Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic Political Behavior in the Soviet Union

Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic Political Behavior in the Soviet UnionAuthor(s): Lee E. DutterSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 311-334Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174197 .

Accessed: 08/05/2014 12:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal ofConflict Resolution.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 12:59:57 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/stable/174197?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic Political Behavior in the Soviet Union

LEE E. DUTTER Boston University

A plural society is defined as one which is ethnically diverse and whose ethnic divisions are politically relevant. Extant theories of politics in plural societies focus primarily on democratic political systems -that is, societies which, during some period of their recent political history, have been characterized by Western-style democratic political and governmental institutions. As a consequence, there has been little effort to formulate and apply analytical or theoretical frameworks which are specifically relevant to nondemocratic systems such as the Soviet Union. The principal objectives of this article are: (1) to augment, modify, and reformulate existing theoretical ideas on ethnic political behavior in plural societies so that their scope includes nondemocratic political systems; and (2) to assess the applicability of these ideas to the Soviet Union.

Explaining and predicting the internal politics and external behavior of a nation-state depend upon a mixture of factors, some unique to each nation- state and others common to a wide cross-section of nation-states. Which are given priority depends primarily upon the specific target of inquiry and a judgment on the weight of the available evidence. Here our target is the internal ethnic politics of the Soviet Union. Our principal argument is that these politics may be best explained and predicted with primary emphasis on theoretical factors and empirical isomorphisms that the Soviet Union shares with a wide spectrum of ethnically diverse societies.

The importance of ethnic divisions to the internal politics of the Soviet Union is indisputable. Mainstream theories of ethnic political behavior in plural societies, however, have focused primarily on democratic political

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is a revised and updated version of a paper delivered at the September 1984 meeting of the American Political Science Association. The author thanks Rasma Karklins, Crawford Young, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 34 No. 2, June 1990 311-334 X 1990 Sage Publications, Inc.

311



312 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

systems (i.e., societies which, during some period of their recent political history, have been characterized by Western-style political and governmental institutions) and have largely neglected nondemocratic systems such as the Soviet Union. The present analysis argues that with remarkably little refor- mulation, extant theoretical ideas can be adapted to cover nondemocratic systems and that the Soviet Union represents yet another variation on the general theme of politics in plural societies.

THE FORMATION OF ETHNOPOLITICAL IDENTITIES

The development of a primordial group depends upon anthropological, economic, psychological, and sociological variables such as region or terri- toriality, means of livelihood, kinship, customs or ways of life, religion, language and literature, and organization (Hall, 1979; Rothschild, 1981). Group "markers" typically form the basis for a "collective identity system" (Spicer, 1971), which is composed mainly of moral and cultural values and beliefs, common perceptions and interpretations of historical events, and a set of well-defined rituals that reinforce and perpetuate this consciousness. Contact with other groups can stimulate the development of a we-they perception and transform a collective identity system into the foundation of an ethnic identity. Ethnicity then can be conceptualized as a set of ascribed and acquired characteristics that derive principally from an individual's birth and upbringing. Although physical appearance may be relevant, it is, in essence, composed of psychological elements that are not only self-perceptions, but also other groups' perceptions.

These elements cannot be shed or significantly altered as easily as purely acquired or adopted characteristics such as occupation. The individual is forever "stigmatized" by his or her group of origin, and if ethnic and political divisions coincide, the switching of ethnopolitical affiliations is a rare occurrence (Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Rothschild, 1981). Thus, political divisions based on ethnic identities are, it can be argued, qualitatively different from those based on individuals' socioeconomic characteristics or adopted ideology.

A variety of factors can be cited to support this last point. Horowitz (1985: 131-135,2231,345, 565) found, for instance, that ethnic politics typically does not concern "material interest," but symbolic claims, which often are not amenable to compromise. Dutter(1981) and Rabushka and Shepsle(1972) argued that, theoretically and empirically, the logic of voting and electoral competition is quite distinct in plural societies. Post (1984) identified two distinct terrorist "mindsets," the anarchic-ideologue (e.g., Baader-Meinhof,



Dutter / ETHNIC BEHAVIOR IN THE SOVIET UNION 313

Red Brigades) and the national-secessionist (e.g., ETA, IRA). The latter is, of course, distinguished by its ethnopolitical character.

Hostile contacts with outgroups can stimulate not only the development of a we-they perception, but also a perceived need for collective action by the group to both defend itself and preserve its identity. Thus, a "political agenda" develops and a "hierarchy of values" emerges in which individuals believe that group loyalty and political action directed toward group preser- vation take precedent over all potential or real competing loyalties such as social class, which may cut across group boundaries (Horowitz, 1985: 131-135; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972).

Following these comments, a preliminary question is: Does the Soviet Union satisfy these basic definitional components of ethnic diversity and identity? The question is almost rhetorical and the answer more than self- evident. In 1979, for example, although 52% of the Soviet Union's 262 million people were listed as ethnic Russians, 22 groups (or "nationalities" in Soviet parlance) numbered 1 million or more. More than 50 groups were officially recognized as titular nationalities of administrative-territorial units in the Soviet federal structure including, at the highest level, 15 soviet socialist or union republics, named for each's dominant group; 20 autonomous republics within the union republics; 8 autonomous provinces; and 10 autonomous districts. Finally, almost every one of the 90 officially recognized groups had its own language (Anderson and Silver, 1984: 1020).

Given this extreme diversity, the first difficulty in assessing the relevance of the theoretical ideas synthesized in subsequent sections is where to begin. Logically, it makes sense to start simply, so we focus on union republic groups for two basic reasons.' First, by forming 15 nominally equal republics around these groups, the Soviets themselves explicitly recognized their economic, political, and social importance. Second, they are the primary foci for contemporary Soviet specialists who are interested in the economic, political, and social implications of Soviet ethnic divisions.

NATION-STATES AND TERRITO AL-STATES

Building upon the preceding definitional considerations, a question of particular importance is: Why do some ethnically diverse societies experience the development and persistence of ethnopolitical identities and activ-

1. For convenient reference, the 14 non-Russian republics can be regionally identified and grouped as Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), non-Russian Slavic (Belorussia, Moldavia, Ukraine), Transcaucasian or Caucasian (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), and Central Asian (Kazakhstan, Kirgbizia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).



314 JOURNAL OFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

ities while others do not? Relevant to its answer is the distinction between a "nation-state" and a "territorial-state" (Rejai and Enloe, 1969).

The modem nation-state has three principal features: (1) a bounded geographic area; (2) centralized and complex governmental and administrative structures, an incumbent regime which controls, monitors, or otherwise regulates economic, military, political, and social affairs; and (3) an attitudin- ally, culturally, or ethnically homogeneous population which is legitimately or effectively governed by the incumbent regime. Typically, in the successful or stable nation-state, the development of (3) preceded the appearance of (1) and (2). In short, the modern nation-state is a major manifestation of a group's cultural or ethnic identity and the principal manifestation of its ethnopolitical identity. It represents the psychological boundary of a regime's legitimacy.

On the other hand, a territorial-state has (1) and (2), but to some noticeable extent lacks (3)- that is, the physical boundary of the regime's authority exceeds the psychological boundary of its legitimacy. Thus, the transforma- tion of ethnic heterogeneity into a competitive or conflictual ethnopolitical heterogeneity in a territorial-state depends largely upon the psychological "milieu" of group members. This milieu is rooted in the collective memories and historical experiences of the groups.2 Moreover, it depends upon the answers to five basic questions about the origin and composition of the territorial-state.3

First, did the existence of its groups precede the establishment of the territorial-state? If the answer is yes, then (also depending on how long the groups have been in existence) the greater the probabilities of ethnopolitical identity formation and the appearance of ethnopolitical activity. Very simply, individuals will find it difficult to transfer quickly, if at all, allegiance and loyalty from their natural group of origin to any new and artificial supragroup's organizations or institutions. Regarding Soviet groups, although their senses of identity have developed unevenly and are still evolv- ing, all 15 union republic groups can be identified in some form prior to, and often many decades before, the founding of the Soviet territorial-state.

2. Historical events and memories, which are kept alive by ethnopolitical leaders, are essential underpinnings for contemporary ethnic perceptions and grievances. In the (Northern) Irish case, for instance, Stewart (1977: 16) observed that:

To the Irish all History is Applied History and the past is simply a convenient quarry which provides ammunition to use against enemies in the present.

See also Douglas (1988), Segal (1979), and Zariski (1986: 19). 3. Although explicit in a few and implicit in many theoretical and empirical writings, these

five questions remain to be thoroughly codified, synthesized, and extensively addressed in one comprehensive analysis. Here, following the discussion of Dutter (1987), we offer only a summary outline.




Second, how did its constituent groups come to be in the territorial-state? If coercion was involved, then the probabilities of identity formation and political activity are increased. Such actions, which can be called "primordial encroachments," typically reinforce group identity and loyalty and strengthen individuals' contemporary sense of ethnohistorical grievance. Here the 14 non-Russian, union republic groups were, by and large, invol- untarily incorporated into the Czarist territorial-state and its Soviet successor. For example, in the years after World War I, Baltic independence (Raun, 1987) and armed resistance in the Ukraine (Mace, 1984) and Central Asia (Ritter, 1985) indicate that these groups probably would not have voluntarily joined the USSR.

One result of this process has been, of course, to add historical grievances to the collective memories of these groups. Consider, for example, the Ukrainian famine of 1933, which effectively ended resistance to Soviet agricultural collectivization and was apparently contrived by Stalin for just this reason (Mace, 1984), and the harsh Czarist treatment of Islam in Central Asia (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1986: 5-12). And with regard to the Balts during the nineteenth century, Alexiev (1983: 3) observed that:

crude attempts at denationalization and Russification by the Czarist regime engendered active opposition and the strengthening of the Baltic peoples' will to self-determination and political independence. It also left bitter political memories and a tradition of Russophobia, which were nurtured in the ensuing periods.

The contemporary presence of Russians in important union republic positions of economic and political power and day-to-day intergroup contacts serve as continuous reminders of this history, thus contributing to the perpet- uation of group identities and reinforcing individual psychological disposi- tions to distinguish between the good "us" and the bad "them" (Karklins, 1986b: 30, 43, 63-65, 212). Summarizing the results of interviews with a multiethnic sample of 50 individuals in Tbilisi, the capital of Soviet Georgia, Kolack (1985: 130) observed that the

entire fabric of Soviet society is subtly but unmistakably permeated by ethnic antagonisms and competition between the dominant Russians and all the others in political, economic, social and cultural life.

In addition to coercion, the specific terms of incorporation into the territorial-state may further raise ethnic consciousness and intergroup tensions. Consider Central Asia. When it was formally incorporated into the Soviet Union in the 1920s, the Soviet government took steps that have, if anything, heightened current ethnic awareness and tensions. For example, the five main groups were each given their own union republic. Thus, a



316 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

territorial dimension was added to their nascent group identities (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1986: 31-35; Burg, 1979, 1984; Horowitz, 1985: 601-613).

The evolution of the Central Asian groups also illustrates a "demonstration effect" in identity formation (Connor, 1977: 29-30). More specifically, Karpat (1983) argued that Soviet policies have raised Islamic consciousness; that Muslims have learned ethnic and linguistic nationalism from the Russian example; and that while reducing traditional religious influence, economic development has encouraged a separate sense of cultural and national out- look, an example of the "law of colonial ingratitude" (Seton-Watson, 1986: 27). Karpat (1983: 74-75) concluded that the

contemporary Muslims of the USSR are emerging not as Russified incarnations of homo sovieticus but as dynamic, progressive individuals deeply attached to their Islamic identity and cultural heritage, though without the religious trap- ping of old. This development may in fact be a great if totally inadvertent Soviet contribution to the Muslim cause.

Third, how many groups does the territorial-state contain? If groups are few in number, then the probabilities of identity formation and political activity are increased. In this instance, group members can more easily identify themselves and members of outgroups, perceive the issues that divide them, and organize to pursue ethnopolitical goals with a higher probability of success. On the other hand, a territorial-state with numerous groups complicates these matters and is likely to facilitate domination by one or a few relatively large groups.

Besides the 15 union republic groups, the Soviet Union contains, as noted, dozens of others. Thus, we would argue that Russian dominance is facilitated by the complicated logistics of intergroup contacts and cooperation, which also have been limited by the Russian-dominated, centrally directed system of controls (Karklins, 1986b: 93-96). Despite these formidable impediments, however, some intergroup cooperation has appeared (Alexiev, 1983; Kowalewski, 1980).4

Fourth, what proportion of the population does each group constitute? The distribution proportion is, of course, correlated with the number of groups. But, ceteris paribus, if group populations are close to balance, then identity formation and political activity are more likely. Again, it is easier for group members to identify themselves and outgroups and relevant issues. Also, relatively large numbers enhance the probability of achieving ethnopolitical

4. An intriguing variation on intergroup cooperation has been suggested by Karklins (1986b: 216), who speculates that, in the long run, regional blocs may form via the physical merging of many smaller groups within and between the 14 non-Russian union republics, thus enabling these new and larger blocs to bargain more effectively with the Russian-dominated center.




goals. By contrast, if one group predominates, then it can more easily acquire sufficient influence to achieve its goals and is more likely to have sufficient numbers to enforce, however tenuously, its political will and social peace on other groups.

Russians, of course, dominate the Soviet population with approximately 50% of the total (three times more than the Ukrainians, the second largest group), thus further strengthening Russian control. But even though they will continue to be the largest group, recent demographic trends, particularly the comparatively high birthrates among Central Asians, ensure that in the near future, if not already, Russians will drop below the psychologically important threshold of majority status. If anything, this will heighten their feelings of insecurity and make them even more sensitive to non-Russian expressions of national consciousness. A variation on this point also is relevant to union republic groups within each republic. Ethnic tensions have been heightened by rapid increases in the nonindigenous population, mainly Russians, especially where the indigenous nationality has become, or is in danger of becoming, a minority in its own republic - for example, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Latvia (Karklins, 1986b: 212).

Fifth, are group members regionally concentrated or widely dispersed throughout the territorial-state? Dispersion can facilitate control by one relatively large group. On the other hand, if group members are concentrated, then some of the disadvantages of small numbers are attenuated. Localized majorities can, ceteris paribus, more easily organize to pursue political goals with a higher probability of success than might otherwise be the case. Thus, the probabilities of identity formation and political activity are increased.

On this question, regional concentration is the norm for the non-Russian groups. With few exceptions, a large majority of each group lives within the boundaries of its designated republic, and a large majority -usually two to one or more - of each republic's population consists of that group. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that most individuals strongly prefer resi- dence in their traditional homelands and will continue to do so (Burg, 1979; Karklins, 1986b: 211). Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the mainte- nance of each group's identity has been facilitated and to some extent the political handicaps imposed by Russian dominance are ameliorated. For instance, Kowalewski (1979) estimated that, from 1966 to 1977, the Baltic republics accounted for approximately 19% of all dissident political demonstrations in the Soviet Union, while constituting only 2% of the Soviet population. Finally, Karklins (1986b: 207) observed that the

territorial rooting and history of the non-Russian republic nations set the baseline for their perceptions and evaluations. They view their traditional




homelands as their very own territory within which they have the right to cultural, communal, and political dominance. This is in contrast to the perceptions of the Russian population which perceives the borderlands as an exten- sion of Russia and themselves as political and economic benefactors and Kulturtraeger.

In sum, the origin of the Soviet territorial-state is largely consistent with the theoretical points that would lead us to expect the development and persistence of ethnopolitical identities and activities involving the 14 non- Russian union republic groups. It should be emphasized, however, that answers to these questions relate to the probabilities, not the certainty, of the development and persistence of ethnopolitical identities and activities. These probabilities are significantly impacted by six mitigating factors, which are considered after our discussion of the phases of ethnopolitical activity.

THE PHASES OF ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTIVITY

The primary factors in the development and persistence of an ethnopolitical identity are group members' collective memories and interpretations of ethnohistorical events. Ethnopolitical leaders are not only the carriers, but also the principal articulators and interpreters of these memories and events. Indeed, they are typically chosen or elected primarily because they are best able to perform these functions (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1971; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Tilly, 1978). Thus, the first phase of ethnopolitical activity is the appearance of ethnopolitical "entrepreneurs," who engage in three major overlapping but analytically separable activities: defining and articulating ethnopolitical goals; presenting these to regime incumbents, or as policy alternatives, if regime incumbents are already drawn from their group; and mobilizing and recruiting ethnic followers into organizations for political action in their pursuit, which overlaps with the next phase.

The second phase can be labeled "normal" politics. In the democratic context, this phase includes, for example, the appearance and development of organizations and political parties, as well as differential patterns of ethnopolitical behavior in competitive elections. Here entrepreneurs build an organizational nexus that is necessary for the persistence of ethnopolitical activity. As discussed by Houska (1985: 36), this nexus performs two crucial functions.

Organizations affect political and social behavior in two ways: through education and encapsulation. Education refers to the process whereby elites transmit the beliefs, attitudes, and history of the subculture to the masses. ... Encapsu-



Dutter I ETHNIC BEHAVIOR IN THE SOVIET UNION 319

lation is a strategy more specifically characteristic of the political subculture. It is a process in which elites isolate followers by attracting them to a broad network of subculturally linked organizations and thereby prevent member contact with competing organizations or even politically neutral groups.

Entrepreneurs attract followers into these organizations by offering symbolic and tangible rewards (Salisbury, 1970)- that is, public goods - which followers can obtain only by formally joining, or at least supporting, the organization(s) (Olson, 1971). Symbolic rewards include the promotion of intergroup solidarity by giving verbal expression to traditional group goals and organizing commemorations of important ethnohistorical events. Tangi- ble rewards include direct action against "enemy" groups or the promise of government policies favorable to the group if the entrepreneurs win office at the next election.5

Given the typical situation of potential entrepreneurs and ethnic groups in nondemocratic contexts, a different conceptualization of these first two phases of ethnopolitical activity is needed. Rather than entrepreneurs, organizations, political parties, candidates, issues, voters, campaigns, and elections, we should think in terms of the available, formal, or legal avenues for ethnopolitical expression that are open to officially designated ethnic representatives in officially sanctioned forums or organizations.6

Adapting a concept from Hirschmann (1970), we should ask: In what ways can ethnic groups voice their identity and political objectives through the existing institutional framework? In the Soviet case, while tightly regu- lated and closely supervised, various avenues of ethnocultural voice (e.g., Baltic song festivals, formal education in a group's native language, practic- ing Islam under the coopted Islamic clergy in Central Asia) have typically, if not consistently, been available.

Regarding ethnopolitical voice, Biddulph (1983) observed that, as long as specific norms of expression are followed, union republic party leaders have been allowed to criticize past policies, complain about local problems resulting from these policies, and advocate new or modified policies. All of the examples that he described at length were from the non-Russian republics. For our purposes, perhaps the most interesting was a plan for the massive diversion of Siberian rivers to the Central Asia republics, proposed by

5. Here one important variation is that intraethnic divisions may appear over the strategy and tactics required to achieve ethnopolitical goals, but not over the goals themselves (Dutter, 1985, 1988).

6. At some point, however, the officially designated ethnic representatives may find themselves in competition with unofficial representatives (e.g., dissidents), a nondemocratic variant on intraethnic competition, and the official representatives thus are likely to lose out unless they move to preempt ethnic political positions, a point noted in the Soviet case by Motyl (1989: 152, 167-168).




Moscow and supported by those republics, that stimulated a nationalist reaction among Russians (Petro, 1987). Ultimately, the project was scrapped.

An additional form of voice, or exit, as it might be called by Hirschman (1970), is emigration, which appears to occur disproportionately among non-Russian groups and to be used by Moscow as a type of safety valve - that is, curbing ethnic dissent by allowing the most vocal dissidents literally to exit (Salitan, 1989). Apparent interaction effects also are observed. For instance, Gitelman (1979: 76-77) noted that even though

in the [Russian republic] only 6% of Jews have requested ... emigration affidavits ... and only 13% of the Ukrainian Jewish population ... between 1968 and 1976, 49% of Lithuanian Jews and 35% of Latvian Jews have requested these affidavits [emphasis added].

Another avenue for the Soviet masses to voice their attitudes has been the electoral process. In the past, of course, Soviet authorities have consistently reported 99.99% turnouts and a similar percentage voting for official candidates, but recent research indicates that over time, abstention or voting against the officially sanctioned candidate had become important acts of political disaffection and that 5-10% of the eligible population engaged in these practices (Karklins, 1986a). Kerblay (1983: 295-296) also noted that the highest proportions of abstentions and adverse votes were typically found in the Baltic republics. Thus, we observe another necessary deviation from the "standard" interpretation of voting behavior. In democratic systems, we look for voting infavor of ethnic parties or candidates as an indicator of ethnic dissent. In the Soviet case, abstention has been an avenue for ethnic groups to express disaffection.

The third phase of ethnopolitical activity can be labeled "abnormal" politics (e.g., whether spontaneous or organized, the occurrence of ethnically based, politically motivated marches, demonstrations, protests, or strikes). The fourth phase can be labeled "sporadic" violence (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically based, politically motivated but essentially spontaneous riots, killings, or bombings). The fifth phase can be labeled "organized" violence (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically based, politically motivated and premed- itated riots, assassinations, bombings, terrorism, coups, or civil war). For these three phases, however, it is not necessary to distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic contexts.

In the Soviet case, before the 1980s, innumerable activities subsumed under phases three, four, and even five occurred. A small sample of these includes: Lithuanian religious dissidence; the appearance of a dissident journal in Belorussia; ongoing Russian-Ukranian friction and various forms of dissidence by individuals in the latter group; expressions of Moldavian




irredentism vis-h-vis Rumania; protest demonstrations and attacks on Soviet officials, including rumored attempts on the life of the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, and bombings by Armenians, Central Asians, and Georgians; and the reappearance in Central Asia of Sufi brotherhoods that are hostile to the Soviet regime and its officially appointed "collabora- tionist" Moslem hierarchy.

In this context, Karklins(1986b: 67-68) has strongly emphasized the point that, given the constraints on ethnopolitical voice in the pre-Gorbachev period, a wide variety of activities that in the West would not be recognized as overtly political (e.g., literary allusions) also should be surveyed. The most extreme view, summarized by Krasnov (1987: 258), has been articulated by a contemporary Russian dissident:

Timofeev. . . [argues] ... that the West "is unable to see [the extent of] societal opposition" in the Soviet Union, because it is used to such conventional manifestations of discontent as labor strikes, petitions, and demonstrations.... The Soviet regime, itself unconventional, gives rise to unconventional forms of resistance against it. One such form of resistance of the population against the regime is a slow-down-and-take-it-easy attitude toward work which undoubtedly counters all official drives to increase productivity. Timofeev sees another form of resistance to the regime in such widespread activities as bribery, swindle, fraud, moonshining and black-marketeering.

Finally, the late 1 980s have witnessed an upsurge in all of these activities, the most significant of which were: the development, rapid escalation, and persistence of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute; petitions and demonstrations on language policy in Belorussia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine; the intensifi- cation of local identities in Central Asia and further development of parallel Islam, which is at odds with the officially approved Islamic clergy; and a veritable explosion of activities by the Balts.

MITIGATING FACTORS

For any territorial-state, progression through the phases of ethnopolitical activity and the observed frequency and severity of activities subsumed under each is related to six mitigating factors. These are: (1) formal state structure and decision-making processes; (2) the behavior of regime incumbents within the state structure; (3) the extent to which regime incumbents are drawn from a single ethnic group; (4) the nature of ethnopolitical goals; (5) external threat; and (6) generational dynamics.

Formal state structure and decision-making processes cover such considerations as unitary versus federal and, in the democratic context, the method




of election of public officials. For example, if the state is federal and proportional representation is used, then it is reasonable to expect that the probabilities of ethnic identity formation and political activity will be lower. As with any generalization, there are, of course, exceptions. For instance, Horowitz (1985: 601-613) noted that in some situations, federalism, by providing a territorial dimension, has intensified ethnopolitical conflict. Thus, this factor is highly context-dependent (Dutter, 1988; Rudolph and Thompson, 1985; Zariski, 1986). The key, however, is whether groups are directly involved in the processes of governing, giving them a tangible stake in the existing system and reassuring group members that their collective identities will not be threatened. In short, ethnic representatives must have real influence on collective decisions. They should not be "pseudorep- resentatives," elected or appointed principally to appease and attract ethnic followers rather than represent those followers' interests (Brichta, 1972).

On the related issue of the extent to which decision making and actual policies take ethnicity into account, relevant considerations are: proportion- ality in governmental programs; acceding to the principal goals of a group; offering specific incentives to ethnopolitical leaders in order to co-opt them; and positive discrimination targeted on a particular group (Etzioni-Halevy, 1975; Lijphart, 1975; Nordlinger, 1972; Smooha, 1978). Such practices, however, can be problematic (Etzioni-Halevy, 1975). They can, at least in the short run, defuse conflictual or potentially destabilizing ethnopolitical demands, but they also can, in the long run, perpetuate individuals' perceptions of political issues in ethnic terms. New, less accommodating, or less skillful leaders may come to power, or new issues may arise that are less amenable to accommodation, which stimulate new demands and, in turn, leads to the development or renewal of conflict (Despres, 1975; Dutter, 1985, 1988). Moreover, disproportionate government benefits or positive discrimination are likely, over time, to stimulate resentment and related political action by other groups (Smooha, 1978).

The second mitigating factor relates to the behavior of regime incumbents who occupy the key decision-making positions in governmental and political institutions. In the face of latent or manifest ethnopolitical demands, these incumbents can follow one, or a mixture, of three basic approaches: do nothing, accommodate, or repress. Doing nothing almost invites progression through the phases of ethnopolitical activity. Accommodation would appear to be a more promising avenue, although in some situations it may not be feasible or even desirable. First, as noted, special benefits to one group may provoke hostile reactions by other groups. Second, concessions may solve one set of problems and create others (e.g., a dissatisfied, militant Protestant- British minority in a "united" Ireland). Third, regime incumbents and their




followers may be unprepared to trade their existing, if tenuous, economic, political, and social positions for, from their point of view, an uncertain future.

Although it might be effective in the short run, the active repression of the ethnopolitical leaders and their followers does not constitute an efficacious, long-run solution, particularly if it is used against various forms of nonviolent political behavior.7 First, the territorial-state may quickly lose the substance, if not the appearance, of democracy or, in nondemocratic contexts, legitimacy. Second, repression is likely to add incidents and martyrs to the dissident group's collective memory, which will reinforce past feelings of grievance and demonstrate the incurable evil of the subjugating group. Third, it may stimulate the very behavior that repression is intended to control or prevent.' Repression is also likely to have two additional effects: heightening group members' feelings of insecurity regarding their physical survival, and hastening the spread of risk-acceptant attitudes among group members - that is, increase their willingness to support or engage in physically risky political behavior. These effects will, of course, increase the probability of progression through the phases of ethnopolitical activity, as well as the frequency and severity of activities subsumed under each.

Similarly, quasi-coercive actions (e.g., homogenizing educational policies), which are ostensibly designed to reduce group differences gradually, are likely to incite short-run resistance as well as to fail in the long run to destroy, or even weaken, a group heritage and collective memory that have been generations, perhaps centuries, in the making. They are likely to be perceived as sinister attempts to emasculate group culture. A "salami" or "domino" hypothesis may then evolve in the minds of group members under which such actions, however mild in form and regardless of the true inten- tions of policymakers, are perceived as the first step(s) down the slippery slope of group destruction. Thus, from the group's point of view, these actions must be resisted because if they are not, then other, harsher ones will soon follow.

Another relevant question is: Can long-run noncoercive or natural processes (e.g., economic development, emergent value consensus, intermar-

7. A middle ground, which includes elements of both accommodation and repression, has been sketched out by Lustick (1979). But as with the inaccuracy of early analyses of preindepend- ence plural societies, critiqued by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 2-22), the effectiveness of such measures is severely bounded by context and time.

8. As discussed by Clark (1983), for example, Franco's prohibition of any expressions of Basque identity triggered an upsurge in ETA activity, especially violence. See also Douglas (1988) and Ramirez and Sullivan (1987). Similarly, preemptive British curfews, area searches, and internment without charge or trial were catalysts for the rebirth and rapid growth of the IRA in Northern Ireland (Kelly, 1972).




riage, social integration, cross-cutting organizational memberships, demographic changes) eliminate, or at least diminish, ethnic divisions? This is possible and, of course, ethnopsychology does change and evolve over time, but the available evidence suggests that, in plural societies, such processes typically result in, at best, cosmetic changes in intergroup perceptions and a superficial homogenization (Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977; Hassanpour and Weinbaum, 1986; Smooha, 1978; Zariski, 1986). Consider economic development. If intergroup contacts follow a superior-inferior pattern, accompa- nied by perceived incidents of discrimination against the latter, then economic progress may do more to heighten ethnic awareness and tensions than alleviate them, even if everyone's standard of living is rising.

The third mitigating factor involves the extent to which regime incumbents, especially key decision makers, are drawn from one ethnic group. If one group predominates, then nonmembers will likely expect, justifiably or not, that policy decisions will systematically favor the incumbents' group of origin (Horowitz, 1985). This expectation could easily be reinforced if the incumbents are perceived to be slow or unwilling to respond to reasonable ethnopolitical goals (e.g., redress of economic disparities), which an ag- grieved group has voiced through the normal or legal channels of political expression. Exacerbating this possibility is how long regime incumbents have engaged in such practices. If these conditions obtain, then the further will be the expected progression through the phases and the greater will be the frequency and severity of activities under each.

Regarding these first three factors, although federal in form, the Soviet Union is, of course, unitary in substance, and the future evolution and operations of the system are ongoing sources of tension and debate, most notably since Gorbachev's rise to power (Karklins, 1986b: 66; Lapidus, 1984: 566; Motyl, 1989). Regarding the behavior of regime incumbents, the Russians have generally kept a tight rein on decision making and policy implementation, which in the perceptions of many non-Russians and despite some forms of affirmative action, appear to favor the dominant Russian group (Burg, 1979, 1984; Karklins, 1986b: 93-96; Lapidus, 1984).

Moreover, even though union republic institutions are, on paper, "inte- grated," Russians typically hold the decisive positions in the party, government, and economy, despite the presence of indigenous elites in positions that nominally outrank these Russians (Lapidus, 1984: 568). In other words, at the highest levels, affirmative action has been practiced in such a way that the status quo is not undermined, even at the risk of perpetuating, if not exacerbating, ethnic tensions (Karklins, 1986b: 93-96). Finally, Gorbachev's shift of regime responses to political expressions of ethnic identity away from




an immediate resort to Stalinist-style repression contributed significantly to an upsurge of ethnopolitical activity in the late 1980s.

The fourth mitigating factor involves the nature of ethnopolitical goals. At least five categories of goals can be identified in rough order of each's implications for the long-run viability of an existing territorial-state. These are: substantive (e.g., economic or political advancement or reform); proce- dural (e.g., decision-making practices); symbolic (e.g., recognition that a group's goals are legitimate); constitutional (e.g., restructuring the state); and fundamental (e.g., dismantling the state). In general, the greater the potential consequences of ethnopolitical goals for the survival of a territorial-state, then the greater the resistance of regime incumbents, the further the progression through the phases, and the greater the observed frequency and severity of activities under each (Hassanpour and Weinbaum, 1986; Rudolph and Thompson, 1985; Smooha, 1978; Zariski, 1986).

This factor, as well as the earlier ones, are well illustrated by the case of the Balts, who probably have the most highly developed ethnopolitical consciousness of all of the non-Russian union republic groups. Moreover, although analogies are hazardous, the Balt experience may provide a para- digm for future developments elsewhere in the Soviet Union, especially for Central Asia (Broxup, 1987; Burg, 1984).

First, as articulated by their most radical ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, the Balts' ultimate goal, falling in the fundamental category, is unambiguous: the restoration of national independence. Second, this goal and the intensity with which it is held are indicated by the nature, scope, and frequency of entre- preneurial activities (e.g., petition submissions, protest demonstrations), which also indicate the Balts' highly developed political consciousness and organizational abilities (Alexiev, 1983; Eklof, 1989; Kowalewski, 1979; Raun, 1987; Vardys, 1980). Finally, the past conduct of many "extralegal" activities, when faced by a regime with few compunctions about using repression, further demonstrates intensity of feeling, as well as risk-acceptant attitudes.

With Gorbachev's reforms and the easing of repression, the late 1980s witnessed an explosion of activities by Balt entrepreneurs and their followers. As far as their ultimate goal is concerned, this included: large-scale demonstrations to observe the anniversaries of Baltic independence from the Czarist Empire in 1918 and forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940; calls for autonomy in economic decision making and eventual home rule; formation of national or popular fronts or committees to promote this goal of autonomy and, in the case of a few individuals, independence; official restoration by local authorities and renewed use of flags and other symbols




of national identity; adopting the local language as the official language of the republic; a declaration of sovereignty passed almost unanimously by the Estonian Supreme Soviet; fielding candidates in the March 1989 Soviet elections who openly called for independence from Moscow; the defeat of Communist Party regulars by many of these candidates; and Lithuania's unilateral declaration of independence.

Also important theoretically are the parallels between Balt activities and Soviet policy responses and the corresponding activities and responses in other plural societies. For instance, the Balt experience clearly illustrates the cross-cutting nature of political cleavages in the plural society. Here, Alexiev (1983: 22, 34) observed that

This analysis has thrown much light on the political significance and potential of Baltic political protest. It has revealed, for instance, a surprising degree of organizational talent, discipline, and purposefulness.... In most cases, partic- ipation bridges the generations and cuts across socioeconomic class lines, though there is a clear overrepresentation of the working class and the youth.... Public protest in the Baltic has not been limited to the larger cities but has manifested itself at all communal levels.... There are also indications that protestors and demonstrators in the Baltic enjoy tacit support among a significant portion of the population at large. One good indication is the reluctance of the authorities to use a volunteer militia . . . which is largely recruited from the local population, for the suppression of demonstrations. [emphases added].

Thus, as illustrated by the Balts, socioeconomic divisions within an ethnic group are largely irrelevant politically. What relevance they have lies in the observed patterns of leader-follower recruitment and relations. Typically, the ethnic upper and middle classes, especially the intelligentsia, constitute the bulk of the entrepreneurship or leadership group, which then mobilizes and organizes ethnic working- or lower-class followers. Second, unless economic grievances are the specific catalysts for ethnopolitical activity, tangible incentives or rewards cannot buy off the pursuit of ethnopolitical goals (Horowitz, 1985: 131-135).

The Balt experience also illustrates an important variation on this second point. Despite enjoying a generally higher standard of living than other union republics, ethnopolitical objectives continue to be intensely held and publicly expressed. Here political entrepreneurs would be quick to point out that the group is doing well despite the handicaps of foreign rule, so think how much better things would be if "we" governed. And whether it is objectively correct, a perception may develop and persist that their advanced region is being economically bled, further solidifying ethnopolitical grievances and a



Dutter I ETHNIC BEHAVIOR IN THE SOVIET UNION 327

willingness to take action (Clark, 1983; Douglas, 1988; Horowitz, 1985: 229-288; Ramirez and Sullivan, 1987; Zariski, 1986: 9).

The Balts do not appear to be alone in these perceptions. For instance, Karklins (1986b: 93-96) notes that Central Asians generally perceive their advances as resulting from their own efforts, rather than from the help of the elder brother Russian republic. In short, even if benevolently and efficiently governed, which is demonstrably not the situation in the Soviet Union, rule by one's own still is preferred, and, as is typically the case in plural societies, socioeconomic conditions and issues are perceived, filtered, and interpreted through an ethnopsychological prism.

The fifth mitigating factor involves the answer to the following question: Is there or has there ever been an external threat to the existence of the territorial-state and all of its inhabitants? If the answer is yes, then, depending largely upon the magnitude of the perceived threat, the less the expected progression through the phases and the less the expected frequency and severity of activities under each (Esman, 1977; Lijphart, 1975; Nordlinger, 1972; Seliktar and Dutter, 1983).

Even though the pure form of this factor does not apply, coercive Russi- fication and ideological indoctrination can be interpreted as a form of external threat to the survival of non-Russian groups, which has strengthened ethnic identities and transformed culture, especially language, into a major political issue (Bruchis, 1987: 234; Motyl, 1989: 163). In other words, there is a vast difference between acculturation (e.g., learning Russian), which has occurred, and assimilation (e.g., feeling Russian), which has not (Gitelman, 1983). Karklins (1986b: 215) also emphasized the distinction between func- tional integration (i.e., behavioral adaptations to specific situations), which can be observed, and attitudinal integration (i.e., convergence of beliefs, values, attitudes, and opinions), which generally has not developed. Accom- panying this has been the appearance of various forms of ethnic self-assertion such as the exploration and glorification of ethnic roots, even before Gorbachev (Lapidus, 1984: 573). Thus, members of ethnic elites, especially intellectuals (Karklins, 1986b: 141), are "mining the historical quarry" mentioned by Stewart (1977: 16), or, perhaps more aptly in the Soviet case, opening the historical graves.

As just mentioned, one key ethnic marker, language, has become a major political issue, which is also true of religion.9 As in other plural societies, however, these are the keystones in an elaborate matrix of markers (Hall,

9. There is, however, some regional variation in their relative importance (e.g., language in the Baltic, the Islamic way of life in Central Asia). See Karklins (1986b: 56).




1979) that defines group identity and its way of life, and conditions perceptions of and relations with outgroups, especially the dominant Russians. Thus, recalling our salami or domino hypothesis, any perceived attack on one of these two markers would generally be perceived as a direct attack on the group and is likely to provoke a strong response. For instance, several observers have reported the occurrence of spontaneous riots in Georgia in 1978 over a draft constitution that failed to mention Georgian as the official language of the republic. The draft was quickly withdrawn and rewritten to include this designation.

In addition, the cumulative effect of past attacks is to perpetuate a festering resentment that will occasionally erupt into protest at lesser provocations (e.g., localized food shortages in the Baltic), or in forms, as suggested earlier, that are unexpected or nontraditional from the Western point of view (e.g., riots at soccer matches involving a union republic team versus a Russian one). Related issues that also have the potential to stimulate ethnopolitical activity are economic development and the competition for resources, the succession process, education, professional advancement, and union republic leadership positions, issues that are, of course, critical ones in Gorbachev's program of perestroika (Burg, 1984; Eklof, 1989; Karklins, 1986b; Lapidus, 1984; Motyl, 1989).

The sixth factor, generational dynamics, concerns repetitions of the phases. For example, if regime incumbents adopt and retain repressive policies, then risk-acceptant attitudes are likely to intensify within the current generation and to spread to group members' descendants via the socialization process. This will impact not only the probability of progression through the phases in the current generation, but also the probability of reprogression through subsequent generations.10 Thus, the failure of one generation to achieve its ethnopolitical goals does not mean that regime incumbents have solved the problem, but simply that it becomes dormant until a new ethnic generation has reached maturity, ready to resume the struggle.

Once again, the Balts provide a good illustration. We can roughly identify three generational progressions. First, Czarist Russia's defeat in World War

10. For instance, throughout the twentieth century, the IRA has failed to achieve its goal of a united Ireland, independent of Britain, and Ireland has seen four periods of major IRA activity: 1916-1923, 1938-1945, 1956-1962, and 1970 to the present (Buckland, 1981). Each pre-1970 period was met with repression by both the British and Irish governments, followed by 10 to 15 years of "peace," sufficient time for the next generation of children and adolescents to be socialized, to reach adulthood, and to resume the struggle. Similar generational patterns are found in the post-1948 generation of Israeli Arabs, many of whom are active in the intifadah (Peretz, 1988; Seliktar, 1984; Smooha, 1980); the Basques in Spain (Clark, 1983; Douglas, 1988; Ramirez and Sullivan, 1987); the South Moluccans in Holland (Herman and van der Laan Bouma, 1980); the Armenians (Gunter, 1986); and the Tamils in Sri Lanka (Arasarantnam, 1987).




I and the Bolshevik Revolution presented one generation with the opportu- nity to gain independence in 1918, which lasted until 1940 when Soviet rule was imposed. By then, another generation had matured, containing many who welcomed the German invasion, their presumed liberation in 1941. They collaborated during the occupation and then engaged in armed resistance to the reimposition of Soviet rule in the late 1940s, until they were not only defeated, but also literally destroyed by Stalin. Left essentially leaderless, the population at large was relatively quiet until the late 1960s, by which time a new generation of potential entrepreneurs and followers had come of age and renewed ethnopolitical activities, exemplified by the Lithuanian Catholic movement (Vardys, 1980), as well as various forms of unalloyed ethnopolitical dissent (Alexiev, 1983), which continues to the present.

Generational patterns also are observed in other regions of the Soviet Union. We see from 1918 to the early 1930s, for instance, Ukrainian collaboration with the Germans in 1918, a brief period of independence during the Russian civil war, and various forms of resistance to Soviet rule until the 1933 famine (Mace, 1984), and in Central Asia, Basmachi and other armed resistance to Soviet rule (Olcott, 1981; Ritter, 1985). In the early 1940s, we also see widespread collaboration with the Germans in the Ukraine and Caucasus (Alexiev, 1982), triggering harsh reprisals by Stalin after the war. Finally, as noted earlier, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed an upsurge of ethnopolitical activities in all of the non-Russian republics.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued that the Soviet Union is an exception that proves the rule as far as general theories of politics in plural societies are concerned. After many decades of repression, sometimes of the most brutal kind, the ethnocentricism of the Soviet Union's principal ethnic groups not only survived, but also resurfaced and strengthened in the 1970s and 1980s. Our analysis should be regarded not only as an explanation of current developments, but also as a prediction of their continuation, their further vertical development in the republics primarily affected so far (Baltic and Trans- caucasian), and their horizontal proliferation to and vertical development in the republics that are as yet only partially affected (Central Asia, the non- Russian Slavic, and Russia as well). These predictions are, of course, condi- tional on Moscow's policies, especially on the continued relaxation of repression.

Also as noted, relatively little effort has been made to examine the Soviet Union with explicit reference to the extant theoretical and empirical literature




on ethnopolitical activity in plural societies. Our brief theoretical and empirical survey has revealed the remarkable degree to which the Soviet case can be subsumed under this literature. At the very least, our analysis should point the way toward a more general approach to thinking about and analyzing Soviet ethnopolitical processes. In partial contrast, one recent book (Motyl, 1987), with a specific focus on the Ukraine, poses the question, "Will the non-Russians rebel?" While obviously an important and relevant question, three comments are in order.

First, Motyl's analysis implicitly assumes, as do many analyses of other ethnically diverse territorial-states (Jordan, 1987: 317-318), that escalating interethnic violence is the most important form of ethnopolitical activity, if not the inevitable consequence of the development and persistence of ethnopolitical identities and activities. Second, he may be asking the wrong question. Perhaps more to the point is: Will the non-Russians continue to fester and, given opportunities, agitate and disrupt? We might answer probably not to the rebellion question, but we would answer most definitely yes to this one. Third, although probably the most important non-Russian republic, the Ukraine may not be the pacesetter in this realm. For instance, Eklof (1989: 149-157) observes that, as in the past, the Baltic republics are the apparent laboratories in which many of Gorbachev's reforms are to be tested. They could very well turn out to be laboratories of a different kind and provide a demonstration of successful ethnopolitical assertiveness toward Moscow.

In the broader context, our analysis and discussion may have led the reader to believe that every ethnically diverse territorial-state teeters on the brink of violent upheavals or disintegration. Any perceived exaggeration or simplifi- cation in this regard should be interpreted to mean that no ethnically diverse territorial-state can be automatically assumed immune to the appearance of ethnopolitical activity and the potentially serious consequences that can result. We have outlined, however, the foundation for a comprehensive approach to assessing the probability, not the certainty, that such activity will appear in any territorial-state.

This brings us back to the issue of prediction and, especially, timing. Except for occasional references to the short and long runs, little has been said about the exact time frame for ethnic upheavals, or even the development of ethnopolitical activity. It is possible, of course, to identify the background conditions under which ethnopolitical activity is likely to appear and to evolve, but the prediction of specific occurrences, or even phases, remains a little like predicting earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. We generally know what the main preconditions are and where they exist, and we can monitor




events, identify tremors, and issue warnings. But we cannot, as yet, confi- dently predict even major upheavals. We can only say that, ceteris paribus, occurrences that may be very unlikely to appear in any given year may be very likely to do so within a generation. Also, regardless of the time frame, it is incumbent upon researchers to explain not only why ethnopolitical activity develops and persists, but especially if the major preconditions are present, why it does not.

REFERENCES

Alexiev, A. R. 1982. Soviet nationalities in German wartime strategy, 1941-1945. R-2772-NA. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp.

Alexiev, A. R. 1983. Dissent and nationalism in the Soviet Baltic. R-2772-NA. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp.

Anderson, B. A., and B. D. Silver. 1984. Equality, efficiency, and politics in Soviet bilingual education policy, 1934-1980. American Political Science Review 78:1019-1039.

Arasaratnam, S. 1987. Sinhala-Tamil relations in modem Sri Lanka (Ceylon). In Ethnic conflict, internationalperspectives, edited by J. Boucher, D. Landis, and K. A. Clark, 33-53. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Bennigsen, A., and S. E. Wimbush. 1986. Muslims of the Soviet empire: A guide. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Biddulph, H. L. 1983. Local interest articulation at CPSU congresses. World Politics 36:28-52. Brichta, A. 1972. The social and political characteristics of members of the seventh Knesset. In

The elections in Israel-1969, edited by A. Arian, 109-131. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press.

Broxup, M. 1987. Islam in Central Asia since Gorbachev. Asian Affairs 18:283-293. Bruchis, M. 1987. The language policy of the Soviet communist party: Comments and observa-

tions. East European Quarterly 21(2): 231-257. Buckland, P. 1981. A history of Northern Ireland. London: Macmillan. Burg, S. L. 1979. Soviet policy and the Central Asian problem. Survey 24:65-82. Burg, S. L. 1984. Muslim cadres and Soviet political development: Reflections from a compar-

ative perspective. World Politics 37:24-47. Clark, R. P. 1983. Patterns in the lives of ETA members. Terrorism, An International Journal

6:423-454. Connor, W. 1977. Ethnonationalism in the first world: The present in historical perspective. In

Ethnic conflict in the Western world, edited by M.J. Esman, 19-45. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Despres, L. A. 1975. Ethnicity and resource competition in plural societies. The Hague: Mouton. Douglas, W. A. 1988. A critique of recent trends in the analysis of ethnonationalism. Ethnic and

Racial Studies 11(2): 192-206. Dutter, L. E. 1981. Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate

contests. Public Choice 37:403-423. Dutter, L. E. 1982. The structure of voter preferences: The 1921, 1925, 1973, and 1975 Northern

Irish parliamentary elections. Comparative Political Studies 14:517-542.



332 JOURNAL OFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

Dutter, L. E. 1985. Perceptions of group identity and recent political behavior in Northern Ireland. Political Psychology 6:47-60.

Dutter, L. E. 1987. Ethno-political activity and the psychology of terrorism. Terrorism, An International Journal 10:145-163.

Dutter, L. E. 1988. Changing elite perceptions of the Northern Irish conflict, 1973-1983. Political Psychology 9:129-154.

Eklof, B. 1989. Soviet briefing, Gorbachev and the reform period. Boulder, CO: Westview. Esman, M. J. 1977. Perspectives on ethnic conflict in industrialized societies. In Ethnic conflict

in the Western world, edited by M. J. Esman, 371-390. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Etzioni-Halevy, E. 1975. Patterns of conflict generation and conflict "absorption": The cases of

Israeli labor and ethnic conflicts. Journal of Conflict Resolution 19:286-309. Frohlich, N., J. A. Oppenheimer, and 0. R. Young. 1971. Political leadership and collective

goods. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gitelman, A. 1979. Baltic and non-Baltic immigrants in Israel: Political and social attitudes and

behavior. Studies in Comparative Communism 12:74-90. Gitelman, A. 1983. Are nations merging in the USSR? Problems of Communism 12:35-47. Gunter, M. 1986. Contemporary Armenian terrorism. Terrorism, An International Journal

8:213-252. Hall, R. L. 1979. Ethnic autonomy -Comparative dynamics. New York: Pergamon. Hassanpour, A., and M. G. Weinbaum. 1986. Political integration and the Iranian revolution:

The case of the Kurds. Midwest Political Science Association. Mimeo. Herman, V., and R. van der Laan Bouma. 1980. Nationalists without a nation: South Moluccan

terrorism in the Netherlands. Terrorism, An International Journal 4:223-257. Hirschmann, A. 0. 1970. Exit, voice, and loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Horowitz, D. L. 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Houska, J. J. 1985. Influencing mass political behavior: Elites and political subcultures in the

Netherlands andAustria. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. Jordan, W. D. 1987. Some thoughts on ethnic conflict. In Ethnic conflict, internationalperspec-

tives, edited by J. Boucher, D. Landis, and K. A. Clark, 317-324. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Karklins, R. 1986a. Soviet elections revisited: Voter abstention in noncompetitive voting.

American Political Science Review 80:449-469. Karklins, R. 1986b. Ethnic relations in the USSR: The perspective from below. Boston: Allen &

Unwin. Karpat, K. 1983. Moscow and the "Muslim question." Problems of Communism 32:71-79. Kelly, H. 1972. How Stormont fell. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. Kerblay, B. 1983. Modern Soviet society. New York: Pantheon. Kolack, S. 1985. Ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union: The unfinished revolution. Journal of

Ethnic Studies 13:125-132. Kowalewski, D. 1979. Dissent in the Baltic republics: Characteristics and consequences.Journal

of Baltic Studies 10:307-318. Kowalewski, D. 1980. Trends in the human rights movement. In Soviet politics in the Brezhnev

era, edited by D. R. Kelley, 150-181. New York: Praeger. Krasnov, V. 1987. Lev Timofeev and soul-searching within the Soviet elite. Studies in Compar-

ative Communism 20(3/4): 253-264. Lapidus, G. W. 1984. Ethnonationalism and political stability: The Soviet case. World Politics

36:555-580. Lijphart, A. 1975. The politics of accommodation: Pluralism and democracy in theNetherlands.

Berkeley: University of California Press.




Lustick, I. 1979. Stability in deeply divided societies: Consociationalism versus control. World Politics 31:325-344.

Mace, J. E. 1984. Famine and nationalism in the Soviet Ukraine. Problems of Communism 33:37-50.

Motyl, A. J. 1987. Will the non-Russians rebel? State, ethnicity, and stability in the USSR. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Motyl, A. J. 1989. The sobering of Gorbachev: Nationality, restructuring, and the West. In Politics, society, and nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia, edited by S. Bisler, 149-173. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Nordlinger, E. A. 1972. Conflict regulation in divided societies. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Olcott, M. B. 1981. The Basmachi or Freemen's revolt in Turkestan, 1918-24. Soviet Studies 33:352-369.

Olson, M. 1971. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Peretz, D. 1988. Intifadeh: The Palestinian uprising. Foreign Affairs 665:964-980. Petro, N. N. 1987. "The project of the century": Acase study of Russian national dissent. Studies

in Comparative Communism 20(3/4): 235-252. Post, J. M. 1984. Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior. Terrorism, an

International Journal 7:241-256. Rabushka, A., and K. A. Shepsle. 1972. Politics in plural societies: A theory of democratic

instability. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill. Ramirez, J. M., and B. Sullivan. 1987. The Basque conflict. In Ethnic conflict, international

perspectives, edited by J. Boucher, D. Landis, and K. A. Clark, 120-138. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Raun, T. U. 1987. Estonia and the Estonians. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Rejai, M., and C. H. Enloe. 1969. Nation-states and state-nations. International Studies Quar-

terly 13:140-158. Ritter, W. S. 1985. The final phase in the liquidation of anti-Soviet resistance in Tadzhikistan:

Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924-31. Soviet Studies 37:484-493. Rothschild, J. 1981. Ethnopolitics, a conceptual framework. New York: Columbia University

Press. Rudolph, J. R., and R. J. Thompson. 1985. Ethnoterritorial movements and the policy process:

Accommodating nationalist demands in the developed world. ComparativePolitics 17:291-311. Salisbury, R. H. 1970. Interest group politics in America. New York: Harper & Row. Salitan, L. P. 1989. Politics and nationality: The Soviet Jews. In Politics, society, and nationality

inside Gorbachev's Russia, edited by S. Bialer, 175-191. Boulder, CO: Westview. Segal, B. E. 1979. Ethnicity: Where the present is the past. In Ethnic autonomy -Comparative

dynamics, edited by R. L. Hall, 7-12. New York: Pergamon. Seliktar, 0. 1984. The Arabs in Israel. Journal of Conflict Resolution 28:247-269. Seliktar, O., and L. E. Dutter. 1983. Israel as a latent plural society. In Culture, ethnicity, and

identity: Current issues in research, edited by W. C. McCready, 301-326. New York: Academic Press.

Seton-Watson, H. 1986. Russian nationalism in historical perspective. In The last empire: Nationality and the Soviet future, edited by R. Conquest, 14-29. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Smooha, S. 1978. Israel: Pluralism and conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Smooha, S. 1980. The orientation and politization of theArab minority in Israel. Haifa: Institute

of Middle East Studies, University of Haifa.




Spicer, E. H. 1971. Persistent cultural systems. Science 174:795-800. Stewart, A. T. Q. 1977. The narrow ground. London: Faber. Tilly, C. 1978. From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Vardys, V. S. 1980. Lithuania's Catholic movement reappraised. Survey 25:49-73. Zariski, R. 1986. Ethnic extremism among native ethnic minorities in Western Europe: Dimen-

sions, causes, manifestations, and institutional responses. International Studies Association. Mimeo.

NOTICE OF GRANT AVAILABILITY

OPTIONS, a University Outreach Project on Nuclear Policy, awards grants to colleges and universities to organize a faculty speakers bureau for off-campus, community education on international security issues. For more information, write Marta Daniels Troy, Executive Director, OPTIONS, Box 875, Juniata College, Huntingdon, PA 16652. Phone: (814) 643-6293.



Documents

Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic Political Behavior in the Soviet Union