The World Bankdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/346761467987911756/pdf/ICR… · report no: icr00003585 implementation completion and results report (ida-h5720 ida-h8320) on a grant

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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003585

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H5720 IDA-H8320)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.5 MILLION

(SDR 2.5 MILLION FROM REGULAR IDA RESOURCES AND

SDR 1 MILLION FROM A CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW)

(US$5.31 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

UNION OF THE COMOROS

FOR AN

EMERGENCY CRISES RESPONSE PROJECT

December 17, 2015

Social Protection and Labor Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2015)

Currency Unit = Comorian Franc (KMF) KMF 441 = US$ 1.00

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfdB African Development Bank DEN Directeur Exécutive Nationale (National Executive Director) DER Directeur Exécutive Régionale (Regional Executive Director) EC European Commission ECR Emergency Crises Response FADC Fonds d’Appui au Développement Communautaire (Community

Development Support Fund) GDP Gross Domestic Product HIMO Haute Intensité de Main d’Oeuvre (highly labor intensive) ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIS Management Information System NGO Non-Governmental Organization PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective UNDP United Nations Development Program

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Mark Lundell

Senior Global Practice Director: Arup Banerji

Sector Manager: Dena Ringold

Project Team Leader: Andrea Vermehren

ICR Team Leader: Andrea Vermehren

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Comoros

Emergency Crises Response Project

CONTENTS A. Basic Information ...................................................................................................... 3 B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... 3 C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... 3 D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... 4 E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... 4 F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... 5 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... 8 H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................. 9 I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................. 9 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................. 10 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................ 14 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 19 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ........................................................ 25 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 26 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 28 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 29 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 31 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 32 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 33 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 35 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 37 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .................................................. 39 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 40 Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and other Partners/Stakeholders ........................ 50 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 51 MAP .............................................................................................................................. 53

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A. Basic Information

Country: Comoros Project Name: Comoros - Emergency Crises Response Project

Project ID: P120631 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H5720,IDA-H8320

ICR Date: 12/15/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: UNION OF THE COMOROS

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 3.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 5.50M

Revised Amount: XDR 5.50M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: FADC

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 02/01/2010 Effectiveness: - -

Appraisal: 02/24/2010 Restructuring(s): - -

Approval: 06/01/2010 Mid-term Review: 03/31/2014 02/13/2014

Closing: 06/30/2014 06/30/2015

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Highly Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Highly Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 18 18

General education sector 18 18

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 18 18

Other social services 27 27

Public administration- Other social services 19 19

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Global food crisis response 13 13

Participation and civic engagement 28 28

Rural services and infrastructure 46 46

Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services

13 13

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Mark R. Lundell Johannes C.M. Zutt

Practice Manager/Manager:

Dena Ringold Lynne D. Sherburne-Benz

Project Team Leader: Andrea Vermehren Philippe Auffret

ICR Team Leader: Andrea Vermehren

ICR Primary Author: Jayshree Balachander

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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Increase access to short-term employment and to basic social and economic services in areas affected by the crises, both global and internally-generated. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)n/a (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Beneficiaries of cash-for-work program (Number, custom) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 5600.00 11000.00 12343.00

Date achieved 09/25/2010 06/30/2014 03/07/2013 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

ACHIEVED: Original target revised after additional financing. 112 percent of final target achieved.

Indicator 2 : Direct project beneficiaries(Number, core) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 12000.00 53400.00 67926.00

Date achieved 09/25/2010 06/30/2014 03/07/2013 06/30/2015

Comments (incl. % achievement)

ACHIEVED: This indicator includes the total number of beneficiaries under all the components combined – both cash for work and all persons living in a community that benefitted from the community based basic infrastructure component. 127 percent of target achieved.

Indicator 3 : Female beneficiaries (Percentage, Core Supplement Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 40.00 40.00 63.20


ACHIEVED. The beneficiary assessment noted a large share of single motherswith many dependents (4 children on average) and hence they were prioritized for cash for work. 157 percent of target achieved.

Indicator 4 : Students enrolled in FADC built/rehabilitated schools or classrooms (Number, Custom)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 2000.00 3200.00 3686.00

Date achieved 09/25/2010 06/30/2014 03/07/2013 06/30/2015

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ACHIEVED. Includes all children (new and existing) benefitting from the new/refurbished classrooms. 115 percent of target achieved.

Indicator 5 : Number of people in rural areas provided with access to improved water sources under the project (Number, Core)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 2000.00 11200.00 10815.00


ACHIEVED. Includes all individuals benefitting from water source. 96 percent of target achieved.

Indicator 6 : People in project areas benefiting from improved roads (Number, Custom) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 28000.00 0 41029.00


ACHIEVED. Includes all persons in communities benefitting from the feeder roads. 146 percent of target achieved as remote communities tend to prioritize feeder roads which increase access to various other goods and services.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Social protection sub-projects completed (Number, Custom) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 220.00 0.00 246.00


ACHIEVED. More communities demanded sub-projects than could be accommodated under the project. 112 percent of target achieved.

Indicator 2 : Percentage of women among beneficiaries (under cash-for-work) (Percentage, Custom)

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 50.00 50.00 62.00


ACHIEVED. As noted, there were a large number of single women beneficiaries with several dependent children. 124 percent achieved.

Indicator 3 : Community-based basic infrastructure sub-projects completed (Number, Custom)

Value (quantitative

0.00 32.00 48.00 54.00

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or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/25/2010 06/30/2014 03/07/2013 06/30/2015


ACHIEVED. Communities received extensive training to prepare local development plans which formed the basis for the selection of sub-projects. The process resulted in the identification of sub-projects that were in demand and in strong community ownership of the assets created. 112 percent of target achieved

Indicator 4 : Community-based sub-projects properly maintained one year after completion (Percentage, Custom)


0 90.00 90.00 92.50


ACHIEVED. . While communities are able to take care of routine maintenance, long term maintenance is an issue as the government does not have a system in place for this.

Indicator 5 : Number of classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions (Number, Core)


0.00 54.00 60.00 87.00

Date achieved 09/25/2010 06/30/2014 03/07/2013 06/30/2015


ACHIEVED. The need for classrooms is so great in these communities that even after the construction of additional classrooms, most communities had to observe the two shift system – one in the morning and one in the afternoon. 145 percent of target achieved

Indicator 6 : Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 8 9.00 18.00


ACHIEVED. Twice the number of targeted water points achieved.

Indicator 7 : Rural Roads rehabilitated (Kilometers, Core) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 0.00 14.00 10.44


ACHIEVED. 75 percent of target achieved. Road sub-projects were technically complicated in remote and difficult (hilly) terrain. High standards of work were required as observed by the technical audit.

Indicator 8 : Community-development plans completed (Number, Custom) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 3.00 32.00 32.00

Date achieved 09/25/2010 06/30/2014 03/07/2013 06/30/2015

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ACHIEVED. 100 percent completed. Considerable community capacity was built through this process as detailed in the government portion of the ICR.

Indicator 9 : Operating ratio (Percentage, Custom) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 18.00 18.00 19.23


PARTIALLY ACHIEVED. The operating ratio was slightly higher than initially targeted due to unforeseeable extensive public sector electricity cuts which had to be replaced by expensive fuel generators.

Indicator 10 : Technical audit of community-based sub-projects completed (Number, Custom) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00


ACHIEVED. Findings useful for mid-course correction and as technical input to implementing agencies. Recommendations implemented

Indicator 11 : Assessment of cash-for-work completed (Number, Custom) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00


ACHIEVED. Confirmed successful implementation of Cash for Work component.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 11/21/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 07/09/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.23 3 12/17/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.33 4 06/16/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.62 5 12/22/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.05 6 06/18/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.55 7 12/31/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.54 8 06/11/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.30 9 11/01/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.71

10 05/15/2015 Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory 8.32 11 06/30/2015 Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory 8.39

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H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The Union of the Comoros (UoC) is a small post-conflict island country (estimated population 680,000) consisting of three islands (Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli). The UoC’s determining characteristics are geographical isolation and limited resources. Moreover, the country has had a challenging political history, including more than 20 coups and secession attempts since its independence from France in 1975. In 2001, a carefully crafted constitution known as the Fomboni Accord was adopted, but it could not prevent yet another secession attempt by the island of Anjouan in 2007–08, which was ultimately resolved only through a joint military intervention by the Union Government and the African Union. An embargo imposed by the African Union on the islands during the conflict caused a sharp deterioration in social and economic infrastructure. The economy of the Comoros is dominated by subsistence agriculture (including fishing) and small-scale retail, accounting for about one-half and one-fifth of the gross domestic product, respectively. The bulk of export earnings come from three high-value export crops—vanilla, cloves, and ylang-ylang. There is a high dependence on food imports (mainly rice, meat, and cooking oil) and remittances account for about one-fifth of the gross domestic product, which make the country extremely vulnerable to external shocks.

2. The country’s political and economic situation for two decades has contributed to low per capita incomes (US$1,391 per annum in 2010) and very limited development of public infrastructure and government. A 2005 household survey conducted by the government with support from the United Nations Development Program had estimated the national poverty rate1 to be 36.9 percent, with higher rates in rural areas (41.1 percent) and in Anjouan. The Union of the Comoros ranked 139 out of 182 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index in 2009. Basic social and economic infrastructure (schools, water, roads) is very limited, especially in poor and remote communities. Surveys conducted by the government about access to social services showed that less than half the Comorian population thought they had adequate access to primary education and less than a quarter to adequate safe water and sanitation. In terms of employment, most of the jobs are in the informal sector2 with few opportunities for paid work in rural areas, driving as much as 15 percent of the population to seek work outside the country.

3. In 2010, the UoC faced a challenging situation created by a series of successive crises, including (a) the political secession attempt on the island of Anjouan in 2007–08; (b) the food price crisis that peaked in mid-2008; and (c) the global financial and economic crisis in 2009. The conflict in 2007 caused a sharp deterioration of social and economic infrastructure as a result of poor maintenance. In 2008, food price increases of over 50 percent hit the poor particularly hard, straining their already weak coping mechanisms. Households that relied heavily on remittances were further hit as a consequence of the global economic crises and the international economic slowdown in 2009.

1 National poverty line. 2 Small scale retail and subsistence agriculture as noted earlier

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4. The Emergency Crisis Response (ECR) Project was intended to complement the responses of both the government and other donors3 to these successive crises through cash for work as well as community-based infrastructure sub-projects. The need to quickly reach affected communities, often the poorest and most remote on the islands, meant that the project design had to be kept simple, and preferably based on tried and tested means of reaching these communities. The ongoing Services Support Project (P084315, 2004–2010) included a community-based basic infrastructure component that was helping communities restore or develop basic infrastructure for the provision of social services. Furthermore, IDA had added a cash-for-work component to the Services Support Project in 2008, financed from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund (TF097191).

5. The ECR project had three decisive design features: First, it built on and expanded the scope of two tested interventions—cash-for-work and community-based basic infrastructure - as these interventions would meet the requirements of an emergency response. Second, it used a very experienced implementing agency, the FADC, which had the proven institutional capacity to implement the project. Third, the ERC was well targeted: the project used the fund allocation formula which parallels the inter-island fiscal formula included in the 2001 Fomboni Accords, so as not to exacerbate any regional tensions. Within the islands, it used a poverty ranking of communities on each island provided by the Planning Commission based on household survey data. For the selection of the poorest households in these poorest communities, a community-based selection process was used. These three important design elements would ensure a successful emergency response while laying the groundwork for a more development oriented follow on operation.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

6. The PDO was to increase access to short-term employment and to basic social and economic services in areas affected by the crises, both global and internally generated.

7. The key performance indicators of project outcomes were the following:

(i) Provide manual labor employment to at least (5,600)4 11,000 beneficiaries among poor segments of the population in areas affected by the global economic crisis

(ii) Increase enrolment through the building and rehabilitation of schools or classrooms by (2,400) 3,200.

(iii) Increase the number of people in project areas with access to an improved water source by (2,000) 11,200.

3 The International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, France, African Development Bank, 4 Original target before additional financing was approved is shown in parentheses.

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(iv) Increase the number of people in project areas benefiting from improved roads by (2,000) 28,000.

(v) Directly benefit at least (12,000) 53,400 people affected by the crises, of which at least 40 percent are women.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators and Reasons/Justification

8. There were no revisions to the PDO and key indicators. However, as a result of speedy implementation and the availability of a grant for additional financing to scale up activities under existing components, the quantities/physical targets to be achieved under each component increased from what was originally envisaged.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

9. The original project was intended to directly benefit 12,000 poor households affected by the crises with special emphasis on benefiting women. This included 5,600 cash-for-work beneficiaries, 2,400 students enrolled in rehabilitated schools, and 2,000 people each in urban and rural areas with improved access to water. With additional financing, the number of direct beneficiaries increased to 53,4005, including 11,000 cash-for-work beneficiaries, 3,200 students enrolled in rehabilitated schools, 11,200 beneficiaries of improved water sources, and 28,000 beneficiaries of improved roads. The project also benefited poor communities by building capacity of community organizations for local development planning and for managing community-based sub-projects, as well as in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), engineering offices (les bureaux d’etudes) and contracted firms (les entreprises) which all contributed to implementing the subprojects.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

10. The project was approved on June 1, 2010 and became effective on September 25, 2010, after the operational manuals were satisfactorily updated. The project comprised the following three components:

Component 1: Social Safety Net (Cash-for-Work) (US$2.6 million, US$1.4 million original credit + US$1.2 million additional financing)

11. This component financed the implementation of a labor intensive (Projets à Haute Intensité de Main d’Oeuvre) cash-for-work program designed to increase access to short-term employment for poor households in areas affected by the global economic crisis and consisting of activities selected by communities. Each subproject provided at least 25 days’ work per beneficiary household at a wage slightly below the going market wage of KMF2000 per day. Wages accounted for 75 percent of the cost of each subproject. The FADC validated the selection of subprojects and ensured they complied with safeguard 5 The higher revised numbers are due to the inclusion of all members of the community as beneficiary of improved roads, although only identified beneficiary households were originally included in the estimate

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policies and were not on a negative list of investments. Subprojects included basic road maintenance, light rehabilitation of feeder roads, prevention of soil erosion, etc. The FADC contracted established NGOs to implement these activities and agencies involved in implementation received training in sub-project planning, community organization etc.

Component 2: Community-driven Basic Development (US$4.1 million, US$2.9 million original credit + US$1.2 million additional financing)

12. This component financed community-based infrastructure subprojects to increase access to social and economic services among participating communities. It included the rehabilitation and construction of small-scale basic social and economic infrastructure subprojects identified by communities, such as classrooms and schools, small-scale water supply and sanitation, feeder roads, and soil erosion activities. Component activities covered the planning, selection, appraisal, implementation, and supervision of these infrastructure investments for the benefit of selected communities, including support to engineering design firms (les bureaux d’etudes) and contractors (les entreprises), as well as grants for this purpose to community associations. The component also provided training to members of community associations and staff of implementing agencies engaged in the implementation of the above activities.

Component 3: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Audit (US$1.25 million, US$1million original credit + US$0.6million additional financing)

13. This component provided support in the form of technical advisory services, training, and other material assistance for the project implementing agency, the FADC. The FADC is an autonomous institution created by a presidential ordinance in 1993 as a public service entity (organisme d’intérêt public) charged with providing financial, technical, and material support to disadvantaged rural and urban communities. Its central office is located in the capital of the Comoros, Moroni, and headed by a national executive director (Directeur Exécutif National). Each of the three islands also has an office headed by a regional executive director (Directeur Exécutif Régional). Policy guidance and overall project oversight are provided by the Central Coordination Committee (Comité Central de Coordination) whose members also constitute the Board of Directors of the FADC along with representatives from the beneficiary communities and the government. The component financed salaries/fees, travel expenditures, and training of FADC staff; operating costs; and technical and advisory services such as technical audits, M&E/assessments, and outreach and communication activities.

1.6 Revised Components

14. Not applicable.

1.7 Other significant changes

15. Additional financing of US$3 million was approved by IDA on March 28, 2013, (effective on July 8, 2013) as a result of speedy and satisfactory implementation of the original project.

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2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

16. Project preparation. The project was processed with the accelerated and more flexible procedures provided under OP/BP 8.00 for emergency operations. Emergency procedures were justified given the need to mitigate the effects of food price and economic crises and to rebuild local infrastructure after the political crisis. The project was able to continue activities that were being successfully implemented in the FADC’s previous World Bank financed operation, the Services Support Project, which had been designed for the provision of basic social services for vulnerable communities and had added a cash-for-work component during the food price crisis of 2009, with US$1million from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund (TF94537). The project was successfully implemented by an autonomous agency, the FADC, which became the implementing agency of the follow on Social Safety Net project financed by IDA.

17. Design factors. The project’s design was based on the Bank Group’s past and ongoing social protection and crisis response experience in the country and the Africa Region, and more specifically on the Comoros Services Support Project that had included community development and social protection activities. Experience from the Services Support Project indicated a strong demand for small infrastructure sub-projects for the provision of social services (such as classrooms and rural roads) in poor and remote communities. There was also a demand for income-generating activities that were seen to have immediate results (the Services Support Project had created 7,500 person-days of work, benefiting over 600 persons within a year) and such activities had been successfully piloted to mitigate the food price crises using a trust fund set up for the purpose. An effective targeting mechanism, using poverty data and combining geographical and community-based targeting, had been established for identifying the poorest households in poor communities. Implementation capacity for these activities in an autonomous agency was also an important factor in project design, as the main lesson learned from previous operations in the Comoros was that the implementation capacity of the government was weak, particularly to respond effectively in times of crises.

18. Quality at Entry. There was no formal Quality at Entry assessment done for this project. Quality at Entry is assessed as satisfactory overall given its rapid response to the emergency situation in a fragile state, as well as the fact that it was based on successful ongoing project and its simple design. Effectiveness was made contingent on the updating of the FADC’s existing operational manuals, which have enabled the project to roll out implementation as soon as funds were available.

19. Assessment of risks. The overall risk level of the project was rated Substantial. Country-level systemic risks were identified as political instability (High) and poor governance and corruption (Moderate), as the project would be implemented by an autonomous agency that functioned with strong oversight from an independent board. Project-level risks were rated Moderate to Substantial. The risk of project benefits not reaching intended beneficiaries as a result of poor technical design of subprojects and lack

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of capacity for implementation of the components was rated Moderate and addressed through multi-level targeting, community participation, transparency, and using proven implementation capacity as well as adequate support and training of the implementing agencies, including the FADC and NGOs. Other identified risks included weaknesses in financial management (Substantial), including potential nonpayment to beneficiaries by NGOs acting as implementing intermediaries, and shortcomings in the management of procurement (Moderate) by the FADC. These were addressed through the development of strong financial management and procurement systems, continued training and capacity building of FADC staff, and external audits including independent technical audits, and beneficiary consultations. Of the identified risks, only the ‘poor technical design’ risk materialized in some sub-projects in the initial years, and thus the lack of implementation capacity did materialize early in the project, but these were effectively addressed by the implementing agency with the assistance from the Bank’s supervision missions (including procurement training) and recommendations from the first technical audit.

2.2 Implementation

20. The cash-for-work component was successfully implemented from the start, with a pipeline of projects and experience gained from the implementation of the Services Support Project and the associated trust fund referred to earlier. The community-based basic infrastructure subprojects faced some initial delays due to difficulties in the recruitment of les bureaux d’etudes that were responsible for the design of the subprojects, but this was a temporary setback. By mid-2012, both components were on track for early completion, a year ahead of schedule.

21. The Bank responded to a request from the government to assist in alleviating the impacts of catastrophic floods in early-2012 by reallocating funds (US$128,000) from the cash-for-work component to the community-based basic infrastructure component, which resulted in project coverage in areas not initially targeted by the project but which qualified for assistance as a result of the new emergency. Further, Additional Financing of US$3 million was granted for the project in March 2013, along with a one-year extension of the project’s closing date to June 30, 2015.

22. Implementation was rated Satisfactory throughout the life of the project. The project met almost all its implementation targets ahead of schedule. The project midterm review was conducted in 20146 and the following external reviews were also undertaken: (a) an assessment of the cash-for-work component and (b) technical audits for the community-based basic infrastructure component, both at the beginning and toward the end of the project.

23. The review of the cash-for-work component was carried out in 2012 by an external consultant, who visited a random sample of work sites, reviewed the works carried out, and interviewed implementing NGOs as well as beneficiaries to discuss implementation issues and confirm payment of wages. The review noted that the selection of beneficiaries and

6 Scheduled somewhat late in the project, but facilitated learning by the new TTL who took over after the mission

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subprojects were satisfactorily carried out and that the FADC had put in place an effective oversight mechanism to ensure the proper management of funds by the implementing NGOs. The FADC representatives made frequent visits to the community for training and supervision and used those opportunities for troubleshooting. A detailed description of community capacity building is provided in the government portion of the Implementation Completion Report (Annex 7). A telephone ‘help line’ was created for beneficiaries to report any complaints related to the program (for example, non-receipt of wages) although few complaints were received through this channel, possibly in view of the frequent direct contact of FADC staff with the beneficiary communities.

24. The first technical audit of the community-based basic infrastructure component was carried out in 2013 by an external engineering consultant. Audit terms of references included reviewing all documentation relating to the subprojects under this component and visiting every subproject to review the quality of the work. The audit made a number of recommendations, including improving technical specifications in the request for proposals (for example, by developing standards for classrooms and toilets—such standards had not existed until then); strengthening the supervision of contractors (les enterprises) by the engineering design consulting firm (les bureaux d’etudes); filling up key vacancies in the regional offices of the FADC; improving the utilization of the information system; and on the filing and archiving of documents. The final technical audit (2015) noted that these recommendations were followed up by the implementing agency and also gave an overall satisfactory rating for the quality of small infrastructure works created under this component. The FADC viewed the technical audit more as a technical consultancy to improve implementation and followed audit recommendations to ensure a satisfactory outcome for the subprojects.

25. Participation and ownership of the communities in the creation of basic infrastructure was notable and evinced not only in the community contribution of 10 percent7 of the cost of the project but also in the selection and oversight of construction of the assets. Communities also assumed responsibility for the routine maintenance of the assets, as there was no local government structure8or system of maintenance of social infrastructure by the government.

26. The performance of the implementing agency FADC was rated satisfactory in financial and procurement management, M&E, and implementation of safeguards throughout the project after some minor difficulties in the initial phase with the office in Anjouan, which were promptly dealt with by replacing non-performing staff. The FADC had progressively built up its own capacity and that of beneficiary communities to implement community-based projects. It also provided adequate support and continuous training to the intermediary implementing agencies, les bureaux d’etudes and NGOs, to enable them to meet implementation timetables and standards. Having established its capacity for implementation of this project, the FADC attracted other sources of financing,

7 Community contribution ranged from 5-20 percent till the Operations Manual was amended in 2011 to require 10 percent across the board 8 Community management structures ‘communes’ are just beginning to be put in place.

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including from the French Bilateral Aid Agency, L’Agence Francaise de Developpement, and from the Union and Island Governments.9

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

27. M&E design. The PDO, as well as outcome and intermediate indicators were appropriate and easily monitored. FADC was appraised to have an adequate monitoring system for the purpose. The system covered (i) management of sub-projects implementation (from selection of beneficiaries and identification of sub-projects to their completion); (ii) management of the annual work program; (iii) management of contracts with local consulting firms (les bureaux d’etudes), contractors (les entreprises) and NGOs; (iv) preparation of detailed monthly and quarterly progress reports; and (vi) monitoring performance of outcome and intermediate results indicators. The system enabled the FADC to prepare the reports needed for monitoring the project’s physical and financial progress as well as intermediate and final results. The system had been progressively improved under the project and FADC will further upgrade this system to automatically link physical progress with procurement and financial management under the new IDA Social Safety Net Project (P150754). Evaluation of project implementation was covered by an assessment of the cash-for-work component and two technical audits of the community-based basic infrastructure component, both of which seem appropriate for evaluating the results of an emergency operation.

28. M&E implementation. The successful implementation of the management information system (MIS) can be deduced from the regular reporting of results indicators right from the beginning of the project and informative half-yearly reports regularly prepared by the FADC based on the MIS and shared with the Bank. Each report consisted of a summary of the activities undertaken during the previous six months and their physical and financial achievements, the status of the result indicators, as well as the plan for the next six months. Details of activities under each subcomponent were provided in the main report. Apart from the routine monitoring activities, an assessment of the cash–for-work component and two technical audits covering the community-based basic infrastructure component, both by external consultants, were carried out as planned.

29. M&E utilization. The M&E system made it possible to troubleshoot lagging performance by one of the islands at the start of the project and also highlight and address the initial slow progress in the community-based basic infrastructure component. The assessment confirmed the satisfactory implementation of the cash-for-work component and the technical audit made substantive recommendations for improving the implementation of the community-based basic infrastructure component. The recommendations on the MIS and other findings of the first technical audit were addressed by the FADC to the satisfaction of the auditor, who noted overall compliance in his final audit report. It is noteworthy that the technical audit was a detailed process evaluation with the audit team visiting every one of the sub-projects, and the implementation of its recommendations

9 These funds were administered in parallel and targeted poor communities that were not reached by the IDA project.

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enabled the FADC to greatly improve the management and outcomes of the infrastructure sub-projects.

2.4. Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance

30. The project complied with the safeguards that were triggered: Environmental Assessments (OP/BP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). The Government prepared and disclosed an Environmental and Social Management Framework and a Resettlement Policy Framework and developed social and environmental operational guidelines to be observed during implementation, in accordance with Bank standards. The FADC appointed a safeguards specialist to ensure implementation of the frameworks. A screening process was put in place during the subprojects identification stage and environmental and social assessment reviews were conducted alongside the technical audit. Safeguard measures were included in bid documents and contracts and field visits to subprojects noted the adequacy and consistency of mitigation measures used to manage any negative impacts of the subprojects. There was no resettlement as a result of project activities.

31. Citizen engagement and social accountability. To reinforce accountability and transparency of project activities, the FADC staff were trained in citizen engagement and social accountability. The operational manual included guidelines for community monitoring and complaints redress mechanisms. Positive social impacts were noted, including integration of women in community activities; democratization of local decision making; and improved community capacity for planning, executing, and maintaining public social infrastructure.

32. Procurement. Although the procurement risk was rated High due to the country and business environment, the performance of the FADC in procurement is rated Satisfactory as the FADC continued to demonstrate its ability to implement procurement activities according to plan and follow up on the recommendations of post-procurement reviews. For contract management, all recommendations, including one for the appointment of a contract supervisor, were implemented, which significantly reduced delays in contract execution. The FADC has successfully implemented several small-scale social and economic infrastructure subprojects using local contracting firms (les entreprises) in the past and it continued to improve the efficiency of this innovative procurement modality. In addition, in this project, the FADC also contracted NGOs for implementing the cash-for-work program and the results were satisfactory.

33. Financial Management. An overall assessment carried out at project closure rated the performance of the FADC related to Financial Management as Satisfactory highlighting that (a) the FADC fiduciary staff conducted the necessary activities in accordance with their terms of reference, (b) the operation has been regularly and properly recorded from an accounting point of view during the life of the project, (c) the FADC appropriately replenished the designated account when needed, (e) the institution submitted Interim Financial Reports on time throughout the life of the project and in accordance with standards, (f) audit reports have been conducted annually by qualified external auditors throughout the life of the project, and (g) no complaints about violation of the Governance

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principles nor any act of corruption have been raised at any point. Annual audits have been performed on a regular basis, in compliance with the Bank’s rules, and no major financial issues have been identified. The overall financial management performance has been rated satisfactory consistently.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

34. In response to a recommendation from the technical audit, the FADC management met with the different stakeholders to try and develop a maintenance program. As a result of strong community ownership of the assets, routine maintenance of the basic infrastructure created under the project has been assumed by the respective communities concerned. Each primary school also has a director who is responsible for ensuring regular maintenance of schools. However, the government does not have a system in place or a budget for regular maintenance of social infrastructure and, in particular, for infrastructure created by communities. The lack of support for maintenance is systemic and not confined to the assets created under the project. In discussions of the ICR mission with the Ministry of Finance, it was agreed that there was a need for each ministry to set aside a small proportion of the government infrastructure budget for the maintenance of existing assets.

35. Institutional capacity building, particularly of the FADC staff, has continued with Bank support, with good effect. The capacity, transparency, and effective work of the institution at the community level is well-recognized in the country, which has allowed it to continue to enjoy autonomy and support of the government under different administrations and throughout political uncertainties.

36. A new IDA-financed Social Safety Net project which became effective on July 4, 2015, continues to work with the FADC to meet new challenges in the delivery of essential social services and provide assistance to the country’s poorest communities. Its objective is to increase poor communities’ access to safety net and nutrition services. Building on the cash for work experience, the project provides (i) support for the establishment of a productive safety net that will provide selected poor households with cash for work opportunities over three years with a view to strengthen their productive capacity while improving the productive infrastructure and climate resilience of their communities, (ii) improve the nutrition of children under 5 years of age, and (iii) strengthen the institutional capacity for safety net management, coordination and monitoring and evaluation. Given other development partners’ engagement in small infrastructure (e.g. UNICEF, EU etc.), the new project does not include new infrastructure but provides some funding for disaster response through cash for work and the rehabilitation of damaged community infrastructure.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

37. The relevance of the project objectives—to provide access to short-term employment and basic social and services —was High at the time the project was prepared in the aftermath of the successive crises. They continue to be highly relevant in the context

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of a country with widespread poverty and high vulnerability to natural disasters which continues to lack social services and social protection for the poor and vulnerable given recurring natural disasters, political instability, and global macroeconomic volatility. The project objectives are consistent with the Bank’s global objectives of reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity, and are also reflected in the Government’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (2009). They also fit within the Government’s draft Social Protection Policy (2014) which includes labor-intensive public works and cash transfers to vulnerable households as a priority and was developed with broad support from development partners. Further, the objective of reducing social vulnerability is one of the two pillars of the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (FY14 – FY17) with Comoros. Providing employment through cash for work and support to public works that build productive assets (with a focus on increasing agricultural productivity and promoting environmental protection) continue to be key elements in the recently approved Comoros Social Safety Net Project, confirming the continuing relevance of the ECR Project’s objectives.

38. The relevance of the project design is substantial. The project was designed in response to the country’s needs to cushion the impact of multiple crises on the most vulnerable sections of the population. Such communities and households were being successfully targeted by strategies developed under the Social Services Project and hence building on that experience was appropriate. Keeping the design simple by focusing on two key service delivery components that were in high demand and selecting an implementing agency that had demonstrated capacity in the previous Bank-financed Services Support Project also proved to be a good approach. While there were other possible mechanisms for social protection such as conditional cash transfers, it would not have been appropriate to experiment with new initiatives in the context of an ECR Project and a country with weak implementation capacity. There were no policy or strategy changes after project approval that required any changes in project design.

39. Implementation of the project exceeded expectations with physical and financial targets being met by the FADC before the closing date, so much so that the Bank was able to accede to the government’s request for additional financing. Moreover, quality, transparency, and community ownership were important characteristics of project implementation. Demonstrating capacity and a process to get things done in a difficult physical (remoteness of the islands and communities within them) and political milieu was valuable in itself. It also established an avenue for other donors and IDA to continue their engagement with development in the Comoros. The unique institutional features of the FADC, with its autonomy from government interference in operations while enjoying government support, its presence on each of the three islands, its credibility with communities, and the multi-sectoral composition of its board, which includes representatives of the beneficiary communities and a broad set of sectors of the government, was also an important aspect of successful implementation.

40. The relevance of the project is therefore rated as High.

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3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

41. The ECR Project sought to increase access to short-term employment and to basic social and economic services in areas affected by the crises, both global and internally generated.

42. At closing, the project over-achieved all of its project development indicators with direct project beneficiaries of 67,926 (about 10 percent of the population) against a target of 53,400, including:

12,343 cash-for-work beneficiaries (target of 11,000); 3,686 students enrolled in new/rehabilitated classrooms (target of 3,200); 10,815 people in rural areas with improved water supply (target 11,200); and 41,029 people benefitting from improved roads (target of 28,000).

43. Details of project outputs are provided in annex 2. The results chain assumption is that cash for work would provide short term income opportunities for poor beneficiaries, at least half of whom were women, by increasing access to short-term employment in areas affected by the global economic crisis. This was achieved. The project created 309,900 person-days of employment for 12,343 beneficiaries of which 62 percent were women. An assessment of the implementation of this component confirmed that the targeting process was effective in selecting poor households affected by the crisis that the works had been satisfactorily executed, and that beneficiaries had effectively received the payment for the 25 days of work at a daily wage of KMF 2,000 as promised. A beneficiary assessment conducted by the FADC revealed that beneficiaries primarily used the money received to purchase food and that the public work opportunity was the first paid employment for many of the beneficiaries.

44. The assumption behind the basic infrastructure sub-project component was that the outputs would create or restore access to basic economic and social services. These results were achieved. Fifty-four community-based subprojects were completed (against a target of 48), including 87 classrooms (against a target of 60), 18 community water points (target 9), and 10.44 km of roads rehabilitated (target of 14 km). The number of beneficiaries for each of the social infrastructure works met or exceeded targets10. Moreover, there was considerable community capacity building, ownership, and participation in project implementation, which ensured that the subprojects selected for implementation were of high priority to the community. In many of the communities visited, schools still followed the shift system (morning and afternoon classes) because of a shortage of schoolrooms. The FADC also received requests from more communities for employment and basic infrastructure than it could accommodate in the project, although project coverage was significant. The cash-for-work component, besides reaching more than 100 percent of the end of project beneficiaries, is estimated to have reached 30 percent of the pool of poor

10 Sub-projects were implemented in targeted poor communities and all members of the community were counted as beneficiaries for roads and water projects. For schools, all children utilizing the new/improved classrooms were counted as beneficiaries, while individual beneficiaries were counted for the cash for work.

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beneficiaries11who could be eligible for the program on Grand Comore, 42 percent on Anjouan, and more than half on Moheli. Basic infrastructure subprojects were implemented in 15 percent more communities than was targeted under the project nationwide, and covered 13 percent of all eligible communities on Grand Comore, 26 percent on Anjouan, and 58 percent on Moheli.

45. Achievement of the PDO is rated as High.

3.3 Efficiency

46. The project’s appraisal document did not estimate a rate of return on the grounds that the type and number of subprojects could not be known beforehand. It noted that several process features (for example, the FADC’s method for community-managed development) and the selection of poor households and communities would ensure efficiency and high rates of return. These assumptions have proved to be largely valid. The targeting system was successful in selecting some of the poorest populations as seen from the beneficiary assessment which details how the additional income was spent primarily on food, reached single women with large households, and provided first time paid employment to several of the beneficiaries. The speed of project implementation is also an indicator of the project’s efficiency, as well as the full and immediate utilization of social and economic infrastructure (schools, roads and improved water sources) by communities.

47. ,Further, an economic analysis was prepared in 2011 for the ICR of the Comoros Services Support Project12 which computed rates of return for projects identical to those implemented here as follows13:

Rural roads. 53.7 percent (benefits include the creation of direct jobs, increase in product flows and people movements, the creation of new economic activities, and so on).

Improved water sources. 27.6 percent (benefits include the reduction of health care costs associated with the use of safe water and the reduction of the time spent fetching water).

Schools/classrooms.14 The impact on households is realized mainly by the reduction of time students spent walking to reach school and attendance benefits. The ECR Project was also instrumental in helping the Ministry of Education develop standards for wider adoption in the country, increasing the cost-effectiveness of all future school buildings.

11 Based on an enumeration of poor communities in the United Nations Development Program Poverty Assessment (2005). 12 World Bank. Union of Comoros Services Support Project Implementation Completion and Results Report, December 2011 13 Schools, roads and water accounted for more than 95 percent of approved sub-projects 14 Social-cost benefit described, but value is not estimated.

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48. The cash-for-work activities, which were satisfactorily implemented according to the external review, effectively transferred 75 percent of the financing of this component15 directly as wages to very poor beneficiaries who were affected by the crises. This ratio compares favorably with cash-for-work programs in other countries (example, 60 percent in India’s Employment Guarantee Scheme). The average wage of KMF 2,000 was probably somewhat on the high side, based on the analysis of an appropriate wage rate for the recently approved Social Safety Net Project. The utilization of wages (overwhelmingly for food and some toward education and health expenses) also confirms the efficiency of the beneficiary targeting.

49. The technical audit of the community-driven basic infrastructure project component rated the overall quality of the basic social infrastructure as Satisfactory, although the first audit noted several points for improvement in the execution of subprojects. Administrative shortcomings included poor record keeping (but with considerable improvement between the first and second audits) and delays in implementation (about half the projects required an extension or supplementary contract to complete the work). Technical shortcomings included lack of standardization of design, inadequate and poorly designed toilet facilities, and shortcomings in provisions for drainage (all corrected after the first audit). The emergency works undertaken after the floods in 2012 did not adhere to the design and supervision standards of the other works under this component, but accounted for less than 5 percent of the budget for the component.

50. Project management costs exceeded the 18 percent targeted at the outset and together with the 7 percent supervision and implementation costs of the subprojects (incurred by les bureaux d’etudes and NGOs/les entreprises) appear to be high in absolute terms. However there are several mitigating factors to explain management costs: the poor accessibility of targeted communities and resultant high transportation costs; lack of technical capacity for implementation of the subprojects resulting in considerable support to implementing NGOs/contractors; frequent visits and supervision required to ensure transparency; and proper accounting during implementation. Further the global economic crisis had increased the costs of all inputs, particularly transportation. Overall the project was efficiently executed despite a context of low capacity and poor infrastructure.

51. Internationally, the cost-effectiveness of public works programs has been calculated based on data sets from countries as diverse as Ethiopia, India, Liberia, Niger and Sierra Leone16. Four measurements have been used: (i) The average share of wage costs for some successful public works programs in low income countries ranges from around 60% to 85%. Comoros ranks high with 75% of costs going to wages. (ii) Targeting performance measures the proportion of wages that went to beneficiaries in the two poorest deciles of the population. Programs range between 87% (Ethiopia) to 67% in Bangladesh. While no exact data exist for Comoros, given the targeting process (selection of poorest communities on each island, community selection of poorest households within these), the

15 Other expenses include cost of materials, equipment, and so on. 16 Public Works as Safety Net: Design, Evidence and Implementation, K. Subbarao, C. del Ninno and others, 2013, The World Bank, Washington DC

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low daily wage rate and the results from the beneficiary assessment (including the use of the cash), it is reasonable to assume the targeting efficiency in Comoros was at least as good as in the other countries. (iii) Net wage gain measures the share of gross wages received by participants after taking into account any income that would have been expected in the absence of the program. International evidence ranges widely, from 50% in the Jefes Program in Argentina (where more work alternatives are available) to around 75% in India, 79 in Sierra Leone and 93 in Liberia. Liberia’s high percentage reflects the fact that approximately three-quarters of the program participants had no other income or employment before the program began, and so forgone earnings were very low. A majority of the Comorian beneficiaries seem to have been in a similar situation. (iv) The indirect benefits derived from public work programs are more difficult to measure but have been estimated to be around 80-85 percent in Ethiopia, Liberia and Niger. It is difficult to assess this measurement for the UoC.

52. Overall, efficiency is rated Substantial.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

53. The relevance and efficacy of the project were high. The technical audit noted shortcomings in efficiency in the execution of the small infrastructure subprojects as discussed in section 3.3, but accepted that most deficiencies had been corrected and that the quality of works was Satisfactory. Overall, the outcome is rated as Satisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 54. The project contributed to short-term income generation for poor households in the poorest communities of the country and put in place some basic social infrastructure in these communities. By ensuring that more than half the beneficiaries were women, the project, according to the beneficiary assessments, increased the bargaining power and status of women within households. The process of developing local development plans resulted in engaging communities in a dialogue about development priorities and building their capacity as well as their ownership and interest in realizing these plans, for example, by seeking funds from other sources for items included in the plan.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 55. In this project, IDA supported the FADC for a fourth successive phase in its institutional development, the previous rounds also being financed under IDA projects, the most recent from 2007 to 2011, during which the FADC successfully implemented the Services Support Project. Successive investments in the institution have built different types of capacity (e.g. monitoring, procurement) to execute development projects successfully, for which there does not appear to be another parallel in the Comoros. As a result, the FADC is sometimes called on to act as interlocutor for the government in its

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discussions with other donors and has been used by other donors to implement community-based development projects.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 56. Investment in the preparation of local development plans had the unintended effect of motivating communities to implement the plans by raising funds for activities included in those plans from other sources, including approaching other donors for funding. The implementing agency noted that the requirements of the environmental assessment raised the quality of works.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

57. The FADC completed two beneficiary assessments covering about a third of the beneficiaries under the cash-for-work component. The assessment revealed that beneficiary households were large, with five children on average. Agriculture and family support (often remittances) were the main sources of income. For several of the participants, this was the first paid work in their lives. Beneficiaries were happy to receive the KMF 50,000 each earned under the cash-for-work component. The income was spent on food (75 percent of beneficiaries), education (9 percent), health (8 percent), and other expenses (7 percent). Beneficiaries regretted that the duration of the work was short (25 days) and would have liked for work to be available for 75 days, to be able to save money to invest in a small business or income-generating activity.

58. Both the cash-for-work beneficiary assessment and technical audits of the community-based basic infrastructure component included extensive meetings with beneficiaries, including visits with every community in which infrastructure subprojects were implemented. Bank missions, especially procurement staff, also regularly visited communities and talked with beneficiaries.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

59. The cash–for-work component augmented incomes for poor families adversely affected by the crises and there is no risk to that outcome in the future. The community-based basic infrastructure works could face the risk of being adversely affected by a future political or economic crisis or a natural disaster, which would impoverish communities again, but these are risks that the project can neither anticipate nor fully mitigate. There is also a moderate risk of insufficient maintenance of the assets. Continuing support to the FADC under a follow-on Bank project to develop institutional capacity in new areas such as social accountability mechanisms like community scorecards, and to strengthen capacity for procurement, safeguards and the management information system will also ensure sustainability of works, as FADC continues to focus its interventions on the poorest communities. . The Agency also receives support from the Government. Overall risk to the development outcome is rated Moderate.

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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory

60. Project design was appropriate to the needs and circumstances in the country at the time of preparation and closely aligned with the government’s priorities. Lessons were learned from the poor implementation of early IDA projects in the Comoros. The choice of a relatively simple approach to meeting the emergency and crisis needs of poor communities in the country through the cash-for-work component, while laying the groundwork for more long-term and sustainable impact through the community-based basic infrastructure component, proved to be appropriate. The progressive approach that the team adopted by starting with an average size project and scaling it up with Additional Financing based on good results is also noteworthy. Selecting an implementing agency with a proven track record (the FADC was successfully implementing both components under the Services Support Project) and further building its capacity was also a good approach. Even though the project was prepared under the accelerated process (under OP 8.00), there also appears to have been a good understanding with the government on the priorities and the mode of implementation.

(b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) Rating: Satisfactory

61. Bank supervision missions took place regularly (about twice each year) and closely followed the project process. Significant contributions include troubleshooting poor performance by the local offices of the FADC, including the early assessment of the cash-for-work component and the technical audits of the community-based basic infrastructure component. The latter audit provided the basis for improvements in the implementation of several aspects of this component including record keeping, standardization of some designs, and contract management. The Bank was also able to meet the government’s requests to provide assistance in flood-affected areas in 2012, not envisaged in the original scope of the project, and also to meet its request for additional financing given the early achievement of many of the project’s goals.

62. In terms of documentation, Project Implementation Status and Results Reports include limited information and do not adequately reflect the aide memoires, issues arising from implementation, and support provided by the team. The counterparts in the FADC appreciated the fact that the same task team leader managed the project from conception to processing the additional financing, which they said gave the Bank the necessary understanding of the country and project circumstances. They also appreciated the fact that the Bank acted as a technical partner in the implementation of the project rather than just a financier. The FADC noted that Bank supervision missions provided considerable technical assistance in the areas of procurement and financial assistance and that they would have liked to receive similar assistance with the engineering and community-based development aspects of the project, particularly early in the implementation of the project.

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(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory

63. Bank performance was Satisfactory, particularly in the selection of project design, close supervision and incorporation of a technical audit. The shortcomings in project documentation were minor in comparison and hence Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory

64. For the purposes of the project, the Government’s performance was satisfactory in the quick processing of the project’s effectiveness, and of Additional Financing, effective oversight as part of the Central Coordination Committee (of the FADC), regular follow up through closing mission meetings, and other supporting measures. It provided the FADC the necessary support and autonomy to implement project activities. In fact, the Government leaned heavily on the FADC to provide necessary input to the preparation and implementation of other donor projects. The President visited some project sites. Although political challenges and lack of financing have meant that the Government provides virtually no services to remote rural communities through its Ministries for Human or Social Development and does not assume any responsibility for the maintenance of social infrastructure developed by these communities, the Departments of Finance and Planning have provided solid support to the FADC to enable it to fulfill this gap to some extent. The Government’s performance is therefore rated Satisfactory.

(b) Implementing Agency and other Agencies Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory

65. The performance of the FADC is rated Highly Satisfactory. It has quickly and adequately provided services in the most remote and poor rural communities, assisting them in articulating and fulfilling their needs for basic infrastructure and income generation in very difficult circumstances. Virtually no other part of the government is serving this need and these populations, and is thus so highly regarded in rural communities as is the FADC, by development partners (AfD, Japan, etc.), and last but not least central government agencies like the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Commission and relevant line ministries.

66. Moreover, the processes and implementation methods of the FADC have been widely recognized to be transparent and effective. Its reputation is so well-established in the Comoros that the FADC has been requested to provide training/support to other implementers of Bank-funded projects (Ministry of Fisheries, Planning Commission) and to help prepare projects for funding by other donors. Other funding agencies have requested the FADC to implement projects for them or have adopted FADC procedures to implement their programs. Effective leadership, staff skilled in Bank procedures, and ability to provide support and capacity building to NGOs, consultants, and communities have all contributed

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to the effectiveness and reputation of the institution. Continued Bank support over a long period has also helped stabilize the institution and build its capacity.

67. The performance of les bureaux d’etudes, the consulting firms charged with preparing the design and procurement dossier, was moderately satisfactory. Despite severe skill shortages for engineers and technical specialists in the country, the sub-projects have been executed to satisfactory standards. NGOs/les entreprises, responsible for implementing sub-projects under the cash-for-work and community-based basic infrastructure components respectively, performed satisfactorily with considerable support and training from the FADC and les bureaux d’etudes. Notably, the FADC successfully built capacity in these entities for project implementation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory

68. The rating for the government is Satisfactory, and the performance of the main implementing agency, the FADC, is rated Highly Satisfactory given its excellent performance in a difficult country crisis situation. Hence, overall borrower performance is rated Satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned

69. Modified cash-for-work activities. The most important needs of disadvantaged communities—those that are remote, poorly served, and have few opportunities for employment—are for basic social infrastructure and employment/investment opportunities. Reaching the poorest households in such deprived communities is especially challenging. Cash-for-work programs may be useful even in a nonemergency situation (for longer-term development) if a technically robust roster of public works selected by communities can be built up and implemented through closely supervised intermediaries (engineering consultants and contractors) as was done in this project. Building a savings component into the program may have added development benefits.

70. Community-managed development. In a situation where the government does not assume the responsibility of ensuring the provision of basic social infrastructure in remote and poor communities, the project demonstrated that community-managed development is feasible even in today’s context and has highly desirable characteristics such as creating assets that are of high priority to the community, engendering community ownership and full use of the assets.

71. Attention to Gender. The inclusion of indicators related to the participation of women in the public works ensured that women were prioritized as beneficiaries. This smart focus also helped to ensure that the weakest and most vulnerable households were included. The overachievement of the targeted indicator may also reflect the fact that the head and a significant proportion of FADC staff are female which may have also contributed in some measure to the success of the organization.

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72. Need for technical support to improve capacity for implementing quality infrastructure works. The low capacity environment of the country meant that it would have been beneficial for the implementing agency as much as its partner institutions to receive more technical support for the works, specifically regarding engineering & planning. While the project contributed somewhat to improving the capacity of local partner institutions, more could have been done to directly enhance the growing capacity of the various bureaus.

73. Donor collaboration. Governments can get more value for each donor dollar and reduce transaction costs if they can get donors to collaborate and fund more of the successful projects/models of development in each sector. The Japanese and the French, for example, have recognized FADC’s successful model for community development and have routed some of their assistance in the same manner. Furthermore, the Bank’s Fisheries project is using FADC to implement some of their community based activities.

74. Implementing agency. The unique character of the implementing agency with its capacity for semiautonomous operation despite strong government support and a multi-sectoral board, including representatives of the beneficiary communities, is worthy of emulation, especially in difficult economic and political circumstances. An implementing agency experienced in handling Emergency Projects is a good resource in a disaster prone country to deal with all potential/future shocks. The development of such an agency is also one of the recommendations of the Bank’s Social Protection and Labor strategy.

75. Market forces and contracting of NGOs. Even in a limited capacity context, there is a supply response to the call for NGOs and technical consulting agencies to assist in project implementation. With the assistance of the project implementing agency, these new les bureau d’etudes and les enterprises managed to build requisite capacity, which is then used in the wider country context. Intensive and continued training and ‘on the job’ supervision have contributed to developing the country’s capacity as a whole, to build more solid small-scale infrastructure.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agency. A draft ICR has been shared with the borrower/implementing agency. Although no comments were received, the Borrower did prepare its own ICR (see Annex 7). It points to the perceived strengths of the project, as described above. Frist, the project built on earlier ones and thus there was a strong institutional capacity for implementation within FADC. The authorities expressed appreciation for the rigor and professionalism of FADC and underlined the importance of having decentralized implementation units on each island to ensure deep penetration in the most deprived areas. They also highlighted that the various mauals had also contributed to the quality of the basic infrastructure and cash-for-work activities. Finally, the authorities pointed to the fact that there was continuity in team leadership: the TTL who oversaw the former project also prepared the ECR and thus had a solid understanding of the local context and key stakeholders.

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(b) Cofinanciers Not applicable (c) Partners N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$, million equivalent)

Components

Appraisal Estimate Original Project (H5720)

Appraisal Estimate

Additional Financing (H8320)

Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions)

Actual (US$, millions)

Social safety net (cash for work) 1.40 1.20 2.60 2.20 Community-driven basic infrastructure 2.90 1.20 4.10

4.25

Project management, M&E, Communications 1.00 0.60 1.60

1.85

Total Baseline Cost 5.30 3.00 8.30 8.10Physical contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Price contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Total Project Costs 5.30 3.00 8.30 8.10 (b) Financing

Source of Funds Appraisal Estimate(US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate(US$, millions)

Borrower (Communities) 0.25 0.30 International Development Association 8.30 8.10

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Social Safety Net (Cash-for-Work)

Region No. of

Communities No. of ProjectsNo. of

Beneficiaries%

Women Employment

Created (person days)

Mohéli 14 30 1,517 55.0 37,925

Anjouan 38 93 4,699 62.0 117,475

Ngazidja 71 123 6,276 63.5 156,900

TOTAL 123 246 12,492 62.0 312,300

Component 2: Community-Based Basic Infrastructure Development

Type of Subproject Number of Subprojects Community development plans 32 Classrooms 87 Water supply points 18 Roads 10.44 km

Component 3: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Audit

Training Topics Total Number of

women % women

Community management 224 77 34.4 Financial management and procurement 224 92 41.1 Participatory M&E 223 93 41.7 Environmental management 223 89 39.9 Participatory investigation and development of community development plan

224 87 38.8

Technical maintenance and sustainability of basic infrastructure

279 115 41.2

TOTAL 1,397 553 39.6

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1.4.1.1 The PAD did not estimate an economic rate of return as the type and number of subprojects could not be known beforehand. It noted that the project is expected to have a high social rate of return as a targeting mechanism was in place to reach those affected by the crisis, the most deprived communities, and the poorest households within them. It also factored that the FADC’s established processes for targeting the poor would ensure efficiency and high rates of return. These assumptions have proved to be largely valid.

1.4.1.2 An economic analysis was prepared in 2011 for the ICR of the Comoros Services Support Project17 which computed rates of return for sub-projects identical with those implemented here as follows:

Rural roads- 53.7 percent. Benefits include the creation of direct jobs and jobs induced by subproject construction, increase in product flows and people movements, the creation of new economic activities within the communities served by roads, the development of the key economic agents’ activities that are operating in these localities, and the impacts on the availability and prices of commodities.

Improved water source- 27.6 percent. Benefits include the impact on health, including the reduction of health care costs associated with the use of unsafe water and the reduction of the time spent fetching water.

Education. For classrooms, the impact on households is realized mainly by the reduction of time students spent walking to reach school. There are also attendance benefits as the communities are located in remote villages and inclement weather and flooded walkways are serious detriments to regular attendance of primary school age children attending school outside the village. The ECR Project was also instrumental in helping the Ministry of Education develop standards for wider adoption in the country, increasing the cost-effectiveness of all future school buildings.

1.4.1.3 These estimates continue to be fully valid for the ECR Project as the subprojects are identical with those implemented under the SSP.

1.4.1.4 The main objective of the cash-for-work program under Component 1 was to transfer cash directly to poor beneficiaries affected by the crisis, using an established targeting mechanism and adding an element of self-targeting by fixing a wage slightly below the minimum wage rate to attract only those households who were unable to find work otherwise. The component was satisfactorily implemented, with minor points noted by implementing agencies (les entreprises) during the ICR mission, notably the difficulty in maintaining

17 World Bank. Union of Comoros Services Support Project Implementation Completion and Results Report, December 2011

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the same workers over a period of 25 days continuously and the lack of durability of such small projects. The average wage of KMF 2,000 was probably somewhat on the high side (given that the project was implemented in rural areas), based on the analysis of an appropriate wage rate for the recently approved Social Safety Net Project (P150754). However, the component transferred 75 percent of the available funds for wages as planned, meeting the cash transfer goal and hence, there were limitations on the kinds of projects that could be financed. A post-implementation beneficiary assessment found that the majority of the cash received was spent on food. Beneficiaries noted that with more number of days of work, they may have been able to effect some savings for small productive investments at the household level.

1.4.1.5 Overall efficiency of the cash-for-work component appears to have been moderate. Perhaps efficiency could have been increased by adding a savings component to the cash transfer. Such a model is currently being piloted in the Comoros (Moheli) with French bilateral assistance.

1.4.1.6 The final technical audit of the community-driven basic infrastructure projects pointed out that the overall quality of the basic social infrastructure was satisfactory, but the first audit noted several points for improvement in the execution of subprojects. Administrative shortcomings included poor recordkeeping (but with considerable improvement between the first and second audits) and delays in implementation (about half the projects required an extension or supplementary contract to complete the work). Technical shortcomings included lack of standardization of design (corrected after the first audit), inadequate and poorly designed toilet facilities, and inadequate provisions for drainage. Some works had been accepted even though they did not meet the quality standards specified in the contracts. The emergency works undertaken after the floods in 2010 did not adhere to the design and supervision standards of the regular program. Supervision costs were on the high side (7 percent), and oversight provided by some contractors was not fully satisfactory. The final audit noted that most of the recommendations made after the first audit had been implemented. The FADC noted that it had treated the technical audit as technical assistance and had learned how to address shortcomings in implementation of Component 2. Overall, the level of efficiency was acceptable in the context of low capacity and poor infrastructure. Further, given that the government was unable to provide basic services in remote communities, the community-managed model, though more difficult to implement, was virtually the only option available to provide such communities with basic social infrastructure.

1.4.1.7 Community selection and management of the subprojects, backed by close technical oversight, increased the cost of supervision and project management but have also increased rates of return to the investments. With regard to infrastructure management, management committees are formally set up in most cases and the committee members have received training in routine

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maintenance and management of infrastructures. Despite the dynamism of local management structures, they lack the financial means to ensure adequate long-term maintenance of infrastructure, and there is an absence of local government or decentralized departments to provide necessary support.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending

Philippe Auffret Sr. Social Protection Specialist AFTSP Task Team Leader

Otieno Ayany Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Financial Management

Paul-Jean Feno Environmental Specialist AFTEN Safeguards

Victoria Gyllerup Sr. Operations Officer AFTRL

Said Hanafy Consultant LEGAF Legal

Nadège Nouviale Program Assistant AFTSP

Onur Ozlu Operations Officer AFTRL

Sylvain Rambeloson Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement

Luis Schwarz Sr. Finance Officer CTRFC Financial Management

Renganaden Soopramanien Lead Counsel LEGAF Legal

Johannes Widmann Country Officer/Co-Task Team Leader

AFCKE

Supervision/ICR

Andrea Vermehren Lead Social Protection Specialist GSPDR Team Leader

Sylvain Auguste Rambeloson Sr. Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement

Joseph Byamugisha Financial Management Specialist GGODR Financial Management

Julia Rachel Ravelosoa Sr. Social Protection Specialist GSPDR Team Member

Khurshid Banu Noorwalla Program Assistant GSPDR Team Member

Maria Concepcion J. Cruz Safeguards Specialist AFTCS Safeguards

Paul-Jean Feno Sr. Safeguards Specialist GENDR Safeguards

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Siobhan McInerney-Lankford

Senior Counsel LEGAM Legal

Jayshree Balachander Consultant GSPDR ICR Primary Author

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel

and consultant costs)

Lending 3.53 4611.27

Total: 3.53 4611.27

Supervision/ICR 36.57 163,787.66

Total: 36.57 163,787.66

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

1. A beneficiary assessment was conducted by the FADC in 2012 to receive feedback from beneficiaries of the cash-for-work activities, with a special focus on the impact of the additional income accruing from the work and the cash transfers’ value as a social protection measure in the aftermath of the crisis. The assessment was conducted on all 3 islands of the Union and covered focus group discussions of beneficiaries between 5 to 10 persons in 28 communities, with 215 respondents in total. In these 28 communities, 33 cash-for-work subprojects had been implemented and they provide income opportunities for 1,650 beneficiaries.

2. Methodology. A questionnaire was prepared for use by the survey staff, covering the following categories:

1) Profile of the respondents

2) Food security situation of the household

3) Utilization of wages received

4) Suggestions and recommendations for improvement

3. Communities for the survey were chosen randomly, and at least 50 percent of the respondents were women.

4. Sociodemographic profile of respondents. Respondents were between the ages of 18 and 68 years. Most of the respondents had children and family size ranged from 4 to 12 persons. More than half the women were heads of their households and had more than 5 children on average. The majority of the male respondents had never had paid work till their participation in the cash-for-work program. They survived on subsistence agriculture and family support.

5. Food security situation. The staple diet of the families was rice, bananas, and cassava. The number of meals per day varied with the time of year and was often only one meal a day.

6. Utilization of cash received. Every respondent confirmed having received cash of KMF 50,000. Their food security had improved considerably after the program and the number of meals increased to two or three per day. More than 75 percent of the cash had been spent exclusively on food. About 10 percent had been spent on education expenses for children, 8 percent for health-related expenses, and 7 percent on other activities, including for income-generating activities.

7. Beneficiary response. Beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the project and the fact that it covered many persons in distressed circumstances. There was a perceptible improvement in their food consumption during and after the work. However, they were

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concerned that they would not be able to sustain these improvements after the work stopped.

8. Conclusion. The assessment confirmed that poor and distressed families have benefitted from the cash-for-work program and that it made an impact on their lives, at least temporarily, particularly with regard to their food consumption. Beneficiaries expressed the desire to have work for a longer period—75 days, for example—so that they could save money to start a small business or other income-generating activities.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not applicable.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The Development Objective The Project Development Objective is to improve access to short-term employment and access to social and economic services in areas affected by crises, globally and internally. Project Components: The 3 ECR (PURC in French) components are:

A. Social protection (Cash for Work) component finances i. access to short-term employment in areas affected by the crises through labour

intensive activities works ii. training of Execution Entity - ENEX

iii. support to the Steering Committee (CPS) for identification of sub-projects, selection and prioritization of workers and site supervision.

B. The Community Based Basic Infrastructure component that aims to improve

access to basic socio-economic services, finances: i. Sub-projects to rehabilitate or build basic infrastructure identified by the selected

disadvantaged communities that developed their “community development plan” under direct project funding.

ii. activities aimed at developing the institutional and operational capacities of local communities particularly in participatory local planning

C. The project management and monitoring and evaluation component intended

to support i. monitoring and evaluation of both the results and impact of the project.

ii. operating costs of the FADC and iii. technical assistance for technical and annual financial audits are also part of this

component.

Implementation Experience: The experiences gained during the three previous financing rounds (FADC I, FADC II, FADC III) under earlier IDA projects constituted significant expertise comprising operational and competent project managers. Moreover the successful implementation of the Services Support Project and associated grant that financed basic infrastructure and ash-for-work component provided useful experience. The rigor and professionalism that have prevailed in the implementation of activities by the FADC led to the achievement of results. No major problems occurred during the implementation of the ECR Project and, all external financial audits were not subject to reservations as required by the Funding Agreements. This is due first to the professional quality and motivation of its staff but especially the clear and relevant working manuals available (procedural manuals and implementation manuals). Furthermore, the presence

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of decentralized units in each island (Regional Executive Secretariats (SER) allowed national coverage that allowed a high penetration rate in the most deprived areas. It is important to note that the Task Team Leader (TTL) at the time of project preparation was also the TTL of the implementation of the ECR project. The design of the ECR benefited significantly from this continuity due to a solid understanding of the local context and familiarity with key stakeholders and institutions. (ii) Assessment of the outcome of the operation against the agreed objectives; The project succeeded in achieving the overall objective which was to improve access to short-term employment and access to basic social and economic services in areas affected by global and internal crises. The following table summarizes the achievements against PAD indicators :

PDO indicator Original target

Changes with Additional Financing

Revised target

June 31 2015

1. Beneficiaries of cash-for-work program (cumulative number of Individuals) (a)

5,600 5,400 11,000 12,492

2.1 Students Enrolled in FADC built / rehabilitated classrooms or schools (number)) (c)

2,400 800 3,200 3686

2.2 People in project areas with access to Improved water source (number) (b) (c)

2,000 9,200 11,200 14,335

2.3 People in project areas Benefiting from Improved roads (number) (c)

2,000 26,000 28,000 41,029

3. Direct Project Beneficiaries (number) of qui:

12,000 41,400 53,4000 71,542

Female (%) (a) ≥40% ≥40% ≥40% 63.2%

Between July 2010 to June 2015, FADC:

(i) Implemented and completed 246 projects under cash-for-work for a total cost of 815 107 900 KMF including 623 350 000 KMF as compensation for 12 492 individuals of which 7718 were women (61.8%) distributed in 123 communities. The 246 sub projects relate in particular to development of feeder roads and small drainage works, works developing public spaces (terracing, planting trees), agricultural development works and environmental protection.

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(ii) recruited and strengthened the capacities of 39 NGOs as Entite d’execution

(ENEX) for the purchase of tools, supervision and conduct of the beneficiaries of projects under construction on cash-for-work

(iii) strengthening the capacity 32 communities and the development of 32 community development plans,

(iv) execution and completion of 69 projects in basic infrastructure (IDB) including 38 MOD 16 IDB FD and 15 IDB in response to flooding. The 69 basic infrastructure created include schools (38), supply of water / tank (8), rural track remediation (21), dikes etc (2). A total of 95 classrooms, 33 water point, 10.23 KM of roads were constructed or rehabilitated and a dam and hoisting ramp were built. Distribution of achievements in social protection projects by island:

SER Number communities Sub Projects

APPROVED

Costs realized (KMF)

Number of beneficiaries

% women Man-Days Created

Moheli 14 30 99 932818 1517 55% 37,925

Anjouan 38 93 309 218760 4699 62% 117475

Njazidja 71 123 405 956321 6276 63.5% 156900

TOTAL 123 246 815 107899 12,492 62% 312300

Impact on economic development Under Argent Contre Travail (A) (Cash for Work) project: Through the implementation of projects under Cash for Work,, the ERC (PURC) project created significant temporary or permanent employment through the recruitment of NGOs (NGO personnel) and the jobs generated by the Social Protection sites. The work done through the ECR (PURC) consisted in the development of feeder roads of interior villages, schools and public squares, environmental protection works, remediation, etc.with the following benefits:

The rehabilitation of roads facilitated population movement and access. Some communities made the roads using concrete.

Development of agricultural tracks facilitated access in agricultural areas contributing to the agricultural production of the beneficiary communities.

The development of school grounds and fences improved student safety. The environmental protection work that consisted mainly in reforestation and

erosion control in hedges decreased soil degradation and runoff of rainwater, improving soil fertility and contributing to the replenishment of groundwater.

The establishment of ganivelle type of dam favored slopes in the beaches, which decreased the rise of sea water in the village and coastal erosion.

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Under Community Based Basic Infrastructure (Infrastructure deBase - IDB) Schools School infrastructure construction improved access to primary education and enabled the resumption of classes in the communities affected by the disaster of April 2012. In addition, the allocation of school furniture, trash incinerators and systematic provision of latrines and water that accompanied the majority of buildings have improved the physical environment in the three islands and improved environmental education and health. Furthermore, all this has resulted in improved access conditions including the growth of schooling for girls and their retention in the education system. In total, 38 schools built to benefit 38 communities in which 95 classrooms were built and equipped with school furniture, rubbish receptacles, incinerators and latrines and water points to benefit 3,686 beneficiary students. Feeder Roads The coatings of feeder roads, construction of culverts, and road surfaces have improved the living and sanitary conditions in poor communities. The buildings have greatly contributed in improving the movement of goods and people in disadvantaged neighborhoods. In total 21 feeder roads of 10.23 KM to benefit 41,029 people. Water supply The construction of reservoirs of drinking water distribution networks through standpipes and the supply of drinking water gravity systems allowed the communities to have access to water and has promoted increased hygiene and health. In total 8 water supply tanks and 33 fountains were constructed for the benefit of 14,335 Dykes / ramp-lifting In a geographical context marked by recurring flood risks, protection of goods and people, ease of access by boats, construction of dams and ramp hoisting presents particular economic significance. The construction of this infrastructure has been undeniably useful for the fishermen of these areas that have suffered the destruction of property and the risk of loss of lives. IDB by type and island:

Subprojects Island (Ile)

Total Njazidja Moheli Anjouan

School 15 10 13 38

Water supply & Tank 5 0 3 8 Rural Track & Sanitation 5 7 9 21 Other (ramp hoisting and dykes) 2 0 0 2 Total 27 17 25 69

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Community Capacity Building : Between 2010-2015, FADC identified and provided technical and financial support to 32 communities for the creation or restructuring 32 Steering Committees (Comités de Pilotage - CP), 32 management committees (Comités de Gestion - CG) and 64 village development agents (agents villageois de développement - AVD). Members of the 32 Steering Committees, the village development agents, and members of the management committees were trained in community management, financial management and procurement, monitoring and evaluation; participatory evaluation and development of local plans of development (PDL) and environmental management in the 3 SER which led to the realization of participatory surveys. The objective is to strengthen the capacity of various actors at the local level to improve their effectiveness in the identification, preparation, evaluation and implementation of sub-projects capable of inducing a long lasting impact and in the life of communities and promote greater stakeholder participation in local development processes, such as participatory community planning, control and management of expenses. The following modules were delivered to beneficiary communities :

1. Community management training aimed to familiarize beneficiaries of the essential concepts of community management, identify suitable persons to staff committees, clarify the roles and responsibilities of the committees and familiarize them with the essential tools of community management.

2. Financial management training and procurement, which aimed to strengthen the

capacity of members of the CP, CG, and AVD in the financial management of projects and beneficiary communities to initiate the principles of procurement.

3. Training in monitoring and evaluation aiming to provide communities with the

basic concepts enabling them to identify performance and impact indicators for the sub project, providing information on techniques of data collection and analysis as well as on the process of making subsequent decisions to allow participatory monitoring of community activities.

4. Environmental Management Training which aimed to give members of the CP, CG

and AVD basic knowledge on environmental protection techniques related to community management.

5. Participatory evaluation training which aimed to provide CP members and AVD

with the basics for conducting participatory surveys and the steps for developing a Local Development Plan.

6. Technical maintenance whose objective was to provide technical support to the CP

beneficiary of a project under the technical maintenance of the works. The 32 targeted communities received technical and financial support for the conduct of participatory surveys, the development and validation of their Local Development Plans.

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Following these sets of training teams of FADC Regional Officers supported communities in carrying out participatory interviews and in the development of their Local Development Plans. The process allowed 32 communities to recognize, identify problems and socioeconomic specific needs by all members of the community, including vulnerable groups. The process also allows the community to identify their existing capacities (material, financial and human) and those required to solve priority problems in the village. The results of this participatory survey process allowed communities to identify and classify the priority actions of the community and the baseline (indicators). The SER worked with the CP and AVD to draft the 1st draft of the Local Development Plans (PDL) and organize community outputs. FADC developed the PDL on the basis of the 1st draft and submitted them to the Management Committee (CR) for approval to the 3 SERs. After integrating improvements made by the members of the CR, FADC edited and finalized the PDL and then made 3 copies. The 32 village communities carried out the validation of PDL by acclamation in an open ceremony attended by local authorities and partners. The purpose of this ceremony was to validate the PDL but also to popularize the investment plan and sensitize partners to get involved financially and technically in the implementation of the priority needs expressed by the communities. Among other committees, beneficiary communities of basic infrastructure were formed for (i) basic hygiene, protection of sources and prevention of diseases related to water, (ii) the operation, maintenance and maintenance of the structures. Table of completion of PDLs Table of Training on the preparation of PDL:

Training topics Total Number of women

% women

Community Management 224 77 34.4% Financial management and procurement

224 92 41.1%

Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation

223 93 41.7%

Environmental management 223 89 39.9% Participatory investigation and development of PDL

224 87 38.8%

Technical maintenance and sustainability of IDB

279 115 41.2%

TOTAL 13 97 553 39.6% The beneficiaries under basic infrastructure projects received retraining of members of the CP / CG / DSA

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(iii) Evaluation of the borrower's own performance during the preparation and implementation of the operation, with special emphasis was lessons learned that may be helpful in the future; a) Government involvement The FADC has establish a good institutional reputation vis-à-vis the authorities. National and island authorities have always shown a very positive appreciation of FADC. Through its statutes, the FADC is under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the General Planning Commission. However, the latter, gives FADC autonomy in daily management and operational decisions as detailed in the Operational Manuals, leaving FADC free from political influence. At the time of its creation in 1993, the Statute of FADC put it under the Ministry of Finance through the General Planning Commission. Recently it was directly attached to the Presidency of the Union. In the preparation and in the execution of the ECR project, FADC received strong support from the latter in particular and Government in general, protecting it against any adverse political obstacle which could affect the achievement of project objectives. The Comorian government especially the president of the Union of the Comoros and the Vice President in charge of the Ministry of Finance, have mobilized en masse members of the government, the Comorian parliament to take all necessary steps to achieve project objectives. b) Trust from the beneficiaries: The beneficiaries describe FADC as an “Agency that keeps its promises". Indeed, FADC has always met its commitments to respond to the requests of the beneficiaries as soon as it was decided to execute them. FADC had committed to realize 220 projects under Cash for Work modalities, 48 basic infrastructure works (IDB) and 32 Community Development Plans for the benefit of the poorest communities and in the end managed to complete 246 under Cash for Work (ACT) project, 69 basic infrastructure (IDB), and 32 Community Development Plans (PDL). Communities that have not yet benefited are very eager to be selected for the ACT or IDB works and other communities have spoken directly to FADC seek intervention. In general, expectations of the communities as part of the execution of the ECR Project have been met. Indeed, the involvement of the direct beneficiaries from the design phase to the reception of the project was beneficial. c) The FADC: FADC, as the execution agency of the Project has always pursued its mission as defined in project agreements under the supervision of Central Coordination Committee (CCC) which serves as the Board of Directors. In terms of project management, financial audits and aide-memoires have noted managerial compliance with respect to signed project agreements,

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procedural manuals and the quality of interventions. The project has left a significant mark in the approach to community managed development for remote and poor communities. To ensure project sustainability, it is crucial that the project supports the beneficiary communities for two to three years in income-generating activities or in productive work by increasing the number of working days. Lessons learned Two important lessons were learned during the implementation of the ECR Project (PURC). First, the initial funding was implemented faster than expected thanks to the mobilization of the staff of FADC which led the Bank to grant the Comorian Government additional funding. Second, the visibility of the activities of the FADC is an important mechanism of accountability and transparency, which is used to restore trust between Government at all levels and other stakeholders in particular the direct beneficiaries. Other lessons include: a) Monitoring and Evaluation. During the implementation of the previous t (Services Support , a computerized monitoring and evaluation system (EMIS) was set up in addition to the computerized Integrated Management System using a software package called TOMPRO, acceptable to the World Bank. Excel was also used as database. However these systems have limitations because there are no automated links between financial and operational systems that will allow an automatic transfer of financial data in the Excel database. FADC with the support of the World Bank will obtain software that will integrate financial and technical data in a new project. b) The environmental dimension has been integrated into the implementation of projects and was one of the notable points that helped to increase the quality of achievements. During the execution of the ECR Project (PURC), no involuntary displacement has been observed and all the projects are implemented in accordance with environmental safeguard guidelines. c) Cash-for-work and basic infrastructure community development approach The project confirmed that these components may (i) provide a better quality of life for poor households, (ii) be an effective mechanism for building small-scale in infrastructure, (iii) build social capital and (iv) have an impact on development. Indeed, these operations can serve as catalysts for a process in which the targeted communities, especially in rural environment over time can participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of projects that meet the common interest the community. d) Importance of targeting the most vulnerable workers in particular women: Since the cost of a project is limited under high intensity manual labor projects (HIMO), the mechanism targeting the most vulnerable beneficiaries was clearly successful and achieved the desired objectives of the project. There was massive participation of women. Priority was given to single women with dependent children. e) Links with the priorities and government policies:

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It is important to note that during the preparation of the project, FADC referred to the national policies of the Union of the Comoros in basic infrastructure. In contrast, for social protection component, no sectoral policy defines social protection in the Union of Comoros. However, Social Protection included in Axis 3 "Increasing access to basic social services and household resilience" of the "Accelerated Growth Strategy for Sustainable Development (SCA2D) ". Among other things, the Comorian government with the support of the World Bank prepared a paper on inclusive social protection policy based on a “rights” approach to meet the basic needs of people and vulnerable groups. The document recommends new safety net strategies, with particular attention to the promotion of provisions promoting the resilience of communities to individual or collective shocks. (iv) Evaluation of the performance of the Bank, The World Bank, in addition to being the financier of the Project, has been a technical partner for the Comorian government and especially FADC, which allowed the good performance of the project in general and FADC in particular. The World Bank team led 9 Supervision missions between July 2010 and May 2015. The team responded proactively to the deterioration of the quality of FADC t management, supporting various personnel changes, strengthening staff capacity and technical audit, which has helped to ensure that development objectives were achieved. The Bank team responded quickly and effectively during supervision missions and different specialists including financial management, procurement and environmental and social safeguard provided necessary technical support and identified problems. The supervision mission of the World Bank during the period of the ECR Project (PURC) allowed FADC to implement the project satisfactorily. The various bank supervision missions have significantly contributed to the achievement of project objectives in compliance with the project documents. The recommendations of the Bank's mission allowed FADC to improve quality management, service delivery and especially the quality of the design of the books. The Technical Audit report of Daniel DUPETY Architect Consultant helped improve (i) the design of the works following the remarks made by the audit, (ii) improvement of technical studies, (iii) improved archiving of files. Following the recommendations, FADC organized various training courses for the benefit of the companies responsible for the execution of works and engineering office in charge of studies, control and monitoring of the works. The Team of the World Bank mobilized additional resources to the project in 2013 to strengthen ECR project (PURC) activities without changing the original purpose of the project. Overall supervision by the World Bank of the ECR Project (PURC) was satisfactory.

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During project preparation, the Bank team engaged with government and other partners to ensure that project objectives were aligned with the country's development strategies and well-coordinated with interventions in development. The World Bank was not the only one to work with FADC. With the experience of FADC in community outreach the French Government through the French Development Agency has granted a donation in the form of budget support in 2013 to the Comorian government for the implementation of a cash for work program. (v) Description of the proposed arrangements for future operation of the project. It was found that much of the Comorian population has no access to basic social services. A recent evaluation of social protection carried out by the World Bank analyzed access to social services for each phase of the life cycle and identified significant gaps that hinder the development of the country. Despite these needs, the Comoros have no effective social protection system capable of meeting these challenges. The recent assessment of the Bank's social protection policies and systems found that social protection programs cover only a small part of the population, despite the high rates of poverty and vulnerability in the country. In addition, the study highlighted the lack of coordination in the sector and a lack of available data and information on programs, while the analysis of the budget revealed the predominance of funding by the external sector. Based on these observations, the analysis concluded that the Government of the Comoros needed to develop a strategic framework for its social protection system and improve coordination and information exchange between its programs of social protection. The Government has prepared a draft social protection policy, which stresses the importance of developing a social safety net consisting of the provision of public work-intensive labor and cash transfers to rural households, and initiatives to reduce malnutrition among young children and pregnant women. The policy also highlights the importance of creating jobs, especially for youth and women, and to increase access to health services and basic education. The Comoros social safety net project will be prepared on these lessons and support the government in the transformation of cash-for-work in a social net intervention of productive safety net which increases household incomes at the same time strengthening their basic productive assets and developing community nutrition activities

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Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents DUPETY, Daniel et Issilam, Oussouf. Audit technique et évaluation des activités Project D’urgence en Repose Aux Crises. March 2014. FADC.Manuel de Procédures, March 2010 revision. FADC.Premières Evaluations de la mise en oeuvre de la Composante Argent contre Travail du Fonds d’Appui au Développement Communautaire. September 2010. FADC. Analyse de l’enquete de suivi d’impact de la composante Protection Sociale, December 2013 FADC. Rapport Semestrield’Activites Nos.1–10. Various years, 2010–15. SUBBARAO, K, del Ninno, C. and others: Public Works as Safety Net: Design, Evidence and Implementation, 2013, The World Bank, Washington DC International Development Association and International Monetary Fund. Joint Advisory Note on the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy for the Union of Comoros. March 2010. Rakotomanana, Eric Jean Michel. Analyse Economique d’un Echantillon de Projets de Soutien aux Services mis en oeuvre par le Fonds d’Appui au Développement Communautaire. June 2011. Union of Comoros. Décret No. 03-013/PR portant modification de certaines dispositions du décret no. 93-063/PR du 23 avril 1993, portant organisation et fonctionnement du Fonds d’Appui au Développement Communautaire. January 2003. World Bank. Interim Strategy Note for the Union of Comoros for the Period of FY10–12. April 2010. World Bank. Project Appraisal Document for Comoros Services Support Project. February 2004. World Bank. Union of Comoros Services Support Project Implementation Completion and Results Report, December 2011 World Bank. Madagascar Community Development Project Implementation Completion and Results Report, June 2009. World Bank. Project Paper on Proposed Grant to the Union of Comoros for an Emergency Crisis Response Project, June 2010. World Bank. Project Paper on a Proposal for Additional Financing Grant for an

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Emergency Crisis Response Project, 2013. World Bank. Aide-memoires of Supervision Missions for the UoC Emergency Crisis Response Project. Various years, 2010–2015. World Bank. Implementation Status and Results Reports for SSP. Various years, 2010-2015.

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MAP

Union of the Comoros