Thinking About Nuclear Power in Post-saddam Iraq Pub979

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THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWERIN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

Norman Cigar

April 2010

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ISBN 1-58487-434-1


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FOREWORD

Pressure for the future spread of nuclear power forboth peaceful and military purposes has been recentlynoticeable expecially in the Middle East. Virtually allcountries in the region have expressed an interest inutilizing at least some aspect of atomic power, andin this monograph Dr. Norman Cigar examines thestatus of such thinking in post-Saddam Iraq. Publicdiscussions in Iraq are surprisingly free, and one cannd a willingness to express a range of views, evenon a sensitive topic such as nuclear power, that wouldhave been unthinkable a few years ago.

Dr. Cigar has sampled opinions from all key sectorsin Iraqgovernment ofcials, politicians, religiousgures, scientists, academics, and news mediapunditslargely the informed public, or those who

are likely to have inuence on future decisions in thisarena. Dr. Cigar highlights the consensus for therebuilding of a nuclear establishment at least forpeaceful purposes, but also the divergent views inthe country on the utility of nuclear weapons, andthe fragmented and evolving political environment inwhich such decisions will be made. He also evaluatesthe concrete steps being taken by the new Iraqigovernment to play a role in the peaceful nuclearsector and the very real obstacles which it will haveto overcome. Dr. Cigar highlights the difculty ofisolating Iraq from regional trends and the need tomanage and control the process through internationaland bilateral safeguards, requiring some U.S. policydecisions.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis study as a contribution to identifying and analyz-ing this signicant emerging policy issue, hoping itwill be of relevance and interest to military and civilian


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analysts, planners, scientists, and national and alliedpolicymakers. It is also anticipated that the results of

this analysis will provide a useful data baseline to helppolicymakers in their efforts to control proliferationand minimize the risk of nuclear accidents in order toensure a safe Middle East.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

NORMAN CIGAR is a Research Fellow at the MarineCorps University, Quantico, Virginia. Before retiring,he taught military theory, strategy, and policy,operational case studies, nuclear war theory, andregional studies at the Marine Corps Command andStaff College and the School of Advanced Warghting.Previous assignments include service as a seniorpolitical-military analyst in the Pentagon, where hewas responsible for the Middle East in the Ofce ofthe Armys Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Dur-ing the Gulf War, he was the Armys senior political-military intelligence staff ofcer on the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Task Force. Dr. Cigar is the author ofWhy Did Iraq Want Nuclear Weapons? Perspectivesof a Would-be Nuclear Power (forthcoming) and of

Iraqs Vision of the Nuclear Battleeld. He has writtennumerous works on politics and security issues dealingwith the Middle East and the Balkans, and has beena consultant at the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia at the Hague. Dr. Cigarwas also a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for ConictAnalysis & Resolution, George Mason University. Hehas studied and traveled widely in the Middle East.Dr. Cigar holds a D. Phil. from Oxford (St. AntonysCollege) in Middle East History and Arabic; an M.I.A.from the School of International and Public Affairs anda Certicate from the Middle East Institute, ColumbiaUniversity; and an M.S.S.I. from the National DefenseIntelligence College.


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SUMMARY

This monograph provides an overview and analysisof thinking in Iraq on the issue of nuclear power. Nuc-lear power has long held a special fascination for Iraq,and despite past controversies, this issue continues todraw the attention of numerous inuential Iraqis inthe post-Saddam era. Informed public opinion in Iraqtoday is clearly a more important factor for understand-ing the background of decisionmaking than it wasduring the Saddam era, so that this monograph ad-dresses the views of all the sectors of Iraqi society likelyto have an input into decisionmaking in this arena.

There is an emerging Iraqi consensus on the desir-ability of a peaceful nuclear program, with argumentssupported by the expected benets for electric powergeneration, agriculture, and medicine, as well as an

eventual transition from oil. National pride is also amotivating factor, as nuclear power is viewed as anindicator of modernity and as proof of being able tokeep up with regional neighbors. As for a militaryapplication of nuclear power, those expressing apositive viewall outside the current governmentsee nuclear weapons as an effective political andmilitary instrument and as necessary to balanceIsraels nuclear arsenal, although their support isvoiced on behalf of the Arabs in general ratherthan using the more sensitive term, Iraq. The beliefin the effectiveness of a balance of terror in ensuringsecurity and stability is widespread. Perceptions abouta prospective Iranian nuclear weapon, however, mostoften break down along confessional lines, with most

Shia welcoming the prospect as a boost to the Shiacommunitys security, while Sunnis continue earlierviews of a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat. There is little


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concern over potential environmental implications orpotential accidents, or attention to ethical issues.

One should expect in Iraq the same movementtoward nuclear power as in the rest of the MiddleEast, at least in the civilian sector. However,daunting obstacles remain to rebuilding the countryseviscerated nuclear infrastructure, which resultedfrom the dismantling of many facilities, the removalof ssionable material, and the emigration or deathof former nuclear scientists. However, Baghdad hastaken steps to reintegrate the country into the nuclearresearch structure of the Arab world and to end exis-ting restrictive international controls. For example,it has requested that France build a new reactor, andhas made an effort to regenerate its domestic scienticcommunity. There is no indication of any intention toreestablish a military program; any decision to do so in

the future would be impossible to predict, given Iraqsevolving domestic political dynamics.

It will be difcult for the United States or theinternational community to ignore or reject outrightIraqs expectations for a nuclear program, given thedeeply-felt entitlement throughout Iraqs informedpublic and in light of the almost universal regionaltrends. But the United States can help to managethe process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclearreintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector. At thesame time, the United States and the internationalcommunity should ensure that any return to a nuclearprogram be accompanied by Iraqs acceptance of strictinternational monitoring and controls to prevent anydiversion to the military eld or terrorist use. U.S.

policymakers and military leaders should also focuson ensuring that any peaceful nuclear program in Iraqbe as secure from accidents as possible through train-ing and assistance.


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Once stability increases in Iraq, U.S. military andcivilian government agencies should launch an effort

to educate the Iraqi military, government ofcials, andthe general population on the benets and risks ofnuclear power. Intelligence analysts should continueto monitor Iraqi public opinion on the nuclear issue,as well as any Iraqi actions which could lead toundesired results, including support from othercountries. More broadly, U.S. and international leaderscan work to modify the overall Middle East regionalthreat environment so as to alleviate the domesticpressures for nuclear proliferation both in the civilianand in the military sphere, especially by encouraginggenuine progress in the Arab-Israeli conict. Finally,U.S. policymakers can support and reassure theIraqi government and public, with regard to anincipient Iranian nuclear threat, although the inclu-

sion of an "umbrella" for Israel or requests for apermanent U.S. military presence in the region wouldlikely derail such an initiative. Awareness of andsensitivity to Iraqi thinking on the nuclear issue, ingeneral, will facilitate the crafting of more effective U.S.policies which can in turn contribute to the security ofthe Middle East region and beyond.


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THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWERIN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

INTRODUCTION

The Terms of Reference.

Nuclear power has long held a special fascinationfor Iraq, as it has for many other countries, not only asa source of energy and as an engine of technologicalprogress, but also as a potent weapon in a countrysarsenal and as a tangible achievement which couldserve to legitimize a regime in the eyes of national,regional, and world opinion.1 Although SaddamHusseins well-documented effort to acquire nuclearweapons ultimately came to naught, it neverthelesshas weighed heavily on the countrys recent history.

The persistent issue of nuclear power hascontinued to draw the attention of Iraqis in the post-Saddam era. Discussions in the news media, despitetheir understandably subdued tone given the sensitivepolitical environment of the past few years, reveal acontinuing interest in a nuclear future for the country.In fact, it appears that discussions about nuclearpower have been increasing in frequency as a newstatus quo took form and as the U. S. presence wasexpected to recede. Public opinion in Iraq indicates anenduring interest in reestablishing a nuclear capabilityat least for peaceful purposes, although Iraqis alsostill seek to grapple intellectually with the conceptsof the utility and consequences of nuclear power ingeostrategic and military terms.

Nuclear issues were pivotal in U.S. policymakersfocus and argumentationif perhaps grossly misusedand mistakenin the period preceding the launching


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of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.2 However,such concerns have now largely disappeared from

the policy horizon. The absence of any weapons-related nuclear facilities, a fact emerging after theinvasion, and the pressing immediate concernsstemming from efforts to rebuild the Iraqi nation haveovershadowed the continuing signicance of suchissues. Nevertheless, any developments in the nucleararena will unavoidably require decisions by the UnitedStates and the international community on how tomanage the situation so that Iraqs interests can beaddressed while ensuring a secure local and regionalenvironment.

How Iraq will decide to proceed in the nuclearsphere in the future is still unclear. This monographanalyzes the public discussions by Iraqis in the newsmedia about nuclear power in the post-Saddam era

in order to gauge prevailing views about the utilityand feasibility of all aspects of nuclear power. Thethesis here is that there is a mounting consensus andpressure for establishing a nuclear capability, at leastin the nonmilitary sector, a prospect that is perhaps notsurprising in light of a similar trajectory throughoutthe Middle East. As for support for a military nuclearcapability, the situation is more ambiguousnotsurprising perhaps, given the sensitivity of that issueand the delicate current political balance in Iraqbutpresent indications are that while many Iraqis do vieweven a military application as positive, unpredictabledomestic political considerations will be crucial inwhether Iraq pursues such a path in the future.

Informed public opinion in Iraq today is clearly

a more important factor for understanding thebackground of decisionmaking than it was during theSaddam era, when it was essentially mute. This factor


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is even more salient given the fragmented nature ofthe countrys present-day political establishment and

the lack, at least for now, of a hegemonic center. Thispublic dialogue among Iraqis extends to the issue ofnuclear power, although discussions in this area maystill not be completely unfettered, given the continuingsensitivity of the topic, and especially given thepossibility of an adverse American reaction. One canpresume that present discourse is thus affected by atleast some self-censorship, as well as by the normalprudence in the case of public gures, who must becareful to avoid treading in controversial areas becauseof their ofcial status. Nevertheless, there are enoughIraqis sufciently open with their views that one candelineate the general lines of thinking about optionsfor the future of nuclear power in the country.

Research Sources and Methods.

The research for this monograph focuses on theviews of Iraqi participants in the discussion aboutnuclear power both in Iraq and in the diaspora. Thelatters opinions are easily available to the public backhome in Iraq via the internet. Thus there is now largelya single discussion arena, at least for the informedpublic. In fact, those Iraqis based abroad may feel lessconstrained about expressing their views than thosein Iraq, given the still substantial, albeit diminishing,U.S. presence and scrutiny.

The commentators considered here range acrossthe spectrum of politics and society, including nuclearscientists, government ofcials, political and religious

gures, and intellectuals. It is these actors who areinvolved in the discussions on nuclear power and whobring expertise or inuence to the table. Any decisions


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in this area are not likely to be the result of popularinvolvement, although opinion makers do seek to

generate public support for their ideas. The views ofIraqi nuclear scientists are especially important, giventheir status as subject matter experts and celebrities.Their role in shaping the perceptions of rising gener-ations of Iraqi scientists and political leaders may besignicant. Religious gures who take a public standalso provide a degree of moral approval, a factor whichis considerably more signicant now then it was duringthe Saddam era. Notably missing from the discussionsare any active duty military voices, although thatmay be understandable, given the immediate securityconcerns which preoccupy the Iraqi military and thecontinuing sensitivity of its status in todays evolvingpolitical environment.

One cannot always determine these days whose

views a commentator may be reecting publicly,whether his own or those of more inuential backersdomestic or foreignwho for politic reasons havethus far chosen to remain silent. The signicance of theopinions of various individuals, of course, will be ofunequal weight in these discussionsdepending ontheir level of expertise, political ties, present job, oraccess to particular news media. Surveying all suchviews is nevertheless useful, as it provides a sense ofthe parameters of Iraqi thinking and insights into howthe issues are framed with regard to the desirability andutility of nuclear power in the countrys future. Whenthere are discordant views, these are always noted inthe study. Thus, in the absence of such indications, theassumption is that there is a consensus.

Scott Sagan has provided a useful approach tounderstanding why states acquire nuclear weapons,and one can extend at least part of that framework to


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the issue of nuclear power in general, whether civilianor military. He identies three main national motiva-

tions, namely, the need to respond to foreign threats,the product of domestic political and bureaucraticdynamics, and the desire to project an identity ofmodernity and technological prowess. Elements of allthree can be glimpsed in the case of Iraq.3

LOBBYING FOR ATOMIC POWER

The Economic Argument.

Discreet lobbying by Iraqis in favor of revivingthe countrys nuclear programat least for peacefulpurposesbegan soon after the downfall of Saddam.As early as the fall of 2003, Iraqi nuclear scientistswere urging a resumption of a peaceful nuclear pro-

gram, touting the tangible benets that would accrueto the country.

Take for example, Hamid Al-Bahilioriginallythe director of the Osirak/Tammuz reactor complex,a professor of nuclear engineering, and at presentAdviser in the Ofce of the Prime Minister and anIraqi government representative on nuclear issuesabroad. His upcoming book, serialized in the news-paper of one of the main Shia parties, charts hisvision for a nuclear future in the post-Saddam era.Al-Bahili stresses the importance of nuclear powerfor Iraq and highlights its peaceful roles, such as thegeneration of electricity and uses in medicine, in-dustry, and agriculture.4 Iraqi scientists abroad alsoexpressed support for nuclear power, and in fact

Asad Al-Khafaji, then working in Canada, arguedthat the absence of the peaceful use of nuclearpower would be considered backwardness in thecultural, economic, and technological arenas.5


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Acknowledging the concern of some about the poten-tial destructiveness of nuclear weapons, at the same

time he dismissed arguments that oil and natural gaswould be available forever, and severely criticizedthose who saw any activity with nuclear energy assimply futile and playing with re.6 The editor of anIraqi scientic journal likewise concluded that simplyput, we cannot do without nuclear power . . . as afundamental substitute for the generation of electricpower. When oil and gas supplies run out, nuclearpower will be the inexhaustible stand-by for the gener-ation of future energy.7

Such testimonials on behalf of the benets of nuclearpower have continued in subsequent years, includingthose by government ofcials. Al-Bahili has sincelauded Iraqs very, very great achievements in thenuclear arena during the Saddam era, and proposed a

comprehensive plan to rebuild Iraqs scientic system.8

Then there is Dhiya Butrus Yusuf, Chief of the

Plant Breeding Department of Iraqs Ministry ofScience and Technology, who has laid out in detail thepotential uses of nuclear technology in agricultureas an alternative to chemical pesticides, a counter tolivestock diseases, a multiplier of soil fertility, a tool forgenetically engineering plants, and a food preservervia irradiation. He concludes that nuclear technologycan be an efcient, effective, and cost-effective solutionto many of the problems which agriculture facesaround the world, then adding that Iraq was oneof the countries which initiated its nuclear programfor peaceful uses beginning in the 1960s of the lastcentury, and whose scientists are trying to maintain

the momentum of that work to this day.9 An Iraqienergy expert, pointing to the current problems ingenerating power in Iraq, maintains that the country


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should begin shifting from its diminishing oil reservesto renewable sources of energy, stressing that it had

uranium deposits that would last one million years,that each square foot of uranium was equal to sevenmillion barrels of oil, and that nuclear fusion couldprovide energy for billions and trillions of years.10Al-Khafaji, too, has continued his efforts on behalf ofnuclear power, suggesting that a concerted effort bemade to convince Iraqi decisionmakers of the benetsof rebuilding that capability.11

Not surprisingly, Iraqs Minister of Science andTechnology, Raid Fahmi, has been a strong supporterof nuclear power, equating its establishment to a basicprerequisite for Iraqs social and economic rebirth,while giving assurances that Iraq would comply fullywith all international guidelines.12 One of the mosteloquent spokesmen in favor of resuming a nuclear

program has been Hussein Al-Shahristani, currentlyIraqs Minister of Oil, and himself one of the countrysmost experienced nuclear scientists. He has argued, forexample, that it is vital for Iraq to have a developednuclear research program for the peaceful use ofnuclear power in the elds of medicine, agriculture,and industry, but admitted that Iraqs abundantreserves of oil and gas were already sufcient forthe production of energy.13 Al-Shahristani was alsocareful to stress that civilian reactors could not beused to produce material for nuclear weapons andthat there was little likelihood of a diversion of nuclearmaterials.14

Perhaps sensing that the case for nuclear materialspertaining to medicine might be the least controversial

application, discussants have surfaced it most fre-quently. One Iraqi scientist, for example, noted thatwhen the countrys nuclear program had been can-


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celed, the rst victim [was] our hospitals.15 Sig-nicantly, in 2008 the Baghdad municipal authorities

announced their intention to establish a 50-bed nuclearmedicine hospital.16

National Pride.

Many Iraqis view nuclear power for their countryas a basic national right or, as Minister Fahmi called it,Iraqs sovereign right.17 Some politicians have beenmore reserved, with the key factor for them being notthe desirability of nuclear power but the timing. Asone member of the Iraqi National Assembly stated onUnited Arab Emirates (UAE) television, The time isnot appropriate at present to build a nuclear reactor,[we prefer] new oil reneries for the short term instead,since even though the nuclear option would address a

real problem, Iraq for now did not have the necessarypossibilities.18 However, another participant on thesame television program, while admitting that theinternal situation and state of the infrastructure wereinadequate at present, countered that Iraq as a statehad the right to acquire a nuclear capability, that nowwas simply a short pause (tawaqqufat shwayya) withregard to nuclear power, and that nuclear power wasa form of fantastic energy. He proposed at least smallresearch reactors for the present.19

Nuclear power is seen in Iraq by virtually everyonein the informed publicequally true in much of theregionas quintessentially emblematic of scienticand intellectual progress, a sort of litmus test fora countrys standing in relation to its peers, and

something to which a government can point as aconcrete achievement to boost its national pride andlegitimacy. Supporters of nuclear power in Iraq have


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argued that this has been the most important eld ofscientic-technological research bar none in Iraq.20

An Iraqi government scientist even concluded thatno country can progress and develop culturally andscientically without [nuclear technology].21 In thesame vein, Dhiya Butrus Yusuf accepted as a giventhat one of the benchmarks of progress for states andpeoples is the possession of nuclear technology.22 Forone nuclear scientist, an Iraqi nuclear capability waseven essential as a guarantee against Iraq returningto the wasteland of backwardness and poverty.23Not surprisingly, Iraqs Ministry of Science andTechnology now has an atom symbol as the mostprominent element of its logo, while the homepage ofthe Ministrys ofcial website is dominated by a largeanimated atomic emblem.24

Iraqis naturally compare their country to their

neighbors in the region and must now nd itdistressing to see themselves falling behind countriesthey had often looked down upon in the past ashaving a lower level of progress. Baghdad certainlyfeels itself regressing as other countries in the regiontake steps to develop nuclear power capabilitiesnot to speak of nuclear weaponization in Iran andSyria.25 For example, one Iraqi university professorwas proud that Iraq had been at the forefront of theArab and Middle East countries in terms of having thesolid advanced scientic brains and capabilities in alldisciplines and elds, but now fretted that the recentbrain drain would remove Iraq from the caravan ofscientic progress and to its signicant regression incomparison with the past period when we were far

in the lead.26 A former senior Iraqi military ofcerlikewise urged public support for convincing the Iraqi


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government to build nuclear power plants, stressingthat this was already being done in Egypt, Saudi

Arabia, and the UAE.27

The Iraqi news media routinelyhighlight the nuclear plans of neighboring countrieswith an implicit sense of envy and resentment. Asnoted above, Iraqis must nd it particularly galling forcountries that in the past they considered backwardand insignicantsuch as Kuwaitto be passing themby in nuclearization. In fact, for Dhiya Butrus Yusuf,one reason for reenergizing the nuclear program isto raise Iraqs status above the ranks of the othercountries.28

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN IRAQS FUTURE?

Understandably, the greatest concern for theUnited States and the international community

should be any Iraqi thinking about reviving a nuclearweapons program, however unlikely and unrealisticthat might be in the near term. Here, as one mightexpect, discussions are often more discreet or indirectthan is the case when dealing with nuclear power forpeaceful purposes. The issue, if talked about openlyat all, is often done by Iraqis living outside of Iraq.Usually, arguments by Iraqis in favor of nuclearweapons are softened by speaking about and onbehalf of the Arabs rather than specically aboutIraq, or by focusing on the utility of nuclear weaponspossessed or being developed by Iraqs neighbors orby countries further aeld. This indirect approach isexpected to be less controversial in the eyes of outsideobservers. Iraqi commentators of all afliationsapart

from unreconstructed Baathistsare sensitive aboutpotential accusations of promoting policies linked tothe Saddam regime, especially with the predominantAmerican presence in Iraq since 2003. Addressing the


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issue in regional terms may also be a way to garnerbroader support among neighbors.

Not surprisingly, the remaining Iraqi Baathiopposition has been the most outspoken in supportingnuclear weapons for Iraq, praising Saddam for hisnuclearization efforts while he was in power, andacknowledging for the rst time that that effort hadbegun as early as the Osirak/Tammuz reactor project,the principal motivation having been to confrontIsrael.29

However, there is also a broad feeling amongmany other Iraqis engaged in these discussions thatnuclear weapons in general provide a country witha unique military capability and that such weaponshave a benecial impact on any countrys security andgeopolitical inuence. For example, one Iraqi nuclearscientist concluded that nuclear weapons have played

an enormous and pivotal role in determining the shapeof the balance of international relations whereby thestrong exploit the weak.30 Often, Iraqis nowadaysaddress the issue by emphasizing the importance ofnuclear weapons for other countries strategy and, inparticular, for what many perceive as Israels or Iransambitions for regional hegemony.

Assessing Nuclear Threats to Iraq.

The perspective that Iraqi discussants have on anuclear threat to their country not only reveals theirassessment of the potential utility of nuclear weapons,but may also inuence their readiness to support asimilar Iraqi path one day. In the past, insofar as an

actual or potential nuclear threat was concerned,Baghdad considered Israel, the United States, andeventually Iran to be most potentially threatening. Insome ways, the Iraqis view of threats has remained


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constant, but in other ways it has evolved since thecollapse of the Saddam regime.

The Israeli Threat. As far as Israel is concerned, thereremains in Iraq (and elsewhere in the Arab world) adeep-seated concern about the perceived threat fromthat countryincluding the nuclear aspectand suchconcern is advanced frequently as motivation and justication for further proliferation in the region.For example, an op-ed piece in a Shia publication inIraq held that Israel threatens the Arab countries . . .with its nuclear monopoly and its aggressive policiesagainst the Arab states and also threatens internationalstability.31 According to this source, Israel wassaid to have achieved geo-political victories in theform of unequal political agreements with the Arabsspecically because of the imbalance of power inthe region in which Israel is the hegemonic actor who

raises the nuclear, military, and economic stick overthe heads of everyone else.32

An Iraqi nuclear scientist was likewise criticalof Israels nuclear monopoly, asserting that whenonly one side has nuclear weapons, that leads to anunjust hegemony in the geo-political situation in theregion.33 Yet another commentator stressed that it wasthe Israeli nuclear threat which prompted neighboringcountries to also embark on nuclear proliferation.34 Forhis part, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Al-HasaniAl-Baghdadi of Najaf saw as unfair that Israel has theright to possess 200 nuclear warheads, while no otherstate in the region has the right to have even a singlenuclear bomb, attributing such an imbalance to theU.S. desire to maintain Israel as the strongest power in

the region.35The Ambivalence Toward an Iranian Nuclear Threat.

On the other hand, perhaps no single aspect of Iraqi


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thinking on nuclear weapons has evolved as much asperceptions of a nuclear threat from Iran. In the past,

the Iraqi argument in favor of nuclear weapons wasoften cast in terms of the need to counter an incipientIranian nuclear capability, as well as the existing Israelione. However, in todays context, Iraqi concerns abouta future Iranian bomb have become considerably morenuanced, with views frequentlybut not exclusivelydividing along sectarian/communal lines.

The Iraqi Shia Viewpoint. Many in Iraqs Shiacommunity, while not wishing to subordinate theircountry to Iran, nevertheless may consider the latteras a guarantor against what they see as threatsfrom neighboring Sunni countries, Israel, or theUnited States, and view Irans acquisition of nuclearweapons with relative equanimity. As one Iraqi Shiacommentator put it, Nowadays, Islamic Iran is the

strong rear area [al-dhahr al-qawi] for Iraq.36

In a similarargument, Iraqs activist Shia Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi noted that we look at the Islamic Republic[of Iran] as a regional power, and as the Islamicstrategic depth for the Arab and Islamic peoples.37 Atthe same time, Iraqi Shia observers frequently parrotIrans argument that its nuclear program is intendedsolely for peaceful purposes.38 An Iraqi Shia academictypically downplayed any Iranian nuclear threat toIraq, arguing during a lecture in the United States thatIran is a sovereign state and has the right to expressits point of view on what concerns it; it is their decisionto make and it is none of our business.39 Similarly, aShia Parliamentarian, Falih Al-Fayyadh, claimed thatIraq is not frightened by Irans possession of nuclear

weapons . . . because that will not affect Iraq in theleast, since relations between the two countries donot permit either to threaten the other. Instead, headded, it is Israels nuclear arsenal about which Iraq


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ought to be concerned, since Israel has aggressiveplans in the region.40

Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi, predictably, disap-proved the American-Israeli plans for opposing thepeaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic [ofIran].41 Another writer on an Iraqi Shia website,purporting to express the point of view of manysons of Iraq, likewise reacted harshly to those Arabcommentators who urged the United States to strikeIran before it acquired nuclear weapons. He dismissedthe views of those in the region who were fearful thatIran and the Safavid Shia would acquire nuclearweapons as stemming from hatred of Iran and ofthe Shia in general and from jealousy of the latterssuccess.42 Indeed, he suggested that the importantquestion now thrown out on the table is . . . what ifIran or any other Shia . . . could liberate Palestine and

Jerusalem? He surmised that even then the Sunniswould be implacable enemies of the Shia and hostileto Iran.43 Instead of being concerned about Iran, a pro-Muqtada al-Sadr writer most feared that the UnitedStates would use the excuse of an Iranian threat toIsrael to deploy a missile shield in Iraq in order todefend Israel.44

Some Iraqi Shia even went so far as to see Iraniannuclear weapons as a positive development, withMundhir al-Kawthar claiming it would be for thegood of humanity. In this observers view, the Iraniannuclear programand clearly what is alluded to bythis term are nuclear weaponswould provide abalance to Israels arrogance and pressure the UnitedStates to solve the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestinian

issues. According to the same source, Irans nuclearprogram does not represent any danger whatsoever.On the contrary, he assured readers that a nuclear


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capability would ensure peace in the broader MiddleEast region, and credited nuclear deterrence as the

reason for a reduced likelihood of war between Indiaand Pakistan. Arguing that it was unfair to accept thatIsrael and North Korea could be nuclear powers butnot Iran, the author attributed Irans desire for nuclearweapons as defensive, stemming from its fear of Israeland the United States, and contending that the Westerncountries were opposed because they do not like astate with an independent will in an oil-rich region,and that the Arab leaders were simply alarmed aboutthe threat to their own positions. 45 Another Iraqi writerconcluded that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, itwould mean the collapse of classical Americanmilitary superiority over the latter, and predicted thatthe United States would therefore try to prevent Iranfrom achieving that decisive capability.46

On the other hand, one Shia nuclear scientist liv-ing in Algeria, Abd Al-Kadhim Al-Abboudi, divergedfrom the general Shia consensus, weaving instead acomplex web of nuclear conspiracies that accuse theUnited States, Israel, and Iran of all plotting to usenuclear weapons against the Arabs. His leftist secularpolitical leanings apparently trumped his communalties.47

Given the prevailing public opinion in Iraq, theNuri Al-Maliki government categorically rejected theuse of Iraqi airspace for any Israeli strike against Iran.48On the U.S.-nanced Radio Sawa, even the countrysSunni Vice President, Tariq Al-Hashimi, perhaps outof concern about an Iranian backlash and resultinginstability in the region in case of a U.S. attack, advised

against an attack on Irans nuclear infrastructure, goingso far as to claim that Iran had a right to its peacefulnuclear program.49


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The Iraqi Sunni Viewpoint. Other Iraqis, however,have been much more critical of Irans potential

acquisition of nuclear weapons. Some have expressedskepticism of the need for Iran to go nuclear evenfor peaceful purposes, citing other better sources forgenerating electricity, such as solar power, and havealso raised doubts about Irans stated intent not to usenuclear power for military purposes.50

One secular leftist observer interpreted Iransquest for nuclear weapons as revealing its aggressiveobjectives.51 A Sunni commentator concluded thatif Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, that wouldput the region under Iranian control.52 AnotherSunni writer opined that the balance of powerbetween Iran and Iraq had already been broken andthat having nuclear weapons could help Iran spreadits Shia propaganda. He worried that no neighbor

could match Irans pretensions of hegemony.53

Stillanother writer expressed indignation at what he saw asIrans demeaning treatment of Iraq and equated Iranscurrent leadership with Saddam in its willingnessto use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) againstothers as well as for blackmail. Thus he saw a need forthe West to block Tehran.54 An Iraqi intellectual livingabroad even inquired rhetorically as to who would bemore merciful with its nuclear weapons toward IraqIran or Israel. He posited that the Iranian regime wasmore dangerous, since it was similar to that of Saddamand would not be deterred by the thought of masscasualties. What is more, he concluded, The Islamicreligion will not serve as a deterrent to leaders suchas the present rulers of Iran in their using all banned

[weapons] in pursuit of their national interests at theexpense of all the Arabs and Muslims.55

Lieutenant General Waq Al-Samarrai, at one timechief of military intelligence under Saddam, dismis-


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sed the idea of a nuclear threat to Iraq from Israel,claiming that the latter would use that capability only

for deterrence. Asked if he thought that Iran insteadhad already become the greater threat, Al-Samarraireplied: Yes, no doubt about it.56 Others alsodismissed an Iranian nuclear threat to Israel, believinginstead that it was Irans Arab neighbors who wouldbe the rst victims, given Tehrans hostility towardthe latter.57 Another commentatora former leaderof the Iraqi Communist Partyexpressed the viewthat Iran would use its nuclear capability for militarypurposes, but not against Israel. Rather, it would useit to blackmail and threaten Iraq and the Gulf states,and urged the European Union (EU) to bring thematter up in the United Nations Security Council.58Indeed, one commentator claimed that once Iran hadnuclear weapons, its resulting swagger would lead to

a renewal in the export of the Revolution again afterit had been stopped by the First Gulf War.59 A Sunnicandidate for Speaker of Parliament, Taha Al-Lahibi,downplayed an Iranian nuclear threat to Iraq but onlybecause he claimed, sarcastically, that Iran already hada dominant presence in Iraq and did not need to usenuclear weapons to get its way with Baghdad, andthat it should be the other neighbors instead who mustworry.60

A U.S.-nanced Baghdad newspaper, on the otherhand, counseled Iran not to threaten its neighbors withits nuclear program, but the reason given was thatsuch a threat would drive other regional states to seekprotection from foreign forces.61

Commentators in Iraqi Baathi circles, predictably,

have been especially alarmist about an Iranian bomb,and one Baathi spokesman claimed that Iran wouldexploit its nuclear project as a tool for pressure toincrease its share of Iraqs remains, in competition


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with the United States.62 Another commentator onthe ofcial Baath website concluded that, thanks to

nuclear weapons, Iran will have taken a great steptoward imposing its hegemony over all the countriesof the oil region.63 Another spokesman for the Baathmade a universal plea for help in preventing the riseof a nuclear Iran by whatever means.64 In fact, anotherIraqi Baathi went so far as to claim that the UnitedStates planned to maintain the Baath Party in reserveif it struck at Iran because of the latters nuclear pro-gram, due to the Baaths implacable enmity towardIran.65

Assessing Other Nuclear Threats.

In contrast, there seems to be limited public concernin Iraq about Syrias potential for acquiring nuclear

weapons. Perhaps this relative indifference may bebecause Syrias success is not viewed as imminent,that Syria is not seen as a direct threat, or that lessinformation is available about Syria than about Iranor Israel. After the Israeli air strike in September 2007against what Iraqis believed were Syrian nuclearfacilities, for example, the principal concern seemsto have been that Iraq might be affected by nuclearfallout, given the proximity of the targeted area to theIraqi border.66 Iraqs Association of Muslim Scholars,a grouping of Sunni ulama, accused the United Statesof repeating the same policy against Syria as it hadagainst Iraq in the nuclear weapons farce, i.e., byfalsely claiming that Syria was developing nuclearweapons.67 Some Iraqis remain vocally critical of Iran,

such as one newspaper editor who termed the Iranianspursuit of nuclear weapons a threat not only to thesecurity of the region but specically to the securityof the Arab Gulfand implicitly therefore also to


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Iraq. Syrias greatest fault, in his view, was its supportfor Irans nuclear program rather than any activity by

Syria in the same eld.68

Viewing matters from a Shia position, on the otherhand, one Iraqi observer even posited a future nuclearthreat to Iraq from Jordan, given the latters hostilityto the Shia community in both Iraq and Iran. Hisconclusion was that for Iraq to achieve a balance ofterror vis--vis Jordan, it would have to build its ownnuclear reactors, although use of the latter on behalf ofa weapons program was only implicit.69

As for any future American nuclear threatwhichhad played at least a supporting role in spurring Iraqspursuit of nuclear weapons during the Saddam erathat is not seen as a pressing likelihood nowadays, andeven if there were any such concern it is unlikely itwould be revealed publicly, given the sensitivity of the

local political situation as the United States continuesits pullout.

The Kurdish Viewpoint.

Iraqi Kurds, less deeply involved in the nationaland regional debate on nuclear power for Iraq, appearmore concerned about any potential negative effectsof nuclear power on their own area and may still feela latent concern about the potential military use ofnuclear weapons against their community in the fut-ure, a fear born of past experience with Saddams useof chemical weapons against them. For example,Masoud Al-Barzani, President of the Kurdistan region,when asked about the Iranian nuclear program,

responded blandly: We hope that the region will befree of all destructive nuclear weapons, because wesuffered in the past from such banned weapons, and


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the Kurdish people paid a great price because of thatat the hands of the former regime.70

At the same time, some Kurds do voice concernabout Irans impending acquisition of nuclearweapons. Intellectual Jawdat Hushiyar, for example,stated: There is no doubt that an Iran with nuclearweapons will upset the existing military balance in theregion dangerously, and particularly between Iraq andIran, a situation that could prove dangerous if somedispute were to erupt between the two countries. Hethen excoriated Iraqs religious-based Shia parties forignoring the threat.71 Other Kurds, like ParliamentarianAbd Al-Bari Zibari, have more typically been prone totemporize, noting that it is way too early to considerIran a nuclear state. He expressed the belief thatinternational pressure would very likely convince Iranto desist and that the United States would not permit

Iran to acquire nuclear weapons in any event.72

Religiously motivated Kurds, on the other hand,seem to take a more nuanced position, based on agreater sensitivity to the Israeli threat. One Kurdishwriter on a religious website, for example, held thata nuclear Iran would provide a balance against Israel,but would also prove threatening to non-nuclearneighbors, especially in the Gulf. He noted that nuclearproliferation would be difcult to halt unless thedouble standard favoring Israel was terminated.73

The Utility of Nuclear Weapons.

Whatever the partisan and confessional coloring ofthe debate, virtually all Iraqi commentators agree that

nuclear weapons are effective in bestowing greaterpower to a country. Most Iraqis involved in suchdiscussions seem to be in the optimist camp of nuc-


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lear partisans, who see proliferation as a means toachieve balance and stability through mutual

deterrence. They take comfort in the analogyhoweveranalytically tenuousof the relationship between thesuperpowers during the Cold War. Asad Al-Khafaji,for example, held that destructive nuclear weaponswere used to kill millions of innocent civilians at a timewhen one side had a monopoly. When the monopolywas broken and that weapon spread to the reaches ofthe East and West, surprise, surprise, the situation thenbecame secure! . . . In sum, I support the proliferationof nuclear weapons to all the parties involved in aconict.74

Even an Iraqi who counseled Iran to end its nuclearprogram so as to avoid a confrontation with theUnited States and Europe nevertheless acknowledgedthat the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state

results in a relative psychological reassurance (istiqrarnafsi) and condence for that state in relation to foreignmilitary threats and attacks against it by others.75

At the same time, others have acknowledgedthe potential for an upsurge of instability, as a stateacquiring such weapons is also said to experiencean increase in its might and an expansion of its powerand inuence.76 One observer concluded that if Iranacquires a nuclear bomb, the White House will nolonger be able to block any Iranian attempt to expandeastward or westward, as it was able to do with theIraqi Baathi regime when it attempted to swallowup Kuwait.77 And still another Iraqi writer, althoughdismissing widespread charges that Iran had aggres-sive intentions against its neighbors, and praising it

instead for its challenge to Israeli expansionism,concluded that if Iran did acquire nuclear weaponsthat will mean opening the terrible gates of hell forthe Americans.78


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As noted earlier, when Iraqis verbalize theirsupport for a nuclear sector within the military realm,

they often broach the topic using the more ambiguousterm of the Arabs, seeking to avoid any politically-charged allusions to Iraq itself. For example, Iraqinuclear scientist Asad Al-Khafaji argued that it wasthe balance of nuclear terror which had kept the peacebetween the superpowers during the Cold War, aswell as between India and Pakistan. He then askedrhetorically: Must the Arabs continue to cater to thefeelings of their Western allies and not disturb thesituation of a lack of strategic nuclear balance of powerin the region?79 Al-Khafaji, perhaps sensing that talkof a renewed unilateral nuclear program in Iraq mightbe premature, urged the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC) countries instead to use their money to nancea joint nuclear development effort with other unnamed

Arab countries, arguing that this would allow the GCCstates to dispense with large conventional forces fordefense.80 Elsewhere, he has used the more vaguelyamorphous term the countries of the Gulf. This termcould be interpreted to include Iraq as the actor whocould establish a nuclear balance of terror with theJewish state or with the Shia state [ i.e., Iran], a scenariohe viewed as a legal international right which no onecan dispute.81

Another nuclear scientist, Numan Al-Naimi,openly opined that Iraq, too, should have that right,insisting that possession of a nuclear [capability] is alegitimate right in order to have technology, science,and the power to defend onself. Depriving Iraq of thistechnology only achieves the Wests strategic goal,

and he went on to rue the fact that the post-Saddamgovernment did not protect the countrys scientistsand that many had even been imprisoned.82 To be sure,


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even those supporting nuclear weapons for Iraq havebeen careful to emphasize that such a capability would

be used only for deterrence by creating a balanceof nuclear terror with Israel and Iran, therebycontributing to regional stability and security. As Al-Khafaji put it, The principle of the balance of nuclearterror is the only practical solution to putting an endto the arrogance of just one party which has nuclearweapons in a conict.83

Bogus claims in the news media by Iraqis to theeffect that Western forces have already used nuclearweapons against Iraq may also make the environmentmore congenial to an Iraqi nuclear option in thefuture. For example, the former Commander of theRepublican Guards, Lieutenant-General Sayf Al-DinAl-Rawi, maintained that U.S. forces had used neutronweapons in the attack on Baghdad Airport, while an

unnamed Iraqi physicist accused the British of usingair-launched nuclear-tipped missiles against SouthernIraq.84 There are claims by other Iraqis that theinternational atmosphere is not conducive to nucleardisarmament, the elimination of nuclear weaponsbeing unrealistic. They point to the U.S. retention andmodernization of its own nuclear arsenal, with oneIraqi commentator labeling nonproliferation talk asno more than sophistry and asserting that peacefulcoexistence is just a myth.85

Making a Case for Nuclear Weapons. An Iraqi Shiapundit, Hamid Al-Shakir, has made perhaps the moststraightforward and extended argument in the Iraqinews media in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons.86He develops his basic premise by asking whether,

given that some states have nuclear weapons, othersshould seek a symmetrical capability or whetherthey should accept the status quo so as to ensure the


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superiority of some states over others in order to createa peace of the strong over the weak. Al-Shakir views

international relations from a realpolitik perspective,emphasizing the primacy of power, and noting thatinternational law is nothing but the other face ofpower. For him, it is technological, military, andstrategic power which give states a seat at the tablewhere the right and the wrong of law are determined.Only power can lead to authentic peace rather thanpeace imposed by the enemyneither good intentionsnor an imbalance of power can produce peace.Moreover, he specically equates the possession ofnuclear weapons with having a seat at the table.

Al-Shakir accuses the West of promoting peacein the Middle East while opposing the buildup ofmilitary power by local states, again asking whetherthe Islamic Arab states can accept peace with Israel

and the world while they are completely emptyand bereft of all power. In particular, he focuses onwhether peace can be crafted between a weak stateand a great nuclear state, noting that no one wants tonegotiate from a position of weakness, and that if oneside lacks nuclear weapons it is automatically weak.He continues to stress the need for peace throughstrength. He even warns that one could wake up oneday and nd an Arab or Islamic country wiped offthe human map by devastating nuclear bombs. . . atthe hands of Israel or the United States of America. Inhis view, Israel would be willing to undertake such anattack so long as it knew that there was no equivalentretaliatory capability.

He concludes in no uncertain terms that nuclear

war cannot be deterred except by possessing onesown nuclear weapons! His solution to this precarioussituation is for the Arab or Islamic states to also acquire


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nuclear weapons, whereupon these states standingamong the nations and peoples [would] change

genuinely. In his view, having nuclear weapons willbring about real peace, security, and stability. How-ever, displaying obvious confessional partiality, Al-Shakir concludes that this realistic strategic perspec-tive is what induces us to demand the developmentof an Islamic Shia nuclear arsenal which will revivethe spirit of genuine balance in the Middle East region,and thus make possible the establishment of a differentbalance between the Arabs and Muslims, on the onehand, and Israel and the West, on the other.

He concludes his analysis with a warning to theeffect that if our Arab and Islamic states do nothasten to acquire standing nuclear deterrent forces,they unavoidably will confront real exterminationin the form of a total war which will force them to

surrender so that the master-slave relationship can beconsolidated. While it is not clear whether the authorfavors nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran, of a Shia-dominated Iraq, or both, what is unambiguous is hisconclusion that nuclear weapons are required in orderto achieve a balance with Israel and the United States.In key aspects, this perspective is a carryover of earlierthinking in Iraq on the utility of nuclear weapons,and one that today is widely shared in the region as awhole.

Marginal Dissonant Views.

The only apparent dissonant element in this over-view of Iraqi thinking would seem to be the prevailing

opinion in one online forum session run by the BBCArabic service. Asked whether the Arabs should havethe right to acquire nuclear weapons, the majority of 47


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replies by Iraqi respondents were negative. However,such surveys should be approached with caution.

Quite apart from the impossibility of determiningthe identity of participants in an anonymous onlineforum (Kurds, Christians, migrs, those declaringfalse data, etc.), the BBC site was likely to attractyounger, Western-oriented, contributors, with littlepolitical clout. What is more, the often critical asses-sments expressed in this forum about the Arabsmay reect Iraqi views of their neighbors capabilitiesand trustworthiness more than views about their owncountry.87 Ultimately, the impact of a small number ofanonymous bloggers on the national debate is likely tobe insignicant.

Ethical Perspectives.

One does not nd discussions in Iraqi circles aboutthe moral/ethical implications of nuclear weapons,even by religious gures, such as emerged in theWest especially in the early years of the nuclear era.On the contrary, those Iraqi Shia ulama who havebroached the subject have used a religious argumentto support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Forexample, Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi told SyrianTV that this Islamic Arab Umma [Arab world] mustacquire nuclear weapons. Otherwise, he concluded,the United States would continue to oppress andattack the Arabs, making them the latest victims ofAmerican colonialism.88 While Iraqi Sunni clerics havenot openly made religious arguments in support ofnuclear weapons, those Iraqi Sunnis seeking moral

support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons canrely on the existing widespread explicit approvalamong mainstream Sunni religious clerics throughout


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the region on the legitimacy of WMD, the acquisitionof which is often declared to be a duty for the Umma.

Environmental Considerations.

Unlike in the past, today there is scope in Iraq forexpressing publicly concerns about the safety andenvironmental impact of nuclear power. Whateverunease Iraqi experts have expressed on this subject,however, has been largely oriented on the effectsstemming from the past. Although commentatorshave painted a grim picture of the current radiologicalcontamination in Iraq, they most often blame thesituation on U.S. actions, particularly on U.S. neglect inthe wake of the collapse of security after the invasionin 2003, when nuclear waste materials were lootedor otherwise disposed of improperly. For example,

scientists such as Anis Al-Rawi, Dean of the College ofScience at Baghdad University, and Hamid Al-Bahilihave described in graphic terms howafter U.S. forcesleft the Osirak/Tammuz nuclear complex unguard-edthe locals took barrels containing nuclear wastematerials, emptied the contents into the river, and thenused the barrels for their own storage purposes or todeliver milk from dairies. They speak of the likelihoodof severe long-term health consequences for the aver-age Iraqi from the contamination that resultedincluding sterility, birth defects, and cancersug-gesting that the United States should be responsiblefor providing medical care for anyone thus aficted.89

The countrys embryonic environmental movementhas also addressed the contamination of Iraqs soil

and water stemming from the U.S. use of depleteduranium munitions.90 In fact, one report concludedthat the existing contamination was an environmental


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and health disaster, listing all the horrendousresulting medical problems.91 One Iraqi scientist also

worried that the United States might pressure Iraqinto allowing it to accept nuclear waste, and warnedthe Iraqi government not to do so.92 This same Iraqiscientist, in fact, proposed a postponement of any newnuclear initiatives until the current nuclear sites werecleaned up, noting that the present time is not at allappropriate for such a [new nuclear] initiative until theappropriate authorities address this [contamination]issue and decontaminate all the land completely.93

However, in Iraq the focus on safety or environ-mental issues does not seem to be linked to the futureor to be intertwined with considerations about thebasic desirability of nuclear power. Although such al-legations released in the public domain may givesecond thoughts to some about the safety of nuclear

power, no one in Iraq has critically addressed thelong-term environmental concerns in discussionsabout new nuclear facilities. On the contrary, an Iraqiscientic journal made the case that whatever thenegative aspects in terms of the environment, nuclearpower was still the best long-term option.94

An unnamed Iraqi government scientist, in fact,assured the public that nuclear energy cannot causepollution to the environment.95 Other Iraqis, such asnuclear scientist Asad Al-Khafaji, have minimized therisks of radiation in general, with the latter declaringhis belief that the risk of being struck by a speedingcar, or drowning at sea, or falling from the tenth story,or having a cup full of sulfuric acid spilled on oneshead is [no] less dangerous than being exposed to

radiation!96 In fact, Al-Khafaji imputed such concernsto a foreign campaign to turn Iraqis against nuclearpower contrary to the countrys national interest.97


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Joining the debate, an Iraqi cinematographer evensuggested that there was ample space in the deserts in

the Middle East to dispose of nuclear waste safely.98

Asin the case of civilian nuclear reactors, even for thosetied to weaponization, most Iraqis involved in dis-cussions of nuclear power do not voice concern aboutpotential dangers. When one Iraqi did voice reserva-tions about the environmental dangers of nuclearpower, it was conned to Iranian reactors, but thatmay have been more politically motivated than basedon environmental criteria.99

To be sure, Iraqis have been sensitive to the pre-sence, in Iraq, of any U.S. WMD. For example, Article7 of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement adoptedin December 2008, only allows the United States tointroduce military equipment into the country on con-dition that it has no direct or indirect connection to

weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons,nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biologicalweapons, and the wastes related to such weapons).100However, in this case, sovereignty issues were probablymore important than environmental ones.

Again, the Kurds have had a different point of viewthan other Iraqis, with one of their leaders, MasoudAl-Barzani, reiterating his general opposition to anynuclear activity whatsoever in Iraq: Actually, I amsimply against nuclear weapons. I am even againstbuilding a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes,citing the risk of a catastrophic nuclear accident.101

PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Although the nuclear power situation in Iraq is stillevolving, with the opinions surveyed here indicating avariety of views on some issues, the positions expressed


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by those Iraqis who are knowledgeable, involved, andinuential as to policy do help clarify some trends for

the future.

The Near-Term Trajectory.

In Iraq, one should expect the same movementtoward nuclear power as in the rest of the MiddleEast. Iraq is an integral part of what has long beenrecognized as a regional system in terms of security,politics, and culture and cannot be insulated frombroader regional dynamics.102 As an Iraqi academicargued at a conference, Iraq, because of its geographiclocation, is part of the Arab world, and one cannotsimply separate or isolate it from its Arab neighbors.103Moreover, as another academic emphasized, Arab,Islamic, and regional forces cannot escape having an

impact on Iraqs policies.104

Even with the still tenuous domestic situation,

most Iraqis feel that their country by right oughtto play aor theleading role in the Arab world.Despite the domestic fragmentation in Iraq, thereseems to be an emerging academic consensus, at leastamong those able to overcome confessional loyalties,that Iraq should again play a major regional role, andthat what is holding Iraq back from inuencing theregional system is only the lack of consensus amongthe patriotic Iraqi forces. Moving from analysis toprescription, a conference participant concluded thatIraq must regain its place in the world and in theArab world in general, and vis--vis the neighboringcountries in particular.105 As the Deputy Chair of

Iraqs National Assembly reminded his colleagues atthe 15th Conference of Arab Parliaments held in Omanin 2009, Iraq is still an important factor in the Arab


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world [Umma], and he assured them that Iraq wouldbe returning to the Arab arena in full force.106

As noted, Iraq is part of a regional geostrategicand political system, and what its neighbors do withrespect to nuclear power is likely to have a signicantimpact on Baghdads own decisionmaking process.Even more than Irans actions with regard to nuclearweapons, what Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Turkey do maybe even more salient for Iraq. Some Iraqi observers takeit for granted that if Iran acquires nuclear weaponsthen the Arab states in the Gulf, for their part, willbe impelled to undertake an arms race, including anuclear one, adding an additional unsettling factor tothe Iraqi calculus.107

For many Iraqis, being a regional leader, as notedabove, also means being a leader in the eld of nuclearpower. It should not be surprising that Iraqis would

want to participate in the same trends emergingaround them in the region. At the moment, and for theforeseeable future, the tendency among virtually all ofIraqs neighbors is to consider or actually embark onsome type of nuclear power development, includingsome oil-rich states such as the UAE and Kuwait. AnyIraqi government will likely seek to avoid openingitself to criticism for its lack of support of scienticprogress, whether in comparison to Iraqs neighborsor to the previous regime. Scientic achievements, andespecially in the glamorous and high-prole eld ofatomic power, may well be the chosen vehicle to bolsterthe new regimes domestic and regional legitimacy.108

Rebuilding an Infrastructure.

There have been discreet initiatives by the Iraqigovernment to help reestablish a nuclear program.Of course, in the recent past, the development of


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civilian and military nuclear programs in Iraq wereintertwined, serving as a catalyst for conict with the

West, particularly the United States, one could haveexpected that after Saddams fall and the end of theoccupation, measures would be taken to reorganizethe countrys nuclear establishment.

In August 2003, the Provisional Government form-ed the Ministry of Science and Technology, absorbingthe formerly independent Atomic Energy Organiza-tion and the Military Industrialization Corporation.Some Iraqis voiced this as an attempt to downgradethe countrys nuclear potential, with an editorial in anIraqi scientic journal criticizing the move and callingfor a review of the hasty decision. The editorialsuggested that at least a separate nuclear directoratebe retained in the new ministry, arguing that alldeveloped countries have nuclear power agencies.109

A distinct National Nuclear Power Committee wasestablished within the new Ministry. In 2009, theBaghdad government also announced its intention toestablish an ofcial independent oversight body, theNational Committee for Atomic Energy, to not onlycoordinate with the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) and other relevant foreign entities, butalso to energize the Iraqi nuclear installations andto prepare high-quality specialists [for overseeing]the national program in order to prepare such cadresof [the appropriate] quality and number.110

Over time, Iraq has taken concrete steps to rebuildat least some aspects of its nuclear capabilities. IraqsMinister of Science and Technology, Raid Fahmi,for example, requested formally that his countrys

outstanding nuclear le dating from the Saddamregime be closed . . . completely . . . ofcially, and forgood, and cast his case against the lingering obstacles


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in terms of the right of states to use nuclear powerfor peaceful purposes.111 One can sense an underlying

resentment, even within government circles, of whatis perceived as an unjustied suppression of Iraqslegitimate right to atomic power. For example, whenannouncing that Iraq would adhere to the IAEAsadditional protocols on nuclear assurances, thegovernment spokesman, Ali Al-Dabbagh, added thatthis would help strengthen Iraqs ongoing efforts toend the oversight of the IAEAs Iraqi task force byeliminating the excuses (mubarrirat) on which someSecurity Council countries rely to have that teamcontinue its oversight work.112

In practical terms, the Iraqi government has alsoworked to reintegrate the country into the Arab worldsofcial nuclear research mainstream and to highlightthe countrys expertise after years of isolation. The Arab

world, for its partperhaps anxious for additionalbalance between Iran and Israelhas indicated thatit would welcome Iraq back in the nuclear fold. Forexample, Iraq has been able to resume cooperationwith the Arab Leagues Atomic Energy Agency. TheSecretary General of the Arab League, Egypts AmrMoussa, reiterated in August 2008 to a visiting Iraqidelegation dealing with nuclear power that the Arabcountries must absolutely enter the eld of the peacefuluses of atomic energy.113 Iraq also served as the Chairfor the Arab Leagues 3-day conference monitoringIsraeli nuclear activity in violation of the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Cairoin 2008, and helped work on the joint Arab position inresponse to the threat of Israels nuclear weapons.114

Later that same year, the Director General of theArab Atomic Energy Organization invited a high-level Iraqi delegation to participate in the agencys


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21st conference in Beirut, Lebanon, where plans werediscussed for Arab cooperation on the peaceful uses of

nuclear power to 2020. Iraqs Minister of Science andTechnology stressed at the conference his countryseagerness to become involved again, stating thatIraq was fully prepared to offer the experience of itsscientists and specialists to develop a joint strategy.Moreover, he was gratied that a recommendationwas to be made to the Arab League to support the lift-ing of United Nations (UN) Resolution 707, passed in1991, which had mandated intrusive inspections inIraq and prohibited activity in the nuclear eld.115

Iraq has also been showing greater assertivenesson other aspects of this issue, with its NationalAssembly, for example, in 2009, resurfacing an earlierclaim against Israel for compensation for the damagethe latter caused by its 1981 air strike against Iraqs

Osirak/Tammuz reactor.116

This issue has continuedto remain active, with complaints that since Iraq wasobliged to continue paying reparations for the 1990invasion of Kuwait and since it still owed money toFrance for the reactor, a 1981 UN Resolution calling forreparations for the reactor should be enforced.117

During his visit to France in February 2009, IraqsMinister for Electricity, Karim Wahid, requested thatFrance help build a nuclear reactor in Iraq because . . .the future is in nuclear power.118 Also indicative ofIraqs interest in foreign assistance in the nuclear areawas the apparent gaffe by an Iraqi government ofcialin announcing that Italys partially state-owned Enienergy conglomerate would invest in nuclear power inIraq. Eni, perhaps embarrassed by the public disclosure,

was quick to stress that its investment would be only inthe oil sector.119 By late 2009, an Iraqi diplomat, Ali Al-Bayati, Counselor at the Embassy in London, told Abu


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DhabisAl-Arabiyya TV that his country had begun tostudy a plan to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful

purposes, which he declared was Iraqs right.120

Objective Obstacles. There are, to be sure,

signicant practical obstacles that militate against arapid resumption of nuclear-related activitycivilianand, even more so, militaryto include the coun-trys physical infrastructure (still incompletely recon-stituted), marginal fuel resources, and depleted humancapital. Nuclear Materials and Facilities. Iraqs nuclearfacilities were damaged by U.S. air strikes in 1991and again in 2003, with decontamination anddecommissioning beginning with international helpafter Saddams fall.121 Iraqs recent disposal of itsnuclear fuel material also presents a serious obstacleto a rapid reestablishment of its nuclear program. In

an operation shrouded in secrecy in 2008, Iraq sold itsstock of 550 metric tons (in 3,500 barrels) of apparentlycommercial-grade yellow cake (milled uranium oxide),to the Canadian company Cameco.122

The Iraqi government appeared to be sensitive todomestic criticism, insisting that the entire operationhad been Iraqs alone and that the United States hadonly provided technical advice (although the U.S.military had transported the materials, reportedly atonly 10 percent of the actual shipping cost).123 An Iraqigovernment spokesman cited the reasons why Iraq haddivested itself of the material as being environmentalconcerns and the expense of providing security, as wellas the impossibility of using it locally anyhow.124As Iraqs Minister for Science and Technology, Raid

Fahmi, later claried, however, there were alsopolitical motives, namely, a desire to meet the terms ofUNSC 1991 Resolution 687, so as to bring Iraq into full


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compliance with the provisions of the cease-re of thatyear.125 At the same time, the Minister saw this as an

important step toward acquiring assistance for Iraq toreestablish its right to engage in nuclear activities forpeaceful purposes.126

Some in Iraq were incensed by the transfer ofthe nuclear materials. Iraqs Association of MuslimScholars, for example, fulminated against what itcalled the theft, . . . of a great national treasure inits Communique 568 of July 8, 2008. Calling for acondemnation of the action, the communique reiteratedthat the uranium oxide remained Iraqi property andthat soon Iraqs rights would return to the people.127Another Iraqi observer living in Sweden cast doubt onthe Iraqi governments assertion that it had agreed tothe initiative, dismissing the rationale that it had beendone for the safety of the Iraqi population and labeling

the U. S. operation banditry . . . more like the actionof a cowboy.128 A former senior Iraqi military ofcerlikewise called those who claimed that the uraniumwas sold out of fear that terrorists would gain accessignorant, gullible, and lacking a conscience.129 Heinsisted that the uranium had been locally mined andshould have been used locally rather than sold for atriing price.130

Iraqs Scientic Community. Iraqs scientic humancapital is also far from being reconstituted. To be sure,the knowledge base gained with the breakthroughsachieved in the last phases of Iraqs program beforeits sudden termination during the Gulf War is stillextant in the minds of the countrys former scientists.However, they are now scattered and far removed.

With most now approaching retirement age and withno sustained program in place to train and organizetheir successors, reconstituting the old programs


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will become difcult and complicated unless presentpersonnel trends are reversed.

Nuclear scientistsas well as other Iraqi aca-demicshave often felt threatened in the aftermathof Saddams fall. Many were pursued by the U.S.occupation force for arrest in connection with theirprevious activity. Moreover, it appears that manyintellectuals have also been targeted for assassinationor kidnapping, and many have ed abroadincludingto other Arab countries and Iranbecause they feltvulnerable.131 Reports of murdered Iraqi scientistshave been frequent in the Iraqi media and on theWeb, with one journalist claiming that if one wantsto destroy this country, it can be accomplished bykilling its scientists, since that would scuttle Iraqsdevelopment, progress, and rebirth.132 A leadingIraqi nuclear scientist, Nur Al-Din Al-Rabi, estimated

that Iraq lost some 5,500 scientists through emigrationor assassination.133 Another source estimated thatof those killed, 350 were nuclear scientists.134 As abaseline, an Iraqi nuclear scientist estimated that atone time some 2,000 scientists and researchers, and10,000 engineers and technicians, had worked onIraqs nuclear program.135

While those responsible have seldom been ident-ied and may include nancially-motivated criminals,Iranian intelligence, and sectarian killers, Iraqisources frequently have blamed unnamed foreignintelligence or have alleged the Mossad, Israelssecret service, implicating at times U.S. acquiescence.136The attribution to Mossad may be plausible, giventhe latters track record of reported assassinations in

earlier years of individuals connected with Iraqs armsprograms, allegedly including the developer of Iraqssuper gun, Gerald Bull, and the then-director of itsnuclear program, Yahya Al-Mashadd.137


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The Iraqi government has more recently begunto make efforts to reconstitute the countrys scientic

community by signicantly raising salaries forprofessors and announcing plans to send 10,000graduate students and faculty in the sciences abroadover the next 4 years for study and research.138 TheIraqi government is also seeking to repatriate scien-tists in the diaspora.139 In 2009, Iraqs Prime Minister,Nuri Al-Maliki, specically stressed the need toinvite nuclear scientists to return home.140 However,due to continuing security concerns, this process ofreintegrating academics may be slow. As of October2008, for example, of 6,700 professors who had leftafter 2003, only 150 had returned.141 The United States,for its part, developed a pilot program to recruit Iraqiscientists formerly involved in the countrys militaryresearch programs for new civilian jobs.142 Despite such

efforts, it is unlikely that the damage suffered by Iraqsscientic establishment can be undone quickly, andthere are indications that returning academics are oftendisappointed by the lack of immediate employmentopportunities.143

Nuclear Security Concerns. Security related to anuclear program, both from accidents and the diversionof nuclear materials, will remain a valid concern.First, as with any nuclear program, and especially aedgling one, there is the possibility of mechanical orhuman error, leading to an accident which could havedisastrous implications for the entire region.144 Thecurrent reduced complement of experts in the eldavailable in Iraq and the still rebuilding governmentstructures may heighten the risk and complicate a

rapid and effective disaster response and damagecontrol capability.


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Moreover, radioactive materials inherent in even apeaceful nuclear program could be misappropriated

by terrorists for use in a radiological dispersal device(the so-called dirty bomb). The still unstable securitysituation in Iraq and the continuing disruptive activityby al-Qaeda, even if at a substantially reduced level,are legitimate reasons for concern in this area. Thefact that three employees of the Ministry of Scienceand Technology were arrested in 2008 on chargesof al-Qaeda membership highlights the continuingpotential risks of compromise by terrorists of sensitivetechnology, information, or materials.145 The highdegree of corruption at all levels of Iraqs politicalsystem and society poses a real security vulnerabilityin this respect.146 The dire economic straits under whichso many Iraqis live only magnify the risk for corruptionpotentially leading to such a diversion.147

Although unlikely, the possibility of reestablishinga covert Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the futurecannot be dismissed categorically. Despite the progressmade over time, there are still questions today aboutthe effectiveness of international monitoring ofcivilian nuclear programs to ensure against diversionof resources to a military program. A report of theNonproliferation Policy Education Center, whichevaluated the efcacy of the IAEA in detecting andensuring against such an eventuality, stated that theinspection agency continues to have serious decien-cies in this regard.148 The willingness of othergovernments to transfer nuclear technology inreturn for money adds to the peril of covert nuclearproliferation.149 Iraqis, however, seldom voice such

concerns. A rare exception was a leftist writer in Iraqwho did worry about the widespread trend in theMiddle East to seek nuclear reactors for allegedly


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peaceful purposes, noting that such technologiescould be diverted for military purposes.150

Iraqs Decisionmaking Parameters on Nuclear Weapons.Whether Iraq ever decides to seek to reestablish amilitary nuclear program will depend on complexdomestic and regional dynamics. The Factors in Decisionmaking. The precedinganalysis suggests that, despite the upheaval accom-panying the U. S. invasion and the elimination of theSaddam regime, the idea of the utility of nuclearweapons may still be present in certain circles, andmay one day be revived in Iraq. Andrew Flibbert,in particular, has made a cogent inferential case thatIraqs historical experience, geography, and regionalsecurity situation will predispose it to renew its questfor nuclear and other WMD even in the absence ofSaddam. He stresses enduring conditions as driving a

future return to proliferation in Iraq, while criticizingwhat he terms the overemphasis on personality in ouranalytical perspective, that is, a focus on the role anindividual such as Saddam played in such a process.151As Flibbert puts it:

Without a fundamental transformation of the region-

al security environment, too many incentives willdrive any future sovereign Iraqi state to seek nuclearand other WMD. Most of the underlying causes ofIraqs pursuit of WMD remain in place today, andnothing is likely to change the continuing reality. Thewar launched by the United States could generate thegreatest proliferation pressure of all.152

Some, on the other hand, have made convincing

arguments for the continuing importance and impactof leaders and personalities in making key decisionsin world affairs, all the more so for the individual-oriented regimes common in the Middle East.153


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Perhaps the most fruitful framework for under-standing the developing decisionmaking situation on

nuclear power in Iraq is a combination of both ap-proaches. However important they may be, evenenduring historical or geographic factors do notforeordain a countrys policies or security choices. Asan analogy, although naval theorist Alfred ThayerMahan isolated various long-term geographic, histor-ical, economic, and social factors as predisposing anation to become a sea power, he nevertheless cappedhis taxonomy with a nal factor: The Characterof the Government, including therein the nationalinstitutions. This human factor in Mahans judgment,could balance the preceding natural conditions:Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular formsof government with their accompanying institutions,and the character of rulers at one time or another,

have exercised a very marked inuence upon thedevelopment of sea power. He thus recognized thatgovernments have a free will, exercising what he callsintelligent will-power.154 For example, countrieswith a geographic conguration such as a long coast-line or location near key waterways could still beoriented on being continental powers rather than seapowerssuch as the United States until at least 1898,or Japan until World War IIbecause of consciouspolicy choices.

In that vein, what this survey of Iraqi opinionwithin the informed public does indicate is theexistence of a domestic intellectual and politicalenvironment that is receptive to the notion of nuclearweapons as a useful and legitimate instrument of

national power. However, there is no direct linearcorrelation between such opinions and the eventualacquisition of nuclear weapons. In particular, therewould still be a requirement for a viable leadership to


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mobilize domestic opinion and resources, deal withthe international consequences, and then formulate

and implement concrete policies. As an Iraqi academicargued, the geographic factor in and of itself is not thesole determinant of Iraqi policy. As or more importantwill be how decisionmakers utilize and maximize thepotential of geography to promote specic policies.155

The Domestic Political Dynamic. Iraqs politicalestablishment at present is visibly fragmented, andthe political situation is likely to remain unstable forsome time to come, with Sunni, Shia, and Kurdishblocs assessing threats and remedies from markedlydifferent perspectives, not to speak of the splinteringand shifting alliances within the confessional/ethniccommunities and political blocs themselves.156 Iraqiintellectuals recognize that the role of their country inregional and international affairs is still evolving and

anything but clear, a consensus conclusion reached ata roundtable of academics in Baghdad recently.157 Thecountrys political leaders will likely be distracted forthe foreseeable future by far more pressing domesticchallenges, and Iraq may be entering a long bout ofinstability not unlike that of the 1950s-60s.

Whether certain attitudes are translated intoconcrete policies in the near future or everespeciallyinsofar as a renewed attempt to acquire nuclearweapons is concerneddepends on numerousunpredictable events. No one can forecast what thenal constellation of forces within Iraq will look like,and internal dynamics will play a pivotal role indetermining Iraqs security orientation and prioritiesand its practical approach to WMD. Paradoxically,

if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a Shia-dominatedgovernment in Baghdad might welcome from Irana nuclear umbrella against Israel or hostile Sunni


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neighbors and perhaps forgo developing its ownnuclear arsenal. Such an eventuality would obviously

provide Tehran with continuing leverage over Iraq.Or a nuclear Iran might help a Shia-controlled Iraqby selling to it or otherwise providing nuclear know-how and materials,

Documents

Thinking About Nuclear Power in Post-saddam Iraq Pub979