Theories of International Politics After the Incident of 911 the Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the Twentieth-First Century

8/9/2019 Theories of International Politics After the Incident of 911 the Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the Twentieth-First Century

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Kasetsart J. (Soc. Sci) 33 : 161 - 169 (2012) . ( ) 33 : 161 - 169 (2555)

Review Article

Theories of International Politics after the Incident of 9/11The Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the

Twentieth-First Century

Poowin Bunyavejchewin

ABSTRACT

The events of 9/11 led to the first two wars of the twentieth-first centurand the Iraq War. Therefore, like many other internationally significant incidetheories of international politics. This article explores the impact of 9/11 onit finds that realism is the only theoretical approach that remains generally app

identifies the shortcomings of realism namely, its premise of secularization, insufficient exastate actors, and insufficient attention to non-military and economic powersKeywords: 9/11, theories of international politics, realism, secularization

11 2001 21

: 9/11

INTRODUCTIONEvery great event brings about subst

lessons regarding the theories of intern

Alumnus, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Hull, United Regional Studies Program, School of Liberal Arts, Walailak University, Nakhon Si ThaE-mail: [email protected]


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politics. The Second World War, for example, ledpolitical realists to critique the idea and praxis of idealism. The concept of Long Peace, introduced byGaddis (1992), as well as the neo-realism developedby Waltz (1979), derives from circumstances of theCold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and thesubsequent end of the Cold War led scholars topronounce realist tradition from political realismthrough neo-realism obsolete and a return to theidealist tradition. Tradition, in this context, refers to[capabilities] of spinning off numerous currents of thought and specific theories; hence, when seen asa whole the traditions constitute the main and mostdynamic centre for theoretical creativity, (Jrgensen,2010, p. 12). The significant difference between bothtraditions, I argue, is the assumption on war. Whilethe former presupposed that war is a prerequisite of change in international politics, the latter denied thatassumption. The events of 9/11 do not differ fromprevious incidents in that they have induced debatesurrounding the validity of theories of internationalpolitics. Thus, they definitively inform our conceptualization of international politics. Nevertheless,when any debate emerges within a discipline after major incidents, prudence is essential since theoryis always for someone and some purpose (Cox,1981, p. 128) and comes from somewhere. Space andtime necessarily become conditions of argumentspertaining to international politics. Nonetheless, theneglect of history always devalues theories. Therefore,this article not only revises theories of internationalpolitics affected by the events of 9/11, but also traces

these theories back to their original historicalcontexts, considering geographical contexts as well.It argues that the events of 9/11 showed academiain the International Relations (IR) field that realismremains generally applicable, whereas the idealisttradition is inadequately applicable because of itsutopian nature. However, despite realisms validity,it is not solely adequate as a means of understandingthe present age. Its inadequacies, such as the falsepremise of secularization of international politics,

will be also examined. Finally, this paper will

conclude by presenting revised constructitheories of international politics in order tothem more suitable in the age of the War on T

In the 1990s, IR academia were drawn ithe myth of the great triumph of the US and itover the communist camp. Realist traditionappeared to be out-dated as theories and pracinternational politics. For instance, since the Pact no longer existed, the North Atlantic TOrganization (NATO) faced debates over its corelevance due to the absence of its opponentled to questions regarding the applicabilitytime-honored theory of alliance in the aretheoretical debate in which idealism once established dominance over realism. The ESchool of theories also became more influeneffect of the theory of humanitarian interveintroduced by Wheeler (2000), can be seeapproaches to humanitarian missions througlate twentieth century. Ultimately, the allurinof US triumph concealed the realities of interpolitics, including the functions of the internsystem and signs of international terrorism.

The US-led wars and the failure of idealist/liberalist tradition

The attack on US soil on 11 September 2led the Bush administration to proclaim the WTerror, and subsequently launch war in Afghin October 2001. The invasion of Afghanistsupported by the international community sUnited Nation Security Council (UNSC) had

endorsed the mission (Dobson & Marsh, 20177178). In contrast, the Iraq war was not according to international law, since the US it alone on the basis of the doctrine of pre-emand with the goal of regime change. What hatwo wars in the Middle East told us? It is nexaggeration to argue that the trail of US fopolicy following the events of 9/11 disprovesscholars supposition that realism is obsolet& Rengger, 1992). Despite the legality of

Afghanistan War, the subsequent Iraq war sh


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international law and international institutions can bedisregarded if they become obstacles to the nationalinterests of major powers. Thus, concepts like neo-liberal institutionalism and theories of the EnglishSchool have been confronted with the crucialquestion: whose international law and internationalinstitutions matter most? This has led to critiques of the essence of neo-liberal institutionalism and theEnglish School. These critiques will be consideredat greater length in the following discussion.

The liberal myth of international regimesAlthough it could be claimed that the US

tried to follow the rules of the United Nations (UN)and engage with NATO, as the efforts the countrymade before 2003 suggest, this article argues thatsuch a claim derives from false, idealistic assumptionsregarding the nature of international regimes. Theclassic definition of international regimes, providedby Krasner (1983), is as a set of implicit or explicitprinciples, norms, rules, and decision-makingprocedures around which actors expectations convergein a given area of international relations (p. 2).Idealists in general or institutionalists in particular tend to see regimes as interest based. Despiteconceding that anarchy is a realist axiom,institutionalists jump to the conclusion that cooperation. . . and prevailing expectations . . . are stronglyinfluenced by the presence and content of internationalinstitutions (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger,2002, p. 26). In this regard, international institutionsbecome significant actors that play important roles

in international politics (Hasenclever et al., 2002, p.28). Idealists assume that the nature of regimes is apositive-sum game and that states have commoninterests in many issue areas, including security, and,as a result, regimes can facilitate a level of international cooperation which is difficult to achieve(Hasenclever et al., 2002, pp. 3033). The theorysweakness comes from its assumption that commoninterests are a specific prerequisite for cooperation.But what common interests led to the cooperation

surrounding the Afghanistan war? This is difficult to

answer since the common interests are senonexistent. Rather, the collective actionabout as a result of the regimes initiativefrom the power-based nature of internationWhile the theory of international regipredominately categorized as an idealinstitutionalist approach, the theory of hestability is widely utilized by realists (VKauppi, 1993, pp. 5758). Adopting the coof the role of dominant powers from hegstability theory makes it possible to appconception to issue areas beyond economicapplying the coercive leadership model inby Duncan Snidal to security issues areas, targues that, as with economic regimes, thecan and does use its superior power to force othersto contribute as well,de facto taxing them for thecollective good provided under his leader[and] coercive hegemons are capable of tabeneficiaries of their actions (Hasenclev2002, pp. 9094). The relative power capabstates are, therefore, crucial features of regthis regard, the dominant power demands aother states in the form of votes on specifiThe demands the US forced upon other sevidenced by the declarations of President Bsaid every nation, in every region, nowdecision to make. Either you are with us orwith the terrorists. . . (Crockatt, 2003, Nevertheless, dominant powers can be chaother great powers, as is shown by the rolepowers played in the UNs official disapp

military intervention in Iraq. This evidennature of regimes as power based and suggthe balance of power can be seen especiallsecurity organizations like the UNSC. In certain international regimes can be deignored if a dominant power has enough wcapability to take unilateral action.

FromJust Peace to Just War From this perspective, the aftermath o

has proven that international law does not


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states, especially dominant or great powers, decideto declare war unilaterally. The key features of theEnglish School, namely, its rules and norms, havethus been destabilized by US unilateralism. A norm-governed relationship or, in other words, the traditionof international law, is the essence of internationalsociety (Brown & Ainley, 2009, p. 51), and,according to Hedley Bull, the expositions of international law contend that states are bound torefrain from forcible or dictatorial intervention in oneanothers internal affairs (Bull, 2002, p. 138). Thus,the US-led invasion of Iraq broke with normsregarding non-intervention and the sovereignty of states, which are at the core of the pluralist strandof international society (Jrgensen, 2010, pp. 108110). The solidarism of international society cannotinvalidate the fact that there is no state standing onthe Iraq side, as states have the responsibility andobligation to offer diplomatic or military support toany state whose international rights have beenviolated (Jrgensen, 2010, p. 111). It should benoted that the action of the US is not the onlyexample of such violation; the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 is another. Consequently, the stanceof the English School has been unconvincing in theaftermath of 9/11.

The US declaration of war also led theoristsof international politics to reconsider the reasons and justifications rather than the root causes of war,hence the just war theory. This reconsiderationsuggested that war is no longer the last resort under idealist presuppositions; instead, it becomes a tool of

foreign policy. The invasion of Iraq represents aprominent example of this shift since the US hadother alternatives, such as police action or a call for international sanctions. In fact, it can be assumed thatthe US had hidden agendas behind its war on terror,and these will be elaborated on later.

US foreign policy and realist theoriesThe preceding discussion showed both

international law and international institutions to be

the instruments of dominant and great powers rather

than the agents of global governance. Neversome scholars, such as Beyer (2010), argue tis a new form of governance, namely, hegeglobal governance. Similarly, this article prthat US foreign policy after the incidents of 9caused scholars to revive realist theories frospheres of influence through containment stThese theories prevailed and were implemeboth theorists and practitioners during the Co

The US-led wars in the Middle East, frAfghanistan to Iraq, did not come as a surpristhe role of the US in this region has been pronthroughout the twentieth century. As MaryHeiss has pointed out, the presence of domingreat powers, primarily the US and Soviet Uthe Middle East has stemmed from petroleusecurity issues (Heiss, 2006, pp. 7795), anGulf War strengthened and solidified the USprimary Western power working for stabilitPersian Gulf and protecting smaller, oil-ricstates like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from oattack (Heiss, 2006, p. 94). From this viewcan be argued that the current intensified prof the US in the Gulf represents the return of to an earlier sphere of influence.

The realist theoriesThe realist concept of spheres of influe

derives from a phenomenon that preceded thWar, but, during the Cold War, the unequal relationships between the Soviet Union and European states became the prominent exam

the concept in practice. According to Kramerspheres of influence can be defined as a rethe world in which a preponderant external(state A) is able to compel the local states to cwith state As own preferences. Other outsidmay also have some leverage over the counstate As sphere of influence, but that leverelatively circumscribed and is greatly eclipthe power that state A exerts (p. 99). In adin the past, geographical proximity has serv

requirement for spheres of influence, as in th


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of US involvement in Latin America. Edy Kaufmancalled this the sphere of direct influence (Kaufman,1976, p. 11). Today, however, geographical proximityis not a requisite condition determining dominant andgreat powers choices of spheres of influence;because of the development of new technologies, theUS can have a sphere of influence in the Middle East,for instance.

This articles argument that, since the beginningof the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Gulf hasbecome a sphere of US influence derives from thebroad classifications of relationships between apreponderant state and its subordinates devised byHedley Bull. Classified as dominant and hegemonic,these relationships dictate spheres of influence(Kramer, 1996, pp. 99100). A relationship of dominance can be defined as one in which thepreponderant state exercises tight and pervasivecontrol over the subordinate states, often paying littleheed to modern norms of international law (Kramer,1996, p. 100); therefore, the US invasion of Iraq andits subsequent presence and policies can be explicitlyviewed as the re-emergence of a dominant powerssphere of influence.The US in the Middle East

The US need for spheres of influence isunambiguous since the region is rich in interests,from economic- to security-related ones. Importantly,general economic interests, or those particularlyrelated to petroleum, and security interests are twofaces of the same coin and cannot be divided. The

US has had long-term relations with the moderateArab states, specifically Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.During the Cold War, the Middle East was another region involved in the war between the US andSoviet Union as a proxy, and the role of both powerscould be seen in all Middle Eastern altercations thatoccurred during that time, including the Six-DayWar, in which the US aided Israel while the SovietUnion aided the Arab states (Baxter &Akbarzadeh,2008, pp. 4956). Significantly, aside from the

communist threat, Islamic extremism has threatened

US interests in the Middle East ever since Iranian Revolution. The fear that the Irevolution would be exported led to thsupported Iraqi government during the Iranin the 1980s (Baxter &Akbarzadeh, 200114123). Nevertheless, the supposed colthe communist camp, a liberal myth of ththe invasion of Afghanistan and, subsequeunintentionally turned Tehran into a region(Milani, 2005, p. 33). For this reason, US have been endangered by the transformatiinternational system and US policies theMoreover, the US-allied Arab states of KuSaudi Arabia require the presence of the Uguarantor since they perceive Iran, as wellas threats to the survival of their regimes. Rthese factors, this article argues that the Asphere of influence in the Middle East acontain Iran and Syria in addition to assustability of American interests. Thus, it concluded that the events of 9/11 do not aserve as the reason and justification for presence in the region. Rather, the reasons long-term interests and global geopolitical sspecifically, the containing of China which will bediscussed in greater detail subsequently. FiMiddle East is not the only US sphere of inSoutheast Asia is also an important spher

The US in Southeast AsiaBefore the announcement of the N

Doctrine in 1969, Southeast Asia was anot

on the front lines of the tensions between thUnion and the US, and it used to be a US of influence during the Vietnam War (Ch1972, pp. 542). The Southeast Asia TOrganization (SEATO), a NATO-modelehad been established in 1954 to cope wcommunist expansion. The region, howebeen more or less relinquished after the wiof US troops. This led to a long power vperiod which lasted until 9/11, in spite of co

bilateral relationships between the US and


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time allies, namely, the Philippines and Thailand.During the vacuum period, the Chinese influencegradually extended over the region, eventuallycausing concern in Washington and prompting theUS to review its policies toward Southeast Asia.What occurred on 11 September 2001 provided agreat opportunity for the US to reengage withSoutheast Asian states, especially with counterterrorismregimes, through both multilateral and bilateralframeworks. Nevertheless, as Beyer pointed out, theUS has mainly taken a bilateral approach towardSoutheast Asian states (Beyer, 2010, p. 121), sincedoing so could lead to comparative advantages, andthis has placed pressure on other states, especiallyMuslim states, to engage with the US more closely.In terms of the economic interests of Southeast Asianstates, the US is the largest market for exports, and,more importantly, the US can both guarantee thesecurity of US-allied states and counteract theChinese influence in the region. Thus, SoutheastAsian states have no other options, unless the regionacts as a backyard for China. For the US,reengagement with Southeast Asia can be seen aspart of global geopolitical strategies which aim tocontain China, the rival power, and tamp the revivalof Russias prominence in the region. The role of theUS, therefore, can be seen as preventing Chinastransition toward greater power (Organski, 1958, pp.299338) and the endeavours of other great regimesto establish a foothold.

Consequently, the presence of the US in theMiddle East and Southeast Asia after 2001 and the

responses of other great powers and small statesindicate the timeless validity of realist theories, fromthe sphere of influence theory to the theory of alliance and containment strategy. In sum, thesereaffirm the realist premise that the internationalsystem is anarchic by nature. Conversely, they alsoexpose the inadequacies of realism, namely, thereligious aspects of international politics which areoverlooked by realist theories, the units of analysis,and insufficient acknowledgement of other forms of

power. However, these inadequacies do not mean

that realism cannot explain international pothe present time, since the applicability of rand its axiom, anarchy, have been justified aftermath of 9/11.The inadequacies of realism

As mentioned previously, religion playimportant role in theories of international pNevertheless, the religious aspect is often ofrom international politics scholarship becaupremise of secularization which derives froorigin of states and dates back to the PeacWestphalia in 1648, which established the sthe only legitimate form of political organiThus, religious units have been excluded frrealm of international politics (Philpott, 207072) throughout much of modern historypolitical scholars have had little to do with This is furthered by the fact that the public/pdistinction is one of the bases of Western knoand religion has been put in the private spherthe Enlightenment. This premise, however, hquestioned following the events of 9/11 anaftermath.The impact of religious fundamentalism

Despite the fact that the anxiety caused bimpact of religious fundamentalism in geneIslamic fundamentalism in particular on interpolitics appeared before the twentieth-first cstudies tend to solely focus on the linkage bsuch anxiety and foreign policy regarding M

states. For instance, Piscatori (1993) focuserole of Islam in Muslim states, concludingIslamic values are not, however, the sole detof the foreign policy of a Muslim country, aoil policy suggests, they are often not relevan(p. 327). Therefore, Piscatori continues, thechallenge to world order has not been as grhas been feared (Piscatori, 1993, p. 331). Frstatements, it seems clear that his study was cby the premises of theories of international

and the assumption that foreign policy is se


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Furthermore, Piscatori merely focuses on statesrather than other actors or units shaped by the eventsof 9/11.

What occurred on 9/11 told us that sub-stateactors and transnational actors, units which representillegitimate political organizations, can behave moreformidably and more productively destabilize dominantand great powers than state actors. Moreover, thedemands posed by these kinds of actors appear to betheoretically infeasible, since they oppose theWestphalian premise, namely, the rights inherent inthe existence of states. In addition, the interdependencebetween religious fundamentalist units and states,which can be seen in the case of al-Qaeda and theTaliban or Islamic fundamentalist groups and theSyrian government, contradicts the secularization of international politics. Such interdependence alsoconflicts with theories of international politics. For example, the English School faces problems sincethe shared norm of Westphalian polity, whichcontinues to have an essential influence on internationalsociety, has been shaken by religious states whichclaim rights of Westphalian state-ness while embracingnon-Westphalian doctrines and exerting transnationalinfluence on other states. Consequently, the lessonto take from the aftermath of 9/11 is that internationalpolitics are not secularised.

This article does not suggest that statesshould not be key units of analysis. Rather, it arguesthat other units, both secular and not secular, shouldbe examined as well in order to calculate potentialthreats. Additionally, a space for possible fusion or

collaboration between states and unconventionalunits should be promoted by theories of internationalpolitics. However, ultimately, states remain the mainactors in international politics since they must takeresponsibility for any activities that occur in their territories, especially those which could transcendterritorial boundaries, as seen in the case of Afghanistan. In this regard, this article defends thestance that states must be main units of analysis butsuggests that they should be the only units. The

aftermath of 9/11 has revealed that realism is a valid

theory in the present age, especially simaintains that the state is not the only actothe most significant one (Brown & Ainley29).The transnational aspects of religiousfundamentalism and the power over opinion

The events of 9/11 also revealed transnational aspects of religious fundamespite of the states continued position as timportant actors, the effects of transnationaon international politics should be considefrom the standpoint of realism since the society relations, as Keohane and Nye (199out, can lead to the emergence of autonomwith private foreign policies that may deloppose or impinge on state policies (p. 55Al-Qaeda is the explicit example of this autonomous actor. From the transnatiperspective, it is plausible that the notion could become diluted, while the notion of trasociety could become stronger. As Aronexplained, a transnational society reveal. . . common belief . . . that cross frontiers. flourishes in proportion to . . . the strencommon beliefs (p. 547). As this articleinternational politics are not secular; religstate cannot be totally divided; and some states are inclined to promote religious funddoctrines beyond their boundaries. Theshave impelled scholars to revise the realisof power over opinion, first introduced b

(2001, pp. 120130) in 1939. According tpower over opinion manifests in the fopropaganda, examples of which span frcampaigns of leaders of the Catholic Churthe Middle Ages to political advertising spby Adolf Hitler during the Second World W(Carr,(2001, pp. 120122). Dominant powers, thhave repeatedly had to exert power over oorder to tamp the expansion of transnationasociety.

The extent of the exertion of power


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opinion by dominant powers has not been exaggerated.This article argues that theories, including realism,must acknowledge this form of power, since itinfluences programs initiated and encouraged bydominant powers through international organizationssuch as the UN. Such programs often aim tomodernize the traditional societies of lesser-developedstates, hence making them more secular. In thissense, the efforts of dominant powers can be seenas propaganda meant to encourage societies in other states, especially religious ones, to forgo fundamentalistideas.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the events of 9/11 indicatedthat theories of realism in international politics stillbest explain the circumstances of this age of the War on Terror. As this article explains, the practices of the US and the responses of other states to the warsin Afghanistan and Iraq reflect realist theories.Nevertheless, a reconstruction of these theories is

needed, as the incidents of 9/11 and their aftermathrevealed theoretical inadequacies. First, the premiseguiding the study of international politics must berevised to embrace non-secularization rather than just secularization. Such a revised premise will maketheories more suitable for analyzing the behavior of religious states, such as Afghanistan under theTaliban regime. Second, despite the fact that the stateremains the most significant actor in the politicalarena, other actors, including religious groups, mustbe carefully examined since they can have intenseeffects on state and international politics. Finally,unconventional forms of power must be recognizedby realist theories since these offer explicit examplesof the exertion of power over opinion withininternational regimes and organizations. In conclusion,great events always affect the world of scholarship.The ten years following 9/11 have disclosed aninconvenient truth to scholars: anarchy has notchanged; hence, realism remains generally applicable.Notwithstanding the timeless applicability of realism,

weaknesses must be addressed in order for theories to more effectively apprehend interpolitics of the twentieth-first century.

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Theories of International Politics After the Incident of 911 the Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the Twentieth-First Century