THENAVAL CAMPAIGN INTHEWAROFTHE PACIFIC 1879-1884

THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WAR OF THEPACIFIC 1879-1884

Capt (SAN) I.C. LittleCommunication, SAOF

South Africa and Chile have always had close military and diplomatic ties butcomparatively little is known in South Africa about Chilean military history. Chile'snaval history in particular is most interesting and as obviously in the 18th centurythe only practical means of travel to and around South America was by sea, hernavy has played a very important historical role. This article is an attempt tohighlight one particular period of Chilean naval history.

There has also always been a very delicate bal-ance of power amongst the nations of SouthAmerica and this is particularly true of the rela-tionships between Chile, Peru, Argentina, Para-guay and Bolivia. Each of these nations has attimes formed alliances with one or the otheragainst the rest and this uneasy balance is stillmaintained today. It has its roots in the Napo-leonic Wars between 1800 and 1815.

Whilst Spain was battling with political and eco-nomic problems during the above period, theSpanish colonies in South America declaredtheir independence and embarked upon theSpanish America Wars of Independence be-tween 1810 and 1826. Revolutionary govern-ments came to power, armies were raised andnavies formed, amongst these the ChileanNavy in 1813 and the Peruvian Navy in 1825.With the coming of general independence in1826 new struggles developed around the bor-ders of the five former Spanish vice-royaltiesand their administrative areas, now independ-ent countries. Peru, the largest and richest ofthese was especially tempted to flex her mus-cles and between 1826 and 1879 engaged in aseries of conflicts with Bolivia, Ecuador, Argen-tina, Chile and Spain. For this last named in1864-1866 she had built up a powerful and newnavy and had by 1879 become a regionalpower.

Chile had played a leading role in the liberationof Peru in her war for independence by virtue ofher navy and had twice been drawn into conflictthereafter. Once (as mentioned above) with Ar-gentina against Peru and Bolivia in 1835, andthen again with Peru, Ecuador and Boliviaagainst Spain in 1864-1866. This last war leftChile with her navy and merchant marine wipedout, but by 1879 she had rebuilt these with newtonnage from the UK and USA and had also

become a regional power. Bolivia had alsoemerged strengthened from these strugglesand with a corridor to the sea between Peruand Chile through the Atacama desert. Thisgave Bolivia the seaport of Antofagasta but shemade no attempt to use it as such nor to fortifyit or build ships to protect it. The whole borderin the area was however still in dispute andBolivia and Chile had thus come to an agree-ment that Chilean nitrates mined in theAtacama desert could be shipped at nominalcost through the port of Antofagasta.

In 1878 and contrary to this agreement, Boliviaincreased the taxes she levied on these Chileannitrates, thus affecting Chile economically andalso bringing the border dispute to a head.

Chile started mobilising her armed forces andactivating her fleet in order to settle the borderdispute by force and on 14 February 1878 aChilean naval expedition seized the undefendedport of Antofagasta. A landing force of 500 menoccupied the surrounding countryside andplaced Chile in effective control of the Atacama.On 1 March 1879 Bolivia declared war on Chile,knowing that she had a secret treaty with Peruto come to her aid against Chile. This treatywas however known to the Chileans who alsothen declared war on Peru. At this stage thecombined Bolivian and Peruvian armies weretwice as large as Chile's and whilst Bolivia hadno navy the Peruvian and Chilean navies werenumerically equal. Most observers expectedChile to lose the war but there was a subtledifference in quality in the two navies whichwould tip the balance in Chile's favour.

Each navy had two iron-clads but the Chileanpair, the ALMIRANTE COCHRANE and BLAN-CO ENCALADA were larger, faster, newer andmore heavily armoured than the Peruvian pair,

Militaria 24/1 1994

Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 24, Nr 1, 1994. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

Monitor HUASCAR, 1865.

HUASCAR and INDEPENDENCIA. The Chil-ean Navy also had a more professional ap-proach based on close links with the BritishRoyal Navy, ex-members of which were servingin the Chilean Navy. The Peruvian Navy bycontrast had had a run of groundings and acci-dents and even in one case, theft.

Their major warship, the monitor HUASCAR,had been stolen by her crew in 1876 in order togo pirating. An international alert gave rise toher being hunted down by the British shipsHMS SHAH and AMETHYST. These two shipscarried out the first recorded instance of a tor-pedo attack on the HUASCAR but it was un-successful. Nevertheless her pirate crew gotsufficient of a fright to put back to Peru andsurrender.

The HUASCAR, in 1879 still Peru's principalwarship was no more than a seagoing monitorwith a ram. Built during the previous waragainst Spain she had a main turret that wasstill trained by manpower. It took a team of 16men a quarter of an hour to crank the turret to abroadside firing position and then to return it tothe fore-and-aft loading position. The gun, amuzzle loader, could only be loaded by trainingit directly ahead and with-drawing it into the tur-ret. It could however only be fired on the beambecause the high ram forecastle blocked the

The Coles turret as fitted in HUASCAR.

field of fire over the bow. It was easier to trainthe ship than the gun. Depending on the qualityof the coal, steam pressure and the state of herboilers and bottom she made between 9 and12,3 knots at full ahead. Her crew was made upof Peruvians, British and other assorted foreign-ers. Quaint as she may be to modern eyes shewas for her time a formidable warship and wasto play a leading role in the events which fol-lowed.

On 16 May 1879 a Peruvian convoy of threetransports, the CHALACO, OROYA and L1ME-NA, carrying 4000 Peruvian soldiers sailed from

2 Militaria 24/1 1994


Callao. The convoy was escorted by the moni-tor HUASCAR and the armoured frigateINDEPENDENCIA under the command of Cap-tains Migual Grau and J. Guillermo Moore re-spectively. The convoy, known as the Peruvian1st Division and Squadron was under commandof Grau and was bound for Arica. Aboard theOROYA in his capacity as President of Peruand Minister of War was Mariano Ignacio Pradoaccompanied by his staff. On the same day aChilean fleet also sailed from Iquique bound forCallao. On the 19th of May the two fleets actu-ally passed each other at a distance of 31 milesapart without seeing each other.

Grau's squadron arrived in Arica and disem-barked the 1st Division. Prado held a council ofwar and decided that the Peruvian squadronwould sail immediately for Iquique to sink anddestroy the Chilean squadron stationedthere.lquique was still in Peruvian hands al-

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Map of operations.

though Chilean ships were using the bay andblockading the port. The squadron would thensail on to Antofagasta to capture an unescortedtroop convoy which had sailed North fromValparaiso on 22 May with 2500 troops to beused as reinforcements in Antofogasta.

The Peruvian plan was to descend onAntofagasta, capture this convoy, bombard thecity to destroy the water condensors and mili-tary installations and render the Chilean occu-pying troops helpless. Thereafter the Navywould break the Chilean sea lines of communi-cation between Antofogasta and Valparaisoforcing the Chilean garrison to surrender andplacing Peru in a favourable position to win thewar. The Navy was to avoid a pitched battleand concentrate on this objective. The Chileansobjective was to bring the Peruvian fleet to bat-tle, destroy it to gain mastery of the sea andthen carry out a series of sea-borne invasions

along the Peruvian coast.

On 16 May, as alreadystated, the Chilean squad-ron at Iquique under com-mand of Admiral Juan Wil-liams Rebolledo preparedto sail for Callao to attackthe Peruvian squadron inits home port. Acting on er-roneous information ob-tained from the captain ofthe steamer LONTUE theyonly actually sailed in theearly morning of 17 May,leaving the two weakestships in the fleet, the frig-ate ESMERALDA underCdr Arturo Prat and thefigate COVADON-GA un-der Lt Cdr Carlos Condellto guard Iquique.

Passing the opposing fleetunseen as it moved in theopposite direction Rebol-ledo arrived 30 miles offCallao on 21 May and pre- .pared for a night attack.Stopping and questioningan Italian fisherman off theport, Rebolledo was horri-fied to find that the Peru-vian fleet had sailed for theSouth on the same day hehad sailed North. He imme-diately made plans to re-turn and at 10hOO on 22May was on his way back

Militaria 24/1 1994 3


to Iquique. Poor coal for his monitors slowedhim down so he bunkered from the corvettesO'HIGGINS and CHACA-BUCO and thenpushed on again. He arrived back at Iquique on30 May to find he had missed his chance forglory.

The Peruvian fleet, in accordance with the ap-proved plan, had sailed from Arica on 20 Mayfor Iquique via Pisagua. In the early hours of 21May whilst Rebolledo was creeping up onCallao, Grau was approaching Iquique to carryout a reconnaissance with the intention of sur-prising the Chilean fleet. Unfortunately for himthe COVADONGA was on patrol off the bayand at 06h30 saw and recognised the Peruvianships two miles away. She immediately fired agun to draw her consort ESMERALDA's atten-tion and then hoisted the flag signal "Enemy toNorth". Prat in the ESMERALDA signalledback" Come and Talk". followed by "prepare foraction" and"have you sent the hands to break-fast? "At the same time Prat ordered the trans-port LAMAR at anchor in the bay to weigh an-chor and escape to the South.

The ESMERALDA and COVADONGA thenjoined forces and Prat and Condell held ashouted council of war. Because of the im-mense Peruvian superiority they decided toplace their ships between the Peruvians andthe city but a short distance offshore so as tolimit the Peruvian mobility. Prat ended up bysaying to Condell "you know what you have todo?" to which Condell replied "All right". Pratthen delivered a fiery speech to ESMERALDA'screw about the glory of the flag.

At 08h30 a shell from the HUASCAR landedbetween the two Chilean ships, the crews ofwhich promptly shouted "Viva Chile" whilstESMERALDA replied with a furious cannonade.In the subsequent action ESMERALDA suf-fered a damaged boiler and with her speed re-duced to three knots Prat decided to close withthe HUASCAR and take her by boarding.

Laying his ship alongside HUASCAR Prat led aboarding party accompanied by a SergeantAldeo but before anyone else could follow, theships drifted apart and Prat and Aldeo wereshot down. ESMERALDA's first lieutenant LuisUribe put her alongside again and Lt Serranoand 12 marines got aboard HUASCAR only tobe massacred as the two ships once againparted. At the third attempt by ESMERALDAshe was rammed by the HUASCAR and sankwith her colours flying, taking 146 crew mem-bers with her. Only 54 of her crew of 200survived. Lt Jorge Velarde was the HUAS-CAR's only casualty.

In the meantime the INDEPENDENCIA hadclosed with the COVADONGA which promptlyheaded Southwards towards the shallowcoastal waters. A shell from the HUASCARlanded on the COVADONGA killing SurgeonVidella and three crewmen but without slowingup the ship. Slipping over an offshore sandbankoff Punta Gruesa the little COVADONGAscored an amazing coup when the INDEPEN-DENCIA in hot pursuit struck the same bankand remained hard and fast aground to becomea total loss to the Peruvians. Seeing this, Grauabandoned his plan and returned to Arica, onceagain evading Rebolledo's fleet. With the an-nouncement of this action morale in Chilesoared and Prat and Condell became nationalheroes.

Grau now put the second part of the Peruvianplan into action and between May and October

Arturo Prato Hero of the battle of Iquique.

1879 carried out systematic commerce raidingon the Chilean lines of communication. He wascontinually hampered in this by poor intelligenceand bad fortune. On 3 June for instance heunsuccessfully attempted to capture the Chil-ean naval collier MATIAS COUSINO offIquique. She escaped and alerted the Chileanmonitors BLANCO ENCALADA and CO-CHRANE. These two ships together with the



corvettes O'HIGGINS and CHACABUCO thentracked the HUASCAR down to the island of 110where they came upon her bunkering at anchor.By excellent seamanship and superior speedGrau managed to escape to sea and thence toCallao for repairs.

On 9 July he was back in Arica and on the nightof 9/10 July 1879 Grau carried out a surpriseattack on the shipping in Iquique. The object ofhis attack was the Chilean corvette ABT AOwhich he had been told was carrying out enginerepairs. In fact ABT AO had already completedher repairs and had sailed to intercept a suspi-cious ship. HUASCAR, fully blacked out, en-tered the harbour at high speed but found theonly ship in the harbour to be the MATIASCOUSINO. The subsequent noise and gunfireattracted the attention of the corvette MAGAL-LANES patrolling offshore under command ofCdr Latorre. He immediately entered the har-bour and closing to a few metres distant at-tacked the HUASCAR. By so doing he divertedGrau's attention from the collier and in turn at-tracted the monitor COCHRANE which came toinvestigate what was happening. Grau onceagain escaped Northwards leaving the field toLattore who overnight became a Chilean na-tional hero.

The Chileans then improved their defence ofAntofagasta and occupied other ports furtherNorth whilst Grau continued his commerce raid-ing. In one incident he stopped the Britishsteamer COLOMBIA and took the opportunityof scanning the newspapers aboard. In one ofthem he came across a list of shipping move-ments in Chilean ports which enabled him to liein wait and capture the troopship RIMAC and allthe troops aboard her. This incident led to ashake-up in the Chilean naval command andCaptain Galvano Riveros was promoted to RearAdmiral and replaced Williams Rebellado whowas retired. Grau in HUASCAR, now fitted withtorpedo tubes, decided to attack the monitorCOCHRANE which his intelligence told him wasimmobilised with engine trouble in Caldera,north of Valparaiso. In fact she was bunkeringand the surprise was on Grau. When enteringCaldera he met the COCHRANE coming out.Outclassed, he beat a hasty retreat and raidingvarious Chilean ports on the way north arrivedback in Arica on 10 August 1879.

From the RIMAC Grau had obtained knowledgeof ships bringing supplies through the Straits ofMagellan to Chile and to stop this he des-patched the corvette UNION under command ofCaptain Aurelio Garcia y Garcia to destroy thisshipping. Garcia sailed from Arica on 31 Julyand made his way as far South as Punta Are-

nas by 16 August, returning unsuccessfullyback to Arica on 14 September. He was unsuc-cessful because the Chileans had deliberatelyweakened their naval forces off Peru tostrengthen the escorts for these ships. (Chileanships attempted a similar interception of Peru-vian shipping near Panama but were no moresuccessful).

On 24 August Grau decided on yet anothernight attack on Chilean naval targets, this timeat Antofagasta. His prey was the two corvettesABTAO and MAGALLANES and two trans-ports. He was also after the monitor BLANCOENCALADA but once again his intelligence wasfaulty as she had sailed South on the 22ndAugust. Grau darkened ship and crept intoAntofogasta harbour finding to his dismay that itwas crowded with merchantmen, mostly neu-tral. Coming across the ABT AO he launchedone of his new torpedos at her from a distanceof 200 metres. The torpedo ran amok and wasonly deflected from hitting the HUASCAR itselfby prompt action by a Lt Diaz Conseco in aship's boat. Grau was confused by this, thedark, and the fourteen ships in the harbour andwas unable to use his guns for fear of provok-ing an international incident if he sank a neutral.He retreated to Taltal and apparently vented hisfrustration by beating up the harbour.

On 28 August he reappeared off Antofagasta at11hOO to finally carry out the Peruvian plan ofbombarding that city. The corvettes ABTAOand MAGALLANES and the shore guns replied.ABTAO, which was under repair, took severalhits resulting in nine dead and twelve wounded.However a shell from the ABTAO also struckthe HUASCAR and inflicted slight damage aswell as wounding Lt Conseco, the torpedo de-flector. Suspecting the return of the Chileanmonitor BLANCO ENCALADA, Grau broke offthe engagement at 17h15 and giving the im-pression that he had once again escapedNorth, layoff just over the horizon from theport.

At midnight the BLANCO ENCALADA did infact return, by which time Grau had taken hisship back to Arica. The Chilean monitor spentthe next few days hunting the HUASCAR butshe stayed in Arica and on 30 August 1879 wasin dry dock having her bottom cleaned.

It had now become a matter of vital importanceto the Chileans to catch and destroy theHUASCAR and UNION as they were renderingthe Chilean lines of communication unusable.The Chilean fleet was thus brought back toValparaiso where the ships were thoroughlyoverhauled. 1800 new boiler tubes were made



by hand in Santiago and as there was no drydock the ship's bottoms were cleaned inch byinch by divers. The ships emerged completelyoverhauled and with the COCHRANE's speedincreased to 12 knots.

On 27 September 1879 the Chilean fleet gath-ered in Antofagasta where a campaign wasworked out to invade Peru by land and cut offArica and Callao whilst at the same time block-ading these ports from the sea. The fleet forthis purpose consisted of two squadrons ofthree ships each under the command of Admi-ral Galverino Riveros.

The first objective was to be the elimination ofGrau in Arica. Grau however sailed South on30 September and the two fleets once againpassed each other at sea without meeting.Riveros thus arrived off Arica on 4 October andfound it empty. He wasted no time there butturned around and headed South again with hissix ships fanned out to sweep for the HUAS-CAR and UNION. This sweep was apparentlyunsuccessful and when Riveros arrived offMejillones he sent Latorre ashore to telegraphHeadquarters and find out where Grau was.Grau, now promoted Rear Admiral, was in factSouth of Antofagasta raiding the small ports ofNorthern Chile and looking for targets of oppor-tunity. Riveros and his aide Latorre then set atrap for Grau who turned North on 6 Octoberand headed into it.

Based on Antofagasta, Riveros spread his netagain with three ships inshore and guarding the

port under Riveros, and Latorre and his threeships between 20 to 50 miles offshore. Shouldeither sight Grau he would attempt to force himtowards the other and thus close the trap.

At 03h30 on 8 October the Peruvian squadronwas intercepted by Riveros in what becameknow as the Battle of Angamos. Grau duckedaway from any action, first South East and thento the East. Riveros deliberately lagged behindto allow Grau to turn North to escape. This hedid and at 07h15 he ran into the offshore(Northern) Chilean squadron. The Peruvians at-tempted to outflank the Chileans but the latter'srecently overhauled ships were able to cut themoff, the HUASCAR being forced South. Thespeedier UNION managed however to carry outthe outflanking movement and getting past hisopponents fought off the pursing corvetteO'HIGGINS and armed transport LOA to getback to Arica.

Grau was trapped and at 09h25 the HUASCARopened fire on the COCHRANE at 300 metres.The captain of the COCHRANE, EnriqueSimpson, ignored this and closed to 220 metresbefore firing a broadside at the HUASCAR. Allher guns hit the target and one shell caused 12casualties and damage to the gun turret. An-other knocked out the engine room telegraphand steering mechanism. The fourth destroyedthe bridge, killing Admiral Grau and his flag lieu-tenant, Lt Ferre. The HUASCAR was thereafterunable to reply to the COCHRANE's gunswhich started several fires. The steering gearwas hit on three separate occasions, the main

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Monitor HUASCAR at sea under the Peruvian flag.



gun turret was out of order with its gun dis-mounted, and her secondary armament andmachine guns were put out of action. At 1Oh10the BLANCO ENCALADA entered the actionand by 10h55 the HUASCAR was dead in thewater.

The Chileans then took her by boarding whilstthe HUASCAR's engineers attempted to scuttlethe ship but were stopped. A prize crew wasput aboard, the Chilean flag was hoisted andthe ship taken into Mejillones and service withthe Chilean Navy in which she still is today. Hersurvivors went into captivity and in 1890 Grau'sremains were returned to Lima in Peru for ahero's burial.

With the capture of the HUASCAR the Chileansachieved their objective of control of the sea,gaining unimpeded mobility and tying the Peru-vians down to static defensive positions alongtheir difficult and barren coastline. Mobility byland was difficult for the Peruvians and theirlengthy coastline made it extremely difficult forthem to fortify and defend every possible land-ing site.

On 2 November 1879 the Chileans put the sec-ond phase of their strategy into operation andan expedition of 10 000 men in 15 transportsescorted by four warships captured Pisagua. Asecond landing took place simultaneously atJunin, six miles to the South. The BLANCOENCALADA captured the Peruvian corvettePILCOMA YO on 17 November and she wastaken into the Chilean Navy with her name un-changed. Two days later on 19 November theChileans won a land battle at Dolores. ThePeruvian forces at Iquiquenow found their posi-tion untenable and evacuated the area. Thiswas an economic blow to Peru's nitrate tradeas Chile now had undisputed control of thearea. Following hard on the heels of the retreat-ing Peruvians, the Chilean forces were given asevere rebuff at Tarapaca on 27 November,which then allowed the Peruvians to fall backunmolested to Arica.

Arica was the principal sea port of SouthernPeru and was very heavily defended by 1858Peruvians and nineteen guns under the com-mand of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi. In portwere a torpedo boat and the monitor MANCOCAPAC. With Chilean command of the seaArica had come under occasional naval bom-bardment .but on 24 February 1880 the portcame under attack. 1400 Chilean troops em-barked in 16 transports at Pisagua and between26 and 28 February were landed North West ofArica at 110 and Pacocha, to cut off Arica fromhelp from the North. The UNION then left

Callao and successfully managed to run theseaward blockade with munitions and supplies.She arrived in Arica on 17 March and success-fully returned to Callao as well. On 22 Marchthe Chileans encircled Arica with the capture ofTorata and on 26 May at the Battle of Tacanathe opposing land forces met once again.

After a vicious four hour battle in which onequarter of the22 000 combatants were killed or wounded theChileans won. Arica was taken by storm on 7June 1880 and the MANCO CAPAC was scut-tled. Chile now carried the war Northward.

On 10 April the Chilean fleet under command ofRiveros blockaded Callao, Peru's chief porteight miles from Lima, the capital. It was heav-ily fortified with fourteen heavy guns and morethan thirty 32 pounders. In port were the moni-tor ATAHUALPA, the UNION and a selectionof minor warships, including an experimentalsubmarine. The blockade was to last for thenext nine months. The Chilean fleet rotated itsships on this duty and on 10 May theHUASCAR was engaged in an action against aschool-ship, some barges and dock installationsin which she received minor damage and in-curred the death of her captain, Thomson.

The Peruvian Navy was reduced to cunningand booby traps and the Chilean shipsJANEQUEO, LOA and COVADONGA were allvictims of booby trapped launches which ex-ploded when brought alongside. The Chileansretaliated by bombarding the ports of Chancay,Ancon, and Chorillos. In September, CaptPatricio Lynch who had seen service with theBritish Navy in the Opium Wars led a 3000 manamphibious force along the northern Peruviancoast between Callao and Payta to cut off thecommerce of that area. The Peruvian Navy alsomade desperate efforts to get their experimen-tal submarine, the TORRO SUBMARINO op-erational and almost succeeded. She wastested and ready for use but no appropriate tar-get could be found.

After a futile series of peace talks in October1880 Chilean troops began the final advance onLima from Tacna. On 8 November a force of 22000 men disembarked at Pisco, the guns of thefleet being used to support the Chileans ashore.

The last naval engagement took place on 6 De-cember 1880 when Chilean torpedo boats at-tacked a Peruvian launch. In the subsequentbombardment the Chilean torpedo boat FRE-SIA was sunk and the UNION damaged. On 17December after two bloody battles at Chorillosand Miraflores the Chilean Army captured Lima,



losing 5500 men against a Peruvian loss of9000. When Lima fell and the news reachedCallao the Peruvian Navy scuttled its remainingships, including its submarine. Callao fell on 17January 1881. Organised resistance by Peruthen stopped, but Bolivia fought on and this to-gether with guerilla warfare dragged the landwar out until the Treaty of Ancon on 20 October1883 brought peace to the area.

As a result of the War of the Pacific, Chileemerged as the dominant power on the WestCoast of South America and together with Ar-gentina as one of the dominant powers ofSouth America itself. By the end of the 19thcentury Chile had a massive navy and from1800 to 1890 the Chilean Navy was superior toanything even the USA could put into the Pa-cific.

The Chilean Navy today has the reputation ofbeing the best in Latin America. Whether this is

in fact true or not is not a question for thisarticle. What they do have however is a longand proud tradition of which the story of theWar in the Pacific is just one example whichtheir friends in South Africa should know about.

SOURCES

anon : Evocacion Historica do los UniformesNavales de Chile. Armada de Chile, 1974.

Biblioteca del Oficial Histaria Militar de Chile, EstadoMajor General del Ejercito 1969.

Espina, P.R. : Monitor Huascar. Editonel Andres'Bello, Chile, 1974.

Prenafeta, Alejandro; Juan Pablo Lira Besa andJaime Villaseca : La Armada de Chile. EditionsDelriosse, Boulogne, France.

Scheina, R.L. : Latin American - A naval history.USN I Press, 1988.



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THENAVAL CAMPAIGN INTHEWAROFTHE PACIFIC 1879-1884