The World Banlk filedocument of the world banlk for ofmlcial use only report no. 14600 implementation completion report madagascar ports rehabilitation project (credit 1752-mag)

Document of

The World Banlk

FOR OFMlCIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 14600

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

MADAGASCAR

PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT(CREDIT 1752-MAG)

JUNE 12, 1995

Infrastructure DivisionCentral Africa and Indian Ocean DepartmentAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency unit = FMG (Malagasy franc)

Year Malagasy Franc US $ 1.00equivalenti

1986 676.3

1987 1,069.2

1988 1,407.1

1989 1,603.4

1990 1,494.1

1991 1,835.4

1992 1,866.4

1993 1,913.8

1994 (Average for first six months) 2,841.4

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER

January I - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CFD - Caisse Francaise de Developpement (Caisse Centrale de Cooperation

Economique in the Staff Appraisal Report)

CMN - Compagnie Malgache de Navigation

DTM - Direction des Transports Maritimes (Directorate of Maritime Transport)

ENEM - Ecole Nationale d'Enseignement Maritime

ERR - Economic Rate of ReturnFAC - Fonds d'Aide et de CooperationKfW - ICreditanstalt fur WiedranfbauMTM - Ministere des Transports et de la Meteorologie (Ministry of Transport

and Meteorology)MTP - Ministere des Travaux Publics (Ministry of public works)

PPF - Project Preparation FacilitySAR - Staff Appraisal ReportSEPT - Societe d'Exploitation du Port de Toamasina (Toamasina Port Authority)

SNMTM - The Societe Nationale Malgache des Transports Maritimes

SVM - Service des Voies Maritimes (Seaway Department)

'Annual average

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Contents

Preface. ................................................ iEvaluation Summary ................................................. ii

Part I: Performance Assessment .......................................... 1......

Project Identity ............................................... IBackground ............................................... . 1A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives ............................................... 2B. Achievement of objectives ................................................ 3

1. Rehabilitation/Provision of Infrastructure and Equipment ............................ ................. 32. Institutional Development ............................................ 33. Shipping Services ............................................. 34. Economic Re-evaluation ............................................ 45. Financial Re-evaluation ............................................ 6

C. Implementation and Major Factors Affecting the Project ............................................ 8

1. Major Factors Affecting the Project ..................................................

2. Project Implementation ............................................ 8

a. Rehabilitation/Provision of Infrastructure and Equipment ......................................... 8b. Shipping Services ......................................... 9c. Additional Components ......................................... 9d. Disbursement and Project costs ......................................... 9

D. Project Sustainability ............................................... ................ ..... 10E. Bank Performance ............................................... 10F. Borrower Performance ............................................... 11G. Assessment of Outcome ............................................... 11H. Future Operation ............................................... 1............................ ..... 121. Key Lessons Learned ................................................ 13

Part IH: Borrower's Contribution .................................. 14

Part III: Statistical Information. ................................. 22

Table 1: Summary of Assessments .................................. 22Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits .................................. 23Table 3: Project Timetable .................................. 23Table 4: Credit Disbursement: Cumulative and Actual................. ................. 24Chart 1: Cumulative Estimate and Actual Disbursement .................................. 25Table 5: Project Implementation .................................. 25Table 6 and Chart 2: Key Indicators for Project Operations .... ........................... 26

This docunent has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their|official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Table 7: Studies Included in the Project ............................ 31Table 8A: Project Costs ............................ 32Table 8B: Project Financing ............................ 32Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits ............................ 33Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants ............................ 35Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ............................ 35Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions ............................ 36

Appendices

A. Mission's Aide MemoireB. AnnexesC. IBRDMapNo. 19595R1

i


MADAGASCAR

PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECTCREDIT 1752-MAG

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Ports RehabilitationProject in Madagascar, for which Credit 1752-MAG in the amount of SDR 13.2 million (US$16 million equivalent) was approved on February 19, 1987 and made effective on September17, 1987.

The credit was closed on December 31, 1994 compared with the original closing dateof September 30, 1992. Final disbursement took place on March 31, 1995, at which time abalance of SDR 2.390 million (US$ 3.766 equivalent) was canceled. Cofinancing for theproject was provided by CFD, KfW, FAC and local sources. The ICR was prepared by KaisBen Hamida, TWUTD and Ahmed Lamrini, Consultant; and reviewed by Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard, Chief, AF3IN and P. Hari Prassad, Operations Adviser, AF3DR The Borrowerprovided comments that are included in Part II of the ICR. Preparation of this ICR was begunduring the Bank's completion mission in January 1995. It is based on material in the projectfile.

ii


MADAGASCAR


EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The Bank's association with the transport sector in Madagascar has been quiteextensive with 11 transportation projects to date, of which seven have been in roads and threein railways. Despite the importance of maritime transport in Madagascar, this project was onlythe first to address the needs of most of the country's ports (the major port of Toamasina wasthe only one to be covered by an earlier project).

2. In 1982, the French "Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration" (FAC) financed a study on portsand shipping, which made a proposal for a reorganization in the port subsector and led to thePorts Rehabilitation Project.

Project Objectives

3. The project objectives were:

(a) rehabilitation of ports' physical infrastructure, and rehabilitation or provision ofnew equipment, to reduce transport costs to users of shipping services;

(b) development of institutional capacity to manage, operate and maintain, at areasonable level of efficiency, the ports subsector and its restored assets; and

(c) elimination of delays and safety hazards to navigation.

4. Financial covenants were agreed at appraisal to help achieve the institutionaldevelopment objective, especially with respect to financial management (see Table 10 of Partm). The covenants aimed to ensure the recovery of operating costs, the submission of auditedreports and the annual review of tariffs.

5. Although the project objectives were both clearly spelt out and important for thetransport sector, they were ambitious, particularly in relation to the relatively modestinvestment provided for their achievement.

Implementation Experience and Results

6. The project achieved many of its objectives. It prevented degradation of the Malagasyports subsector. Rehabilitation works and equipment endowed DTM ports (run by Directorateof Maritime Transport, i.e., all ports except Toamnasina) with the necessary means to performtheir activities, while enabling SEPT (the port authority for Toamasina) to support strong levels

iii

of activity. The objective of reducing costs was partially met in DTM ports and in Toamasina.Institutional reforms and technical assistance enhanced the efficiency of management inToamasina and have created a good base for future operations in DTM ports. The objective ofeliminating delays and safety hazards was generally met.

7. The project's recalculated ERR (reflecting actual data through 1994 and revisedprojections) is 27% (29% in the SAR). Overall performance to date has been satisfactory, butthe recalculated ERR for some ports is below expectations, due essentially to overestimation oftraffic volumes (see para. 16).

8. The steady and important devaluation of the Malagasy Franc enabled SEPT to achievehighly satisfactory financial performance and meet all its financial objectives; this was duemainly to its tariffs being indexed to the ECU since 1992 (see para. 27). The devaluation hadan opposite effect on DTM ports because their tariffs were indexed to the local currency.Overall financial objectives for DTM ports --including recovery of operating costs-- were notachieved. The ports' financial management improved substantially, however, as reflected inthe set up of a new commercial accounting system, the inclusion of depreciation in financialstatements and the annual submission of audited reports (see para. 33).

9. Actual project costs amounted to US$ 27.4 million compared to US$ 34.8 million atappraisal. The difference between actual and foreseen costs is explained largely by the higharnounts allocated to contingencies in the SAR (see para. 45). The project was financed byIDA, CFD, KfW, FAC and local sources; about 18% of the credit and 13% of other donorfinancing was canceled in early 1995, reflecting persistent delays that extended projectimplementation beyond ten years of its identification (see para. 44). Although infrastructureworks and cargo handling equipment were implemented in time, many delays were recorded,mainly in the project's dredging and navigation aids components.

10. The key factors that affected the achievement of project objectives were:

(a) the project's complex design involving a large number of ports (see para. 7);(b) overestimation of traffic volume (see para. 16);(c) the steady devaluation of the Malagasy Franc (see para. 27, 44 and 54);(d) political events creating gaps in decision making (see para. 44);(e) damnage caused by cyclones to port infrastructure (see para. 43);(f) cumbersome administrative procedures for contract signing (see para. 53);(g) unavailability of the Malagasy financing contribution at the contracted times

(see para. 36);(h) lack of competencies, mainly of DTM staff (see para. 53); and(i) the inadequacy of preliminary studies for the dredging component (see para. 11

and 40);.

11. Overall Bank performance was satisfactory. However the objectives at appraisal wereambitious and very demanding for the Borrower. The frequency of supervision missionsexceeded the pace of the project's progress. Also worth noting is the virtual absence ofaccounting for project accounts (see para. 50). Borrower performance was satisfactory for the

iv

port of Toamasina but deficient for DTM ports, whose management capability was not strongenough to adequately implement the project.

12. Despite numerous hurdles, the project overall outcome is satisfactory.

Summary of Findings, Future Operation and Key Lessons Learned.

13. The project saved the ports subsector from important degradation. To further upgradethe condition of Malagasy ports, a reform agenda should be pursued through sector adjustmentand lending. Future efforts should: (a) emphasize the importance of maintenance works, toensure that investment lasts; (b) reorganize the ports sector by developing in the three mainregional ports autonomous entities and involving private sector participation in Toamasina; (c)study and implement a tariff system indexed on a stable currency especially for DTM ports,and examine the scope for harmonizing SEPT's tariffs with those of other ports in the Indianocean; (d) ensure the implementation of an efficient cost recovery system to finance ongoingmaintenance and renewal of equipment as required; and (e) simplify administrafive andcustoms procedures, especially for coastal shipping. In addition, the Bank should invest IDAresources in infrastructure rather than equipment (see para. 56).

14. The most important lessons learned from this project suggest future efforts should seekto: (a) ensure the capacity of the implementing agencies for new operations as well as theavailability of local funds; (b) design projects that are well focused and limited in their scope;(c) contract maintenance works to private operators rather than by force account; (d) set up aneffective system for managing the information necessary for supervision and implementationcompletion reporting; and (e) set up a sound accounting system, choose an accountingsoftware, both acceptable to the Bank, and accept auditing process for project accounts as acondition of effectiveness.


MADAGASCAR


PART I: PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Project Identity

Name: Ports Rehabilitation ProjectCredit number: 1752-MAGRVP unit: AfricaDepartment: Central Africa and Indian Ocean DepartmentCountry: MadagascarSector: Transportation

Background

1. Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world with about 12 million inhabitantsunevenly distributed across an area of about 590,000 sq.lan. The central highlands and the eastcoast are the most populated. The topography is generally rugged and a central mountainrange traverses the country from north to south. The climate is mainly marne-tropical, withcyclones and heavy rainfall particularly frequent on the east coast Exports are largelyagricultural; coffee, cloves, vanilla and shrimp are the most important. Some minerals are alsoexported, including graphite, chromite and mica.

2. Transport Sector. The country's transport sector accounted for about 14% of GDPand about 26% of total government expenditures in 19891. Weak road and railway networkshave given rise to dense domestic air and coastal transport networks consisting of 17 airportsand 16 ports. Extemal transport needs are met largely by maritime transport for freight and airservices for people.

3. Port Subsector. The most important ports are Toamasina (the main international port),Mahajanga, Antsiranana and Toliara. These four ports handle about 90° of the countly's totltraffic; Toamasina accounts for nearly three-fourths of that share. The remaining 10%/0 of trafficis handled by all other ports2 catering exclusively to coastal shipping vessels. The CompagnieMalgache de Navigation (CMN) handles coastal shipping. Several private operators operatesmall vessels along the coast and to nearby islands. All ports are managed by the Ministry ofTransport and Meteorology (MITM) through the Directorate of Maritime Transport (DTM),

' Last transport sector review was in May 1991.2Mananjary, Morondava, Nosy Be, Vohemar, Manakra, Saint Louis, Antalaba, Maintirano,Maroantsetra, Antsohihy, Morombe and Tolagnaro.

2

except the port of Toamasina which is managed by an independent Toamasina Port Authority(SEPT) under the supervision of MTM.

4. Origin of the Project. This project was the outcome of a study on ports and shipping,financed by the French "Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation" (FAC) in 1982, which proposed areorganization in the port subsector.

A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives

5. Project Objectives. The main objectives of the project were: (a) to rehabilitate thephysical infrastructure, and rehabilitate or provide new equipment, in 10 of the country's 16several ports, in order to reduce transport costs to users of shipping services; (b) to develop theinstitutional capacity to manage, operate and maintain, at a reasonable level of efficiency, theports subsector and its restored assets; and (c) to eliminate delays and safety hazards innavigation.

6. Project Descnption. To help achieve the objectives, the project provided financialassistance to the ports of Toamasina, Manakara, Tolagnaro, Toliara, Vohemar, Morondava,Mahajanga, Nosy Be, Antsiranana, and Port Saint Louis, as summarized below (see Table 8Afor details):

(a) Port rehabilitation and modernization (US$ 7.7 million): repair andrehabilitation of existing infrastructure (quays, slipways, yards, building,utilities);

(b) Cargo handling improvements (US$ 9.3 million): procurement of new cargohandling equipment, floating crafts, spare parts and materials;

(c) Institutional development (US$ 4.6 million):

(i) Technical support to MTM and SEPT, to strengthen technical skills,improve management, cargo handling operations, maintenance,navigation aids and dredging; and

(ii) Training for MIM and SEPT staff, including scholarships and trainingmaterials; and

(d) Shipping services (US$ 4.5 million):

(i) Dredging at Manakara, Tolagnaro, Toliara and Mahajanga;(ii) Navigation aids and hydrographic equipment including new buoys,

solar power lights, lighthouse repair and telephone communicationsystem; and

(iii) Spare parts for the international and coastal shipping fleet.

7. Evaluation of Project Objectives. Although clearly spelt out and important for thetransport sector, project objectives were ambitious, particularly in relation to the relativelymodest investment provided for their achievement. Moreover, the scattering of project

3

components throughout the country, covering the most important ports, weakened the project'soverall impact. Funding from four financiers and implementation by two agencies also madethe project complex and very demanding for the Borrower. Together, these factors made theproject's evaluation difficult and increased the risk of only partial achievement of objectives.

B. Achievement of Objectives

1. Rehabilitation/Provision of Infrastructure and Equipment

8. Infrastructure. The objective of infrastructure rehabilitation was partially met.Planned works were to protect the port infrastructure from suffering further damage whilemaintenance and significant repair work was to enable infrastructure to last longer; these weregenerally achieved. However, even though appraised in 1986, the operation was not realizeduntil 1990, resulting in continued degradation until that time. In addition, some techniquesused in rehabilitating platforms and quays turned out to be unsuitable for port activities.

9. Equipment. Rehabilitation and provision of handling tools, which had been eitherlacking or in a very advanced state of dilapidation, improved the ports' ability to perform athigher levels. However, the low level of traffic due to the currently weak economic situationprevented DTM ports from taking full advantage of these capacities. The KfW post-evaluation(which concerns only DTM ports) concluded that a large part of the equipment purchasedunder the project is at present in bad shape. Primarily to blame is the lack of maintenance;future projects should emphasize the importance of this component. It would also be wiser toprovide the country with less sophisticated equipment that would be easier to maintain. InToamasina, improvement in productivity was achieved. The Caisse Fran,aise deD6veloppement (CFD) noted that the equipment supplied under the project enabled this port tohandle cargo more efficiently.

2. Institutional Development

10. The Training and Technical Assistance component achieved its goals. Trainingprovided at home, as well as abroad, was highly beneficial to the SEPT and DTM staff.However, the program would have realized greater benefits if similar training had beenextended to other port operators (maritime shippers, custom officers, private operators), asplanned in the SAR.

3. Shipping Services

11. Dredging. The unforeseen events and risks faced at different worksites attest to theconsiderable inadequacy of prelininary studies. Barely 50 percent of the dredging objectiveswere realized. This includes, because of non responsive bidding process on dredging worksand technical difficulties in the concerned ports not identified at the time of appraisal, repair ofthree dredgers. However, these dredgers might break down again because of the spare parts'failure.

4

12. Navigation aids. Project activities have enabled access to ports by night, improvementof ship safety and a considerable cut in standstill time. However, many maintenance problemsremain to be addressed. The absence of spare parts, the low technical skills of port workers inrelation to those needed and an insufficiency maintenance budget were the main constraints toachieving the project's stated objectives. The new access ramp to Morondava port was notuseful, since the ligtherage companies were not supplied with the required lighters (with rampsat the front).

4. Economic Re-evaluation

13. Recall of Project Objectives. For purposes of economic analysis, the basic objectivesof the project were to reduce the cost of shipping primary commodities and to facilitate exportsthrough improvements in cargo handling. The project was also intended to improve shiputilization through more efficient use of equipment, and improve safety by reducing the numberof accidents due to lack of lighthouses.

14. Main Benefits. The main quantifiable benefits realized were: (a) decrease in shipwaiting time attained through dredging and improvement in productivity of cargo handling(major benefit); and (b) increase in night traffic.

15. Costs. As in the SAR, economic cost calculations were based on financial costsexcluding taxes and duties. Unlike the SAR, the present analysis reflects costs in US $ termsbecause of the important and steady devaluation of the Malagasy Franc. All project costs havebeen included in the analysis, except training costs and the indirect cost of technical assistance,which can not be allocated to each port. So calculated, total costs in the analysis amounted toabout 74% of total actual project costs (63% in the SAR).

16. Traffic Forecast. The analysis of benefits was based on traffic forecasts for the mainports. Although those forecasts assumed a low rate of economic growth, the total traffic ofDTM ports3 , foreseen at appraisal, was overestimated. The moderate traffic increasesexpected for the four major ports: Antsiranana, Mahajanga, Toamasina and Toliara, whichrepresent the large majority of the national traffic, were underestimated at the time of appraisalas reflected in the SAR forecast, although growth in Mahajanga's traffic was belowexpectations. In Nosy Be and Port Saint Louis, slight increases in traffic outperformedforecasts for a traffic decline. An estimated increase in traffic at Manakara proved optimistic:the port recorded a marked decrease in traffic volume due to irregular use by navigationcompanies and the use by potential customers of the paved road. Tables 6B and 6C of Part mcontain additional information on actual and estimated traffic.

17. Economic Rate of Return (ERR). The project's ERR has been recalculated to reflectactual data available through 1994 and revised projections for future years (see Annex 1 andTable 9 of Part III for details). The same methodology was used as in the SAR. Therecalculated global ERR is 27% (29% in the SAR). The project's overall performance to datehas been satisfactory; however, the recalculated ERR for some ports is below expectations, for

3 All ports under the project except Toamasina

5

various reasons detailed below. The ERR calculation was especially sensitive to threevariables: traffic, productivity and costs.

18. Results exceeded expectations for Mahajanga, and especially for Toliara andToamasina, where costs and productivity were correctly estimated. In addition, Toliara andToamasina experienced higher-than-expected levels of traffic, which, in tum, led to higherreturns. In Mahajanga, the low traffic level was compensated by lower costs and very goodproductivity performance. In Antsiranana, traffic was correctly estimated, while productivityand costs were higher and lower, respectively, than the levels projected.

19. The ERRs for Nosy Be and Port Saint Lowus compared well with those foreseen in theSAR. In Nosy Be, financing of equipment was canceled, thus substantially reducing costs ofthis component; in Port Saint Louis, the stronger-than-expected traffic helped offset theincrease in costs.

20. Manakara, Voh6mar, Morondava and Tolagnaro recorded negative ERRs. InManakara and Voh6mar traffic was very low (well below 50% of the expected levels).Tolagnaro's poor results stemmed from gains in productivity that were projected but notrealized. In addition, costs were significantly underestimated for Tolagnaro as they were forManakara; high costs recorded in Tolagnaro and Voh6mar were due to equipment that wasoversized in relation to that needed to support existing traffic volumes. On the other hand,costs were correctly estimated in Morondava.

21. The ERR for the Navigation aids and shipping component was 29% (26% in the SAR).The objective of decreasing time to entry was met. Actual costs were lower than estimated dueto the cancellation of the hydrographic survey for reasons of its high costs.

22. The ERR and other variables for each component, are summarized below:

Tolagnaro negative 28% -SMianakara negative 25% 0 -- -4Morondava negative 41% - 0 -3Voh6mar negative 26% - ++ -1Nosy Be 50% 53% - ++ -1Saint Louis 18% 22% 0 - -3Toliara 45% 29% + 0 0 1Toamasina 39% 270/o5 + 0 0 1Mahajanga 31% 22% + + + + 2Antsiranana 29% 38% 0 + + 2Nav. Aids 29% 26% -_ n.a n.a + + n.a

4This rate is obtained by algebraic addition of traffic, productivity and cost codes.5 This rate does not take into account improvement in handling coffee cargo; with such improvement, theSAR estimated an ERR of 32%.

6

Codes:- -: Worse than expected by more than 50%- Worse than expected by more than 10% and less than 50%0 No more than 10% better or worse than expected value+: Better than expected by more than 10% and less than 50%

+ +: Better than expected by more than 50%

23. The nature of investment affected the ERR (see Table 2B of Annex 1). In Toamasina,71% of the costs reflected in the econornic re-evaluation were related to equipment; these costsrepresented only 26% for DTM ports whose largest investments were in dredging andrehabilitation. In most DTM ports, dredging works had high costs, while rehabilitation did notimprove traffic levels. Oversized equipment also adversely affected ERR, by obstructingprojected improvements in productivity.

24. In conclusion, good results were obtained for the most important ports, mainlyToamasina and Toliara. In these ports, traffic volumes were less subject to exceptionalvariations and thus more correctly estimated, making economic evaluation more reliable. Theproject's achievement of its objectives would have been superior if activities had focused moreheavily on these ports.

5. Financial Re-evaluation

SEPT

25. Financial performance of SEPT was highly satisfactory. Project financial objectiveswere met (see para. 26) and SEPT complied with all financial legal covenants (see Table 10 ofPart EI). The excellent results of SEPT were due mainly to its tariffs being indexed on theECU since 1992. The important and steady devaluation of the Malagasy Franc helped SEPTachieve its good financial performance.

26. Under the project, SEPT was to: (a) phase out its non-port activities; (b) increase thecollection rate of its receivable; (c) improve staff productivity; and (d) increase tariffs, in realterms, in 1987. All these objectives were met. Since 1987, SEPT has been engaged only inmaritime activity. Between 1986 and 1987 its financial performance improved dramatically asa result of improved port performance and financial restructuring. Between 1986 and 1993, areduction in its staff by about 45% led to an improvement in staff productivity. Receivableturnover declined by about 28% between 1986 and 1993, pointing to an improvement incollection rates. Since then, however, this ratio has been below estimated levels reflecting abuildup in accounts receivable. Continuous efforts to improve collection are needed by SEPT.

27. Table 6D of Part mI shows that SEPT's operating performance improved significantly,converting a loss of FMG 4.6 billion (US$ 6.8 million equivalent) in 1986 into net income ofFMG 3.5 billion (UJS$ 1.8 million equivalent) in 1993. When the Malagasy currency is used,actual net income over this period varied between three and six times the estimated levels, withan average annual increase of 56%. The devaluation of the Malagasy Franc accounted largelyfor this big difference. In US dollar terms, actual net income was closer to estimated levels(136% of that estimated for 1993). Supporting the improved operating performance was an

7

increase in traffic of about 6% annually, combined with tariff increases implemented between1987 and 1992.

28. In four of the last five years, SEPT generated an added value from its operations inexcess of 60% of its total revenues; operating income for the period ranged between 13% and31% of its revenues. According to the financial statement for 1994, SEPT had better control(than in 1992 and 1993) over its working expenses, which increased only by 18% compared toa 39% increase in revenues. Over the last nine years working and operating ratios6 were betterthan estimated. In 1994, they were, respectively, 54% and 68% compared to projected ratiosof 71% and 83%, indicating superior profitability relative to that expected. The debt-to-equityratio decreased from 74% in 1990 to a more acceptable level of under 44% in 1994.

DTM

29. The " Service d'Exploitation des Ports" is responsible for financial management of theports under DTM. The financial performance of DTM ports was unsatisfactory in relation tothe financial objectives defined in the SAR. Financial covenants (cost recovery, submission ofaudit reports and annual tariff review) were only partially met. However, substantialimprovements were recorded in the financial management of these ports.

30. The financial objectives of the project were: (a) to set port tariffs at a level that wouldensure recovery of global cost; (b) to reduce staff by 10%; and (c) to increase the importance ofmaintenance in the budget. Overall, those objectives were not achieved.

31. In four of the last five years, port revenues increased annually by nearly a third.Increases in tariffs were undertaken regularly to achieve the objective of cost recovery. Sincethe tariff system in these ports is based on local currency, however, steady devaluation of theMalagasy Franc reduced the impact of tariff increases with a negative effect on the financialresults. Net operating income was negative until 1994, when it turned positive; however,reflection of the project's infrastructure investments in the financial statements led to a loss ofabout FMG 147 billion. To achieve the objective of cost recovery, tariffs should be indexed ona more stable currency, at least for the most important ports of Toliara, Mahajanga andAntsiranana.

32. Working and operating ratios improved over the last five years by an average of 9%annually. Operating ratios decreased from 158% in 1989 to 100% in 1994 pointing toachievement of the objective of operating cost recovery. The working ratio also decreased,from 78% in 1989 to 52 % in 1994.

33. Although financial results were not satisfactory, substantial improvements were notedin the ports' financial management. A commercial accounting system was set up throughtechnical assistance within the project. Depreciation is now reflected in the financial statements(albeit not in the amounts necessary to ensure proper and sound maintenance and renewalpolicies), and financial situations have been submitted annually, most of the time within sixmonths after year-end. In addition, precise information on the port sector's financial situation,

6See Glossary of Terms Used in Financial Management: GP 10.03 Annex A

8

lacking in 1987, now, allows complementary actions to take place such as the establishment ofa cost recovery system.

34. Environmental Impact. By paving areas, improving the drainage system andremoving shipwrecks, rehabilitation works had a positive environmental impact.

C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project

1. Major Factors Affecting the Project

35. Factors not generally subject to government control, which created a gap betweenactual and expected outcome, included: (a) project design--the inclusion of several ports madethe project very demanding for the Borrower and substantially affected the achievement of allproject objectives; (b) overestimation of traffic volume, which in several ports reducedsubstantially the expected benefits; (c) steady devaluation of Malagasy Franc, which affecteddifferently the financial results of SEPT and DTM; and (d) the exceptional events includingcyclones and political events which in the end caused many delays in project implementation.

36. Factors generally subject to government control included: (a) cumbersomeadministrative procedures for contract signing; (b) unavailability of the Malagasy financingcontribution at the contracted times; and (c) the arrangement of a subsidiary loan to make fundsunder the credit available to SEPT, which resulted in many delays.

37. Factors generally subject to implementation agency control included: (a) slowness inthe signing, as well as completion, of study contracts, which led to many delays in theimplementation; (b) weakness in project monitoring which made project management andfollow-up difficult; (c) lack of competencies in DTM staff; and (d) inadequacy of preliminarystudies for the dredging component.

2. Project Implementation

a. Rehabilitation/Provision of Infrastructure and Equipment

38. Rehabilitation and Enhancement of Port Infrastrcture. Civil works covered quaysand slipways, preparation and paving yards, utilities such as electric and water distribution,drainage and lighting. Most of these works were carried out on time, except "coffresd'amarrage" in Antsiranana. Two operations concerning the rehabilitation of the lighthouse of" I'lle aux Prunes" and the refection of the mole C in Toamasina were started just before theclosing of the credit and have been partly financed under the Cyclone Damage Repairs Project(Credit 2625-MAG).

39. Improvement to Cargo Handling. The handling and carrying equipment was financedby KfW in DTM ports. The loan was divided into three parts. Equipment was delivered ontime according to the initial plan for the two first parts of the loan; for the third some delayresulted from the slowness of contract signing procedures.

9

b. Shipping Services

40. Dredging. Many problems arose during the execution of dredging works; as a result,only 50% of the desired objectives were met. The initial idea of having these works done by aspecialized enterprise was changed, because of non responsive bidding process on dredgingworks and technical difficulties in the concemed ports not identified at the time of appraisal, infavor of a technical assistance contract with the maritime Seaways Department (SVM) torepair three dredgers. Later the dredging works were done by the administration on forceaccount. These changing arrangements resulted in a reduction in the impact of this componentand many delays in its implementation. Three of the five ports initially targeted for thisoperation (Mahajanga, Nosy Be and Antsiranana), were withdrawn, while Port Saint Louis wasadded; Port Toliara was simply cleaned at the quay level.

41. Navigation Aids. This component was to include a hydrographic survey and purchaseof equipment to renew lighthouse beacons in the interests of safer port access. Thehydrographic survey was given up because of its high cost and technical difficulties.

42. Spare Parts for Private Companies. The purchase and distribution of spare parts forthe coastal navigation fleet and handling companies did not take place. Most private companiesinvolved preferred to purchase spare parts with their own funds, which was not envisaged atappraisal because of then prevailing foreign exchange regulations.

cG Additional Components

43. Additional Project Components. Due to damage caused by cyclones to the port ofToamasina in early 1994, it was agreed that repairs would be funded under the project; for thispurpose, about US$ 1.2 million was transferred from DTM ports to Toamasina. Rehabilitationworks concerned the slipway, the quay C and the procurement of a lot of equipment and spareparts. The latter operation had not been carried out entirely before the closing date of the creditbut has since been completed under the Cyclone Damage Repairs Project. Some additionalrehabilitation works on waterfront structures were carried out in the Ports of Toliara andTolagnaro, financed by MIM, with the agreement of IDA.

d Disbursements and Project costs

44. Disbursements. Chart 1 of Part Ell compares actual with estimated disbursements.The delays can be traced to a slow start-up during the first three years exacerbated by thepolitical and social events of 1991. The credit was not entirely disbursed; about 18 percent hadto be canceled on March 31, 1995; 13 percent of financing committed by other donors was alsocanceled. CFD disbursed about 75% of the US$ 10 million foreseen at appraisal. Havingsuspended disbursements upon SEPT's freezing of the reform process, CFD had pledged thatreactivating of institutional reform would lead to disbursement of the remaining part Suchdisbursements did not materialize, however, given SEPT's protracted response to CFD'sdemand. KfW disbursed only 88% of its committed amount, due to both administrative delaysand the political events of 1991. Local sources provided only US$ 1.2 million of the planned

10

US$ 3.8 million, largely due to the steady devaluation of the Malagasy Franc which preventedthe Government from keeping its commitments.

45. Project Costs. The final project cost was US$ 27.4 million, net of taxes and duties,compared with US$ 34.8 million estimated at appraisal. The difference between actual andforeseen costs is explained by the high amounts allocated to contingencies in the SAR (about30 percent of base cost). Actual costs for each component were in line with those estimatedexcept for dredging, whose costs were 138 per cent the projected level. DTM ports andToamasina accounted for 40 percent and 60 percent of total costs respectively. In DTM ports,the highest share of investmnent was in infrastructure, while over 50 percent of total investrnentin Toamasina was in cargo handling equipment. Detailed project costs are given in Table 8Aof Part m and in Annex 2.

D. Project Sustainability

46. For Toamasina, the project appears sustainable. Economic benefits generated arelikely to continue, particularly when privatization of some activities (such as cargo handling) isundertaken, as proposed by a French study. Regarding equipment, efforts are needed to set upa cost recovery system that would ensure sound maintenance and renewal policies.

47. Technical assistance and training which improved staff skills in financial managementat DTM ports are certain to enhance future financial performance. MTM staff have becomemore conscious of the impact of port efficiency on transport costs. However, continued effortsare needed to improve staff technical, financial and managerial skills. Dredging and civil workcomponents are unlikely to be sustainable unless an adequate follow-up program forinfrastructure and equipment maintenance is properly designed, funded and carried out.

E. Bank Performance

48. Identification. Bank performance was satisfactory. At the time of identification, allaspects of the port and coastal shipping subsector exhibited need for priority investment, givingrise to the project.

49. Appraisal. The importance of the maritime sector and especially coastal shipping ledthe Bank to consider a large-scale nationwide project. However, financing constraintsrestricted achievement of the project's objectives.

50. Implementation and Supervision. The implementation of the project was closelytracked by the Bank. On average, two to three missions per year were assigned to supervisionduring the implementation period. These missions focused on the DTM ports, given the lowperformance of DTM services in charge of project implementation. Many adjustments weremade during the supervision missions, such as allocating more funds for training, canceling theproposed hydrographic survey as well as the procurement of oversized equipment in Nosy Be.However, the frequency of supervision missions exceeded the pace of the project's progress,leading to a repetition of recommendations in two or more successive memoranda. TheBorrower has also noted some delays, on the part of the Bank, in answering correspondence inparticular with regard to tender documents. Further, due to the length of project

11

implementation, Bank supervision staff changed frequently over time. This caused additionaldifficulties in project follow-up. Also worth noting is the virtual absence of accounting for theproject accounts, with the first audit for the project accounts performed as late as 1993 for1992 accounts . Table 13 shows the limited participation of financial analysts in supervisionmissions.

51. Relations with Cofinanciers. With cofinancing from other organizations, the projectsuffered from a lack of coordination in its preparation as well as follow-up. This was true evenon joint missions of the Bank and CFD. The project could have benefited from more effectiveleadership, which the Bank, given its large participation therein, was likely the best suited toprovide.

F. Borrower Performance

52. Borrower performance was different between the port of Toamasina and DTM ports:in Toamasina it was generally satisfactory during all the stages of the project, but was deficientduring implementation and operation for the DTM ports.

53. Financial and technical indicators of performance show good results for the port ofToamasina; notwithstanding some delays, all covenants were complied with. For DTM ports,however, a lack of competencies was noted. The management capability of MTM staff wasinadequate for the project, contributing to many delays in complying with covenants and in thetreatment of tender documents. Moreover, the dispersion of the ports across the island madethe task of the centralized authority harder. Determination of actual costs and their distributionwas also difficult due to the absence of a clear and detailed database of the different contractswithin the project. The allocation of costs per port --indispensable for the economic re-evaluation-- was completely absent or very unclear.

G. Assessment of Outcome

54. The project's overall outcome was satisfactory. Despite numerous hurdles, it achievedmany of its objectives. It was supposed to prevent degradation of the Malagasy Portssubsector, which it broadly did. The rehabilitation works and the acquired equipment haveendowed the DTM ports with the necessary means to perform their activities. They enabledSEPT to support a strong level of activity and good financial results. At the same time,institutional reforms and technical assistance have enhanced the efficiency of the port sectormanagement. However, the project's national scope served to dilute and impair its impact oneach individual port. Devaluation of the Malagasy Franc, although beneficial for SEPT,restricted the achievement of the DTM ports' financial objectives. Finally, cumbersomeadministrative procedures and the exceptional events (cyclone damage and the 1991 politicalevents) that occurred towards the end of the project generated important delays in itsimplementation, which took ten years (identification in 1983).

12

H. Future Operation

55. To upgrade the status of the ports sector, other projects have to be undertaken. Portssuch as Toliara, Mahajanga and Antsiranana are potential candidates for such operations.Future efforts should:

(a) emphasize the importance of maintenance works to ensure that investmentlasts;

(b) reorganize the ports sector by developing in the three main regional ports(Toliara, Mahajanga, and Antsiranana) autonomous entities and involvingprivate sector participation in Toamasina;

(c) study and implement a cost based tariff system indexed on a stable currency,especially for DTM ports, and examnine the scope for harmonizing SEPT'stariffs with those of other ports in the Indian ocean for SEPT;

(d) ensure the implementation of an efficient cost recovery system to financeongoing maintenance and renewal equipment as required; and

(e) simplify administrative and customs procedures, especially for coastalshipping.

56. For future operations the Bank should invest IDA resources in infrastructure ratherthan equipment. Although infrastructure costs more and did not achieve as high a rate of returnas compared to equipment (see comparison between Toamasina and other ports in Table 2B ofAnnex 1), it has longer life and more durable benefits. Equipment has lower costs thaninfrastructure and leads to a higher rate of return when appropriately sized, but has shorter lifeif not properly maintained and can be financed through means other than IDA resources. Whenthe Borrower invests in equipment, the Bank should ensure that the Borrower takes allnecessary actions to allocate necessary funds for maintenance and renewal of this equipment,or implement an efficient cost recovery system to provide for ongoing financing needs.

13

I. Key Lessons Learned

57. Future efforts should seek to:

(a) ensure the capacity of the implementing agencies for new operations as well asthe availability of local funds indispensable for project implementation;

(b) design projects that are well focused and limited in their scope (in contrast to aproject as complex as the present one, involving two implementing agencies,four cofinanciers and 10 ports, for a credit of only US$ 16 million).

(c) contract maintenance works to private operators rather than by force account,whose drawbacks are illustrated by the fate of the dredging component.

(d) set up an effective system for managing the information necessary forsupervision and implementation completion reporting (for the Bank, majordocuments kept in staff members' offices should be logged to be located easily;For the Borrower, an adequate system for collecting information --such as acontracts database-- should be set up after the beginning of the project andsupervised during the supervision missions); and

(e) set up a sound accounting system, choose an accounting system, bothacceptable to the Bank, and accept auditing process for project accounts as acondition of effectiveness, as such a system is a prerequisite for efficientmanagement of a project's financial operations.

14


MADAGASCAR


PART II: BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION

15

PROJET DE REHABILITATION DU SECTEIJR PORTUAIRECREDIT 1752-MAG

RAPP'ORT D)'ACHEVEMENT

(Y)NTRI BUTION DE L'EMPRINTEUR

1. L'accord (le crc&lit 1752-MA(G ortsar t 5ssxr la. r4habilitation *lu secteurpotrtuairs 8 Madagascar, d1et4e di. 119 Fevrier 1937, a. ete mise en vigaueur Le 17Septembre 1987. 11 a ete cl6tulbre le 31 Deocemhcre 1994.

Le monitant dl.a pr#'t est de, 13.200 0(0) ET'D tirnt 9.900.0Y)0 EMS> a etie gerepar Ie Ninisti-re des Traraort,s et de la. t&orologie (MM) pour la.rehas.ilit.t,ion des neuf pcirrinci-paux poirts secondrliies (Arttsirarnaa_, N<osy Be.Port, Sainrt Lis-,as M ge., Morondajva8._ Toliac.y, Tola,gnrgxo, Mmainkara., VohufiLar)et, le reste gyre p.r la Sx- i4t4 d' Expo1itatiorn ia Port dle Toamesina. (SEPT)pour la rehabilita.tion de ce pr-.emi-r port princIcipal.

Le -present rapport traite l.a partie diu projet gere paIsr Ie MM-

2.1. Les obiectifs du Proiet

Les objectifs du projet &t.aient de remettre eni etat l'infrastruecture decertains ports. de dtiveloLpper la capacit6 instit.utionnelle a gerer, exploiteret entretenir le sous-secteur ties ports et les biens y appartenant, et deminimiser les aleas dle la navigation.

En 'me &'atteindre lesdits objectifs, le projet comprenait les partiessuivantes:

A. Remise en etat et am4lioration des infrastrnctures rortuaires:

- Ex6cution des travatux urgents de r@paration des struetures de quais desports de Manakara. Toliary. Vohl&mar. Morondava. MIaajanga. Nosy-Be et PortSaint LOuis.

- Construction dtrun nouveau quai et dun] remblai en terre a Vohb&mar.construcltion d%n nouveau slipway A Manakara et construction d'ine nouvellerampse c'accs pour passagers a Mahajaiga.

- Preparation et revetement d-environ 70.0(0 nil de terre-plein dan3 lesports de Manakara. Tolagnaro, Toliary. Voh4mar. Morondava. Mahajanga. SaintLouis et Antsiranania: et construction de rampes de chargement et dechargementdes camions.

- Construction d't%n batiment admini3tratif A Toliary- Travaux de voirieet r6seaux divers dans les rorts de Manakara, Toliary, Tolagnaro et Morondava.

B. Modifications et Amiliorations de mmnutention rortuaire:

- Achat et montage si nrkessaire de materiel de manutention portuaire, depi&ces d6tachees, de mat6riaux. d'outila et de mat.eriel pour tous les ports duProjet o6rt?s par le MTM.

16

C. Aides A la navigation maritime:

- Ex6cution des travauLz de dragage A Mahajanga, Tolagnaro. Toliary etManakara; achat de mat6riel et pikees detzache&es pour IVex&cution de cestravatux et r6habilitation de la drague existante A Manakara-

- Fourniture de materiel flottant et installation dce nouvelles bou6es, defetLx, de pices d6tacthees. d&tunl atelier cie r6p,aration mobile, et de systemesde commiunications radi ophoniilues at tA l6phoniques-

- Achat et distribution de piA-ces detach4&es pour la flotte de cabotage etles compeagnies de maaiutention, y compris leur montage e-ventuel-

D. D6velor'Dement et rAforme des institutions

- Formation de certains employ6s dulqMM, y compris octroi de boursesd '6tudes-

- Renforcement des capacit6s du TM datans la gestion des ports et dans lestechniques correspondantes.

2.2. Evaluation des actions entreririses

A. Remise en 6tat des infrastructure

- Les travaux de r6eparation des structures tie quais des ports out permisdtemp&cher la degradation tres pouss6e des ouvrages portuaires. Les actionsentreprises ont pu permettre tie sauvegarder I operationnalite des lineaires dequais existants dLans les ports. Des actions devraient etre poursuivies pourlVam6lioration du sy3ttme de defenses de quais car ce qui ont et6 r6aliseessont assex pr6caires. Par ailleurs. les structures qui n'avaient pas faitl objet de reparation commencent actuellemetnt a se degrader par faute demaintenance durant 1-e.xecution du projet.

- Le revetement des terre-pleins a az&liore consid6rablement iacirculation des engins rortuaires et. la restauration oiu l'installationd6clairage dans les ports a permis le travail de nuit.

- La construction de rampes d-acci-s de chargement et de dechargement n'aw &tre effectuee qtfau port de Morondava. Cette action aurait dui etrecomprise dans les dossiers techniques de rtThabilitation des infrastructuresdes ports, comme celle de Morondava. A 1iexceeption tie Morondava. la decisionde construire des rampes a 6t. prise vers la fin de 1Jex6cution du projet et,le projet n a pas pU b1n6ficier d'ume assistwnce dtiun bureau d'6tudes pour laconstitution des dossiers techniques.

B. Modification et am4lioration de manutentioni rortuaire

- Cette partie a 6te financee par KFW. Les Societes de batelage ont 6t6 doteesde mat6riels tels que remorquetrs, grues simples et a conteneur. remorques.tractetrs, chalands et des pieces de rechange.

Une amelioration de IVexploitation a et6 constat6e mais le rendementportuaire n a pas beaucoup accru. ac 1 erception du port de Tolagnaro.

17

C- Aide a la navigation maritime

- La renrovatioan des 4qpniperments de 1L signalisaetion maritime a. ete ent reprisepar ic MAG Le3es c s ax princip&uxx po.rts out et,e r6habilit6s mais unprobleme dLentretien saibsiste dba fait de 1.a carence en pi&ce de rechange desequijementr par faute de credit dle maintenance.

f-1-alemerat les rA.t.S de Tolagna-ro, Saint zjYiSt5 et Toliar7 ont pUbt6rrficie de tra'8.Va:x de dragage - (>s trwvaux. S'xrtcnat 4 Tolagnaro, ouit, permisdl amAliorer 1 ex-ploitatiuor dia port. (>ela a 6ete fdamontrf.re lo7fs de l'op*rationde sauwetage cia3 Sad de l'I-e centre la famine dule 4 la secheresse.

Les tramaux d.e dragage idars les aut-res ports deivraient e.tre poxursurias &1'ai(de ders trois drraffes gquli ourt ete rehasbilit,es wa *:0o3rs ria projet.

D- IMveloppement et reforme instit-uti onnel

- ['tude l'txane restructuratifofn ca tdad,get ann£exe dles ports a 6te effectue-e.MIais la mise cni pla:e effective cLone syst6me df. comptabilite- de typecommercial et la. misc en place des r4gissenxcs de recette et de dIA*pe-re pouram4liorer 1a perception des redIeances et p-oxr ameliorer la gestion lPes po)rtsnWont pas pa se faire.

Le volet reforme institutionnelle est le volet qai devrait etre entreprisaua cotrs da futur projet pour garaxtir les investissements effectu6s et lesinvestissements A venir.

3. Avis de 1 EmTrunteur concern'ant limplantation ija ProJet

- L.e projet a ete financ- par les baillears de fonds ci-apres:

- Banque Mondiale- FAC- KIN.

Comme il a et6 dit, plus hauit. le FAC a fiincancm les 6quipements de lasignalisation maritime. KEW les 6quipements portuaire et, la Banque Mondialele reste. Wlrant lxe4-x6cution dia projet, il nWy a p:as eu beaucoup de r4tMionsde coordlination entre les co-finaniciers et VEmpranxteur dci pmr,jet pour aaxerles actions entreprises par Tlhactun vers les objectifs escompt6s du projet.

4. Les difficult6s reneontrees roendant I'ex6cution du rpro.iet

C6te technique:

- La disp'arit.e des I:ortts et les montanits des travaux.- dlani les ports quinl6taient pas asses 6leves ant ete les causes principales de la non obtentionde travaux ex&zuttes satisfaisants.

A V'avenir, il serait sauhaitable de conc-evoir an projet mains c-omplexe.

- Le manque de persormel qualifle et mat6riel adequat au sein des Servicestechniques de la Direction des Transports Mlaritimes a ete tr3e des faiblessesdans la celerit6 dettablissement des dossiers tecluhiqties et, egalement dans lapreparation des travauLx de dragage dans les ports.

18

Une formation dans le domaine comptabilit6 et gestion de projet pour lepersonnel de pilotage de projet est n6cessaire pour une am6lioration de laconduite cVu3n fust,ur irojet portsa.hire- En effet. la. faiblesse sur lacomptabilite dh proijet a ete4 arincmnce *.denss les audiits du projet.

C6jt6e administrativee:

- Le probleme majeur rencontre a ete la lotu-deur de la procedure de passationdes march6s.

C4te financi6re:

- Insuffisance chronique des fonds de contrepartie.

5. Evaluation de l'impact du rvro.iet stir la situvation financie6re des rorts

(Pour me6mire)

6. Evaluation de -l'action de la Baniue rendant la rpriode de mise en oeuvre du-pro.ie t

- Au d6but du. pro-jet ls Banlque a effectue detLx missions de supervision par an .Ces missions etaient devenues tom-is fois vers la fin de I-ex&cution du projet-

La multiplicite ties missionis de la Banque ame6iiore consid6rablementI ex6cution du projet.

7. Evaluation de la r-erformance de 1T ir. etiat la mise eni eouvre dul pro jet

- Une cellule de projet a 6te cre6e at: sein tie la Directioni des TransportsIlaritimes poulr le pilotage et coordination tiu projet- Cette cellule a et6assistee par uin Expert pour la gestion din projet. La faiblesse tie cettecellnle a 6te le manlque tde personnel. surtott, en reasponsable financier ainsique le manque de materiel iniformatique an d6tbut et an milieu tie IVex6cution dinprojet .

8. Relation entre la Banque et -VEmrir.uiteur r:endant la re6alisatio n 2u isr MJet

- Cette relation entre la Banque et 1fEmprint-eur a et6 hacndicat7ap6e at: d6but dtiprojet par la faible frequence de mission tie supervision. Elle a eteconsidtrablement amelioree vers la fin tin projet par la pre&ence permanentedThm responsable de stuivi des projets aupres de la missioni r6sidente de laBanque.

Enfin. la Direction des Trawsports Ilaritimnes souhaite travailler avec lameme 6quipe de la Banque Mondiale prur tine icontinuit6 tie la bc'nne ambiance decollaboration.

19

PORT DE TOAMASINAt -J SJ•JJLK'~~~~~~ Lr3Yr -- 3= -* -. -

* GC UX LfttW.Ž G @,7

Lre montant du pret prevu dans le present accord de cr6ditest de 13.200.000 DTS. La SEPT beneficie des 1.970.000 DTS pr6vusdans le contrat initial et qui ont ete repartis comme suit

- 1.150.000 DTS pour la r6habilitation des infrastructuresportuaires

- 820.000 DTS pour l'acquisition des equipements deManu:ention.

La part pr4vue a la rehabilitation des infrastructures a etepar 'a suite augmentee de 405.000 DTS et cela & titre decompl4ment de cr4dit.

Suite au passage du Cyclone GERALDA Fevrier 1994300.000 DTS ont et4 octroyds a la SEPT pour la rehabilitation desd4gAts cycloniques, pour la construction d'une cale inclinee,pour l'a,hat des pieses de rechanges et pour la refection deszerres-Dleins. Cette enveloppe rentre dgalement dans le cadre d-zr4dit 1752 MAG.

Au total, la SEPT a b4n4fici4 d'un cr6dit de 3.175.000 DTSdans le cadre de ce credit 1752 MAG.

2- 2-2. L'S OJECTIFS DU PROJET

Faisant r4ference A l'accord de credit entre la R4publique.e Madagascar et l'Association Unr-ernationalb de D4veloppement'1 IDA) 4tabli 1- 2'1 octobre 1986, les objectifs du projet sont*i4crits comms ci-apres

A - Remise en etat et Amalioration des infrastructures-x4c-^uticn des travaux de r4paration des quais du Portdo Toamasina

- Rev§temen: d'environ 70.000M2 de terres-pleins,.onstruction d'ateliers d'entretien et de travaux*'4clairage , de drainage d'adduction d'eau et dedistribution d'4lectrici±t au Port de Toamasina.

B - Amelioration de la l'anutention portuaire- Achat de mat4riels de manutention -- Rdamenagement du systeme de transport du minerachrome O 34JD

- Achat d'un stock de pieces detachees, de materixfiOtd-'outillage y compris leur montage 4ventuel c00

'' ~ ~ t:S:- .= - ' .a 0000

-atej t5};t

............ f/f7 96

AnsA' $LIXS4ta. . , - A F. IJJJ£9' In sZ s - s .~ rS'X/5 s:9'0a.A 3- YS tr. JJS.ScV* .*! * .J W Zt.nOM / .}-U

20

C - Developpement Institutionnel- Renforcement de la capacite de la SEPT dans la gestiondes Ports et des Techniques correspondantes

- Eormation d'un certain nombre d'agents de la SEPT, ycompris l'octroi des bourses d'etudes.

2-2 EVA!UJATION DES ACTIONS ENTREPRISES

A - DRns 1'ensemble les trvaux de rehabilitation desi-frastructures portuaires sont achev4s dont

- La r6habi.itation des terres- pleinsM Mole A'( 15.000 M2) 207.697,72 DTSXole-B (40.000 M2) - Voie d'acces au Port 12.000 M2)

628.145,74 DTS.. Mole C ( 67.003 M2) 1.522.471,83 DTS

B - Am4liora ion de la Manutention

Le crvit 1i752 MAG, prevoyant l'acquisition des materielsa5 ndra-lement d'origine non francaise, a permi d'acheter

- des chariots dlevateurs- et des pi_ces de rechange 6values A 780.000 DTS

_ut a -'accord de crsdit compl4mentaire de 800.000 DTS en1994, le Port Ce Toamasina a entrepris la construction d'une caleinch inre cl= 200.000 DTS, travaux entierement acheves, l'achat despilces de rechange de 100.000 DTS et avec le reste, lafina'isation des travaux de refectior. du Mole C touche par lecyclons GIFAIDA, dont le marche est en cours d'6x6cution. Notonsqae c'-st les derniers travaux en cours d'achevement, prevu finMai- 19g95.

C - D6veloppemnnt Institutionnel

La restructuratiLon du systeme de Gestion permet A la SEPT debien suiv-re l'4volution de ses d6penses et recettes et d'adopterune politique de gestion bas6e sur un equilibre budg4taire.Suivant le d6cret 85.282 du 04 Septembre 1985 le Port deToamaisna est regJe par le droit commun des Soci6t6s Anor.ymes.Cette disposition rend fa-le l'am6lioration de la qualite deo-sticn de type priv6 et ceci par V'application du systs'me decomptabilit4 de type co.mmercial. Le changement institutionnelpermet a 'a ES?T de proc6der facilement a la correction de sestarifs gen6raux.

3 - AVIS DE L'EM?RUNTEUJR CONCERNANT LE PROJET

Du fait que le cr4dit 1752 MAG est le resultat d'un accordtripartite BANQUE MONDIALE/ETAT/SEPT, mat6r(iellement c'estl'E'at qui emprunte aupres de la Banque Mondiale, pr§t qu'ilretrocbde A la SEPT par la suite. Et ce qui fait que la SEPTsubit la '.ourdeur de la procedure administrative.

21

A - LES PRINCIPALES DIFFICULTES RENCONTREES PENDANT L'EXECUTIONDU PROJET

Pour memoire)

5- -VALUATTIO: ^- L'IMPACT DU PROJET SUR LA SITUATION FINANCIEREDE LA SEPT

aC r6habilit4ioon des infrastructures et les acquisitions desFrj4rie's d ex:loitation ont permis a la SEPT d'ameliorer sesactifvieS 6e le rendement portuaire. Cette amelioration ne peut

-''R eurs gu' avoir un impact positif sur ses situationsd'e:ploitatior. et financi4re.

'n peut dire en effet qu'A l'heure actuelle, la SEPT peutfa-re face au renouvellement de ses equipements et au..e;bo.irsement de ses creanciers. N'anmoins, compte tenu du volume5.e l'endettement en monnaie etrangere, on ne peut pas dire, par-ontre que l1impact de la politique de change menee par leG-ouvernement n'est pas sans effet. Les differences de change-tant A la charge de l'emprunteur, c'est A dire de la SEPT, cetaea repr6sente A terme, un goulot d'etranglement pour lastructure financ--re. Aussi pour pallier A ce probleme est-iln6cessaire, tout d'abord, de reeva'luer les actifs et de procederensuite au changement de 1a structure institutionnelletransfert aux opdrateurs prives de certaines activit6s).

T1 serait souhaitable que la SEPT pour les credits A venir-G..tractera directem-nt avec les bailleurs de FOnds sansinterrgddiaire et cela afin de pouvoir all6ger le service de laz'et et b, 4ficier d'run taux d'int4er§- moindre.

5 - EVr;A:"I DE L1ACTION DE LA BANOU MONDIALE - PE IN DAI"T LA^-E?-IDE DE MITSE EN OEUV?E DU PRC'jET

res experts de la Banque Mondiale ont effectu6 pdriodiquement-'e mssions dce supervision au Port de Tc.amasina. Ces missions ont

!-rris au: deux parties des echanges dce vue tres enrichissanrles-i.in A I'ex6cution du projet.

22IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

MADAGASCAR


PART IH: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Non applicableMacro policies Dl 0 El ElSector policies El 0 Dl OlFinancial objectives Dl 01 El O]

Institutional development Ol 02 °°

Physical objectives 0 l E EPoverty reduction D ElO El RGender issues El Ol El 0Other social objectives EEl REnvironmental objectives El 0 E EPublic sector management El 1 E EPrivate sector development El El 0 E

Project sustainability Likely Unlikely UncertainInfrastructure 0 El ECargo Handling 0l ElShipping El E0Institutional development 0l O E

Bank performance Highly satisfactory Satisfactory DeficientIdentification a 0 EPreparation assistance E 0 EAppraisal a 0 ESupervision D El 4

Borrower performance Highly satisfactory Satisfactory DeficientPreparation El 0f FImplementation El E l5Covenant compliance a El ElOperation El El 05

Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly unsatisfactorysatisfactory

Assessment of outcome El R El El

'Substantial for Toamasina and negligible for other ports2Substantial For Toamasina and partial for other ports3Likely for Toamasina, unlikely for other ports4Substantial improvements were noted from 19925 Satisfactory for Toamasina, deficient for other ports

23

Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits6

Credit 200-MAG 11.4 million dollars 1970 Closed The physical objectives werePort of Tamatave project would be spent over satisfactory achieved by the

three-year period for project completion date .construction of new However many difficultiesberths, purchase of cargo were faced in achievinghandling equipment and institutional objectives.provision of consulting Those difficulties wereservices to provide essentially due to the lowadequate facilities for productivity levels, the poortraffic projected until financial performance of the1979 and establishment port authority and theof an operationally and unsuitability of peoplefinancially autonomous employed for top executiveport authority posts.

Table 3: Project Timetable

.......... ..................... ,.. ............ ,. . ...................................

Identification July, 1983

Preparation June-July, 1984

Appraisal April, 1986

Credit negotiations October 27-30, 1986

Board presentation January 6, 1987

Credit signature February 19, 1987

Credit effectiveness September 17, 1987

Credit completion September 30, 1992 June 30, 1994

Credit closing March 31, 1993 December 31, 1994

6Includes projects in ports and waterborne transports

24

Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimate and Actual

March 31, 1987 1.0 0.0 0June 30, 1987 1.6 0.0 0Sept. 30, 1987 2.2 0.0 0Dec. 31, 1987 2.9 0.69 24March 31, 1988 3.7 1.73 47June 30, 1988 4.5 1.79 40Sept. 30, 1988 5.3 1.79 34Dec.31, 1988 6.1 1.87 31March 31, 1989 6.9 1.93 28June 30, 1989 7.7 2.16 28Sept. 30, 1989 8.5 3.63 43Dec. 31, 1989 9.3 4.58 49March 31, 1990 10.1 5.73 57June 30, 1990 10.8 7.13 66Sept. 30, 1990 11.5 7.42 64Dec. 31, 1990 12.2 7.79 64March 31, 1991 12.8 7.79 61June 30, 1991 13.4 8.09 60Sept. 30, 1991 14.0 8.09 58Dec. 31, 1991 14.5 8.49 58March 31, 1992 15.0 9.84 66June 30, 1992 15.4 9.84 64Sept. 30, 1992 15.7 10.14 65Dec.31, 1992 16.0 10.33 65March 31, 1993 10.95 68June 30, 1993 11.39 71Sept. 30. 1993 11.69 73Dec. 31, 1993 11.83 74March 31, 1994 12.21 76June30, 1994 12.62 79Sept. 30. 1994 12.77 80Dec. 31, 1994 13.58 85March 31, 1995 14.68 91

25

Chart 1: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

CUMULATIVE ESTIIATE AND ACTUAL DIS BURS EMENTS

16 _______________________>________ ____ __ _

8 - ./ -_-i- - - - - + ~~~~~~~~~~Estimate|; 6 _ _ _ _/ f 7_ _ . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Actual|

6 gf' - -- -- -- - -- - -- ---- -- - - --- - -

10

87 88 89 90 9 1 92 93 94 95

Quarte rs

Table 5: Project Implementation 7

Port infrastructure 1990 1990

Cargo handling equipment 1990-92 Most floating crafts in 1990

Dredging and equipment 1991 1993

Navigation aids Mid 92 Equipment delivered, civil works 93-94

Hydrographic survey vessel 1990 Postponed du to high costs

Institutional development Mid 92 Toamnasina 1991, other ports on goingExternal training completed

7No indicator of project execution was defined at the time of appraisal.

26

Tables 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation

Table 6A: Actual and Estimated Productivity per Port (tons of dry cargo per day)

250 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450____Actual ______ n.a n.a n.a 480 510 1179 570 828 na

Estimate 170 185 200 225 250 275 300 325 350Actual n.a n.a n.a 117 180 200 270 220 n.a

Manakara Estimate 160 180 200 220 240 250 260 270 280Actual n.a n.a n.a 270 292 235 205 253 na

TolagnaroEstimate 200 220 240 250 260 270 280 290 300Actual n.a n.a n.a 171 166 165 242 247 n.a

ToliaraEstimate 170 185 200 215 230 245 260 275 290Actual n.a n.a n.a 354 291 660 370 453 n.a

Morondava_7Estimate 90 105 120 130 140 ISO 160 170 180Actual n.a n.a n.a n.a 135 n.a n.a n.a n.a

MahajangaEstimate 200 215 230 245 260 270 280 290 300Actual n.a n.a n.a 603 606 612 744 786 n.a

Nosy-BeEstimate 100 115 130 145 160 180 200 220 240Actual n.a n.a 162 n.a n.a n.a 197 435 n.a

Pt louisEstimate 170 170 170 170 170 180 190 200 210Actual n.a n.a n.a n.a 548 157 258 171 n.a

In the SAR, the estimations of productivity were given only for 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1992,

values in the table corresponding to other years were obtained by linear interpolation.

Table 6B: Actual and Estimated Traffic Per Port (DTM) 27

Estimak ~~~~~93.47 103.20 112.93 122.66 132.40 135.34 138.28 141.22 144.16|Actual ~~~~~98.67 88.87 57.74 107.86 135.04 111.00 130.88 162.63 191.46

Estimate 25.20 28.10 31.00 33.90 36.80 37.66 38.52 39.3S 40.24 Actual 39.70 39.70 34. 70 170.00 80.00 90.00 152.98 81.16 145.63 |

VohemarDry cargolEstimate 23.30 23.90 24.50 25.10 25.70 26.14 26.58 27.02 27.46Actual 14.88 5.57 14.44 16.68 16.03 11.57 18.91 13.78 7.29 |

OilIEstimate 6.27 6.70 7.13 7.57 8.00 8.20 8.40 8.60 8.80 |

Actual 5.73 5.73 1 6.35 7.00 9.23 1 6.41 9.42 8.04 1 9.90 |

ManakaralDry cargolEstimate 54.20 54.95 55.70 56.45 57.20 58.28 59.36 60.44 61.52|Actual 50.21 34.11 26.17 14.82 29.33 15.25 19.22 16.62 13.24|

OillEstimate 14.87 16.15 17.43 18.72 20.00 21.18 22.36 23.54 24.72|Actual 17.88 11.94 15.02 12.70 19.55 16.53 15.06 15.48 15.45

TolagnarolDry cargolEstimate 28.63 29.95 31.27 32.58 33.90 36.02 38.14 40.26 42.38Actual 23.88 16.40 19.88 17.53 25.73 32.66 48.27 27.86 20.86

OilIEstimate 7.33 7.75 8.17 8.58 9.00 9.22 9.44 9.66 9.88 |

Actual 6.16 6.42 4.09 4.80 7.38 6.82 7.26 6.62 7.30

Toliara _ __ Dry cargolEstimate 57.80 60.75 63.70 66.65 69.60 68.78 67.96 67.14 66.32Actual 59.88 32.50 32.20 50.50 71.78 44.51 52.56 64.87 80.18|

OilIEstimate 14.83 14.75 14.67 14.58 14.50 14.86 15.22 15.58 15.94

Actual 18.36 18&36 1 9.94 11.10 12.09 111.66 12.01 14.14 17.42|MorondavalDry cargolEstimate 28.05 27.55 27.03 26.52 26.00 27.00 28.00 29.00 30.00|Actual 3.18 12.34 12.03 15.32 9.72 8.20 7.72 5.30 5.30 |

OilIEstimate 7.20 7.90 8.60 9.30 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00|Actual 7.73 7.73 8.33 7.70 6.40 15. 72 3.60 n oo R 0.0

MahajangalDry cargolEstimate 160.53 166,55 172.57 178.58 184.60 186.06 187.52 188.98 190.44|Actual 40.49 46.28 40.99 113.13 128.85 100.26 101.80 118.44 96.94|

OilIEstimate 53.47 55.50 57.53 59.57 61.60 63.92 66.24 68.56 70.88Actual 51.52 51.52 59.14 55.95 50.97 66.03 49.53 92.67 75.18

Nosy BeDry casgolEstimate 34.70 35.20 35.70 36.20 36.70

Actual 28.91 29.81 29.80 32.59 61.39 32.58 37.28 38.73 13.42|OillEstimate 23.00 23.64 24.28 24.92 25.56 Actual 80.57 80.57 37.20 17.42 17.10 11.72 6.33 38.38 35.14|

St-LouislDry cargolEstimate 60.80 59.32 57.84 56.36 54.88Actual 21.59 39.04 35.63 44.53 60.05 40.23 26.90 45.20 28.87|

OilIEstimate 9.00 9.22 9.44 9.66 9.88 Actual __ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.12 1.03 0.12 0.12 |

Total 1Dry cargolEstimate 445.98 466.85 487.70 508.54 624,90 632.14 639.38 646.62 653.86lActual 341.69 304.93 268.88 412.95 537.92 396.25 443.53 493.43 457.56l

OillEstimate 129.17 136.85 144.53 152.22 191.90 197.90 203.90 209.90 215.90lActual 2-27.65 221.97 174.77 186.67 204.37 217.00 257.2LL256.61 J_206.14

Charts 2A: Actual and Estimated Traffic Per Port 28

Antsiranana: Actual and Estimated Dry Vohemar: Actual and Estimated Drycargo traffic cargo traffic

200.00 3000

180.00

16000 250

140.0020.00

120 00

1 0000 1 15.00

oargo 8000fic cargotrc10.0060.00

4000 5.00

20.00

000 0 00

19B6 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

E- _ 1111Estimate| Estimate| -+ Actual | Actual

Manakara: Actual and Estimated Dry Tolagnaro: Actual and Estimated Drycargo traffic cargo traffic

70.00 50 00

45 0060.00 ...

40 00

n 3 5.00

30.00

in 25.00

20.00C)

20 00 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~15.0010.00

10.00

0 00 0.00

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Estimate ll-_ EstimateActual Actual

Toliara: Actual and Estimated Dry cargo Morondava: Actual and Estimated Dry

90 00 ~traffic300 cargo traffic

so 00~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~50

70 00250

60.00 20.00

*~50.00I00

a, 40.00

20 0

5.0010 00

0 00 <.0.00 -

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Estimate EE~stimeate-- Actual - Actual

29

Nosy-Be:Actual and Estimated Dry cargo Saint Louis: Actual and Estimated Dry

traffic cargo traffic70 00 ;0.00

60.00 60.00

50 00 -. : .......... .~ . .'/ \,9, ' .............. : n 50.00

e v ,,, z 40 0 0

200

19B6 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1986 1987 19BB 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

¢ + Actual _ Actual

r---

Mahajanga: Actual and Estimated Dry

; e~~~~~argo traffic200.00. . ... .. ,, ^,, , .40.

4000~~~~~~~~~~~100

120.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~200

Estimate ~ ~ Eststiaat

--- ~~~ ~ ~ ~ Actual A|ua

Totl: ctul ad stiate Oi MafficToga: Actual and Estimated Drycag

200.00

80.00

60 .00

u 140 00

- 20.00

4000

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

E|timate

+ Actual | | + Actu-aAltu;

Total: Actual and Estimated Oil traffic Total: Actual and Estimated Dry cargotraffic

700 00300 00

600 00

250 00a,500 00

m 200 00

15000 000

100.00 200 00 ~ .

50 0 100 00 *'

0.00

1986 1987 1989 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941986 1987 1988 1989 19,90 1991 1992 1993 1994

30

Table 6C: Toamasina: Actual and Estimated Traffic ('000 tons)

Dry cargo (International)Estimate 476 470 463 457 450 457 463 470 477Actual 580 510 527 564 700 534 638 700 810 *

Dry cargo (Cabotage)Estimate 106 105 104 104 103 106 108 Ill 113Actual 117 103 103 83 83 70 67 119 115

Oil (Intenational)Estimate 315 349 383 416 450 480 510 540 570Actual 322 448 594 359 522 556 442 526 559

Oil (Cabotsge)Estimate na na na na na na na na naActual 121 130 Ill 116 123 138 92 86 98

(*) Estimation obtained from the tonnage handled during the first nine months

Charts 2B: Toamasina Traffic ('000 tons)

Tm na Cog rCrToamasina: International dry CargoToamasina: Cabotage dry Cargo

120 900

~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~8000 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 700

so60

400

20020

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994_ Estimate Estmat

_ -+ Actual 1 + - Actual

31

Table 6D: Toamasina: Financial performnance indicators

RevenueEstimate 4,796 5,905 7,292 7,692 8,120 8,557 9,015 9,497 9,803Actual 6,488 9,996 18,190 29,905 19,518 20,741 27,968 37,756 -

Working expensesEstimate 5,135 5,388 5,632 5,895 6,174 6,301 6,429 6,613 7,014Actual 7,802 6,669 8,296 10,500 11,281 14,306 17,964 26,813 -

Operating resultEstimate -357 517 1,660 1,797 1.946 2,256 2,586 2,884 2,789Actual -1,314 3,327 9,894 1,9405 8,237 6,435 10,005 10,943 -

Net incomeEstimate -1,081 -402 362 174 117 225 575 916 930Actual -4,596 471 824 1,121 1,464 1,237 3,045 3,525 -

... __

Estimate f 4,200 3,660 3,580 3,510 J 3,440 [ 3,370 [ 3,360 3,300 3,300Actual - 3,648 | 2,994 [ 2,582 j 2,607 | 2,534 2,422 2,385 2,296

Table 7: Studies Included in the Project

................................................... ... . .. t t s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

| Engineering studies for sector transport project Completed Good1993-1997

Study in order to provide spare parts Completed Good

32

Table 8A: Project Costs (US$ Million)

Navigation aidsandspar7Local Foreign Total Local Foreign TotalINFRASTRCTURE 2.5 3.8 6.3 2.8 4.9 7.7 122%CARGO HADLING 1.4 10.3 11.7 0.0 9.3 9.3 80%

Dredging 0.4 1.4 1.8 0.7 1.8 2.5 138%Navigation aids and spare parts 0.7 3.4 4.1 0.5 l 5 2.0 49%

Subtotal 1.1 4.8 5.9 1.2 3.3 4.5 76%INSTITUTIONAL DEV'TTechnical support 0.3 3.5 3.8 0.5 1.0 1.5 40%Training 0.6 3.2 3.8 0.1 3.0 3.1 82%

Subtotal 0.9 6.7 7.6 0.6 4.0 4.6 69%ENGINEERING, SUPERVISION 0.3 2.9 3.2 0.3 1.0 1.3 41%

TOTAL 6.2 128.6 34.8 4.8 | 22.5 27.4 79%

(*) SAR's costs including physical and price contingencies.

Table 8B: Project Financing (US$ Million)

;.ffLocal Foreign Total Local Foreign Total IDA 2.4 13.6 16.0 3.7 10.6 14 3(') 89__'%_lCFD 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 7.4 7.4 74%KfW 0.0 2.6 2.0 ... 0.0 3.6 3.6 136% ..FAC 0.0 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.9 0.9 39%Local sources 3.8 0.0 3.8 1.2 0.0 1.2 32%

TOTAL 6.2 28.6 34.8 4.9 22.5 27.4 79%

(*) Difference between this amount and the one stated in Table 4 (US$ 14.7 millioni) is due to differentexchange rates used in disbursments and in costs calculation.(**) 82% when amounts are in SDR(***) In the SAR, it was taken into account, only a part of the funds allocated by KtW to the project: US $2.6 million. In fact, the funds allocated were US $ 4.1 millions. Only 88% of this aniount was disbursed.

33

Tables 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Per Component

AN I SI RANA NA SAINT LOLIIS

Bener fitefits (osls Net-heniefits [liear I Beneftis I Costs I e-enft

981 0 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1986 0 4

982 (I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 987 0 0 ~t*~988 II I) 1q88 ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 0

1989 0 10.024 .163,0241 1989 0 203.264 ~T.~~191 770I ,11 990 101,5800

1991 ",5,53 331) 33,23h 1991 68,012 0 .- 4~.6019')2 77,27,3. 32.31)( 44.933 1992 45.5 15 0

193 96.0Ž2 1231 3,2 973.834 460.174 1.u,'g 41994 11.4 2.3(11 63,721 199431,3 .0

95 11(1,41 32.1038074 1994 111,134 5.600 7i. -, .,1o 1005341`99 11.41D.308,74I1 1996 111.134 5,600 -.~ w,11996 113.041 32.31)0 80.741j 1996 111.134 5.600 , 0"3

1998 11317 32,110 80,741j 1998 111,134 5.600 v!2, *-1998 113,041 32,300 90711998 111,134 5.600 i

- - d ~~~~~~~ER8R(SRA f.. I2] 8 .'.UMSMlR48% 8 , .'

_________ XIIIIII..9R ___________ _________ NOSY BE

1ea I Blenefits I osts I [e-enftsjYear I Benefits [ Costs T Net-benefits 1

19)86,)1 1986 001917 0~~ 987 ~ 0 0 ~ 0

1988 (I 0 , 1988 0 0 .3SrX.(98 1 618,041 .140 1989 0 48,495 -

219911 117.834A 20.29009. 1990 52,41 29,3001991 8S.049 2(0.200 64,84 199g1 52,41 29,3001992 139.0(5 20,20(1 I I8.80 i992 61,209 29,300 ~1993 101,295 20.200 .81;0951 1993 1 66,310 29,300 lk .1994 53.588 20,200 53341994 40,806 29300

995 533.588 20.2001 , .3995 51,008 29,300 0

_99 __53,588 20______00,3 1996 51,008 29,300[A I197 53,588 20.2001 1~~jS997 51,008 29,300

1998 5358 2,00.~7~ 38 1998 51,008 29,300

199 53.588 20.21)0 I 1999 51,008 29,300

M_____NAHAJANGs(A MANAKARA1['e r Benefits I Costs I Net-beneFits I Year I Bcnefits- Costs Net-benerits1981, 0 8 ] 186 0 0

19847 30 . 9 87 0 0 1,j,i~

1988 0 0 1988 8 33 5,076 ..

1989 11 989.4134 . '98A1989 0 958,417

19-30 448,1197 5(50,0(1 938: 1990 256,504 136.9371 .f

199,)1 349,7 47 50.000 ~-~299,47 19=91 85,351 0.

1992 351.88(t 50.000 -' 1 . 301~816 1992 168,067 789,061 ~ 1993 415.3141 511.00( 1 , -. 5 . 86M41 1993 1 145,326 5,6001994 334.4251 51000 '4; , .,i'A*2425l 1994 115,806 5,600 1995 fll,424-~5 5)100110 1995 139,946 5,600

1996 334.425 50.000 1996 139,946 5,6001917 334.425 5(10M00.e. 3 1997 139,946 5,600

1998 3 34,425 5(1.000 ~ 98139,946 5,03949 14,4 25 50,000 . .4, . 1999 1I39.9465,0

____TO LI.iRAATOLAGNA RO

[Year Beneit Costs___ ] Net-benerits iVa [ Benef'its I Costs I Net-benerits

1986 1 0986 0 0

1992 507,24 1_00 24 1992 219,323 868,81319 Q" 5 193 8 2.0 1993 126,597 961,044

19Q94 49437 7,591994 1 94,781 22,600I199 495 ___655 ,, 1995 94.781 2,0

1996 495.655 _______ _000 _____ 1996 94,781 22,600 AM " M 811997 _______655 21_____000,. 1997 94,781 22.600 I1) ___5 __55_ 47406 1998 94.781 22,600 ' 4 -k73 I

111 ________ 47651999 94.781 22,600 '4..- -,' ,.

EIMR 45% f14K46/PR(SAP -29% -8

34

MORONDAVA TOTAL MTM

|Year I Benefits I Costs I Net-benefits tYear I Benefits I Costs I Net-benefits

19S6 0 0 1986 01987 0 0 9 p. 1987 1988 0 ° 0§,l;.P 4 e pt988 0 o 670,1141989 C 468,560 j 198 O 4,210,993 i 1 {@

1990 86,400 0 1990 1.662,717 408,5941 99 1 72,889 . 1991 1 I,292,950 1 52.80 3i. 1992 68,622 0 1992 1,638,724 1,810,6741993 47,111 88613 1993 1,673,416 1,668,2311994 47,111 33,300 19-94 1,406,348 256,8591995 23,556 33,300 1995 1,417,135 219,9001996 23,556 33,300 1 996 1,417,135 219,9001997 23,556 33,300 1997 1,417,135 219,9001998 23,556 33,300 1998 1,417,135 219,900mo u,4,41999 23,556 33,300 9 99 1,417,135 219,900 -j

NAVIGATION AIDS TOAMASINA

[Year | Benefits Costs Net-benefits lYear Benefits Costs Net-benefits

1986 0 ol 1986 °

1987 r °l Ol a 987 1 °l° 4 i1988 0 0 1988 01989 0 198940 2,465,8661990 450,507 867,878 1990 937,629 1,479,374_1991 162,183 0 1991 1,191,051 2,667,9471992 450,507 221 ,179 1992 2,553,195 1,094,2821993 202,728 0 1993 3,421,650 53,6001994 450,5071 1 ,4 i, 6 _ 411994 3,649,775 5 , 0 _ g1995 450,507 0 1995 3,649,775 53,6001996 450,507 0 1996 3,649,775 53,6001997 450,507 0 1997 3,649,775 53,600p1998 450.5071998 3,649,775 53,6001999 1 450,507 0 1999 3,649,775 53,600

() Recalculated on the same basis (32% in the SAR)

TOTAL OF THE PROJECT

[Year &: enerits Costs I Net-beneis |

1986 0 °l° s1987 01 _ 1988 0 [ 601 1_19S9 1 ° 6,6f,9 -1990 1 3,050,8531 2, 5 84 _ 1

p1992 4,642,426[ 3,1 6 34[993 5,297,7941 1,721,831 _

11994 1 5,506,6301 ",62 ,9 21995 5,517,4171 2 73 ,500_01996 5,517,4171 27 3 5 0

11997 5,517,4171 2 73 5 0{P8 [ 5,517,4171 273 ,5500

{1999 5,517,4171 2 3 5 0

35

Table 10: Status of Legal CovenantsMadagascar

Ports Rehabilitation Project

DTM Portsl|Scin3.03 b Complete a review of level and structure of port Complied withl

related charges and by June 30, 1988 revise suchl ~~~~~rates l

Section 4.01 b(ii) Submit audited report within six months Complied with only in 1993Section 4.02 Not to undertake investments above US$50,000 Complied withl_____________ without consultationSection 4.03 Beginning in 1988, take measures to ensure gross Covering working expenses but not full

revenues to meet operating expenses, including depreciation in 1993. Complied with in 1994______________ depreciation but the net income is still negativeSEPT

Section 3.03 b Annually review action plan before June 30 Complied with

Section 3.03 b Review tariffs in each fiscal year before June 30 Complied with

Section 4.01 b(ii) Submit audited reports within six months Complied with

Section 4.02 Not to undertake investments above US$300,000 Complied withwithout consultation

Section 4.03 Beginning in 1988, provide gross revenues to meet Complied with.. _ _ operating expenses

Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

|Through appraisal 41.2 n.a.

|Appraisal-board 45.2 n.a.

Board-effectiveness 9.4 n.a.

|Supervision 90.5 n.a.

Completion 12 n.a.

Total 198.5 n.a.

36

Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions

Identification July-7 7 1 PE 1 Aug. 10, 1983Preparation June-84 21 3 SE, FA, PE 9 July 10, 1984Preparation Oct.-84 14 3 SE, FA, PE 8 Nov. 26, 1984Pre-appraisal July-85 7 2 SFA, SLO 1.5 July 29, 1985Appraisal Nov.-85 10 2 LO, SE 3 Dec. 13, 1985Post-appraisal Apr.-86 12 3 FA, SE, PE 5 May 28, 1986Supervision I Dec.-86 4 1 SFA n.a. n.a. 0.3 July, 8 1987Supervision 2 Mar.-87 7 2 PE, FA n.a. n.a. 2 July, 8 1987Supervision 3 Feb.-88 14 2 PE, SE n.a. n.a. 4 June 10, 1988Supervision 4 Oct.-88 14 3 FA, SE, PE n.a. n.a. 6 Dec. 20, 1988Supervision 5 June-89 14 2 PE, SE 1,1,11,2 n.a. 2 Sep. 21,1989Supervision 6 June-90 14 2 PE, SE 1,1 1,1,2 n.a. 2.7 July 19, 1990Supervision 7 Oct.-90 21 2 PE, SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2, 1,2, 1,2 6 Dec. 5, 1990Supervision 8 Mar.-91 10 2 PE, SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2, 1,2, 1,2 3 May 6, 1991Supervision 9 June-91 12 2 PE, SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 4.5 Sep. 5,1991Supervision 10 Dec.-91 14 1 SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 1 Jan. 27, 1992Supervision 11 July-92 14 2 PE, SE 1,1, 1, 1,2 2,2, 1, 1, 1,2 3.3 Aug. 24, 1992Supervision 12 Nov.-92 17 1 SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 2.5 Jan. 8, 1993Supervision 13 Jan.-93 12 2 PE, SE, FA 1,1,1,1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 3.7 Mar. 26,1993Supervision 14 July-93 17 2 PE, SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 3.7 July29, 1993Supervision 15 Nov.-93 12 2 PE, SE 1,1,1,1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 2.5 Jan. 5, 1994Supervision 16 Feb.-94 14 2 PE, SE 1, l. 1, 1,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 1.5 Mar 25, 1994Supervision 17 May-94 9 1 SE 2,1,1,2,2 2,2,1,1.1, 2 1.3 June 21, 1994Supervision 18 Aug.-94 7 1 SE s, s, 1, 2, 2,2 2,2,1,1,1,2 1 Sep. 6,1994Supervision 19 Nov.-94 7 1 PE s, s, 1, 2, 2,2 2,2,1, 1,1,2 1 Dec. 6,1994Completion Jan. 95 14 2 PA, C 4 Mar. 31 1995Total 83.5

SE Senior EconomistPE Port EngineerSFA Senior Financial AnalystC ConsultantFA Financial AnalystSLO Senior Loan OfficerLO Loan OfficerPA Projects Assistant

APPENDICES

MADAGASCARMISSION D'ELABORATION DU RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT

Fevrier 1994

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Projet de Rehabilitation des Ports. Credit 1752-MAG

A. Introduction

1. Une delegation de la Banque Mondiale composee de MM. A. Lamrini (Consultant), et K.Ben Hamida (Projects Assistant) a effectue du 24 Janvier au 7 Fevrier 1995 une mission de post-evaluation du Projet de rehabilitation Portuaire a Madagascar. La delegation a egalement visite leport de Toamasina (Tamatave) et le Port de Mahajanga. Par ailleurs la mission a eu des entretiensavec les compagnies de transports maritimes (CMN, SMNTM). Le present aide-memoire reprendles principales observations faites par la delegation apres les discussions avec les responsables de laDirection des Transports Maritimes (DTM) et la Societe d'Exploitation du Port de Toamasina(SEPT) ainsi que les cofinanciers du projet (CFD, FAC, KfW) et les compagnies maritimes. Ilcontient les principaux points de repere qui seront developpes lors de 1'etablissement du Rapportd'Achevement du Projet.

2. La delegation exprime ses remerciements aux responsables de la DTM et de la SEPT ainsiqu'aux representants des cofinanciers du projet pour I'assistance et I'aide dont ils ont fait preuve ason egard. La liste des personnes rencontrees au cours de la mission est donnee en annexe I.

B. Etat des credits alloues au projet

3. Le projet est quasiment acheve. La date d& cl6ture du credit fixee initialement au 30Septembre 1992 a et repoussee deux fois, suite aux missions de supervisions. Le credit est clos le31 Decembre 1994. Cependant, il n'a e debourse que 85% du montant initial prevu dans I'accordde pret. Une partie du reliquat restant est en cours de deboursement et le reste (environ US$ 1.5million) sera annule. Ces retards, qui ont conduit par ailleurs a I'annulation du dernier reliquat,s'expliquent par plusieurs facteurs dont les plus importants sont:

(a) Lenteur dans la devolution des marches d'etudes ainsi que leur realisation.(b) Contrepartie malgache non toujours disponible a temps pour l'engagement des

marches(c) Lourdeur des procedures administratives pour la passation des marches.(d) Dispersion des sites et leur isolement ainsi que les difficultes techniques imprevues.(e) Evenements politiques et sociaux deroules en 1991.

4. II est a signaler que deux operations viennent de demarrer et ont fait l'objet d'un debut dedeboursement (rehabilitation du phare de l'ile aux Prunes et refection du mole C du port deToamasina). Pour ces deux operations, les travaux engages apres la date de cloture du credit serontpris en charge par le credit d'urgence relatif aux degats cycloniques.

2

5. Les cofinanciers du projet n'ont debourse qu'une partie du montant alloue initialement (88%pour [a KFW et 79% pour la CFD). Ils ont aussi justifi6 ce fait, ainsi que les retards enregistres, parla lourdeur des procedures adnministratives et la situation politique que le pays a vecu en 1991.

C. Realisation des Objectifs Physiques du Projet

6. In?faxsrilwfires: La inajorit6 des travaux de genie civil et d infrastructure de rehabilitationdes neuf principaux ports soUS Ia tutelle du. MTM ont et executes a temps. Ces travaux visaient aameliorer l tat de l'infrastrLictuLe portuaire qui joue un r6le vital dans l'economie du pays. Lestravaux effectues out permis d'ernpcher une degradation de l'infrastructure portuaire.

7. Eqluipeinents: Les equipements de manutention et de transport ont ete financesessentiellement par la KtW. Ces equipernents ont ete fournis selon les delais prevus pour les deuxpremi&res tranches du cr&dit, et avec quelques retards pour la derniere tranche. Ce retard est du a lalourdeur des procedures de passation des marches. Les equipements ont permis aux ports de se doterde moyens de manutention absents ou en tres mauvais etat avant le debut du projet. Ils ont ameliorela capacite des ports a operer avec des niveaux superieurs. Cependant, le faible niveau du trafic dG ala degradation de la situation economique, n'a pas permis d'exploiter pleinement ces capacites. 11ressort de l entretien avec la KfW que beaucoup d'equipements achetes sont actuellement enmauvais etat. Ceci est dfi essentiellement a l'absence de maintenance. Dans les futurs projetsl'accent doit etre mis sur l importance de cette composante. 11 serait aussi preferable de financer desequipements moins sophistiques et plus faciles a maintenir.

8. Travauix de Dragage: Beaucoup de problemes ont ete rencontres dans la r6alisation destravaux de dragage. LU'idee initiale de faire faire ces travaux par une entreprise specialisee a eteabandonnee. 11 a ete procede, A la place, a la passation d'un marche d'assistance technique auService des Voies Maritimes pour la remise en etat de trois dragues et la realisation des dragages parles equipes de l'Administration. Ceci s'est traduit par une reduction des objectifs prevus dans cettecomposante.

9. Aides a la navigation: Les aides a la navigation consistaient en une etude hydrographiqueainsi que la rehabilitation du genie civil et la renovation des equipements des feux et phares d'accesaux principaux ports. L'etude hydrographique a ete annulee pour cause de coCGt leve. Les travauxde genie civil ont et6 finances par l'AID. L'achat de materiels et les petits travaux de reparation ontete finances par le FAC. Ces operations permettent l'acces nocturne aux ports, I'amelioration de lasecurite des navires et la reduction de leur temps d'immobilisation. Cependant beaucoup deproblemes de maintenance ont et rencontres. L'absence des pieces de rechange, le niveau faibledes agents par rapport aux techniques actuelles et l'insuffisance des credits d'entretien constituentles principales causes de reduction de l'impact des objectifs consideres.

3

D. Realisation des Objectifs Institutionnels du Projet

10. Assistance technique etformation: L'assistance technique dont a beneficie la DTM lui apermis de mener le Projet a son terme. La formation, realisee sur place et a 1'etranger, a beneficieaussi bien aux cadres qu'aux personnels de maitrise. La formation de formateurs a permis d'etofferle service formation du MTM. Le programme aurait pu mieux atteindre ses objectifs s'il avaitenglobe les autres intervenants portuaires (Transporteurs maritimes, Douanes, Operateurs prives).

11. Restructuration financiere: Les resultats de la restructuration financiere diff6rent entre laSEPT et la DTM.

DTM: Les objectifs fixes initialement pour la DTM consistant a (i) assurer un niveau de recettespermettant la couverture des cofits en tenant compte des amortissements, (ii) reduire le personnel de10% et (iii) augmenter la partie du budget allouee a la maintenance, n'ont pas e realises.L'examen des resultats comptables du BAP (Budget Annexe de Ports) des trois dernieres anneesmontre que les recettes sont insuffisantes pour couvrir les charges d'exploitation. Ceci peut etreexplique d'une part par la devaluation du Franc malgache, empechant a l'augmentation des tarifs derepondre a l'objectif de reduction des coOts, et d'autre part par l'incorporation des investissementsrdalis6s dans le cadre du projet, dans les comptes financiers. Cependant des resultats positifs sont asouligner dans les methodes de gestion financiere. En effet, 11 a ete passe dans le cadre du projet unmarch6 d'assistance technique dans le domaine financier qui a permis l'installation d'un systeme decomptabilit6 commerciale assurant beaucoup plus d'efficacite.

SEPT: 11 ressort de l'examen des resultats financiers de la SEPT une grande amelioration parrapport a 1987, date du debut du projet. Une augmentation annuelle et soutenue, de son resultatd'exploitation tres superieure aux estimations a e enregistree.

E. Conclusions de la Mission

12. Le projet a permis d'empecher une degradation du secteur portuaire malgache. Les travauxde rehabilitation et les equipements achetes ont dote les ports sous la tutelle du MTM de moyensindispensables pour assurer leurs activites. Ils ont permis a la SEPT d'assurer un bon niveaud'activite et d'excellents resultats financiers. Les reformes institutionnelles et I'assistance techniqueont ameliore 1'efficacite de la gestion du secteur portuaire. Cependant la generalite du projet,touchant tous les ports du pays, a reduit son impact sur chacun des ports. La devaluation du Francmalgache a limite la realisation de ses objectifs financiers. La lourdeur des proceduresadministratives et l'occurrence d'evenements exceptionnels (degats cycloniques et evenementspolitiques de 91) ont engendre beaucoup de retards dans 1'execution du projet qui s'est deroule sur10 ann&es (identification en 1984).

4

13. Afin d'amdliorer I'etat du secteur portuaire, d'autres projets sont a envisager. Des portscomme Tulear, Mahajanga et Antsiranana sont des candidats potentiels pour de telles interventions.Les points a souligner dans les prochains projets sont:

(a) Mettre l'accent sur l'importance de la maintenance afin d'assurer la durabilite desinvestissements.

(b) Reorganiser le secteur portuaire en regroupant les trois principaux ports (Tulear,Mahajanga et Antsiranana) dans une entite autonome et en etudiant la possibilited' intervention du secteur prive (particulierement au port de Toamasina).

(c) Etudier et mettre en oeuvre un systeme tarifaire, base sur une comptabilite analytiqueet indexe sur une devise stable (pour la DTM).

(d) Simplifier les formalites administratives et douanieres, particulierement pour lecabotage national.

Antananarivo, le 07 Fevrier 1995Pour la Banque Mondiale

A. Lamrini K. Ben Hamida(Consultant) (Projects Assistant)

ANNEXE I

MADAGASCARMISSION D'ELABORATION DU RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT

Fevrier 1994

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Projet de r6habilitation des ports. Credit 1 752-MAG

Liste des personnes rencontrdes

Ministere des Transports et de la Meteorologie (MTM)

M. RIVOSON Razanamahazo, Directeur des Transports Maritimes,M. JACKY Razafimanantsoa, Chef du Service des Voies Maritimes,M. RABARY Jean Germain, Chef du Projet Portuaire,M. GUILLAUME, Chef du Service de ]'Exploitation des Ports,Mme. RAZANAMPAMONJY Pascaline, Chef du Service Formation.

Societe d'Exploitation du Port de Toamasina (SEPT)

M. ARISTIDE Emmanuel, Directeur general,M. MANANJARA, Directeur technique,M. ZAFINANDRO Rend Max, Directeur de I'Exploitation,M. RAKOTOVAO Eugene, Directeur Administratif et Financier,M. IMPALY Seraphin, Contr6leur de gestion.

Port de Mahajanga

M. BECKY Symphorien, Capitaine du Port,M. LEGEN de la Compagnie Malgache de Manutention (CMDM).

Compagnies de Transport Maritime

M. RAMANANTSOA Andrianoro, Directeur General de la Societe Nationale Malgache de Transport Maritime (SNMTM),M. ABOUBAKARY Assani, Directeur Gendral de la Compagnie Malgache de Navigation (CMN).

Caisse FranVaise de Developpement (CFD)

M. VAILLANT Louis Jacques.

Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC)

M. DECAMPS Benoit, Conseiller a la Mission Francaise de Cooperation et d'Action Culturelle.

KFW

M. SCHMID, Representant du Kfw.

Annex IPage I of 3

Economic Calculation Model

The economic calculation of benefits is based on the saving in time on cargohandling operation. This saving is reached through improvements in productivity. Savingare calculated as follow:

For the year n: Number of days saved is:

Tonnage handled at the year n Tonnage handled at the year n

productivity without the project productivity with the project

The benefits are equal to:

Benefits = Days saved for vessels x C, + Days.saved for coasters x

Cv,essel: Cost of waiting in ports for vessels

Ccoas,er: Cost of waiting in ports for coasters

When benefits begin before the end of the investment they were taken equal to thelast formula, but deflated with the percentage of the achieved investment of the totalinvestment.

For Toamasina: time in port to time in berth was taken into account to compute thenumber of days saved. You find in next page the details of calculation for Toamasina. Thesame methodology was followed for other ports.

I ( t *,; - ( . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Annox I . *f PORT 01? T2MAOf Anne

1989 1,417,333 2.465,866~~~~~~~~~~~~~98 00

1992 874,667 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~98 0-

_|i 199 41,300,29 ,69'4 :^i

Ya T.vsesl . coasters(2 ) Benfit 1992| 2,553,195 1,094,282 1,458,9131990 700 83 2,930,7 199 3,421,650 53,600 3,368,055

+ 1991 534 70 2,326,81 3,649,775 53,600 3,596,17519I 92 638 67 2,553,19 I1995 3,649,775 53,600 3,596,1751993 700 119 3 421T g h 1996 3 649 775 536 00 3t596s1751994 810 115 3(649,72) Toag 3,649,775 53,600 3t596s1751995 810 1155 3,649,700 1a 3,649,775 53,600 3,596,175

1999. . 41,300.. 53...60--(3299 3,649,775 53,600 3,596,17n

Toear ~2SAR costs Actal co s am.1986 ~0 0 TMI W 77w

1988 9384,000 0 | Traffic: Higher than prevision

1989 1,417,333 2.465,866t1990 1,685,333 1.479.374k Productivity: Compared to prevision

1 992 874,667 1,.0964,2982 Costs: less thani expected

1993 41,300 53.600 m,

-1996 41,300 53600 , ,;j, ,.,(1) Tonnage handled bv vessels ('000 tons) - ;-;-1997 41,300 53,600 &-(2) Tornnage handled by coasters ('000 toiis)::;

1998 41,0 53,600( Recalculated oni the same basis

Annex I

Page 3 of 3

Table: Effect of Traffic, Productivity and Costs, on the ERR calculation

I_ I____~~Toia t :ro;5 -26% 28% -5Mgnakara -9% 25% 0 -4

Mrondava -100% 41% 0 -3Vohemartl00 X X: -2% 26% + + -I

IosyBe S 50% 53% - - - I+

18% 22% 0 - -3

ToIiara 45% 29% + 0 0Toamasina 39% 32% + 0 - IMahajanga 31% 22% + + + + 2Antsiranana 29% 38% 0 + + 2Nav. Aids 29% 26% n.a n.a + + n.a|DTM ports 12% 28% -- n.a n.a

|Total Project | 27% | 29% " n.a I n.a I I n.a

Codes-: Worse than the expected by more than 50%

*: Worse than the expected by more than 10% and less than 50%0: More or less 10% than the expected value+: Better than the expected by more than 10% and less than 50%+ +: Better than the expected by more than 50%

Table 2A: Effect of Investment type on the ERR values for each Component

-26% 28% 12% 42% 46%

-9% 25% 31% 41% 28%.. 0n ;.a -100% 41% 100% 0% 0%

lohomalr 0 -2% 26% 100% 0% 0%osy& 0. ; 0t i 50% 53% 100% 0% 0%

Eouis f :; ;:i 18% 22% 31% 0% 69%Toliara 45% 29% 35% 25% 40%Toamasina 39% 32% 29% 71% 0%Mahajanga 31% 22% 100% 0% 0%Antsiranana 29% 38% 100% 0% 0%

Table 2B: Effect of Investment type on the ERR values for MTM ports and Toamasina

||DTM I 12% 28% 44% 26% 30%

||SEPT(IDA) | - - 74% 26% 0%||SEPT(CFD) | - - 0% 100% 0%||SEPT(tot.) | 39% 32% 29% 71% 0%||

(*) Percentage of the total costs of each component. These costs are only the one taken intoaccount in the economic evaluation

Tables 1: Costs Ventilation per Category and Cofinancier (US$M) Annex 2Page I of2

Table IA: Total Project

I \C~g~an~Ihg~ ~;. ~ ~j $hsppmg. , ]~ . 1o~sjwuoaJ Devlpmeflt Tow;cn~

C________> Fo-tisgn I,.t,,l-afibggn.l TLe otc l]l -Foreign Local 1.Foreign ILal ioreign , Foeign Locd I m

IDA (MTM) 1.08 3 33 0 00 0.00 0.53 1.80 0 35 0.62 0.36 1 02 0 05 0.28 0.25 0 96 2 62 8.03 10.65

IDA (SEPT) .04 1 55 0 00 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0.00 0 00 0 00 1 04 2 58 3.4)2

Local 066 000 000 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 000 0.03 0.00 006 0°00 15 0 00 1.15

CFD 0 00 0 00 0 00 4.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0.00 2.74 0 00 0 00 0 00 7 38 7.38

KfW 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.62 0.00 (.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0 00 0 00 3 62 3.62

IFAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00° 0.00 0.00 0.87|| 0.87

lTOTAL lJ 2.781 4.881 0.00° 9.291 0.681 1.80| 0.50° 1.491 0.45 1.02 0.09 3.02 0.31 0.96 4.80 22-48 27-28

iI 7.66 9.29 2.48 199 1 147 3.11 ! 1.27

II 4.48 4.58

Table IB: DTM Ports

IDA (MTM) 108 3-33 0°00 0 00° 0.53 180 035 62 036 1 02 005 028 025 096 262 803 10.65

Local 0.66 0.00 0l00 0 00 0 15 0 00 01 5 0 00 009 0 00 003 000 006 °°°| I 15 0o 1.15

KfW 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 621 0.00 0.00 0 00 o oo 000 000 000 000 00 000 00 362 3.62

FAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.o0 0.87 0 000 0 00 0 000 0 000 0 871| 0 870

|LTOTALI iJ 1.741 3.331 0.00 3.621 0.681 1.80j O.50j 1.491 0.451 1.021 0.091 0.28j 0.31j 0.961 3.77 12.52J 16.28 ]5.08 3.62 q 2.48 11 1.99 1.47 11 0.37 r1 1.27 J

4.48 1.84 lrTable IC: Toamasina

|IDA (SEPT) 1.041 1.551 0.00° 03 00 0 0°001 0°00 0-00l 000 000 0.001 ° o °°l 10 041 2 58

CFD 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.64 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0700 274 000 00 38 |1

T 1.041 1.551 0.00 5.671 0.00| 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00° 0.00° 0.00 2.741 0.00° 0.00 .04 9.96|

2.59 0.05.67 °°11 02.74 !! °-°° 11-0.00 2.74

Anncx 2Paee 2 of 2

Table 2: Costs Ventilation per Year and Port (*) (USS)

ii . . . ; g l M t - | TOT AL |T-07 %(**

Antsiranana

1990 152,5391 1 1 | 10,4851 163.024IRehabilitation I I0 0%

Mahajanga

1990 | 927,4601 1 | 61,9741 989.434 Rehabilitation 1)0( 0

Manakar

1988 335,076 335,076 Equipment 4 1

1990 895,246 63,171 958,417 Rehabilitation 3%1

1991 136,937 136,937 Equipment 41%

1993 789.061 789,061 Equipment 4 1%

1994 822,891 1 _ 49,019 871,910 Dredging 28-%(

Morondava

1990 | 437,6761 1 I | 30,8841 468,560lRehabilitation I I(On|

1994 1 6s,9501 | 22,6631 88.613 Rehabilitation I I0O%|

Nosy Be

1990 45,3761 3.119| 48.495Rhabilitationi I 100%

St Louis1990 190,191| I | 13,0731 203,264IRehabilitationi 31.

1994 434,3031 1 25.871 460,174 Dredging 69"n

Tolieara

1988 335,0381 335,038 E-quipinent |25oo |

1990 437,676 _ I _ 30.884 468,560 Rehabilitation | 35°o

1994 297,155 203,714 500.869 Dredging 40%

1995 23.352 9,989 33,341 Dredging 40%

Tolagnaro |

1990 238,732 J 16.8461 255,578 Rehabilitation 12

1993 1 868,8131 _ 868,813 Equipment | 42-o|

1994 1 731,459 I 229,5851 961.044 Dredging J 46%

Vohemar

1990 578,2981 _ J | 39,7511 618,049IRehabilitation I00'1o||

Toamasina

1990 1,047,129 1,418,737 _ r J 2.465866

1991 775,490 703,8841 1,479.374

1992 641,827 2,026,1211 _ _ 1 2,667.947

1993 635,697 458,5851 _ 1 J 1,094.282

Nav-Aids

1990 J 14,279_ 5,255 19,534_

1991 7 1 7 867,878 1 7 867.878, 1 11

1993 J 165,884_ 557295 221,179 1 111995 j 1,243,207 T I r 98,256 1,341.463 _11

TOTAL | 10,801,8171 4,607,3271 867,8781 2,464,9241 969,8341 19,711,7801

(*) These costs are only the ones taken into account in the economic evaluation

(**) Percentage of each category as a part of the amount spent on each port.

Annex 3

Page I of 6

MADAGASCARPORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT

SEPT!Income Statements

tor the vears etided December 31st

(nillljoii FMG's)

Source: SEPT and Auidit Reports NATW 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Revenue:

Cargo relate(d (Estinate) 3,542 74% 4,462 76% 5,620 77% 5,900 77% 6.215 77S 6,581 77% 6,966 77% 7,372 7S%

Cargo related (Actual) 4,249 65Y 7,769 78% 12,627 69% 12,511 42 % 13,998 72% 12,615 6)% 20,198 3) 72% 16,410 S9%

Vessel relatedl (Fstiinates 499 ioqx 636 ii% 810 ii% 862 i1% 918 Is% 949 iS% 982 is 1,015 10S

Vessel relatedl (Actual) 508 8s 881 9% 1,880 ios 2,544 9% 3,111 16% 3,870 19% 4,447 16% 6,010 21%

Other (Estmate) 755 ibcs 806 i4% 861 12% 92) 12% 987 125 1,026 12% 1.067 12% 1,1I10 12%

Odlier (Actual 1,731 274 1.346 13% 3,683 2o% 14,850 so% 2,409 12% 4,255 21 % 3,324 s2% 15,337 'n20%

Operating Revenues (Estimate) 4,796 iooe 5,904 soos 7,291 ioo% 7,683 ics% 8,120 1oo% 8,556 100% 9,015 0os% 9,497 soosOjperatingRevenues (Actual) 6,488 at 0$ g 7 IExpenseSalarie.N (kEstnaite) 3,829 74Y 3,987 74 i 4.149 74 % 4,323 73X 4,505 73 % 4,555 72% 4,602 72 % 4,645 70%

Salaries (Actual) 3.591 4i6s 4,005 6oX 5,461 66X 6,047 58% 5,629 so% 7,441 S2% 9,075 5i% 10,343 39%

Materials (Estimate) 922 19% 972 18gX 1.025 III° 1,083 18i 1,144 19% 1,201 19% 1,260 20% 1,321 20%

Materials (Actual) 857 II, 1,249 i95 868 iso 1,703 16%X 2,582 23% 4,243 30% 5,557 31% 5,933 22%

Othe r (Estimate) 401 s x 429 8s 458 89 490 8S 525 9% 546 9 s 567 9% 647 10%

Otlier (Actuiil) 3,354 41i 1,415 21% 1.967 24% 2,750 26% 3,069 27% 2,622 18% 3,332 19% 10,538 39%

Working Expenises (Estimate) 5,152 ioos 5,388 iooe 5,632 ioos 5,896 ioos 6,174 ice% 6,302 ices 6,429 eoo 6, 613 icesWorking Expenses (Actual) 7,802 i 4i 39 . ,ti7 9 iN I M X

Operating Result (Estimate) (356) 516 1,659 1,787 1,946 2,254 2,586 2,884Operating Result'(Actual) (1,314) t .3327' Ii i.i_Depreciation (Fsimaste) 526 668 810 892 993 1,039 1 084 1,129Depr,ciatnto and piovisionsActual 2,30t5 2.171 6,445 14,788 2' 6.486 7,140 9,218 9,955

Net Operating Result (Estimate) (882) (152) 849 895 953 1,215 1,502 1,755Net Operating Result (Actual) (3,619) . 1,156: .4., t4ti'Mt4N S I.. ,,.

Interes.t esen.s (Estimate) 198 251 488 731 836 992 928 839iiterest eslsenscs (nel) (Actual) (h) 45 227 1,134 2,488 1,077 (1,164) (712)

Eitraoodliirs it(moo (tEminair)Extraiidtnary items iict) iActual) (917) (640) (2,398) (2.362) 2,201 3,019 1,095 1,825

Net Inicome L oss) (Estimnate) (1,080) (403) 361 164 117 223 574 916Net Incomne ( Loss) (Actual) (4,596) 471 . -24 . -Ž 4 ta .- - _ g ' , 3 U

! I)This inicrease is dun to Ihc iincrease In rice iniport betweeni 1988 and 1989.

(2) This increa,se is due to thc increase In provisions on rice receipts.

(3) This incracase is diirc tn he change of taritication system. Before 1992 tariffs were indexed on Malagasy franc, After 1992 they were indexed on the ECU(4) Prv.isioin ior liabiitijes

Annex 3Page 2 of 6


SEPTBalance Sheets

for the years ended December 31st(million FMG's)

Source :Audit reports 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993ASSETSCash (Estimate) 1I190 9% 886 6% 875 5% 923 5% 974 5Y 1,027 6S 1,082 7% 1,140 7%Cash(Actual) 2,431 20% 3.189 8% 3,859 8% 8,873 14X 16,795 23% 22,268 26% 25,534 27% 24,670 27%

Accounts Receivables (Estimate) 5,525 43 % 5,306 35s 5,111 29z 4,205 24% 3,462 19% 2,846 16 # 2,339 14 % 1,922 12%

Accounts Receivables(Actual) 3,124 260 4,361 ui% 9,213 18% 10,472 16% 9,659 139 8,356 10o 10,767 I2% 13,027 14%

Inventories (Estimate) 805 6 % 992 7 % 1,224 7o 1,292 7 % 1,363 7 o 1,437 8% 1,514 9% 1,595 1saInventories(Actual) 919 8% 1,149 3% 1,464 3S 1,636 3 % 1,762 2 % 3,148 4Y 2,534 3% 2,919 3%

Current assets (Estimate) 7,520 59% 7,184 47 % 7,210 41% 6,420 36% 5,799 32% 5.310 310 4,935 30 % 4,657 29%

Current assets(Actual) 6,474 53 % 8,699 2z% 14,536 29% 20,980 33% 28,217 38% 33,772 39% 38,835 42 % 40,616 os%

Net Fixed assets (Estimate) 5,045 4o% 7,876 52% 10,440 6s% 10,977 62% 11,805 64s 11,398 66s 10,828 66% 10,137 63%

Net Fixed assets(Actual) 3,927 32 % 30,592 75 x 34,499 68s 41,618 65% 43,589 isa 45,345 53 % 50,276 54 % 47,262 52%

Deffered Charges (Estimate) 3 oX 3 o% 3 os 3 0% 3 0% 3 3, 3 0% 3 o%Deffered Charges(Actual) so O% 0% 0% 1 s's 54 so 47 0% 35 o%Other assets (Estomate) 196 25 115 is % 128) -is 368 2% 726 4% 632 4 T 732 49 1,371 8aOther assets(Actual) 1,723 14% 1,235 3% 1,503 ;s 1.860 3% 1,870 3s 7,132 8% 3.878 4% 3,592 4%

Total Assets(Estimate) 12,764 1os 15,178 soo% 17,525 oos 17,768 10 18,333 o% 17,343 soox 16,498 iooa 16,168 100%Total Assets(Actual) 12,125 :o:s 40,526 so 50,538 soo 64 ,458 IOOS5 73,677 oo%s 86,303 ioows 93,035 sos 91,505 soos

LIABILITIESCurrent Liabilities (Estimate) 5,971 47 % 5,182 34% 4,496 26% 3,906 22% 3,395 L9% 2,876 17s 2,436 t5% 2,505 15s

Current Liabilities(Actual) 10,162 s4s 4.938 12% 7,235 14% 11,521 i8% 17.145 23% 18,323 21% 27,344 29% 27,535 30%

Long Term Debt (Estimate) 2,755 22 9 5,360 35 % 8,031 4609 9,190 52- 10,899 59% 10,203 59 o 9,223 56 8,158 50%

Long Term Debt(Actual) 2,181 is8 2,070 5% 8,638 170 17,827 28% 20,642 28% 33,034 ii's 33,766 36 % 32,690 369

Provisions (Estimate) 1,500 1 2%s 1,500 1o% 1,500 9% 1,000 6% 250 1 x 250 , x 250 2% 0o

Provisions(Actual) 262 2 % 26,380 65 % 27,175 54 % 27,190 42 % 27,451 37 % 26,497 31 0 21,495 23 % 20,017 22%

Paid in Capital(Estimate) 6,710 S3 x 6,710 44% 6,710 38X 6,710 38% 6,710 s7 x 6,710 o9 o 6,710 41 % 6,710 42 %

Paid in Capital(Actual) 4,500 373 11,557 29% 11,557 230 11,557 85% 11.557 16s 11,557 13 ' 11.557 12% 11,557 13%

Retained Earning (Loss) (Estimate) (2,092) -i6s (3,171) -2i% (3,573) aox (3,202) -i8s (3,038) -17% (2,919) -i7% (2,695) -16% (2,121) .13%

Retained Earning (Loss)(Actual) (547) -5s (5,143) -13% (5,109) -io% (5,060) -8s (4,993) -s7 (4,905) 6., (4,855) 5% (4,807) -5%

Reserves (Estimate) (1,000) -8s so% o s 0% o% 0 ' ox 0%Reserves(Actual) 163 i x 163 o% 219 c,s 301 o% 413 1 % 560 i s 683 , 9 988 i%

Current income (Estimate) (1,080) -8% (403) -3 % 361 2% 164 i x 117 i s 223 , W 574 3 9 916 6%

Current income(Actual) (4,596) -380 471 is 824 20 1,121 20 1.464 2o 1,237 13 3,045 3% 3,525 4%

Total Equirs' (Estimnate) 2,538 2os 3,136 Si' 3,498 20 's 3,672 210% 3, 789 21 3 4,014 233 - 4,589 25 % 5,505 34%

Total Equity(Actual) (480) -4s 7.048 7 % 7,491 15X 7,919 32% 8,442 ,1% 8.449 10% 10,430 H, 11.263 12%

Liabilities and Equity(Estimate) 12,764 soos 15,178 ooxs 17,525 i0870 17. 768 sos 18,333 mos IZ7343 io . 16,498 ioo% 16,168 100%Liabilities and Equity(Actual) 12,124 ioo% 40,436 oo% 50,538 ,ous 64,457 ioo% 73,680 ,oos 86,303 os,I 93,035 6,0% 91,505 soos

Annex 3Page 3 of 6


SEPTProForma Ratio Analysis


Source: SEPT and Audit reports 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993Efficiency:Revenue turnover(Estimate) 95.1% 75.0% 69.8% 70.0% 68.8% 75.1% 83.3% 93.7%Revenue tumover(Actual) 165.2% 32.7% 52.7% 71.9% 44.8% 45.7% 55.6% 79.9%Receivables turnover *(Estimate) 415 324 252 197 153 120 93 73Receivables tumover *(Actual) 173 157 182 126 178 145 139 124Inventory turnover *(Estimate) 60 60 61 61 60 60 60 60Inventory tumover *(Actual) 51 41 29 20 33 55 33 28Revenue/Employee (Estimate) 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7Revenue/Employee(Actual) 7.5 8.2 11.4 15.8Tons of Cargo/Employee (Estimate) 125 118 112 105 99 100 101 101Tons of Cargo/Employee(Actual) 300 238 286 344

Pricing :Gen'l Cargo('000 tons) (Estimate) 590 580 570_ 560 550 560 570 580

@ FMG/lton(Actual) 6.1 12.7 20.0 19.3 17.9 20.9 28.6 20.0Number of vessels(Estimate) 358 356 354 352 350 348 346 344Number of vessels(Actual)

@ millionFMG/vessel (Estimate) 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0@ millionFMG/vessel(Actual)

Profitability:Working Razo (Estimate) 107%. 91%. 77% 77% 76% 74% 71% 70%

Operating Ratio (Estimate) 118% 103% 88% 88% 88% 86% 83% 82%

Return on Fixed Assets(Estimate) -21.4% -5.1% 3.5% 1.5% 1.0% 2.0% 5.3% 9.0%Return on Fixed Assets(Actual) -117.0% 1.5% 2.4% 2.7% 3.4% 2.7% 6.1% 7.5%Net return (after int.) (Estimate)Net return (after int.)(Actual)

Liquidity:Working Capital **(Estimate) 1,549 2,002 2,714 2,514 2,404 2,434 2,499 2,152

Current Ratio(Estimate) 1.26 1.39 1.60 1.64 1.71 1.85 2.03 1.86Current Ratio(Actual) 0.64 1.76 2.01 1.82 1.65 1.84 1.42 1.48Quick Ratio (Estimate) 1. 06 1.22 1 .41 1 .41 1.42 1.49 1 .58 1.40

CapUtalization:Debt to Equity(Estimate) 52.0% 63.1% 69. 7% 71.5% 74.2% 71.8% 66.8% 59. 7%

Asset Leverage(Estimate) 80. 1% 79.3% 80.0% 79.3% 79.3% 76.9% 72. 2% 66.0%Asset Leverage(Actual) 104.0% 82.6% 85.2% 87.7% 88.5% 90.2% 88.8% 87.7%Self financing(Estimate)Self financing(Actual)

* Average days on hand** Million FMG

Annex 3Page 4 of 6


SEPTActual Income Statements

for the years ended December 31st(Thousand US$)

Source: SEPT T17 8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Revenue:Cargo related (Actual) 6,283 7,266 8,974 7,803 9,369 6,873 10,S36 8,574Vessel related (Actual) 751 824 1,336 1,587 2,082 2,109 2,386 3,140Other (Actual) 2,560 1,259 2,617 9,262 1,612 2,318 1,783 8,014Operating Revenues (Actual) 9,593 9,349 12,927 18,651 13,063 11,300 15,005 19,728Expense:Salaries (Actual) 5,310 3,746 3,881 3,771 3,768 4,054 4,869 5,404Materials (Actual) 1,267 1,168 617 1,062 1,728 2,312 2,981 3,100Other (Actual) 4,959 1,323 1,398 1,715 2,054 1,428 1,788 5,506

Working Expenses (Actual) 11,536 6,237 5,896 6,549 7,550 7,794 9,637 14,010

Operating Result (Actual) (1,943) 3,112 7,031 12,102 5,513 3,506 5,367 5,718Depreciation and provisions(Actual 3,408 2,030 4,580 9,223 4,341 3,890 4,945 5,202

Net Operating Result (Actual) (5,351) 1,081 2,451 2,880 1,172 (384) 422 516Interest expenses(net) (Actual) 89 42 161 707 1,665 587 (624) (372)Extraodinary items (net) (Actual) (1,356) (599) (1,704) (1,473) 1,473 1,645 587 954

Net Income ( Loss) (Actual) (6,796) 441 586 699 980 674 1,634 1,842

Annex 3Page 5 of 6

MvADAGASCARPORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT

SEPTEstimate Income Statements

for the years ended december 31st(Thousand US$)

Source: SAR Estimate -TIY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 3

Revenue:Cargo related (Estimate) 5.237 6,598 8,310 8.724 9,190 9,731 10,300 10,900Vessel related (Estimate) 738 940 1,198 1,275 1,357 1,403 1,452 1,501Other (Estimate) 1,116 1,192 1,273 1,362 1,459 1,517 1,578 1,641

Operating Revenues (Estimate) 7,092 8,730 10,781 11,360 12,007 12,651 13,330 14,043Expense:Salaries (Estimate) 5,662 5.895 6,135 6,392 6,661 6,735 6,805 6.868Materials (Estimate) 1,363 1,437 1,516 1.601 1,692 1,776 1,863 1,953Other (Estimate) 593 634 677 725 776 807 838 957

Working Expenses (Estimate) 7,618 7,967 8,328 8,718 9,129 9,318 9,506 9,778

Operating Result (Estimate) (526) 763 2,453 2,642 2,877 3,333 3,824 4,264Depreciation (Estimate) 778 988 1,198 1,319 1,468 1,536 1,603 1,669

Net Operating Result (Estimate) (1,304) (225) 1,255 1,323 1,409 1,797 2,221 2,595Interest expenses (Estimate) 293 371 722 1,081 1,236 1.467 1,372 1,241Extraodinarv items (Estimate)

Net Income (Loss) (Estimate) (1,597) (596) 534 242 173 330 849 1,354

Annex 3Page 6 of 6

MADAGASCARPORTS REIABILITATION PROJECT

MTMIncome Statements


Source: Consultant's Report 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Revenue:

Expense:Salaries 181,021 51% 187,646 46% 205,599 55% 212,723 41% 217,366 37%

Materials 155,703 44% 198,297 49% 163,205 43 % 299,990 57% 346,120 sssOther 19578 s% 20,850 5% 7,445 2% 10,952 2% 30,208 5%

m___r- N_ -__ -_ __ -_ N_ l__- NDepreciation 363,739 531,865 547,447 550556 537,313

Interest expenses 380,808 141,089 43,133 42,602 40,850Extraodinary items (net) (275,210) 223,994 (193,830) 96,146 (110,780)

I~N _ N N 11I, _- N

MAP SECTION

IBRD 19595R1

12' MADAGASCAR 4'

PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT ANTSIRANANAc PROJECT PORTS 4 ,J

PAVED ROADS St. LouisALL-WEATHER ROADS * o -

- - - - NON-PERMANENT ROADS Nosy-O 4 VohimarinoRAILROADS Abo 1s

RIVERS /7

4- AIRPORTS / So,"Iseos

* NATIONAL CAPITAL Replnono

O FARITANY (PROVINCE] CAPITALS AnoeoAYt-oh,hrqk- +e Andopo a

-- - -. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Bofondriono -

MAHAJANGA'5' J Bersde \\Mondritioro\

Mt., 0 1 o *' y) ~2i -6' OiiV

I616 5 1 °§~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ° 0roco ampioon.Iy jMoonorror

,,}/ ArbotoboetnyO 0

R'A\ J )

4-+s sIompy Moevstsoons J ) Tss,stonsos 2 ooniroorpo-ivoogo NOSEtll4- -nq NOSY-

/ PAndr AndI n .4A.d Anbod.fototro

// 0 Morsfnnooe \p 4'Lg

Mo-trsno<- nubotaondrazo a

0 > Ank-j;gnlzOO 2TAOMASINA

An so In~~~~~~~~11~hs

' Tsroonomsnddy t s, VA

/ 0S'.vnsodr on° }Andrsnos.nnj 4-' loonrBelo-T.lrRN-3 ,lo4>efq la

20' ) Antsirabe ' FondMoon o or20- Mrnao_ rlmoj 0Mronoan c. \Mso bondy

,oro bo Sor /snN,orr

M,nL9 e~~~~~~- <Mananj~MnanaryBororono Faonarantso -

Morombe >6Torwndavo O [ 8\ !~~~~~~onkor

oAnk-.ob. Io ., M nakaraII ~~~~~~~ ~ ~~lb.,

0

4n.szosoo ,9ohiVoh,peno KILOMETERS 0 50 100 ISO 200

5>oWorCho Y V-ndr-0o >ForMILES 0 50 10

^ B~~~~~~ ~~entroko/TOLIARY ' ? oi n

24 9elo -g M ,ds ngy / Zi n ZAIRE TANZANIA

21. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~24' )-.. OOOThe boundaries, colors, C Sorooto * 'J MAIAWI OMa1 rdenominations and any 4 i ZAM IA .X rtother information shown 'i--i j

on this map do not / A , J r ,

The World Boank Group, Amb\sary-Sud R-13 ZEMA8W( MADAACARony judgment on the legal -v Toolagno K 5stotus of any territory, -> -- o 9 -or any endorsement 'tAbo- SOLJTHor acceptonce of such AFRICASboundaries.

ASWAZILAND44'

48IMAY I995

.! . E l, I .

. , _ .I -.J

,; ! .. : :

Documents

The World Banlk filedocument of the world banlk for ofmlcial use only report no. 14600 implementation completion report madagascar ports rehabilitation project (credit 1752-mag)