Thematic Study - MRLG

Customary Tenure Arrangements within Khmer

Communities in Cambodia

Written by Sivhuoch Ou

Thematic Study

Mekong Region Land Governance

July 2019

Thematic Study

Written by Sivhuoch Ou

The author would like to express his sincere thanks to a number of individuals who have contributed to and reviewed this report. They include Christian Castellanet and Antoine Deligne (MRLG Deputy Team Leaders), Sothath Ngo (MRLG National Facilitator in Cambodia), Jean-Christophe Diepart and Natalie Y. Campbell (MRLG), various members of the MRLG Learning & Alliance (L&A) initiative, and finally all the interviewees.

For more information, contactSothath NGO <[email protected]>Antoine DELIGNE <[email protected]>

Suggested citation:

Ou, S. (2019). Customary Tenure Arrangements within Khmer Communities in Cambodia. MRLG Thematic Study Series #10. Vientiane: MRLG

The views, opinions and interpretations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and contributors. They should not be interpreted as representing the official or unofficial views or positions of SDC, BMZ and Luxembourg.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License

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Table of contents

Table of contents ................................................................................................................................................................................I

List of abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................................................... II

Executive summary .......................................................................................................................................................................III

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................................................................1 1. The evolution of customary tenure arrangements for land and natural resource management in Cambodia................................................................................................................................................4 1.1 Customary Tenure before the French Protectorate .......................................................................4 1.2 During the French Protectorate: 1863-1953........................................................................................4 1.3 The administration of King Norodom Sihanouk ..............................................................................5 1.4 The Democratic Kampuchea regime ........................................................................................................5 1.5 Beyond the Democratic Kampuchea regime ....................................................................................5 1.6 The 2001 Land Law and Its Impact ..............................................................................................................6

2. Customary tenure, resources and governance ..............................................................................................10 2.1 Customary tenure in (agricultural) land ................................................................................................10 2.2 Customary tenure in forest resource systems ..................................................................................11 Swidden system/shifting cultivation .................................................................................................11 Spiritual forests ....................................................................................................................................................12 Resin collection ...................................................................................................................................................12 Timber harvesting, foraging and opportunistic collection activities .....................13 2.3 Customary tenure in fisheries and wetland resources .............................................................13 The Tonle Sap floodplain ............................................................................................................................13 Big rivers/lakes ......................................................................................................................................................15 2.4 Co-management/hybrid regimes ..............................................................................................................15 Community Fisheries (CFis), Community Forestry (CF) and Community Protected Areas (CPAs) ................................................................................................................................15 Community-based ecotourism (CBET) ..........................................................................................17

3. Customary tenure and the dynamic of change: concluding remarks ....................................20 Future Research Opportunities ............................................................................................................................21

References ...........................................................................................................................................................................................24

Annexes......................................................................... .........................................................................................................................26 Annex 1: List of Interviewees ....................................................................................................................................26

II

List of abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

CBET Community-based ecotourism

CEDAC Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture

CFi Community Fishery

CF Community Forestry

CPA Community Protected Area

CPP Cambodian People’s Party

CPR Common pool resources

CT Customary tenure

EIA Environmental impact assessment

ELC Economic land concession

DK Democratic Kampuchea

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FUNCINPEC United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia

L&A Learning & Alliance Initiative

MLMUPC Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction

MRLG Mekong Region Land Governance project

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea

PTCF Prek Trapaeng Community Fishery

III

Executive summary

1 Three specific papers by Roberts (2015), Swift and Cock (2015), and Ironside (2017) discuss CT in Khmer communities in commendable depth and breadth; other works included in the list of references touch on different aspects of CT.2 More detailed ones are elaborated on in the conclusion.3 It is worth distinguishing between land use rights and land control rights. Households have land use rights, which are restrictive, permitting users, for instance, to cultivate mostly annual crops but not perennials. Land use rights exclude other households from using the land at the same time. Communities, not households, have land control rights and can constrain the choices households can make over how they use the land: that is, what can or cannot be planted on it, or the length of time the land should be cultivated and then left fallow. With land control rights, communities may set the rules concerning the transfer of land. For instance, they could withdraw the users’ access to the land once they leave it and assign the use to another person.

Customary tenure (CT) is a system of means local rules, institutions, and practices governing the access, use, and management of land, forests, fisheries and other resources which have, over time and use, gained social legitimacy and become embedded in the fabric of a society. A common misconception about CT systems in Cambodia is that it is confined to indigenous communities in the peripheral uplands of Cambodia and does not exist in their Khmer counterparts. Consequently, while Cambodia’s related laws, particularly land laws (1992 and 2001), recognize the customary tenure of indigenous people, they only tolerate but do not recognize that of the Khmer people although customary practice prevails across the majority of Khmer communities. In response, this research compares related studies 1 on customary tenure in Khmer communities, and describes the evolution of customary tenure within them, the different categories of potential resources governed under customary tenure, and the governance regimes of those resources. It then proposes three practical cases/communities for further field-based documentation. Below is a brief summary of the findings2.

Historically, before the French occupation, peasants acquired customarily recognized usufruct rights by clearing, cultivating and benefiting from land. With the emergence of private property introduced by the French protectorate (1863-1953), possession of land was required to turn into ownership. During the administration of King Norodom Sihanouk (1953-1970), there was not much change to the practice of land governance that had been applied by the French. The Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime (1975-1979) abolished private land possession and ownership and collectivized all means of production: the regime then collapsed in 1979. Following the fall of the DK, the Krom Samaki (Solidarity Group) was established but was short-lived (1979-1988). By 1989, private property was gradually re-introduced and the 1992 Land Law was passed and implemented. This law caused confusion between posses-sion and ownership rights in respect of State land. While the 2001 Land Law diminishes the vagueness of the 1992 Land Law, it recognizes possession rights only in respect of the land occupied five years before the 2001 Land Law was passed. It forbids any further customary practice of acquisition “by the plough”.

In order to understand the complexity of Khmer customary tenure systems, below is a brief overview of the report findings detailing Khmer customary land use and tenure practices:

Land. While 63.6 percent of agricultural and residential lands have ownership titles, the rest is still possessed customarily with the recognition of community and local authorities. Communal rice paddy and communal land exist in some Khmer communities, and communal religious and spiritual lands (such as Buddhist buildings (Salachhortien and Neak Ta) are seen in virtually every Khmer community. Most of the time, these lands belong to the whole community and are managed by their representatives, the local authority, pagoda associations, and even by school committees where relevant.

Contemporary swidden cultivation is practised among Khmer communities in various provinces such as Kampong Speu, Pursat, Battambang and Kampong Thom. In many cases each household has land use rights but land control rights3 are collectively managed by the whole community. Over the last 20 years, local norms have changed considerably pertaining to both sets of rights. In sum, the community has gradually lost its authority to control land; land has been privatized to a greater extent and can be sold. Furthermore, community members have greater control over the use rights – although previously farmers grew only annual/agricultural crops (corn, rice, and so on), these days they have started to grow perennials. In addition, the area of land devoted to shifting cultivation has shrunk, and further expansion is not permitted.

Resin collection is customarily practised in Khmer communities but the degree of resin tapping has decreased due to the significant losses of resin trees particularly in the 1990s. Resin trees grow on forest land and in residential areas; different local rules govern the access to, and possession of these trees. It is crucial to note that the practice of resin harvesting has, and continues to create an enabling environment and incentive for tree owners to protect surrounding forests.

Timber harvesting, foraging and collection activities. The Khmer collect various forest products, ranging from timber to plants, which they manage and conserve sustainably. During the pre-war period, farmers respected the law and collectively banned improper and unsustainable exploitation of forest resources. Lately, because of severe deforestation and illegal timber harvesting, forest resources have greatly declined; farmers these days still harvest forest resources but due to the overharvesting and scarcity of timber, cannot conserve them as they did during the pre-war period.

IV

The floodplain of the Tonle Sap is rich in natural resources such as fish, inundated forest products, grazing land, and land for crop production. By tradition, during the dry season, land-dependent communities take their rice to communities who are dependent on the lake in exchange for fish. Farmers who migrate to the lake area from upper areas also fish themselves, cultivate rice, and conduct other activities during the dry season. During rainy season they return to their upland homes. Traditionally, people govern the floodplain resources using locally recognized institutions peacefully and effectively. Peasants dependent on Tonle Sap are permanent (all-year-round) community members while farmers from the upper areas move to the villages in Tonle Sap temporarily for a few months each year. However, they know who owns what land plots, and the conditions under which members have rights to use their plot. Recently, the wetland area for cultivation has shrunk and the fishing grounds have also decreased. The primary reasons for this are the lack of government recognition of farmers’ rights to use the floodplain land, and the different zonings demarcated by various ministries, which have encroached on farmers’ customary tenure systems.

Big rivers/lakes provide opportunities for communal management and the extraction of fisheries resources. While fishing in big rivers and lakes is open access, some fishing grounds become communal assets in the low fishing season, where attempts have been made to manage these resources collectively. For instance, households living in the vicinity of the fishing zone (riversides of the Mekong or the Bassac) use tree branches collectively to attract and catch fish on a bi-weekly or monthly basis. They share the fish stock equally. Only families living along the banks of those big rivers and lakes, where there is the potential for such fishing activities, are permitted to extract such fisheries resources. All of the above practices are recognized locally.

Community Fisheries (CFi), Community Forestry (CF) and Community Protected Areas (CPAs) are forms of co-management/hybrid regimes modernizing traditional customary systems within the modern legal framework. They have mushroomed over the last two decades or so, with collaboration from donors and the government of Cambodia. At this stage, CFis, CFs and CPAs are being implemented, and while some have faced numerous problems, including closure, others have been sustained. These resource-dependent communities work and thrive when: 1) members’ livelihoods are enhanced through commercial sales of non-timber forest products, timber, and fish harvest; 2) community members have the capacity to control access to their resources and to arrest illegal encroachers; 3) communities manage to generate significant income to pay guards to patrol their resources on their behalf, particularly when the resources cover large areas; and 4) the community management committees are bound by transparent and accountable systems, allowing members access to grievance mechanisms and independent mediation when they are not satisfied with the committees’ performance or perceive that they have been treated unjustly.

For similar reasons, different research papers have placed a preliminary focus on Community Based Ecotourism (CBET), considering this to be operating more effectively than CFis, CFs and CPAs because the livelihoods of relevant participants have improved together with the growth of their CBET communities.

This report highlights the diversity of customary tenure systems in Khmer communities and will describe the evolution of these customary tenure systems, and governance of natural resources. The report then proposes further research areas where Khmer communities practice customary tenure, in order to further document and secure Khmer rights to their customary lands.

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Customary tenure (CT) refers to the local rules, institutions and practices governing the access, use, and management of land, forests, fisheries and other resources, which have gained social legitimacy and become embedded in the fabric of a society (Palmer, Fricska, & Wehrmann, 2009). Cambodia is rich in natural resources, some of which are governed under CT, including grazing land, agricultural land and paddy (flooded) rice fields, communal and reserved land, areas of swidden system/shifting cultivation, trees, (inundated) forests, timber and non-timber products, watersheds and fisheries, and rivers/lakes. Globally, some of these resources are managed by the community, or by the community and households, and are recognized by local and national governments, where and when relevant, concerning access, use, transfer, and sale of the resources. Furthermore, local institutions governing such resources may change over time. For instance, local rules can become intertwined or hybridized with the State laws and policies. A good example can be seen in the management of common-pool resources (CPRs)4 such as forests and fisheries, which have emerged out of the synergies of local existing collective action and rule, with the collaboration of the government and external actors5.

CT is crucial to support farmers’ livelihoods and to reduce poverty among indigenous and Khmer communities alike. Notwithstanding, there is confusion in using the concept both in practice and in legal contexts. In practice, CT, in regards to shifting cultivation, for instance, is frequently considered and accepted to be a tradition conducted by Cambodia’s indigenous communities, yet it is not accepted as a traditional practice of the Khmer. While related laws and policies in Cambodia recognize the CT of indigenous people in the peripheral uplands of Cambodia, they tolerate and barely recognize its relevance to Khmer communities although the customary practice prevails across the majority of these people. Such confusion requires clarification. Indeed, in academia, the term “Indigenous Peoples” generally refers to native peoples who have originally occupied areas of a particular country or region, regardless of whether or not they now constitute a majority or minority in their contemporary environment6.

Introduction

In this regard, the Khmer people are qualified to be considered as indigenous people as well given that they have settled in the country since the early days of its history.

Because this Thematic Study focuses specifically on customary tenure arrangements within Khmer communities and not of those living in Cambodia’s uplands, it adopts the terms “Khmer” or “Khmer communities” throughout the text to avoid any confusion on indigenous as opposed to non-indigenous spectrum. In addition, the terms peasants, farmers, and Khmer people will be used interchangeably throughout the text. The aim is to document relevant work on CT in Khmer communities and describe the evolution of CT as practised by these people, the different categories of potential resources governed under CT and the governance regimes of those resources7. It concludes by proposing three practical cases/communities that the Mekong Land Governance Project (MRLG) Learning & Alliance (L&A)8 initiative members could follow up on in detail. The report is structured following the order of the said objectives.

The research methodology for this report included an initial comprehensive review of relevant studies on CT within Khmer communities indicated that there were few studies that had examined this topic seriously in depth and breadth. Thus, to compensate for the shortage of relevant literature, semi-structured interviews (via Skype, phone, and in person) were conducted among four scholars in the field, one forest administrator stationed in Ratanakiri, a commune councilor in Kampong Chhnang, one member of a Community-based Ecotourism (CBET) group, one member of a Community Fishery (CFi), and three local citizens (two from Kandal province and one from Takeo). Two consultative workshops were also organized among MRLG L&A members.

4 Following Elinor Ostrom (2008, 11), common-pool resources (CPR) “…are sufficiently large that it is difficult, but not impossible, to define recognized users and exclude other users altogether”. A person’s exploitation of the common resources may subtract the benefits that others enjoy (ibid.). According to Ostrom, CPR may be governed by different institutions, be it governments, private sector, or communities, or co-managed by governments and communities.5 Such support includes the passage of the relevant government laws and (sub) decrees, day- to-day local and national government cooperation (such as the arrest of illegal loggers and fishers) and technical and financial assistance from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donors such as Danida and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. 6 The term “Indigenous Peoples”, according to “The United Nation Forum on Indigenous Issues”, is based on the following: self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member; historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; distinct social, economic or political systems; distinct language, culture and beliefs; form non-dominant groups of society; resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.7 Without sufficient relevant studies to consult, some details of the governance regime of each category of resource may be incomplete.8 The MRLG L & A aims to improve the understanding of CT by classifying and describing it (resources and governance regimes) in respect of Khmer communities in upland and lowland areas, and to inform relevant stakeholders and the wider public about the importance of recognizing CT among Khmer farmers.

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1. The evolution of customary tenure arrangements for

land and natural resource

management in Cambodia

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Thematic Study - Customary Tenure Arrangements within Khmer Communities in Cambodia, May 2019

1. The evolution of customary tenure arrangements for land and natural resource management in Cambodia

1.1 Customary Tenure before the French ProtectorateCambodia is commonly known as “a country of rivers, forests, and rice fields” (Ahmed, Navy, Vuthy, & Tiongco, 1998, p. 4). Fishing, rice farming, and the harvesting of forest resources have been the major activities that have generated food, livelihoods, an array of various materials, and energy for subsistence since time immemorial (ibid.). In other words, agricultural land and natural resources have long been crucial for the livelihoods of Khmer farmers (Ahmed et al., 1998; Ebihara, 1968; Ovesen, Trankell, & Öjendal, 1996).

Traditionally, land and water belonged to the king (Diepart, 2010) and “… the notion of inalienable ownership of land, as distinct from land use, does not seem to have developed in [traditional Cambodia]. Land left fallow for three years reverted to state control” (Chandler, 2008, p. 22). Consequently, for centuries, Khmer farmers practised usufruct rights – the rights of individuals to use a piece of land and benefit from its outputs (Kirsten Ewers Andersen, 2011). The general practice is that farmers access and use land by clearing and settling on it, and then cultivating it; the process is known as appropriation “by the plough” ( Diepart & Sem, 2018). Farmers enjoyed possession of the land for subsistence as long as they did not infringe on the rights of other community members (ibid.). Historically, land has been abundant, when social or economic pressures grew too strong, peasants escaped the tension and moved to clear new land in the wilderness in other parts of the country (Thion, 1993, p. 215).

The governance of land and resources, traditionally, has been based on coordination between households (Diepart & Sem, 2018): management has been based on socially negotiated relations, influenced by two locally-recognized institutions – patronage and pagoda associations (ibid.). Patronage refers to a system of consistent hierarchy and social structure defined by a flexible set of dyadic relationships that extend from the king and his administrative structure to the grassroots level (ibid.). With patronage, trust is maintained as moral obligation between patrons and clients. In the land area, patrons could be village and commune chiefs who recognized and authorized land possession. Patronage is also embedded in the economic sector – patrons could be rich farmers who provided agricultural inputs and credit for the poor, and commercialized agricultural outputs. Such norms and practices are integral to decision-making in rural areas regarding land and resource management (Diepart & Sem, 2018; Ledgerwood & Vijghen, 2002).

The other category of institution covers pagoda associations. These organic associations are forums in which people come together to discuss and resolve social problems relating to, for instance, religious ceremonies, education,

access to credit, public work ( Diepart & Sem, 2018), health, agricultural production, land conflict resolution, and even domestic violence (Thon, Ou, Eng, & Ly, 2009). Even though not all relationships and networks established around pagodas are connected to resource governance, they have the competence, resources, and authority to nurture collectivism based on consensus (ibid.). In short, patronage and pagoda associations are local systems and domains through which villagers (indirectly) govern land and other resources.

It is crucial to emphasize that patronage and pagoda associations have been central elements of Khmer social fabric throughout history and remain foundational in contemporary Cambodia, although pagoda associations have less influence because, for instance, public schools and hospitals have taken away some of their former functions. Even so, it has recently been confirmed that the elderly (chas tum) in most of Cambodia, who are usually affiliated to pagodas and their associations, still play crucial and active roles in bringing local people and local authorities together, helping to resolve social conflicts, perhaps relating to minor land or resource conflicts or to domestic violence (Thon et al., 2009).

1.2 During the French Protectorate: 1863-1953Before the French colonized Cambodia, the concept of private property per se did not exist. The French introduced private land ownership using the Land Act of 1884 (Thion, 1993). This privatization project aimed to control the peasants, boost rice production, and to provide free land for large-scale plantations for French investors ( Greve, 1993; Thion, 1993). The introduction of private land ownership created a change from a system of land possession (paukeas) to a system of land ownership (kamaset) ( Diepart & Sem, 2018). While the difference appears subtle, the implications are significant (ibid.). Possession refers to land tenure that is tied to certain conditions such as continuous presence and the consensus agreed upon by village and commune authorities (ibid.). In contrast, ownership rights are definitive - land owners are not necessarily required to continuously cultivate or occupy the land in order to claim full property rights on it. The transformation from possession to ownership is based on the idea that ownership provides more security and incentives to investors and farmers to use the land in a more efficient manner (ibid.). At the same time, it marks the entire commodification of land: land with ownership rights can be bought and sold as a commodity to any individuals without approval from the community and authorities, whereas land with possession rights does not constitute a commodity or the absolute ownership by specific individuals; occupation and use of the land is usually recognized and endorsed by a community and is not permanent.

Nevertheless, the efforts of the French to appropriate land using the Land Act met with extensive resistance from the elites, local authorities and the peasants themselves because land titles meant tax imposition, and they were unwilling to pay for that (Thion, 1993; Williams, 1999). This

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explains why 90 percent of land was registered as “possession” (paukeas) and only 10 percent as “ownership” (kamaset) (Thion, 1993), and why the traditional appropriation of land “by the plough” remained prevalent. Furthermore, most of the land during the French protectorate was divided into small parcels as opposed to large-scale plots as summarized in Table 01. Figures from 1930 show that about 88 percent of farming households owned between 1 and 5 hectares of land. In 1962, the situation remained largely unchanged, with 84 percent of farming households cultivating plots of between 1 and 5 hectares (Ovesen et al., 1996, p. 19). Another slightly different account suggests that, in 1930, up to 93 percent of land was comprised of plots of less than 5 hectares, and only 1.2 percent consisted of parcels that were larger than 10 hectares; in 1956, the figures were 92 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively, and in 1962, they changed slightly to 86 percent and 4 percent (Thion, 1993, pp. 41-42).

1.3 The administration of King Norodom SihanoukKing Norodom Sihanouk’s administration did not alter the resource tenure arrangements created by the French. Peasants continued to claim land in three ways - customary occupation/acquisition (by the plough), possession, and ownership (So, 2009).Although major areas of plantation land were registered as ownership, peasants continued to clear and claim land under customary arrangements that had been practised before the introduction of private property by the French ( Diepart & Sem, 2018; So, 2009). The parallel practices of clearing and claiming, and the modern system of private property rights caused conflicts when the government was unable to protect farmers who did not conform to the modern property system (ibid.).

1.4 The Democratic Kampuchea regimeThe Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime attempted to modernize and construct an agrarian State between 1975 and early 1979; the DK’s approach and implementation were radical. Their ruling body - the Angkar - abolished individuals’ rights to possess and own land, nationalized the whole agricultural sector, and collectivized all means of production ( Diepart & Sem, 2018). Urbanization was abandoned, people were moved to the countryside, and labour was forced and organized into various collective

Year 1- 5 ha. 10 ha and above

1930 88%* 93%** N/A* 1.2%**

1956 N/A 92% 1.2%

1962 84% N/A 4%* Column representing data from Oversen et al., 1996** Column representing data from Thion, 1993

Table 01: Percentage of Land Possession in Relation to Land Size

Table 02: Types of Land and Use in Cambodia

production groups. The DK’s collectivized regime did not work and was defeated in early 1979 by the Salvation Front - a group of Cambodian communists dissatisfied with the Khmer Rouge, led by Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Heng Samrin - with military support from Vietnam.

1.5 Beyond the Democratic Kampuchea regimeIn 1979, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) introduced the Krom Samaki (Solidary Group) and private property remained unrecognized. The aim of Krom Samaki was to distribute land to a small group of 15 to 20 households who were supposed to cultivate collectively and share produce. By the end of 1980s, the PRK realized that collectivization/ Krom Samaki had failed and accordingly restored land to the status of private property (Gottesman, 2004; Williams, 1999). Then, the land claimed collectively under Krom Samaki was distributed - relatively equitably in most cases - to families belonging to each Krom Samaki (Diepart & Sem, 2018).

By 1989, various legal provisions related to land were incorporated into the Constitution and one point was made clear – no-one could claim the rights to land acquired before 19799 even though anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers who were well-connected with village or commune chiefs, or had paid bribes to the chiefs, were able to claim the land possession rights that they had held before 1979 . It was thus from 1989, and the amendments to the Constitution, that Cambodians were permitted by law to occupy, use, and sell the land that the State had allocated to them. Land was grouped into three types as shown in Table 02:

Type of Land Size Purposes

Settlements (loumneuvthan) Less than 2,000 m2 Settlement

Agricultural (kasekam) Less than 5 hectares Agricultural production

Concessions (sambathian) Larger than 5 hectares Agro-industrial development

9 Interview with a villager from Prek Bi village, Koh Thom B Commune, Kandal province, 1 August 2017.

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At the same time, the law allowed up to 5 hectares of possession rights relating to cleared forestland (ibid.). The process set the preconditions for the 1992 Land Law in stipulating that all the land belonged to the State and that Cambodians were permitted private possession rights (use, access, claim, exclusion and transfer) on areas allocated to them.

However, beyond these provisions, the rest of the law is, in places, somewhat vague. First, while the 1992 Land Law recognized the private use rights of land customarily claimed and distributed in the 1980s (Williams, 1999), the status of customary usufruct rights after 1992 was unclear (Van Acker, 1999). Second, as was the case with the French law, the 1992 Land Law was still ambiguous about possession (socially recognized and locally approved by commune chiefs) and ownership (definitive private ownership processed though cadastral offices) ( Diepart & Sem, 2018). The two are clearly distinct as an ownership title can invalidate possession when conflicts arise and the case is taken to the court ( Diepart & Sem, 2018). For instance, while the law firmly forbade the private ownership of agricultural land, it created provisions and conditions for someone with a possession certificate to turn into the actual owner of the land (ibid.). As a result, Van Acker contends that the 1992 law was unable to synthesize the three main land tenure regimes previously adopted - land acquisition “by the plough”, State land, and private ownership (Van Acker, 1999).

The implementation of the Land Law 1992 led to massive and illicit land acquisition in Cambodia’s countryside and the privatization of State resources (Diepart & Sem, 2018). Between 1994 and 2001, 7,084,215 hectares were allocated for forest concessions, equal to 39 percent of Cambodia’s territory or more than half of Cambodia’s forest areas (ibid.). Several factors instigated this dynamism. First, the Western donors, primarily the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), imposed privatization under the neoliberal agenda. Second, the 1990s marked the consolidation of power among conflicting factions, especially the Cambodian People’s Party (the CPP) and FUNCINPEC10. Therefore, the CPP, the strongest faction, was able to permit rampant land concessions, leading to forest exploitation and trades that generated enormous informal revenues to strengthen this group (the national elites comprising the military, the judicial officials, the police, and the subnational administrators). Finally, the surge in land acquisition was facilitated by the vagueness of the law, mentioned above. Consequently, land acquisition led to a significant decline in customary access to land and other resources, which severely affected rural livelihoods, especially those of vulnerable groups (Diepart, 2015a; Meas & McCallum, 2009).

1.6 The 2001 Land Law and Its ImpactThe rampant resource conflicts related to control of, and access to, natural resources and land in the 1990s led the government to establish new laws and provisions to address them (Diepart, 2015a). However, it was the heavy influence the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that pressured the government to pass and implement the Land Law 2001 across Cambodia without any piloting (Ironside, 2017). The Western donors were particularly influential at the time because the government that followed the post-1997 coup was in dire need of external legitimacy (Diepart, 2015a).

As Figure 1 below shows, land in Cambodia is divided into two major legal categories: private and State domain. The State domain is comprised of two components. The first is State public land that serves the public interest (military bases, roads, or land where public services are delivered such as schools, administrative posts, public hospitals, or land with a natural origin such as forest, water bodies, river beds, mountains, and the like). The second is State private land: that is, State land that is not public land. State private land can be legally privatized. The private domain consists of full legal private ownership. Other categories include monastery land and indigenous community land - the law recognizes the CT of land by indigenous communities. Such a clear demarcation did not exist in the 1992 Land Law. It is worth emphasizing that the 2001 Land Law permits the possession and ownership of land that had been occupied (by the plough) five years before this piece of legislation took effect. Specifically, the 2001 Land Law stipulates that “possessors” are individuals who occupied State private land in a peaceful, continuous, and open manner. When the occupation lasted for at least five years, the possessor was entitled to claim ownership. However, the 2001 law does not permit “possession” to be based on occupation that started on, or following, the date the 2001 law came into effect. In short, the practice of temporary and customary occupation “by the plough”, which, according to the 1992 law, would lead to possession of the land, was no longer permitted. Moreover, while the 2001 Land Law recognizes the CT of indigenous people, it does not have provisions that fully acknowledge the CT systems, especially in respect of communal land, of Khmer communities (Ironside, 2017; MRLG, 2017a).

10 United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia.

Figure 1: Land property categories under the 2001 Land Law

STATE D

OM

AIN

PR

IVA

TE D

OM

AIN

Private LandState

Public Land

Indigenous Community

Land

Monastery Land

State Private

Land

Source: (Diepart & Sem, 2018)

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According to Jeremy Ironside (2017), the provision of economic land concessions (ELCs), as a part of the 2001 Land Law, constitutes its largest negative consequence. The ELC framework was further developed by a 2005 sub-decree on ELCs. In principle, ELCs are granted on State private land. The overall area covered by ELCs is massive, at the end of 2012 they were estimated cover around 2,004,592 hectares (Diepart and Sem, 2018). The challenge is that most of those ELCs are located in upland areas where peasants customarily practise shifting cultivation, grazing, and forestry activities, but do not possess ownership titles. The negative effects on people and the environment are apparent for the following reasons:

With ELCs causing so many land conflicts, the government issued Directive 01 prior to the 2013 national election in an attempt to tackle land insecurity among claimants to State land, especially in the upland areas of Cambodia. At the beginning, Directive 01 was intended to provide land titles for thousands of peasants residing inside ELCs. However, just six weeks after the implementation of the initiative, the Council of Ministers extended the scope of Directive 01 to cover forest concessions, forest rehabilitation areas, and Protected Areas (Diepart & Sem, 2018). By the end of 2016, under Directive 01, 637,130 individual titles had been issued (MLMUPC, 2017).

Box 01: How economic land concessions (ELCs) are harmful to people and the environment

Negative effects of ELC’s in upland Cambodia

1) Concessionaires have largely ignored the government’s requirement to conduct environmental and social impact assessments (EIAs);

2) The government’s restrictive policies requiring an ELC to cover less than 10,000 hectares are not fully respected;

3) New concessions are illegally granted on forested areas and indigenous land;

4) Illegal logging around ELCs has been prevalent;

5) Concessionaires rarely consult the communities who are affected and ignore the destruction they cause (ibid.).

Source: Ironside (2017)

2. Customary tenure, resources

and governance

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2. Customary tenure, resources and governance

2.1 Customary tenure in (agricultural) landAs explained above, Khmer peasants are used to customarily clearing, cultivating and claiming land – acquisition “by the plough”. In locations where nobody has settled, farmers may clear, plough and cultivate the land for subsistence as long as the acquisition does not encroach on the rights of others in the community (So, 2009). Land appropriation by the plough has led to temporary and conditional individual possession rights (paukeas), or private de facto rights, relating to the associated land, which are accompanied by a bundle of rights linked to transfer, use, access, claim, and exclusion (Diepart & Sem, 2018). The possession rights are temporary and conditional, in that the land may be forfeited to somebody else if it has not been continuously occupied and used for several (often between three and five) consecutive years (Diepart & Sem, 2018; So, 2009). This practice also gained recognition within a community and among local authorities.

The establishment and process of possession has evolved over time. In contemporary Cambodia, possession frequently does not operate in complete isolation of formal statute. In this way, legal pluralism – “the situation in which numerous, contradictory and competing sets of rules and norms regulate social, economic and political relationships” (Adler, Porter, & Woolcock 2008, p1) – is pervasive. Except in the case of land used for shifting cultivation, which is ruled under a distinct form of governance (to be discussed in the next section), traditionally land possession often means land occupation which is recognized by a community or local authority, and is subject to the force of related laws and regulations (Diepart & Sem, 2018; So, 2009). In practice, however, the legal authority dominates, meaning that the possessors of land frequently have the right to sell that land without approval, either from the community or the local authorities, even though acknowledgment from the local authority is required.

The process of recognition stated above, where the land possessor’s exclusive rights by local authorities (on the condition that the use is peaceful and continuous), is the basis for the establishment of the land titling process and its implementation under the 2001 Land Law. In other words, the formalization of the statutory rights (ownership) builds on the customary acquisition (possession) of land11 (Ironside, 2017). This hybridization of customary and statutory land tenure is foundational, not only for land management, but also for other forms of natural resource management in Cambodia. It is indicative that, by the end of 2016, 63.6 percent (4,451,817 titles out of the total of

approximately seven million) of land owners had individual titles (MLMUPC, 2017); however, in areas that land titling has not yet reached, customary practices continue (ibid.). Land around markets or close to main roads is expensive and has titles, but “possession” continues in places where it is of less value.

Other than residential and agricultural land, in Cambodia’s Khmer communities it is common to see communal land collectively owned and managed by the villagers. For instance, in Prasat commune, Kandal Stoeung district, Kandal province, there is a large piece of 400-hectare land that is owned by the peasants and a local authority12. In other places, such as in Kork Banteay commune, Rolea Pha-ea district, Kampong Chhnang province, there are two pieces of communal land – one of which was 0.5 hectare that was formerly military land, and another area that was more than two hectares which belonged to the commune office13. The land in Prasat commune used to be co-managed by the local authorities (commune and village levels) and the elderly (chas tum) who represented the villagers. It was normal practice for a few representatives of the community to hold frequent meetings with the local authority to decide what to do with the land. Decisions were often announced during religious ceremonies (such holy days) or traditional holidays such as Khmer New Year. However, over time, especially as land prices have soared, the commune chief and other commune councillors from the same ruling party, with the support and approval of the district and provincial authorities, have used their power to marginalize community voices and to sell the land. By 2017, only 200 hectares of communal land was left in Prasat commune. The communal land in Kork Banteay has been largely managed by the commune chiefs on behalf of the community, who, at times, make decisions about it in secret. The 0.5 hectare of land formerly allocated to the military was sold a few years ago and some land surrounding the commune office has also fallen into private hands.

Communal rice paddies also exist in some Khmer communities. For instance, in 1989, approximately 5 hectares of fertile rice paddies in Phnom Del village, Taing Kraing commune, Batheay district, Kampong Cham province, were allocated for communal use14. The area is located near to a public school and pagoda and has been managed by a few representatives of the villagers, the pagoda, and school committees. So far, the land has been leased to local villagers for farming; the income from leasing has been used to buy food for the local monks and for various community purposes during Khmer New Year, Pchum Ben (the annual Buddhist festival organized in September), and Bon Da Phum ( - the post-harvest festival). Very recently, because the local school needs to be expanded, a portion of the communal land will soon house a school building. Similar areas of communal rice paddy exist in Kandal Stoeung district, Kandal province15.

11 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017. 12 Data obtained from participants at the first consultative workshop organized by MRLG, 7 July 2017.13 Phone interview with a commune councilor from Kok Banteay, Rolea Pha-ea District, Kampong Chhnang Province, 4 August 2017.14 Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by MRLG, 21 August 2017.15 Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by MRLG, 21 August 2017

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Another type of communal property includes sacred or religious land/buildings that belong to almost every village in Cambodia. Salachhortien (Buddhist buildings) attached to communities are owned by villagers who come together every holiday or once/twice a year, depending on a consensus and their needs, to worship or to organize various Buddhist ceremonies. Such buildings and the land they sit on frequently belong to the whole community represented by the elderly and recognized by the village and commune authorities16. In some cases, however, in Prek Samrong village, Koh Thom B commune, Kandal province, the land is in private possession; it is owned by a generous family who allow the land to be used for the community’s religious purposes. The building, however, was constructed by villagers and is common property.

2.2 Customary tenure in forest resource systemsThe Khmer manage and harvest forests and non-timber forest products in different ways. Peter Swift and Andrew Cock (2015), who emphasized the roles and relevance of the traditional Khmer system of forest management, categorized forest resources and their management by Khmer communities into four groups. Those include swidden-based/shifting cultivation practices, spirit forests/zones, resin tapping, and timber harvesting, foraging, and opportunistic collection activities. The two authors’ research is based on interviews conducted over more than ten years in the provinces of Prey Veng, Takeo, Kampong Speu, Kampong Chhnang, Pursat, Oddar Meanchey, and Kampong Thom.

Swidden system/shifting cultivation

Swidden refers to land clearance by cutting trees and burning an area of forest for farming for a limited period of time. Usually, agricultural crops such as corn, rice or vegetables are grown for a number of years as agreed upon by community members. Then the land is left fallow for several years before clearance occurs again. Swidden is commonly known in Khmer as the making of a chamkar - , in Cambodian legal documents as chamkar ponechar - (shifting chamkar), and by NGOs as chamkar vil chum - (rotating chamkar) (Swift & Cock, 2015). Swidden cultivation is practised in numerous Khmer communities such as in the districts of Aoral, Thpong, and Phom Sruoch of Kampong Speu province, the districts of Kravanh and Veal Veng of Pursat province17, the district of Samlaut of Battambang province, and varied places in other provinces including Kratie, Stoeung Treng18, Kampong Thom, and Pursat (Swift & Cock, 2015).

Normally each household has land use rights to cultivate and harvest crops, such as those listed above, for subsistence and sale, and to exclude others by growing their crops. However, land control rights are collectively managed by the whole community. It is important to emphasize here

that the governance of land use and land control rights has changed significantly over time. Local institutions now permit the changing practices of swidden cultivation19. Some 20 years ago, in Samlaut district, for example, farmers grew only annual/agricultural crops and not perennials. More recently, some farmers have started to grow both - annual crops and industrial crops - on the same plot; others who could afford to, have moved to permanent farming, planting only perennial crops. Local institutions now also allow gradual land privatization; however, this also means that a community has less control over their land rights. For instance, when a community household, having planted perennials in location A, moves to location B, they still retain the rights to own not only their land but also their perennial crops on the land in location A. Before, when a farmer left an area of land, they could own only their swidden plot of land for a number of years, as agreed upon by the community, and could not own any crops on the land. Two decades ago, community members were not permitted to sell their plots to outsiders.

These days, while shifting cultivation plots located inside Protected Areas cannot be sold, plots close to settlement areas or villages where land prices have soared, can be. However, where the community rules and leadership are strong, sale remains forbidden.

Swidden farming involves recognition by the local authorities and the Ministry of Environment. These days, farmers are allowed to live and cultivate on the edge of Protected Areas, as is the case in the Phnom Samkos sanctuary. Furthermore, they are allowed to conduct swidden cultivation in sustainable use zones. However, although they can continue to cultivate on the current plots they possess, the provincial department of environment does not permit them to extend their land use any further. It is also important to note that, since Prime Minister Hun Sen implemented Directive 01 in 2013, shifting cultivation has been negatively affected20. Many parcels of land, for instance in Pursat’s Kravanh and Veal Veng districts, are now privately owned. This means that some land previously used for swidden cultivation is now all private property, overriding the authority and the usage of local communities. Now, even though there is still land for shifting cultivation and swidden practices to continue, the areas allocated to these activities have declined, and most land is located in forest land or in Protected Areas21.

In an interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, from the Mekong Region Land Governance (MRLG) Project22,he reported that there is a mixture of ethnic groups who have been living in areas like Samlaut for centuries, as well as Khmer people who migrated there in the early 1990s. When the Khmer saw the success the Por indigenous ethnic group were having with swidden cultivation, they copied and even competed with them using the same farming techniques.

16 Interview with a villager from Prey Nheat commune, Korng Pisey district, Kampong Speu province, 15 July 201717 Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 21 August 2017.18 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.19 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.20 Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 21 August 2017.21 Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 21 August 2017.22 Skype interview with Jean-Christohpe Diepart, 4 August 2017.

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Spiritual forests

In the Khmer society, spirits permeate varied domains in and around villages and farther afield (Swift & Cock, 2015). The Khmer practise the animist tradition, which means that people believe that elements of nature such as rocks, forests, rivers, trees, and so on, are inhabited by various invisible spirits. These beliefs held sway long before the arrival of Hinduism and Buddhism. Many Khmer villages have a guardian spirit, or neak ta - which is often believed to stay with specific trees, geographical features, forests, or other physical objects, or in a small, specially-built spirit house. The Khmer believe that neak ta play a crucial role in protecting the inhabitants of each village against any aggressive or intruding forces of evil from outside. Villagers usually hold annual ceremonies to worship, please, and sustain the existence of their village guardian spirits. Land surrounding neak ta trees, where neak ta forests grow, or where neak ta houses are situated, are considered to be community property. Neak ta properties are managed by elderly people in the village who represent the villagers and are recognized by the local authorities. When villagers gather for annual ceremonies, they contribute money for the maintenance of the houses, building walls (where required), and the purchase of materials necessary for the house use. The neak ta land areas range from 100 square meters to 2,500 square meters, some of which were allocated for neak ta since time immemorial. In Prek Bi village, Kandal province23, the land of neak ta belongs to a wealthy family who provide the land for collective purposes. Neak ta land, especially land within village boundaries, is often not generally available for sale in contrast to the communal land mentioned above.

These days, spirits are now considered to be less powerful than they were in the past and spirit forest areas are declining in size. However, spirit forests are better protected than other forest areas because of people’s attachment to them (Swift & Cock, 2015). In light of this, Cambodia’s forest law, at least ostensibly, complements this traditional practice. Article 45 states that the…:

“Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries shall recognize the religious forest of local communities living within or near the forest, as Protection Forest serving religious, cultural or conservation purposes. It is prohibited to harvest any spirit trees, thus they may be specially marked and shall be identified in a Community Forest Management Plan” (RGC, 2002).

The implementation of this Article is, however, limited for two reasons – the government agencies do not consider that many Khmer communities live near enough to spirit forest areas for the law to apply, and, more importantly, economic land concessionaires with strong connections to the ruling party prioritize their own economic interests and have damaged much of the associated customary and cultural heritage (Swift & Cock, 2015).

Resin collection

Resin tapping is customarily and widely practised in Cambodia, not only among the ethnic groups, but also among the Khmer. Resin is a liquid that is extracted from a number of species of the Dipterocarp tree family including Dipterocarpus alatus (chhoe teal - ), Dipterocarpus intricatus (trach - ), and Dipterocarpus tuberculatus (khlong - ) (ibid.).

Tappers cut a hole at the bottom of the trunk of a resin tree, burn the hole, wait for resin to flow into the hole, and later collect it - every day or every few days depending on the distance between the trees and their home. This tradition has a significant potential for forest preservation24, even though it attracted little attention from policy-makers and reform-promoting agencies prior to 2001 when the resin tree owners started to complain about the effects of logging concessions on their livelihoods (Swift & Cock, 2015).

According to established norms, when somebody taps a tree, no-one else can do so, and people do not steal resin; the trees, however, can be transferred from one owner to another by inheritance, gift or sale (ibid.). The number of households in each village who own resin trees, and the number of trees per household, varies from one location to another. Whereas in some villages just a few families possess trees, in others, almost every household own resin producing trees. Some families own just a few, other hundreds. For instance, in a village in Pursat, about one third of the 30 households have resin trees, and each family holds about 100. In another case in Kampong Chhnang, five or six families out of 30 tap trees for resin. In the Oral district of Kampong Speu, an individual owns around 15 trees. In Prey Veng, all resin trees are located on private land that has frequently been transferred from one generation to another, and the land could be in a different village from where the resin tappers live. Therefore, somebody other than the landowner may own the trees since the trees and land can be inherited differently. Trees can be distributed among children, but the land is given in its entirety to the youngest in the family (ibid.).

Through the complex system of resin tree tenure in Khmer communities, resin collection has, and will continue to contribute to forest conservation, as families and communities highly value the productive trees, and therefore protect and conserve areas where they are found, as a community. The trees are often in the middle of forests, therefore community members have to protect the surrounding forest area so that their resin trees can survive, and so that they can consequently benefit from further resin harvests25. The traditional practices of resin tapping are legally recognised under the various articles in the 2002 Forest Law. For instance, Article 35 of the Forest Law, drafted by the former PRK, forbade the logging of resin trees (Swift & Cock, 2015). Likewise, Article 29 of the 2002 Forest Law states that: “…it should be prohibited to harvest the…trees

23 Interview with two villagers from Prek Bi village, Koh Thom B Commune, Kandal province, 1 August 2017.24 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.25 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.

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that local communities have tapped to extract resin for customary use ...”. Article 40 states that:

“For local communities living within or near the Permanent Forest Reserves, the State shall recognize and ensure their traditional user rights for the purpose of traditional customs, beliefs, religions and living as defined in this Article. The traditional user rights of a local community for forest products and by-products shall not require a permit. The traditional user rights under this Article consist of the collection of dead wood, picking wild fruit, collecting bees’ honey, tapping resin, and collecting other forest by-products . . . ” (RGC, 2002).

Before the civil war started in 1970, resin was harvested in almost of every part of Cambodia comprising Prey Veng, Takeo, Kampong Speu, Kampong Chhnang, Pursat, Kompong Thom, Siem Reap and Kratie (Swift & Cock, 2015). However, the anarchic logging in the early 1990s, especially from 1994 to 1998, seriously depleted the number of resin trees. Recently, a significant number of resin trees have been cut as a result of land clearance for plantations. The loss is widespread in Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey, and in other provinces dominated by indigenous people, such as Preah Vihear, Kratie, Rattanakiri, and Mondulkiri (Swift & Cock, 2015). Today, only a few provinces still have sufficient trees for resin extraction. In Prey Veng, there are resin trees (chhoe teal) that remain to be tapped, but they are on private land. Kampong Thom and Oddar Meanchey also still have mature trees for resin tapping. There are other provinces where resin is still tapped to varying degrees include Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kampong Chhnang, and Pursat.

Timber harvesting, foraging and opportunistic collection activities

Besides resin, the Khmer collect various products from forests such as timber and (dead) wood for boat-building, fuel, housing and fencing. They also gather a variety of fruits, plants and barks for daily consumption or traditional medicine. In earlier times, yams, betel, tree leaves, bamboo (shoots), honey, mushrooms were also important for forest foraging activities26 (Swift & Cock, 2015). Until recently, the harvesting of forest timber and forest products had remained prevalent: a 2013 survey cited by Ironside (2017) discovered that up to 39 percent of the 2.1 million households with agricultural holdings were involved in forest related activities such as harvesting bamboo, charcoal production, gathering firewood and cutting sandalwood and other forest timber. Bamboo and firewood were harvested by 97 percent of households, as reported by Cambodia’s National Institute of Statistics (NIS, 2015). Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Kampong Speu, Tbong Khmum, Kampot, and Takeo are provinces in which more than 50,000 households harvest firewood and bamboo (NIS, 2015). In addition, the largest number of households engaged in handicrafts, such as basket and mat weaving, are to be found in Takeo, Kampong

Cham and Siem Reap (ibid.). In Kampong Speu today, it is not uncommon for tourists travelling on national road 4 between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville to buy pickled bamboo shoots sold by local peasants. However, as in the case of resin, forest products are on the decline. In Kampong Speu’s Oral district27 and Koh Kong, for instance, sugar plantations have appropriated land that used to provide access rights to the locals to freely harvest forest products (Meas & McCallum, 2009).

Before civil wars erupted, Cambodia had bountiful forest resources for communities to benefit from and access. At the same time, peasants such as those in Kampong Thom and Pursat respected forestry laws and local norms by cutting down only mature trees as permitted by foresters (Swift & Cock, 2015). Furthermore, there was implicit shared understanding among peasants that resources had to be harvested in a sustainable manner, promoting inter-generational justice – it was considered that resources should remain for the benefit of future generations (ibid.). People were able to adhered to these harvesting norms as there was little external influence and pressure to further develop their land. As a result, traditional forest management and State forest management were effectively implemented (ibid.). Currently, the norms of the “good old days” – norms of sustainable common pool resource management, a less rigidly adhered to. Local farmers are now motivated to extract resources as much as possible, especially trees, because the State law has not been strictly enforced, permitting illegal logging on a large-scale, and providing immediate expendable income for local communities and peasants.

2.3 Customary tenure in fisheries and wetland resourcesThe Tonle Sap floodplain

A large scale survey of 5,117 households, published in 1998, identified five types of fisheries and wetland resources (Ahmed et al., 1998). These were: 1) inundated forests; 2) big rivers/lakes; 3) flooded rice fields; 4) banks/beds of rivers/lakes; and 5) irrigation canals/or dikes. The samples were selected from Khmer fishing communities (from 83 communes in 51 districts) in the Great Lake, Tonle Sap River area, and the floodplains of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers as parts of the provinces of Kandal, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Siem Reap, Pursat, Battambang, Kampong Thom, and Phnom Penh (ibid.). A considerably high number of households, 92 percent, responded in the surveys that they had access to the fisheries and wetland resources situated within or outside of their communes. Inundated forests were used by the largest proportion of households (81 percent) as fishing grounds and as grazing land, and for firewood. Almost 80 percent of the households depended on large rivers and lakes for irrigation water and fish. Around 61 percent and 51 percent, respectively, relied on flooded rice lands and riverbanks (ibid.) primarily for

26 As a Khmer, the author can also recall all of these forest products.27 Based on the author’s trip to Oral in 2013.

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animal grazing, snail/crab collection and vegetable production (ibid.). However, while the survey was large in scope, it lacked details and depth. Furthermore, its data, while still largely relevant, is now old. Therefore, this section provides an updated categorization of fisheries and wetland resources and CT.

The ecology and economic productivity of the floodplain are driven by the flood pulse concept28 (Roberts, 2015). In the rainy season, the flush of water from the Mekong River and the inflow from tributaries swell the lake from about 2,500 square kilometres to 13,000 square kilometres, while the average water depth rises from 1-2 meters to 8-10 meters (ibid.). The flood brings not only fish to spawn and grow, but also sediments and nutrients to enrich grass, aquatic plants and mangroves.

The floodplain provides many resources and opportunities for Khmer communities residing on and near the lake; these include rice production, fishing, cattle and buffalo herding, firewood, collection of grasses for roof thatching, and harvesting of snakes and small birds (ibid.). Given the regional, national and even international political, economic and ecological significance of the lake, various ministries have a stake in it29. The overlapping and conflicting governance relating to the lake, the rise in land prices, and competing interests among various State agencies, relevant international bodies and other private and economic interests, have had a negative impact on the livelihoods of the peasants who depend on the lake, and on customary practices there (Mak, 2011). For instance, before the civil war, Roka village in Kampong Thom was inhabited by some 20 families. Traditionally, in December, when the flood water receded, as many as 60 families moved in. Some farmers moved in to fish, others to grow small-scale flood recession rice on the margins of the lake, many did both, and others used the area to graze their animals30 (Roberts, 2015). It is important to note that some permanent residents of Roka also grew deep water rice. Customarily, the land for rice cultivation was not privately owned. Many families in Roka were year-round residents, others returned year after year to the same sites recognized by the chief of the local community fishery committee (ibid.). If the lands were left uncultivated for too long, the chief could transfer the use rights to others (ibid.). This fluid land and natural resource tenure system contributed to the resilience of Roka community and incoming farmers (ibid.), and this locally-developed mechanism involved almost no serious conflict among the small number of peasants who knew each other well and respected the plots of land of each household31.

Starting from the 1990s, customary practice in Cambodia has gradually become more precarious (Roberts, 2015) for a number of reasons. First, rising land prices in Roka have attracted investors and speculators. Second, the nature of the area does not fit into the land titling program of the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction. Third, for some years after the war there was not enough deep-water rice seed for certain areas in the village. At the same time, the government was supporting modern, high-yielding rice varieties. Therefore, some parcels of land were left idle. And finally, the government had an interest in large-scale rice production in the floodplain. With land abandonment, land speculation and a lack of recognition of the peasants’ customary land tenure, some families started to sell some of their land holdings, and others soon followed. Consequently, land suitable for deep water rice has been concentrated in the possession of a few urban elites from Kampong Thom (ibid.). Without landholdings in the vicinity of the lake, villagers in Roka and other incoming fishers and farmers have significantly less access to land for deep water rice cultivation and fishing. The encroachment of private and State interests, which reduces the size of CT and resources, is a worrying phenomenon that has also taken place in various areas around the Great Lake32. Rising land prices have also been disastrous for peasants’ livelihoods in other ways. For instance, interviews have revealed that, in the Kampong Svay, Angkor Leu, and Angkor Krom communes of Kampong Thom, inundated forests have been encroached upon indirectly by Chinese companies that have been buying land for rice cultivation, among other purposes33. Such transactions are sophisticated and indirect, often involving Chinese businessmen who act from behind the scenes, encouraging the local people to clear and in order for them to claim the land. Eventually, it is the Chinese who buy most of the land, piecing it together to form large-scale rice farms, and, as a result of the clearance of inundated forest, there are fewer and fewer fish.

Customary tenure practices and resources within the Tonle Sap area have been visibly affected by numerous zones demarcated by different State agencies34. The immediate consequence is that the zonings have narrowed the space available for fishers to conduct their customary fishing activities35. The natural features of the Tonle Sap mean that it is grouped into the terrestrial ecological zone, the floodplain, and the aquatic ecological zone (Mak, 2015). However, the State has developed three different zoning areas to manage the resources of the lake. First, for conservation purposes, and under the biosphere reserve system, the Tonle Sap is zoned into transitional, buffer, and core zones; access by fishers to the core zone is heavily

28 Flood pulse concept explains how the periodic inundation and drought control the lateral exchange of water, nutrients ad organisms between the main river channel and the connected floodplain. See http://www.fao.org/3/ad526e/ad526e0c.htm29 For details about the different types of zoning relating to the Tonle Sap Lake, see Mak, 2015, p. 337.30 A similar phenomenon occurs in Boribo district in Kampong Chhnang. During the dry season, between two and three months a year, people from the upper area take their rice down to exchange it for fish with the water-based people. In addition to conducting this exchange, farmers from the upper areas also fish themselves.31 Interview with Mak Sethirith, a researcher who has extensively studied the Tonle Sap floodplain, Phnom Penh, 1 July 2017.32 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.33 Interview with Mak Sethirith, a researcher who has extensively studied the Tonle Sap floodplain, Phnom Penh, 1 July 2017.34 Interview with Mak Sethirith, a researcher who has extensively studied the Tonle Sap floodplain, Phnom Penh, 1 July 2017.35 Interview with Mak Sethirith, a researcher who has extensively studied the Tonle Sap floodplain, Phnom Penh, 1 July 2017.

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restricted (Mak, 2015). The Ministry of Environment plays the key role in this first zoning. Second, more recently the flooded forest management system has been categorized into Zone 01, Zone 02, and Zone 03 36. The Tonle Sap Authority is the leading body in charge of this classification and its implementation. Third, in 2012 the Royal Government abolished all commercial fishing areas and transformed them into open access; the Tonle Sap consequently has been classified as open access, conservation areas, and areas for Community Fisheries (CFis). The Fishery Administration is the main actor in this last zoning exercise.

It is important to note that the Tonle Sap Great Lake region has experienced declining fish productivity and diversity (So.n.d.; USAID 2015). With wild fish harvests exceeding sustainable limits, the annual fish catch per fishing inhabitant has significantly declined from 347 tons in 1940 to 196 tons in 1995 (a decrease of 44 percent), and to only 116 tons in 2008 (down by 67 percent) (FAO.n.d.; So.n.d.). Whilst various zoning exercises have been enforced, and government laws and policies have attempted to protect and reduce the decline in the fish population, resources are still decreasing, and this has been exacerbated by many factors including the growing population of fishers (of the Tonle Sap) (from 0.36 million in 1940 to 1.2 million in 1995, and to 1.5 million in 2008), the use of illegal/destructive fishing methods, the gradual loss and degradation of healthy fish habitats and essential floodplain, and climate change (So.n.d ; USAID 2015).

Big rivers/lakes

Besides accessing the Great Lake, many Khmer peasants customarily fish in big rivers such as the Mekong and the Bassac, and big lakes such as the Boeung Thom (“big lake”) located in Kandal province. The intensity of fishing is seasonal; for instance, around January and February when fish swim upstream to Steung Treng and surrounding areas, many farmers rush to catch a large number of fish to sell or for long-term consumption. During low fishing seasons, farmers conduct rice farming, cultivate crops, and fish for supplementary income and food consumption. Most of the time, especially during the high fishing season, fishing in big rivers and lakes can be conducted on an open access basis. However, fisheries are under active management in the low season in some areas of big rivers and lakes. For instance, households living in the vicinity of fishing zones (riversides of the Mekong or the Bassac) collectively use tree branches to attract and catch fish on a bi-weekly or monthly basis. They share the fish stock equally. Only families living along the banks of those big rivers and lakes, where there is the potential for such fishing activities, are permitted to so this37. All of the above practices are locally recognized. Banks/beds of rivers/lakes are used for different purposes. For instance, during the dry season, farmers grow corn as food for cattle on the banks/beds of rivers. Others might plant vegetables. From big lakes, farmers these days often

cut small inundated trees for firewood while others conduct short-term rice production on the margin of those lakes: it is also common for farmers to collect water-based plants (such as lotus and water lilies) as well as various non-timber products38. There is no formal documentation on the customary governance systems in the river banks and beds. However, an interview with two farmers in that location indicated that, given the land speculation, many land plots around the Boeung Thom in Kandal province are now privately owned or under private possession. Before the civil war, the CT in Boeung Thom was almost as fluid as tenure in Tonle Sap floodplain area39.

2.4 Co-management/hybrid regimesBeyond the CT practices detailed above, Khmer from around the early part of this century have been involved in community-based natural resource management approaches (Sunderlin, 2006; Van Acker, 2010). These experiments have highlighted two issues:

• The modern management model has not been implemented by Khmer farmers, but has been applied by Western donors who have assumed that there is local space for effectiveness in resource management and consequently in poverty reduction. Co-management - or co-CPR management - is a modern and foreign idea because it contains many elements such as democratic leadership and democratic participation by members, whereas local Khmer groups operate on patronage and top-down approaches40 (Meas & McCallum, 2009).

• In Cambodia’s history, beyond pagoda associations, there have been few local intermediary institutions or civil society organizations connecting State and society (Collins, 1998; Ebihara, 1968). CPR management attempts to organize and develop such civil society groups to ensure better management of local resources.

Community Fisheries (CFis), Community Forestry (CF) and Community Protected Areas (CPAs)

The decline in access to natural resources, resulting from aggressive expansion forest concessions and fishing management, and donors’ initiatives, have led to the development of various Cambodian laws and policies41

pertaining to community-based natural resource management. The result has been the emergence of Community Fisheries or CFis in the national fisheries domain, Community Forestry (CF) initiatives in the forestry domain outside of Protected Areas, and Community Protective Areas (CPAs) in the Protected Areas. Even though approaches to CFis, CFs, and CPAs vary, they share common ground: for instance, communities actively set up their own management plans and activities, usually with support from the government, NGOs, and donors. Community-based approaches have been proliferating (Marschke & Berkes, 2005; Marschke, Lykhim, & Kim, 2014) as shown in Table 03.

36 Zone 1: residential zone—395,578 ha; Zone 2: agricultural development zone—369,865 ha; Zone 3: flooded forest zone—647,406 ha (Mak 2015).37 Data obtained from participants at the first consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 7 July 2017.38 Interview with two villagers from Prek Bi village, Koh Thom B Commune, Kandal province, 1 August 2017.39 Interview with two villagers from Prek Bi village, Koh Thom B Commune, Kandal province, 1 August 2017. 40 Interview with Meas Nee, Phnom Penh, 24 December 2012.41 For instance, the Fisheries Law 2006, the Royal Decree on Community Fisheries 2005; the Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management 2007; the Law on Forestry 2003; the Forestry Law 2002, and the Sub Decree on Community Forestry Management 2003.

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Table 04: Factors Leading to the Effectiveness and Sustainability of CFis, CF, and CPAs

Factors Sources

Members’ livelihoods are enhanced, for instance, through commercial sales of non-timber forest products and timber, and through an increasing fish catch.

(Marschke & Berkes, 2005; Ratner, 2011)

Members have the capacity to control access to their community resource areas and to arrest illegal encroachers without seeking the intervention of a forestry officer who is 50 km away.

Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4

August 2017.

When the community covers a large are, community members manage to generate significant income to pay guards to patrol their resources on their behalf

Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4

August 2017.

The community management committees are bound by a determination, and systems, to practise transparency and accountability, and have a legal mandate, allowing members access to grievance mechanisms and independent mediation when they are not satisfied with the committee’s performance or feel that they have been treated unjustly

Based on the empirical observations of Christian

Castellanet

Table 03: Number and Size of Community Fisheries (CFis), Community Forestry (CF) and Community Protected Areas (CPAs)

Number Area Covered Sources

Community Fisheries (CFis) 358 537,837 ha Save Cambodia's Wildlife, 2014

Community Forestry (CF) 485 410,025 ha Forestry Administration, 2015

Community Protected Areas (CPAs) 151 255,076 ha Ministry of Environment 2018

Numerous studies have been conducted in recent decades to assess the effectiveness of CFis, CFs, and CPAs. Those studies share a number of common conclusions:

Studies showed that frequently there is active participation among community members at the initial phase because they consider protection and sustainability of such CPRs to be useful and beneficial for their livelihoods and for those of their offspring (Kim & Öjendal, 2007).

In many cases participation and ownership of the resources fade away over time because of broader political economy issues that constrain and restrict the operations of resource communities. CFis, CF and CPAs operate within a legal framework whereby limited authority is given to them. For instance, they are not allowed to arrest illegal loggers and fishers on the spot but have to report such cases to the relevant Fishery and Forestry Administration or the Ministry of Environment for intervention. The delay and lack of political will to support CFis, CF and CPAs to protect their CPRs allow the offenders to easily escape, discouraging the future participation of members42 (Kim & Öjendal, 2007). Likewise, the State prioritizes the control of these initiatives over communal interests: for instance, CFis, CF, and CPAs are allowed to operate for only 15 years and they are supposed to renew their agreement for further operation; and the Fishery or Forestry Administrations are even permitted to cancel CFis or CF schemes should they consider that the community is not performing well (Diepart et al., forthcoming; Ironside, 2017; Van Acker, 2010). Such

challenges lead to a weak sense of ownership among the members of CFis, CF schemes and CPAs.

The lack of legal authority of CFis, CF and CPAs makes them even weaker when they have to confront much more powerful commercial actors such as sand dredging companies and forest and fishery concessionaires who are well connected to influential national political elites; these well protected economic elites even have the power to manipulate the State, which is weak: local CFis and CFs are not the only weak parties in this respect43 (Diepart et al., forthcoming; Sok, 2014). That explains why Blake Ratner (2011, p. 4) calls for “…policy support for community-based management in forestry and fisheries [that gives] explicit prioritization to protect against threats from other types of private- and public-sector investment”. In the same way, national and provincial authorities are requested to support local institutions (Marschke et al., 2014).

Some communities are governed and managed exclusively by the management committee, which lacks accountability toward, and transparency among members, driving a wedge between the management committee and community members (Diepart et al., forthcoming). This mistrust can further deepen when management committee members, especially the chief, receive benefits (financial, training, and so on) from NGOs, and the community members do not44. According to numerous evidences, CFis, CF and CPAs can be effectively and sustainably managed if the following conditions listed in Table 04 are met.

42 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.43 Interview with Taitai, an eco-tourism community member, Koh Kong, 30 August 2016.44 Interview with Meas Nee, Phnom Penh, 24 December 2012.

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Despite the structural challenges faced by co-management or CPR regimes, in some favourable contexts there is evidence of effective and sustainable CFis and CF schemes. For instance, in Tram Kak district - in which Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC) has established many farmer cooperatives - some, once sustained, have mobilized members to set up CF schemes. In the area surrounding Damrei Romiel Mountain, there were almost no trees in 2000, but, in 2013, when the author visited, approximately 20 hectares of trees, as tall as 10 and 15 meters, were growing into a large area of forest with no signs of illegal logging. The CF initiative there seems to be functioning in a way that is similar to that of others. However, Tram Kak operates in a different context that enables collective activities and management to operate with relative ease. In addition, it appears that because Sok An, a former deputy prime minister and the minster of the Council of Ministers at the time, was in charge of Takeo (as a part of the ruling party’s portfolio), his power warded off powerful economic interests, allowing the forests in Tram Kak to flourish with little disturbance.

When CFi management committees are unable to protect a large body of water and resources, it makes sense for them to safeguard a smaller area close to their villages45. During a 2013 visit to the village of Baktrea in Battambang, the author was able to witness a CFi that had been established to protect fish during the dry season in a large pond of approximately one square hectare. The community was well up and running, and the pond is close to their homes. The idea is to allow the fish to develop in the dry season for breeding across the expanse of the Tonle Sap during the rainy season. The author went to the pond and saw many fish, a clear result of decreasing illegal fishing activities over the last serval years. The project was initiated by World Fish with collaboration from relevant authorities. The initial success of World Fish-initiated CFis can also be observed in Kampong Thom’s Phat Sanday commune, and in various locations in Pursat, Battambang, and Siem Reap46. Again, it appeared that the CFis could work in the context of a small-size pond and that there had been effective collaboration between the commune chief and the CFi at the time.

Community-based ecotourism (CBET)

Since the early 1990s, CBET has been established to generate income for community members and to conserve natural resources (Rith, Williams, & Neth, 2009; Ven, 2016). CBET initiatives have emerged with the combined support of the government and NGOs together with a strong backing from the donor community (Rith et al., 2009). In the early 2000s, there were a few CBET initiatives, but the number increased rapidly to approximately 30 in 2008 (ibid.). The rationale behind these initiatives is to encourage

and strengthen the capacity of local communities to participate in natural resource management, and strengthen and diversify and local economies (ibid.).

The literature on CBET in Cambodia suggests the following challenges: CBET programs are supposed to follow the policy directions of donors, but lack capacity, networking and marketing strategies, and need stronger coordination between CBET and other development actors such as the State agencies and supporting NGOs (ibid.). However, a case study focusing on Yeak Loam (in Ratanakiri) and Chambok (Kampong Speu) suggested that CBET appears to be a useful tool for conservation and has the potential to generate considerable income for overall community development (ibid.). There is also clear evidence of a decline in logging and hunting, together with the emergence of mechanisms to cope with environmental problems; such as awareness raising about environmental issues and man-agement, creating community by-laws concerning restrictions on resource extraction, incentives, and sanctions (ibid.). Similarly, Seyha Ven (2016) found that in Yeak Loam community, the majority of members had developed a positive attitude toward the CBET initiative – those who classified themselves as “Absolute Supporters” accounted for 69 percent, and 14 percent of respondents were in the “Beneficiary Supporters” category. The early evidence of the effectiveness of CBET seems to show that it rests on the participation of the members whose livelihoods have improved with the introduction of the tourist initiative.

Evidence from Koh Kong’s Tatai CBET, Kep’s Prek Trapaeng Community Fishery (PTCF), and the mangrove CBET, near to the city of Koh Kong, confirms the above analysis. The author’s visits to the mangrove CBET near to the city of Koh Kong in 2006 and 2012, and his discussion with an informed mangrove researcher indicate that the mangrove had almost disappeared in the mid-2000s when the local farmers hurried to cut down the special trees to make charcoal that was valuable. However, it was with the support of several donors that the CBET was establish to protect further destruction of the mangroves. The same progress has taken place in Prek Trapaeng Community Fishery (PTCF). In around 2000, there were barely any mangrove trees in Prek Trapaeng, then in 2003 PTCF was established after which community members and tourists engaged in actively planting mangroves. In PTCF now, several dozen hectares of mangroves have been restored, thus boosting tourism and increasing fish and crab stock. A community member from Prek Trapaeng reported that powerful interests still encroach on the project area: however, at least for now, PTCF is able to keep the intrusion at bay. These three cases of CBET all demonstrate that the members have experienced an improvement in their living standards following the establishment of the CBET communities.

45 Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017.46 Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 21 August 2017.

3. Customary tenure and the dynamic

of change: concluding remarks

20


3. Customary tenure and the dynamic of change: concluding remarks

The highly diverse natural resources, and their evolution and management, have shaped the Cambodian rural landscapes in distinctive ways. A key aspect of this diversity relates to CT arrangements that incorporate local rules, institutions and practices governing the access, use and management of land, forests, fisheries and other resources. These have gained social legitimacy and become embedded in the fabric of society (Palmer, Fricska, & Wehrmann, 2009). In its attempts to modernize land tenure regimes, through the case studies highlighted in this report it is clear the Cambodian State shares an inadequate understanding about the diversity of these customary institutions and practices and has recognized them only partially. Customary tenure arrangements are most often discussed in the context of indigenous peoples in Cambodia’s highland areas, even though the Khmer communities have many practices and management systems that are based on customary tradition and should be recognised as such. As a result, the importance of CT in rural Khmer communities has largely been neglected and have not received appropriate or adequate recognition. In the last three decades or so, these resources have been prime targets for privatization with detrimental consequences for the livelihoods of rural families, particularly the most vulnerable who tend to be more reliant on them.

This thematic study has identified a variety of customary institutions, systems and practices of Khmer communities for different natural resources. Agricultural and communal land is the most common form of resource that is governed customarily, often by local communities and authorities, across the country. Forest resources are vital for Khmer communities, particularly for spiritual forests, swidden agriculture, resin collection, and timber foraging. Fisheries

and wetland resources are also of paramount importance for Khmer communities, particularly for those living around the Tonle Sap where these resources are managed seasonally and jointly by farmers, herders and fishers. The study also identified the customary, seasonal arrangements adopted to manage fisheries along the banks of lakes and rivers. Villagers have created local rules to harvest and share such fishery resources where they are available.

Unfortunately, the extent of these crucial resources, and access to them, have significantly shrunk over the last 25 years and the customary regimes governing them have become weaker overall.

The study also discusses the attempt by the State to establish co-management schemes or CPR governance to manage these resources through the formation of partnerships between government institutions and local communities. Despite some evidence of effectiveness, the limit of these hybrid systems to fully capture the diversity and complexity of CT institutions and practices has been shown. Therefore, alternative management systems based on legal recognition of existing Khmer customary tenure and practices in collaboration with diverse stakeholders could be a potential solution.

While the Cambodian government has taken a long journey to reframe natural resource management as proposed in the Environmental and Natural Resources Code, this study argues for a stronger and more comprehensive recognition of CT arrangements not only in indigenous communities but also in their Khmer counterparts. This literature review will therefore serve as an important tool to assist the MRLG and its alliance partners to further support the full recognition of customary tenure rights, including the productive use of forest resources, in the ongoing development of the Environmental and Natural Resources Code and upcoming revision of the Forest Law, and the Protected Areas Law.

21

3. Customary tenure and the dynamic of change: concluding remarks

Future Research OpportunitiesBased on an extensive literature review, in virtually every Khmer village/community there are customary tenure and natural resources management systems. These systems are diverse and complex and may have various forms depending on the available resources and community cohesion. Therefore, the three cases detailed below, synthesized from this literature review, highlight key strategic areas for further research and policy change that could lead to the recognition of customary tenure systems for Khmer communities:

• The lowland of the Tonle Sap floodplain. The Tonle Sap floodplain is a rare natural phenomenon and farmers settling on and around the lake have customarily extracted water- and land-based resources peacefully using customary governance institutions since time immemorial. Khmer communities’ customary land use and rights are not recognised by the State, their customary land has been subject to various exclusive zoning irrespective of traditional usage, and have been prohibited from harvesting natural resources (primarily fish) in their harvesting areas. Essentially, due to the lack of secure customary tenure, the Khmer in the Tonle Sap floodplain have been dispossessed of their main sources of livelihood.

• Highland areas: Pursat’s districts of Kravanh and Veal Veng, and Battambang’s district of Samlaut are good candidates for further investigation. These are areas in which Khmer communities practise shifting cultivation. It is interesting to document that even the Khmer people have adopted swidden farming and that these are areas where they do not have secure tenure. Land resources, among others, have attracted internal migrants, creating a mixture of old (existing) people and new (recently arrived) people. Therefore, social capital (such as trust and networks) are presumably poorer than they are in

other, more stable communities such as, Takeo, Prey Veng, and Svay Rieng. Tenure insecure and conflict-ridden societies can contribute to the fragility of customary governance and institutions. At the same time, the State has a large stake in such unstable communities. To date,Directive 01 has been implemented in those areas, affecting the customary practices and governance of swidden cultivation in various ways.

• A stable community in Tram Kak, Takeo. Tram Kak is a more stable, less internal migration and conflict, community where there are not many extractable natural resources, along with some diminishing community forests in around 2000. Therefore, few people have migrated to this location. People from Tram Kak are more likely to have migrated to resource rich places. However, two things are significant and relevant for follow-up activities. Tram Kak is a typical community in which communal land, salachhortien, neak ta, communal lakes/ ponds and so on, which are pervasive across Khmer villages. Hence, it is interesting to map those existing CT resources and their governance. As it is a stable community, an assumption can be made that the Khmer communities there are better able to protect their CT and resources than those where conflict is high. A Community Forest initiative in Tram Kak, according to various studies, has worked while many CF schemes in other places and provinces face uneven sustainability. In 2000, forest resources were declining in Tram Kak’s Domrei Romiel area however, by 2013, forest resources were largely restored. The author’s investigations suggested that this is largely due to the fact that, it was building on the initial success of vibrant saving groups and various farmer cooperatives that had been established by CEDAC— various (committee) members of those saving groups and cooperatives later set up the CF initiative. By 2013, the Tram Kak CF initiative was quite effective.

References and

Annexes

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Annexes

Annex 1: List of Interviewees

1. Interview with two villagers from Prek Bi village, Koh Thom B Commune, Kandal province, 1 August 2017. The two villagers are from Prek Bi village but are aware of the common property of Prek Somrong, a nearby village

2. Interview with a villager from Prey Nheat commune, Korng Pisey district, Kompong Speu province,15 July 2017

3. Interview with a land expert, Phnom Penh, 25 July 2017

4. Interview with a member of Prek Trapaeng Community Fishery, Kep Province, 31July 2017

5. Interview with Mak Sethirith, a researcher who has extensively studied the Tonle Sap floodplain, Phnom Penh, 1 July 2017

6. Phone interview with a commune councilor of Kak Banteay, Rolea Pha-ea District, Kampong Chhnang Province, 4 August 2017

7. Interview with Taitai eco-tourism community member, Koh Kong, 30 August 2016

8. Skype interview with Jean-Christophe Diepart, 4 August 2017

9. Phone interview with a provincial forestry administrator from Rananakiri, 20 June 2017

10. Interview with Meas Nee, Phnom Penh, 24 December 2012

11. Data obtained from participants at the first consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 7 July 2017

12. Data obtained from participants at the second consultative workshop organized by the MRLG, 21 August 2017

Funded by: Supported by:Implemented by:

The Mekong Region Land Governance Project (MRLG) aims to improve the land tenure security of smallholder farmers in the Mekong Region through contributing to the design and implementation of appropriate land policies and practices. It responds to national priorities in terms of reducing poverty, increasing economic development and supporting smallholder farmers, so that they can be secure and make good decisions about land use and land management. MRLG has been operating in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam since April 2014.

For more information on MRLG, please visit

www.mrlg.org.

The Mekong Region Land Governance (MRLG) is a project of the Government of Switzerland, through the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), with co-financing from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Government of Luxembourg.

The MRLG project is implemented by Land Equity International (LEI) in partnership with GRET Professionals for Fair Development and supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

Further InformationMekong Region Land GovernanceUnit 11, House No. 262, Ban Saphanthong Kang, Sisattanak District, Vientiane Capital, Lao PDR PO Box 2973, Vientiane Lao PDR 01000

P +856 21 454 807F +856 21 454 807

[email protected]

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