolenceofastateatpermanentwaroverseas.

99Lieblich&Shinar.100Nopper&Kaba.