•NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regardedas authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy inall aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarilythose of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est pr~liminaire et nla autun caract~re officiel.On nla pas v~rifi~ son exactitude et les interpretationsqulil contient ne sont pas n~cessairement celles du Servicehistorique.

Directorate of HistoryNational Defence HeadquartersOttawa, CanadaK1A OK2

July 1986

o( '.aapoat' ao.:ua

IIIISrMxCAL :tC

LI'fAI'fr JIBAIDQlLI'MIiIlS

c

4»P""1'. w.. wInte1l1geDoe Repoaot (IBl'1t1!1h~ at DIB(88 J.\IS a,.

• wCClIIlb&~ pOl:'t aD4 enou ~~4(oeto~ ben"')4UI!'iIls !lI'Ullh Atteek CIII DIBPpa19" t1 ( ~ ..).

•• eta. (b) 117 -.1_ O. sa a..a-~:-~n·J-:~......tes ...).

r .....lI. C

• IIILL·,PDP

10. III .. • 1011. ~A:sa. u 1I~'0e4t2IIlt .r':.U _ .0.• ". "- . WlItllt 1Ib1 ... beUllft4 to ha..._~ au..... cToet'IQ•••

" •1I11b' !law ae-wcl 1Il ,... ro. the bow- 7" ot ..iIel_. Xt 18 lIlte"~ to~ , F_ •.,....w0GIlIIUIF or .~ eo _F 18 p1&..4 111 • .,.., ••'1••_U1lCID ill tho 0.. m u.t or UD1te. tRM1a.'•

• UCID tho1l ti. 111 , poII.~ be F••• .,. ..... 7 " •

• Pt"_b~. _. IIIIN .....,..t:IIN.

(0) Jl!11!S C""".£:'M!i!9l&LU. lie _ ot1<l11 to .ttaeII -.:t . 41"''''lIlto r- 41UlIlot pIIU.. t

(1) c___ t S 1tl t2IoIL_.(11)

(Ul)

(lY)

I• •

f!I&'ifl~SiP ta, ~ f~'~' :JP l~rl'i~lltP itIIIJ11~1!rlr~Clcl~'It~~!i·i'l r~ ~f!i i~ ii 31,1, t li~~ If Ii It !IE ! i .

.fit r~ i f~ 81 !~ I 'I~l: ,,' ~ tId

i...r r48 ~~f : Iliff n1111"18'1:1 !.ftl ,.:;Ij ~. I '.. •

. 8 18 ! ~ii, .:. fl, ...flf I ,!:: ~r pH

II i! l~fJ~I.i i l'afn'l . 1 !I

.I .! · i · HI· •

• a f -

•

•

•

•

•

•

•COpy

Annex to pnr~graph 4 of the LXXXI Amy Corps H.Q.Opcr~_tion6 Ord""r, 640/42 Secret

Hc~dou~rtors, LXX~I Army Corps

Intelligenco Sectien

H.Q., 22 August 1942

INTELLIQENCE HEPar.! ON BRITISH LANDING AT Dll:PFE ON 19 AUG 42

(Eno~y Intentione - SoureD, CapturGd Docuounts)

L) Mission:

a) To land at 0610 in DIEPPE itself and on both sidc.a of tho city under tho

protection of th(; Air Foret! and the Navy.

b) To occupy the city and the fortified arM. of DIEPPE.

c) To push through with infantry and nrmour6d Units to ARGUES-LA-8ATAILLE

whor£J it was assumod that a Division Commend Post lias locatt.;d.

2.) Purpose:

The English intonded to put the DIEPPE Dofonst: Zone out of acticn for the.

longest possible tim. It \V&S also their intention to immobilize for aome

time. to come all military installations, coastal battt.rius, radio stations,.ai~finlds, ships, as well as all utilities (Gas, Elootrieity, Harbour,

Crance, Railroads).

Furthormore, they envisaged taking the larg~ct possiblo number o'prisoners plue a large ~rietf of military dOQuments, weapons and ~ipmont.

After completing their mission, thoy were to re-umbe.r):: by 1530 hours.

3.) COnI:EJ1ders:

Commndbr-in-Chief: prcsUlDflbly Lord t~ountbntton

COr.11%ndor of Ground Forcesl l.!ajor Gencrc.l Roberts (His nppointcent '\OIt:.S not

identified. )

Coccnnder of the 4th Bri~de: Brigndier Lett

Cocmonder of ihe 6th Brigade: Brigadier South~~

1/1""----~---------------_-......""_--'-c---"~-'-".._"""_ ...._-1/ • • -2-

4.} The Task Force Consisted of:

2nd Canadien Infcntry Division

4th Brigade (Hccdqu:l.rters 25 Men)

(1 ) Royal Regimer:t. of Cc.no.d;;, (500 :!en)

(2 ) Royal E::.:niltor. L:igh"t Inf,:.ntry (5~0 Eon)

(3) Es~cx-Sccttisr. RcgisL;r.t (520 :'.on)

6th Brieadc <He~dq~rters 25 il~n)

(1) F\lsili£irs i~ont-Rv:J'::J. c.f C:'-n£!.dc. (560 :.!cn)

(2) Ca.'!leroons of Canc.d!. (500 ~l.:l)

(3) South &s.t.ntchm:c.u ROi;iJ1cnt (SUO Hen)

Troops Atta.chc-d tc. thl.." Task Forc.::: (tot:..l 1580 ",:m)

Black U::..tcll of Ceru...dp.. (5tL BriGade) attc.chL;d to the 6th Brig-r.de

'~"".~ .

5.) Phn:

(58 Tr.nks)

English ~brincs (str<':l1€;th Wl.'imc..,:n)

Canadian E!leinccr Units (Roynl Ccm:di!Ln Enr,ineers) (330 i:'.,m)

Third Corr...lt.ndo (ApproxiT;lCltoly OGO r.:en)

Fourth CO!:l'~ndo (fippr:...xi:x toly 225 ul,..n)

It is nl)t kno1m \":hcth...r ell units lc.ndcd in full strt:neth.

This \illS certaluly n...:t the enG.. with a p:-rt ~f the uttn.chc.-d tr...1L9s,

the Tank &.ttCl3.dl in p'J.rticultr.

c) The 5rd CC!'J:'nndo \:t.s suppt.st.'...d to l!:.nd ','ith 4 4;,cc.ult Prrtics n,",cx EEffiJh.'VAL

n.~d ~ith 2 Pnrti~s L~ t~e d~fil& ~~3t ~f BEFCiEVAL, in ord~r to crptur.. th~

2nd &.ttcry (Sr. Tr ... .Jr) of the 770th C.D. /irtill.er'J E:-tta.licn in':lll c.tt&ck

fro~ bvth flt.l'lkG. All A3~c.ult P,:,rti(;s ~:ur.., tu r·~t<l.rn t .. tncir ships d't'::T

acc~~plishinc th~ir tus~iJ:n.

b) A lc..ndinc; r.ns te. ~-I cff.x;tcd r..t fUlTS in tr'c \.C.v~s, the first \.T,va tc cun-

sist. of the R,;yc.l Ro:;i;;'t-nt ..::.f Cc.n:':.dc. '£"i'th ;"nc lipht b!:.ttE.<IX (Br. Tro"p) c.ud

on~ licht ~ti-c.ircrr..ft ~ssLult ~\:cti~n; ~nd the 3<;.cund ~~vc .~s tc ccn~~

,,;,f the Blac!: Tatch Bc:ttc.li.,n. Gnu iXlrt L..f thi:: f_TCe: -·e.s t..:: rcluc..:. :..:.il-

itary vbJcctives ~cst~~rds ~lvnG the Cv~st; ~ sccvnd, t~ push f ...roure t·

NEUVILLE, whilst a third ~~s 'tv take thv hill vn thE; Lest ..f DIEPPE.

• •c) Two \?aves vere to land in DIEPPE as follows: the first to be made up of the

Essex Scots, the Hamiltons, the 14th Army Tank Batte:ion and Canadian Engin~~r

units; the second, of the. Fusiliors j:ont Royal.

Tho ESS0X Scots with one tank platoon (8r. Troop) had tho task of taking

tho eastern portion of DIEPPE and th~ harbour arca. !he rQmaining t~ battal­

ions and tho tank battalion, 108s one platocrt (Sr. Troop), UlTL to take the

\1estr.rn part of DIEPFE and the hill i/t.st of DIE??!!:, thon t:> 510" the high

ground, ST. AUBlll..ARQULS LA BATAn..LE, sinel it v/ns Resumed tha.t tho 110th In­

fantry Division hfld its hoadquarters in the latter tOlOno 'i'ho Canadian Engineers

~cre supposod to preparo a path across th~ b~&ch and through th~ tank barriers

for the tanks.

d) The South Saskatchewan Battalion was to E. nd as the first ,oUve nt POURVILLE,

followed by the Cameroons of Canada Battalion &a tho aocond wave. They were

to push on through tho SCrE VALLEY, to swing to the East destroying the air­

port IJ.t ST. AUBllJ, and knock out the Divisional Commr.nd Pee t nt ARQUES.

e) The 4th Commando u::s supposed to disembo.rk at VAREUGEVll..LE ::md ::t the mouth

of the SOHlfE, seize tho 813th B~ttery, !:nd rlithdraw to eot:. ertor nccomplishing

their tasK.

f) Every la.nding point \"."8.S to be covered by protoctive fire from a destroyer.

Two destroyors were supposed to slip into the barbour of DIEPPE aDd land

troops directly.

g) After all tasks wore accompli8h~d, the withdrawal to tho landing points,

which would be aarried out under cov&r of bombura, vas to bo ~ffect~d in

such a way that tho reombarkation would bo completed by 1530 hours.

6.) Prepnretion:

Tho undertaking vms prepared moat conscientiously. The Operation Ord~r

is very dotailed (121 typewritten pa.ges) and, th~refore difficult to visualize

ns a whole. Tho many code worde us~d meke it difficult to grusp in its Lntir~­

ty, and even more 80 to use as e basis for issuing orders in battle. Tho

plar~ing dovm to the last datail limite thu independ~ncc of net ion of the sub­

ordinnto officer and loaves him no opportunity to make indopendent docisions

in an &1.tered eituation.

/

• • -4-

Th£ onony had very good naps (cl~~r printing ~d geed pap~r) d~tod

1 Auguet 1942, uith fortific~tions cle~rly ins~rt(d, pr~sUDcbly the rosults

of tho ovnluction of aerial photographs ~nd possibly of ruconnaisaancv by

leu-flying fight or plnncs. Corroberction by et:oret ngents 'wUG cvidbntly

not carried out (o~g. The strength ~f tho t~~k barrioTs in DIEPPE WUB not

known. It ~us Q8s~d thnt tho 110th Inf~try Division ~s in tho sector

end th~t Division He~dqu~rters ~s loc~tLd in ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE. Thera

v.ns ~ genoral Inck of knowlodgo as to the locction of rcgtn£ntnl and

bctt~lion coonand posts.

7.) Conbat Efficiency of the Encoy:

The Second C~Qdinn Division had l~in fer quito BODO tiea in tho

South of Engl::md, !:lost of thE;; tine in C::lt"lps. Tho troops \Joro transported

to tho co~st by truck on tho ~ftcrnoon of 18 August, loaded onto tl~sports

l'..nd shiopGd to the French Co::.:.st without being told eithu tho objectivo or

the ~is8ion, 60 that the ordinary scldiors wore conplct~ly in tho d~rk.

The Canadians on the whole fought badly and surrendered afterwards in ...

swarms.

On tho other hand, the combat efficiency of the Commandos was very

high. They v!ere well trained und fought with real spirit. It is reported

that they showed great skill in climbing the stoep coastal cliffs.

8.) Succoss of the Undortaking~

The Third Commando was ropulsed at BEfl.NEVAL by the Naval Signal

Station and the Second Battery (Br. Troop) of the 770th Anny Coast Artil~

lory Bettnlion. 80 men ~cre takon prisonor by our Division.

The ROEl Regiment of Cnn~da and tho Bleck Watch woro unsuccossful

in their attompt to tnks the strongpoint at PUlTS. They w6re cut down by

fire on the beach cnd suff&red 150 deod. Th~ rGmnindor, consisting of some

300 men, surr~ndercd.

The ~ex Scottish Bnttc.lion, tho fusilicrs f~ont-Royol Bo.tt:l1ion,

the Canadi3Jl Engine~rs nOO the 14th Army Tnnk B~.ttnlion r6m!.inod on the

bee.ch at DD:PPE in front of the enti-tcnk iroll, end suffort;d hifh lossc.s in

dead and wounded.

( • •-5-

Tht: Calu(.;rOan fll1d South &isbtcnt.."\7an Bcttalions succeeded in bro;:oaking

throueh the strongpoint 1 but for so~c unaccountablo reasons, proc~eQed no

further, with the exception of a patrol sent to HAUTOT. 200 :m.n \1.::re taken

prison~r by the Division R~scrve; th~ r~st got B..:ay on th~ boats.

The Fourth Comnando accompli~hcc its ~:ssion (z~izurc of the 8l5th

Batt~ry) and r~e~ba~~~d.

9.) Conclusio::1&

The op~ration f&ilLd, primaril7 b~CLUS~: in PUITS the lending ..cs

rGpulsec, i~ DIEPPE thG tenks did not succ-e.~ in crossing the nuti-t~r~-~~llJ

end neo.r POUFVILLE tl.e 9ritish bette-lions did not ccntinuc thl:lr cdVaDcc.

For t~c Corp~ E.Q. St(~f

T~e C!:h:f of tht) GentTnl St:lff

sign~d: sign~turc

C~rtifi~d a true COV/: S~id~nstic~~r

Captcin cnd Personal Assisthnt

•AH' "'1"'" .. t; ..

Corp. Headquarters, L:.<x::U .n.m,y Corps

Operations Officer

Nr. 640/42 Secret

25 August 1942

COiillAT R:HlRT I,,!D EXP..Rm~CES ChINED IXJRlNC THE

BRITISH ATT,\CK ON DBPPE 19 "UaUST 1942

I.) llIITUL SITU,.TI N:-

Disposition of our o"n Division:

The dispositions of the J02nd Infantry Division made allowances

for the 70 kJn ,•.i.de Divisiollll1 sector J the nature of the coe.stline, and the

steep slopes with numerous ravines leading do,m to the sea.. Consequently J no

continuous defence line \','a::; used but defences I. ere concentmtt.d round focs.l

points, i.e. aroWld the ,ports ,;,;herE: lUldings \";'ere possible or probable. With

the Y/ef'.k i'orce~ under our COIllJJ\l.I...'ld '.fC knouingly didn't defend every rnvinc.

Witho\1rtroops paste.d as thty vore, \',1.1 could not prevent th(; British from

making temporary lo.ndin.gs on the coast nt I3.c:HNEV~.L and V.t.1<ENGtvILLE and ob­

tt'.ining local SUCC(;SSt.:S \nt~ sp,",cial,\.,,;l~cquipp~d troops.

Our mo.L'"1 strc.tc:sy is to bo e.G stn::ng us posaibltJ ne.:l,T tht. porta

v.hich fom the foco.l ?oints o.nd on ,.hich our strongpoints an bas"' .... , so t..~t

an att&ck from land and sec. c:m Ol;, b~tc;n ofl'. Bccid<:s tMt, it 18 importc.nt

to have ns 4".J'.ny mobile rcscrVl:S CtS f)vssibl\.: in order to be l'.bll.: to support

strongpoints nnd initic.t\.l ilill'l1cdi!".t ... countt:r-atto.cks ag[!.inst urn..tny troops tW.t

may hc\Voa l<mdc;d in bt:twecn tht.sc strong pointe. It is ~.ll tht. oorc important

to withhold strong r",sE:rvcs 0.8 in ::.ny l.1.rgc sct'.l... .:1ss<J.ult th... \Jnemy ,rill cer­

tainly lcunch 0. simultnnc'Ous Air r...nd Sea attack :\gninst our coastal d.efc.nse,;.s:

the nir ~ttv.ck COIl.Sisting of strong t'.irbonliJ and pnrachutc forcos.

The following troops ,;o1'£'; cmployt.d in the atrongpoint cren of

Dn::PPE itsc.lf, the..; 571st Infll1ltry Regi~nt - H.Q., d.th ho Infc.ntry Battalions,

H.C}. £nginecr &.ttalion a..1ld t·",o Engincer Co.llpa.nie5, <.:ight Bl:C.ch D\]fc.-'llce guns

and th~e 4-7mw. Anti-Tonk guns 'Hhich 'kre me.nned by Infantry troops, the third

&.t';~on (Br. :B:lt~ry) of t:lt. ;02nU .....rtUlt.ry U\.:;¢.:.lOnt cons.i.sti.1:1&. of t-;;o

,..-2-

Batteries (Br. Troops) of Light Ho~~tzers and t\lO Batteries (Br. Troops)

carrying only equipment and supplies J and the 265th Heavy Infa.T1tI")P Ho•.1.tzcr

Battery (:3r. Troop) for coastal defences.

j.nti-ii.ircraft Unit 5:

One heavy anti-llircI<l.j.'t bil.tt~ry of 75mm (Er. Troop)

One Section of 5Omt:l

One Section of 37nu~

T";.o Sections of 20mm

..~bout 200 men 01' different naval units, 60 policcc.en and one experimental

coCPDJ'ly of about 60 men. (Tnmslator's note: possibly a. penal detachment).

Corps Reserves:

Regimental Hendquarters 676th Infantry Regiment OOUDL"VIIJ.j;

1st 3:rtt.:l11on, 676th InfLJ1-:ry, R glllcJlt in the !Ii2\ICOURl' woea.

3rd &tto.lioD., 676th Int..illtry R gil:-.cnt in the YVEl.'Ol' area.

3rd Ikrtt.:'.1ion, 570th Ir..,:...ultry Rcgi.....1...::lt in th ..... B....et.JJSVIILE area.

81 at Tank Company in the w;:,?Or <lreD..

These Corps reserves ,/f;)TO in a position that erlL~bled them to reach rc.pidly the

areas oi' the 302nd Division or of the 3,32nd InI~antr'y Division. These; disposi­

tions proved ac't(lq'· e on th~ 19th of i.ugust 1942.

The :.rtiller:t Ba.ttn.llon of the Corps reserve (1 at Ba.ttalion 352nd .~rtillcI')·)

-;;n15 U500 for lOc=.l.l cb&st.:l1 protection ~r FEt)liP l.UlL1 UtS._dt'a\Jn frori', thcI'(; to

the Corps Reserve.

II.) = BRITISH Pr.}l OP ATTfCK:-

The British int~ntion is clo~rly lnid CD\m in the detailed

orders , ..hich werc found. The Britis.l,. intE.nded to put th.; coastal. batteries

ncar BERtfi:Vl.L lll1d 7A.luJIG;.VII..L.t; out of nction. For this purpose t·.to COnJrn.::UlOO

detachments 0 ..... 250 and 350 men ,",-ere usc This ',:c..5 und~rtc.k(..n to prevent these

batteries fro:n shtJlling the initial landing as m:-ll IlS thG evacu.1.tion \mich

,;as schoduled to be completed by 15:;0 hours in thE. afternoon.

The lll!'";l.in objective \IllS to be the strongpoint area of DIEPPE,

\there 7 Battalions, supported by spcciol troops und one ArrD3 Tonk Battalion

(5& ranks). ,..lOre to be u""d.

•••-3-

Near ?\lite one Battalion \'lith one r.ight Bnttbry (Br. Troop)

end one Light rlJlti-~drcraft •.ss~u.lt Section (C-etnchmmt) UlI'{.. to l:.nd in th..:

first ,",eve n.nd f'Ntht;:r Batt:-_licn in th,- sc.c;Jnd \.":'.vc.

~ &t.J.cr.rJ.cnt -,-,ns tu attnok the .•nti-..ircr~ft CJr.'.pla.cu.\c.nts o.t

Q.'.lr? DZ ROliLDt 1 y;hich ;::..:;;c.ns tre.. t tho:' -,;.::rc to S\."ing Ec.st,.nrds c.ftc;r lnndinn:•

. .nothGr ~t.."\c~"L,...nt \.-:"3 to p..:.nctr"'.tl.. into RIITS oleo, end Tas

to o.ttc.ck ~l .".nti-.Urcrnft Ci".Iplo.ccl.1cnts .~_lcng thc. cOllstt\l roO-d fro:-J PUlTS to

D~1?PE on the hill to th... East of the port.

The ranincler of~ Battn.lions ,.l:,;l'C to s,,;::ing South;1:J.rds from

RIITS, ~ttc.ck ". II B(\ttc;l1~ (un-i,u-.1'll1i..d) ~t th... 1'<"ElJV".l"T,T.~ crossroa.ds, th13n

occupy the D:IW??E gc.s ~rks or (..l~ctric~ \.urks ",hioh \-,'cr~ to bo dClltroyod by

~ spf;cbJ. :~i.rh,;ur I::Iutc.chm:nt.

Hc.:\r DIL:?PE onl1 3Cltt,:~i,:m \·.ith one Pl:-.toon (Er. Troop) of tanks

"Ina to lo.nd duo 7i"cst of th... port \ ...ith thoir right flnnk on the street RUE DU

DtqtrESNE '·...hich ",,::\S also tht;' botU"kry line 'dth the Fourth B.:lttn.lion.

This Bnttc:.li,m l"........d tr.1.; t::.sk of occupying th<. ru-.r nr.,;cs of the

port end B.=.1jm OF KJID:\, end to ndv£lIlce up to the racet:rnck, which they were

to prepare for use as n lending glvund.

l~t !!:.£~~~£ ...'.crsi'l!ps vere to enter the port: the

Destroyer IOCl5T, and a. cutter.

~!!!£.!:! Buttc.lions ... ith tID J..rmy Tank Ba.ttalion, less one pla­

toon.(Br. Troop) wer€: to land on th..:.. DDJPPE B:L.:.GH V:est of the RtE DU DUQUESNE..

One Dets.cP..mcnt 5upportf.;d by one Tank Platoon (ar. Troop), lonS

to attack the hill West of the Casino, push on in the direction of the coast

road 10Cl.ding to roURVILI.E nnd roll up the vn.riolls battle h<mdqu::lrters looo.ted

in tlul.t nrea.

Another Dctnehm.;nt, also supported by on,; T.:mk Platoon, VIaS to

o.dV"'....J1.cE: through the. tcnil'l., in ord€;r to tc.kc the .~nti-Aircr3,ft positiona ~d

the positions 0::' Battery liB" (un-manncd) on thE: rn.r•.in rond to I.E R..VRZ.

The ram:l.ind~r~~~ Battalions, supported by one Ta.n.1<:

COtllpc>.ny, VJaS to advmcc llong,the In.:I,in rolld to ROUEN to the H~Q. of the

Engineer .Pcttalion on the Southern oJ:1gc of the.; to-.:n n.nd m.:::.ke conta.ct ..-dth

'the 31,.tte:.lion on their lr.;ft ne.::.r the .n1lti-iJ.rcruft positions East of tho

Engineer R.Q.

• • -4-

Onu Cot::ptny 'tms to :nove froe FOURVII.T;:. clang the. coasto.l roo.d to DnF~ and

'mB to roll 1.9 froI:l the '.:~~t the •..nti-..ircmft and cir foreo positions clang

the coast ..

The Sl,;com Campen)' ·...'Us to ~tt.:lck the f.::.rm 0 4 VINrES on the

]',Qst bnnk of th03 SCIE.

~ Third Campe..ny ',.'0.5 'b:> advunce :uong the \iost bank of the

SCrE up to thll South~rn udgL: of FOURVILT2.

The lo'ourth Compa.l!l was to a.d~..nce fIm:'l POURVIT,T.E along the

coast up the high ground in order to tnke the t!t.dline gun po3it1on situated

up there.

The Seventh Battalion ,me :J.so to lnnd a.t lUURV:ILI...? behind the- .Sixth Blltta1.ion "hioh ha. to ~stE.blish the bridgeher.d. (The perilnett:r of this

bridgehea.d 'Wfl5 fcIl!lt;;d by he Conpc.ny objectives i:!.e.:.ntioned ~boVG). The Seventh

Battalion >ms thl;:n to c..dvance w.ong the ~:(;st b.mk of tht:: SCG in Q. South-

"cst(;lrly direction to t~"1l nir field of ST. AUBDf. SUbsequently it ','illS to

proct::ed North~nstw:lrd ani take the positions of the 265th Buttery (Ur. Troop)

North of t'.RqUES-Iu-B..<1.'l'AIIL..t: wherG t:1C Division H.Q. ,lElS presur,led to be locatc:d.

It is not appurent \:hctiu:':r further units HerE: to la.'ld, should

this a.ttack he.ve btlcn sueccs3ful. It is possible that the eonvoyof 26 lo.rgc

bouts mieh left WRl'S2l()UI'!i ~out noon nnd ',hich lc.ter on turned £iliad, uas

to be th<; 8':'0000 ".nVC, should the operation meet yj. t."l success. This is al:oo

indic.::.ted by th£: fact th&.t mIinCroUS prioont:rs said thC".,i expected support or

relic.f from 1700 hours om.urds.

The British had. at their disposal excellent mapa on "hich cll

the inforrli:.tion obtained from al!!riDJ. reconnaissanoe \18.,9 plot-i;ed. This in-

eluded the smallest detail of the German ?oaitioD.s, and even the DIEPPE

;'lnti-Tank wallS, \",hich aeparate the streets fro!;} the. hc.rbour promenade,

were maim... .All possibilities of ascent ard descent \'ltlTe also c1<::a.rly

"

marked. However, thes~ maps give!!£ indication tl-.a.t thE: local French-Britieh

espionage has ~orked ~~ll. The locations of Reginantal and other H.Q. '5

"tere unkno·.:n. DivisiOJUl H.Q. \JC!.S presut:ed to be in iJ\CltJES-LA-a.·,x.·.IT,IT': \'ihere

it had bZt;n LlDlly Iocmt.lts ago. The pKsenc(.. of the 1iOth Infantry Division

was presumed, \.h,:)ro.£s th... 302nd I11.J....<:ntry Division MlS i.ctually (H\g&&ed.

• • -5-

III RllCORD OF EVENTS

Tl~nty l~iloIilcter::; fran DIEPPE, the English force encountered 0. GeIt>Wl

convoy l'l.t npproxir.ntely 0500 hn:. ~.$::' l"esult of the 1..1lsuing :;ilCJrt J'lllwll

enza.gClilent, the entire COuBt nafunee .Jy3tc.m \"n6 a10rtoc1. Y.bile the defen-

sive 1'orcos y,ere still in c1ou:Jt '.kK:thc.r the; 3hips in front of DIEPPE ",<ere

friendly or cncoy, "- scri~s of exmcE.:ntrr.tcd air attacks begen c.t clo.vm. These

attncks ',vero dirootcd ag..-.inst positionc on both side of DIEPPE. i/hila the

bonbing nnd str.:.fing t\tto.clt'.s, "hich ',''Lrc. obviously'..l<.Jc:nt to pin do,'.n the

coa.stl defences ",.'Ore still iJ."'l procrcnll, S'>nn:1S of lnndi.'l6 cmft in "!I.ves

of 40 to 50 h~dl,..-d f,J!' th\.. shore out of -,h(; protection of th,- -:1..'\turol oom-

i.t"1g fogs a.nd c.rtificinl D<:\Ok...: ocrt:t;ns lrdd clo'"n by the F.ttl:'.CJr.ing p1.D.nuD ::'.nd

vcnt<.:u the ~rtillc..ry froi~ dc:.troyi_'lg the J.:l.'ldins crc.ft .•::Uo still off-short).

Hits \,crV only r.:::lgist~rc.d by tll..... "rlillLry nntl h~vy ·;,c:lpuns on the lc.ncling

craft, juot bcfoI'o thc..y tnucht.cl thl,,; bo.:::.ch. Fog c.ncl ,-".:oke .x.cle obsl.rv:ltion

difficult cvun Cot th<: b",,,ch.

To the.: :i):.t::t of DIEPPE, the vnCii(f h.::.u L~.fLd.cd in tho:. d<.:filca at BERNEVaL,

t_.sk ....;::,.3 to :J(,;iz~ •..nd clcstI'JY t:.<:. 2nd Bc.tto.:rJ (Br. Troop) of thl". 77ot."1 .ilni\Y

Canst _4.rtill(;ry Bc.tt ....lion (Br. B..·.ttLlJ~), ',,hich ,:LG Q~.~k.cd~.. t:'1.c..r<... 7Jy using

roPQ l.o.dclliro And cuylinca c,nc1 all.,iL::lr 'VtUlt:LinC:3ring equip.iltmt, the cnc1JY 5llC-

ccct'.cd in cllobi..I:J.s t: ...... stoep clifZs of th.:.. 1.~v1n(;~, ~voidi.ne th..... !:1inE:fiulds

(plc.cc.:d only in tho r.:.v'iJl;,..:s), ant! ntt-c1ci.Jl-6 the &.tt<..ry (ar.. Tro')p). The :&.t-

tory itsl,..lf \fD.S lo~tljd in [\ fortifi0d stro1lJPoint. It dispntc."1...e. onc r.nch:L'11J

f,"\4'1. patrol W'ldcr an officGr to th~ BZRNEV...L nwinc, ·,m.urt: thl.Y bok pc.rt in,th6 loc-~l dcfe:nce. ~rtt..Cd OJ t:1C~ o.nti-l'.ircroft t,."U!l pk.toon st...".ti.:mcd

This YIC.5 .lont:: in p:'.rt by th" uircct fire o.t C;'051,,; rr..J1[:;t.. c..nd by r.nchim.. l!."W1

and rifl<: fiI'(;;. Th..... spcci.:'~ .~ir .?oree llmk.ll_tion (a.:-.d::::.r'?) ...rui its CT\.....1 of

100 uc..n, in pc..nnne:nt support of the B.:.ttcry J -"ns clSJ cttnck..:c., though in loss"r

dcert:o, nnd drovo off c.ll f'.ttncks, 1"_lso in p:~rt ,~t closo ~e. I

As soon as thl..l ne..-.-s of the. l1.ttc.ck ct BERNEV}L bc.:ce..-:-.c !rn:.mn, the 302nd.

________s J

-6-

.,Nored :ix.j::r V0n Blficho:.;r, co:1.~ndcr of tho .302m.l •.nti­

T.:mk B.....tk.li::m, to J...'\unch ::.n c.tt .C]: ·'n :aLIDCV•.L. :'io.j;)r von Blllch... r received,

'::'5 '"lUll, cor.::tul<.l of tho J3icyclc Squ..c":.ron fro:: ST. iiICOL..s :-.nd the -.tt::cb..d

3r~1 ?i.:>nc:cr Co:..--:p...-my (tlll-.:.?,)r...ri1l' ;-..::t.:.riscc.) froT': _.RCJtrS lu B.>T••t=",T,i. ?h~3o.;

",.\.r... l"t...r r ... inf.")rO:'-L by tIK. jr'::: C:.l:-':;:'.f'..j ~. th... 572nd Ini ..:\try RcgL.:(;nt, "..hic.'1

hc.d been crdr...rc.l:. to sr. :':.Rl'n:. 'l'hc. B:~n::V.L :k-ttc..~· h..~. -"".r"':"'d ,;jff the

c..n~=-\Yts clost. ..:ttc.ck. .L::.j<:.T von BIUch.c:r ',at. t~.c Wlit3 or his cc:.r..:...-"'.J1d ..c.!'c

~.bl(,: to dC.3trc;r th... t.n~ ;_t BL:P1EV•.L ~..nl. to t .k\.. 2 offict:ra ::nil. so t:cn pris-

':lncr.

The cnc~' J:.unch.c:c.•. siailc.r .::.tt.~.ck '.:i.th c.n ::I\i;l::"sh CO:";:..:'.J'l.C::> r':-.rt). ;) .... 300

,:,.(..::1., '"cst of DII:!??3, :-.,:;::.in5t the 813th __~. C):-.st~.l :i3..tt<..ry ~t V~.E:..t~G:"~.

T~csc Co;::r.:.c.n..bs lc.ndc:l :_t the cliffe 'n b.:.t!1 siu<..s .;f V.J8t;c.:~, under c:vc.r

of' c. s::okc screen. ..rwthcr ;;roup, ::...-.ll\,hil.... , tr1c.l to lent! n ...c.l' i;h... fortific.(~

stron.:.'1?Oi."1t f'_t QUIB~ztVILLEJ ·\Ih...rc ant. pL:.t...cn or t:1C. 3rd Cor'!;.x:..ny f the 571st

Ini'.:'Jltry Rc.:::;i.~c.nt ',,::'_5 st:::.tione<.... Th... ::~ttc:._.)tvl L.nQ~ C.t QUIB:::RVILI..J:: Y.:1'::>

frustr.l;e.d by th0 cvnccntr~~tcd rire of tho 3rd Cor::.i.),".!lY ~f tho 5715t. On th;,,:

other l'r'..nd, the. iJ1sliah COJ:1:l.r.ndcs in V. .R':UC-VIIJ.;:: "."Or... ,'Or... successful. Thc~/

y:t::rc (I.blt. to cli;:lb the cliffs c.:t ~.ri0U3 p',)inta, ',:here: :3:1.'.11, YIOOut.U., Itl':-;St.d

rL~vin ... s Icc-Co tlur.~"l to tl1t. se,~,. 'rhis is t ... rr::.in ·,.h... r...: obs<.:rvC'.tion i3 ~1ifficult

.:'.nd t'r0fir(".so 10 p0:J::libl... .:d.y r~:;:· t::,:.in(".,:. cli:'lbt.ra.

Thl.s;,; ~1:r.J.i=ili i'orc.... :J - .... rjunG. t!rr... l,.; htl."1l:red .:te.n - .:.tt"'.ckud th... 813th lk.t­

tcry fr.:>r.: 0.11 sidc..s ..1.th L..... 'rt.:lX3, ·~:.chi:.ll". :,uns, ;.'l~ch:i.Ilt.' ~isto1:3 (sub:·x..chine:

guns), a.m::' hc.ll..:~ gren..':'es. ~.i:(";:'_"l...,hil(;., c;)nti."1tlJUS lo..,-flyin.~ ~.ir ·.ttf'.CI:5, using

full ('.r.::nncnt, huld th\.. :J.:.tte.ry in c~(;cl{. By this :.'...:-119, th... &.'1.u115 stort.d in

:l.."1r.lU1\ition )it.::, tnt. -;,""_tt...ry c:::p1:: c .....__'" :t:, :.ne. cv...n the sunc th....-:sclvcs, \-,<.:rc.:

s~t en .l."'irc. The.: _:'.ttery C....:f'\..:lC.t.d i t5...1f v.::.li~1t17 until the Vl.-:"l# C'lld. 28

L~U. nn2 29 ,;0:'>' e.~ t ...stify to the.. br::-.v... <i.... l'cncc. ,_."bJ: ..., th... l:.ttcr -.,"1~ the

:3.:.ttcry C:>r.r:.n<'l....r, \':10 diruct .....l fir......'r::!..~ C1l.. -bscrv::_tion r,;:..st. L":.t r, ~.cco::..-

p.:-.nict:. by the. .:.bscrv.:_ticm ..Nst ct.c·don, :he.: f')uQl't his ~. t:li:r.rds th f'i[,i1tL'X.:

3l'.t't:l,;x""./. The .i3~t;t<..ry "o'o-.:J t,,:?cF...rily ecizcJ. ".Jy th.:: E!\~lish. Ho\".1Jv\,;r, the. '"1JJlS

.!C.rt. f::Jr til... mst _j_'.rt onus..-.'ulc b(;OC.use of tht. burnin..:;. ,-·f the.. 31\0115.

-7-

• th .1 4 prison<.:rs .-:'J'1l: numb..:r3 0i th..;ir 0\'.11 C.<..~_d .nd ....oundc..--d,.

Beth opcr::.tioru:.., .:-.t BERitEV~.L ;Jlo.1. .:.t v:_~G.:!:;n!Jz, obviou~~ md e.G their

~~sion tht:: d.c3troeti~m of th.,) t\,;) h~.:'.ry co'-'.ct:..l b~.tt,':rics (Br. Troop). This

,.~uld w.ve :rC'.cilito.tcd j,'urth0r deb~.rkr.ti.:m.::: :-.uti f.lt,.r em"o.:.r1c.tions :~t DIEPPE.

Both of tho -::..riiJY C:O':-.3t·.l b::,:;;"i;;c:ri~:3 1:l..\.1 outside of the DL...ppc Dcfanoc Zone.

It \ll::.3 i;,1.t')Qusibl(.. to give thL..:u s)c.oic.l protuct1on by irrf':-.\1.try b..::c.....u:Jc of tho

l.....ck of ~vr.iL:'.blc.. tX'O;)ps. 'he dcngcroU.!l position of thlJ 813th ik.tt ....r,r ';C.B

kno',Jl. Its inclusivn in the Vill."'PE Dd~cnco Zono ','::'8 to h:..Vl.:: tc.kon yl:..ce

shortly .:-.ft..::r tho cotilplct1.:n of the. i'ixod t.r.1,?1· .evncntB••

duV\Jlopcd on r. broc.d f'r.;::t \,ith throe i'llD.in thnlsts:

at FUITS, e:.t DIEPPL: itsoli', :'..ne~ .t POURVILI.E.

ccntr:'.t",d fire of tnt. ~c....Vj~ ',:oc.p.::l:'1.S, ,.:ith grc.:::.t loss to th.<.. cnc::lY.. Not::. si,,"1g1o

of the. oor;'bc>.cloB, on t.1l...: high S~ ·.cll, l.nJ. :m tlH.l bc..:.ch itself d""Cir.:.~.t<.lc:. his c.t-

tc.cldllB linc:s. ..siclu from th~ nUIlC!'CUS prisoner=:, o~r 150 d~.:..d ',;ore a:nmtt.:d ~ t

this poL'lt ..

The br.ttc.lien, \;hic.'<1 l.".Jldcd from jUGt Y1Cst of: DIEPP~ to tho Rue: du Duquesne

':.0::.6 destroyed .:m the bc.:-:.ch pro:"lca..~_dc, alone \Ii~~h ..~ll the t.::.nks I.:--.ndcd thtire. :U"Ound

070) hra., t..'1.c destroyer, LOCUST, co:ni..ng clooc to the h:..rbour -.ppror.chos, -;;::::'3,

c=.:ught in thO' fire OJ: CO~3t deft-nee: :~rtilll.ry :-.nd [Jlti~ircrr..ft guns. She received

30vt;rr~ d.'treet hits, tur:lvd b.,ck in th..: rag, :.nd ;;,'[.0 pr<:::Bll1l\'lbly sun.lt, since; ~~he

storn of ,: In.rg.;l f;:L"lking ship \71th :rom.;; 200 or 300 null on boc.rd IICS ObtlC,;rvcd during

h:,tt0~ions ·.ihic.'l, r.-::i.'li·orCClll. by ~oj,~.nks, lo...'1.d.cd ",lith th... m:.in body on l:x:>th sidee

of the Ccsi..,o.. Thcy lUtd thc:il' t.::.nks '.. l..rc dcstroye.'<1 ',':1ilc l.....n'li.:!l.3. em the:: blX:.ch or

on t.'l"o beech pro:.ilCll....d.c, tog:ct..~...r :iith the. l..-.lllll.:d t"'n.b. .:ith thLo cXOJption or

n. fWf pc.trols, they \toro un..bL. to pc.n...t~.to int:) the City. The 6th :8;lttalion, on

th<. other h:.nd J hr_d more SUCO<.SJ \Uld...r cov",r of d:'..rkn...3S •.r.d to:;. Tho:\, -,-."L.rc t.ble-

to punctrc.tl.i 'lUst-.nlrdD into roURVILLE, nh<::rc thuy oV...,l-po\,'\)rGd thl.i \1'1"'1: g.:crrison

(1 Pl..'\toon of Inf-::.ntry .:'nd :1 fl."; lllcn of the Todt or{!p-"11zc.tirm). Tha bcit:llion

thon triLod to rO:lch its d(;sign.:,t(.d obj..::ctivc3. T-.-:o OO''1_),·..:"1.ios roving -;.O&t·,..::'.rd out

• •of POURVILLE ,:,.loIl.[; the cx.st::.l ro:..d, roll..d up the .:l::;sitions in tho..: XI:: V~.I.LEY.

They succeedod in getting r.s f=.r ....5 t:'l... c.nti-t.~.k po~ition ·.!hich ti.1UY disc.blcd tl..:lJlIXlr-

c..rily by direct hits, =.nc'. ponsibl:,' by h::.nd gren......dos. i,bst ,1f tho gun 01\.'\: ..r.s

kill~d. Zlu.ll:nts ~f th...: rne;lish llc:m. tr..ted tho SCL", D. ji, but ·..nil\... ~.ttcmpting to

push forc......:~.rd to t;,o northern pl".rt of th.... 4. Vonte.s R.rm, they '."Cre. \-:i.pcd out.

Both ooLpc.nics \;ure u.'uJUcct:S6i"'u1 in brc:-Jcing throuzh Ute xin line of

rcsiz~.ncll.

Tho nr.in DIEPPE c.ei'oncvs roc..lly baein =.t thin :.'-'1ti-t;.nk position. POUR-

VII..LE \(:.8 only ~. lightly held ....clv.:Jlccd outpo:Jt.

The t,oO other COr..lpnnil...D oper.:-.tod ..iest of th(; SC!E RIVE:a. They C;PP'" rcntly

c.tU'.in{.'<1 their first objcctiw, sinco thoy seized the 30uthe.ln edge of POURVlLLE

.:md the l:Y.'.chinc eun po;:;iti'::ln on th{; hill \.'Cst of POlJRVTI..LL, -:horo they cet.......b-

lishod I'. bridBchcc.d.,

The Sevanth DI'.tt.."tIicn \.:'.s to follo·,.- th" Sixth Bc.ttc.Ii:m in loJ1ding Oond

to push fot'\~ on the ,.'Cst b,...."1k ,f t:10 SOlE up to tr.... ~.irfic:ld :\t SOX. _.UDIN.

The &tt... lion ~dv:.nce-d in the. '.;O-:;:Idcd clo6o countr~t .:m Utu hills '.>cst of the

oo.n:, frc!J POURVILLE, o.s fc.r LS the vicinitJ' of H:.UTOT.. It •.us C!lug.'lt in the

flo.nkine f:1.rc co!:".ing fro•.: 4 Vcntc;s l'~. It then cnc.Juntore:o tho tor.~.rd

Bio(Y'clc Plntoon of th\,.o R...ni.':l\.,n),;.....l Hcc.dquurturs of thu 571 at Inf.:.ntr:t Regir..cnt

::.nd SO::lO ~troIs froo th~ 1at Bc.ttc.lion ;;)f the s..-'V.lC. Rcl9~l(:nt. Until then

tho B::ltt..."'.1ion h.....d t.nc:nmtl.rcc:. no sc.rious Gon::l.::J'l. opponition, there bci..ng no Gcr.:r.n

dcfCJ......c.: set; up in tho .:-.r::.:.. It is, thc.rofero, net =-pp...~.rcnt ·,h.Y this Bc.tt.."".11on

only zot .":5 !..•..r ~s P'..,.U'1'OT ~"ld could not :-..co:;mplish ito :.lissic.n; y:hich ;-,t.s to 'PU&h

on tvY"'"Ide the ST. ~.UBIN ('.lrfie.lc.1. Prc:su.....-r.bly, it ...,-t.G n.r.ltoc by the c:or:o..".l'ldur of

tho E...v.ish Forces, beer.usc the front:1l c.tt(l.oks on DJ:i::FP:C e:.nd FUrrS ha.d failed.

T!"."::: Zl\:;lish cpvI'I.ti::;..ns ;:>n'ter stt.tca th:.t, :'.ftcr l::md.i.ng, troops ',,'\..I'G sup-

posed to rc::..ch their ~.ssi.JlcC objc:ctiv\"s by 1230 ~.nli n:.r~, b......c..l.< to rc-crj)c.rk froe

1230 on. Rc-o_ .ix"~r:lo.:.tion ·,,':'-8 supposed t:-. be cO;.Qlctcd by 1530 hra.

Up until nidd=.~·, ;.:r.ny f.Y..rl.. bonts kopt J.:'J-.cline en the b(...·.ch c.t D~. In

tho ax>ke scree-n, it oould n:Jt be seem -.-:l1Cjt:l(;r they ,".ore brirlflinz up !XII'-.. trocpa

or 10cllin.e t.:"i> ·,.ith solCil...rz .:.lr(,;~.uy 1·.ncl

w.) .)i30.8UrOS T~~.l...!.hc Division ~ by COrps:

Soon ['.ftcr 0600 hrs. J tho full sc::,?o of ',;l~o [·.tt...ck b~c·_"1C knoY.n, C'J1d

it \:c.s n.ppr.rcnt t:Vlt TID c.tt.'.ckn \,ero tcJcinr; :..)lr.cc C'.t t~lC ·~uth :;'1" tho SOi.iiilE,

,

• • -s-

in ~ TRZPORT or in th"" sector .;;r th\.. JJ2i1": Ini'=.ntr;,~ DinGior'_ Th(,rc.r~ro, tho

Division - .S st:'.tc-d ..b:}V(: - 3crr;; the.: Bicycl.... TroJp (Dr. Squ...dron) :-.ntl the ro­

L'r\i'orcod 3X\.'1 Pion,Jur C:);'~,?['ny frc~: ...Rf.!U::S-L..-I1.Ti.ILL:J to Bt.'Ri:"V"•.L. Under COD­

;',:.nd :f il... jor YDn BlU.cher, thl;y ',rere: to rcliov{; th... BZRlf.!JV•.L br.tt\..ry, then Ul\clor

o.tt"ck.

# ...t 0710 hrs. J th.:. 571st Ini':'.ntr)~ Rcgi.:.:Lnt in D'ILPIS oI".:'wrc.d its F1r::st a...t­

t:'~ion in QUIBERVIILi: to prop:-.rc in tho ro!1i,,;i1 of li.UTOT 1":)1' ....n .:.tt:-.ck in th.c dir­

ection of FOURVILI..!!.:.

LXXXI Corps ordered I1ScoQnc st:'Son :u..:..rr: 1'.)r ~.ll tlivisiona t:'.nd. corps ras.-

'" ves. _.t 0730 ;1rS. J Corps pL:.C(;l1 the )r<1 B=.tt:.lion :;f the 570th Inf:mtry Rugin­

c:I'lt, "il.ic.'I} ~.._S in E..O':'ULVILL?, (~t t~v ..as?oscl -:Jf t"l": 302m: Inf..:.ntry Division .::.ne..

ordered it to :t'roc-.:~d to OFFItJNII..I.r:J. Th.: rcL£.ll1.c1cr ;:.f thu Col;)S Rcsorv~ (Hcc.d.-

qu,....rt"'rs Jf the 676'.;;h D:f:'.l1try Re.!::.i.-Jent jluz it~ l:;t ~_nd 3rd B:.\ttc..lionz, the lot

lk.ttc.li.:m (Br. Bc.ttery) vi the 332ntl ~.rtillt.l"Jr Ru,sii.l.ont, [.a~\ the 81tlt T:..nk Cor:?­

c..ny) recoived t....c onlor to ::::.ve to D. .c~U::V1!.J.aC: (J.4. kil.J:1l.. t ...rs SOUt:1·.:CZt of DILPPi:).

Totz.rds 1000 MS. the 1st Bc.tt:'.Eon of tho 5713t Inf:-.ntr;)r '..~:; pr...~.rcd

in the lllUTOT en..:. for the r.tti'.ci: on .t?Ol.mV!L!..rI::. Thv .3:-.ttr.lkn f~ its.::lf 1."1 c.n

tmcl...nr sitU":~:":Jn bl.c.~.\ls~ of th" clo:; c.~untl"J·. It TOc:>::r:lOitercd i., th~ Circcti,m

of POURVILLE ~.nd v. .REim...,'VTLLE. Th... B.. tt:',liol1 .:lpci1uc1 it .. r.tt·.ck .:m FOURVILIZ

r.r,mnd 1130 hra. It ...~s .:.blt.: t" C1\....-_1' th\.: Q1C:-O' :rot of th ... hill ,[.:;st :1);: POUR­

VILL2 ~..nd t: tckc :-.bout 200 prisor.t.Ts.

;!.I'v~ n.:,l.Jn, the Rezj:1Cnt..... l Co_':""......ridtlr ·Jf the 571st Inf'"ntry RCzi..::"..c.nt to:-k

stops t;:, clc:-.:- up th..:: situt~tL.1 in DJ:i.opj}. He ort:-.:rcu t..~<.- 5th CJ'l,l :!:.rtu vf tho

11th Conpor.iC.'s c.nd 2/3 ai' tho") 211'..1 Pionocr Co: :~:x~ of thu 302ncl t,J l..:'.unch :'. c:Juntcr­

..... tt..".ck :.rul I:Pp up tho tr::l.:'ps on ·t;ht.: ba.ch. It Y.~.D possibl... b:>' tLis ..... ttc_ck to ferco

tho cv!::;)letol;y e..:-.ze~ Engli:::;h l ....ndi...~ tro:"}!?S to nurrc':i.c.cr. nun..'L:..-VLS vi' pri:::;:::m... rc

t:vI"C tc.kcn.

In the :.:uc.""1ti.-,o, r..D. C01"'1'$ Rc;s<.-!"Voo h:.t'\ beun I-'l~.c",l: _t the (Uspv.:J.::.l of the

302nd Infc.ntry Divtsion. Th...~, "'rorc or.:1crod to OFFR.1IVIL'I..E ;,;ith thl.;. i'1.tc.:ntion of

l......\Ulchinz c.n .::l.ttt.ck out cf or'FR.JNTIJ,~ in thv dirl.ction of rotmVILLE, nl::llle ',-;-ith

tho Blst T-:..nk Cor:~ .. :5;:,' tk.t ti;:-;c, ho\;cvc.r, the let Bl:l.tt".li~n f tho 571st Inf­

c.ntT"".1 Rt..~nt lr_r. clvr:.r,;,.-d th<.- I".ncs:;y fr:).::' t.'1<: :_r<3.::'.. i7est :jf POURVILL3. The.r...foro,

the ~tte.ck by the: COI?s Rcs~r\.'c Y'r.5 ncv... r c.:.rri...u out.

Tho Corps Reserve (676th Inf.:...r.try R.:;Gi:.ant) . '.3 c..::nitt ....c.'l. :LTJ. the nftomoon

in the.: POURVILLB - sr. ~JJ3D~ ::lector, uoint: t·,.n ;:,f its bnttc.1io:iw on the. C0~·.Gt .nd

• •one in roservo. This ,.us d.:mc b\,;c.~.usc oJf the D..-'"'.nY OCS2C<;CB on ~nd reporting stronG

fon.ntionz of ships en route fron EnClcnc1. Thorof.vru, tho possibility thn..t the

British tltta.ck ,,ould be ronC\","Od h.:~d t::., be reckoned \"lith •

.s.,t 0950 hrs.,. the lOth ~~urcd Division \.~S pkcc..d under tho co:-u"'J'ld of the

LXXXI Corps, e..nd recoivod the or..lcr tc rove its :-.clvc.ncc<l. dct:-.cru.lcnt ( vne reinforced

ba.tt.:U.ion) ~s fast l'.S pos::iblc u:;? intv the C'.~ of TOReY I.E PErIT (14 kilo;:wtcrs

south of DlEE'PE). The ror.nindDr of the Division \~.s sup sod to follo·... to the ::l.r'OO.

of NE.1FC1i:...TEL - WlmINIERES. The Cor.::'t11dinz G<:ne:rnl intcndud to ooi:Oit tho 10th

~ured Division ./Cat :Jf thu ~..RQUDS Rivc:r .:'.~5t those onOCJy troops \".m.ch h..'1d

lC.ndod at POURVII.oL:i!:. This decision dopcndod on ·..hethcr or not tho other Gen:nn

forces h......d been successful by thnt ti!::lc in pushin,!! thu C11c!:\y thure bn.ck into the

see.. Thoronftor, the Gcnft'"('~ intended, if neoesM.ry, to direot the Division to;~

c.rds tho Eo.at ..

The COI:1:nndi.ne GenQrol gc.ve tho follo,>iJlt order ct 1200 hra. .. to the 10th

~ured ~nd tho 30200 Inf:mtry Divisions:

1.) The 10th L.I"J:lJurcu Division llith its !l.(1V"'....rlcod c1OClonts c.nd those units.

uJ.:I'CO.dy co:nittcd fran the 302nc.. Inf~try Division and Corps Rese.rves,

first c.ttncks tho hciV'lts ,;cat of POURVILLE. It is to destroy the

on<qy, ('.m1 thon join in the f'.ttnolc fron the wost of o.nt!. in DIEPPE, if

this is necosSo.'\ry.

2... ) Boundn.ry bct\...Qcn the 302nd Cond the 10th Divisions: fran the Western

od:;e of POURVILLE to J•.NV~JL to the SCu:: VJJ.J.E'[.

3.) Those IXlrts of the 302nd Inf'mtry Divioion ontl Corps Reserve '.ilich hllve

a.lroc.cl;y c.d'Vr'Jl.ccd to the West of this line \".ill be nttc.chcd to the 10th

l'a.rl::xlurCJ. Division..

4.) One roinforcod P=.nzC7r-<;.~orRoCincnt £'.t th£, disposition of COTIS

rarr.ins tlJ the. South ......!l.ll in the vicinity of LONDINIERES.

• • -11-

3. ~ The Divisions will :JD.ke ttutuD.l arrongcoonts for the tir:c at ,.mch

loth ;.r..tOUJ:'E,-d IIivision :"SSUI:\.OS tc.ctic:::.l control.

HO\fGver, the: 10th ...,....,,:,oured Division did not fP into cotion, but 'i'r'nS ordered

nt 1345 hrs. to atom by nt tho diaposcl of Corp" 1l.Q. in the nrcn TORey LE PETIT ­

NEUFCIL.TEL - LONDllIIERES.

The lOth ...4"!.l)urcd Division rcr:nincd L'l t..1'l.O ooribllt zona during too nicht

19-20 ••ug 1942.

V.) WHaT U1>" TIlD c..US!': 01' =GRE..T BRITISH F•.II.UP.B?

Tho British cotlplutely nisCCl.lc~.tcu. tho strongth of the GerrJrut dClfcnco end

. tried to II grc.b the bull by the ho:m:J 1l by l,~.ndir-G the o:..in body of their invc.sion

forct:s, porticu.larly the t,~.,·1kfl, right in front of DIEPPE. Thoy persisted \lith

this plan n1though they 'rere cX~.rc of tho strength of the DIEPPI: street defences,

concrete constructions, c..nti-te.'1nk -:;;oJ.16, u:::.chine gun positions, t:nd co:lstnl guna.

This \YO knoYI froT.l th(::ir Til..'lpS. It is ,,130 inconc(;iva.blo "ily they did not support

the bfl.tt<l1ions duch L'1J1.ded ncm.r POURVILLE ,nth tl-.nko. :..n c.tto.ek with tonks from

POURvn.LE llN.inst thv hill ,;:est of DIE:PPZ end o.g.:dlwt the "4 V!m'ts" Fcr:.l oisht

hn;vc bc(.."Jl sucecssi"ul, .~&hough it '.(:luld he.vc been .;ost difficult to ovorcoi:1C the

DJlti-tcnk ...lO.1la, the pier ;-.nd tho S;n:: <l."JJ.

Contrnr,Y to ell c},.,,!>cc'l;..-.tion, thc British did not ouploy Po.l":1chutista ond

..L1rbourno troops. If they h:-,d L".tt.."'!.ck:od PUITS siL:Ult.-"..I1OQusly "lith .:.irbourne troops

:-..nd fro•.1 the sco.., the initi..-..l p.:lsition of thl".: dci'"cndurs of ?UITS "fJUld prob..··!.bly rove

been criti~.

T1iG Britia..'l oust h:::.vi.. c:qx..ctcJ. th.:.t th~ T.\.'1.s5oc1 enplo;y'!:¥)nt of·tho ..·.ir Force

o.gC.iU3t till:: CO:lstv~ defence of DII:PPL , ..auld s.h::~ttor the GcIf'"...c.n defenco to :Juch an

extent, :la to Ol'l.n.blo the ll.ssa.ult bo.tt."'!.liol13 to brenk through the eoastc..l defence.

It is probc.blc t.."1.:'.t the h(,;;[\vy CI'.Dkc 5croun ovor DIJ::PPE coMickrobly diL1i.nished the

c.ccurJ.cy of h1t~, nnd thu uffcct of tllL British nir ntt.."'!.cka.

They did lD.nd light r.nd hOllvy r.:ort..'"'.rS, but th(;ir entire coribr.t orck:r r..entivn­

cd enly ono light bc.ttory (Br. Troop) o.nd ono li.91t c.nti-nircro.ft stJction ·...hich ".u.s

to be Inndcd nc.:-..r PUITS. l..s thi~ landing fo.11od, this c.rtillcrJ.· ·ms rot o.ctuD.llJ.'

l."r.1l?loyod. ..~ fO'W lieht c.ssr.ult 3Wl3 T.uuJ.d pr::bc.bly hcvu bCl".n :-ore usc to the Brit­

ish in their first attcck, W.n the tW:~. SincE: fire evntrol obse~tion on tm

big ships >nS poor bcC['.uso of thL. &:.:>kc ~rc(..n, the l~ force h.:ld no o..rtillc:ry

support \1h.......tsocVCr.

• ••It is r.Dwnizhin..:, tll'.t thv British ah uld hc.vl.: W1Cc1'\..st1j'"l.:.tud our defence,

as thc;y h.:::.cl dctc.ils of n::lSt of it frcl.1 dr-.t.:110tos; cqc:'.lly ntril:::in::l; is the; short

tir.1C in '..hich they o~~ctcJ t· c:,.rr,r out the .:>:~(,r:',ti"';l.

T!lo British. oper:":'i:i.:>n,..'\l ordc.r of c.bout 100 pc.e;C3 fixed C1vvry dct~l of

tho t".ction for o:".ch unit. This ::'1_thod of pl:.nnin -:; 1...1.l1e the f::ilurc of the "mole

r-.....id inc;vit.::,blo in t:"I(..: (,Vl.ont of m'\L;"p'-ct(.d difi'icultic;s.

The :aritish t".ttnc?. r.t DIn?PZ failed, ',;i~ h~~\V'.f enO!aY 1055(;8, th.::.nks to

th.... co~.:;c;ouS der~nciv~ ;:.ction uJwn by E::!!. Or."'..YJ.oh...:3 of the- L\lUui forces. 95

o~iccrs cr.a. 2122 0(..'11 -;:uro ~l'ltur.;d by the G<.X'tX'.1l3. By 24 .n~st, 475 d~d ·.""TO

buried. Tho tid~ is at:U"l •.1'".shing '-.3horc oo:-c corpses. ... hi3h po1'c...nt..'\gc of

Gnc..;;y losses, y,hich c.::.nnot, hn-d....v ....r, be (;stll~"t....d, ...."r'.s incurrcd at SOL. t~uzh

our nrtillcry fire. :.l1.d c.erkl bo;!'h..rdi:!.c.-nt, :,.nd throUJh the ~inl::in.g of L..-.nding

er::ft, fl.:lt-bottl)!.lcd bo:··ts J -:l..nd dcstroyl,.;rs. Tot..1.l enomy lossc..s probnbly aJI'OUllt

to at le..'"'.st 60,J - 70 of the lP..nding foret:.

Our losses:

302nd Inf. ~. 5 01'fi~(:rs, 14l'l::O'5, 68 &-.i (Othor lW.nks) ucr...d

1 1'100 ,9 ~ (Other Rcnks) missing

50fficl,;rs, 27 NGO's,l24 Ei-i (Othvr R"'.nks) \/Oundod

Tot.:.l los~rJ~. (.-.nc"..}', Nu.vy, :..ir Force, OrGf.niGf'.tion Todt)

6 Officers, 1.4J+ jICOls nnd EH (othl.r R'"lJlics) Q......:..d

15l!OO's and j'j.i (Othc.r Rr.nks) missing

50fficc.:rs, 270 :~C:OI::; '1J16. ~r (Oth(,r Rr.nko) 'to'Ounded

Cap.tured eng cquip?~.

1 Personnel Truek

1.300 Riflo3

170 1 £"chi.'1.Cf Gun:;

60 U'"'.cCino Pistols

42. ;.nti-Tt-.111: Rines

70 Light <.brt'lrs

60 Hc::.vy MJrtc.ra

.:-..nd c. l..o.ree amount of DJ!m,!"l-; tion, hwld grcn.:.dcG, c:q>losiV\:.:s, end other equip-

!!lent.

• • -13-

VI. CRI1'IQUE

a) Disposition of Troops:

If the British attack us again on the sn~e scale, or on a brander front,

it is to be expected that they ~111 attempt to pen~trcto WEQk spots ~d

try to enclrcl£ the h~rbours. Th~y cr~ not likuly to repeat n ~ssed

frontal ·",ttc.ck c.g[.inst r. 3trongly fortified crou, t.S in the D:Lcppt.: c.ttc.ck

of August 19th, 194~. It 15 therefor~ n~st L~port~r.t thet "C h~ve mobile re­

serves rC:ld:r for c. caunter-::.ttnck. These mobile rescrvc3 !!rUst be uquippcd

with ceny ~torlsad ~tl-t&nK ·~c.pons, GO~~ of ~hich c.r~ still l~cking.

b) Sector R~Eervcs;

RGg1ment~1 end sector re~erv~s should ~~ h'ld in clo~~ ~upport ~nd b~

supplied with ht!c.vy V;,;;:"lpons end r..rtill.:ry insofc.r n::; is po(;~iblc.

R~sarvc b~ttcllon~ ~hlch cr6 in ~i~pcr~~d billets, m~t cu :~sembl~d c.t

thu Vf:Jry l!:.tbst by the tim\.. the uSccond St-;,g&" ft.l:-.rIil i!.J ..:ou!lded. TheSE res­

en,s must stO:.rt countt)r-:;,ttu.cking pror,lptJ.:r rnd r.uto:n::tier.lly cnd not m;~it

for orde1's in u..'lehr~r situC'.tion:;. T'm, quick,Jst i7C.y to clc.rify tho r.itur.tlon

is to initi:::.tc 1". forceful rttc.ck t<J pl'uVI.lr'.t thv C.Ilu:r.y frOM ctnsolidr-.ting his

ptJi31tit.m. M....rcov~rJ (). prtJ~pt ce,untl;<r-c.ttc.ck 't:y l,;ur rl;;:SUrl,.;S h:l".vcs the re­

serves frcr:l highc.r· fO~!"Ir.thms frt:<v to., suppcrt units 'ihich h.:'.vu bC,;l1 un(~blo

to c~pt.t ,lith thuir situetiun. An illustl·r.tJ.on of c. cCJunt&r-rttnck •.11ich

should hc.vo o.::~n l··.uncht....c SOvll':lr, is pI'ovidt.:d tTy tl·,\.. o·;pcrit.:ncL;s vf th~ Is:'

&tttlion, 571st Infnntry Rugi!:ilmt. Th1.: B:.tt.::.liun ";e.s infott.(;~ c..t 0710

th~t th~ British ~ttack cn QUIBLRVILLL n~c tu~n rutrulsca ~r.d t~t the

Eritish h•.d 3uccl;lcdec ir. lc.ndL'lg >::t POURVILLE. T!'~' b..'".ttuicn '\.c..s ord",rc:. by

the reri:'IC:1t t<J prcpr~re to ll:.unch e.n ·:"tt::ek frc..::'l HAUTOT. H· wc;:vor J the s1tu­

c.t:'",n r~:-.o.:.in-.!e c~seure for SCtT l<.: tiet:. in the cl.... 3t: ec.untry $c..uth~-cst of POUR­

VILl.E ~d ,Jv~I"Y',hLrc U-_c c-:.tte:.lion patr(..ls rn'l ~t() fJ.r~. A prOI.lpt tond

d(j!tLr::ri.nocl .::.ttcck to~rds POURVILlE -:·\._uld probclay lt~.VE: ch'r.r(;~ up the situ­

ntL...: _ur~ quickly ;:'11::':. . :vulc. h::.vc :.....lpoo ·,·ip... out \..vcn l·-.rg\.·r nu.....burs ... f th(.

en..:_=y :-.ct:.r POURv I LLI:.

c) Cc.rps R~scrv~D:

Tr.e corp::; rus ...rVI3S • :<:ore •.lcirt~d '.itr....ut diffieul tit.: s • y"t, th ...ir ass13'-lbly

and .;:ntruckir-t; to....;: to... riue!. tir::o. Tho tr~ n".port cl..ll.lU:ls hc.d b£t:n l:e.pt tvu

-1'1--'

• .oncontrntcd irl thu are::l Lf th" rcelJrv",s; it t~lll bo nccc3zIlry tv distribute

then clos~r to the troo~s. i\llot~~nt vf trrJ1Zport to the batt~lions and the

ertillory uust ~ tr.ctlc~lly clos~r. It bcCOU05 nUccs3~Y to ~5sign nrtil-

l~ry t~ the cvrps r~serves ~t all t~~s. P~rt ~f their crtillvry ~ust eluays

be 11:Jb(..rcd up tu per:rl.t r~.pid c ....:.UJlt:.~i;nt ... i th th~ CiJrpl:> rusorvcs. The corps

res,;rve nrtillery bctt<l.livn, ,;"ihicil l"ns lJn th~ CUc.st, 0:'...10 tv"" l~te bcc<.:.usa

vf the tino it tvok to liuber up '1U'J. o;:utruck. It '.;vuld be d{)sir"bl~ to n"vc

ccrpa rcservt:lS ('loser ti. the c ....~,st rnd t ... rtt"lc.: ccrte-in rt.;SL:rvE': Ul.its to

Divisiuns as in th~ past. This \ ...ulc Of: p;):3sibl"" if the corps, in C!lS(, lJf en

cne~ attack, clJuld count on th~ supp~rt vf vue u~t~rlz&d or crr.,ow'ed divi-

siun.

d) !Anding of Tanks:

Expt:rleneo has ~·..:.ved toot tho;: Briti&!l ~r~ ~blc tu l!'.n~ tc.nks en ~. bench

frOD thoir speciel l~ndL~g crLrt ~~t~i~ ~ vury s~rt tiDe. Th~ref~re, the

defbnce h~s t~ prJvide fur ~jrG cnti-tcnk dcf~nces, even in the swell r~vin~s

t hrlJugh \1hieh lJ.:ltbs run d0i,n t ... t!JJ c....cst, oJ. e. nen CRIEL-~UIBERVILLE-ST.

AUBIN-VEUL~"TES, ate. Thu :-'e',;,vy gre.vEll ,In th"" DIEPPE bl;:~ch c~rtc.inly rendcr(.-d

the landing Jf Briti3h t~nks ~~r~ difficult, but did nut pruvcnt it. This UtS

been pr.Jved by the f"!.ct thr.t sever"l ta.nks ",!t.:rt:l lJvvl::l:1 vVvr the: ~r~·.vcl .!ith'lut

difficulty, aft~r tl~y h:.d be",n r~I)!...irec.. \"itn..,sses r0p...rtt.'d thr.t r:L"lny l.lore

tanks (pr~bcbly 16) had racch&d the ~ro~unr.dv ~lvng thu beach, but thct they

turn~ around ~nd re-cros~ed the gr~vul t~ find ~vre pr0toctlvn cgainst tho

hccvy dtfunsivu flr~ b~hlnrt the gravol b~nk.

e) Anti-knk Def.nce:

The ~.eslve c.nti-t~nk eefcnc~, £urnisn~-d Qy cnti-~~nk '~ls, h~s stuud the

tt~st. Tht: '~alls kvi,; tlJ co f;itl.-d in such :l. t:C'.y tint their flc.nks c.::.n bE:

£!.p.i'roach~ng the:" cr.i pl!:.r.ting expl..siv\:;s. It. ~, ...:ll~ ~ dl..s1r:..ble tt. stc.e!:~r

these ·,tile in de.Jth in C'.se tte: €:n~:...;y bt.l.Juld succct:d in bret'.kinc tnrcuch

t 6 first J.inc. Actlvu" ::lti-k.nJe de.fenccs 1·... t tJ....l ~h;,uf.,. .11,.:.1 '- ut. T:.

ar:.lOUX ~)r lJl~lo-A:1{.;ric<::.n t~.nii:e in ::;'t.st inst~nce~, \:0:.9 Dl.. t r'enotrr. tee by the

57011 shr:.lls. So fex cnly tv;" lwlcs frv:'l 57~ s,.t;:lld ha.Ve be.:ll: discovLredj

vnc in th'3 re,,"~r ~.nd ....nE: Lt tho sic\.; uf ~. ce.~turt;'; knk. Meny tr:>cbs of j-J.ts

heve beon foW1d., but J.t res =:'o\.;n itlJNssi'tl<: tu detcr'.:!ine thE: c'libre of the

• s~11s which c~u:ed them.~ > - IS-

Dn th~ other hend, it ap_lcars that the tre.cks of

Anglo-American tcnks erc more vulnerablo to ~nti-t~nk fire.

f) Artillery

The b~~ch defence guns stood tr~ test very well. Greater numbers (two or three

times as wany) TIould be desir~bla. If th~~~ re~pons ,ere to bo providGd, nar

ostnbllshm~nts rrould heve to be chang~d b~C~USb the infcntry does not POS~CSE

sufficient personnel to ;nOll them. T'ne guns should be emplc.cL-d, in such e

manner thl:.t they c.:.n provide short r:-.nge fl!..nkiJ"l.g flru r:ithout being hit by

fire from the 3en.

ArmY C03St Artillery

Corps h~dqu=xtcrs h~s given ordors for the dls.1ecem~nt of cac.st ~Iti11ery

guns into th~ defence sectors, if possibl&, into the vicin~ty of lnf~ntry

strongpoints. Independ.mt fire h:.s provod superior to controlled fire,

(L~gbes1sverfahrcn)J in ectionc Lgr-i~st c stLtio~ry fle~t of l~nding craft.

Co-ordin~tio!l Betwl:)(:n Artillery ~.n1 other Brcnchvs of thE< Armed FOrC\35

Ar~ co~st ~rtill~ry poe it ions cp(:ne~ fir~ indepernently, beceu~& the ~val

conanander IS pcraission to fire c.rrivsd only about t,,-,O hours r.fter the begin-

ning of thu engagement.

g) Att~cks from the Air

Aerial ette.cks J which '.'erc c':-.rried out uith bombs c.nd guns in continuous

waves, did not produce the expected effect en our bntterics and AA positions.

The renson probably ~us thc.t t~ British thaoselves, in order to blind the

defences, had laid such c hecvy s~okG ~cracn t~t the ~ccuracy of their cr.n

weapons nnd target recognitivn r.ns considercbly r~uccd.

h) Co-ordinaticn

Co-ordination nith oth(:r branches of tho :'.rmed. fiJrcf;s end v;ith the TOD'!' Con-

struction Orge.nisatlon nas exc~llent rnd frictionless. JUl Irien pc..rticiprting

in t}-.~ ection complotoly fulfilled t.heir duties. C(,-I,.rdin.....tion r.ith fightoar

and pursuit plano co~nds, Vias carried vut by Corps He!'.d.qu-:rte:rs r.ith JefU

2, J~~tt 3, IX Fliegorkorps ~nd the li~13vn officer of Luftflottc 3 ~t Aroy

Group. It ...·auld be u~cful to design~te c. single com.rand vest for the co-ord-

lnation of ell echelons. This co~-nd post J ~ith sufficient ccmounic~tions

• • -16-fc.c.i.1it.:es, ".-ould be the only t.ne to mcl;:c f'nquir1es :It corps ':.nd \':ould

help to :'ovoid '.n overcror;ding of sifn': 1 ch:..nnels. Inf....ntry trl'.ini!".g of

Nc.vy :nd Hr Force personnel l;:ng-eed in ground fiGhting should be continued.

i) Mine Fi&lds

Not ~ll of the mine fields in the v~rious 3~~1 rLvines ~ere as ef~ectiv~ as

expected. RG~son6 for this d~ficiency er~ ~tlll being Ly~in~. Tnc British

auccecc!E:d in by-passing the !Dine ::"1<;;lds. 1~:"m fields must urt~nd l.D 7idtb

beyond the ravinGs. Uo liir~s [Just W '/i~1bl= on 'the :H...._y;rrd sldG. Tly; first

ou.va of the Briti::>h =.tt.e.cking PUlTS \.o.e c'Jught in r.. mine fil:ld. This ::L-de

it posslblu to kill 50 to 60 m~n by ~~hln~ gun f1rL.

k) Sign~l Sommunlcctlons

OQ the #holc, the trcnsois3ion of ord~rs =na reports fUllctioned 5~t1af,c-

tori1y. Th~3 kuvt th~ Division ~nd Corps H~'dqu:rt~rs continuously 1n-

formed of the progress of the b~ttle. It muct be borD~ in mind, however,

thnt th6 British did .10t !".ttumpt to dClstror COlill':lo':'f'..d ,JOsts r nct ml;ss~e:e

centcr~ of d1vis1on~l~.nd lor'er hE::~dqU!·rt(lr~. This cells for the estLb-

lishl!i(:nt of ffiEt3SC.gO clolnters c.long ..~ li:w runnlnr pr~rrllEtl to th... cO",st

ct c. distr..nce of ~.b"'ut 10 ktl. ThcS6 n~~s2nce CE.:nterR r.1l,,1,.St be ct jur;ctions

of :i'I~.ln ro'~ds leo-ding to t (If, shore ~ nd should be on t. single telephon6

network 'Wah Division :_00 Corps Hf..c.dqu.....rt....rs. ThlS \'"Ould !!i".k{; it Ilos~iblf::

to rc.:'.ch rcoservt: wlits cO::i!i:utt<;d in th~ r:CJL!b't zon.. 'l"Jy t ... ll.'l~i:on(; r.t <:1l

timlZs. Th~ control of rc;sE..rv(,s, cpj)ro~.ching frol:! the r •. r or flrnks, ~ould

then bt: Inlch ~Il(lier. Thf:l b~ttcrica CEr. 1'rvop) nec.-d ::. third r~c.ic s~t. Fore-

\iI'~rd observers lu:..d to be connectoo by tc1'.1phones m'_ kin~ foI' 310\7 fire control.

Fp.dio co=::.'lUIl1c~tlono by Decii!lctcr .::.'.et t,6t.\' (;cn the: 770th t~T1;)" C:,,'-st .~rtil.-

ler)~ Be.tt~lioD (".nd the 613th Ec.ttery C&-. 'I'rc,(p) fW:l.:ti:...ncc1 ....t all t:::h.:'!J E'..nC

r~luct~~cc to t!~ e~ploY1~Gnt of redia CG~~llC t~ons.

1) Civili~.n Trcfi"ic

In c:.se of ('. "Second str·.C'(." ..\l:,rm, ;".11 civilir..n traffic in t c COlllcnt zene

::lust be stop 00 irnrJ.ooi!:.tely. Fren-;:h "'"lotor vehicles r:er~ I2.ctu.:.lly ('eing into

and out (,f DIF..PPE a.url.~ thE: oo.tt1;.:. Civil telt::phont.> r.o-:x:un1cc.tivns L:ust

cls~ b~ 6u~pcnded in t~e L. of C. rx~~.

• • _ .... -17-

VII S:'~\ilCBS OS SUP?LY

a.) Generc.l

Insof~r :-.5 conclusion:::: ern be cr:.\!n froi:. t:.e .::.hort "cUon, dl prep:.r-

ctory me~5Ul'es ~orked ~ell. No d1If~c~ties ~rooa durinG the ~ctiQn or

during the lcter re~lenishm~nt of division ! ~up_~i(5. Mutu~l cont~ct

rTQ,5 sufficitlnt for t::t. h'_nC:lin~ of -il .1ro:.l ....i~f>. Cu-operf'.tion ~:ith t.h~

senior tr~_n.5port officer 1-:'5 ~ tisf ctory.

At; in !!iost Letionl:; of this '''Y,jt~J thb grl.:.t ... .:t dif.:J.culti...J ... (;rc cn<'(.ountl;)red

.3cfr':"sit '-_0::"- ..possible J Corps H£'=.d~U!..rt(;rJ J 1"suvd th!;;; n\!cc..5.s:.ry order::: on thu I'olle' '1ng

Too t:l""'J1y suctions froI!! higher he dqu rtel~S interr':r.L'~ ftl!r the b~ttle.

Thl~ incre~&ed thl:l ci.ifficultios for th!. troops ."t DILPPE.

b.) J.J:mlunitoo~

1.) Supply

The ~llot~&nt of t~o or e'l~n tp~eo ·.~ts or flru to th~ I~~nt~·, H~~vy

vrer,pons .::'_~1d to the: f'.rtil101'j' proved sufflci(;r!t., d(js~ite th<.: fl ct thr.t ~s

is r,lTiq's the c::.ae .7ith troops fighting for the. first t;',J"" C".nd f,.ciur ,ood

2 .} stor'1pe

div1s1on by rr;.~l bcc .....ust. t!:e Bri'tLh h,-d "itad: ::n '.:n? no furttler 1 rE.~ Gt':...ll,,;

enl'my r.ctJ.vi ty '~c.s expect-cd. The rc~1_r..J.3hmvnt C.t :u:.r.1Wl1tlvn .~ i:> :.lUil"·st

CO~91~te en thv oveuinp, of 21 August 1942.

c.) Rations

• • • -1$-

d.) ~Gdic~l S6rv~co

Tht; :m.."Clicc.l scrvic~.:; ci' ti1c div1si~n, tl' rt1cul;:rl~' tho cV!:C'~~ tien ;;;f

c:.sucl.ti<:lS, ":"rerJ t:Xcellcntlr pre:9~.rt.-d. Tt.l. first h,,;,z;.it-:l tr=in : rr1vc-d

at F.OUEN :.5 eerly ".S 0130 hours, 20 ;'1.l;,.-:u:::;t 1942, :·..r.d tht. \ vun~l.;d. i erc

~dD~ttGcl to the G0ncr~1 HO~fitLl. It r~~.1~s to bL d~c!c~4J' cth~r i~

':"ouldn1t. be ot:tt\Jl' for thl. di-.,!f;Ln t{.o ~'V~:C\1:ltQ itt.; :.::..undl:d tt. tL..· h1.o3­

flit::~;, it:: botll RDlB:; r.ne. iJ.UE;1S s!:J,cc: t!l... f ....1""_I.. r 1::; inf'\4.ftl.ciently

equi!J,>Vo. ttl d0,.-l ',-ith :. l~rC;t:: 111XJ.'b•. :' vI ::vu.."1t...:d C~-i:lt: :. li:.:.itcd period

c: tiD\,.;. ~...--d1cr.l 1n:~t~1-_t:'cn5 in th", . h." .A' thG Ct.rrj)s • n:. l.nzw'f1­

ci,",r.t. Hosplt::~(; 1.11 ROUEN ..e:-6 :' lrQ:.~:>· ...v-.,.r-cro·. 'd....cl .:'S1"~C:i.- ti.is ....n l:.t.:f.l€nt.

0.) Vcter1r~~y S~rvl.ce

It \tt.s .i:liJ·)b!:>.lb~(j t"" dr~.~- c ...ndUS1~m: ,.f :-ny illp~r"'nc,"" k::Sc>6 Lf i.~vrs",s

c.r..: ltnlf':1, but thu t<..t"-.l l1u.:'I:,er '-'~~tJlc.yu1 in t.l..: ~ctl(..n is n ...t lm~', n ~t this

time. It 1s th",ref.,r..: llJpus::;1bl", tv c-.lcul.:.tc t •.lOI ......rconto:c.. vf .l<.;SSt.S.

f.) TC'odt Cunstruction Orf::::'.nisc..ti-';1.1 C~l"..;.Lns

The succet;S of tt."" .:ithdr,.·.. ·~.l ~r T.... e.t c~1u.::n5 frvi",l th.:; Cl. ·.ct . ut:. their

fw·thol' vu)lo)"';D,unt flor ,.ha lU:"I':in@' c..~ tr",. ;n:: c:""-, tr:-.n::;port~ ti n {.f l:luy)li;;,s

excl:\.:,,lcd expliict::.ti....m:;. Th<. quick '.. vrk vf Stt.ff.... lfUhr...,r J~.kob:::{.'ll c.;' th(;

NSKK (t~~tJ.on· 1 Socl.-.list Hotor Tr:-.c.s~)ort Corps) In th~ ".::'0'. of the '!lith

Ir:.fr.r.tT)· Division dcSE.rv€:s .::_ ·cci:-1 rJ ...ntion, !:'ncUf.n C~ rgo upr.Cl.. i:: d bb'.:n

conccmtr!:tud OJ' tho Qu=.rt~rJl-sh.r in thu FOUE.~ f.I (.;L to on"l·l, H.~ ::::u,J.:>ly

syate~ to m6~t nIl vventu:·liti~3.

g.) F'.101

The supply of fuel offered no difficulties. Only the n:.plenishr.\('nt of'

fu<"l s·J.'y~..lles for vehicl.\:s O_:l ...r tL,"< on co::l-g:- t. ·lC..S d.ii·f~c~t, :.incc th~_r6

m s nc. E:X,,-ct l_st of pllnts proo"J.cing c .....-rcc.c.l ot' t ....Jir c··.~-.c~t~·.

h.) Prisor.t::rs of . C.T

Prisoners c.f ~.r "Erc ev~cw~t.::~ ;~t Dut cliff1cultlry~.

i.) Cc.ptarecl. tJir.tericl ad Eou:'rL1-~t

The sclv ge of c~ptured mctoricl r~d equi~vnt, ~s us~~, is ~rocb~din[

• -1S­t.:;" p ...:'sonnEl. 3p.;,01:1 dif.. ir;uli:1..:!s ,:I'(.

resulting frolll the L)rc·S.;:lncl. of u:.ny ':"ivc ",xi1lo",lvf.; c.w~·eus ,":"':".d from t.}l.

fc..ct t~vt ,:,11 .ecpons t.r;; lo:.dc.d. T-r.: Divl:;ic~l Ie (·strblu.hea. .

collecting point for C'" tJtUl"uc! t'!'"tL.ric"l ~ u~ L-C!uilJmvnt in . coord noc: "1th

tiy.lstine rogul':.tions.

k./ -e~pons !nd Egu1pmunt

6 - 1501!'.I:l CU- ct :...rtllL·l"Y GurlS

2 57m.'r. J::.ntJ.-t..:.nk gun.::>

2 - Czech ?J7~ ~t~-tcnk ~~

5 - Light machin~ guns, Mod~l 34

2 - Spnr~ bcrr(.:~ for Czech 47~ ~nti-t~nK ~s

2 - Trucks

1 - Field kltch~ns

Slgnoo

G~nur.l of I~~uured Truops

520th In! Div

Cps. Svct. NT. lo~/42 Secret

1 inol.

Diy hq, ~ S~pt 194~

25 Copies

.. Copy

Supplo:n...nt"ry rf;!.i<:.rks ::url rJ.: ~):, ~f th,,;, divlsion to fCJll .. ··~.

ft.r the CG

DiRtributic.n

A(R~t~o~ts 4 Cepies)

CG, Op:. orIlccr

I~tcilleun~~ cff~cor

• • copy

CorpS' H.Q. = ;.rm:r Corps Corps H.q. 2 Sopt_or 1942-Opcrotions Soct. NT. 184l./4? scoro~

Reference: H.Q. Li....lCXIV ~. Corps, Ope:rc.tionr; Scct. 1787/42 secret d..1.tcd 29,.usus t 1942-

Subject Combc..t rorx>rt :::.nd c:q>;:;ricnccs g-incd by the LXXXI ~ Corpsduring tho British ~ tkck on Dioppc, .•ugust 19th 19~

l.d.d.itions i.X.d.:;l b;}t tho LXXXIV Corps to the co:'lb::-.t report c.nd tho e:r:pcricnccsg:l.inod by the LXXXI Corps during tho Briti:Jh c.tt~cl{ on Dicppo.

?orc.grophs "-) to d) OnoER OF Th.TTLI: .Jill r:cSJ::Rv:Js

1. Bl'.ttorics or Plc.toons of ....rtillcIJ.' (Br. Troops or SCctions) ah:>uld be

cJ.lottcd to thQ r;;:ls....rvc Bntt:-.li..:ms. Trucks should be pl'.rkc..c. nc:\I' the

rosc.rvc B.:l.tt.:..lions in order th::'.t their porsolmel c.nd pcrsonru.:l from the

t!.tte.cl'l.ed Lrtillc.r:r c.".n bl.: cntruckf,;d ,.-ithout doll'S in the event of c.n :'.1ert.

In the event of .:.. "Sccond.-St.:..[;c" Alo.nn, the: reserve iktttaJ.ions .,ill c.ssomblo

o.coording to th(.l !Jl~ le.id dO'..n in j.X'.r.:.gmph 4.

2.:. Trucks f6r tI'C'.nsporting sign.:.,l c.quipJ.ont, hec-v;}° inf['JltI"'J "'C.:::.pons and !£.

~_":'lJ'lllJ1iti\)n ::JUst bu :l.llotc..d to CO~iC8 oqui?ped 'fiith bicyclos, in order to

o.void fr....qucnt brc.:tkdo·,llls rcsultinZ fro;:. ovorlo,'1ding of bicycles.

3. ~.nti-Tn.nk ,,~['.pcns in sufficient nur.ibcrz T.Ulst be "notud to roserv" Bo.tto.lions.

~.nti-To.nk oowp..wius should be h ...ld in rco<..rvo in or&....r th.:..t they ccn be

employed :lg~·.inst the r.'f_in cncqy tUlk ::'. t'k.ok.

Divisions .:nd Corps rc...s...rv<; unito \..-i11 report by tho 10th of

Septeuber 1942 on th... folloYling:

0..) T~'lE ~l(.tacnt of dct.:.ch.:1tmts f ..l their 14th COI::lpLl.nies to

the rcse;rv.... &ltt:llions. Strength:md ·.7C:......pons strength will

be stc.tc.

b) Tho nllot;:l.cnt of ...nti-Tnnk rlflCls, 3ren..'\do-dischargors,

BDng..'\loro torpedoes .....nd T-r.J.nos to the reserve Bo.ttc.lions.

c) The; pr.:-octicability of c,llotin,~ r-orc fixed ..Ul.ti-T::.nk guns ,lith

c. C.....libru grc~tcr t~ 3.71:!i:\. The nur.fucrs c.nd type of the

t,'OC.pons will be stetu

4. In thc; c;vont of :'. IISccond-stec" ...,J.u.m, tho '&.tt8ion of the CoIp.S re~orvo

Ttill o..sscr.::ble .:..'·'ul be :ru:..:.~T to c.dv:".1lcQ into c.ction. ,.s th0 B..'\t~ions -=tJ.y be

COI:'l:'.i:ttcd in any 0110 of st-vcr-.l diroctio1'l5, :"!.coo:rdin& to the tc.,..J.tice.l :rl~

-2-

• tio~~nveniont c.sllr..:nbly points '.ill be selected boforoh::md in proJ:nretion

fer an ~.d.V"'....nc<: in vithcr of tho threo r:nin directions, North, &.st, nnd Vlest..

.I. sector of n strvet or :l side strcGt ",rill be allotcd to o~ch Compmy so that

the depc.rture from tho nsscmbly c.ree.. "ill be carried out promptly end Sl!Pothly.

The ll.ppronch routes to these ll.ssembly ::!.ro~.s .:llld the oo.rching time will be kid

do'fm bcforch.."'.lld in order to c.void oolwms cr,Jss1ng o=.ch other. Troops uill

only c.ssemblt; nt these points ' ....hen Co "Second-StQ.ge" J...1c.nn giving North, :&:tst.,

or West has been sounded. If this :lddition.."\l direction is E2! included in the

c.1.:lrm, Corps reserve units .rill :l6scr.J.ble in their qu."U'ters e.s in ~ "Pirst­

Stago" .Uo.:m and be reo.dy to Dr.rch off. The ~ssE:;.nbly points selected c.ccord­

ing to these instructions will be reported to Corps Hc=.dquo.rtors by the 6th of

SCptember 1942.

5. Reserve Bnttc.lions, pa.rticulr.rly Divisio!l.-~l Reserve B.:'.tto.lions, mll in !;lOst

et".se.~ go into nction c.t 0. p~riod "hen the u-.ctic.."l sitmtion is obsoure.

Since the sucoc.:ss of ... counter-e.tt.:'l.ck is dependent upon its speed of execution,

thoro is no t:Lw ~.vo.il:lblc for systcm..1.tic rcconnc.isBl'.nco. The best rGconnnis­

so.nco is an nttcck \!hich assures ~.g::'.inst surpriso by thu cnployncnt of c.ct;ive

adv:':\1lcc guArd po.troIs ".nd by holding b.:.ck 0. reserve. HO\'rover the enemy is ns

ignor~t of th.J t.."I.ctical sitmtion e:.s "/0 c.re, cmd if we lo.unch an ~rly counter­

ntto.ck '·...0 ffivo the initiative.

Pb.rogrophs d) o.nil 0) ioNTI-TJ1NK DEFENCE:

Anti-Tonk obstneles lIUst b ... surrounded vd.th bc.rbed "lire to prevent tho enemy

from cli.rnbing ovor them. They must :l1so be covered by flonking fire from 11&1 s

so tho.t cnenxv sappers c.:.nnot blo"1 t~e:n up. In this connttction rofer to LXXXIV

Corps Operc.tions instruction 1743/42 of the 24th of :\ugust 1942, pa.mgraphs 1 to 7.

Pb.rogroph f) ,.arION •.GnINST T;UGErS ,.T SE;.:

This ,lill be cnrried out -..ith the :tid of the R!'.&:.r equipment. The Navel COrnrnnnder

of the Nol"'JlnIldy Sector rr-.s ~iven instructions tlw.t the re=.d1ngs of the Navo.l Ro.&.r

unit~ should be sent to him ('I,S \loll c.s to the Centrol R:..d:lr station. The Hc.vnl

COJ:IllmI1der is nlso kept infonned of the ev.:-.lUD.tion of R....d'lr re.-.ding, lmd he rlill

transmit this infonna.tion to Corps c.nd Divisiorul.1 Hec.dqUllrt~rs.

Pnrogroph i) HINE FIElDS:

lUne Fields blocking the entrances to r~"..Vines c..nd p.:l8SCS , ..ill be eJCmined to sec

if there is c..ny possibility of their being by-pa.secd. If' neeesse-ry those mine

fields ytill be extended beyond the ro.vincs.

1tinos duch C'.re 1D.id ':.s protootion ng:li.nst Infa.n"try :in phC'o.s

• • -3-

vJhieh are not ,-tithin tho field of our ooserv€.:d fira, must be conta.c. mines,

be<l:::lusc tho ommCf rral'cs n reRUlnr pra.ctic,£ of cutting through trip ,"."ires.

Devicos usod to r.nrk mine fields r.".:ty be r'EOvcd frot'! t.'le side of

t..lle mine field nC:lr.::st "'the cnG.JY if 'thON is absolutely no a.......nger of sontries

t.nl!cing a.long this outer 5idc. Othcrrd.se 0.11 tunc fields must hnvo the bouncl.o.ry

noc.rcst the encny cl..:.n.rly indicc.ted for the s:!.fety of our O\Dl troops. Rl.trols

frequently p.1.ss t'.long tho enemy side of r,line fields.

P~rogreph k) (1) sr.§],' OP.G.JIIZ..TIOH LLlOOH . .lID COiWillIIC..TIOll:

Unit st.:-.!! officers :mel nssis'bnts to CDIl'Q:J'1ders ru..u>t or~.nize within their st:lffs

n systC!:'1 for lit.loon c.nd corrnn.micc.tion ·...'ith subord1n:.te units, neighboring units,

nnd other services.

Comb:lt reports fon. the bc.sis of the coIr-'Jldcr ' s decisions. It is­

therofore nccesSo.-'U'y to !:D.kc n cl~ distinction bct,;ocn fc.cts, ll.ssUi:ptions ~d

deductions.

(2) Orders for the ~trt.."'.b1ist!"-nent of 1iess::.gc centers referred to in pnrt VI,

parn.g,I'Q.ph le, (SiglU'.ls) oro to fo110\7.

;.dd to p~rt VII: SlJ-PP-Wl::

P~rogreph :.) GENER;.L:

Divisions \'.1.11 check the meo.sures tcJ<cn for bringing up to tho front and

e\QCt1.'\ting c.11 types of !!'..::.terir.l nnd supplies r.nd \Jill report on neccs~ry

improvements. This inspection will cover the: storng6 of ::1.11 supplies, ~nd nnk03

:l lX".rticuL..... r cllCck to ensure th'lt ~.nr:!u.'lition is stored sc.flolly.

p--'..mgmph b) •..;",m;l'rION:

(1) .JilI:l\lllition on Hond:

_.lthough ~ sufficient ::.tock P_.....8 been built up, t~mrj' shortuges ~ro bound

to :lrisc O\-,"inG to the incre'\scd cousUOJption of units in h..,:,.vy eng.'\gUL--cnts.

Divisions ylill th<:Nfol'C ~rro.ngc for f.lClbilc rescrvvs of ~tion c.nd chec.lc

the org:.mizn.tion for bringing up '\Ilnunition to the front UJlcs.

(3) ~_p.......rt fran. the Division......l .J!i:lUnition dur.'rps, c.nomition e::m he obta.ined. from

tho .J:nunition illCHEL. The.~ int<.:nd3 to sond for.....erd or.:nunition tro.ins to

the edge of the zone of opeT!'.tions on the 00::'5t, ,-.hanover the circurLst:o.nces

penllt.

• •Pcrc.groph d) ;IEDIC,~ 5E~:

Ccsu..'\lties fron the r..rer". of th'J 716th Infl'.l'ltry Divi.-s..i...?1! ,~-Ul be cvaCUo.'\ted

to th~ B~so Hospit'\l or the Collecting Stction ~t C;XN. Subsequent ev~cuction

,-:ill be org:,.nizcd by :,nlY. It i3 intended to uovo the Gcncrnl Hospitfl.1 r.t

c.m to :.RG:::HT.:Jr or l.IENC.oN :-ro to ~3t('.blish in ita plnco nt t:.:.EN on cnlL'rged

stl'.tion Hospit.:'.1 ,71th n Surgc:rz-. Units or the 320th Infrmtry Division l".nd

the 319th Infc.ntry Division, loc<';.ted on the :udnlnnd North of the line and the

OOUT~' CbS - ST. ID '7111 evncu....tc their c...~sunlties via the !.rrJ3 Dressing Stc-

tions ei thor to the Str:tion HcspitC\l or to the collecting point for lightly

./ounded l'.t ST. LO. Jtrthor oVT'.C\U!.ticn y;ill be rcgulctcd by ;.:rrJYI C.o.S1.10.1 tics

occuring South of the line (X)U':'!...NCES - ST. LO YJill be cv:lcu..~tcd to n 8Dl'~1

collcctinz :Jt ....ticn ,'1hi.ell \1111 be c:str.blished Inter; i ts loc..~tion ":ill be

I".nnouncod. Cl",ounltios fra-. the .'319th Infnntry Diviuion on the IslC'nds will be

eve.cur.ted (",s l'Jn7, (l.S :Jhi:1s "XC still sro.ilin.:; thro~ to the collecting st~tions

c.t ST. K.LO to the Gcncr~l Hospitul nt mJINES, or by JUNKERS 1iospitl'.l plMca

directly teo ICl'1..cS, or P~·,;US. Thl7: c.lployncnt of ncspit~l trt'ins ,.'ill 00

ordered by :'.r..:.; r.ccording to eireurlsbnec13.

The diviaicno '>'ill oupcTvioe th(; :?rovioit11:::: i-lc.de for the eVC'.cu:-.tion of \7orkora

of the roDT Org':'.nizt".ti(m in C".5C of r'.l{'.t!.4 They \'rill report by 15 Sept 1942

how l.l.."'U'\Y vehicles of the TODT Orgl.'.niza.tion ,rill b..:: ~.VC'.il(\ble t'.ftcr the eVT~CU-

r.tion of the rl':lr~cro -nr"- :1~': these vehiclco -,'.1.11 b~ u:;cd.

Pcrc.gnnh g) FUEL:- -The following dunps .;ill ~ r.V":'.ill".ble to sU?;lls~ vchiclc.o v,'ith fuel:

1) The Rr.ilw~ filling st....tions o.t NOYERS, V~·..U:::)(:;'H1?S, o:mnr: SUR VIRE, nnd. CZREli~S,

2) the reserve duu~ (Sp.::rrlngcr) nt co:JV,:ms.

In order te f(",eilitr-.te the supplying cf divisions, Corps HCI'.dquorters

br.S l'.rrnngod th.'\t ;.rr:I;f koeps th~ Rro.i1wn;y f'illing st'\tionc c-w.i..lc.blc cc. l..ont; o..s

possible. _'.. ~c.f iciont 'supply of Nd 1:'u.W. OOUiXJruj shoul.d ba l,r.in:ta~

Pnrc.grcph h) ll.'JIDLIID OF rRlSOlJERS OF '·'i.R:

'fl.C follO\7ing diviaiCl'll'.l p;,' c~gcs 'will be cct~bli.shcd:

716th Inf~try Division: ~t OOffi-ZLL.::S, ne.?..r C\J:Jt, r'J1d nu."'X ISIGNY

320th Inf'r.ntry DiviGion: r.t V:Jmirr:3 ond roUT;J cz:S

519th Inl'mtry Divi5icn: r.t GR.:JlVILIE

.•

• •It i6 intended to cstnblish !'. trensit ce.mp ~t ST. 1.0 and Co penn:ment CJ.go at

RENNES.

Prisoners \i1ll bo brought to the divisio:1C.l ~os by field troops. The division

•.1.11 provide for the guc.rc:ling of prisoners in their cages. Prisoners from the

c='.gOB ~ t Q~, IS!GlIY, V.oWGNES ',-lill be ·cv:.mr. ted by personnel of the tronsit

a::lJD.P.:lt ST. W. Prisoners from the cc.gcs ~t COUT..,NCES :md GR.NVILLE will be

Cv:l.eu=.t"d by personnol of the: pc~cnt cngo r.t HENNES.

Po=groph i) C.::PTURID lLTERlEL:

Tho divisions will ccto.blish :... roster of troops for salvo.ging c...'\pturcd m..'lterial

in the ~.rious sectors ~nd ."ill dcsign:..to the necesso.ry number of collocting

points. Tho salW\go troops \fill b<,; equipped .lith vehicles; they ,fill be given

troined persoJ1lle:l to .:lvoid c.ccidcnts dur1ns tho s...-clv::-.e;ing process r..nd from

e:Jq:llosions. The cv.::.eu=.tion of c.'·'..pturcd ra:ltcriel from the c:Jllccting points

will be tnken e.-i.re of by COrp3 Hc('.dq~rters.

For tho Corps Hc~~rtcrsThe Chief ef St~ff

signed von opprn

Indorsement:

320th Inf Div.Ope=tions Officer No. 1058;42. SECRh"'T

Distribution:

k. (hor.-ever 4 to Regt) ,CQ., Ops Officer, SUpp1¥ OfficersIntell. Officer

Div Hq, 5 Sept 1942­2.5 aDpics12th oopy

For the CODlm.;.nding GCneI'C'.1Cofa

• • - ',7-

Operotions Officor

3Z01ih Info.ntry Division

Division Hoo..Q.qtUI'ters.

5 Sept_or 194.Z

SUBJECT: COll'lnents' by Division:-

REFEREN'CE: Secret Doc-...;snt Number 1058/42,.

~'\tad 2 Septembvr 42, fr~ Op6t":).tions Officer, 320th

Infc.ntry Division..

·CoIllOents by Diviaion:

To l'hrt VI:

To P"rogrophs n) to d):

To. Soction 1:

lIRcconmcndo.tiona herein con~ined havo ~l.roo.dy been

et.rricd out .. ll

To Svction 2:

lief .. confidonti.c.l doClL'ilvnt Number 2266/42 fran Com­

nr.nding Gono;r-..ll r.nd Opomtiona Officer, 320th Infnn­

try Division. Reports should nuke pD.rtieul:'.r ocn­

tion of the distrib"cl.tion of tx:ucks to comp:::.nioo

equipped "lith bicycles.. 11

To Section .3:

llRcports in oor.for.nity ••i.th S~ction 3, Subauctions

b) :.nd n) rill be submitted by 8 SeptCl:lber 42.

tiThe question of o.ttaching n. pktoon of the 14th

Com;po.ny to the Division Reserve is being considered. 1\

To Sootion 4:

liThe nssembly arc.:lS mentioned in oonfidontW doCUJOCnt

No. 529;'4Z. dated 30 June 42., from the Operotions O~­

ficer of the Second Bo.tt:llion, 585th InfD.ntry Regiment

.::.re here,-,.ith countermnnded. ...ssembly ro.rec.s., \tblich c.....n

be easily co.IOClufl..'"'.ged, uill be reconnoitered near biV'­

ouo.c ~rc~. The cren.s must be locnted in such ~ \--;;'ly _~s

to permit the immcd.:...:l.te dofCrture of troops.

n) tOl~.rds the East

• • b) torp'_rda thu South

~) towcrds tho Vest.

"Rf:ports uill be submitted by B Soptcrnbor 42.."

To Po.r<'.grc_phs d) ~.nd e):

"Reports ,/ill be SUbmitted, cith sketch, by 15 S<:tp­

tembor 42, rogc.rding :-..uti-tank 7=..113 "..trl.ch .:l.rc not yG-t

protected by ocl.I'bed ",'ira c.nd covered by ~chine gun

fire. n

To El'.rognph i):

"Of' P.:'.rogr::.pil 2, Confid.cnticJ. Document Number 2247/4.2-,

dnted. 29 .August, from tho Opcrc.tions Officer (Engineer

scction) end SUpply Oi'ricor, 320th Infc.ntry Division.

lIltineficlds, ;-,hose for-..crd boUl'ld:-.ries c.re not on sen­

try rcutes, \"till be r<..portcd to Division H~

To p=.groph k):

liTho sroff orgmisD.ti..m .,-,hich h::s bl,,;l,,;n sot up faT c:.ac.s

of =.L~.rm \",'ill be rO-eJ(r.rnincd. •• now c.ll.ooc.t.ion of duties

,;bich ',Quld ensure tho opeedicr tI"CJlSi.1ission of r.lOSs.:l.ges

vlill be nsid.crod.

To Part VII:

To PC'.r:::.gr::l.ph a):

IICf. Cunfidentinl Docur,tont ~ur 758/42, dD.tcd 28 uU'"

g1,I.St 42, from 320th InfaJ$'Y Division. (Sont onl,y to

586th Inf::ntry Rcgimc~ DiTision Supply Column Officor

320th Inf::.ntry Divisl"")'"

To Pnrogroph d) :

"Of.. Confident1.':lJ Document N\.l.lJ:ber 422/42, &.ted 26 .tlu­

gust 42, fi'om ~l\e Opcrotions Officor, Su:PPl3' Oftioor ond

Medi.cc.l Officer, 320th Infcntry Division."

To p-...rogroph f):

liTo be taken~ of b.y tho Division (SUpply 01'­

ficcr). Tho roport IlIUSt be ""'~ by 13 September 4Z .

'I!o Pr.r..greph h):

"Cf. Co:.fidcnUo.l Document Number 726;1.2 ~.tod 25 .~ugust

• •42:, from the Intelligence end SUpply Officers J :"j20th,

,

rnfc.ntry D1visi,on. 1I

To P.:\~gr".ph i):

II' roster \:ill be prcIX'_red by Division Supply Officer by

15 SCptember -+2... II

Distrib'.J.tion:

•• ) Regi.rrl.cnt J 4 copios

Co.1i:m'lding Goncra.l, OpcI':".tions Officor

Supply Officer (cquipul.:nt); _SUpply Offic...::r (r.::.tions), ~cd.1ce.I-

Officer, r.nd VotcriJ"l..::-.ry Offioar.

Intelligancc Officer.,

,-

.'

•

• •.Corps H.Q., LXXXIV ArrJy CcrpsOperntions Sect. No. 1965/42 SECBE'1'

Corps H.q., 11 Sopteobcr 1942

Reference:

2nd co:>Y

Secret order H.Q. LXXXIV Arr:ry Corps Op3.. Sect., No.. 1743/42, dated24 J.Ufl\lst. 1942

SUBJECT Experiences fioa::l the Diep~e raid.

ro 320th In! Div.

1. The Divisions will send the results of their invcstigc.tions regarding

the construction of anti-t~ walls in places nlong the co~t to 11th Fortress

Engineer Bnttc.lion which, in collaboration ~'1ith the Divi.sions, will dctenrlne the

schedule and the extent of the work neces5Cry.

For tho time being, only those of the nlls surveyed according to the

secret report Q:y the 11th Fortress 3nc;inecr Pl'.ttc.l;,.on, No. 274/42, dated SC?t. 42,

will be built ylhich nre in particulC'.rly wonk sectors: (Napoleon (uci end South of

the oonstnl roil~ stntion). In cQnstructi~ these wolls, the tcchnicnl experiences

g.C'.incd at Die:rypc (see :rCT.ll\.rk No. 12 in secret letter fra:1 Corps, Nq. 1917/421, dated

6 S~t. 42) will be nndc use of.

2. The 320th Tnt Div, l..n cooperation with the Nnvy, will reinforce the

road berrier (TrosBensperre) at GAT'lEVILIE.

~.

3. In the event of an c.lC.Tt, l:lobile reserves will load only such equ11J!lont

as is needed in ocnbnt.

under guard.

Office, workshop an.d sheltering equipnent will be lett bchind

4. Dur:D:Jy instf'~lntions will net bc constructed tor clone to nctuol install(\.-

tions so that the lnttor nrc not .hit by artillery fire directed ngo.1nBt the faroer.

Duml::::(y' installations will be corwtruotoo. in such (\ oo.nnor thnt thoy do not obstruct

the field of fire of our own weapons, c.'Yen if'thc3e {'\TO firod han the rear of the

canbl\t zone. Dur;qy installations will be ninoc.. in tJI'd~r to prevent the eneny fraa.

using thee. Ac:tuo,l installations DUst not be so 0108..:: to co-ch ether thAt. severn!

of thea nre p.1t out of 0. ctian in ono en~ conoentration of fire.

5. :lli..1.itary Police troops c.."U1not bo wployod in the defence of particular

loce.lities \1hencver a "Second-8tnge" Alan:l sounds, bceo.usc they 3rC needed for other

(E.-g. traffic control during tho Doving up of reserves) ,. they may be

employed for the protection of their own ateticns only if those stations ore in

'. /----\

For the Corpa Ccr.:mondcrChief of Staff

Signature