Upload
doancong
View
243
Download
3
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Theory of the Firm
- Economics of Strategy -
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Winter Semester 2009 2010
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Contents
I Introduction amp Basics
II Introduction Strategy and Economics
bull Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
bull The need for principles
III Economic Primer Economic Concepts for Strategy
bull Costs
bull Economic Costs and Profitability
bull Demand and Revenues
bull Theory of the Firm - Pricing and Output Decisions
bull Perfect Competition
bull Game Theory
II The Evolution of the Modern Firm
bull Doing business in 1840 (US)
bull Doing business in 1910 (US)
2Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Literature and further Reading
Besanko David et al (2007) Economics of Strategy 4th Ed Evanston Illinois
Saloner Garth Shepard Andrea Podolny Joel (2001) Strategic Management 2nd Ed
New York
Brickley James A Smith Clifford W Jerold L Zimmermann (2008) Managerial
Economics and Organizational Architecture 5th Ed New York
3Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Homepage
wwwuni-hohenheimdeinnovativehealth
Password
Nonprofit22
Exam
To be determined
4
Further Information
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Guest Lecture
ldquoPharmaceutical Industry Studies ndash Drug Discovery Processesrdquo has been
postponed from December 8th (1400 ndash 1600) to December 9th (1800 ndash 2000)
The lesson will take place at HS 09
5
Further Information Schedule
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
WHY ECONOMICS
Introduction Strategy amp Economics
6Theory of the Firm
Introduction
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Contents
I Introduction amp Basics
II Introduction Strategy and Economics
bull Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
bull The need for principles
III Economic Primer Economic Concepts for Strategy
bull Costs
bull Economic Costs and Profitability
bull Demand and Revenues
bull Theory of the Firm - Pricing and Output Decisions
bull Perfect Competition
bull Game Theory
II The Evolution of the Modern Firm
bull Doing business in 1840 (US)
bull Doing business in 1910 (US)
2Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Literature and further Reading
Besanko David et al (2007) Economics of Strategy 4th Ed Evanston Illinois
Saloner Garth Shepard Andrea Podolny Joel (2001) Strategic Management 2nd Ed
New York
Brickley James A Smith Clifford W Jerold L Zimmermann (2008) Managerial
Economics and Organizational Architecture 5th Ed New York
3Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Homepage
wwwuni-hohenheimdeinnovativehealth
Password
Nonprofit22
Exam
To be determined
4
Further Information
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Guest Lecture
ldquoPharmaceutical Industry Studies ndash Drug Discovery Processesrdquo has been
postponed from December 8th (1400 ndash 1600) to December 9th (1800 ndash 2000)
The lesson will take place at HS 09
5
Further Information Schedule
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
WHY ECONOMICS
Introduction Strategy amp Economics
6Theory of the Firm
Introduction
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Literature and further Reading
Besanko David et al (2007) Economics of Strategy 4th Ed Evanston Illinois
Saloner Garth Shepard Andrea Podolny Joel (2001) Strategic Management 2nd Ed
New York
Brickley James A Smith Clifford W Jerold L Zimmermann (2008) Managerial
Economics and Organizational Architecture 5th Ed New York
3Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Homepage
wwwuni-hohenheimdeinnovativehealth
Password
Nonprofit22
Exam
To be determined
4
Further Information
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Guest Lecture
ldquoPharmaceutical Industry Studies ndash Drug Discovery Processesrdquo has been
postponed from December 8th (1400 ndash 1600) to December 9th (1800 ndash 2000)
The lesson will take place at HS 09
5
Further Information Schedule
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
WHY ECONOMICS
Introduction Strategy amp Economics
6Theory of the Firm
Introduction
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Homepage
wwwuni-hohenheimdeinnovativehealth
Password
Nonprofit22
Exam
To be determined
4
Further Information
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Guest Lecture
ldquoPharmaceutical Industry Studies ndash Drug Discovery Processesrdquo has been
postponed from December 8th (1400 ndash 1600) to December 9th (1800 ndash 2000)
The lesson will take place at HS 09
5
Further Information Schedule
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
WHY ECONOMICS
Introduction Strategy amp Economics
6Theory of the Firm
Introduction
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Guest Lecture
ldquoPharmaceutical Industry Studies ndash Drug Discovery Processesrdquo has been
postponed from December 8th (1400 ndash 1600) to December 9th (1800 ndash 2000)
The lesson will take place at HS 09
5
Further Information Schedule
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
WHY ECONOMICS
Introduction Strategy amp Economics
6Theory of the Firm
Introduction
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
WHY ECONOMICS
Introduction Strategy amp Economics
6Theory of the Firm
Introduction
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
7
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Firms (corporations) can be analyzed from numerous perspectives
Possibilities include
Game theory (choice situations that involve rivalry)
Psychology (what individual motivations and behaviors shape organizations
and their performance)
Organizational Perspective (Need for performance measures in expert dominated
organizations like universities hospitals)
Political Science Anthropology etc etc
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
8
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Something to be said for multi-discipline approach BUT ldquodanger that we sacrifice depths
for breadthrdquo deep knowledge permits powerful hypotheses on firm decision making
firm behavior
Economics perspective requires analyst be explicit about key elements of the process
considered for instance
Decision makers (who are active players Whose decisions are ldquofixedrdquo)
Goals (what are dm‟s objectives profit maximizers vs multiple objectives)
Choices (what possible actions what strategic variables like prices (DRGs)
time horizon for decision under consideration)
Relationship between choices and outcomes (Uncertainty complexity)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
9
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Economic theory is distinctive answers to these questions almost always obtained as
part of theory development clear link between assumptions and conclusions
ldquoAudit trailrdquo of thought that allows to distinguish between logically-derived propositions
and mere conjectures
Example
Profit-maximizing (goal) monopolist (decision maker) Cournot (quantity) competition (choices) under
certainty (relationship)
Demand function p = A-bx A gt o b gt 0 x gt 0 (relation)
Cost function K(x) = Kf + kvx Kf gt 0 kv gt 0 and A ndash kv gt 0 (relation)
Profit p(x) = px- K(x) Max
p(x)‟ = A-2bx- kv = 0 (p‟‟lt0) x(Abkv) = (A- kv) 2b = 0
Logically-derived proposition Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant in a Cournot-monopoly situation u
certainty
Conjecture 1 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under oligopolistic competition
Conjecture 2 Fixed costs Kf are not decision-relevant under uncertainty and risk-aversion
Conjecture 3 Firms that base short-term decisions on variable costs are always correct (Cost accounting 101)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
10
The need for principles
Multi-billion $ question What drives business success
Often-made (fallacious) assumption Watch and imitate successful firms
Whole industry and management concepts based on this (Benchmarking)
PetersWaterman (1982) ldquoIn Search of Excellencerdquo NY Harper
N = 43 long-term ldquosuperior performing firmsrdquo (profitability and growth)
Success-drivers ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoStick to the knittingrdquo and ldquoBias for actionrdquo
Wiersema (2001) The New Market Leaders NY Free Press
Studies ldquoleading firmsrdquo in the New Economy (Internet IT)
New market leaders are ldquoclose to customerrdquo ldquoskilled at segmenting marketsrdquo
ldquoDevelop new productsrdquo ldquointensive advertisingrdquo ldquoOutsource core activitiesrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
11
The need for principles
Collins (2001) ldquoGood to Greatrdquo NY Harper
Firms that went from ldquogoodrdquo (above-average) performance to 15 years of ldquogreatrdquo
performance (stock return 3 x that of general market) Walgreens Wells Fargo
Phlipp Morris and Abbott qualified
Success-drivers ldquoleaders shun spotlight and work for firmrdquo ldquoStaffing is crucial =
right people in right placerdquo ldquoTechnology supports strategyrdquo
So what‟s the problem
Using currently successful firms as a standard for action Conjecture Other firms can
obtain similar results by mimicking them
Problem 1 Reasons for success often unclear and complex
ldquoThe Rise and Fall of the New Economy‟s Darling The Enron Storyrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
12
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Example
August 2000 Enron Stock trades for $9056 on NYSE
Praised as one of the most innovative and firms in the world great ldquoexamplerdquo for other firms
January 2002 Enron in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (what is that) ceased trading at NYSE at $ 067 per share
Until then biggest bankruptcy in US history (until Lehmann Brothers 2008)
More than 20000 people lost jobs life-savings and health care benefits
Investors lost more than $ 75 billion
Most of Enron success stories relied on ldquoaccounting tricksrdquo (off the balance sheet financing special purpose
entities)
Auditor Arthur Andersen convicted ending of a world-famous accounting firms
A good brief summary of the complete story is Wikipedia Entry ldquoEnron scandalrdquo
More details at
Healy Paul M Krishna G Palepu (Spring 2003) The Fall of Enron (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2)
Real danger that you look up to the wrong ldquoidolsrdquo
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
13
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Problem 2 Successful firm may have a great internal management system that promotes
innovation (not easily identifiable from outside)
Problem 3 Are industry situation and market conditions comparable for
would-be imitators
Problem 4 Idiosyncratic factors (an engineering or design genius is impossible to imitate)
Problem 5 Successful strategies vs unsuccessful ones that have been tried
Example ldquoThe problem of ldquohindsightrdquo
XYZ Inc considers adoption of risky but innovative new technology (business software other than Oraclecopy or SAPcopy)
Scenario 1 Gamble pays off huge success ldquotechnology supports its strategyrdquo (good thing gurus will praise it)
Scenario 2 Software is a disaster but it may be rational to stick with it (sunk costs) gurus this firm lets
ldquotechnology determine its strategyrdquo (bad thing)
Real mistake was selecting the bad technology not its ongoing application
Managers cannot decide what to invest inwhat people to hire after the fact that‟s why manager work is risky and
well-paid
Conclusion
There is value in studying firm behavior to identify general principles
NOT to develop al list that is a blueprint for success (there is no such list)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
14
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Further problems
For every winner there is a loser often using the same approaches (Wal-Mart vs KMart)
Bewildering variety of successes and failures (strategies)
Markets change Time-traveling manager (US Steel) from 1901 when firm was first whose
annual sales exceeded $ 1 billion today USX has to sell oil to stay in top 25 of US firms
Interpretation 1
Firm success and firm strategy is so complex that it is a matter of luck (lecture ends here)
Interpretation 2
Firm succeeded because their chosen management strategies best allowed them to
exploit profit opportunities that existed at the time or adapted to changing circumstances
I (and you since I am the professor ) buy into interpretation 2 firm success can be
understood by studying decision-making in terms of consistent principles of market
economics and strategic action odds for success increase when managers apply these
principles to the conditions and opportunities they face
What are these consistent principles
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
15
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Principles concern the ldquobig issuesrdquo a firm faces
Boundaries of the firm What should the firm do How large should it be What business
should the firm be in
Market and competitive analysis Nature of markets in which firm competes What
Competitive interactions prevail in those markets
Position and dynamics How should the firm position itself to compete what should be
The basis of its competitive advantage and how should it adjust over time
Internal organization How should the firm organize its structure and systems internally
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
16
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Boundaries of the firm
Boundaries define what the firm does in three dimensions
Horizontal how much if its product market does firm serve (size)
Vertical what does the firm do itself what is purchased from specialty firms
Corporate what is the set of distinct businesses the firm competes in
Examples
Boston Consulting Groupcopy 1960s Learning curve amp market growth addresses horizontal
boundaries
Planning tools like growth-share-matrices (BCG-matrix) address corporate boundaries
Virtual corporations (Amazon) address vertical boundaries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
17
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Market and competitive analysis
Role of industry structure
M Porter (1980) in ldquoCompetitive Strategyrdquo Performance across industries is
not a matter of chance or accident
Examples
Even mediocre firms in the pharmaceutical industry have (by economy wide standards)
impressive profitability performance
Even top performing airlines achieve low profitability in the best of times
Why is that
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
18
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Position and dynamics
Position (static) Is the firm (at a given point in time) competing as a cost leader or using
a differentiation strategy What resources and capabilities are in place
Dynamics How does the firm accumulate resources and capabilities over time
How does the firm (over time) adjust to changing circumstances
(J Schumpeter ldquothe impulse of alluring profitrdquo amp ldquocreative destructionrdquo)
Examples
Think up some of your own (position and dynamics) and fill them in
(Boeing vs Airbus Pharmaceuticals Car Industry)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
19
Why do we adopt an Economics Perspective
Internal Organization
If concepts exist for boundaries markets position (expected) dynamics firms must
decide what organizational structure is needed to implement concepts
Examples
Direct monetary incentive and reward systems vs intrinsic motivation
Resource allocation within the firm (Internal capital markets)
Divisional organization vs centralized structures
Flow and processing of information within organization (not IT)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR STRATEGY
Economic Primer
20Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Primer
This chapter lays out the basic economic tools that will be used to develop the principles
you will study in this course
The five main parts will be
bull Costs
bull Demand prices and revenues
bull The theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm
bull The theory of perfect competitive markets
bull Game Theory
Basic ndash Equation
Profit = Revenue ndash Costs
21Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Costs
Statement of Costs
bull Presentation of costs most
Managers are familiar with
bull Information about what happened
during the past year
bull Essentially retrospective information
22Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
But what if a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it
increased production above the previous year‟s level
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Cost Function
Total cost function TC(Q) represents the relationship between a firmrsquos total costs (TC)
and the total amount of output (Q) it produces in a given time period
bull For each level of output the firm might produce
the graph associates a unique level of total cost
bull Efficiency relationship between total cost and
output (assuming that the firm produces in the
most efficient manner possible given its current
technological capabilities)
bull The only way to achieve more output is to use more
factors of production (labor machinery materials)
therefore the total cost function must slope upward
23Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
24Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Fixed and Variable Costs
Whether costs are fixed or variable ultimately depends on the time period in which
decisions regarding output are contemplated
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
direct labor general and administrative expenses
commissions to salespeople property taxes
Variable and Fixed Costs Semifixed Costs
maintenanceinterval costs (cargo per truck)
Casting moulds
advertising and promotional costs
Fixed costs affected by other dimensions of the firm‟s operations
Electric utility ndash the costs to hook up houses to the local grid depend primarily on the
numbers of subscribers to the system (not to the total amount of electricity sold)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
The average cost function AC(Q) describes how the firmrsquos
average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount
of output it produces
If total costs were directly proportional to output ndash
for example
or more generally
then average cost would be a constant This is because
25Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average Cost Functions
Often however average cost will vary with output Average cost may rise fall or remain
constant as output goes up
bull When average cost decreases as output increases
there are economies of scale
bull When average cost increases as output increases
there are diseconomies of scale
bull When average cost remains unchanged with respect
to output we have constant returns to scale
A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and
diseconomies of scale over another
Output level Qrsquo is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted
and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale
26Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Marginal Cost Functions
Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more
unit of output
When output is initially and changes by units and one knows the total cost at each
output level marginal cost may be calculate as fallows
Example
27Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Relationship Between Total Cost Function and Marginal Cost
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output The marginal cost function
MC(Q) is based on the total cost function TC(Q)
Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger the marginal cost
curve must increase in output Therefore at higher levels of output such as Qrsquorsquo a one-
unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost and the corresponding marginal
cost is higher
28Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Businesses often use information about average cost to estimate the marginal cost
of a change in output But average cost is generally different from marginal cost
The exception is when total cost vary in direct proportion
to output
Basically
bull When average cost is a decreasing function marginal
cost is less then average cost
bull When average cost is an increasing function marginal
cost is greater than average cost
bull When average cost neither increase nor decrease in output ndash because it is either
constant or at a minimum point ndash marginal cost is equal to average cost
29
Economic Primer Costs
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
The curves labeled are the short-run average cost functions
associated with small medium and large plants respectively
For any level of output the optimal plant size is the
one with the lowest average cost
The long-run average cost function is the ldquolower
envelope ldquo of the short-run average cost functions
This curve shows the lowest attainable average cost for
any output when the firm is free to adjust its plant size
optimally
The long-run average cost function exhibits economies of scale
30Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Long-Run versus Short-Run Average Cost Functions
Short-run average costs are the sum of average fixed costs (AFC) and average variable
costs (AVC)
As the volume of output increases average fixed costs become smaller which tends to
pull down SAC
Offsetting this is the fact that average variable costs rise with output which pulls SAC
upward
31Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
Sunk costs are investment costs incurred before a certain activity takes place which
cannot be recovered by the possible sale of the asset they produced
bull Highly specific investment (eg RampD) are usually sunk costs
bull Sunk costs represent barriers to exit A firm which has incurred high sunk costs will
have difficulties in deciding to exit the market even if it sees good opportunities
outside
bull Therefore when weighing the costs of a decision the decision maker should ignore
sunk costs and consider only avoidable costs
bull A firm that is deciding whether to enter into a certain business will have to consider
with a particular attention the sunk costs and the risk that during the operations period
they might not be recovered Sunk costs in this perspective represent barriers to
entry
In the case of an exporter an example of sunk costs could be the costs of analyzing the
market and of exploring opportunities and seeking commercial partners
32Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Accounting costs like statements of costs are grounded in the principles of accrual
accounting which emphasize historical costs
But accounting statements are designed to serve an audience outside the firm
for example lenders and equity investors
This concept says that the economic cost of deploying resources in a particular activity is
the value of the best foregone alternative use of those resources
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is
33Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Business decisions require the measurement of economic costs which are based on
the concept of opportunity costs
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic versus Accounting Costs
Consider the resources that have been purchased with funds that stockholder provide to
the firm To attract these funds the firm must offer the stockholders a return on their
investment that is at least as large as the return that they could have received from
investing in activity of comparable risk
Example
Firmrsquos asset (could have been liquidated) $100 million
bull By tying their funds up in the firm investors lose the opportunity to invest in an activity
providing an 8 percent return
bull Because of wear and tear of plant and equipment the value of the assets decline by
1 percent over the year
The annualized cost of the firmrsquos assets is then
(008+001) x $100 million = $9 million per year
34Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
Accounting Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Accounting Cost
Economic Profit = Sales Revenue ndash Economic Cost
= Accounting Profit ndash (Economic Costndash Accounting Cost)
Example
Consider a small software development firm that is owner operated
bull Revenue of euro 1000000
bull Incurred expenses on supplies and hired labor of euro 850000
bull Owners best outside employment opportunity - a salary of euro 20000
Accounting Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 = euro 150000
Economic Profit euro 1000000 - euro 850000 - 200000 = - euro50000
The Software business destroyed euro 50000 of the ownerrsquos wealth
35Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Economic Profit is closely related to the concept of net present value from finance
Example
Consider a firm that contemplates constructing a plant with capacity to produce
100000 units per year
bull Production expenses (when producing at capacity) are $5 per unit of output
bull Market price is $25 per unit
bull Cost of building the plant is $15 million
bull Infinity long live (ie it does not depreciate)
bull Cost of capital is 10 percent
This rate reflects what the firmrsquos investors could make from alternative investments and thus reflects the appropriate opportunity cost for evaluating
the investment in the plant
36Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Should the firm build the plant
Economic Profit
Total Revenue $25 million per year
Total production cost (accounting cost) $50000 per year
Annualized opportunity cost $15 million x 01 = $15 million
Economic Profit 25 ndash 05 ndash 15 = $05 million per year
Since the investment in the plant is expected to yield a positive economic profit year after
year the firm should build it
37Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The Present value of a cash flow C received in t years at an interest rate i is equal to the
amount of money that must be invested today at the interest rate i so that in t years the
principal plus interest equals C
The present value of a stream of cash flow received over a period of years is the sum of
the present value of the individual sums
Which can be written more compactly
38Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economic Profit and Net Present Value
Net Present Value (NPV)
The net present value of an investment is simply the present value of the cash flows the
investment generates minus the cost of the investment
The term in the summation is the present value of perpetuity A perpetuity is a level cash
flow received each year forever The present value of a perpetuity is equal to the cash
flow divided by the interest rate Ci With this formula we can rewrite NPV as
Since the net present value is positive the firm should undertake it
Note that the calculation NPV and economic profit are similar (What is exact relation)
39Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Economic Costs and
_Profitability
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Demand Curve
The Demand function describes the relationship between the
quantity of product that the firm is able to sell and all the
variables that influence that quantity
The demand curve is generally downward sloping
bull The lower the price the greater the quantity demanded
bull This relationship is called the law of demand
The law of demand may not hold if high prices confer prestige or enhance a productrsquos
Image or if price signals quality
40Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Of special interest is the relationship between
quantity and price
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
The Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand η is the percentage change
In quantity brought about by a 1 percent change
in price
Thus over the range of price between $500 and $575 quantity demanded falls at a rate
133 percent for every 1 percent increase in price
bull If η is less then 1 we say that the demand is inelastic DA
bull If η is greater then 1 we say that the demand is elastic DB
41Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
High price sensitivity
- standardized products (airfare movie tickets paper for printers)
- durable consumer goods (cars major appliances)
- price of inputs for sensitive end products (goldjewelry crude oil gasoline)
Low price sensitivity
- information-intensive products products with spot demand (legaltax services)
(search goods vs experience goods vs credence goods)
- Goods subject to Moral Hazard (Health Insurance Subsidies)
- Goods with high switching costs
- Goods with commitment effects (DVD Blu-Ray and relevant disks)
42Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
Just because the demand for a product is inelastic the demand facing each seller of that
product doesnrsquot have to be inelastic too
Example
bull Demand for Cigarettes ndash well below one
bull General increase in price only modestly affect overall cigarette demand
bull Only one brand increases prices demand for that brand would probably drop
substantially because consumers would switch to the now lower priced brands
Brand-Level elasticities are higher than industry-level elasticities because
consumers can purchase other brands when only one brand raises its price
43Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
A firmrsquos total revenue function denoted by TR (Q) indicates how the firmrsquos sales
revenues vary as a function of how much product it sells
A firmrsquos marginal revenue MR(Q) is analogous to its marginal cost
It seems plausible that total revenue would go up as the firm sells more output and thus
MR would always be positive But with a downward sloping demand curve this is not
necessarily true
44Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
To sell more the firm must lower its price Thus while it generates revenue on the extra
units of output it sells at the lower price it loses revenue on all the units it would have
sold at the higher price
In general whether marginal revenue is positive or negative
depends on the price elasticity of demand
bull When demand is elastic so that η gt 1 it follows that MR gt 0 In this case the
increase in output brought about by a reduction in price will raise total sales revenues
bull When demand is inelastic so that η lt 1 it follows that MR lt 0 Here the increase in
output brought about by a reduction in price will lower total sales revenue
45Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Demand and Revenues
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
The theory of the firm assumes that the firmrsquo ultimate objective is to make
as large profit as possible But how is the optimal output determined
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Cost
Change in Total Profit
bull If MR gt MC the firm can increase profit by selling more (QΔ gt 0) and to do so it should lower its price
bull If MR lt MC the firm can increase profit by selling less (QΔ lt 0) and to do so it should raise its price
bull If MR = MC the firm cannot increase profits either by increasing or decreasing output It follows that output and price must be at their optimal level
46Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
An alternative way of thinking about these principles is to express MR in terms of the
price elasticity of demand Then the term MR = MC can be written as
Total variable costs are supposed to be directly proportional to output so that MC = c
The percentage contribution margin PCM on additional units sold is the ratio of profit per
unit to revenue per unit or PCM = (P-c) P Algebra establishes that
bull A firm should lower its price whenever the price elasticity of demand exceeds the
reciprocal of the PCM on the additional units it would sell by lowering its price
bull A firm should raise its price when the price elasticity of demand is less than the PCMof the units it would not sell by raising its price
47Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Pricing and Output Decisions
Example
P = $10
c = $5
PCM = 050
The firm can increase profits by lowering its price if its price elasticity of
demand η exceeds 105 = 2
P = $10
c = $8
PCM = 020
In this case the firm should cut its price if η gt 5
The lower a firmrsquos PCM (eg because its marginal cost is high) the greater its price
elasticity of demand must be for a price-cutting strategy to raise profits
48Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Theory of the Firm ndash
_Pricing and Output Decisions
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A special case of the theory of the firm is
the theory of perfect competition
bull An industry with many firms producing
identical products (consumers choose
among firms solely on the basis of price)
bull Firms can enter or exit the industry at will
bull Because firms in a perfectly competitive industry produce the same identical
products each firm must charge the same price
49Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
The firm takes the market price as given and thus faces a horizontal demand
curve at the market price This horizontal line also represents the firmrsquos
marginal revenue curve MR
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
A single firmrsquos supply curve is shown in the graph on the left The industryrsquos supply curve
SS is shown in the graph on the right These graphs an industry of 1000 identical firms
Thus at any price the industry supply is 1000 times the amount that a single firm would
supply
50Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
Complemented by the demand curve
bull At the price P each firm is producing
its optimal amount of output q
bull The quantity demanded equals the
quantity Q supplied by all firms in
the industry
Each firm is earning a positive profit because at q the price P exceeds cost AC(q)
resulting in a profit on every unit sold
New firms would thus like to enter this industry
51Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull At price P new entrants are attracted to the industry As they come in the industryrsquos
supply curve shifts to the right resulting in a reduction in market price
bull Entry ceases to occur when firms are earning zero economic profit (price equals
average cost)
bull Firms are choosing the optimal output and earning zero economic profit when they
produce at the point at which market price equals both marginal cost and average
cost (also at minimum efficient scale)
52Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Perfect Competition
bull When Demand falls the demand curve shifts from D0 to D1 and price would initially
fall to Prsquo
bull Firms would earn less than they could earn elsewhere and would eventually begin to
leave the industry
bull As this happens the supply curve shifts to the left from SSrsquo to SS1
The industry shakeout ends when price is again P (Implications of zero profit)
53Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Perfect Competition
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Theory
The perfect competitive firm faces many competitors but in making its output decisions it
does not consider the likely reactions of its rivals This is because the decisions of any
single firm have a negligible impact on market prices
The key strategic challenge of a perfectly competitive firm is to anticipate the future path
of prices in the industry and maximize against it
But in many strategic situations there are only a few players
bull Power Supply
bull Pharmaceutical Industry
In such cases the firm has to ldquoget inside the mindsrdquo of its competitors Game theory is
most valuable in precisely such contexts It is the branch of economics concerned with
the analysis of optimal decision making when all decision makers are presumed to be
rational and each is attempting to anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors
54Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Economics of Strategy
5 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 4190euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3950euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im Dezember
4 Auflage
(ca 5490euro)
bull ab 100 Ex ca 3900euro
bull ab 200 Ex ca 3600euro
Auslieferung voraussichtlich im November
55
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Example
bull An industry consisting of to
firms (Alpha and Beta)
bull Identical products
bull Each must decide whether to increase its production capacity in the upcoming year
(Each firm will make its capacity decision simultaneously and independently)
bull Alpharsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Betarsquos strategy
bull Betarsquos strategy maximizes its profit given Alpharsquos strategy
In this game the Nash equilibrium is (EXPAND EXPAND ) that is each firm
expands its capacity
In this situation we say that Expand is also a dominant strategy
56Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
To identify the ldquolikely outcomerdquo of games game theorists use the concept of a Nash equilibrium At a Nash equilibrium outcome each player is doing the best it can given the
strategies of the other players
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Food for thought ndash what do you make of this
B1 investigate cost report
B2 do not investigate cost report
A1 report truth on cost situation
A2 cheat on report
57Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
B1 B2
A1 (100-50) (00)
A2 (-500200) (5000)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
58Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
Dominant strategies are not inevitable in many games players do not possess dominant
strategies
The Nash equilibrium in this game is (SMALL SMALL)
The Nash equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the outcome that maximizes the
aggregate profit of the players
At the Nash equilibrium expectation equals outcome ndash expected behavior and actual
behavior converge (self-enforcing focal points)
This would not be true at non-Nash equilibriums
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
In many situations decisions making is sequential rather then simultaneous and it is
often more convenient to represent the game with a game tree instead of a game matrix
Suppose that Alpha seeks to preempt Beta by making its capacity decision a year before
Betarsquos Thus by the time Beta makes its decision it will have observed Alpharsquos choice
and must adjust its decision making accordingly
59Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
15
16
18
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
To derive the SPNE we use the so-called fold-back method
bull We start at the end of the tree and for each decision ldquonoderdquo (represented by
squares) we find the optimal decision for the firm situated at that node
bull We assume that Alpha anticipates that Beta will choose a profit-maximizing response
to any strategic move Alpha might make
The SPNE is for Alpha to chose LARGE Beta responds by choosing DO NOT
EXPAND
Note that the outcome of the sequential-move game differs significantly from the
outcome of the simultaneous-move game
60Theory of the Firm
Economic Primer Game Theory
In analyzing this game tree we see what is known as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE )
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
61
1840 1910 and Today
The Evolution of the Modern Firm
61Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the modern firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
62
The evolution of the modern firm
1840 1910 and Today
The years 1840 1910 and 2003 represent widely disparate business conditions
A historical analysis of business conditions illustrates the durability of fundamental
economic principles behind business strategy
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
63
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1840 (US)
Numerous intermediaries
Farmers to factors to brokers agents to buyers
John Burrows as an example for a factor (Iowa potatoes to New Orleans)
Substantial price risk for participants (lack of information)
Broker
Matches buyer amp seller
Farmer
(cereals potatoes)
Factor
(transport to market)
Sells to
Customer
(Local and abroad)
Agent
(transport to market)
Places order with
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
64
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Infrastructure in 1840
Infrastructure (Definition) assets that assist in the production or distribution of
goods and services that an individual firm cannot easily provide itself
Such as basic research transportation telecommunication and finance
What is the basic economic problem of infrastructure
Public Goods Individual firm that improves a highway bears full cost of the
investment but captures only fraction of benefits Other firms along the
improved highway get its use for free (freerider problem)
No-one actually improves the highway
Role of GOVERNMENT in providing Infrastructure
1840 Poorly-developed infrastructure by modern standards
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
65
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1840
Transitory period from horse to rail (steam engine) but in 1836 US had
only 175 miles of track (Germany 1835 6 km 1840 548 km)
1850 Many different gauges no tracks west of Appalachians no
co-ordination of schedules
Predominant way of transportation inland waterways (Erie Canal 1825
connects Eastern Cities (NY Boston etc) to Great Lakes)
Ocean transport Still 95 done by sailing ships
Consequences
No safe reliable transportation for large volumes Firms reluctant to
expand dominance of the small family-owned business
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
66
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communications in 1840
Predominant communication system was US Postal Service (horse and
stage coach) Letter from Waterburry CT to Philadelphia 2 (7) days in
good (bad) weather Very expensive 1-sheet letter cost 185 cents
First considerable improvements telegraph 1844 (seller contacts with
factors customer contacts with agents) railroad scheduling 1851 (1853
23000 miles of cables) transatlantic cables 1870 Western Unioncopy on of
Largest company in US
Consequences
Impossible to obtain on-time information on prices in different locations
and changing market conditions
Major problem of co-ordination between even two locations
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
67
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1840
Most businesses were partnerships credit hard to obtain
Loans mostly at high interest on a personal basis
Existing stocks not widely traded (risk price information)
Short-term credit provided by 788 small private banks
Smoothing of cash-flow cycles BUT Severe cycles of boom
and bust (high risk)
Beginnings of modern finance consortia funding Erie canal
But as yet no futures market to reduce risk
Consequences
Severe limitations on finance especially for large ventures
dominance of small-family owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
68
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1840
Production Technology Application of scientific and technical
Knowledge to production processes
Limited use of modern power (steam engines)
Technology yet undeveloped Beginning of standardized parts in clock and firearms
(interchangeable parts yet in the future) but low volumes
(Economies of Scale)
Consequences
Substantial technological constraints dominance of small-family
owned firm
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
69
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1840
Role of government Resolve commercial disputes and set rules under which
businesses operate
Investment in infrastructure (1820-1838 18 states advanced $ 60 mio canals
$ 43 mio railroads $ 45 mio for roads)
1869 Government sponsored first transcontinental railroad
1884 Prime meridian conference Washington DC
Consequences
Very limited role of government major breakthroughs in infrastructure
yet to come
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
70
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Doing business in 1840 ndash a summary
1 Technology limited production to traditional levels
2 Without transportation infrastructure and access to large
markets
mass production technologies would not have been useful
3 Without communication infrastructure information on prices
sellers and buyers were not readily available
4 Given the tremendous risk banks were unwilling to finance
business expansion
5 Under these conditions businesses were small and informally
organized
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
71
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Illustration of principles ndash competition between cities
Early 1800s fierce competition between Cincinnati Toledo Peoria St Louis and Chicago to become regionbdquos
center of commerce
Chicago won due to significant changes in infrastructure and technology (1860 Chicago Board of Trade had virtual
Monopoly on the grain trade) Chicago meatpackers (Armour and Swift dominated the industry)
Chicago conducted business differently from competing cities by taking advantages of new technologies
Swift and Armour quickly adopted refrigerated freight car slaughter hogs and cattle at chicago before weight (and
value) loss
McCormick used grain elevators to efficiently sort store ship grain from midwest
Breakthrough financial innovation Grain Futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade Risk reduction
Meatpackers and Grain merchants required large-scale investments in facilities (cattle pens meatpacking plants grain
storage) rail transportation what is required to make such large scale investments pay off
Look at maps following slide what was ultimately responsible for Chicago‟s success
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
72
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Theory of the Firm
Growth of American Railroads From 1840 to 1890
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
73
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash the era of mass production
Dominance of the huge vertically-integrated firm
Oil Company
Corporate Center
Future
Field
Development
(Prospecting)
Drilling
amp Oil production
(Field exploitation)
Processing
Refineries (joint
Production)
Wholesale amp retail
Sales of products
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
74
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
The World in 1910 (US) ndash governance issues the problem of ownership and control
GMcopy in 1920s
Corporate Center
Division
Buick
Division
Chevrolet
Division
Cadillac
Professional
managers
ShareholdersHire
Accountability
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Vice president
operative dm
Corporate finace
R amp D
New Models
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
75
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Production Technology in 1910
Period of rapid technological development (Bessemer process
assembly line production (Ford Model T)) High-volume low
cost manufacturing (Steel automobiles chemicals aluminum)
and distribution
Technology advances in managing these huge organizations
(document production typewriters copying (carbon copy
Photocopying analysis (adding machines) IBMcopy Burroughscopy
Remingtoncopy
Consequences
Technology advances allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in
certain industries (Steel Automobiles) but not others (furniture textiles farming)
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
76
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Transportation in 1910
High-volume (throughput) manufacturing requires developed transportation
1910 dominance of railroads
easy to obtain raw materials from and distribute goods over long distances (Searscopy)
Consequences
Transportation allowed for high-volume firms relying on throughput in certain industries
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
77
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Communication in 1910
US Postal Service and telegraph of continued importance
Telephones use became widespread after initial problems had been solved
management from distant headquarters quick communication with wholesalers
and customers production planning (batches)
Consequences
Communications supported throughput-dependent large firms
Both for internal management and supplier and customer relations
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
78
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Finance in 1910
Existing financial centers (NYSE) to raise equity (IPOs underwriting) and efficiently
trade shares of large industrial firms ruthless bankers
(JP Morgan)
Credit bureaus made credit information easily accessible installment financing for
customers expanded markets
Public disclosure of accounting information (mandatory reporting) size and scope of
new firms triggered accounting innovations
(railroad cost accounting Sears inventory turnover)
Consequences
Sufficiently-developed financial institutions to support throughput-dependent
large firms
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
79
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Government in 1910
Government regulation extended to such areas as corporate law antitrust and
worker and product safety
Increased regulation forced managers to collect a lot of data on internal operations
Mandatory secondary schooling provided the labor force needed by large bureaucratic
organizations
Consequences
Dangers of new system (product safety investor fraud collusion) increased
role of government regulation
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
80
The evolution of the modern firm(Slides 58 ff Copyright Richard Ponarul
California State University Chico)
Doing business in 1910 ndash a summary
1 Expanded infrastructure allowed firms to expand their markets
product lines and production scale
2 New technologies allowed high volume standardized production
3 Growth of financial infrastructure made large scale firms viable
4 Resulting problems (labor disputes collusion monopolies) called
for greater role of government
Theory of the Firm
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
81
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Jenny Taylor has founded the Taylor Hardware Store Inc He is the
sole owner (100) Letbdquos assume (for simplicity) that he can engage in
two unobservable utility-generating activities only
e1
Activity that increases firm value (work hard find customers etc)
e2
Activity that increases his utility (Consumption on the job large car
nice office good looking male secretary)
what is the optimal level of activities from Jennybdquos point of view
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
82
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Assume that Jenny has the following (net-) utility function
Firm value is created by
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
UtilityCost
( ) 100 1002
e eU e e e e e e
1 1 1( ) (100 )W e e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
83
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Optimal level of activities if Jenny is 100 owner-manager
Value of the firm
( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )100 2 0
25
U e ee e e
e
U e ee e e
e
e e
(25) (100 25) 25 1875W
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
84
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What happens if Jenny sells 50 stake in her firm to outside
investors
Jenny still benefits 100 from every $ spent on e2 but only 50 of
value creating activity e1 accrue to her
( ) ( )( )
21 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
NutzenKosten
( 0) 100 10052
e eU e e e e e e
( ) ( )
( )
1 21 1 2
1
1 22 1 2
2
1 2
( )100 2 0
( )1
0
00 2 0
10 30
5U e e
e e ee
U e ee e e
e
e e
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
85
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What is the impact of these new activity levels on firm value
Solution for general stake a (0 lt a lt 1) a Jenny‟s shares
(10) (100 10) 10 900 50() dgt eclineW
( )( )
( )( )
11
22
50 3 10
3 1
100 500
3 3 1 3
dee
d
dee
d
a
a a
a a
a
a
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
86
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
What will naiumlve investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s company
05 1875 =9375
What will a rational investors pay for a 50 stake in Jenny‟s
company
05900=450
In a rational world Jenny will get a price that is only less than half()
of the potential value of the firm = Agency problems of equity
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
87
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Agency-costs (of equity)
Difference between firm value if 100 owner-operated and firm value
If stake a is sold to outside investors (borne by owner)
9375 ndash 450 = 4875 gt 50 potential value()
Possible explanation for
Difficulty of raising equity capital
Jenny would like to ldquopost a bondrdquo (bonding activity) that she will
behave (small company car only will limit personal activities to $ 500
a month)
Jenny will accept outside control (monitoring by third party)
(board control audited financial statements)
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article
Institut fuumlr Haushalts- und Konsumoumlkonomik
Fg Oumlkonomik und Management sozialer Dienstleistungen
Prof Dr Christian Ernst
88
Aside 1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Theory of the Firm
Consumption on the job ndash Separation of Ownership u Control
Real-world phenomena
Short-term easily terminated contracts for top-management
Control bodies like Boards Of Directors Committees (corporate
governance)
Stock Options and Stocks as part of management pay
Audit an Disclosure Obligation (Ad Hoc Statements)
One of the most-cited articles in business literature
Jensen M Meckling W (1976) bdquoTheory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure‟ in Journal of Financial Economics 3(3) 305-360
I expect you to have read that article