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1 Incentives, Innovation, and Imitation: Social Learning in a Networked Group Thomas N. Wisdom Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Departments of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Indiana University August 2010

Thomas N. Wisdom Doctor of Philosophy in the Departments …cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/rgoldsto/Wisdom_Dissertation.pdf · Indiana University ... Allen Lee, Andy Jones, Zoran Rilak,

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Incentives,Innovation,andImitation:SocialLearninginaNetworkedGroup

ThomasN.Wisdom

SubmittedtothefacultyoftheUniversityGraduateSchool

inpartialfulfillmentoftherequirements

forthedegree

DoctorofPhilosophy

intheDepartmentsofPsychologyandCognitiveScience,

IndianaUniversity

August2010

2

AcceptedbytheGraduateFaculty,IndianaUniversity,inpartialfulfillmentofthe

requirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy.

DoctoralCommittee

_________________________________________________

RobertL.Goldstone,Ph.D.

_________________________________________________

ElinorOstrom,Ph.D.

_________________________________________________

KevinE.Collins,J.D.

_________________________________________________

JasonGold,Ph.D.

_________________________________________________

EliotR.Smith,Ph.D.

3

Acknowledgements

IwouldverymuchliketothankRobGoldstone,LinOstrom,KevinCollins,EliotSmith,and

JasonGold for invaluable advice and assistance in shaping this research; ToddGureckis,

Michael Roberts, Drew Hendrickson, and everyone in the Percepts & Concepts Lab for

feedbackandadvice;AllenLee,AndyJones,ZoranRilak,XianfengSong,andSarahGrantfor

helping to program and design the experiments; and Frances Kidwell, Itai Hasak, and

BennisPavisianforassistancewithrunningtheexperiments.Thisworkwasfundedinpart

byanNSFIGERTtraineeship.

4

ThomasN.Wisdom

Incentives,Innovation,andImitation:SocialLearninginaNetworkedGroup

Humans’extraordinarytalentsforlearningfromtheirenvironmentsandfromeachother

arethebasisofculturalandtechnologicaldevelopment,butfactorsaffectingtheuseof

theseskillssuchastime,informationdifferences,groupsize,andmaterialincentivesare

notyetcompletelyunderstood.Weusedaseriesoflaboratoryexperimentstoinvestigate

thecauses,consequences,anddynamicsofsociallearningstrategiesemployedbygroupsof

peopleincomplexsearchenvironments,andhowindividualimitationandinnovation

behaviorsaffectresultsatthegrouplevel.Intheseexperiments,participantsplayeda

simplecomputer‐basedpuzzlegamewithothers,inwhichguesseswerecomposedofsets

ofdiscreteunitsthathadbothlinearandinteractiveeffectsonscore,andeachplayercould

viewandimitateentireguessesorpartsofguessesfromothersinthegroup.Players

receivedround‐basedscorefeedbackaboutthequalityoftheirownguesses,andinsome

cases,others'guesses.Ourresultsshowedthatparticipantsusedseveralsociallearning

strategiespreviouslystudiedinotherspecies,aswellasstrategiesstudiedinthecontextof

innovationdiffusion,suchasimitationbiasestowardsolutionssimilartoone’sown,and

towardincreasinglypopularsolutions.Wefoundthattheriskofexploringinalargeand

complexproblemspacecausedparticipantstotakeaconservativeapproach,withsmall

amountsofinnovationandimitationusedtoacquiregoodsolutionsandmakeincremental

changesinthesearchforbetterones.Finally,wefoundthatimitation,ratherthanmerely

beingusedtocopyothersandavoidexploration,wasoftenusedbygroupmembersto

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improveoneachothers’guesses.Contextualfactorsthatdisruptedordiscouraged

imitationgenerallyresultedinpooreroutcomesfortheentiregroup,becauseofareduced

capacityforparticipantstocreatesuchcumulativeimprovements.Theseresultsare

discussedinthecontextofknowledgeasacommons,withimplicationsforthepromotion

ofinnovationsandintellectualpropertypolicy.

6

TableofContents

1.(A)socialLearning...............................................................................................................................................7

2.Experiment1–PictureGame......................................................................................................................29

3.Experiment2–CreatureGameA...............................................................................................................53

4.ExplorationasaSocialDilemma................................................................................................................89

5.Experiment3–CreatureGameB(scorevisibility).........................................................................101

6.KnowledgeasProperty................................................................................................................................129

7.Experiment4–CreatureGameC(paymentandprotection)......................................................145

8.GeneralDiscussion.........................................................................................................................................188

References...............................................................................................................................................................195

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1.(A)socialLearning

1.1.Introduction

Penguinsarethoughttobewarm‐bloodedanimalslikeotherbirds,butanoften‐told

talesuggestsotherwise.Asthestorygoes,agroupofpenguinswilloftenhesitatebefore

leavingtheicetoforageforkrill,becausealeopardsealmaybewaitinginthewaterto

forageforthem.Eachpenguinwouldprefertofindkrillassoonaspossibleandnevermeet

aleopardseal,buttheonlywaytobesurethewaterisfineisforatleastoneofthemto

jumpin.Thepenguins'simplesolutiontothisdilemmaistopushoneoftheirfellowsover

theedgeandobserveitforsignsofbeingdevoured(Dawson,1974).

Thankfully,humansocietieshavedevelopedinsuchawaythatgoingouttofind

fooddoesnottypicallyrequirenudgingourneighborsintothejawsofahungrypredator.

Butwedodependheavilyoninformationabouttheexperiencesofothersthatweexpectto

shareinsomeform.Infact,therearefewactivitiesthathumansparticipateinthatdonot

dependinsomewayonknowledgeobtainedfromothers.Thisisevidentuponcasual

reflectionabouthowpeoplegatherinformationandmakechoicesaboutthingslike

restaurantsormovies,candidatesforajoborpoliticaloffice,anewcitytoliveinoralarge

householdpurchase.Such"sociallearning"allowspeopletoobtaininformationabout

availableoptionswithoutundertakingthecostlyprocessofdirectlyevaluatingeachone,

thoughwithouttheincreasedaccuracythatsuchevaluationmightprovide.Thisprompts

thequestionofhowdecisionsaremadebetweentheoptionsoflearningaboutthe

environmentdirectlythroughexperience,orindirectlyviainformationprovidedbyothers.

Learningdirectlyfromtheenvironmentoftencarriesacostforthelearnerinterms

ofriskorresources,sowhenpossible,peoplewilloftenprefertoobtaininformation

8

indirectlythroughotherswithoutindividuallybearingthecostoflearningonone’sown.If

toomanypeopleavoidthecostsofdirectindividuallearningbutcontinuetomakeuseof

theinformationavailablethroughindirectsociallearning,anundesiredstagnationor

reducedadaptationtocomplexityandchangeintheenvironmentmayresult.

Ontheotherhand,whenlearnersareincompetitionforresources,eachlearner

mayhaveanincentivetopreventimitationbyothersoftheircostly,individually‐obtained

information.Adifferentproblemmayresultfromthisavoidanceofinformationsharing,

becauselearnersarepreventedfrombuildinguponandimprovingothers'solutions,which

canleadtorepeated"reinventionofthewheel,"anotherkindofstagnation.Ifanindividual

canpreventotherindividualsfromimitatingtheirsolutions,thenthecollectivebenefitsof

theirinnovationswillbeunderutilized.

Thesetradeoffsbetweenshort‐termself‐interestandgroupinterestcanbetreated

asanexampleofthewell‐studiedclassofphenomenaknownassocialdilemmas.Such

dilemmasapplytouseofnaturalresourcessuchasfisheries(Acheson,Wilson,&Steneck,

1998)aswellasartificialresourcessuchasirrigationsystems(Siy,1982).Alarge

literatureoftheory,fieldresearchandlaboratoryexperimentationhasbeenbuiltaround

thestudyofsocialdilemmas,andtheenvironmentalandinstitutionalfactorsthatcan

contributetotheirsolutions(Ostrom,1990).Recently,themethodsandframeworksused

toanalyzesocialdilemmasofphysicalresourceshavebeenproductivelybroughttobear

onthequestionofknowledgeasaresource(Hess&Ostrom,2007).

Thoughnotalwaysformallytreatedassuch,thesocialdilemmasofsociallearning

areaddressedinthepoliticaleconomyofknowledgeasatradablecommodity,intheform

ofintellectualproperty(IP).Intheory,IPlawandpolicyattempttobalancetheinterestsof

9

knowledgecreatorsandusersinordertofurthertheprogressofknowledge,giventheir

environmentsandincentives.However,thedistinctionbetweenknowledgecreatorsand

usersisnotalwaysclear,becauseknowledgecanbeusedasafoundationorscaffoldingfor

creatingfurtherknowledge.Sorestrictivepropertyrightsgrantedtoincentivizeknowledge

creatorscanactuallyhavetheeffectofimpedingtheprocessofcreation,reducingbenefits

forall.Thusadilemmaarisesintheconflictbetweentheprivateinterestsofindividuals

andthecollectiveinterestsoftheirgroupsintheuseofcurrentknowledgeandthecreation

offutureknowledge.

Thecomplexityofreal‐worldlearninganddecisionmakingmakesitdifficultto

teaseaparttheeffectsoffactorssuchasindividualdifferences,groupinfluence,and

environmentalcharacteristics,aswellaschangesinlearningandinteractionsovertime.

Theseriesofexperimentsreportedinthisdissertationwillattempttobridgetheindividual

andgroupperspectives,byexploringthedynamicinterrelationshipsofactions,incentives,

andinstitutionsinvolvedintheexchangeofideas,andtheirconsequencesforboth

individualsandgroups,throughaseriesofcontrolledlaboratoryexperimentsonhumans.

1.2.(A)sociallearning:Definitionsandbackground

BoydandRicherson(2005)defined"sociallearning"as"theacquisitionofbehavior

byobservationorteachingfromotherconspecifics."Sociallearninghasbeenstudied

extensivelyinhumans(e.g.Hurley&Chater,2005),aswellasnon‐humananimals,

includingforagingchoicesinstarlings(Templeton&Giraldeau,1996),foodpreferencesin

variousrodentspecies(Galef&Giraldeau,2001),andmatechoicesinblackgrouse

(Höglund,Alatalo,Gibson,&Lundberg,1995)."Asociallearning"canbedefinedconversely

10

astheacquisitionofbehaviorbyindividualinnovationorexplorationoftheenvironment,

withoutrecoursetoinformationfromothers.

Laterinthispaper,"asociallearning"and"innovation"willbeusedinterchangeably,

aswill"sociallearning"and"imitation."However,agreatdealofresearchhasgoneinto

attemptingtodefineanddisambiguatethevarietiesoflearningthatorganismsexhibit.

Beforewegoon,wewillsurveysomeofthisresearchandclarifywhichareaswewillbe

exploringindetail,andwhatwewillbeneglectinginordertoachievethisfocus.

1.2.1.Sociallearning/imitation

Galef(1988)reviewedmanystudiesofsociallearninginvariousspeciesinan

attempttoclarifythedefinitionsandexplanationsthathavebeenusedforthese

phenomena.Galefnotedinhisreviewthefutilityofusingtheword"imitation"inageneral

andunambiguousway,becauseoftheoverabundanceofusesanddefinitionsithas

acquiredovertheyears.Galefdiscussesthisabundancebeginninginthemodernerawith

Romanes(1884),Morgan(1900),andThorndike(1911),whosedifferenceswererootedin

differingviewsabouttheevolutionofhumans,andtheevidenceofprecursorsofhuman

abilitiesinotheranimals.

SimilarlytoBoydandRicherson(2005),Box(1984)suggested"sociallearning"asa

genericdescriptiveterm,todistinguishsocially‐influencedlearningfromlearningthatis

notinfluencedbyothers,thoughGalef(1988)notesthatthisdistinctionisnotnecessarily

clear,since"itisalwaystheindividualwholearns;"behaviorsmaybeinitiallyacquired

fromothersbutsubsequentlymaintainedbyindividuallearningoffavorableconsequences.

11

Wedonotintendtoattempttoresolvethisambiguity;itmustremaininthebackgroundto

helpexplainlearningbehaviorsinanyparticularcontextasamixtureofinfluences.

Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwomajordescriptivetermsforsocial

influence:(1)"socialenhancement,"inwhichothersinfluencetheperformanceof

behaviorsalreadyestablishedinanindividual'srepertoire(Galef,1988);and(2)"social

transmission,"inwhichsocialinteractionincreasesthelikelihoodthatanindividualwill

cometoindependentlyperformabehaviorinitiallyintherepertoireofanother,suchthat

thereisan"increasedhomogeneityofbehaviorofinteractantsthatextendsbeyondthe

periodoftheirinteraction"(Galef,1976).Forexample,inthemid‐20thcenturywhenitwas

commonformilktobedeliveredandleftoutsideofhomes,itwasnoticedthatincreasing

numbersofbirdswerelearningtoopenmilkbottlestodrinkthecreamfromthetop

(Fisher&Hinde,1949).Thiswasfoundtobeacaseofsocialenhancementratherthan

socialtransmission:laterexperimentsshowedthatforthepurposesoflearninghowto

opencontainers,allowingnaïveindividualstofeedfromcontainersopenedbyotherswas

justaseffectiveasallowingthemtoobserveaconspecificopeningacontainer.So

conspecifics'actvitiesfocusedothers'subsequentforagingonsimilarcontainers,whose

topswerevulnerabletoexistingfeedingbehaviorssuchaspecking(Sherry&Galef,1984,

1990).

Thephenomenathatthispaperwillexaminegenerallyfallunderthedescriptionof

"socialtransmission"ratherthan"socialenhancement;"weareinterestedinthespreadof

locallynovelinformationviapeerobservation,ratherthantheinfluenceofsocial

interactiononuseofinformationpossessedbyallgroupmembers.

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Alargevarietyofexplanatoryterminologyhasdevelopedtorefertotheorized

behavioralmechanismsthatcouldunderlietheabovedescriptiveterms.Thiscollectionof

terminology,accordingtoGalef(1988),is"extensive,contradictory,andvague",and

thoughithasnotprovedadequateforexhaustivelyclassifyingoreffectivelyexplaining

sociallearningbehavior,ithasbeenhelpfulinsuggestingapproachesforexperimental

analysisofthemyriadwaysinwhichsocialinteractioninfluencesbehavior.Followingare

severalofthemorewidely‐usedtermsinthisarea.

"Stimulusenhancement"(Spence,1937)and"localenhancement"(Thorpe,1963)

refertosituationsinwhichobservationofademonstrator'sactions,orevidencethereofin

theenvironment,causetheobservertodirectagreaterproportionofitsbehaviortoward

thelocationorobjectofthedemonstrator’sactivity."Socialfacilitation"referstosituations

inwhichthepresenceofothers"energizesallresponsesmadesalientbythestimulus

situationconfrontingtheindividualatthemoment"(Zajonc,1965)."Contagiousbehavior"

isusedforsituationsinwhich"theperformanceofamoreorlessinstinctivepatternof

behaviorbyonewilltendtoactasareleaserforthesamebehaviorinothersandsoinitiate

thesamelineofactioninthewholegroup,"suchasyawninginhumans(Thorpe,1963).

"Copying"referstosituationsinwhichanobserverissensitivetothedegreeofsimilarity

betweenitsownbehavioranditsmodel's,anditsresponsesarereinforcedpositivelywith

greatersimilarityandnegativelywithdissimilarity(Miller&Dollard,1941;Thorndike,

1911).

"True"or"reflective"imitation,alsoknownas"observationallearning,"requires

thattheperformanceofanactissufficientlyinstigatedsimplybyobservingit,andinvolves

purposeful,goal‐directedcopying(Galef,1988).Bandura(1965)calledhumans'raretalent

13

forsuchimitation"no‐triallearning,"becauseitisevenfasterthantheone‐triallearning

observedinanimalswithastrongbuilt‐intendencytoformcertainassociations(e.g.

betweenthetasteofafoodandasubsequentstomachache).Evidencefor"true"imitation

inotheranimalshassofarbeenunconvincing(Davis,1973;Hall,1963)becauseofthe

difficultyofcontrollingforallofthealternativesociallearningprocesses(Galef,1988;

Heyes,1993).

Thisdissertationisconcernedmainlywithphenomenathatfallunderthe

descriptionof"socialtransmission,"sooftheaboveexplanatoryterms,wewillbelooking

mainlyto"true"imitation.Theexperimentsdescribedhereinwillbedesignedsuchthat

participantsaregivensufficientinformation,ability,andopportunitytopurposefully

observeandimitateothers.Theseaspectswillbeexplainedinmoredetailinlatersections.

1.2.2.Asociallearning/innovation

Asmentionedabove,ouruseoftheterm"asociallearning"isessentiallydefined

negativelyastheprocessofobtainingorgeneratinginformationfromsourcesotherthan

one'sfellowlearners.Theterm"innovation"isusedasashorthandoutoftheneedfora

conciseandfamiliardescriptorfortheimpliedindividualintroductionofinformationthat

islocallynovel(givenaverylargespaceofoptionstoexplore)amongagroupoflearners,

asopposedtothetransmissionofexistinginformationbetweenlearners.Using

"innovation"inthiswayinvolvessomeriskofconfusion,however,becausethistermisalso

usedheavilyinthebroaderstudyofcreativityanditsinstantiationinscientific,industrial,

andartisticpractice.(SeeSternberg(1999),KouniosandBeeman(2009),Paletzand

14

Schunn(2010),Dunbar(1999),andGarciaandCalantone(2002)forhintsastothebreadth

ofthisfield.)

Intheinterestofbrevity,thecomplexityandspecificityofanalysisinthisliterature

willbeomitted.Wewilltrytoretainsomeclaritybylimitingourdefinitionofinnovationto

theuseoflocallynovelsolutionelementsbyindividualsamplingfromtheenvironmentina

problem‐solvingcontext,asopposedtoobtaininglocallyknownsolutionelementsthrough

observationofothers.

1.3.Learningstrategiesandtradeoffs

GabrielTarde,oneoftheforefathersofsocialpsychology,consideredinnovation

andimitationtobe"thefundamentalsocialacts"(Tarde1903/1969).Innovation

(generatinglocallynovelapproachestosolvingproblems)producesadiversityof

solutions,thoughoftenatacostinresources(suchastimeorenergy)orrisk(ingivingup

theopportunitytoexploitmorereliablesolutionsinfavorofsomethingneworunknown).

Imitationallowsadecisionmakertoemploysolutionsdiscoveredandpassedonbyothers

withouthavingtodevelopthemindependentlyusingcostlytrial‐and‐errorlearning.When

adecisionmakeracquiresinformationfromothersaboutpossiblesolutionstoaproblem,

theresourcesnotexpendedininformationgatheringcanbeusedforotheraspectsof

problemsolving,thusimprovingperformanceoverall.

Ofcourse,dominationofacommunitybyeitherinnovationorimitationcanbe

problematic.Excessiveinnovationisunhelpfulbecausegoodideasarenotpropagatedand

extendedbyothers.Excessiveimitationismaladaptivebecausegoodbutsuboptimal

solutionsarespreadtotheexclusionofbetteralternativesthatareleftunexplored.A

15

commonassumptionisthatthecollectivecostsofexcessiveimitationwithinagroupare

particularlydetrimental–therearetypicallystrongincentivesforindividualstopursue

largelyimitativestrategiestoavoidrisk,whichmayleadtoadearthofgoodnewsolutions

thatwouldbenefiteveryoneinthegroup.Sothegroupmaybebetteroffifimitationisnot

universallychosen,buteachindividualisbetteroffbychoosingimitation.Thisideahas

strongparallelsinthelargebodyofresearchonsocialdilemmas,inwhichindividuals’self‐

interestsareinconflictwiththesharedinterestsofthemselvesandothersfacingthesame

problem.Researchonsocialdilemmashasconsistentlyshownthatwhensuchinteractions

arerepeatedovertime,andparticipantsareabletorecognizethedilemmatheysharewith

others,theyareoftenabletoadapttheirbehaviortoameliorateoravoidsocialdilemmas

(Ostrom,1990).

Laland(2004)reviewedstudiesofanimal(includinghuman)sociallearning

strategies,andtheirinteractionswithasociallearninginvariousfoodforagingbehaviors,

aswellasmatechoice,foodpreferences,andotherimportantdecisions.Ingeneral,itwas

foundthatthedefaultstrategy(thatis,thepreferredoptionwheneveravailable)isthe

simplestpossiblebehavior:exploitationofanexistingsolutionorknownresource

continuesuntilitisnolongerproductive,atwhichpointeitherinnovationorimitationcan

beusedtoacquireanewsolution.Mostofthestrategiesstudiedformakingsuchdecisions

canbedividedinto“when”and“who”strategies;thatis,heuristicsthatdictateunderwhat

circumstancessociallearningisfavoredoverasociallearning,and,whenitisfavored,those

thatdeterminefromwhichothersanindividualwilllearn.

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1.3.1.Whentoimitate:Costlyinformation

Decidingwhentousesociallearningoftendependsonarelativeassessmentof

asociallearningasanalternative.Often,thereisgreaterrelianceonsociallearningwhen

acquiringinformationthroughasociallearningiscostly(Boyd&Richerson,1985).These

costscanbeintheformoftheresourcesrequiredtocarryoutasociallearning,theriskof

acquiringinformationthatwillnotbereliableinthefuture,andtheriskassociatedwith

learningabouthazardsdirectly(e.g.predators).Asmightbeexpected,sociallearningabout

predatorshasevolvedinawidevarietyofanimals(Mineka&Cook,1988).Returningtothe

AdeliepenguinsmentionedatthebeginningofChapter1,itisdifficulttoprovethatthey

intentionallypushoneanotherintothewatertotestforleopardseals(ratherthan

accidentallyjostlingoneanotherofftheedge),buttheydoavoidthewatertemporarily

whenoneoftheirfellowsiseaten(Dawson,1974).Ithasalsobeenshownthattheyare

sensitivetotheeffectsofpredatorsongroupsize:theyarelesslikelytoenterthewaterifa

groupreturningfromaforagingrunisunusuallysmall,indicatingthatithasbeenattacked

anddispersedbyaleopardseal(Müller‐Schwarze,1984).Perhapsmoresurprisingisthe

factthatpredatoravoidancelearninghasevolvedinsomecasesbetweendifferentspecies

vulnerabletothesamepredators(Mathis,Chivers,&Smith,1996).Thisstrategyis

beneficialbecauseitallowsminimalindividualcontactwithhazards,thoughifone

individuallearnsthe“wrong”hazards,imitationbyothersmaybeinefficientordangerous.

Arelatedstrategyistorelyonsociallearningwhenataskisdifficulttolearn

asocially.Suchastrategyhasbeenobservedintheprocessingoffoodswithphysicaland

chemicaldefensesbygorillas(Byrne&Russon,1998)andinanexperimentalvisual

identificationtaskinhumans(Baron,Vandello,&Brunsman,1996).Again,thisstrategycan

17

savevaluableriskandeffortforimitators,butiftheexamplestheylearnfromareflawed,

inefficientorharmfulbehaviorscanspreadinagroup.

1.3.2.Whentoimitate:Resolvinguncertainty

Another"when"strategyistocopyotherswhenoneisuncertainabouttherelative

valueofavailableoptions.Forinstance,BeckandGalef(1989)showedthatwhen

presentedwithtwonovelfoods,ratsshowedabiasfortheonethathadbeenconsumedby

conspecifics,asevidencedbytheodorontheirbreath;whenthefoodswerefamiliar,this

biaswasmuchweaker.Suchstrategiesareespeciallyusefulwhen,asabove,informationis

costlytogatherasocially–samplingfoodswithoutregardtoothers’decisionscanresultin

insufficientnutritionorevenpoisoning.

Anearlystudyofsocialinfluenceinhumansfoundthatinasimpleperceptualtask,

thelesscertainanindividualwasofhisownjudgment,themorelikelyhewastobe

susceptibletotheinfluenceofothers(Deutsch&Gerard,1955).Likewise,whenan

individualisuncertainabouttheappropriateresponseinaparticularsituation(becauseof

eitheralackofinformationorthefailureofpreviousresponses),itismorelikelythatthe

individualwillresorttoimitation(Thelen,Dollinger,&Kirkland,1979).Whilerandomly

tryingoutsocialbehaviorsisnotusuallypoisonous,socialmistakes(violationsofnorms)

canresultinostracism,whichhasbeenshowntocauseneurologicalresponsessimilarto

thoseofphysicalpain(Eisenberger&Lieberman,2004).Thisisthoughttobeduetothe

evolutionarynecessityofgroupinclusionforsurvival(MacDonald&Leary,2005).

However,ifnormsareharmful,theircostsmayoutweighthebenefitsofinclusioninthe

group.

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1.3.3.Benefitsofimitationdependonselectivity

Itmaybethatonceadecisionismadetoimitateothersviaoneofthestrategies

above,individualsdonotmindwhotheycopy,aslongastheyavoidthecostsofasocial

learning.However,asimulationbyRogers(1988)ofagentsinanonstationary

environmentshowedthatifavoidanceoflearningcostsistheonlybenefitofimitation,then

theadditionofagentswhopersistentlyimitate(andchoosetargetsofimitationrandomly)

toapopulationofindividuallearnersdoesnotimprovetheaveragefitnessofthe

population.Thisisbecauseovertime,thecostsavoidedthroughimitationwillbebalanced

bycostsresultingfromtheuseofinformationthatisnolongeraccurate.Thusat

equilibrium,amixedpopulationofsocialandasociallearnershasthesameaveragefitness

asanasocial‐onlypopulation.(Asimilarconclusionwasreachedinatheoreticalanalysisof

foragingbehaviorbyGiraldeau,Valone,&Templeton(2002).)

BoydandRicherson(1995)andKamedaandNakanishi(2002)confirmedthese

results,butalsoextendedthemtoshowthatwhensociallearnerscanimitateselectively

(e.g.imitatingwhenindividualexplorationisrelativelyunreliableandthusmorecostly),

theoverallfitnessofthepopulationcanincrease,becausebothindividualandsocial

learningcanbecomemoreaccurate.

1.3.4.Whotoimitate:Frequency‐biasedstrategies

Frequency‐dependentimitationtakesintoaccounttherelativeprevalenceof

behaviorswhendecidingwhichtoimitate.Thisoftenentailsconformitytothebehavior

commontothegreatestnumberofobservedmodels.Suchbehaviorhasbeenobservedin

19

manyspecies,includingguppies(Lachlan,Crooks,&Laland1998),rats(Beck&Galef,

1989),andhumans(Hurley&Chater,2005).Granovetter's(1978)theoryofinnovation

diffusionisbasedona"threshold"proportionofgroupmembersnecessaryforan

individualtoadoptaninnovation.Suchconformitycanresultfromagoalofobtaining

informationabouttheutilityofasolutionfromitsapparentpopularity(informational

conformity),oravoidingtheappearanceofdeviancefromagroupanditsnorms

(normativeconformity).

1.3.5.Whotoimitate:Payoff‐biasedstrategies

Manyselectivestrategiesinvolveobservingthesuccessofmodelsinorderto

determinewhichtoimitate.Such"payoff‐biased"strategiescanuseanyofseveralcriteria,

dependingontheinformationaboutothers'successthatisavailable.Anindividualcan

simplyimitateany“successful”individual(whichrequiresonlysomeminimalthresholdor

criteriaforsuccess),ashasbeenshowninunsuccessfulbats'tendencytofollowpreviously

successfulbatstofeedingsites(Wilkinson,1992).Addingabitofcomplexity,onemight

comparethepayoffsofallindividualsandcopythemostsuccessful,asassumedinmany

theoreticalmodelsofhumandecisionmaking(Schlag,1998).Anindividualmayalso

imitateanydemonstratormoresuccessfulthanitself(whichrequiresevaluationof,and

comparisonbetween,theindividual'sownperformanceandthedemonstrator's).

Whilesuchstrategiesmayallowanimitatorgreatercertaintyinthepayoffofa

particularchoice,theymayalsorequiregreateffortininformation‐gatheringand

calculation,andtheserequirementsmaygrowexponentiallywiththesizeofasocialgroup

andtheirresponsivenesstoeachother.Thefeasibilityofsuchstrategiesisquestionedin

20

theoriesofboundedrationality,whichposit"fastandfrugal"heuristicsthatallowdecision

makerstoprosperwithlimitedinformationandcomputationalresources(Gigerenzer&

Goldstein,1996).Inpractice,suchlimitationsmaysubstantiallychangethecost‐benefit

calculationforcomplicatedstrategies,andleaddecisionmakerstofallbackonsimpler

strategiesorfacereducedperformanceinthefaceofexcessinformationprocessing

requirements.HeiseandMiller(1951)showedthatinadifficultcommunicationtask,the

removalofsomeparticipantcommunicationcapacityledtoincreasedperformance.The

broaderphenomenonofreducedperformanceinthepresenceoflargeamountsof

informationhasbecomeknownas"cognitiveoverload"(Sweller,1988).

Thoughmanymodelssuggestthatcopyingsuccessfulindividualscanbeaneffective

strategy,thebehaviorresponsibleforsuccessmaynotbeapparent,andthusunproductive

ormaladaptivebehaviorsmayaccompanysuccessfulones(Boyd&Richerson,1985).Even

ifaccurateinformationaboutagoodsolutionisavailable,itsuseorexploitationbytoo

manyusersmayreducethebenefitsavailabletoeach.Thussimplepayoff‐biasedstrategies

mayhavecostsintheformofcrowdingandoveruse,whicharenotremediableinthelong

runwithoutmorecomplexcontingentstrategiesthatrecognizetheeffectsthatotherusers

haveonthepayoffofsomesolutions.

1.4.Conformityandculture

Researchonhumansociallearningisfairlywidelydispersedacrossavarietyoffocal

behaviorsandmethodologies,whichisunderstandablegiventhemyriadpossiblefunctions

forsocially‐mediatedinformationinsuchasociallycomplexorganism.Belowisafocused

summaryofsomeofthisresearch.

21

1.4.1.Innovationdiffusion

Inhisstudiesofthediffusionofinnovationsacrosspopulations,Rogers(2003)

positsseveralfeaturesofaninnovationthatcanaffectitsadoption,amongthemthe

relativeadvantageobtainedbyreplacingaprevioussolutionwiththeadoptedinnovation,

andthecompatibilityoftheinnovationwithprevioussolutions.Theformerisaclear

analogtothesimplepayoff‐biasedimitationstrategiesmentionedabove,butthelatter

dealswithmorecomplexcostsofadoption.“Backwardcompatibility”withaprevious

solutionmaybedesiredtominimizethecostsofadaptationbytheadopter,suchas

learninghowtouseit,orreplacingitemsusedcomplementarilywithit.Compatibilitymay

alsobedesiredtomaintaincontinuedinteractionswithotherswhohavenotadoptedthe

innovationyet.Thisminimizessocialcosts,andmayallowthepreservationof"network

effects,"benefitsofaninnovationwhichscaleaccordingtothenumberofusers(Katz&

Shapiro,1985).Examplesofbackwardcompatibilityininnovationincludetheabilityto

playgamesfromanoldervideogamesystemwithanewerone,ortheabilityofusersof

newertechnologiessuchascellulartelephonesandvoice‐over‐IPtoconnecttousersof

land‐linetelephones.Whenthesecompatibilitiesarenotavailable,adoptionofnew

technologieswillpresumablyproceedmoreslowly.

1.4.2.Conformityasanadaptivebias

Imitationinhumansocialactivitiesbringstomind"conformity,"whichhasnegative

connotationsinbothcommonusageandinmuchofthesocialpsychologyliterature.Some

ofthesenegativeconnotationscanbetracedbacktoAsch's(1951)classicstudiesof

22

conformityinvolvedmeasuringtheeffectofagroupofunanimousconfederatesonthe

visualjudgmentsofnaïveindividualparticipants.However,theearlyemphasisonthe

prevalenceofundesirablebehaviorsintheresultsofexperimentssuchasAsch'shasbeen

moderatedinrecentre‐evaluationsofthedata(Hodges,2004),andcallsforamore

balancedexaminationofthecomplexityoftheenvironmentalmoderatorsandmotivesof

biaseslikeconformity(Krueger&Funder,2004).Forinstance,arecentmeta‐analysisof

125studiesusingtaskssimilartoAsch'sexperimentshowedthattheeffectofthesizeof

theconfederatemajoritygroupdependedonwhetherresponsesweregivenpubliclyand

face‐to‐faceorprivatelyandindirectly,whichisthoughttodeterminethetypeof

conformityprocess(normativeorinformational,respectively)thatdominatesthesituation

(Bond,2005).

Modelinghasshownthatthetendencytoimitateothersratherthaninnovate

(“conformitybias”)canbeadaptiveinuncertainenvironments(Boyd&Richerson,1985;

Kameda&Nakanishi,2002).Similarly,socially‐influenced"informationalherding"

behaviorhasbeenproposedasanexplanationforphenomenasuchasfadsandfinancial

panics(Bikhchandani,Hirshleifer,&Welch,1992;Eguíluz&Zimmerman,2000),butithas

beenarguedthatsuchbehavioristheresultofotherwiseadaptivelyrationalBayesian

reasoninginuncertainconditions(Anderson&Holt,1997;Banerjee,1992;Bikhchandani

etal.,1992).

KamedaandTindale(2006)arguethatconformitybiashasevolvedinhumansand

severalothertaxabecauseofitstendencytopromoteanetaveragebenefitforindividuals

ratherthanerror‐freeperformance.Culturalconventionsarethoughttobeaformoflarge‐

scaleconformitytobehaviorsthatevolvealongwiththeirassociatedpopulations,subject

23

toaccompanyingadaptivepressures(Boyd&Richerson,2005).Oftenthegroup‐levelor

population‐leveloutcomesassociatedwithdecisionsthatareindividuallyrationalarenot

immediatelyapparentorpredictable.Muchlikethesociallearningstrategiesstudiedby

Laland(2004),manycomplexculturalmechanismshaveevolvedtodealwiththisdilemma.

Whentheinteractionofagroupofindividualsinacertainenvironmentisfairlystableover

time,traditionscandevelopwhichdictateexpectationsfor"sensible"behaviorinthat

environment,anddiscourageinnovation.Traditionsmayberelatedtointeractionswiththe

environmentsuchashuntingorfarming,orinteractionswithotherindividualssuchas

marriagecustomsordominancehierarchies.Suchtraditionscanbereinforcedthrough

punishmentofthosewhoviolatethem,rewardsforthosewhofollowthem,orboth.

Traditionscanalsobestabilizedthroughsimpleconformity,thetendencytoimitate

behaviorsthatarecommoninagroup.Whenmembersofagroupimitate,adaptive

solutionstoproblemscanbeeffectivelypreservedwithinaculture.

1.5.Studyinginnovationandimitationinalaboratorysetting

1.5.1.Previouswork

Howcanweprojecttheinfinitespaceofhumaningenuityandsocialcomplexity

ontothecircumscribedstageofacontrolledexperiment?Asidefromflawsinthe

interpretationofAsch's(1951)studiesofconfederateinfluenceonthejudgmentsofnaive

individuals(Krueger&Funder,2004;Friend,Raferty,&Bramel,1990),alargerproblem

withthiskindofexperimentisinitstreatmentofconformityasastaticinfluencerather

thanpartofadynamic,interactiveprocess.Changesincultureandtechnologyinvolvelarge

numbersofagentsinteractingoverlongtimescales,andthegenerationandexchangeof

24

informationbetweenpeoplecannotrealisticallybetreatedasaseriesofisolatedevents.

Whileignoringsociallymediatedinformationinalaboratorysettingmayyieldaclearstudy

ofimportantcognitiveprocessesofindividualproblemsolvingandchoice,inmany

situationsitrepresentsanunrealisticconstraint,andmaylimittherelevanceor

applicabilityoftheconclusions.Asch,andthevastmajorityofthesubsequentresearch

inspiredbyhisstudiesofconformity,madethemethodologicalchoiceofcreatingjudgment

situationswithasinglehumansubjectsurroundedbyaccomplicesoftheexperimenter

whowerescriptedtogivespecificjudgments.Thismethodisjustifiedfromtheperspective

ofcreatingawell‐controlledexperimentalenvironmentforexploringfactorsaffecting

isolatedindividualchoicestoimitate.However,thecostsofthismethodareroughly

twofold.First,constrainingthejudgmentsofallbutoneparticipantinagroupmeansthat

mutualinfluencesininnovationandimitationcannotberevealed.Second,limitingthe

opportunitiesforresponsetoasingletrialforeachjudgmentmeansthatchangesinthese

mutualinfluencesaredifficulttostudy.Theimpactofindividualinnovationandimitation

choicesonthegroup’sperformancecanbestberevealedbyallowingallparticipantsina

decisionmakingtasktobenaturally,spontaneously,andrepeatedlyinfluencedbyone

another.Understandingthegroupdynamicsofimitationandinnovationisoneofthemain

goalsofourstudy,andsoweallowallgroupmembers’theopportunitytoinfluence,andbe

influencedby,eachotherovertime.

Theextensiveliteratureon“groupdynamics”(e.g.Hare,1976;Forsyth,2006)

providesinsightintomanyinterestingprocessesofinteractioningroups,butmuchofitis

focusedoninterpersonalvariablesandspecificsettingssuchasclassroomdiscussion,jury

deliberation,orworkplacecollaboration.Whilethesearecertainlyfascinatingand

25

worthwhiletopics,theyoftenprioritizerealismandapplicationtothesesettingsatthe

expenseofcontrolandgeneralizability,andthusforourpurposestheyremainanindirect

influence.Amoredirectinspirationisderivedfromstudiesofthe“emergence”ofcollective

behaviorfromrelativelysimpleinteractionofindividuals(Holland,1999).Mason,Jones,

andGoldstone’s(2008)studyofgroupexplorationofaone‐dimensionalspaceservesasa

foundationforourstudyinamorecomplexdomain,andwewillwilluseitforcomparison

toourresultslater.

1.5.2.Experimentaldesignandgoals

Conceptually,wecandistinguishbetweentheoptions(behaviors,tools,foods,etc.)

availabletobeexplored,andthelearningstrategies(individualorsociallearningofvarious

types)usedtoexploreandexploitthoseoptions.Wecanalsothinkofchangesinsuch

strategiesovertimeasaformoflearningatahigherlevel.Inthecontextofanexperiment,

wewouldliketobeabletoclearlydesignandmanipulatetheoptionsandstrategies

availabletoparticipants,withoutexcessivelyconstrainingbehavior.

Manylearningtaskscanbeseenascombinatorialpuzzles‐‐choosingacombination

ofmoreorlesswell‐knownpartsorsubtaskstocreateamorecomplexbehavior.Such

combinatorialproblemsareanalogoustoexplorationofalargespaceofpossible

combinations.Ifparticipantshavetheabilitytosampleoptionsfromtheenvironment

throughasociallearningstrategies,oradoptthemfromothersthroughsociallearning

strategies,wecanobserveseveralimportantphenomena:varyingcombinationsof

elementsinparticipants'tentativesolutions,varyingmixturesoflearningstrategiesin

participants'choices,andvaryingproportionsofparticipantstrategiesingroups

26

attemptingtosolveproblemssimultaneously.Thesevariationscanbeobservedwithin

groupsovertime,orbetweengroups(e.g.thosewithdifferentnumbersofmembers,or

havingaccesstodifferentamountsorkindsofinformation).

Withthisinmind,weconstructedtwoexperimentalparadigmswithrecognizable

parallelsinreal‐lifeexploratoryandlearningactivities,inwhichparticipantscansample

andsharecombinationsofelementsfromalarge(butfinite,well‐defined,andstably

related)set,suchthatallchoicescanbeevaluatedaccordingtoanobjectivefunction,while

allowingforalargedegreeofflexibilityandvariationinchoicesandlearningstrategies

overtimeandacrossindividualsandgroups.

Incontrasttoseveralpreviousstudies(e.g.Rogers,1988;Boyd&Richerson,1995;

Kameda&Nakanishi,2002),weusedataskenvironmentthatdoesnotchangeovertime,

andenabledprovisionofregular,reliablescorefeedbackaboutparticipants'ownsolutions,

aswellasthoseoftheirpeers.Thesefeaturescouldbeexpectedtodiscourageexploration

oftheproblemspace,inthatthereisnopenaltyforperpetualexploitationofexisting

solutionsorrepeatedimitationofothers'solutions.Inaddition,theproblemspacewas

designedtobelargerandmorecomplexthaninthosemodels,inordertoprovidegreater

realismintheformofalargernumberofoptionsforexploration,aswellassubstantial

uncertaintyaboutoptimalsolutionsandstrategies.

However,byimplementingtheabovechangesandexplicitlyinstructingparticipants

tofocusonagoalofmaximizationofcumulativeperformance,wehopedtosimplifythe

taskwhilemimickingcharacteristicsofreal‐worldproblem‐solvingenvironments.Inour

task,solutioninformationcannotbecomeoutdatedinthesenseofinaccuracy,butits

performancecanbecomerelativelylesssatisfactorygivencontinuingopportunitiestofind

27

bettersolutions.Thisisanalogoustopracticaltechnologicalprogress,inthatolder

technologiesoftenstillfunctionadequatelyfortheirdesignedpurpose,butnewer

technologiescanprovideimprovementssuchasextrafeaturesormorereliable

performance.Ifthegoalistomaximizecumulativeperformance,someriskmaybe

rationallyjustifiedtoenablegreaterfuturerewards.

Thisapproachisofcoursenotideallysuitedforansweringallquestionsrelatingto

humansociallearning,butitallowsustoapproachavarietyofissueswhichmight

otherwisebetooabstract,varied,andsubtletoreasonablyapproachinacontrolled

laboratoryexperiment,suchastheroleofimitationinconformity,theeffectofindividual

differencesinrisktoleranceorincentiveresponsivenessinthediscoveryofinnovations,

andthecharacteristicsoflearningasacomplex,dynamic,socialendeavor.

1.5.3.Generalpredictions

Basedonthesociallearningstrategiesandtradeoffsdiscussedearlier,wecan

discusssomepreliminarypredictionsaboutparticipants'behaviorandperformance.First,

giventhateveryparticipantwassubjecttothesamechoicepossibilitiesandpayoff

structure,andthepayoffstructurewasfixedforagivengame,weexpectedthatimitation

wouldbemorecommonthaninnovation,becausetheformeroffersimmediaterisk‐free

returns,whilethelatteroffersmoreriskyandvariablereturns.Imitationwouldbebiased

primarilytowardhigher‐scoringsolutions(accordingtopayoff‐biasedstrategies),and

secondarilytowardrelativelysimilarsolutionstotheimitator'sown(duetocompatibility

strategies).Asforoutcomes,anintuitivepredictionbasedontheabovebehavioral

expectationsisthatthehighratesofimitationandsmallamountsofinnovationwouldlead

28

tostagnantgrouplearningprocesses,andalackofsubstantialimprovementsin

performanceovertime.Thispredictionisinlinewithanegativeviewofimitationasstatic,

idleinformationalconformity,butatoddswiththepotentialforgroupstosolvecollective

actionproblemsgivensufficientinformationandincentives(Ostrom,1990).These

predictionswillberevisitedandelaborateduponlaterinthisdissertation.

29

2.Experiment1–PictureGame

2.1.Experiment1overview

Inordertoexplorethedynamicsofinnovationandimitationingroups,andto

attempttoarbitratebetweenthecompetingpredictionsregardingindividualincentives

andgroupconsequences,wedesignedanexperimentinwhichnetworkedgroupsofpeople

exploredahighdimensionalproblemspaceoveraseriesoftime‐limitedrounds.

Participantsreceivedscorefeedbackabouttheirguessesaftereachround,andpassively

sharedinformationabouttheirguessesandscoreswithothers.Participantscouldobserve

andcopythemostrecentguessesoftheirneighborsastheyformedtheirownguesses.

Thedifficultyoftheproblemwasmanipulatedacrossconditionsbychangingthe

sizeoftheproblemspace.Arangeofgroupsizeswastestedtoinvestigatetheeffectsofthe

amountofsocialinformationonindividualperformanceandstrategies.Thein‐game

interactionbetweenplayerswaslimitedtothesimplepassiveexchangeofguess

informationonly,soastoallowexaminationofimitationandinnovationbehavior

unencumberedbymorecomplexsocialinteractions,suchasdirectcommunicationamong

players.

2.1.1.Predictions

Performancewaspredictedtoimproveoverroundswithineachgame,andacross

gameswithinanexperimentsession,duetoscorefeedbackandsimplelearningeffects.

Conversely,solutionturnover(theamountofchangeinasolutionbetweenrounds),and

thediversityofsolutionswithinagroup,wereexpectedtodecreaseovertimeas

30

participantsfoundmorepartsofthecorrectsolution,narrowedtheirsearchtosmaller

areasoftheboard,andrefinedtheirsearchstrategies.

Imitationwasexpectedtobemorecommonofpeerguesseswithhigherscores,

becauseutilitiesofguessesareexplicitandthusimitatorscanmaximizetheirexpected

utilitiesbychoosingthehighestscoringguesses.Imitationwasalsoexpectedtobefocused

onguessesthatweremoresimilartotheimitator'sownpreviousguess,asnotedabove.

Participantswhoimitatedmostoftenwereexpectedtoobtainbetterscoreperformance

(relativetothosewhoimitatedlessoften),becausetheywouldpresumablyimitategood

solutionswhiletakingfewerrisks.Theaveragescoresofparticipantsinlargegroups

(greaterthan4participants)wereexpectedtobegreaterthanthoseinsmallgroups,

becausethelargergroupswouldproduceagreaterdiversityofsolutions,andthusbeable

tosearchtheproblemspacemoreefficiently,contingentontheabilityofparticipantsto

makeuseofthisincreaseddiversitythroughselectiveimitation.

2.2.Experiment1Methods

145participantswererecruitedfromtheIndianaUniversityPsychologicaland

BrainScienceDepartmentundergraduatesubjectpool,andweregivencoursecreditfor

takingpartinthestudy.Participantspopulatedeachsessionbysigningupatwillfor

scheduledexperimentswithamaximumcapacityof9persons,andweredistributedacross

39sessionsasshowninTable2.1.

31

Table2.1:DistributionofParticipantsAcrossGroupSizes

Groupsize 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

#Sessions 8 6 9 3 3 5 1 2 2

#Participants 8 12 27 12 15 30 7 16 18

Weimplementedtheexperimentusingcustomsoftwareruninawebbrowser,and

eachparticipantusedamousetointeractwiththeexperimentalgame.Allparticipants’

computerscommunicatedwithagameserver,whichrecordeddataandupdatedscores

andteaminformationforparticipantsattheendofeachround.Thetaskwasaround‐

basedpicture‐matchingpuzzlegamewithscorefeedbackgivenaftereachround.Thegoal

picturethatparticipantsattemptedtomatchwasarandomlygeneratedsplinequantizedto

agridofsquarepixels.Thesquaresmakingupthesplinewerecoloredblack,andthe

remainingsquarescoloredwhite(seeFig.1forexamples).

Figure2.1:ExamplesofrandomlygeneratedgoalpicturesinExperiment1.

Theparticipant’sgameboardwasagridofthesamedimensionsasthegoalpicture,

witheachsquareinitiallycoloredwhite.Thecolorofeachsquareonthegameboardcould

betoggledbetweenblackandwhitebyclickingitwiththemouse.Eachparticipant’s

32

displayincludedtheirowngameboardandmostrecentscore(givenasthenumberof

squares,bothblackandwhite,markedcorrectlyoutofthetotalnumberofsquaresonthe

board),theirneighbors’gameboardsandscores,andindicationsofthecurrentroundin

thegameandtheamountoftimeremaininginthecurrentround(seeFig.2).Playerscould

copyaneighbor’smostrecentsolutiontotheirownatanytimeduringthegamebyclicking

thechosenneighbor’sboardwiththemouse.Eachgameconsistedof24roundsof10

secondseach1.Afterthelastroundineachgame,participantswereshowntheirguesses

andscoresforeachround,alongwiththegoalpicture,andabuttontoclickwhenthey

werereadytobeginthenextcondition.Whenallparticipantshadclickedthisbutton,the

nextconditionbegan.

Figure2.2:Exampleofaparticipant’sdisplay.

1 Inapilotstudy,we foundthatusingagamestructurewithhalf thisnumberofroundsandtwice the timeperround

yieldedfairlylowaverageandfinalperformancemeasures,andagreatdealofobservedparticipantidlenesstowardthe

endofeachround,whichpromptedthechangetoprovidingmorefrequentfeedbackinthecurrentgamestructure.

33

Participantswereinstructedtomaximizetheirscoresoverallroundsbymatching

thehiddengoalpictureascloselyaspossible.Theywerealsoinformedthatthepicture

theyweresupposedtomatchineachgamewasrandomlygeneratedandnot

representativeofanyparticularobject,shape,orsymbol,andwasgenerallynot

symmetrical;thattheblacksquareswereallconnectedtoeachothervertically,

horizontally,ordiagonally;andthatthenumberofblacksquareswassmallrelativetothe

sizeofthegrid.Followingtheinstructions,theparticipantsweregiventhefirstcondition,

afterwhichtheexperimenterconfirmedthateachoftheparticipantsunderstoodthe

mechanicsofthegame,andansweredanyquestionsthatarose.Theparticipantsthen

playedtheremainderoftheconditions,withanorderwhichwasrandomizedwithineach

session.Attheendofeachgame,participantswereshownthegoalpicture,alongwiththeir

guessesandscoresineachround.

Aparticipant’sscoreineachroundwasdefinedasacell‐by‐cellcomparison

(overlap)betweentheparticipant’sguessforthatroundandthehiddengoalpicture(i.e.

thenumberofcellswhichthetwopictureshadincommon),dividedbythetotalnumberof

squaresinthegoalpicture,togiveapercentagewhichcouldbecomparedbetween

conditionsofvaryinggridsize(seeFig.3).Animprovementwasdefinedasaninstanceofa

participantobtainingascorehigherthanallpriorscoresofallplayerswithinaparticular

condition.Eachparticipant’snormalizedimprovementsharewasdefinedastheir

individuallyachievedproportionofthetotalimprovementsachievedbyallparticipantsin

asession,multipliedbythenumberofparticipantsinthesession.Avalueof1indicateda

“fair”share,e.g.aparticipantachievedonethirdoftheimprovementsinathree‐person

34

session.Aparticipant’sscorerankinaparticularroundwasdefinedastherankoftheir

score(onebeingthebest)amongallscoresinthegroupinthatround;individualswiththe

samescorehadthesamerank.Turnoverforeachround(afterthefirst)wasameasureof

theamountofchangebetweenaparticipant’sguessesoversuccessiverounds.Itwas

definedconverselytosimilarity,exceptthatthetwopicturescomparedwerethe

participant’sguessesfromthecurrentroundandthepreviousround.

Figure2.3:Score/overlapcalculation:thefirsttwopictureshave20outof25squaresin

common(shownindarkgreyontheright),sotheyhaveanoverlapof80%.

Imitation(ameasureofwhetheraparticipantcopiedaneighbor’sguessina

particularround)wasdefinedasfollows:

Ipr =1:maxi(overlap(Gp,r,Gi,r -1)) > overlap(Gp,r,Gp,r -1)0 :maxi(overlap(Gp,r,Gi,r -1)) ≤ overlap(Gp,r,Gp,r -1)

;p ≠ i

WhereGp,ristheguessofParticipantpforRoundr,Gi,r­1istheguessofNeighborifor

theRoundpriortoRoundr,andoverlapisthecomparisondescribedaboveforthescore

calculation.Inotherwords,aparticipanthasimitatedinaparticularround(Ipr=1)ifthe

35

participant’sguessisclosertothemostsimilarneighbor’spreviousguessthantothe

participant’sownpreviousguess.

Diversity(ameasureofthespreadofgroupmembers’guessesovertheproblem

spacewithinaparticularround)wasdefinedasfollows:

Dr =1−majority(Gspr)

p∑

s∑

StotPtot

WhereGspristhebinaryvalue(blackorwhite)ofsquaresintheguessofparticipant

pinroundr,Stotisthetotalnumberofsquaresinthegameboard,Ptotisthetotalnumberof

participantsinthegroup,andmajorityisabinaryfunctionthatconveyswhetherthevalue

ofGsprisinagreementwiththemajorityofparticipantsinthegroupforthatsquareinthat

round(0=notinmajority,1=inmajority).Diversityasdefinedaboveisconstrainedtobe

withinthe0to1range,andhighervaluesofdiversityindicatemoredeviationof

individuals’guessesfromthemajorityguesses.

Thenumberofsquaresinthegameboardwasmanipulatedacrosstwoconditions:

inthesmallboardsizecondition,thegameboardwas7squaresoneachsideforatotalof

49squares,andinthelargeboardsizecondition,thegameboardwas9squaresoneach

sideforatotalof81squares.Thelargerboardwashypothesizedtobemoredifficultto

fullysearch.Therewere4repetitionsofeachcondition,foratotalof8gamesineach

session.Theprobabilitydistributionofscoresamongallpossiblegameboardstatesineach

oftheboardsizeconditionsdescribedaboveisshowninFig.4.Thesizeofthegroup

participatingineachsessionwastreatedasacovariate;groupsizerangedbetween1and9.

36

Anotherfactorconsideredwasthe(randomized)positionofeachconditioninan

experimentsession;thiswascalledthegameorder.

(a)Boardsizeof49 (b)Boardsizeof81

Figure2.4:Distributionofscoresforallpossiblegameboardstatesineachboardsize

condition.Notethatduetothenumberofpossiblegameboardstatesineachcondition

(approximately5.6x1014and2.4x1024,respectively)themeanoverallandfinalscores

appeartofalloutsideofthedistributions,butinfactarejustveryrarescoresintheupper

tails.

2.3.Experiment1Results

Formostanalyses,dependentvariableswereaveragedacrossallparticipantswithin

agrouptogivemeasuresforthegroup’saggregateactivity.Inthismanner,the

fundamentallevelofanalysiswasthegroup,nottheindividual,anddependenciesbetween

individualswithinagroupdonotleadtoelevatedTypeIstatisticalerrors.

37

2.3.1.Boardsize/difficulty

Intheaggregate,participantsachievedfinalscoresof.893(i.e.89.3%oftheway

fromtheworstscoretothebestscore),andaveragescores(overallrounds)of.833%.

Meanfinalscoreswereslightlybutsignificantly(about2percentagepoints)lowerinthe

largerboardsizecondition(t(38)=‐2.88,p=.006;seeFig.2.4).Theaverageguessturnover

rateperroundwas7.3%ofthegameboard,andparticipantsengagedinimitationon

25.8%ofguesses.Therewerenosignificantdifferencesinturnoverorimitationrate

betweenthetwoboardsizeconditions.

2.3.2.Rounds

Thedatawereaveragedacrossallparticipantsandallconditionsineachgroupto

givedependentvariablemeasuresforeachgroupwithineachround.Linearmixed‐effects

modelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossroundsforeachdependentvariable,witha

randomeffectofgroupmembershipontheslopeoverrounds.Apreliminaryexamination

ofguesscontentconfirmedexperimenterobservationsthatparticipants’firstround

guessesoften(approximately18.5%ofthetime)consistedofallwhitesquares,becausethe

resultingscorewouldrevealhowmanysquareswerecorrectlymarkedaswhite,andthus

howmanyblacksquareswereinthesolution.Thiswasacleverandusefultacticfor

participants,buttendedtoskewtrendsacrossrounds.Forthisreason,thefirstroundwas

excludedfromanalysis.

Analysisofscoreversusroundshowedastronglysignificantpositivetrend

(F(1,857)=139.91,p<.0001,β=0.577;seeFig.2.5a).Similarly,astronglysignificant

negativetrendwasobservedforturnoverversusround(F(1,857)=169.06,p<.0001,β=‐

38

0.527;seeFig.2.5b).Asignificantnegativetrendwasalsofoundforimitationrateversus

round:participantstendedtoimitateeachotherlessoftenaseachgameprogressed

(F(1,713)=14.37,p=.0002,β=‐0.182;seeFig.2.5c).Guessdiversitywassubjectedtoa

similaranalysisafternormalizingitforparticipantgroupsize,whichwasaccomplishedby

dividingallvaluesbythemeandiversityvalueinthesecondroundfortheappropriate

groupsize,whichwasgenerallyatornearthemaximumduetothefirst‐roundblank‐board

phenomenonnotedabove.Theanalysisshowedthatthediversityofguessesinagroup

decreasedsignificantlyoverthecourseofagame(F(1,713)=33.38,p<.0001,β=‐0.415;see

Fig.2.5d).

(a) (b)

39

(c) (d)

Figure2.5:(a)Meanscoreincreased,while(b)turnover,(c)imitationrate,and(d)guess

diversitydecreasedasmoreroundswereplayedwithinagame.

2.3.3.Gameorder

Similarlinearmixed‐effectsmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsfordependent

variablesacrossgameorderwithinsessions,averagedacrossallparticipantsandall

roundsineachgame.Onceagain,participantgroupwasusedasarandomeffectineach

model.Analysisofscoreversusgameordershowedasignificantpositivetrend

(F(1,272)=52.69,p<.0001,β=0.437;seeFig.2.6a),whileasimilaranalysisofturnover

showedasignificantnegativetrend(F(1,272)=23.08,p<.0001,β=‐0.305;seeFig.2.6b).

Imitationincreasedsignificantlyacrossgameorder(F(1,246)=11.86,p=.0007,β=0.214;see

Fig.2.6c),whileguessdiversitydecreasedsignificantlyacrossgameorder(F(1,111)=7.27,

p=.0081,β=‐0.282;seeFig.2.6d).

40

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure2.6:(a)Meanscoreand(c)imitationrateincreased,while(b)turnoverand(d)

guessdiversitydecreasedasmoregameswereplayedwithinanexperimentalsession.

2.3.4.Groupsize

Amildupwardlineartrendwasobservedforscoreversusparticipantgroupsize

(F(2,36)=4.56,p=.0395),aswellasamarginalquadratictrendwhichpeakedatagroupsize

of4(F(2,36)=4.33,p=.0446;seeFig.2.7a).Similar,strongerupwardlinear(F(2,28)=24.07,

p<.0001)andquadratic(F(2,28)=16.94,p=.0003;seeFig.2.7c)trendswerealsofoundfor

41

imitationrateversusgroupsize.Nosignificanttrendswerefoundforturnoverorguess

diversityacrossgroupsize,althoughbothdisplayedsubstantialvarianceacrossgroup

sizes,andbothseemedtobegenerallyinverselyassociatedwithscore(seeFig.2.7b&

2.7d).

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure2.7:(a)Meanscoreand(c)imitationrateshowedsignificantquadratictrendsacross

participantgroupsizes,while(b)turnover(d)guessdiversityshowednosignificant

trends.

42

2.3.5.Scoredifferenceandrankinimitation

Analysesofthetargetsofimitationshowedthatnearlyallinstancesofimitation

wereofthosewithhigherscoresthantheimitator’s(seeFig.2.8a),implyingthatimitation

behaviorwasgenerallypurposefulandnotrandom.However,therewasastrongbiasfor

imitatingthetop‐scoringsolutioninsmallergroupsthatweakenedsubstantially

(indicatingthatitwasmoredifficult)inlargergroups(seeFig.2.8b).

(a) (b)

Figure2.8:(a)Nearlyallimitationwasofguesseswithhigherscoresthantheimitator’s,

and(b)therewasastrongbiastowardimitatingtop‐scoringparticipants,whichweakened

inlargergroups.

2.3.6.Learningstrategy

Tofurtherinvestigatetherelationshipbetweenstrategyandperformance,we

performedregressionanalysesofscoreversusmeanratesofimitationandturnoverfor

43

individualsandgroups.Notingthepeakingtrendsforscoreandimitationacrossgroupsize

insection2.3.4,andthedifferenceinimitationtargetsacrossgroupsizeinsection2.3.5,we

splitgroupsizesapproximatelyinthemiddleoftherangecoveredintheexperiment,into

thosewith4orfewerparticipants,andthosewith5ormore.Alinearregressionofmean

individualscoreversusmeanindividualimitationrateshowedasignificantpositive

relationshipforthoseingroupsizesof4orless(F(1,49)=7.69,p=.008,β=0.368),butnone

ingroupsof5orlarger(seeFig.2.9a).Likewise,asignificantpositiverelationshipwas

foundbetweenmeangroupscoreandmeangroupimitationrateingroupsof4orsmaller

(F(1,16)=9.92,p=.006,β=0.619)butnoneingroupsof5orlarger(seeFig.2.9b).Acrossall

groupsizes,therewasasignificantpositiverelationshipbetweenanindividual’sscoreand

themeanimitationrateofallothergroupmembers,excludingtheindividual

(F(1,135)=11.68,p<.001,β=.282;seeFig.2.9c);thatis,regardlessofwhatanindividualdid,

she/hewaslikelytohaveahigherscoreiftheothersinher/hisgroupimitatedmoreoften.

Similaranalysesofscoreversusmeanturnovershowedstrongnegativerelationshipsfor

allgroupsizes,atalllevels:forindividualscoreversusindividualturnover

(F(1,143)=198.9,p<.0001,β=‐0.763;seeFig.2.10a),groupmeanscoreversusgroupmean

turnover(F(1,29)=34.59,p<.0001,β=‐0.738;seeFig.2.10b),andindividualscoreversus

groupothers’meanturnover(F(1,135)=40.0,p<.0001,β=‐0.478;seeFig.2.10c).In

addition,forimitativeguesses,weestimatedavaluefor“innovation”bycalculatingthe

proportionofanimitativeguesswhichwasdifferentfromboththeimitator’sprevious

guessandtheguessthatwasimitated.Thecorrelationofscoreswiththisvaluewerenearly

identicaltothosefoundforturnoverabove.

44

(a) (b) (c)

Figure2.9:Forsmallergroups(<5participants),higherscoreswereassociatedwithhigher

imitationratesforboth(a)individualsand(b)groups;however,theserelationshipsdidnot

holdforlargergroups.(c)Forallgroupsizes,regardlessofaparticularindividual’s

imitationrate,theindividual’sscoretendedtoincreaseastheimitationrateofothersinthe

groupincreased.

(a) (b) (c)

Figure2.10Higherscoreswereassociatedwithlowerturnoverratesfor(a)individualsand

(b)groups,aswellasfor(c)individualsrelativetotheturnoverratesofothersinthegroup

(regardlessoftheindividual’sturnoverrate).

2.3.7.Improvements

45

Anexaminationofparticipants’normalizedimprovementshareshoweda

distributionwithanunequalskew;approximately57.7%ofallparticipantsachievedless

thana“fair”improvementshareof1,whileasmallminorityachievedmuchhighershares

(seeFig.2.11).Inordertocomparethedistributionsofimprovementsumswithan

outcomegeneratedfromarandomprocess,weconstructedaPoissondistributionof

improvementsumsforeachparticipantgroupwithlambda(meanvalue)equaltothemean

improvementsumforthatgroup,andfoundtherangeofvalueswhichcontained50%of

thedensityinthisartificialPoissondistribution.Inover80%ofgroupswithmorethanone

participant,the50%densityrangefromtheassociatedPoissondistributioncontainedless

than50%ofthedensityoftheactualindividualimprovementsums,indicatingthatthey

hadagreaterskewthanwouldbeexpectedbychance.

Figure2.11:Histogramshowingtheunequaldistributionofimprovementsacrossthe

participantswithingroups.(Avalueof1indicatesanevenshare,e.g.anindividualachieved

one‐thirdofthetotalimprovementsinathree‐persongroup.)

46

Meanoverallscoreshowedastrongpositivecorrelationwithimprovementshare

(F(1,105)=46.89,p<.0001,B=0.350)Themeanturnoverrateforguessesthatresultedin

improvementswassignificantlysmallerthanthatofnon‐improvements(0.055for

improvementsvs.0.074fornon‐improvements;t(2040)=12.11,p<.0001).Nosignificant

differencewasfoundformeanimitationrate.

2.3.8.Guesssimilarity

Acomparisonbetweenthesimilarityofimitators’mostrecentguessestothose

whichtheyimitated,andtothosewhichtheydidnotimitate,revealedthattherewas

significantlygreatersimilaritytoimitatedguessesthantonon‐imitatedguesses(.777for

imitatedvs..723fornon‐imitated;t(4914)=‐18.23,p<.0001;seeFig.2.12a).Inotherwords,

imitationtendedtobebiasedtowardguessesthatweremoresimilartotheimitator’sown

priorguess.Thisdifferenceheldoverallroundswithinagame(seeFig.2.11b),even

thoughmeanguessdiversitydecreasedoverroundssuchthatsolutionsgenerally

converged(seeFig.2.5d).Nosignificanttrendswereobservedinlinearregressionsof

similarityversusimitatedscorerank,orthescoredifferencebetweenimitatorandimitated

participants.

47

(a) (b)

Figure2.12:Similaritybiasforimitation.(a)Imitators’previousguessesshowedgreater

similaritytotheguessestheyimitatedthantothosetheydidnotimitate.(b)Thebias

towardimitatingmoresimilarguesseswasconsistentacrossallroundsinagame.

2.4.Experiment1Discussion

2.4.1.Dynamicsandstrategies

Thelargerboardsizehadasignificantnegativeeffectonfinalscores,which

confirmeditsuseasaproxyforproblemdifficulty,butthischangeindifficultyhadno

significanteffectontheotherdependentvariables.However,weobservedrevealing

patternsinparticipants’behaviorthatgavesomecluesabouttheirstrategies.

Increasingmeanscoresacrossroundsandgameordershowedthatparticipantsin

groupslearnedthetaskandtheirdrawingsconvergeduponthecomputer’s“secret”picture

overroundsofonegameandoverthecourseoftheentiresession.Participants

accomplishedtheirimprovementsthroughtheuseoffairlyconservativestrategies,as

evidencedbythelowmeanturnoverrate.Furthermore,thedynamicsofthesestrategies

48

causedsolutionstobecomeincreasinglyentrenchedoverthecourseofthegame.This

happenedintwoways(whichmayhavebeenmutuallyreinforcing):participants’ratesof

imitationandgeneralturnoverdecreasedacrossrounds,andtheimitationthatdidoccur

wasbiasedtowardmoresimilarsolutions.Thisentrenchmentcarriedovertothegroup

levelaswell,shownbythedecreasinggroupsolutiondiversityacrossrounds.Ofcourse,

thisresultislikelypartiallyduetoparticipantsconvergingtowardthegoalpicture,butthe

averagefinalscoreofapproximately89%ofthemaximumsuggeststhatgroupmembers’

solutionsoftenconvergedbeforefindingtheoptimalsolution.

Theproblemspaceusedinthistaskisquitelarge(ontheorderof5x1014possible

solutionsforthesmallerboardsize),andanychangetoasolutionbymorethanonepixel

caneasilyresultinasituationwherescore‐decreasingchangescanceloutscore‐increasing

changes,whichmakesscorefeedbackdifficulttointerpret.Inaddition,thenatureofthe

problemispurelylinear–eachcorrectsquareaddsthesameamounttothetotalscore,and

therearenointeractionsthatmakethesearchproblemmorecomplex,orincentivized

largechangesoversmallones.Thusitmakessensethathighscoreswereconsistently

associatedwithlowturnover,andthatmeanturnoverwassignificantlylowerforguesses

thatresultedinimprovements.Ratherthanlarge,revolutionarychanges,participantsmade

small,incrementalimprovementsbychangingonlyafewcells,typicallyjustone.These

smallchangesallowedparticipantstomakeaccurateinferencesabouttheireffectson

score.

Theunequallyskeweddistributionofimprovementswithineachgroupshowedthat

notallparticipantswereskilledatfindinggoodnewsolutions,thoughimitationallowed

someparticipantstotakeadvantageofotherparticipants’innovationsandmaintainhigh

49

meanscores.Thefactthataverageturnoverwashigherfornon‐improvementguesses

shows,however,thatnon‐improverswerenotjustidlywaitingtoimitateothers’

improvements.

2.4.2.Benefitsofimitation

Imitationwasbiasedtowardhigher‐scoringandmore‐similarguesses,asexpected.

Thelatterallowedparticipantsawaytotakeadvantageofothers'goodsolutionswhile

maintaininglowturnoverandhighercontinuitywiththeirownpreviousguesses,

preservingthevalueoftheirexistingknowledgeoftheproblemspace.

Theassociationofhigherscoreswithgreaterimitationratesatboththeindividual

andgrouplevelsinsmallergroups(whowerebetterabletodistinguishthetop‐scoring

guesswhenimitating)showsthatimitationisnotnecessarilyharmfultoinnovationand

performanceimprovements.Inaddition,theassociationofhighindividualscoreswithhigh

imitationratesbyothersinthegroup(regardlessoftheindividual'sbehavior)indicatesa

systemicbenefitforimitationthatdoesnotaccordwithaviewofimitationasapurelyself‐

benefitingact.Itmaybethat,regardlessoftheintentionsofindividuals,imitationbenefits

thegroupbyactingasafilterforpropagatingandpreservingthebettersolutionsavailable

inagroupatagiventime,aswasfoundinarecentcompetitionofsociallearningstrategies

inasimulatedenvironment(Rendelletal.,2010).Thoughitwasreasonabletoexpect

improvementstobeassociatedwithalowerimitationrate(becausethosewhoonlyimitate

otherscannotdobetterthanthosetheyimitate),wefoundthattherateofimitationwas

aboutthesameamongimprovementsandnon‐improvements,whichmeansthatimitators

wereoftenbuildingontheguessestheyimitatedtocreateimprovements.Improvements

50

wereoftenachievedbyimitatingarelativelysuccessfulparticipant’ssolutionandthen

slightlytweakingthissolution.Oncetweaked,theimprovedsolutionwasthenavailableto

otherparticipants,includingtheindividualwhowasoriginallyimitated.

2.4.3.Imitationinformationoverload?

Therewasanunexpectedlylowerbenefitforimitationinlargergroups,asshownby

thelackofassociationbetweenimitationandscoreinlargergroups,whichwaspresentfor

smallergroups.Largergroupscanbethoughttoprovidemoreinformationaboutthe

distributionofsolutionstotheirmembers,becausetherearemoremodelsforeachgroup

membertoobserve.Thiscanalloweachofthemtomakemoreinformeddecisionsabout

whomtoimitateandwhatchangestomaketotheirguesses.However,itmayhavebeen

thatforlargergroupsizes,theamountofinformationprovidedwasmoredifficulttosearch

andcompare,whichledtomorerandomimitationdecisions(asindicatedbytheweaker

biastowardimitatingthetop‐scoringguess)andthuspoorerconvergenceongood

solutions.Itisunlikelythatthiswaspurelyastatisticalartifactofrandomchoiceamong

moreoptions,becausetherewasauniversaltendency(acrossallgroupsizes)toimitate

better‐scoringpeersthanoneself,arelativelyeasierthingtoaccomplishthanfindingthe

bestscore,butdecidedlynon‐random.So,thoughscoreinformationwasreadilyavailable,

itmayhavebeensubjecttocognitiveloadeffects(Sweller,1988).Largergroupswouldbe

expectedtoshowagreatervarianceinsolutionqualitybychance,butanincreasing

inabilitytoproperlydistinguishgoodsolutionswouldcanceloutthisbenefit.

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2.5.Conclusions

Thoughourassumptionsaboutparticipants'imitationstrategies(favoringhigher‐

scoringandsimilarguesses)wereempiricallysupported,therelatedpredictionsofpoor

performancewerenotborneout.Therewasaconsistentbenefitforindividualstobein

high‐imitationgroupsregardlessoftheirownbehavior,andimitationwasalsoassociated

withbetterindividualandgroupperformancewhenitcouldbedoneselectivelyand

accurately.

Inshort,thetheoreticalimitation‐relatedsocialdilemmadidnotcauseatragic

outcome,whichisconsistentwiththebenefitfor"conformitybias"foundinprevious

modelsandexperimentsofsociallearning(Boyd&Richerson,1985;Kameda&Nakanishi,

2002),andwiththeliteratureonsocialdilemmaswithrepeatedinteractionsand

recognitionofacollectiveactionproblems(Ostrom,1990).Infact,thedegraded

performanceoflargergroupswaslikelyduetoanimpedimenttoimitation.

2.5.1.Modificationsandmotivations

Thefirst‐gamediscontinuityfortrendsinscore,turnover,andimitationindicated

thatthefirstgameineachsessionmighthavefunctionedasapracticegame,duringwhich

participantswerestilllearningthemechanicsoftheexperiment.Thissuggestedthat

explicitpracticeshouldbeincludedinfutureexperimentsbeforedatagatheringbegins,in

ordertoobtainmoreconsistentdata.Inadditiontothefirst‐roundblankboardstrategy

notedabove,participantswereoccasionallyobservedattemptingtocreateimagesonthe

gridcorrespondingtopatterns,symbols,andalphanumericcharacters,despiteinstructions

tothecontrary.Thisisanunderstandableresponsegivennaturalhumancreativity,the

52

presumablylowvisualorconceptualinterestinthegoalpictures,andpotentialsuspicion

aboutexperimenterdeception.Thesebehaviorsaddedsomenoisetothedata.Thelinear

natureoftheproblemandlackofinteractiveeffectsbetweensolutionelementsmayhave

resultedinalackofvariationfromtheslowandincrementalstrategiesweobservedinthis

experiment.

Theseissuessuggestseveralmodificationsforsubsequentexperiments:(a)amore

engagingtask,with(b)lesspossibilityforperformingthetaskinawaythatdepartsfrom

itsintendedpurpose,(c)aclearerandmoreintuitiveinterfaceandinstructions,(d)more

frequentfeedbacktoparticipantsabouttheirperformanceduringthegame(i.e.more

rounds),(e)moreexplicitrecordingofparticipantchoicesforimitation,innovation,etc.,

and(f)asmaller,morediscreteproblemspace(toimprovebothparticipant

comprehensionandtractabilityofanalyses)withinteractiveeffectsbetweensomesolution

elements(toobservepossiblevariationsinexplorationstrategiesfromthoseinthis

experiment).

Inthisstudywefoundthatthebehaviorofisolatedindividualsattemptingtosolvea

complexproblemdiffersmarkedlyfromthatofpeopleconnectedingroups,andthat

differencesinthesizeofagroupcanhavesignificanteffectsonbehavior.Overall,thereare

strongimplicationsinthesedatafortestingthepredictionsofpastworkintheareaof

groupproblem‐solvingbehavior,andpotentialapplicationstomanyreal‐worldproblems.

Theresultspresentseveralintriguingareasforfurtherstudy,whichwedecidedtoexplore

usingataskmodifiedaccordingtotheguidelinesabove.

53

3.Experiment2–CreatureGameA

3.1.Experiment2Overview

InordertoaddresssomeoftheissuesinExperiment1notedabove,wedesigneda

newtaskthatincorporatedthematicelementsofpopulargamessuchasvirtualpetsand

fantasysportsleagues(thoughtheparametersofthetaskwerelimitedtomakeitmuch

simplerthaneitherofthese).Theparadigminvolvesparticipantstryingtomaximizethe

scoreofachosensubsetofindividualunitsfromalargersetoveraseriesofrounds.

Participantscanseetheselectionsofothersineachroundandimitatetheminwholeorin

part,andtheunitsthatparticipantschoosefromareassignedindividualaswellaspairwise

interactionpointvalues.Thesizeandcomplexityoftheproblemspace(andthusthetask

difficulty,asinExperiment1)weremanipulatedviathesizesofthesetofselectableunits

andthesubsetthatcouldbechosenandevaluatedatonetime,aswellasthenumberof

pairwiseinteractions.Weincludedthoroughwrittenandoralinstructionstoparticipants,

aswellasopportunitiesforhands‐onpracticewiththetaskbeforedatacollectionbegan.

Wechangedtheinterfacetomakescorefeedbackclearer(providingemphasisonthesize

anddirectionofscorechangesaftereachround).Wealsounambiguouslydefinedand

determined(ratherthanhavingtoestimate)instancesofimitation,innovation,andso

forth,byrecordingthesourceofeachplayer’sselectionsintheinterface.

3.1.1.Predictions

Thenewtaskalsoallowedustogatheradditionalexplicitdataaboutthe

proportionsofthesourcesofparticipants’solutionelementchoices,includingInnovation

(theintroductionofsolutionelementswithoutpriorassociatedscorefeedback),and

54

Retrieval(thereinstatementofpreviouslyusedsolutionelementsafterchangingthem),

whichwerenotavailableasseparateclassificationsinExperiment1,aswellasImitation

andRetention(roughlytheinverseofturnoverfromExperiment1).

Imitationwasexpectedtobegreateringreaterdifficultyconditions(reflectingthe

greaterriskinalargerandmorecomplexproblemspace),andInnovationwasexpectedto

decrease.Ingeneral,InnovationwasexpectedtoberelativelyrarecomparedtoImitation,

duetoitsrelativelyhigherrisk.RetentionandRetrievalwereexpectedtoincreaseover

rounds(andthusInnovationandImitationwereexpectedtodecrease),asparticipants

narrowedtheirsearchtosmallerareasoftheproblemspace.Weexpecteddecreasesin

InnovationandRetrievalandanincreaseinImitationinlargerparticipantgroupsizes,

becauseparticipantswouldbeabletorelyonalargerpoolofgoodpeersolutionsto

imitate,whichwouldreducetheneedtoexploreorrelyontheirownprevioussolutions.

Thenewtaskwasgenerallyintendedtomaintainthesameoverallcharacterofthe

taskinExperiment1,whilecorrectingafewissues.Thereforeweexpectedthattheresults

wouldshowthesamegeneralpatternsobservedinExperiment1,withtheexceptionof(1)

smoothertrendsofdependentvariablesacrossgameorder(asopposedtothe

discontinuityinthefirstconditioninExperiment1)duetobetterinstructionandhands‐on

demonstrations;and(2)roughlymonotonictrendsacrossgroupsize(asopposedtothe

peakedquadratictrendsinExperiment1),duetointerfaceimprovementsallowing

participantstosearchandcomparepeersolutionandscoreinformationmoreefficiently.

55

3.2.Experiment2Methods

201participantswererecruitedfromtheIndianaUniversityPsychology

Departmentundergraduatesubjectpool,andweregivencoursecreditfortakingpartinthe

study.Participantspopulatedeachsessionbysigningupatwillforscheduledexperiments

withamaximumcapacityof9persons.49sessionswererun,and10sessions(containinga

totalof48participants)werediscardedduetonetworkorsoftwareproblems.The

remaining153participantsweredistributedacross39sessionsasshowninTable3.1.

Table3.1:DistributionofparticipantsacrossgroupsizesinExperiment2

Groupsize 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

#Sessions 8 6 5 5 5 2 4 3 1

#Participants 8 12 15 20 25 12 28 24 9

Weimplementedtheexperimentusingcustomsoftwareruninawebbrowser,and

eachparticipantusedamousetointeractwiththeexperimentalgame.Allparticipants’

computerscommunicatedwithagameserver,whichrecordeddataandupdatedscores

andteaminformationforparticipantsattheendofeachround.Inthegameitself,

participantsattemptedtomaximizethenumberofpointsearnedbytheirchosensubsets

(“teams”)fromaset(“league”)ofcreatureiconsover24rounds.Thedisplayincludedan

areafortheparticipant’sowncurrentteam,anotherareathatcouldbetoggledtoshowthe

participant’spreviousroundteamortheirbest‐scoringteamsofarinthegame(alongwith

theassociatedscore),aleagueareawhichshowedalloftheicons(potentialteam

members)thatwereavailableforselection,andindicationsofthecurrentroundinthe

gameandtheamountoftimeremaininginthecurrentround.

56

Ifasessionincludedmorethanoneparticipant,eachparticipant’sdisplayalso

showedtheteamandassociatedscoreforallotherparticipantsinthepreviousround.

Iconscouldbecopiedfromanypartofthedisplaytoaparticipant’scurrentteamby

dragginganddroppingthemwiththemouse,exceptforthosealreadyontheparticipant’s

currentteam,whichwerefadedinthedisplayandnon‐clickable.Thecurrentteamcouldbe

replacedentirelybyanotherteambyselectingthescoreboxabovethelatterasa“handle”

anddraggingittothecurrentteamarea.Theorderingofpeers’teamsineachparticipant’s

displaywasnotkeptconstantacrossconditions,toavoidimitationbasedonpastbehavior.

AscreenshotoftheparticipantinterfaceisshowninFig.3.1.

Figure3.1:ExampleofexperimentinterfaceinExperiment2.

57

Atthebeginningofeachsession,playersweregivenahands‐ondemoofthegame

(includingthevariouswaystomovecreaturestoone’scurrentteam),andfurtherinformed

aboutthemechanicsofthegameandwhattoexpectintheremainderoftheexperiment

session,includingthefollowinginformation.Eachgameconsistedof24rounds,andeach

roundwas10secondslong,asinExperiment1.Scorefeedbackwasgivenaftereachround:

iftheparticipant’sscorehadimprovedfromthepreviousround,thenumericalscore

displaycounteduptothenewscoreandturnedgreen,andifithadworsened,thedisplay

counteddowntothenewscoreandturnedred.Attheendofeachgame,thedisplay

showedtheplayer’sfinalscore,alongwithatableofthescoresofeachplayerineach

roundofthegame,whichwassortedbyaveragescore.Theplayer’sownscoreswere

highlightedtoshowtheirrelativeperformancewithoutplacingcompetitiveemphasisonit.

Playerswereinstructedtodotheirbesttomaximizetheirteams’scoresoverall24rounds.

Atthebeginningofeachgame,eachplayer’steamwasarandomselectionofcreatureicons

fromtheleague.

Eachgroupplayed8games,ofwhichhalfhadalargeleagueandteamsize(48and

6,respectively),andhalfweresmaller(24and5).Thesetwoparametersettingswere

intendedtovarythelevelofdifficultyofthegame,withtheformerbeingmoredifficult.

Thiswasbecausealthoughthescoredistributionandcombinatoricsmadehigher

numericalscorespossible,italsomadehigh‐scoringteamsrarerthaninthelattercase:for

thesmallerleaguesize,about4%ofallpossibleteamshadscoresgreaterthan70%ofthe

maximum,whileforthelargerleaguesizethisfigurewas0.4%(seeFig.3.3).Thatis,with

thelargerleagueandteamsize,itwashardertofindgoodsolutionsbecauseofthe

relativelylargenumberofpoorersolutions.

58

Ineachgame,eachiconwasassociatedwithacertainpositivenumberofpoints,and

severalspecialpairsoficonswereassociatedwithseparatescorebonusesorpenaltiesthat

capturedinteractionsbetweenicons.Thescoreforateamwascomputedbysummingthe

individualpointvaluesforeachicon,andthenaddingorsubtractingthevalueofany

specialpairspresent.Thepairsdidnotoverlap,andthedistributionwasdesignedtobe

challenging:pairswhichgavelargepositivebonusesweredistributedamongiconswith

smallindividualpointvalues,andpairswhichgavelargenegativepenaltiesweregenerally

foundamongiconswithlargeindividualpointvalues(seeFig.3.2).

(a)Leaguesizeof24

(b)Leaguesizeof48

Figure3.2:Pointdistributionforindividualicons(boxes)andinteractionbonusesand

penalties(ovals),forleaguesizesof(a)24and(b)48.

59

Individualpointvaluespericonrangedfrom1to8points,andpairinteraction

valuesrangedfrom‐20to20points,sothatthepossiblescorerangesforthelargeand

smallleagueandteamsizecombinationswere[‐6,60]and[‐6,51],respectively.Foreaseof

comparisonandanalysis,allscoreswerenormalizedtotherange[0,1]accordingtothe

rangeofscorespossiblewiththeassociatedleagueandteamsizecombination.The

combinationsofsuchindividualandpairvaluesresultedintheprobabilitydistributionof

scoresamongallpossibleteamsforeachleaguesizeshowninFig.3.3.

Participantswerenotgiveninformationaboutthemaximumscore,thescore

distribution,orthepositionoftheinteractionterms,thoughtheycouldpotentiallyhave

beendeducedduringplay.Theicons’displaypositionandassociationswiththepoint

distributionwereshuffledrandomlyforeachgame,sothattheirappearanceand

placementinthedisplaydidnotgivecluesastotheirpointvaluesduringthecourseofan

experimentsession.

(a)Leaguesizeof24 (b)Leaguesizeof48

60

Figure3.3:Distributionofscoresforallpossibleteamsineachdifficulty(leaguesize)

condition.

Ineachround,thefollowingdatawereautomaticallyrecordedforeachplayer:the

iconsonthecurrentteamattheendoftheround(orchoices),thesourceofeachicon,and

theresultingscore.Thesourceinformationindicatedwhethereachiconwasunchanged

fromthepreviousround(Retained),copiedfromtheplayer’sownpreviousroundteam

afterinitiallybeingremovedfromtheteam(Returned),copiedfromtheplayer’sownbest‐

scoringteamsofar(Retrieved),chosenfromtheleaguedisplay(Innovated),orcopiedfrom

anotherplayer’steam(Imitated).WhenImitationwaschosen,thepersistentidentifierof

thecopiedplayerwasrecordedtoallowfurtheranalysesofimitationdecisions.

InthecaseofaplayerreplacingtheentireteamwithImitatedicons,allchoiceswere

recordedasImitated,evenifoneormoreofthemwerealreadyontheplayer’sprevious

roundteam.(ThesamewastrueofreplacinganentireteamwithRetrievedicons,or

removinganiconandthenputtingitbackontheteamviaaLeaguechoice.)However,a

comparisonwiththeplayer’spreviousroundteamallowsthedeterminationofacorrected

choicesourceforeachicon,effectivelyrevealingapotentialincreaseintheRetainchoice

source,andapotentialdecreaseforallotherchoicesourcesexcepttheReturnchoice

source.Inessence,theoriginaluncorrectedchoicesourcesrevealtheliteralactionsof

players,whilethecorrectedchoicesourcesrevealtheireffects.Scoreimprovementsand

scoreranksweredefinedidenticallytothoseinExperiment1.

SimilartoExperiment1,guessdiversityforaparticularroundwasdefinedasthe

proportionoficonsintheleaguerepresentedononeormoreparticipants’teamsduringa

61

givenround.Thisvaluewasnormalizedbytheaverageexpectedvalueofthisproportion

foreachparticipantgroupsize,generatedbyaMonteCarlosimulationassuming

independentrandomteams.(Itshouldbenotedthatthiscalculationandtheassociated

solutionspacesinExperiments1and2areofdifferenttypesandsizesduetothenatureof

thetaskineach.)

3.3.Experiment2Results

Participantsachievedameanoverallscoreof.596(i.e.about60%ofthewayfrom

theworstscoretothebestscore),andameanfinalscoreof.690.Theaverageguesschoice

sourceproportions(originalandcorrected)areshowninTable3.2.TheverylowReturn

ratesuggestedthatanaverageturnoverratedefinedequivalentlytothatinExperiment1

couldbeapproximatedasoneminusthemeanRetentionproportion,or26.1%.(Allfurther

analysesofchoicesourcerefertothecorrectedversions,exceptwherenoted.)

Table3.2:AverageOriginalandCorrectedchoicesourceproportions

ChoiceSource Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval Return

Original 20.6% 14.0% 59.5% 6.5% 0.5%

Corrected 9.8% 13.7% 73.9% 2.6% n/a

Difference ‐10.2% ‐0.3% +14.4% ‐3.9% n/a

Fortheinitialanalysis,dependentvariableswereaveragedacrossallparticipants

andallroundstogivemeasuresforthegroup’saggregateactivityineachgame.Thesedata

wereanalyzedusingarepeated‐measuresANOVA,treatingeachgroupasasinglesubject,

62

withdifficulty(leaguesize)asawithin‐groupsfactor,thegroupsizeusedasacovariate,

andtheparticipantgroup(sessionidentifier)includedasarandomeffectinthemodelfor

eachdependentvariable.Datafromthefirstroundofeachgamewasexcludedfrom

analysesofchoicesource,becauseseveralchoicesources(Imitated,Retrieved,Retained,

andReturned)areonlydefinedrelativetoapreviousround.Theaboveanalysesrevealed

significantmaineffectsofdifficultyandgroupsizeonscoreandseveralchoicesources,and

asignificantmaineffectofgroupsizeonguessdiversity,aswellasasignificantinteraction

effectbetweendifficultyandgroupsizeonguessdiversity.Theseresults,aswellas

dependentvariabletrendsoverrounds,gameorder,choicesourceuse,scoreperformance,

andguesssimilarityaredescribedindetailbelow.

3.3.1Leaguesize/difficulty

Participantsachievedmeanoverallscores(averagedacrossallrounds)andmean

finalscoresforeachLeagueSizeasshowninTable3.3andFig.3.3.Scoreswerenormalized

asdescribedabove,andpercentilesweredefinedasthepercentageofallpossibleteams

withlowerscoresthantheassociatedmeanscore.

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Table3.3.Meanscore,guessdiversity,andchoicesourceproportionsineachcondition.

LeagueSize

MeanOverallScore

(Percentile)

MeanFinalScore

(Percentile)

MeanGuess

Diversity

MeanImitation

MeanInnovation

MeanRetention

MeanRetrieval

24 .606(90.1%) .693(95.7%) 67.6% 6.8% 16.8% 69.5% 6.3%

48 .539(93.7%) .634(98.5%) 63.4% 7.1% 14.9% 72.1% 5.3%

Diff. ­.067* ­.059* ­4.2%* +0.3% ­1.9%* +2.6%* ‐1.0%

*significantdifferences

Atwo‐samplet‐testwasusedtoexaminethemaineffectofdifficultyoneach

dependentvariable.Itwasfoundthatrelativetothelowerdifficultycondition,thehigher

difficultyconditionresultedinsignificantlylowerInnovation(t(306.8)=2.71,p=0.007),and

significantlygreaterRetention(t(307.5)=‐2.02,p=.0445),butnosignificantdifferences

werefoundforImitationorRetrievalbetweendifficultyconditions,andtrendsforallwere

unchangedforuncorrectedchoicesources.Thehigherdifficultyconditionresultedin

significantlylowerguessdiversity(t(233.8)=2.16,p=.0320),andsignificantlylowerscores

(t(305.8)=7.55,p<.0001;seeFig.3.3).Thescorepercentilesachievedareactuallyhigher

forthelargerLeagueSize,butthisismostlikelyduetothedifferenceintheshapesofthe

twoscoredistributionsused.

3.3.2.Rounds

Linearmixed‐effectsregressionmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossrounds

foreachdependentvariable,witharandomeffectofgroupontheslope.Analysisofscore

vs.roundshowedastrongpositivetrend(F(1,919)=897.05,p<.0001,β=0.717;seeFig.3.4).

64

Theaverageimprovementinscoreacrossroundswithinagamewas23.7%,andtrendsin

scoresoverroundswerepositiveforallgroupsizes.Guessdiversityshowedasignificant

decreaseacrossrounds(F(1,735)=188.62,p<.0001,β=‐0.404;seeFig.3.4),andsuchtrends

overroundsweremorestronglynegativeforincreasinggroupsize.

Asforchoicesources,Imitationshowedasignificantdecreaseoverrounds

(F(1,681)=126,p<.0001,β=‐0.453),asdidInnovation(F(1,857)=70.78,p<.0001,β=‐0.277).

Theoverallincidencerateofimitationdecreasedsimilarly.Retentionincreased

significantlyacrossrounds(F(1,857)=21.43,p<.0001,β=0.214),asdidRetrieval

(F(1,857)=9.67,p=.0019,β=0.128;seeFig.3.5).Usinguncorrectedchoicesourcesrevealed

nosignificantchangestothesetrends,exceptforslightdifferencesinslope.

Figure3.4:Meanscoreincreasedandmeanguessdiversitydecreasedasmoreroundswere

playedwithinagame;strongereffectswereobservedforlargerparticipantgroupsizes.

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Figure3.5:MeanproportionsofRetentionandRetrievalincreasedandImitationand

Innovationdecreasedasmoreroundswereplayedwithinagame.

3.3.3.Gameorder

Similarlinearmixed‐effectsmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossgameorder

withinsessionsforeachdependentvariable.Scoredisplayedasignificantupwardtrend

acrossgameorder(F(1,272)=14.69,p=.0002,β=0.186;seeFig.3.6a).Theaverage

improvementinscoreacrossgameorderwithinasessionwas5.6%.Guessdiversity

displayedacorrespondingdownwardtrend(F(1,216)=20.02,p<.0001,β=‐0.180;seeFig.

3.6b).Nosignificanttrendswerefoundfororiginalorcorrectedchoicesourceproportions

overgameorder.

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Figure3.6:Asmoregameswereplayedwithinanexperimentalsession,(a)Meanscore

increased,and(b)thediversityofguessesdecreased.

3.3.4.Groupsize

Trendsacrossparticipantgroupsizeforeachdependentvariablewereexamined

usinglinearmixed‐effectsmodels,withthegroup(sessionidentifier)usedasarandom

effectontheintercept.Scoreshowedasignificantupwardtrendacrossgroupsize,withan

averagescoredifferenceof11%betweenisolatedparticipantsandthoseinthelargest

groupsizeof9(F(1,37)=73.62,p<.0001,β=0.466;seeFig.3.7a).Guessdiversitydecreased

significantlyforlargergroups(F(1,29)=38.25,p<.0001,β=‐0.663;seeFig.3.7b).

Asforchoicesources,Imitationincreasedsignificantlyforlargergroups

(F(1,29)=22.35,p=.0001,β=0.565),andRetentionincreasedaswell(F(1,37)=12.09,

p=.0013,β=0.433),whileInnovationdecreased(F(1,37)=28.95,p<.0001,β=‐0.563),and

Retrievaldecreasedaswell(F(1,37)=12.46,p=.0011,β=‐0.464;seeFig.3.8).Original

(uncorrected)choicesourcesshowednotrendforRetentionacrossgroupsize,but

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otherwisemaintainedthesamepatternofresultsnotedabove,withslightdifferencesin

slope.

Figure3.7:(a)Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,meanscoresinagroupincreased,and

(b)thediversityofofferedsolutionsdecreased.

Figure3.8:Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,meanproportionsofRetentionand

Imitationincreased,andInnovationandRetrievaldecreased.

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GiventheresultsforImitationabove,itisimportanttodeterminewhetherthescore

advantageforlargergroupswassimplyanartifactofthegreaterchanceofobservinga

betterscorethanone’sowngiventhelargernumberofguessesbeingmade,leadingto

moreimitationandthushigherscores.Inordertodeterminewhetherthiswasthecase,we

calculatedthescoredifferencevariance(SDV):thevarianceofthedifferencesbetweenthe

top‐rankedparticipantandallotherparticipantswithineachround,averagedwithineach

game.Usingalinearmixed‐effectsmodelliketheothersusedforgroupsizeanalysesabove,

weconfirmedaslightbutsignificantupwardtrendofSDVacrossgroupsize

(F(1,29)=11.37,p=.0021,β=0.262).However,asimilaranalysisofImitationproportionvs.

SDVdidnotrevealanysignificanttrend,andcontrollingforSDVintheImitation

proportionvs.groupsizemodelabovedidnotalteritsignificantly.Inotherwords,the

greaterImitationinlargergroupsdidnotappeartobeduetoincreasedscorevariance.

3.3.5.Scoredifferenceandrankinimitation

Theanalysesinthissectionrefertooriginaluncorrectedchoicesources,because

theirintentistocaptureparticipants’awarenessofotherplayers’scores,notthecontentof

theirguesses.OfallguesseswithgreaterthanzeroImitationproportion,94.3%imitated

onlyoneotherparticipant,5.1%imitatedtwoparticipants,and0.6%imitatedmorethan

twoparticipants.Ofallinstancesofsingle‐participantimitation,82.4%involvedimitation

ofparticipantswhosescorerankwas1(thetopscoreinthegroup),10.7%whosescore

rankwas2,and7%whosescorerankwas3orbelow(seeFig.3.9a).Atthetimeofsuch

single‐sourceimitations,thescoreoftheimitatedparticipantwasgreaterthanthatofthe

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imitatorin89.6%ofcases,equaltoitin2.6%ofcases,andlessthanthatoftheimitatorin

7.8%ofcases(seeFig.3.9b).Nosignificantdifferencesacrossgroupsize,round,etc.were

observedinthesevalues.

(a) (b)

Figure3.9:Therewerebiasestowardimitating(a)better‐scoringparticipantsthanoneself,

and(b)thebest‐scoringparticipant,andthesebiaseswereunaffectedbygroupsize.

3.3.6.Choicesourcestrategy

Thechoicesourcesofeachnon‐isolatedparticipantovertheentiresessionwere

analyzed,andeachparticipant’schoicesourcestrategywascategorizedaccordingtotheir

proportionofeachsource.Participantswhosechoicescontainedonesourceinanaverage

proportiongreaterthantheglobalaverageforthatsourceplusonestandarddeviation,

werelabeledwiththatstrategy.Forexample,aplayerwhoseguessesoverthecourseofa

sessionconsistedofagreaterproportionofImitatechoicesthantheaverageforallother

participantsintheexperiment,plusonestandarddeviation,werelabeledashavingan

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overallstrategyof“Imitate.”Thosewhofittheabovecriteriaformorethanonechoice

source,ornone,werelabeledashavinga“Mixed”strategy.Thescoredistributionfor

playersineachstrategycategoryisshowninFig.3.10(a),withtheRetainstrategyscoring

thebest,followedbyMixed,Imitate,andRetrieve,withInnovatescoringtheworst.

Analysisoforiginaluncorrectedchoicesourcestrategiesshowedasimilarpattern,except

thattheImitateandRetainstrategiesswitchedplaces(seeFig.3.10(b).

(a) (b)

Figure3.10:Scorevs.(a)correctedchoicesourcestrategyand(b)uncorrectedchoice

sourcestrategy,showingthataconservativeandimitativestrategyresultedinthebest

performance.

Theabove‐mentionedfiguressummarizetheresultsofsimpleregressionanalyses

performedforscorevs.individualandgroupuseofeachchoicesource.Alinearregression

ofmeanindividualscorevs.meanindividualImitationguessproportionshoweda

significantpositivetrend–thegreateraparticipant’saverageproportionofImitation,the

bettertheparticipant’sscore(F(1,143)=8.64,p=.0038,β=0.239;seeFig.3.11a).Asimilar

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positivetrendheldforRetention(F(1,143)=55.72,p<.0001,β=0.530;seeFig.3.12a).The

oppositewastrueforindividualscorevs.Innovation,whichdisplayedasignificant

negativetrend(F(1,143)=119.8,p<.0001,β=‐0.675;seeFig.3.13a),asdidRetrieval

(F(1,143)=10.93,p=.0012,β=‐0.267;seeFig.3.14a).Analysesofscorevs.original

uncorrectedchoicesourcesshowedsimilartrendsforImitationandInnovation,butnone

forRetentionorRetrieval.

Averysimilarpatternofresultswasshowninanalysesofmeangroupscorevs.

meangroupguessproportionforeachchoicesource,withupwardtrendsforImitation(i.e.

thehigheragroup’smeanImitation,thehigheritsmeanscore)andRetention,and

downwardtrendsforInnovationandRetrieval(allp<0.001;seeFigs.3.11b‐3.14b).The

onlydifferenceforanalysesofuncorrectedmeangroupchoicesourceswasthelackofa

trendforRetention.Likewise,averysimilarpatternofresultswasfoundforanalysesof

meanindividualscorevs.meangroup(excludingtheindividual)guessproportionforeach

choicesource.TherewasapositivetrendforImitation(i.e.themoreanindividual’sfellow

groupmembersimitated,thehighertheindividual’sscore),aswellasRetention,and

negativetrendsforInnovationandRetrieval(seeFigs.3.11c‐3.14c).Onceagain,theonly

differenceforanalysesofuncorrectedmeangroupchoicesourceswasthelackofatrend

forRetention.Alltrendsnotedaboveweregenerallymonotonic;thatis,therewereno

thresholdsorinflectionpointsbeyondwhichtherelationshipschanged.

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(a) (b) (c)

Figure3.11:Higherscoreswereassociatedwithhigherimitationratesfor(a)individuals

and(b)groups,aswellasfor(c)individualsrelativetotheimitationratesofothersinthe

group(regardlessoftheindividual’simitationrate).

(a) (b) (c)

Figure3.12:Higherscoreswereassociatedwithlowerinnovationratesfor(a)individuals

and(b)groups,aswellasfor(c)individualsrelativetotheinnovationratesofothersinthe

group(regardlessoftheindividual’sinnovationrate).

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(a) (b) (c)

Figure3.13:Higherscoreswereassociatedwithhigherretentionratesfor(a)individuals

and(b)groups,aswellasfor(c)individualsrelativetotheretentionratesofothersinthe

group(regardlessoftheindividual’sretentionrate).

(a) (b) (c)

Figure3.14:Higherscoreswereassociatedwithlowerretrievalratesfor(a)individuals

and(b)groups,aswellasfor(c)individualsrelativetotheretrievalratesofothersinthe

group(regardlessoftheindividual’sretrievalrate).

3.3.7.Improvements

AsinExperiment1,improvementsweretalliedforeachparticipantineachsession.

Ahistogramofnormalizedimprovementshareshowedthatjustoverhalf(54.5%)of

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participantsachievedlessthanthe“fair”shareof1;however,thedistributionispeaked

stronglyaround1,andtherewerenoparticipantswhoobtainedzeroimprovements(see

Fig.3.9).JustasinExperiment1,inordertocomparethedistributionsofimprovement

sumswithanoutcomegeneratedfromarandomprocess,weconstructedaPoisson

distributionofimprovementsumsforeachparticipantgroupwithlambda(meanvalue)

equaltothemeanimprovementsumforthatgroup,andfoundtherangeofvalueswhich

contained50%ofthedensityinthisartificialPoissondistribution.Injustover60%of

groupswithmorethanoneparticipant,the50%densityrangefromtheassociatedPoisson

distributioncontainedlessthan50%ofthedensityoftheactualindividualimprovement

sums,indicatingthattheygenerallyhadonlyaslightlygreaterskewthanwouldbe

expectedbychance.

Figure3.15:Histogramshowingrelativelyequalachievementofimprovementswithin

groups.(Avalueof1indicatesanevenshare,e.g.anindividualachievedone‐thirdofthe

totalimprovementsinathree‐persongroup.)

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The mean choice source proportions for guesses that resulted in score

improvementsandthosethatdidnotareshowninTable3.6.

Table3.6.Meanchoicesourceproportionsforimprovementandnon‐improvement

guesses.

ChoiceSource Imitation Innovation Retention RetrievalProportioninnon‐improvementguesses

9.9% 12.9% 74.9% 1.7%

Proportioninimprovementguesses

8.0% 20.2% 70.0% 1.4%

Difference ­1.9%* +7.3%* ­4.9%* ‐0.3%*significantdifferences

3.3.8.Guesssimilarity

Acomparisonbetweenthemeansimilarityofparticipants’mostrecentguessesto

thosewhomtheyimitated,andtothosewhomtheydidnotimitate,revealedaslightbut

significantdifference:.550forimitatedvs..503fornon‐imitated(t(5029)=‐7.10,p<.0001;

seeFig.3.20).Inotherwords,priortoimitation,theaverageimitators’guesswasmore

similartothatoftheimitatedparticipant(s)thantothoseofothers.Inaddition,the

differencebetweenmeansimilarityforimitatedandnon‐imitatedparticipantsremained

overrounds(seeFig.3.21).Nosignificanttrendswereobservedinlinearregressionsof

guesssimilarityvs.imitatedscorerank,orsimilarityvs.thescoredifferencebetween

imitatorandimitatedparticipants.

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Figure3.16:Similaritybiasforimitation.(a)Imitators’previousguessesshowedgreater

similaritytotheguessestheyimitatedthantothosetheydidnotimitate.(b)Thebias

towardimitatingmoresimilarguesseswasconsistentacrossroundsinagame.

3.3.9Frequencyandmomentumbias

Inordertomeasurethebiasofparticipantstochooseaniconaccordingtoits

frequencyinneighbors’choices,wetalliedthenumberofplayersinthegroupwhoseteams

includedeachiconinthepreviousround(NR‐1),aswellasthenumberoftheremaining

playerswhoaddedittotheirteaminthecurrentroundviaImitationorInnovation.To

convertthesefigurestonormalizedfrequencies,thefirstnumberwasdividedbythe

participantgroupsize(N),andthesecondnumberwasdividedbythenumberof

participantswhodidnotpossesstheiconinthepreviousround(N–NR‐1).Inthiswaywe

wereabletomeasurethemeanprobabilityofImitationandInnovationforanyiconnot

alreadyincludedonaplayer’steam,basedonthefrequencyofitsappearanceon

neighbors’teamsintheplayer’sdisplay.

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Thechanceprobabilityofimitation(resultingfromchoosinganiconatrandomfrom

amongallneighbors’teams)scaleswiththechoicefrequencyofaniconrelativetotheteam

size.Thechancelevelofinnovation(resultingfromchoosinganiconatrandomfromthe

leaguedisplay)isaconstantatoneovertheleaguesize.Sinceleagueandteamsize

conditionswerebalancedinallsessions,weusedtheaveragevalueofeachtocalculatethe

chancebaselines.Alinearmixed‐effectsanalysisofimitationprobabilityversuschoice

frequencyshowedapositivefrequency‐dependentImitationbiasthatwassignificantly

greaterthanchance(F(1,1128)=1648,p<.0001,B=.300;seeFig.3.17a),aswellasasimilar

butmuchsmallerfrequency‐dependentInnovationbias(F(1,1128)=268.7,p<.0001,

B=.062;seeFig.3.17b).Interestingly,theprobabilitiesofImitationandInnovationonly

roseabovechancewhenthemajorityofaparticipant’sneighborspossessedanicon(i.e.

whenChoiceFrequencywasgreaterthan0.5).

(a) (b)

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Figure3.17:Therewerebiasestowardchoosingelementsthatweremorefrequently

representedonotherteamsin(a)Imitationand(b)Innovationdecisions,showingacopy

themajoritystrategy.

Inasimilaranalysisof“choicemomentum,”wetalliedthechangeinthenumberof

playerswhoseteamsincludedtheiconintheprevioustworounds(NR‐1‐NR‐2),aswellas

thenumberoftheremainingplayerswhoaddedittotheirteaminthecurrentroundvia

ImitationorInnovation.Toconvertthesefigurestonormalizedfrequencies,thefirst

numberwasdividedbytheparticipantgroupsize(N),andthesecondnumberwasdivided

bythenumberofparticipantswhodidnotpossesstheiconineitheroftheprevioustwo

rounds(N–max(NR‐1,NR‐2)).Inthiswaywewereabletomeasurethemeanprobabilityof

ImitationandInnovationforanyiconnotalreadyincludedonaplayer’steam,basedonthe

changeinfrequencyofitsappearanceonneighbors’teamsintheplayer’sdisplayoverthe

previoustworounds.

Thedistributionoffrequencychangesforalliconswasverynearlysymmetrical

aroundzero,suchthatanequivalentnumberofpositiveandnegativeproportionchanges

occurred,withsmallabsolutechangesmorecommonthanlargeones.Afterlog‐

transformingtheImitationprobabilitydatatoachieveanormaldistribution,at‐testof

Imitationprobabilityfornegativeandpositivechangesinchoicefrequencyshoweda

significantpositivemomentumbias(t(1236)=18,p<.0001;seeFig.3.18a),andasmallbut

non‐significantmomentumbiasforInnovation(seeFig.3.18b).Therewasalsoasignificant

diminishingofthepositivemomentum‐biasedImitationeffectacrossrounds,butno

changeacrossgameorderorparticipantgroupsize.

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(a) (b)

Figure3.18:Therewerebiasestowardchoosingelementswhoserepresentationonother

teamswasincreasingin(a)Imitationand(b)Innovationdecisions.

3.4.Experiment2Discussion

3.4.1.Dynamicsandstrategies

AsinExperiment1,participants’increasingmeanscoresacrossroundsandgame

orderassuredusthattheylearnedthetaskandwerenotguessingrandomly.Theoverall

characteroftheirstrategiessharedtheconservativepatternofthoseinExperiment1,as

evidencedbythehighmeanproportionofRetention(whichincreasedacrossrounds);this

cautiousapproachwasaccentuatedinthehigherdifficultycondition.Likewise,the

correctedchoicesourceresultsshowedthatmanyguesselementsthatwereinitially

classifiedasImitationorRetrievalwereactuallycomposedoflargelyRetainedelements.

OurpredictionofahighermeanproportionofImitationrelativetoInnovationwas

borneoutinparticipants’intentions(asrecordedintheiruncorrectedchoicesources),but

contradictedintheireffects(correctedchoicesources)–theactualproportionofsolution

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elementsdevotedtoInnovationwashigherthanImitation.Aspredicted,wedidfind

significantlylowerInnovationinthehigherdifficultycondition,butasinExperiment1,

therewasnosignificantdifferenceinImitationbetweenconditions.

Individualguessesbecameincreasinglyentrenchedovertime,asevidencedbythe

decreasingproportionsofinnovationandimitation,andincreasingproportionsof

retentionandretrieval,acrossrounds.Thisbehaviorisconsistentwiththecopywhen

uncertainstrategyinthatmoreimitationoccurredearlyonineachgamewhenparticipants

hadlessexperiencewiththecurrentproblem.Guessesbecameentrenchedatthegroup

levelacrossroundsaswell(asshownbydecreasinggroupsolutiondiversity)despite

decreasingamountsofimitation,becausetheremainingimitationwasincreasinglydriven

byconvergentbiasestowardgreaterguesssimilarity,higherchoicefrequency,andpositive

choicemomentum.Thesebiasesalsohelpexplainthedecreaseinguessdiversityinthe

greaterdifficultyconditionwithoutanaccompanyingincreaseintheincidenceofimitation.

WhereasBaron,Vandello,andBrunsman(1996)foundthatincreasingtaskdifficulty

increasedtheincidenceofimitation,inthisexperimentitappearstohaveinsteadchanged

thefocusoftheimitationthatoccurredtofavorincreasedgroupsolutionhomogeneity.

Thefactthataveragefinalscoresarelessthan70%ofthemaximumpossiblescore

impliesthat,especiallyinlargergroups,participantsaresettlingongoodbutsuboptimal

solutionsduetoinsufficientsearchofthemultimodal,“rugged”problemspace.Thisresult

agreeswiththefindingsofMason,Jones,andGoldstone(2008),thatfully‐connected

groups(liketheonesinthisexperiment)performedrelativelypoorlyonamultimodal

problemspace,whereasmoresparsely‐connectedgroups(latticesandsmall‐world

networks)foundoptimalsolutionsmorereliably,thoughmoreslowly.

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Thelackofsignificantchangesinchoicesourceproportionsacrossgameorder

withinsessionsimpliesthatlearninginthecombinedcontextoftheproblemspaceandthe

groupoccurredanewforeachgame,withoutmajoradaptationsofthemembersofthe

grouptoeachotheroverthecourseofexperiment.Thismayhavebeenduetothelackof

communicationavailablefordiscussingorcoordinatingactionswithinthegroupduring

thesession(Ostrom,Gardner,&Walker,1994).However,guessdiversitydecreasedacross

gameorder,suggesting(aswiththedecreaseacrossdifficultyconditionsnotedabove)

mechanismsofconvergencethatmayhaveoperatedthroughtheabovebiasesinimitation.

3.4.2.Groupsizeeffects(andlackthereof)

ThepredictedincreaseinImitationwithlargergroupsize(afteraccountingfor

artifactualscorevarianceexplanations),alongwithdecreasedInnovationandRetrieval

indicateabiastowardsociallearningthatscaleswiththenumberofmodelsolutionsto

compare,choosefrom,andintegrate,andtheaccompanyingincreaseinscoreindicatesthat

thiswasabeneficialstrategyforthistask.Conversely,thereductioninRetrievalwith

increasinggroupsizeindicatesagreaterdependencebyisolatedindividualsandthosein

smallergroupsonthebuilt‐in“memory”oftheBestScoreoptioninthegameasasourceof

reliablygoodsolutionsonwhichtobuild.Thecombinationoftheseresultsimpliesthatin

largergroups,thisfunctionofmemorymaybe“outsourced”tootherswhoimitateandthus

propagateandpreservegoodsolutionswithinthegroup.Thisphenomenonhasbeen

exploredpreviouslyasa“divisionofcognitivelabor”inthetheoryof“transactivememory”

ingroupcognition(Theiner,2009;Wegner,1986).Adifferentapproachtothecopywhen

uncertainstrategyisshownhere:Imitationisfavoredwhenthepayoffforinnovationis

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relativelyuncertain,comparedtotheabundantinformationavailableaboutthecontent

andutilityofneighbors’guesses.

Weconfirmedtheintuitivepredictions(andthegeneralpatternfromExperiment1)

thatmostimitationeventswereofthetop‐rankedneighbor(confirmingtheuseofthecopy

successfulindividualsstrategy),andofneighborswithhigherscores(confirmingtheuseof

thecopyifbetterstrategy).Theactionsofimitatorswhochosenon‐top‐rankedoreven

lower‐scoringneighborstoimitatewerenotexplainedbysimilaritybetweentheirguesses,

andmayhavebeenduetorandomerrors.Thelackofinfluenceofparticipantgroupsizeon

thisresult(aswellastheroughlymonotonicincreasesinscoreandImitationacrossgroup

size,andthemoreequitabledistributionofimprovementshares)indicatesthatthetask

modificationsweimplementedinthisexperimentseemedtohavetheintendedeffectof

clarifyingthecomparisonofpeersolutionsandscores.

3.4.3.Choicestrategiesandcumulativeinnovation

Therelationshipevidentbetweenperformanceandchoicestrategy,inwhichabove‐

averageRetentionandImitationproducehigherscores,whileabove‐averageInnovation

andRetrievalproducelowerscores,reinforcestheevidencefromExperiment1thatthe

overallconservative(butnotregressive)approachnotedaboveisbeneficialforthistask.

However,acounterpointforthisseeminglysimpleresultisprovidedbythecomparisonof

choicesourceproportionsbetweensolutionswhichgeneratedimprovementsandthose

thatdidnot,whichshowedthatareplacementofsignificantamountsofImitationand

RetentionwithInnovationwasrequiredtocreatenewandimprovedsolutions.Thefact

thatsubstantialamountsofeachoftheabovethreechoicesourceswerepresentinsuch

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improvedsolutionsshowsthatimprovementswerecumulative,relyingonindividuals’own

pastsolutionsaswellasborrowingfromothers.This,inturn,impliesthattheadaptive

valueofImitationinthiscontextisduetoitsfacilitationofselectivelearningandthe

generationofcumulativeimprovementswithlessriskyInnovation(Boyd&Richerson,

1995;Kameda&Nakanishi,2003).

3.4.4.Improvements,free‐riding,andanabsenceoftragedy

Theresultsregardingimprovementsandtheirdistributionwithingroupsindicate

thatparticipantssharedthetaskoffindingbettersolutionsmoreequitablythanifmost

participantswerepursuingapuresocialloafingstrategy.However,thedecreasein

InnovationandincreaseinRetentioninlargergroups,suggestadaptationsbygroup

memberstolimitriskyInnovationtowhatwasrequiredtoachieve“goodenough”results

giventheeffortsofothers.Infact,itmaybethatthelowerendofthedistributionof

Innovationthatactuallyoccurredwasnearlyoptimalfortheverythin‐taileddistributionof

scoresinthespaceofpossiblesolutions(seeFigure23).Only4.3%and1.6%ofpossible

solutionshavehigherscoresthantheparticipants’averagefinalscoreinthelowerand

higherdifficultyconditions,respectively.Thus,althoughtheresultsshowinginequalityin

individualimprovementsharesindicateasubstantialamountoffree‐ridinginthis

experiment,therewasnoassociated“tragedyofthecommons”forInnovations(Hardin,

1968;Ostrom,1990).ThisalsooffersaplausibleexplanationfortheincreasedInnovation

andcorrespondinglowerperformanceofparticipantsinsmallergroups‐‐havingfewer

fellowplayerstocopyfromalsoprovidesfewercluesastothedistributionofpossible

scores,whichpromptsfurtherriskyexplorationatahighercostinaverageperformance.

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3.5.Experiments1and2–GeneralDiscussion

3.5.1.Factorsthatinfluenceimitation–whenandwhomtoimitate

ParticipantsinbothExperiments1and2displayedfairlyconservativestrategies,

typicallypreservingalargeproportionofeachguessfromroundtoround(throughlow

turnoverandhighretention,respectively).Theentrenchmentdynamicsseeninboth

experimentsshowedthischaracteristicintensifyingovertime,asincreasingproportionsof

guesseswerepreservedinlaterrounds.Asforthechangesthatweremade,Laland(2004)

describesseveralstrategiesthatareobservedacrossawiderangeofspecies.Thecopy

whenuncertainstrategyseemedtobethedefaultatthebeginningofbothexperiments,but

forthosewholearnedtherisksofinnovationfirsthand,thecopywhenasociallearningis

costlystrategywasaverylikelynextresort.Participantsalmostuniversallyemployedthe

copywhenbetterandcopythebeststrategiesaswell,andastrategyoffrequency‐

dependentimitationthatcloselyresembledcopythemajoritywasprevalentinExperiment

2.Participantsalsoshowedapositive“momentumbias”towardimitationofsolution

elementsthatwereincreasinginoverallfrequencyinthegroupratherthandecreasing.

Thisphenomenonhasalsobeenshowntooccurinanexaminationofbaby‐naming

decisionsbyparentsasrevealedby130yearsofsocialsecuritydata(Gureckis&Goldstone,

2009).

Characteristicsoftheproblemspaceandtheinformationenvironmentplayeda

substantialroleinthedynamicsofthesestrategiesandtheirconsequences.Theparticipant

groupsize‐dependentpatternsofimitationanditseffectsinExperiment1(andthelack

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thereofinExperiment2)showedtheimportanceofclearandsharablesolution

information.

Itisusefultonotethatthetaskdesigninbothexperimentsallowedparticipantsto

pursuehybridstrategieswithinasingleround,inwhichtheyretainedsomepartsofa

solutionwhilechangingothersusingbothsocialandasociallearning.Oneparticularly

interestingwaythiswasaccomplishedwasthroughsimilarity‐biasedimitation.This

allowedtheimitatortomakeuseofsocialinformationwhilekeepingasolutionpartially

compatiblewithprevioussolutionsandexistingknowledgeoftheproblemspace,a

phenomenondiscussedatlengthinrelationtoinnovationpropagationbyRogers(2003).A

biastowardborrowingfromsimilarratherthandissimilarsolutionshasalsobeen

incorporatedintogeneralmachinelearningalgorithmsfeaturingmultipleagents

simultaneouslysearchingforsolutions(Goldberg,1989).Whenagentsborrowsolution

elementsfromotheragentspursuingsubstantiallydifferentsolutions,thereisastrongrisk

thattheresultingblendofsolutionswillbeasub‐optimalhybridnotwelladaptedtothe

nicheofeitheroftheoriginalsolutions.Byanalogy,twosolutionstopredationforasmall

mammalmightbeevolvelargeclawsforclimbtreeseffectivelyortodeveloplargewings

forflying.However,ahalf‐breedthatcombinesbothsolutionsmightwellenactneither

solutioneffectively.Likewise,giventhecomplexproblemsearchlandscapesusedinthe

experiments,participantsmayhavebeenbiasedtocopysolutionelementsfromsimilar

ratherthandissimilarsolutionstoensuregreatersolutioncompatibility.

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3.5.2Group‐leveleffectsofimitationandinnovation

TheresultsofExperiment1suggestthatimitationcanbeindividually

counterproductivewhensocialinformationcannotbereadilycompared,integrated,and

adaptedtocreatenewsolutions.Thissituationmayariseforseveralreasons:(1)

evaluativeinformationiseitheractuallyunavailable,orpresentedinsuchawaythat

cognitiveloadeffectshinderitsuse;(2)theproblemspaceistoolargeorcomplexforparts

ofdifferentsolutionstobeeasilyanalyzedandcombined;or(3)theproblemspaceistoo

largeforsubstantialchangestobeeffectivelyevaluated.

TheresultsofExperiment2showthatwhentheabove‐mentionedproblemscanbe

avoidedorameliorated,imitationcanbeproductiveforindividualsaswellasgroups,

becauseitenablesthepreservationofgoodtentativesolutionsin“groupmemory”and

theirfurtherimprovementthroughcumulativeinnovation.Theseresultsalsoshowedthat

therisksofinnovationcanoutweighthebenefitsforbothindividualsandgroups,andthus

becomecounterproductivewhenusedtoomuch.Obviously,acompletelackofinnovation

willresultinalackofimprovements(becausestrategiesthatcombineimitatedelements

fromdifferentmodelswilloftenlosebeneficialinteractions),butthisexperimentsuggests

thatinalargeandcomplexproblemspace,atboththeindividualandgrouplevels,

innovationisbestusedsparingly,alongwiththeretentionofpreviousgoodsolutionsand

imitationofothers,toimproveoveralloutcomeswhilemaintaininghighaverage

performance.

Thesetworesultstakentogetherwiththereductionsindiversityovertimeimplya

viewthatisatoddswiththosepredictedfromasimpleTragedyoftheCommons(Hardin,

1968)orproducer‐scroungerdilemma(Kameda&Nakanishi,2002)interpretationof

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sociallearning.Muchlike“conformist,”beinga“scrounger”oftencarriesanegative

connotationordenotation,suchas“socialloafing”(Latané,Williams,&Harkins,1979).

However,suchbehaviormaybeappropriatewhennotallgroupmembers’fulleffortsare

requiredtoproducesufficientbenefit.Inacomplexbutrelativelystableenvironment,the

bestoutcomeforthegroupmayresultfrommostgroupmembersconvergingona“good

enough”solutionquicklytoachievehighmeanperformance,andthenintroducing

productiveinnovationswhenpossible.Thus,insomecircumstancesatragic(oratleast

distinctlysuboptimal)outcomecanresultfromtoomuchinnovationandnotenough

imitation,ratherthantheotherwayaround,becauseinnovationisriskyandpossibly

redundant(andthuswastefulofresources),andimitationhelpstoconcentrateeffortsand

improvethethoroughnessofsearchintheproximityofknowngoodsolutions.Givensome

baselineinclinationtoaminimumamountofindividualexploration,thelimitingfactorin

improvingsearchperformancemaybetheamountofinformationsharingandcoordination

amongsearchers,whichallowthemtopoolboththebenefitsandtherisksofasocial

learning(Hess&Ostrom,2007).

Ofcourse,theresultsobtainedherearelikelytobehighlydependentonthe

problemspaceandtheinformationenvironmentinuse.Thoughthebenefitsofsocial

learninginatemporallystableenvironmentareoftenassumedtobeevident(e.g.Kameda

&Nakanishi,2002),thisstudyilluminatessomedetailsaboutthedynamicindividualand

group‐levelmechanismsbywhichthesebenefitscanaccrue(ornot,insome

circumstances).Givenimperfectindividualmemory,the“culturalknowledgepool”

(Kameda&Nakanishi,2003)requiresnotonlyprovisionofinformationbyasociallearning,

butalsoitsamplificationandpreservationthroughmechanismslikefrequency‐biased

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adoption,or“conformisttransmission”(Boyd&Richerson,1985).Ourtask,inwhich

solutionshavemultiplecomponentswithepistaticrelationships,alsoallowedusto

examinehowsuchsolutionsarebuiltcumulativelyusingselectivelyvaryingproportionsof

differentinformationsources.Thisaddsrealisticcomplexitybeyondthatprovidedby

modelsandexperimentalsettingswithsimplerproblemstructuresorlessflexiblelearning

strategies.

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4.ExplorationasaSocialDilemma

4.1Dilemmasofknowledge

Sofarwehavefoundevidenceforseveralimportantlearningstrategiesdiscussedin

previousmodelsandanimalresearch.Wehavealsoexploredtheideathatcollectivesearch

problemsliketheonesinourexperimentaltasksarepotentiallysusceptibletosocial

dilemmas(thoughwehavenotobservedevidenceforsuchadilemma).However,wehave

notsufficientlyelaborateduponthecharacteristicsofthe"resource"involved,howitis

createdandmaintained,orhowitmightbedegradedordestroyed.Atthispointitwillbe

usefultoreturntotheliteratureonsocialdilemmastopursuethisfurther.

4.1.1.Storiesandassumptions

Socialdilemmascanbesaidtooccur"wheneverindividualsininterdependent

situationsfacechoicesinwhichthemaximizationofshort‐termself‐interestyields

outcomesleavingallparticipantsworseoffthanfeasiblealternatives"(Ostrom,1998).

Contemporaryexamplesoflarge‐scalesocialdilemmasincludethefailuretolimitthe

productionofatmosphericpollutants,andtheoverharvestingofoceanfishstocks.Butsuch

dilemmascanariseinmanyeverydaysituations,fromtrafficjamsatrushhourtofibbingat

taxtime.Socialdilemmashaveoftenbeenframedintermsofthreemetaphoricalstories:

thePrisoner'sDilemma(Poundstone,1992),theTragedyoftheCommons(Hardin,1968),

andtheLogicofCollectiveAction(Olson,1965).

ThePrisoner'sDilemmaisbasedonahypotheticalsituationinwhichtwo

individualsaccusedofcommittingacrimetogetherarequestionedseparatelyandoffered

twochoices:confesstothecrimeorkeepsilent.Ifbothkeepsilent,theauthoritiescanonly

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convictthemonminorchargesandthepenaltyforbothismild.Ifbothconfess,theyare

convictedforthecrimeandreceivesubstantialjailsentences.Ifonlyoneconfesses,hegoes

freewhiletheotherreceivesaharshsentence.Thissetofpossibilitiesissuchthat

whatevertheotherdoes,therational(ordominant)optionforeachindividualistoconfess.

However,ifbothindividualsfollowthisreasoning,thebestoptionforboth(keepingsilent)

isunavailable.(Itmaybethatwedonotwantcriminalstobeabletoescapesucha

dilemma,butthissituationcanbere‐framedinanynumberofotherways,e.g.anarmsrace

betweencountries,steroiduseamongcompetitiveatheletes,etc.)Theactionsofthetwo

agentsareinterdependentsuchthateithercanindependentlyincreasehisownpayoffat

theexpenseoftheother,butthebestoutcomecanonlybeobtainedifbothhavesomeway

totrusttheotherandjointlyincreasetheirpayoffs.

TheTragedyoftheCommons(Hardin,1968)isanotherhypotheticalsituation,in

whichapasture(orcommons)isavailableforusebymanyindividualstograzetheir

animals.Eachadditionalanimaladdedtothecommonsincreasesitsowner'spayoffinthe

shortterm,butreducestheamountoffodderavailableforalloftheotheranimals.Inthe

longterm,overgrazingcanleadtotheruinationofthepasture,sothatnofodderis

available.Themarginalbenefitofaddinganotheranimalisobtainedbyoneindividual,but

theshort‐termcostisspreadacrossallindividualsusingthecommons(anegative

externality).Thismeansthattheshort‐termbenefitsoutweighthecostsforeach

individual;ifallindividualsfollowthisreasoningsymmetrically,thelong‐termbenefits

(continuedgrazingcapacity)areunavailable.Again,thismodelisnotonlyimportantfor

cattlefarmersinagrarianvillages,asitcanbere‐framedtofitmanyothersituationsmore

relevanttomodernsociety(e.g.usinglawnsprinklerssuppliedbyacommonreservoir

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duringadrought).Onceagain,theimportantpointisthattheactionsofmultipleagentsare

interdependentsuchthateachcanincreasehisorherownshort‐termpayoffatthe

expenseofothers,butthebestlong‐termoutcomecanonlybeobtainedifallfindsomeway

tocooperate.

TheLogicofCollectiveAction(Olson,1965)portraystheconflictinherentbetween

theself‐interestsofalargenumberoffirmssellingthesamegood.Themarketforthisgood

ispresumedtobeperfectlycompetitive,butina"disequilibrium"state,sothatprice

exceedsmarginalcostforallfirms.Eachwouldliketomaximizeprofitsbysellingasmuch

ofthegoodastheycanproduceatthehighestpricepossible.However,(undercertain

assumptionssuchashighbarrierstomarketentry,inelasticdemand,andsoforth),firms

thatincreaseproductionwillsellmorebutalsoincreasetheoverallsupply,whichwill

eventuallylowerprices.Anyfirmthatattemptstounilaterallyrestrictitsownoutputin

ordertolowersupplywillsimplyreduceitsrevenues,giventhatnofirmhasenough

marketpowerindividuallytoaffectprices.Allofthefirmshaveacommoninterestin

higherprices,buteachwouldrationallypreferthattheothersbearthecostoflowered

productioninordertogetit.(Onceagain,ifonehastroublefeelingempathyforthefirms

depictedhere,theframingcanbechangedtothatofworkerswhocannotallearna

sufficientwageifeachoffershisfullcapacitytoexploitativeemployers.)InOlson’s

formulation,theonlywaytokeeppriceshighisthroughsomeexternalintervention,such

asgovernmentpricesupports,tariffs,orcartelagreements,thecreationofwhichrequires

costlylobbyingororganization.Assumingthatthefirmssomehowforeseetheproblemand

bandtogethertocollectivelycreatetheprice‐supportingintervention(aslightdeparture

fromtheprevioustwomodels),aproblemremains.Becausethemarketforthegoodis

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indivisible,eachfirmonceagainhastherationalincentivetoenjoythebenefitsofsuch

interventionwithoutcontributingtocreateormaintainit,ifsuchcontributions(lobbying

firmfeesorunionmembershipdues)arevoluntary.Thusthefirst‐orderdilemma

(agreeingtoorganizetocontrolprices)isatleasttemporarilysolved,butthesecond‐order

dilemma(maintainingthecostlyorganization)isvulnerabletoa“free‐riding”problem.

Eachoftheabovethreemodelsillustratesanimportantpointaboutsocial

dilemmas,andthenontrivialityoftheirsolutions.Thoughtheycaneachbeadaptedto

resemblefamiliarsituations,problemsarisewhenthesemodelsaretakentoberealistic

representationsofhumanbehavior.Withoutdenyingthatsocialdilemmascanhavetragic

outcomes,itmustbenotedthatthestoriesabove(andthetheoriestheyrepresent)involve

severaloverlysimplisticassumptionsaboutsocialdilemmas:(1)resourceusersarestrictly

selfishmaximizersofshort‐termgains,whowillnotcooperatetoovercomeasocial

dilemma,(2)itisarelativelysimpleanalyticaltasktochangetheincentivesofresource

usersbydesigningnewrules,and(3)centralizeddirectionandcoercionisrequiredto

successfullyovercomesocialdilemmas(Ostrom,1999).Ingeneral,thethreeassumptions

abovehavenotbeenborneoutbydatagatheredonhumanresponsestosocialdilemmas,

inthelaboratoryorinthefield.Peoplecaninfactrecognizethedilemmastheyface,and

changerulesandincentivestoavoidthem(Ostrom,1990).However,doingsocanbequite

acomplexanduncertainprocess,involvingmuchtrialanderror,andmaynotalwaysbe

successful(Sandberg,2001).Finally,centralizedsolutionshavegenerallynotbeenas

successfulasthosedesignedusingtheknowledgeandparticipationoflocalresourceusers

(Sneath,1998).

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4.1.2.Typesofgoods

Socialdilemmasdealwithpotentialconflictsbetweenagentsoveravaluable

resourceorgood.Twopertinentdimensionsoverwhichgoodscanvaryaresubtractability

(whethertheuseofsomeportionofthegoodbyoneindividualprecludesitsuseby

others),andexcludability(theextenttowhichpotentialuserscanbepreventedfromusing

theresource).Subtractabilityisgenerallyabinarycharacteristic,andsubtractablegoods

arealsoknownasrivalrousgoods,becausepotentialusersarenecessarilyrivalswhenany

portionofagoodcanonlybeusedbyoneofthem,butisdesiredbyall.Whena

subtractablegoodisscarceandnomeasuresareinplacetoprioritizeitsuseamong

individuals(suchaspropertyrightsorotherrules),theexpectedresultisincreased

scarcityandconflict.However,thecharacteristicofsubtractabilitycanbeusedtomonitor

theuseofagood,whichcanhelpinencouragingorenforcingcooperationinadilemma.

Excludabilityisamorecontinuouscharacteristic,andneednotbeabsoluteinordertobe

effective.Physicalandtechnologicalmeansplayarole,butlegal,social,andculturalnorms

areimportantaswell;conceptsoffairness,justice,andtraditioncanallaffectthe

excludabilityofagood.

"Privategoods"arethosewhicharebothsubtractableandexcludable,suchasatool

oraloafofbread."Clubgoods"arethosewhichareexcludablebutnotsubtractable,suchas

accesstocopyrightedworks,orascenicviewfromfencedland.Privateandclubgoodsare

generallypresumednottoentailseriousdilemmas,becausetheirownersorproviderscan

excludepotentialusers,anduserscanavoidthosewhichareinefficientlyprovided.

Goodswhicharesubtractablebutforwhichexclusionisimperfectorcostlyare

knownas"commongoods"or"commonpoolresources"(CPRs).Instancesoftheseinclude

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fisheries,forests,andthecanonicalexampleofpasturelands.Common‐poolresourcesare

typicallyself‐renewingatsomefiniterate,butadilemmamayobtainifindividual

incentivesdonotsustainappropriationoftheresourceandavoidoveruseordestruction.

TheyhavetypicallybeenthoughtofaccordingtotheTragedyoftheCommonsmodelas

describedabove.

Goodsthatareimperfectlyexcludableandnon‐subtractableareknownas"public

goods."Instancesoftheseincludegenerallyintangibleorindivisibleitemssuchas

televisionbroadcastsandthelightfromlighthouses,respectively.Theprimarypotential

dilemmaforpublicgoodsisthe"free‐riding"problem:howsuchgoodscanbesufficiently

providedandmaintained,sincetheycanbeusedbyindividualswhodon'tcontributeto

theirprovision(freeriders).Aconnectedproblemishowtoassurethosewhowishto

contribute(butdon'twanttowastetheircontribution)thatotherswilldosoaswell,

insteadoffree‐riding(theassuranceproblem).Thisdilemmaisoftenmodeledusingthe

LogicofCollectiveActionparadigmdescribedabove.

PublicGoodsandCommonPoolResourcesareconceptuallyandnaturallyrelated,in

thataCPRoftenrequiresaninitialorcontinuinginvestmentintheprovisionofinstitutions

andinfrastructurerelatedtoappropriation.Thisinvestmentallowscurrentandfuture

userstoparticipateintheappropriationoftheresource;thatis,theinputsthatcreatethe

benefitoftheinstitution'scontinuedexistencearerivalrouseveniftheresourceitselfis

not.Themoregeneralclassesofprovisionandappropriationproblemsaretypically

modeledandtreatedseparatelyinordertoelucidateusefulcharacteristicsinalleviating

eachtypeofproblem(Ostrom,Gardner,&Walker,1994).

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4.1.3.Knowledgeasacommons

Thetaskofunderstandingknowledgeasagoodaccordingtotheabovetaxonomy

canbeabittricky,becauseknowledgecantakevariousformsthataresubjecttodifferent

usesandnorms.HessandOstrom's(2007)treatmentof"KnowledgeasaCommons"begins

bydefining"knowledge"as"alltypesofunderstandinggainedthroughexperienceor

study"(p.8).Inthisintangibleform,knowledgeappearstobeapurepublicgood.Firstly,it

isquitedifficulttoexcludepotentialusers:asdiscussedinpreviouschapters,humanshave

aprodigioustalentandinclinationforgainingknowledgefromeachother,andoncea

particularideahasbeenunderstood,itisdifficulttoun‐understand(or"derstand"(Currie,

2010))itbyanyreliablemeans,voluntaryorcoercive.Secondly,oneperson's

understandingofanideadoesnotprecludeorsubtractfromanyotherperson's;if

anything,thesharingofunderstandingcanreinforceandpreserveit.

Ofcourse,peoplehavefoundwaystoencodeandrecordthisintangible

understandinginvariousphysicalforms(e.g.paintedtombwalls,incisedclaytablets,

handwrittenpaperscrolls,printedbooks,pressedphonographrecords,celluloidfilm,and

documentsanddatabasesinanynumberofdigitalmedia)inordertoarchiveitandpassit

ontonewpotentialunderstanders.Thevaryingdegreestowhichthesetoolsfor

instantiationofknowledgearesubjecttophysicalandlegalconstraintiswhatcomplicates

thegovernanceofknowledgeasaresource.

Asphysicalobjects,printedmatterandaudiovisualrecordingscanbeprivately

ownedbyanindividualandmadeinaccessibletoothers,orheldbyapubliclibrary

collectionforfullandfreeusebyonepersonatatime,orkeptinamuseum'sdisplaycase

wheretheyareobservablebutnotfullyusable.Images,text,andsoundcanbeencoded

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digitallyandcopiedmoreorlesseffortlessly(thoughtheymustalwaysbestoredinsome

physicalform).

Despitethenon‐rivalrousnatureofintangibleknowledge(andastransmissionand

storagebecomecheaper,perhapsanydigitizableknowledge)asapublicgood,some

resourcesrequiredtocreateit(money,tools,etc.)arecertainlyrivalrous.Totheextentthat

knowledgedependsonmorethanonepersonforitsprovision,theclassicalassurance

problemofcollectiveactionobtains.Totheextentthatthecreationofnewknowledge

dependsontheuseofpreviouslyexistingknowledgeand(1)thephysicalinfrastructureof

knowledgestorageandaccessrequiresresourcesformaintenance,or(2)knowledgecan

beappropriatedandaccessprevented,dilemmasofunderprovisionandoverappropriation

becomepossible.

Finally,ifa"commons"isdefinedsimplyasa"asharedresourcethatisvulnerable

tosocialdilemmas"(Hess&Ostrom,2007,p.13),itiseasytosee"knowledgeasa

commons."ForHessandOstrom(2007),analysisofanycommonsrequiresexaminations

ofequity("issuesofjustorequalappropriationfrom,andcontributionto,themaintenance

ofaresource"),efficiency("optimalproduction,management,anduseoftheresource"),

andsustainability("outcomesoverthelongterm").Wewillreturntothesethreecriteriato

judgeresultsofourexperimentsandthoseofotherstudies.

4.2.Influenceofinformationenvironmentonsociallearningstrategies

Sofarwehavenotfoundevidencefora"tragic"outcomeinunderprovisionof

individualexplorationinourparticipants'collectivesearchbehaviorovertime,extreme

inequityinprovision,orunsustainabilityinlonger‐termresults.Thoughparticipantswere

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ratherconservativeintheirstrategies,innovationwasmorecommononaveragethan

imitation,implyingarelativelackofharmful"freeriding."Improvementsharewasfairly

equitablydistributedwithingroups,andfinalscoreswerequitehighintermsof

percentilesinthedistributionofpossibleoutcomes.However,participantsgenerallydid

notreachoptimalsolutions,sotherecouldbepossibilitiesforimprovingefficiencyand

absoluteperformancethroughchangesinparticipants'incentivesandinformation

environment.Theremayalsobeimportantfactorswhichcouldharmparticipants'abilityto

contributetotheproductionandsharingofinnovations.

4.2.1.Inefficiencyandinformation

Previousworkhasshownthatmakingsociallearningprocesseslessefficientcan

actuallyimprovethelong‐termperformanceofgroupsattemptingtosearchacomplex

problemspace,bothinlaboratoryexperiments(Mason,Jones,&Goldstone,2008)and

agent‐basedmodels(Lazer&Friedman,1997).Thereductioninefficiencywas

implementedinthesestudiesbychangingthedistributionoflinksinthesocialnetwork

connectingparticipants.Thishadtheeffectofslowingthespreadofinformationviasocial

learning,encouraginggreaterexploration,andmaintaininggreatersolutiondiversity

amonggroupmembers,thusavoidingprematuresettlingofthegroup'ssearchongoodbut

suboptimalregionsoftheproblemspace.Havingobservedsomegeneraldynamicsand

learningstrategiesofcollectivesearchintheexperimentsdescribedsofar,wewishedto

seewhetherthisseeminglyparadoxicaleffectwouldoccurwithconceptuallysimilar

changestoourexperimentalparadigm.

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Ourpreviousexperimentshavealsoshownthatthesociallearningstrategiesthat

participantspursuedependontheinformationavailabletoeachparticipant,specificallyin

termsofthenumberofotherparticipantssharinginformationabouttheirtentative

solutions.Presumably,thisisbecauselargernumbersofpeerssharinginformation

increasetheoverallreliabilityoftheinformationavailabletoeach.Aspreviouslydiscussed,

thiscanbeinterpretedasaninstanceofthecopywhenuncertainsociallearningstrategy

(Laland,2004),becausegreatercertaintyaboutthevalidityofsocialinformationincreases

therelativeuncertaintyofasociallearning.Otherworkondiffusionofinnovationshas

shownthattheuseandinfluenceofsocialinformationdependontherelativeambiguityof

thebenefitofadoptingaparticularsolution(Granovetter,1978;DiMaggio&Powell,1983;

Abrahamson&Rosenkopf,1997;Gibbons,2004).Inamodelofsocialforagingbehaviorina

changingenvironment,KrebsandInman(1992)showedthatifthereisadelayinan

observer’srecognitionoftheforagingsuccessofademonstrator,thereisacorresponding

reductionintheinformation(andthusthebenefit)providedbythesocialinformation

providedbythedemonstrator;withalongenoughdelay,theobserverisbetteroffignoring

thedemonstratorandforagingasocially.Anotherresultfrommodelingisthatifpersonal

(asocial)andsocialinformationcannotbegatheredsimultaneously,theremaybeno

benefittousingsocialinformation,becausetheycannotbeeffectivelycombined;

furthermore,whenothers’actionsareavailabletobeobserved,butnottheresulting

success‐relatedcues,socialinformationshouldbeminimizedtoavoidinformation

cascades(Giraldeau,Valone,&Templeton,2002;Bikhchandani,Hirshleifer,&Welsh,

1992).

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4.2.2.MotivationandconceptualdescriptionofchangesinExperiment3

Havingshowninpreviousexperimentsthatparticipantscanuseavarietyof

learningstrategiestosolveacollectivesearchproblem,wewantedtoseehowthese

strategieswouldshiftinresponsetochangesintheinformationenvironment.Ratherthan

changingthestructureofthesocialnetworkconnectingourparticipants(asinthework

citedjustabove),wedecidedtosimplyremoveaccesstoscoreinformationaboutothers'

solutions.Participantswouldstillbeabletoobserveandcopytheirpeers,butwouldhave

towaitfortheirownfeedbacktolearnthevalueofimitatedchoices;informationabout

others'solutionswasentirelyambiguous,whileinformationabouttheirownsolutionswas

entirelyunambiguous.Thisissimilartocontextsinwhichindividualanimalscanobserve

thebehaviorofothers,butnotthecuesoroutcomesthatmotivatethoseactions,or

situationsinwhichprivatefirmscanwithholdinformationaboutrevenues(i.e.thesuccess

oftheiractions)fromcompetitors.

Wewishedtousethisrelativelysmallmodificationtoaskquestionsabouthowthe

eliminationofinformationsupportingonekindofsociallearningwouldcauseparticipants

tochangetheirlearningstrategies,andhowsuchchangeswouldaffectperformance.Asthe

workaboveonimprovedcollectivesearchperformancethroughreducedcommunication

efficiencyindicates,impedingsociallearningmayincreaseasociallearningamongmost

participants.Suchanoutcomewouldpresumablyreducefree‐riding(improvingequityof

provision);butwouldthischangecauseparticipantstoactuallyfindbettersolutions,or

wouldthereducedefficiencyofaccesstopreviousknowledge(andtheinabilitytouseit

simultaneouslywithasocialinformation)reducetheefficiencyofknowledgeproduction?

Presumingthatsociallearningisnotdisplacedentirelybyasociallearning,howwouldits

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prevalenceandusechange,andwhatinformationwouldbeusedtodirectremaining

imitationchoices?Finally,wouldtheseadaptationsinbehaviorimproveoverallindividual

andcollectiveoutcomesandimprovementsovertime(sustainability)?

Inordertoavoidceilingeffectsonperformanceandpresumablymakeiteasierto

distinguishtheperformanceofsuccessfulsocialandasociallearning,wechangedthe

problemspaceslightlyfromthepreviousexperimenttoshiftsomeofthemassofthescore

distributiontoalongerandfatteruppertail(increasingtheproportionofsolutionswith

higherscores).Thisallowedtheparalleldiscoveryofhigher‐scoringsolutionsamong

participantswithoutrequiringasmuchconvergenceofsolutioncontent;performance

couldbeincreasedwithoutnecessarilyconstrainingsolutiondiversity.

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5.Experiment3–CreatureGameB(scorevisibility)

5.1.Experiment3Overview

Thetaskusedinthisexperimentwasthesameasthe“CreatureGame”of

Experiment2,withtwomajorchanges:(1)thescoresassociatedwithpeers’solutionswere

showninhalfthegamesineachexperimentsession,andhiddenintheotherhalf;(2)the

problemspacewaschangedbyaddingmorepositive‐scoringbonusinteractionsbetween

solutionelements,whichhadtheeffectofmakingtheuppertailofthescoredistribution

longerandfatter,sothattherewererelativelymoresolutionswithhighscores.

Modification(1)allowedfortheexaminationofdifferencesinstrategiesandperformance

associatedwithdifferencesintheavailablesocialinformation.Modification(2),thoughit

madedirectcomparisonswithExperiment2slightlymoretenuous,allowedparticipantsto

achievehighscoreswithoutnecessarilyconvergingintheirsolutions.

5.1.1.Predictions

Becauseofthesmallchangeswemadetothetask,weexpectedthatresultswould

bequitesimilartothoseofExperiment2whenpeers’scoreswereshown.Whenevaluative

informationaboutpeersolutionswasunavailable,participantswouldbeunabletobe

sufficientlyselectiveinimitation,andthusparticipantsemployinghighlyimitative

strategieswouldhaverelativelylowerscoresthanthosewithlessimitation‐heavy

strategies,participantswouldemploylessimitationandmoreinnovation,andsolution

diversitywouldincrease.Similarity‐biasedandfrequency‐biasedimitationstrategies

wouldbestrongerwhenpeerscoreswereinvisible,inordertocompensateforthelackof

directevaluativeinformation.Overall,ratherthanimprovingexplorationbehavior,the

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impedanceofsociallearningbymakingpeerscoresinvisiblewouldresultinlowermean

scores(includingthoseofrelativelysuccessfulasociallearners)becausetheywouldbe

unabletoeasilytakeadvantageofgoodsolutionsfoundbyothersthroughselective

imitationandfurtherimproveuponthem.

5.2.Experiment3Methods

234participantswererecruitedfromtheIndianaUniversityPsychology

Departmentundergraduatesubjectpool,andweregivencoursecreditfortakingpartinthe

study.Participantspopulatedeachsessionbysigningupatwillforscheduledexperiments

withamaximumcapacityof9persons,andweredistributedacross65sessionsasshown

inTable5.1.

Table5.1:DistributionofparticipantsacrossgroupsizesinExperiment3

Groupsize 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

#Sessions 16 8 11 11 7 2 4 4 2

#Participants 16 16 33 44 35 12 28 32 18

ThetaskusedwasnearlyidenticaltothatofExperiment2,withthefollowing

changes.Tomoreeasilyfitthesessionintheone‐hourtimelimitrequiredforexperiments

usingoursubjectpool,thereweresixgamespersessioninsteadofeight.Inthreeofthese

games(theinvisible­scorescondition),thescoresofotherparticipantswerenotshown

alongwiththeirsolutionsfromthepreviousround;intheotherthreegames(thevisible­

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scorescondition),otherparticipants’scoreswereshown.Ofcourse,thisdistinctiononly

matteredinsessionsthatincludedmorethanoneparticipant.

Thedistributionofindividualpointvaluesfortheiconswasthesameasforthe

largerleaguesizeinExperiment2,butsevennewpositivebonusinteractionswereadded

betweenicons,andseveralexistinginteractionvalueswereshiftedtodifferentpairsof

icons,asshowninFig.5.1(comparetoFig.3.2b).Thesechangeshadtheeffectofincreasing

thecomplexityoftheproblemspace,aswellasincreasingthenumberofpossiblehigh‐

scoringteams.Asaresult,thepossiblescorerangechangedto[‐6,88],butallscoreswere

againnormalizedtotherange[0,1]foreaseofanalysis.(Notethatduetothisshift,

normalizedscorescannotbedirectlycomparedbetweenExperiments2and3.)The

combinationsoftheseindividualandpairvaluesresultedintheprobabilitydistributionof

scoresamongallpossibleteamsshowninFig.5.2(comparetoFig.3.3b).

Figure5.1:Pointdistributionforindividualicons(boxes)andinteractionbonusesand

penalties(ovals).

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Figure5.2:Distributionofscoresforallpossibleteams.

5.3.Experiment3Results

5.3.1Overallmeans

MeandependentvariablesineachconditionareshowninTable5.2(seealsoFig.

5.2).Ofallgroupedparticipants,81.7%hadhighermeanscoresinthevisible‐scores

conditionthanintheinvisible‐scorescondition(seeFigure5.3).Isolatedparticipants

achievedmeanoverallandfinalscoresof.356and.395.

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Table5.2.Meanscore,guessdiversity,andchoicesourceproportionsbycondition

Cond.OverallScore(Percentile)

FinalScore(Percentile)

GuessDiversity

Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval

Visible .447*(92.6%) .523*(97.5%) 62.2%* 9.1% 13.4%* 75.0%* 2.4%*

Invis. .394*(89.1%) .475*(94.6%) 79.0%* 8.4% 15.0%* 71.0%* 4.2%*

IsolatedPartic. .356(81.4%) .395(89.1%) ‐‐ ‐‐ 29.2% 55.8% 13.7%

*significantdifferencesbetweenconditions

Figure5.3:Scattergramofindividuals’meanscoresineachcondition,labeledwiththeir

participantgroupsize.

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5.3.2.Rounds

Linearmixed‐effectsmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossroundsforscore

andguessdiversity,witharandomeffectofparticipantgroup.Analysisofscoreversus

roundshowedastrongpositivetrendforgroupedparticipantsinthevisible‐scores

condition(F(1,1126)=521.82,p<.0001,B=.656,meantotalincrease=0.220),andaslightly

shallowerpositivetrendintheinvisible‐scorescondition(F(1,1126)=446.53,p<.0001,

B=.727,meanincrease=0.172;seeFig.5.4).Guessdiversityshowedasimilarlystrong

decreaseacrossroundsinthevisible‐scorescondition(F(1,1126)=304.78,p<.0001,B=‐

.443,meanchange=‐0.468),andaweakerdecreaseintheinvisible‐scorescondition

(F(1,1126)=97.31,p<.0001,B=‐0.453,meanchange=‐0.271;seeFig.5.4).Isolated

participants’scoresincreasedmuchless(thoughsignificantly)acrossrounds

(F(1,751)=30.26,p<.0001,B=.348,meanincrease=0.075;seeFig.5.4).

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Figure5.4:Scoresincreasedandguessdiversitydecreasedmoreacrossroundsinthe

scores‐visibleconditionthaninthescores‐invisiblecondition.

Trendsforchoicesourcesacrossroundsshowedverysimilarpatternstothosein

Experiment2:ImitationandInnovationdecreasedsignificantly,andRetrievaland

Retentionincreasedsignificantly.Therewerenosubstantialdifferencesinslopesbetween

conditions,norsubstantialdifferenceswiththeslopesoverroundsfoundinExperiment2.

5.3.3.Gameorder

Similarlinearmixed‐effectsmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossgameorder

foreachdependentvariablewithinconditions.Forthisanalysis,thegameordervaluefor

eachgamewascorrectedtoitsorderwithinthecondition,i.e.Game1,2,or3ineach

condition.Scoredisplayedaslightbutsignificantincreaseacrossgameorderinthevisible‐

scorescondition(F(1,97)=16.57,p=.0001,B=0.264,meanchange=+0.048;seeFig.5.5),and

asmallbutnon‐significantincreaseintheinvisible‐scorescondition.Guessdiversity

displayedacorrespondingdecreaseacrossgameorderinthevisible‐scorescondition

(F(1,97)=62.09,p<.0001,B=‐0.263,meanchange=‐0.103),aswellasintheinvisible‐scores

condition(F(1,97)=70.79,p<.0001,B=‐0.363,meanchange=‐0.115;seeFig.5.5).

Asforchoicesources,changesovergameorderwithinconditionsweregenerally

slight.Imitationdecreasedslightlybutsignificantlyovergameorderinthevisible‐scores

condition(F(1,97)=6.24,p=.0141,B=‐0.121,meanchange=‐0.011),whileincreasing

significantlyintheinvisible‐scorescondition(F(1,97)=32.97,p<.0001,B=0.289,mean

change=+0.040;seeFig.5.6a).Innovationdecreasedsignificantlyacrossgameorderwithin

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boththevisible‐scores(F(1,97)=26.82,p<.0001,B=‐0.173,meanchange=‐0.028)andthe

invisible‐scores(F(1,97)=41.04,p<.0001,B=‐0.226,meanchange=‐0.036;seeFig.5.6a)

conditions.Retentionincreasedsignificantlyonlyinthevisible‐scorescondition

(F(1,97)=29.97,p<.0001,B=0.252,meanchange=+0.041;seeFig.5.6b),andRetrieval

increasedsignificantlyonlyintheinvisible‐scorescondition(F(1,97)=14.42,p=.0004,

B=0.228,meanchange=+0.012;seeFig.5.6b).

Figure5.5:Scoreincreasedsignificantlyonlyinthevisible‐scorescondition,andguess

diversitydecreasedinbothconditions.

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(a) (b)

Figure5.6:(a)ImitationandInnovationdecreasedsignificantlyinthescores‐visible

condition,whileImitationincreasedandInnovationdecreasedinthescores‐invisible

condition.(b)Retentionincreasedsignificantlyonlyinthevisible‐scorescondition,and

Retrievalincreasedsignificantlyonlyintheinvisible‐scorescondition

5.3.4.Groupsize

Trendsacrossparticipantgroupsizeforeachdependentvariablewithinconditions

wereexaminedusinglinearmixed‐effectsmodels,withtheparticipantgroupusedasa

randomeffectontheintercept.Scoreincreasedsignificantlywithgroupsizeinthevisible‐

scorescondition(F(1,63)=79.59,p<.0001,B=0.580),aswellasintheinvisible‐scores

condition(F(1,63)=15.45,p=.0002,B=0.309;seeFig.5.7),thoughthelattertrendwasnot

asstrong.Guessdiversityshowedacorrespondingdecreasewithincreasinggroupsizein

thevisible‐scorescondition(F(1,47)=68.83,p<.0001,B=‐0.699),aswellasaweakertrend

intheinvisible‐scorescondition(F(1,47)=17.28,p=.0001,B=‐0.430;seeFig.5.7).

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Asforchoicesources,Imitationincreasedsignificantlyforlargergroupsinboththe

scores‐visible(F(1,47)=41.47,p<.0001,B=0.597)andscores‐invisible(F(1,47)=28.04,

p<.0001,B=0.500;seeFig.5.8a)conditions,andInnovationdecreasedsignificantlyfor

largergroupsinboththescores‐visible(F(1,47)=18.42,p=.0001,B=‐0.492)andscores‐

invisible(F(1,47)=14.04,p=.0005,B=‐0.436;seeFig.5.8a)conditions.Retentionincreased

forlargergroupsonlyinthescores‐visiblecondition(F(1,47)=5.91,p=.019,B=0.286;see

Fig.5.8b),whileRetrievalshowednosignificanttrendacrossgroupsize(seeFig.5.8b).

Figure5.7:Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,meanscoresinagroupincreased,andthe

diversityofofferedsolutionsdecreased,withslightlyweakereffectsforbothinthe

invisible‐scorescondition.

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(a) (b)

Figure5.8:Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,(a)meanproportionsofImitationincreased

andInnovationdecreasedinbothconditions,and(b)Retentionincreasedonlyinthe

visible‐scorescondition,andRetrievalshowednosignificantchangeacrossgroupsize.

5.3.5.Differencesinimitation

Ofallinstancesofsingle‐participantimitation,thescoreoftheimitatedparticipant

wasgreaterthanthatoftheimitatorsignficantlymoreofteninthevisible‐scorescondition

thanintheinvisible‐scorescondition(t(74)=16.07,p<.0001;seeFig.5.9a);inthelatter

condition,theprobabilitywasabout54%,orapproximatelyatchance.Inaddition,there

wasasignificantlygreaterprobabilityofimitatingthetop‐scoringsolutioninthegroupin

thevisible‐scorescondition(t(80)=20.08,p<.0001;seeFig.5.9b).

Toexamineseparatelyhowoftenandhowmuchparticipantsimitatedoneanother,

wemeasuredthemeanproportionofguessesinwhichtherewasgreaterthanzero

Imitation(Imitationincidence),aswellasthemeanImitationproportioninsuchcases

(Imitationproportion).MeanImitationincidencewassignificantlyhigherinthevisible‐

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scorescondition(F(1,229)=31.17,p<.0001),butthedistributionofmeanimitation

proportionswasweightedsignificantlymoreheavilytowardhighervaluesintheinvisible‐

scorescondition,asshownbyaKolmogorov‐Smirnofftestofequalityofdistributions

(D=0.1893,p<.0001;seeFig.5.10).Inotherwords,participantsinthescores‐invisible

conditioncopiedoneanotherlessfrequentlybutinlargeramountsatatime.

(a) (b)

Figure5.9:Inthevisible‐scoresconditiontherewerestrongbiasestowardimitating(a)

better‐scoringparticipantsthanoneself,and(b)thebest‐scoringparticipant,while

imitationbehaviorintheinvisible‐scoresconditionappearedessentiallyrandomwith

respecttoscoredifferenceandscorerank.

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Figure5.10:ForguessesthatincludedatleastsomeImitation,participantsintheinvisible‐

scoresconditionhadhigherproportionsofImitationintheirguesses.

5.3.6.Choicesourcestrategy

AsinExperiment2,thechoicesourcesofeachnon‐isolatedparticipantoverthe

entiresessionwereanalyzed,andeachparticipant’schoicesourcestrategywascategorized

accordingtotheirproportionofeachsource.Participantswhosechoicescontainedone

sourceinanaverageproportiongreaterthantheglobalaverageforthatsourceplusone

standarddeviation,werelabeledwiththatstrategy.Forexample,aplayerwhoseguesses

overthecourseofaconditionconsistedofagreaterproportionofImitatechoicesthanthe

averageforallotherparticipantsinthatcondition,plusonestandarddeviation,were

labeledashavinganoverallstrategyof“Imitate.”Thosewhofittheabovecriteriaformore

thanonechoicesource,ornone,werelabeledashavinga“Mixed”strategy.Thescore

distributionforeachstrategycategoryineachconditionisshowninFig.5.11.

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(a) (b)

Figure5.11:Scorevs.choicesourcestrategyin(a)visible‐scoresand(b)invisible‐scores

conditions,showingthataconservativehigh‐Retentionstrategyresultedinthebest

performance,thoughasimilarlyconservativehigh‐Retrievalstrategy(returningoftentoa

personalbest‐so‐far)showedgoodrelativeperformanceintheinvisible‐scorescondition.

Theabove‐mentionedfiguressummarizetheresultsofsimpleregressionanalyses

performedforscorevs.individualandgroupuseofeachchoicesource.Alinearregression

ofmeanindividualscorevs.meanindividualImitationguessproportionshoweda

significantpositiverelationship(thatis,thegreateraparticipant’saverageproportionof

Imitation,thebettertheparticipant’sscore),butonlyinthevisible‐scorescondition

(F(1,216)=8.12,p=.005,B=0.190;seeFig.5.12a);nosignificantrelationshipwasfoundin

theinvisible‐scorescondition.Theoppositewastrueforindividualscorevs.Innovation,

whichdisplayedasignificantnegativerelationshipinboththevisible‐scores

(F(1,216)=146.2,p<.0001,B=‐0.635;seeFig.5.12b)andinvisible‐scores(F(1,216)=67.88,

p<.0001,B=‐0.489)conditions.ApositiverelationshipheldforRetentioninboththe

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visible‐scores(F(1,216)=64.6,p<.0001,B=0.480;seeFig.5.12c)andinvisible‐scores

(F(1,216)=13.81,p=.0003,B=0.245)conditions.Finally,apositiverelationshipwasfound

forRetrievalinonlytheinvisible‐scorescondition(SI:F(1,216)=12.73,p=.0005,B=0.236;

seeFig.5.12d).

AsinExperiment2,analysesofmeangroupscorevs.meangroupguessproportion

foreachchoicesourceshowedsimilarrelationshipsofthesamesignificanceanddirections

asthosenotedabove,aswellasanalysesofmeanindividualscorevs.meangroup

(excludingtheindividual)guessproportion,withtheexceptionoftheabsenceofa

relationshipwithRetrievalatbothlevels.Alltrendsnotedaboveweregenerally

monotonic;thatis,therewerenothresholdsorinflectionpointsbeyondwhichthe

relationshipschanged.

(a) (b)

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(c) (d)

Figure5.12:Higherindividualscoreswereassociatedwith(a)higherindividualImitation

onlyinthevisible‐scorescondition,(b)lowerInnovationinbothconditions,(c)higher

Retentioninbothconditions,while(d)higherindividualRetrievalonlyintheinvisible‐

scorescondition.Bestfittinglinearregressionlinesareonlyshownwhenthelinear

relationwassignificant.

5.3.7.Improvements

AsinExperiment1,improvementsweretalliedforeachparticipantineachsession

andcondition.Histogramsofnormalizedimprovementshareshowedarelativelyequitable

distributionofimprovementswithingroupsinthevisible‐scorescondition,witha

distributionstronglypeakedneara“fairshare”of1(56%ofparticipantswerebetween0.4

and1.2),andonly6.4%ofparticipantshavingzeroimprovements;incontrast,therewasa

stronglyinequitably‐skeweddistributionintheinvisible‐scorescondition,withonly36.2%

ofparticipantshavingimprovementsharesbetween0.4and1.2,and21.1%withzero

improvements(seeFig.5.13).AKolmogorov‐Smirnofftestofequalityofdistributions

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indicatedthatthesedistributionsweresignificantlydifferent(D=0.1789,p=0.002).Mean

overallscoreshowedastrongpositivecorrelationwithimprovementshareintheinvisible‐

scorescondition(F(1,168)=64.49,p<.0001,B=0.369),butthisrelationshipwasnotevident

inthevisible‐scorescondition.

Themeanchoicesourceproportionsforguessesthatresultedinscore

improvementsandthosethatdidnotareshowninTable5.3.Inbothconditions,the

proportionofInnovationchoiceswashigherforguessesthatyieldedimprovements

relativetonon‐improvements(invisible‐scores:t(733.20)=‐14.03,p<.0001;visible‐scores:

t(907.73)=‐17.14,p<.0001).Intheinvisible‐scorescondition,theproportionofImitation

choiceswassignificantlylowerforimprovementsthannon‐improvements

(t(916.77)=11.54,p<.0001),whileinthevisible‐scorescondition,theproportionof

Retentionchoiceswassignificantlylowerforimprovementsthannon‐improvements

(t(916.33)=9.34,p<.0001).Ofallimprovementsinthevisible‐scorescondition,24.2%

resultedfromguessesthatincludedImitation,versus12.2%intheinvisible‐scores

condition.In52.3%ofallimprovementsinthevisible‐scorescondition,thefocalplayer

imitatedatleastonepeerwhohadpreviouslyimitatedthefocalplayer,versus41.5%inthe

invisible‐scorescondition.Inotherwords,aplayerwhowasimitatedbyanotherplayer

oftenlaterimitatedthatsameplayerinthecourseofcreatinganimprovement,butthis

happenedsubstantiallymoreoftenwhenscoreswerevisible.

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Figure5.13:Histogramsshowingrelativelyequitableachievementofimprovementswithin

groupsinthevisible‐scorescondition,andaninequitabledistributionintheinvisible‐

scorescondition.

Table5.3:Meanchoicesourceproportionsforimprovementandnon‐improvement

guessesineachcondition.

Condition Improvement %ofguesses Imitation Innovation Retention RetrievalNo 94.6% 9.1% 11.4%* 76.3%* 2.2%Visible

Scores Yes 5.4% 8.2% 19.4%* 69.5%* 2.1%No 95.6% 10%* 13.3%* 71.2% 4.4%Invisible

Scores Yes 4.4% 3.9%* 21.6%* 70.5% 3.5%*significantdifferenceswithincondition

5.3.8.Guesssimilarity

Acomparisonbetweenthemeansimilarityofparticipants’mostrecentguessesto

thosewhomtheyimitated,andtothosewhomtheydidnotimitate,revealedslightbut

significantdifferencesinbothconditions,butinoppositedirections.Inthescores‐visible

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condition,thereweresimilarityvaluesof.563forimitatedvs..524fornon‐imitated

guesses(t(5084)=‐5.47,p<.0001;seeFig.5.14a).Inthescores‐invisiblecondition,there

weresimilarityvaluesof.316forimitatedvs..346fornon‐imitatedguesses(t(4267)=4.35,

p<.0001;seeFig.5.14b).Inotherwords,priortoimitation,theaverageimitators’guess

wasmoresimilartothatoftheimitatedparticipant(s)thantothoseofothersinthescores‐

visiblecondition,andlesssimilarinthescores‐invisiblecondition.

(a) (b)

Figure5.14:(a)Inthescores‐visiblecondition,imitators’previousguessesshowedgreater

similaritytotheguessestheyimitatedthantothosetheydidnotimitate,while(b)inthe

scores‐invisiblecondition,theoppositeeffectwasobserved.

5.3.9.Frequencyandmomentumbias

AsinExperiment1,wemeasuredthebiasofparticipantstochooseanicon

accordingtoitsfrequencyinpeers’choices.Toreiteratebriefly,wemeasuredthemean

probabilityofImitationandInnovationforanyiconnotalreadyincludedonaplayer’s

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team,basedonthefrequencyofitsappearanceonpeers’teamsintheplayer’sdisplay,and

comparedthemtoexpectedchancebaselines.

Linearmixed‐effectsanalysisofimitationprobabilityversuschoicefrequency

showedapositivefrequency‐dependentImitationbiasthatwassignificantlygreaterthan

chanceinthevisible‐scorescondition(F(1,604)=943.25,p<.0001,B=.741),butsignificantly

lowerthanchanceintheinvisible‐scorescondition(F(1,604)=231.67,p<.0001,B=.470;see

Fig.5.15a).Therewasaslightpositivefrequency‐dependentInnovationbiasabovechance

inthevisible‐scorescondition(F(1,604)=181.20,p<.0001,B=.441),andbelowchancein

theinvisible‐scorescondition(F(1,604)=12.78,p=.0004,B=.131;seeFig.5.15b).

Wealsorepeatedtheanalysisof“choicemomentum,”bytallyingthechangeinthe

numberofplayerswhoseteamsincludedtheiconintheprevioustworounds,aswellas

thenumberoftheremainingplayerswhoaddedittotheirteaminthecurrentroundvia

ImitationorInnovation,andnormalizingforgroupsize.Afterlog‐transformingthe

Imitationprobabilitydatatoachieveanormaldistribution,at‐testofImitationprobability

fornegativeandpositivechangesinchoicefrequencyshowedasignificantpositive

momentumbiasinthevisible‐scorescondition(t(640)=‐14.192,p<.0001),andasmaller

positivebiasintheinvisible‐scorescondition(t(661)=‐9.98,p<.0001;seeFig.5.16a).A

slightpositivemomentumbiaswasfoundforInnovationinthevisible‐scorescondition,

butnocorrespondingsignificantbiaswasfoundintheinvisible‐scorescondition(seeFig.

5.16b).

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(a) (b)

Figure5.15:Therewerebiasestowardchoosingelementsthatweremorefrequently

representedonotherteamsinthevisible‐scorescondition,andlessfrequentlyrepresented

onotherteamsintheinvisible‐scoresconditionfor(a)Imitationand(b)Innovation

decisions.

(a) (b)

Figure5.16:Therewerebiasestowardchoosingelementswhoserepresentationonother

teamswasincreasingin(a)bothconditionsforImitationand(b)onlythevisible‐scores

conditionforInnovationdecisions.

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5.4.Experiment3Discussion

Aspredicted,resultsinthescores‐visibleconditionwerequitesimilartothosein

Experiment2,whiletheresultsinthescores‐invisibleconditiondifferedinsomewayswe

didnotpredict.

5.4.1.Differencesinperformance

HavingdemonstratedbenefitsforImitationinthepreviousexperiments,the

impedimenttosociallearningintroducedintheinvisible‐scoresconditionlowered

performanceaspredicted.Thus,thereductionintheefficiencyofsociallearning

implementedbyhidingpeers’scoresdidleadtoincreasedInnovationandsolution

diversity,butdidnotseemtoimprovecollectivesearchperformanceasinMason,Jones,

andGoldstone(2008)andLazer&Friedman(1997).Thisdifferencefromthestudiescited

abovewaslikelyduetothewaythatcommunicationefficiencywasreduced:whereasthey

decreasedtheconnectivityofthesocialnetworkthroughwhichinformationwas

exchanged,weleftthenetworkunchangedbuteliminatedanimportantpartofthe

informationthatparticipantsusedtoguideimitationdecisions.Ourresultsare

substantiallyinaccordancewiththefindingsofGiraldeau,Valone,andTempleton(2002),

whofoundthataninabilitytocombinetheuseofsocialandasociallearning

simultaneouslywouldresultinalackofbenefitforsociallearning;however,wedid

observesomebenefitforsociallearning,inthatparticipantsintheinvisible‐scores

conditionstillperformedbetterthanisolatedparticipants.

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5.4.2.Differencesinstrategy

Overall,thechangeintheavailabilityofperformanceinformationseemedtoshift

participants’tacticsfrommakingsmallchangestotheirguesses,combiningasocialand

sociallearning(incrementaliststrategies)inthevisible‐scorescondition,tomakinglarger

jumpsaroundtheproblemspaceandoftenjumpingbacktopreviousknowngoodsolutions

(saltationiststrategies)intheinvisible‐scorescondition.Thisdifferencewasdiscerniblein

anumberofresults.First,whenscoreswereinvisible,proportionsofInnovationand

RetrievalwerehigherandRetentionwaslower,implyingthatonaverageparticipantswere

keepingsmallerportionsoftheirguessesfromroundtoroundandchangingoftenbetween

newandoldsolutionelements.ThoughtheoverallmeanproportionofImitationwasthe

sameinbothconditions,Imitationwasusedlessoftenandforalargerproportionofthe

guessintheinvisible‐scorescondition–participantsweresignificantlymorelikelytocopy

mostorallofapeer’ssolution.ThelowermeanRetentionintheinvisible‐scorescondition

impliesthatparticipantswereoftenjumpingtoapeer’sguessandeitherkeepingitifit

increasedtheirscore,orjumpingbacktotheirRetrievedpreviousbestguessifitdidnot.

Theabilitytomakeincrementalchanges,mixingelementsfromallsources,should

allowparticipantstoassesstheeffectofsmallerchangesandmakebetterjudgmentsabout

thequalityofindividualelementsandpairsfromotherparticipants;thustherewere

substantialincreasesinscoreacrossroundsandassociationsofRetentionandImitation

withhighscoresobservedinthevisible‐scorescondition.Arelianceonlargeriskyjumps

aroundtheproblemspacewouldlikelypayoffabouthalfthetimeforthemedian

participant,andthosewhojumpedbacktogoodprevioussolutionswouldloselessoverall

thanthosewhocontinuallyjumparound;thustherewereshallowerincreasesinscoreover

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rounds,andanassociationofhigherscoreswithRetrievalbutnotImitationintheinvisible‐

scorescondition.Thissaltationiststrategyseemstohavebeenmoresuccessfulthannot

usingImitationatall,however,asshownbythesubstantiallylowerperformanceof

isolatedparticipants.

Theremovalofscoreinformationalsoaffectedtheuseofotherkindsofinformation

inparticipants’imitationstrategies;however,ratherthanstrengtheningsocially‐mediated

informationbiases(assuggestedbyAbrahamsonandRosenkopf(1997)andGibbons

(2004))suchasfrequencybiasorsimilaritybias,participantsactuallyshowedweakened

oroppositeinclinations.Theaboveinterpretationintermsofchangingthemagnitudeof

movementsintheproblemspaceholdshereaswell.Copyingasimilarsolutiontoyourown

isaninherentlyincrementaliststrategy,sothepresenceofthisbiasinthevisible‐scores

condition,andthepresenceofitsoppositeintheinvisible‐scoresconditioncanalsobe

explainedintermsofanoverallchangefromincrementalisttosaltationiststrategies.The

unpopularitybiasandreducedmomentumbiasweobservedmayhaveoccurredbecause

participantsknewthatimitationdecisionswereoftennotbasedonreliableperformance

information,andthusfrequency‐basedbiasesshouldbeavoidedtokeepfromjoining

informationherds(Banerjee,1992),assuggestedbyGiraldeau,Valone,andTempleton

(2002).

5.4.3.Learning?

Changesinstrategyacrossgameordercanbethoughtofaslearningoradaptation

tothetaskoversuccessivegames.Thechangesweobservedacrossgameorderimplythat

strategiesineachconditionwerestrengthenedoverthecourseofthesession.Inthe

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visible‐scorescondition,thedecreasesinInnovationandImitationandincreasein

Retentionshowamoreincrementalistapproach,whileintheinvisible‐scorescondition,

theincreasesinImitationandRetrievalanddecreaseinInnovationdisplayedmoresolidly

saltationisttendencies.Itisfairlysimpletoseethatanincreasinglyincrementaliststrategy

thatincludedsomeImitationwouldshowanincreasingpayoffintermsofbeingableto

distinguishgoodindividualelementsandpairs,andtheimprovementinscoreacrossgame

orderinthevisible‐scoresconditionreflectsthis.Anincreasinglysaltationiststrategy,

however,isnotlikelytoshowbenefitsunlessthesolutionsofone’speersimprove,and

thuswesawnoimprovementinscoreacrossgameorderintheinvisible‐scorescondition.

Thereisnoobviousbetter‐performingstrategyinthiscontext,however,soparticipants

seeminglydoubleddownonthisone.

5.4.4.Convergent/locallyefficientsearch

Asseenintheincreasingscoreanddecreasingguessdiversitytrendsacrossrounds,

averageperformanceincreasedviatheconvergenceofgroupmembersonregionsofthe

problemspacethatcontainedhigh‐qualityteams.Thisconvergencecombinedwithasmall

amountofindividualexplorationcausedsuchregionstobeexploredmorethoroughlyand

stillbettersolutionstobefound.However,intheinvisible‐scorescondition,whenimitation

wasnotfocusedonasmallgroupofbetter‐performingneighbors(becauseperformance

informationwasnotavailable),similarguesses,orpopularsolutionelements,this

convergencehappenedmuchmoreslowly,searchwasmorediffuseandlessefficient,and

lowerperformanceresulted.Theweakertrendsofincreasingscoreanddecreasingguess

diversityacrossgroupsizeintheinvisible‐scoresconditionshowedthatthelackofscore

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informationmadesearchersunabletoeffectivelytakeadvantageoftheincreasingnumbers

oftheirfellowsearchers.

5.4.5.Cumulativemutualimprovement

Thesignificantcorrelationofimprovementsharewithmeanscoresintheinvisible‐

scoresconditionsshowsthatindividualswhowererelativelymoreskillful(orlucky)were

rewardedwithproportionatelybetteroverallscorescomparedtoothers;thiswasbecause

theirfellowplayerscouldnoteasilycopytheirimprovementsandachievetheirscores,and

becauseknowingthatImitationwasunreliablemadesomeparticipantsmorelikelytoseek

outimprovementsontheirown.Inthevisible‐scoresconditionthiscorrelation

disappeared,butthemoreequitabledistributionofimprovementsshowedthatmore

participantswerecontributingtotheirdiscovery,andmeanscoresincreasedsignificantly

suchthatnearlyallparticipantsdidbetter.Inotherwords,whensociallearningwas

unimpededinthevisible‐scorescondition,highandlowindividualachievershad

approximatelythesamepayoffs,butabsolutepayoffswerehigherforallcomparedtothe

invisible‐scorescondition,inwhichhigh‐achieversgotabiggerpieceofasmallerpie.Thus

impedingsociallearningledtorelativelygreaterinequityandinefficiency,andpresumably

lowerlong‐termperformance(thoughwedidnottestthisexplicitlywithlongergames).

Thisadvantageformoreefficientsociallearningaccruedbecauseimitatorswerenot

merelyscroungers;thesubstantialproportionofImitationpresentinimprovementsshows

thatimitatedguesseswereoftenthebasisforfurthercumulativeinnovations.The

cumulativeinnovationhypothesisissupportedbythefactthatalargerproportionof

improvementsweretheresultofmutualImitationinthevisible‐scorescondition,inwhich

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solutionelementswerepassedbetweenplayersviacopyingandbuiltintobettersolutions

intheprocess.Thisenabledamoreactivesharingofthe“labor”ofproducing

improvements,andincreasedperformancefromparticipantsoverall.Intheinvisible‐

scorescondition,thenecessityofadoptingothers’guessesinordertoobtaininformation

abouttheirperformanceallowedfeweropportunitiestoevaluatevariationsonthem;it

alsopreventedgroupmembersfromperformingthe“filtering”functionofcopyingand

consistentlyretainingonlysolutionelementsassociatedwithrelativelyhighscores,sothat

otherswouldhavelesschanceofobtaininglow‐scoringsolutionelementswhencopying.

5.5.Conclusions

InExperiment2,wenotedthelackofa“tragic”outcomeintheproductionanduse

ofhigh‐scoringsolutions,despitetheapparentincentiveforindividualstounder‐produce

innovationsandfree‐rideontheinnovationsofothersviaself‐interestedimitation.Inthis

experiment,weshowedthatitwaspossibletoinduceatragicoutcomebyreducingthe

capacityofindividualstomakeself‐interestedimitationdecisions,evenwhilethey

increasedtheirproductionofinnovation.

Itappearsthatlowerperformanceinthistaskwasnotduetoanunderprovisionof

individualinnovation,butalackofevaluativefilteringofsolutionelements,which

participantsinthevisible‐scoresconditiondidbychoosingtoimitateandretainsolution

elementsassociatedwithhighscores,andwhichinthescores‐invisibleconditionwasmade

muchmoredifficult.Theconsistentuseofthebetter‐performingsolutionsdoesnotrelyon

altruisticorpublicly‐mindedmotives,butsuchfilteringisimportantforsupportingothers'

successfulsociallearning,aswashighlightedinarecenttournamentofsimulatedsocial

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learningstrategies(Rendellet.al2010).Insummary,wehaveshownthroughthis

experimentthatwhenknowledgeiscumulative,efficientandinformedappropriationisan

importantstepinfurtherprovisionofthepublicgoodofknowledge.

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6.KnowledgeasProperty

6.1.Promotingprogress

Intwopartsofthesociallearningexperimentsdescribedthusfar(largergroup

sizesinExperiment1,andthescores‐invisibleconditioninExperiment3),wehaveseen

thatdespiteapparentlyadequateprovisionofinnovation,obstaclestoaccurate,strategic

imitationofthoseinnovationscanleadtounderperformanceinfurtherinnovation.Inthis

chapterwewillexploresomemeasurestakenintherealworldto(ostensibly)encourage

efficientinnovationand(eventual)imitation,andintroduceseveralimportantconceptsfor

understandingtheirimplicationsontherelatedpublicandcommongoodsofknowledge

discussedinChapter4.

6.1.1.TheProgressClause

Practicalresearchanddevelopmentarecostlyactivitiesintermsofmoney,effort,

time,risk,andopportunity.Theseactivitiesgenerallywillnotbeundertakenunlesstheir

resultshavesomeexpectedvaluetojustifytheircosts.The"ProgressClause"oftheU.S.

Constitutionempowersthelegislature"TopromotetheProgressofScienceandusefulArts,

bysecuringforlimitedTimestoAuthorsandInventorstheexclusiveRighttotheir

respectiveWritingsandDiscoveries."Manyothercountrieshaveenactedsimilarstatutes

andpoliciesprotecting"intellectualproperty"(IP),whichgenerallyallowtheoriginatorsof

certaininnovationstocontrolthedisseminationorproduction(andthusthebenefit)ofthe

productsoftheirinnovations.(Thisclausecoversthecreationofbothpatentsand

copyrights;inthischapterandthenext,wewillbefocusingonpatents,thoughmanyofthe

sameargumentscouldapplytocopyrights.)TheownerofapatentgrantedbytheU.S.

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PatentandTrademarkOfficeisgiventherighttoexcludeothersfrom"making,using,

selling,offeringtosell,orimporting"thepatentedinvention(35U.S.C.§271),andthisright

canbereneweduntil20yearsafterthepatentapplicationwasfiled(35U.S.C.§154).In

exchange,apatentapplicantmustdescribetheinventioninenoughdetailsothataperson

whoisskilledinthefieldwouldbeabletomakeandusetheinvention(35U.S.C.§112).

Thedisclosurerequiredforapatentedinventioncanbeconsideredacontribution

toaknowledgecommons,inthattheinformationthatenablesoneto"makeanduse"the

inventioncanalsobeusedtoimproveit,ortocreateotherinventions.AsGhosh(2003)

notes,thecharacterizationofagoodasrivalrousdependsonthepropertyrightsthat

governit.TheexclusivecontroloveraninventionthatIPstatutesgivetocreatorscanmake

thatinventionusablebyonlyoneindividualorfirm,andsoartificiallytransformpractical

knowledgeintoasubtractableresource.ThustheexerciseofIPrightscanbeconsidered

appropriationofresourceunitsfromthecommons,whichcannotbedoneinan

unrestrainedwaywithoutthreateningtheviabilityoftheresource.

Thebalanceofrightsandresponsibilitiesintheseprovisionsimplicitly

acknowledgesthatindividualinnovationisencouragedforthepurposeoftheextending

thecollectivebenefitsofthegeneralprogressofknowledge.Thestandardassumption

abouttheintentofthe"ProgressClause"isthatitwasmotivatedbytheframers'viewthat

"encouragementofindividualeffortbypersonalgainisthebestwaytoadvancepublic

welfare"(MazervStein,1954).Thatis,publicbenefitistheprimaryintendedend,andthe

provisionofaprivateincentiveisthepreferredmeansforachievingit.Asdiscussed

previously,however,privatizationofaresourceisnotalwaysthebestwayofensuringits

equitable,efficient,andsustainableuse.

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6.1.2.Measuringthepromotionofprogress

Theprogressofsciencedependsontheincentivesthatinventorshavetoinvestin

researchanddevelopment,aswellastodisseminatetheirinventionstothosewhocan

productivelyadopttheminsocietyatlarge.Thus,thesuccessofpatentstatutesinthe

promotionofscientificprogresscanbeusefullyevaluatedonthebasisoftheneteffectsof

theIPsystem,bothforthosewhodirectlyadvancetheprogressofscience,andforthe

generalpopulace.Thereareundoubtedlybenefitsthataccruetomanypatentholdersasa

resultoftheirexchangeofideasformoney,asthereareplainlybenefitstosocietyinthe

formofpatentedmoderntechnologies.ThequestioniswhethertherewardsoftheIP

systemoutweighitscostsforallinventors(boththosewhoareIPholdersandthosewhose

inventionsarenotprotectedbyIP),andthesocietyandeconomyinwhichtheywork.(The

lattercanbeconsideredanextensionoftheformer:aseconomiesandsocietiesgrow,new

technologicalneedsariseandthusnewopportunitiesforinnovation.)Herewewilltakea

shortdetourtoexaminepreviousattemptstoanswerthisquestionempirically,aswellas

thetheoriesunderlyingIPsystems;thesewillhelpconstrainandmotivateourfinal

experiment.

Though"rights"canseemratherabstract,proxieshavebeendevelopedforstudying

thequantitativeeffectsofvariousfactorsonoveralleconomicgrowthincross‐national

econometricstudies,includingprotectionsforpropertyrights.Generally,traditional

propertyrights(thosegoverninge.g.objectsorrealestate)haveastrongandunambiguous

relationshipwithgrowth(Svejnar,2002;Keefer&Knack,1995,1997).ParkandGinarte

(1997)performedaregressionusingindicesof"marketfreedom"(i.e.traditionalproperty

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rights)aswellasIPrights,andconfirmedthattheformerhadastrongrelationshipwith

growth,butnotthelatter.Inafollow‐upstudy,GinarteandPark(1997)actuallyfound

evidenceforacorrelationbetween5‐yearlaggedR&DspendingandthestrengthofIP

rightsprotection,implyingthatinvestmentininnovationsledtothedevelopmentof

protectionsforthem("reversecausality").Incontrasttotraditionalpropertyrights,IP

rightsappeartohaveonlyanindirectorweakrelationshiptoeconomicgrowth;itmay

holdonlyforcertaingroupsofcountriesorcertainkindsofmeasures(Falvey,Foster,and

Greenaway,2006),andthecausaldirectionisunclear.

SeverallinesofresearchhavebeenpursuedtoaddressthequestionofwhetherIP

rightsarebeneficialforinventors(andtheiremployersandinvestors).Studiesof

innovationpriortoandduringthe19thcenturyshowedthatmanyinventionsmadetheir

inventorsenormousprofitsandwerejudgedtobehighlyinnovativedespitebeing

unpatentedorhavingtheirpatentsinvalidated(Mokyr,1999;Moser,2002).Bessenand

Meurer(2008)andBoldrinandLevine(2008)reviewedabroadrangeof"natural

economicexperiments"ondiscretechangesinthepatentlawsofvariouscountriesinthe

20thcentury.Theyfoundthat,overall,thereisstrongevidencethatstrengtheningpatent

protectionleadstomorepatenting(asinthe"reversecausality"notedabove),butweakor

noevidencethatitincreasesinnovation.Infact,intherealmofsoftwarepatents,firmsthat

acquiredrelativelymorepatentssubsequentlytendedtoreducetheirR&Dspending

relativetosales(Bessen&Hunt,2007).BoldrinandLevine(2008)describeincreasesin

patentingactivityas"navigatingthepatentthickets,"inwhichfirmsthatfearinfringement

lawsuitsfromas‐yet‐unknownpatenteesacquirepatentsstrictlyforthepurposeoffiling

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countersuitsandachievingsettlementswithouthavingtomodifytheirbusiness,thatis,to

avoidbeingforcedtoinnovatefurther.

BessenandMeurer(2008)examinedpatentrenewalbehaviorinordertoestimate

thevalueofpatentsapartfromtheirunderlyingtechnologies,andfoundthatnearly60%of

U.S.patentsfiledin1991werenotrenewedtofullterm,whichindicatesthatthemajority

ofpatentsfileddepreciatetoavaluelessthanthefewthousanddollarsoftheaverage

renewalfee.Asonemightexpect,thedistributionofpatentvaluesisskewed‐‐most

patentsareofrelativelylittlevalue,whileasmallnumberarequitevaluable.Avarietyof

measuresofpatentandinventionvalueadhereapproximatelytothe80‐20rule:80percent

ofthetotalvalueiscontainedin20percentoftheinventions(Harhoff,Scherer,&Vopel,

2003).BessenandMeurer(2005)foundthatgenerally,patentsgrantedtosmallinventors

(individuals,nonprofitsandcorporationswithlessthan500employees)aremuchless

valuablethanthosegrantedtolargerentities,about50%inthemean,andthedifference

betweenindividualsandorganizationsoverallisevengreater.Furthermore,theownership

ofthisvalueisfoundtoberatherlopsided:morethanhalfofthevalueofworldwide

patentsaccruestoasmallnumberoflargepharmaceuticalcompanies,andmorethantwo‐

thirdstofirmsinthechemicalandpharmaceuticalindustriesgenerally.

Overall,thereisstrongevidencethatpatentscandeliversignificantvalueto(some

of)theirowners,butthepatentsystemalsoimposescostsonpatentownersthrough

disputesovertherightstotheirinventions,aswellasonnonpatentinginventorsthrough

disputesrelatedtoinadvertentinfringementofothers'patents.Theprocessof"clearing"

rights(byeithermakingsurenotrespassoccursorobtainingalicense)isnotnecessarily

simpleformanypatents,becausetheboundariesofwhataninventiondoes,andbywhat

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processormethoditisdone,canbearcaneandopentocostlylegalinterpretation(Moore,

2005).BessenandMeurer(2005),aftercontrollingforawidevarietyofvariables,found

thatincreasedspendingonR&Disactuallycorrelatedwithanincreasedriskofbeingsued

forinfringement,whichsuggeststhatinfringementisoftennotwillful,andoccursdueto

difficultiesindeterminingpatentboundaries.Acomparisonofaggregatelitigationlosses

incurredbyasampleofdefendantpublicfirmsduringtheyearsof1984‐1999withthe

aggregateincrementalprofitsderivedbypublicfirmsduringthesameperiodshowedthat

outsideofthechemicalandpharmaceuticalindustries,thecostsoflitigationclearly

exceededprofitsfrompatents(Bessen&Meurer,2008).Thusoverall,thepatentsystem

appearstoconstituteanetdisincentiveforinnovation.

Theresultsnotedabovesuggestthatinitspresentform,thepatentsystemisnot

promotingtheprogressoftechnologicaladvancement;thatis,theequity,efficiency,and

sustainabilityoftheknowledgecommonsdonotappeartobeimprovedbythepatent

system.Thismaysimplybeduetostructuralshortcomingsofthesystem,remediableby

adjustmentstopatentlengthorbreadth(Gilbert&Shapiro,1990).However,theremay

alsobemoresubtleissuesregardingthemotivationalprinciplesandinterdependenciesof

innovatorsthatarenotbeingadequatelyaddressedbyexistingpatenttheory,law,and

institutions.

6.2.Prospectingforprogress

Themonopolygrantedbyapatentisexpectedtocause"deadweightloss,"a

reductioninmutualvalueforproducersandconsumersthatoccurswhenconsumerswho

arewillingtopaymorethanthemarginalproductioncostofagood,butlessthanthe

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patentee'smonopolyprice,arethuspreventedfrompurchasingthegood(Gilbert&

Shapiro,1990).Kitch(1977)introducedthe"prospecttheory"ofpatentstocommonlegal

usage,inwhichthecosttosocietyofdeadweightlossisexplicitlyjustifiedanddiscounted

byaperceivedneedtoincentivizenotjustcreationanddisclosureofinnovations,butalso

theirefficientmanagement.Kitchexpoundeduponthistheorywithananalogytothe

exploitationofmineralresourcesintheAmericanWest,buthewasrespondingtoBarzel's

(1968)callforasolutiontoacollectiveactionproblemamonginnovators.Barzelobserved

thatfirmswhowantedtousethe"freepublicgood"ofbasicscientificknowledgeto

produceinnovationsforcommercialuseeachhadanincentivetointroducesuch

innovationsassoonastheywereprofitable.Buthereasonedthatinnovators(andthus

societyatlarge)wouldcollectivelybebetteroffiffirmsdelayedtheintroductionof

innovationsuntilan"optimal"time,whenmarginalprofit(relativetoreliableoutside

investments)couldbemaximizedthroughthedevelopmentofsufficientproduction

capacityanddemand.InthesameyearasHardin's(1968)analysisoftheTragedyofthe

Commons,Barzel(1968)alsorecommendedenclosureoftheknowledgecommonsinthe

formofownershipofbasicknowledgeinordertopreventwhatheviewedasatragic

outcomeinitsuse.ButaswithHardin,theintellectualorigins,analogies,andassumptions

usedtounderstandthiscomplexsituationmustbecloselyexaminedforcluesastowhere

proposedsolutionsmaysucceedorfail.

Barzel'sanalysisofthis"optimal"usedependsonanumberofsimplifying

assumptions;forourpurposesthemostsalientarethat(a)innovationshaveaconstant

costandthuscanbeintroducedatanytime(ignoringthedynamicandcumulative

developmentofknowledge),(b)thereisonlyoneinnovatorassociatedwithagiven

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innovation(ignoringcollaborativeinnovationprocesses),(c)therearenobenefitsofthe

innovationpassedontotheconsumer(ignoringtheexistenceofexternalitiesor

"spillovers"(Frischmann&Lemley,2007)uncapturablebytheproducer,suchas"network

effects"(Katz&Shapiro,1985)),and(d)theparametersofthesystemarewidelyand

accuratelyknown(ignoringthecomplexanduncertainnatureofinnovation).Kitch(1977)

argued,amongotherthings,thattheU.S.patentsystemwasstructurallypredisposedto

"prospect"uses,andthatgrantingbroadandlong‐termpatentrightsonthebasisofthe

"prospect"forefficientintroductionandmanagementofaninnovation(ratherthanonthe

basisofthepreviously‐accepted"rewardtheory"ofsimplyincentivizingproductionand

disclosureofinnovations)wouldresultinanetpositiveforsociety.

Implicitinthisapproachareotherassumptionsaboutinnovatorsandtheir

motivations.Primarily,theaboveanalysestreatinnovationasanactivitythatispursued

onlybyfirmswhoproducegoodsforthepurposeofsellingthemtoendusers.Themining

analogyusedbyKitch(1977)impliesthatmostpracticalinventionsrequireagreatdealof

investmentintheextractionandprocessingofthe"ore"ofbasicknowledge,andthusthat

firmswithexclusiveclaimswillbethebestinformedandequippedtocreateandmanage

innovations.However,thehistoryoftechnologyshouldteachusthatpeoplearegenerally

notskilledatanticipatingtheusesofnewinventionsortheneedsoffutureusers(Boyle,

2007);inventionssuchasmobilephones,DVDplayers,andfinancialdatabasesoftware

haveresultedinavarietyofusesandamagnitudeofeconomicandsocialbenefits

unimaginableanduncapturablebytheircreators(Baumol,2002).Thoughprospecttheory

positsadecentralized,entrepreneurialimplementationofinnovationatlarge,itcentralizes

controlofanyparticularinnovationinonefirm.Inpractice,holdersofpatentscandelayor

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preventfutureinnovationsbyeitherrefusingtolicensetheirpatentstosubsequent

innovators,orchargingsufficientlyhighlicensingfeessothatsmallerinnovatorsare

preventedfromenteringthemarket(Merges&Nelson,1990).

Previousinventionscanaidinthecreationofnewinnovationseitheras“research

tools”thatenableafurtherinnovativestage,orasthebasisforanimprovedproduct(or

sequentialinnovation)onthe“qualityladder”(Hall,2007).Itisnotnecessarilythecase

thateithertheoriginalinnovatororonlythosewithdeep‐pocketedinvestorsarebest

suitedtoimproveuponoruseapreviousinnovationtocreateanother,butinsomecases

thesemaybetheonlyagentswhoareabletodoso.Additionally,innovatorsmaynothave

sufficientincentivetocreateorallowimprovementsontheiroriginalideas,iftheyfearthat

anewusewouldcompetewiththeoldone(Scotchmer,1991).Whenpreviousinnovations

necessaryforthecreationordevelopmentofanewinventionarepatentedbymultiple

parties,aphenomenoncalled“thetragedyoftheanticommons”canresult(Heller&

Eisenberg,1998).Inthissituation,thetragedyresultsnotfromalackofresourceoversight,

butfromanexcessofit;ownersoftechnologiesthatarecollectivelynecessaryforanew

innovationmayfailtoagreeonlicensingorrevenuesharingterms,andthusanyofthem

canvetofurtherprogress.

Tosummarize,wehaveseenthatpatentsystemsareintendedtoincentivizethe

creationanddisclosureofinnovations,aswellastheirefficientmanagement(undercertain

interpretations).Inpractice,however,patentscanalso(a)incentivizenon‐innovative

strategicorrent‐seekingbehavior,(b)reducetheincentivestocreateanddisclosethrough

theaccompanyingriskofcostlypatentlitigation,and(c)reducetheincentivetooptimally

managethroughpatentholders'abilitytodelayorprevent(butnotcaptureorprofitfrom)

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manypositiveexternalitiesoftheirpatentedinnovations.Theabovefactorsalsoconstitute

disincentivestoimitateandbuildsequentialimprovementsfromtheinnovationsofothers.

Returningtotheconceptofaknowledgecommons,theseproblemsaresignsofan

institutionwhichisfailingtoensurecontributionandpreventoverappropriationfroma

resource(theoverallpoolofexistingknowledge)byitscommunityofusers.Inthelong

term,suchflawsthreatentheviabilityoftheresource.

6.3.Balancingmotivations

Anotherareaofresearchinwhichtheadequacyofexclusioninfosteringinnovation

becomessuspectisthecurioustendencyofpeopletotreatextrinsicincentives(suchas

monetarypayment)andintrinsicorsocialmotivations(suchaspersonalsatisfactionor

socialapprobation)differently:asnon‐additive,mutuallyexclusive,orcompletely

incommensurable.Forexample,givenanactivitythatproducesintrinsicrewardssuchas

volunteerserviceorblooddonation,theofferofmonetaryrewardsmayactually"crowd

out"themotivationtopursuetheactivityandreduceitsoveralllevel.Thus,undercertain

circumstancesthepricemechanismforraisingthesupplyofgoods,oneofthefundamental

pillarsofeconomics,maynothold.Thestudyofthisphenomenonhasproducedalarge

bodyofworkinbotheconomics(e.g.Titmuss,1970;Frey&Jegen,2001)andsocial

psychology(e.g.Deci,1971;Deci,Koestner&Ryan,1999).

HeymanandAriely(2004)positedthatsocialandmonetaryrewardsaremediated

byseparate"markets,”andthattheycannotbemixed.Theyperformedexperimentsin

whichtheymeasuredtheeffortputforthinresponsetovaryinglevelsandtypesofrewards

offeredtoparticipantsforperformanceofatask.Itwasfoundthateffortwasconsistently

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highwhennorewardwasoffered,aswellaswhentokennon‐monetaryrewards(e.g.

candy)ofvaryingvaluewereoffered.Whencashwasofferedorthecashvalueofthenon‐

monetaryrewardswasmentioned,effortwasproportionaltothevalueofthereward

offered,andonlyapproachedthelevelreachedbynorewardsathighlevelsofmonetary

rewards.

FreyandJegen(2001)reviewedstudiesrelatedtothecrowding‐outeffectof

extrinsicrewardsonintrinsicmotivationsandfoundthatitwaspresentforavarietyof

norm‐relatedmotivationsandsettings:workeffortandreciprocityinsupplyinglabor,

altruisminserviceprovision,civicdutyandenvironmentalcareinmanagingacommon‐

poolresource,andtrustinlegalsystems.Deci,Koestner,andRyan(1999)performeda

meta‐analysisof128studiesonthiseffectandfoundthatawidevarietyofextrinsic

rewardsandrewardcriteriaunderminedintrinsicmotivationandinterestineffortful

tasks.

Thepresenceofsocialorintrinsicrewardsforsomecreativeandinnovativeactivity

isinasenseevidentbydefinition,fromthefactthatsuchbehaviorscontinueinamultitude

ofcontextswithoutanyexternalmonetaryreward,andeveninthepresenceofsubstantial

costs(e.g.varioushobbyistpursuits,amateurblogging,Wikipediacontributions,etc.)

Beyondthisevidence,theintrinsicmotivationsthatpeoplehaveforcreativeworkhave

alsobeenstudiedinsomedetailandavarietyofreasonsarefoundforparticipating:

curiosity,theenjoymentofchallengeornovelty,personalexpressionofvalues,buildingor

maintainingapositivereputationamongpeers,andsoforth(Lakhani&Wolf,2003).

Totheextentthatinnovatorsunderstandthedependenceoftheirworkonthatof

previousinnovators,andthatspilloverscanaccruetofellowinnovatorsandtosocietyat

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largeasaresultoftheirefforts,themotivationsofreciprocityandpublicbenefitsmaybe

includedinthislistofintrinsicmotivations.Inthiscase,theopportunitytoexcludeothers

frombuildinguponone'sworkmaybeunattractive.Totheextentthatextrinsicrewards

canunderminethesemotivationsforcertainkindsofwork,someinnovativeactivitymay

simplynotoccur,oronlyatagreaterrelativecost.

6.4.Othermodelsofinnovation

Theseflawspromptustoconsiderothermodelsofinnovationanditsgovernance.

Theassumptionsofthe"reward"and"prospect"theoriesofinnovationbyproducers

excludeimportantclassesofinnovators:individualsorfirmswhocreateinnovationsfor

theirowninternaluse,andthosewhoproduceinnovationsinopencollaborationwith

othersinordertoshareinthecostsoftheircreationandthebenefitsoftheiruse(Baldwin

&vonHippel,2009;Strandburg,2009).

Innovationscreatedbyindividualsorfirmsfortheirowninternaluse(ratherthan

forsellingtousersataprofit)needonlytoprovideenoughbenefittocovertheeffortof

producingthem.Thismeansthatsmall,incremental,orspecializedinnovationsthatmight

notjustifyinvestmentorproductionbyanon‐userfirmcanbecreatedwithoutthe

provisionofexternalincentives.Studiesinawidevarietyofindustriessuchaschemical

products(Freeman,1968),scientificinstrumentsandsemiconductors(VonHippel,1976,

1977),andsportingequipment(Shah,2000)haveshownthatalargeproportionof

importantandnovelproductsandprocessesweredevelopedbyusers,andthatsubstantial

proportionsofusersengageindevelopingormodifyingproductstheyuse(Gault&von

Hippel,2009).Moreover,userinnovatorsoften"freelyreveal"(relinquishexclusiverights

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andallowgeneralaccessto)theirinnovations(Harhoff,Henkel,&vonHippel,2003).They

dothisbothtoavoidthecostsanddifficultyofexcludingothersthroughIPrights(as

discussedabove)ortradesecrecy,andtotakeadvantageofprivatebenefitssuchasaccess

tothesequentialimprovementsofothers,reputationenhancement,orpositivenetwork

effectsresultingfromincreaseduseoftheirinnovation(Harhoff,Henkel,&vonHippel,

2003).However,userinnovatorscanalsomaintainsomeIPrightsandpursueotherlegal

measuresforthepurposeofavoidingexpropriationoftheirefforts(O'Mahony,2003).

Thisconceptcanbetakentoanotherlevelinopencollaborativeinnovation,in

whichagroupofusersactivelyrevealandcoordinatetheircreativecontributionstoeach

otherforintegrationinalarger‐scaleproject,effectivelypoolingtheirinvestmentswith

assurancesthatallwillshareintherewards.Suchprocessesareinusemostrecentlyand

visiblyinopen‐sourcesoftwaredevelopment(Benkler,2002),butthismodelof

developmenthasbeenusedinotherindustriesformanyyears(Allen,1983).Open‐source

contributorsdosobecausetheywanttoincluderatherthanexcludeothersfromtheuseof

theircontributions,oftenfornormativereasonsrelatedtothecultureofopen‐source

software,orforprivatebenefitssuchasthosementionedabove(Lerner,Tirole,&Pathak,

2006).Advancesincomputingpowerhaveenabledlargereductionsindesignand

developmentcostsforuserinnovation,andrelatedadvancesinnetworkedcommunication

andcollaborationsoftwarehaveloweredbarriersforthecoordinationofcontributionsin

collaborativeprojects(Benkler,2002).Thesedevelopments,alongwiththeincentivesthat

suchactivitiesprovideforbothinnovationandimitation(andrelatedsequential

innovationsandotherspillovers),makeitincreasinglyattractiveasamodeofscientificand

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generalacademicpractice(Boyle,2007;Lougee,2007),aswellasmoresociallyoptimal

governanceofknowledge(Baldwin&vonHippel,2009).

6.5.Testingmodelsofincentivesandprogress

ThecomplexityofIPsystemsaswellastheirlargepotentialimpactoneconomic,

technological,andculturaloutcomesinsocietymakesthemfertilebreedinggroundsfor

theoriesaboutunderlyingissuessuchasincentives,conformity,creativity,theoptimal

balancingofindividualandcommoninterests,thenatureandstructureofknowledge,and

ahostofotherissues;thesetheoriesbynecessitycrossdisciplinaryboundariesoflaw,

politicalscience,economics,psychology,andphilosophy.Thepurposeofexperimentsin

understanding"intellectualproperty"andthepromotionofintellectualdiscovery,asinany

othersystem,istosimplifytheissuesathandinordertoshowmoreclearlyhowthey

operateandinteract,andinsodoing,topointoutwhatisnotwellunderstoodforfurther

study.

Thepreviousexperimentsinthisdissertationcanbeconceptuallycomparedtoopen

collaborativedevelopment,becauseeveryparticipant'scandidatesolutionsand(exceptin

onecondition)informationabouttheirperformanceareavailableforusebyothersinthe

group,withnocostorhindrance(thoughparticipantsdidnothaveachoiceinthematter).

However,therewardsforgoodandbadperformancearemateriallythesame‐‐course

creditwastheonlycompensationgiventoallparticipants.Wewishedtotesttheeffectofa

changetotheincentivesinthiscontextbypayingparticipantsasmallcashrewardbased

ontheirperformance,aswellasimplementingaverybasicandlimitedpatent‐likesystem.

Inthissystem,eachparticipantwouldbeallowed,atacertaincostandforalimitedtime,to

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automaticallychargeotherswhocopytheirinnovations.Thepreviouslyexistingincentives

forinnovation(thepossibilityofreceivingthebenefitofanimprovedsolution)wouldbe

enhancedbythepaymentsthatsuccessfulinnovatorscouldgetfortheirsolutions;the

previouslyexistingincentivesforimitationwouldbereducedbythepaymenttothe

imitatedplayer.

Thischangewouldostensiblyincreasetheuseofinnovation,whichcouldresultin

thediscoveryofbettersolutions,whichcouldbecopiedbyotheruserswhilerewarding

originators.Butweknowfrompreviousexperimentsthatinnovationisrisky,andthegains

ofimprovementscanbecanceledoutbypoorer‐performingsolutionsdiscoveredinthe

process.Wealsoknowfromtheseexperimentsthatcumulativeimprovementsare

importanttothecollectiveperformanceofgroups‐‐ifthischangecausedlessefficient

imitationorlessuseofimitationoverall,thegainsachievedbysuccessfulinnovatorscould

failtopropagateandbearfruitinsequentialimprovements.Thereisalsotheriskthat

competitivemotivationsamongparticipantscouldleadtoexcessivepatentingto

intentionallykeepothersfromimitation,withoutregardtopotentialinnovatorgainsvia

transfersfromimitators.

Previouslaboratoryexperimentsbyothersregardingtheconsequencesofdifferent

systemsfordistributingandrewardingknowledgeproductiondonotgiveusreasonfor

confidenceintheperformanceofexclusionarypatentsystems.Onesuchstudycompared

"patent‐like”(winner‐take‐all,accordingtofirstdiscoveryofthebestsolutionelements)

and"market‐based"rewardsystems(inwhichparticipantscanbuyandsellsharesin

solutioncomponents,effectivelymakingbetsonthesuccessoftheirsolutions)forgroups

attemptingtosolvetheKnapsackProblem,andshowedsubstantiallyinferiorperformance

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forthepatent‐likesystem(Meloso,Copic,&Bossaerts,2009).Anotherexperimentusinga

multi‐userinventiongametaskshowedthatboth“patent‐only”andmixed"patentand

commons"systemsofcumulativeinventionunderperformeda"commons‐only"systemon

severalmeasures,includinginnovation,productivity,andsocietalutility(Torrance&

Tomlinson,2009).

Wewilldiscusstheseexperimentsfurtherinthenextchapterincomparisonwith

ourownresultsinExperiment4.Inthisexperiment,wehavenotattemptedtoapproach

thelevelofversimilitudetorealpatentsystemsseenintheabovementionedstudies,

becauseweareinterestedintheeffectsofchangingincentivesongeneralizedsearchtasks,

andnotnecessarilyinallofthespecificdetailsofaparticularpotentialpatentsystem.We

expectthattheresultsofthisexperimentwillhavesomerelevancetopatentsystems,as

wellasothersituationsinwhichenvironmentalorinstitutionalfactorschangethe

incentivesofthosewhoexplore.ThegoalsforExperiment4aretocontinueourstudyof

thebasicmechanicsanddynamicsofsociallearningseeninthepreviousexperiments,by

examininghowtheyareinfluencedbyconcreteanddifferentialrewardsfordifferent

searchstrategies,andhowindividual‐levelprocessesaffectgroup‐levelresults.

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7.Experiment4–CreatureGameC(paymentandprotection)

7.1.Experiment4Overview

ThetaskusedinthisexperimentwasthesameasinExperiment3,withfourmajor

changes:(1)inhalfofthegamesineachexperimentsession,weallowedparticipantsto

forfeitasmallnumberofpointsto“protect”theirguessessothatotherswhousedthesame

guess(oranyverysimilarguess)wereforcedtopayasmallnumberofpointstothe

protector;(2)welengthenedthetimeofeachroundslightly,sothatparticipantswould

havesufficienttimetotakenoteofwhethertheirguesswasprotectedbyanotherplayer

andchangeitiftheywished,andthenumberofgamesineachexperimentsessionwas

decreased,inordertofitthesessionintheallottedtime;(3)participantsreceivedasmall

cashpaymentaccordingtothenumberofpointstheyearnedinthegame;(4)participants

filledoutapost‐tasksurveyabouttheirperceptionsofthetask,andtheirownstrategies

andperformance.

Modification(1)allowedfortheexaminationofdifferencesinstrategiesand

performanceassociatedwithchangingtheincentivesforasocialandsociallearning.

Modification(2)wasintendedtoavoidnoiseinthedataassociatedwithunintendedor

hurriedchoices.Modification(3)allowedfortheexaminationofbehavioraldifferences

(frompreviousexperiments)associatedwithextrinsicmonetaryrewards.Modification(4)

offeredfurtherinsightintothemotivationsandjudgmentsofparticipants,whichcouldbe

correlatedwiththeirbehaviorinthetask.

7.1.1.Predictions

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Inthegameswherethe“protection”featurewasunavailable,weexpectedlittle

changeinbehaviorandonlyasmallimprovementinperformance(comparedtothevisible‐

scoresconditionofExperiment3)duetothesmalladditionaltimeperroundandthe

expectationofcashrewards.Whentheprotectionfeaturewasavailable,weexpected

differencesinresultscomparedtowhenitwasnotavailable.Thepossibilityofreceiving

additionalpointsfromimitatorswaspredictedtocauseparticipantstoinnovatemorein

ordertofindrelativelyhighscoringsolutions,andthosewithhighscoringsolutionswould

tendtoprotectthemwhenpossible.Thoughthe“fee”forusingaprotectedsolutionwasset

quitelowrelativetotheaveragescoreearnedinasingleround,weexpectedthat

participantswouldavoidimitatingprotectedsolutions,thusreducingimitationbehavior

overall,anddirectingalargershareofimitationtounprotectedlower‐scoringsolutions.

SimilartoExperiment3,thiswasexpectedtoreduceorreversesociallearningbiasessuch

asfrequencyandsimilaritybias.Thecombinationofthesetwoinfluenceswouldslow

convergenceofsolutions,andkeepguessdiversityrelativelyhigh.Asforperformance,we

expectedthattheextraincentivetoexplorewouldresultinhighermaximumscores,but

thelargenumberoflowerscoresencounteredintheprocess,aswellasthedisincentiveto

builduponthe(protected)bettersolutionsfoundthroughthisincreaseinexploration

wouldlowersearchefficiency,thusmakingmeanperformancethesameorlowerthan

whenprotectionwasunavailable.

7.2.Experiment4Methods

159participantswererecruitedfromtheIndianaUniversityPsychology

Departmentundergraduatesubjectpool,andwereofferedcoursecreditfortakingpartin

147

thestudy,aswellasasmallcashpaymentaccordingtotheirperformance(meanpayment

wasapproximatelythreedollars).Participantspopulatedeachsessionbysigningupatwill

forscheduledexperimentswithamaximumcapacityof9persons,andweredistributed

across45sessionsasshowninTable7.1.Oneparticipant’sdata(fromoneofthe8‐person

sessions)wasexcludedduetoextremelyoutlyingperformance.

Table7.1:DistributionofparticipantsacrossgroupsizesinExperiment3

Groupsize 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

#Sessions 14 8 3 4 5 4 3 2 2

#Participants 14 16 9 16 25 24 21 16 18

Thetaskusedwasnearlyidenticaltothatofthevisible‐scoresconditionin

Experiment3,withthefollowingchanges.

Protectionavailability:inhalfofthegamesineachsession(theprotectionavailable

orPAcondition),participantswerepresentedwithachoiceforsevensecondsattheendof

eachround(justafterlearningthescoreassociatedwiththeirsolution)toforfeitfour

points(approximately.042intermsofnormalizedscore)to“protect”thesolution(ifthey

madenoselectionwhilethechoicewasavailable,thedefaultwasnottoprotect).Forthe

nextthreeroundsafterasolutionwasprotected,anyotherplayerwhoused(attheendof

theround)asolutionwithinoneelementdifferenceoftheprotectedsolutionwould

automaticallytransfertwopoints(approximately.021innormalizedscore)tothe

protector.Solutionswithinoneelementdifferenceofaprotectedsolutioncouldnotbe

protected.

148

Theprotectionfeeandusefee,respectively,wereintentionallysetatfairlylow

valuesinordertoensurethatthecostfortheseoptionswouldbevisiblebutwouldnot

undulydiscourageparticipantsfromusingthem,orexcessivelywarpincentivestoward

oneoptionortheother.Thewordingoftheoptionspresentedtoparticipantsattheendof

eachroundisshowninAppendix7.A.Weensuredthatparticipantsunderstoodthese

optionswithadditionalinstructionsandhands‐ondemonstrationsbeforedatagathering

began.Inordertoensurethatparticipantswereawareofthedecisionstheymade

concerningtheuseofprotectedteamsduringeachround,anypeers’teamsthatwere

currentlyprotectedwereshownwiththeirbackgroundhighlightedinbrightred.In

addition,whenaparticipantchangedtheirteamsuchthatitwasprotectedbyanother

player,itsbackgroundwasalsohighlightedinbrightred,andthemessage“Protectedby

anotherplayer”wasshownaboveit(thesenotificationsoccurredassoonasthechange

wasmade,notattheendoftheround).Ineachround,werecordedwhethereach

participantprotectedhisorherteamorusedanother’sprotectedteam,andhowmany

others(ifany)usedtheplayer’sprotectedteam.Intheotherhalfofthegamesineach

session(theprotectionunavailableorPUcondition),theprotectionoptionwasnot

availabletoparticipants,andgameswereplayedastheywereintheScoresVisible

conditionfromExperiment3.Gameswereplayedinarandomorderineachsession.

Longerroundsandfewergames:togiveparticipantssufficienttimetoevaluatethis

choiceandchangetheirguessesifdesiredintheprotectionavailablecondition,andtobe

abletoproperlycomparebehaviorbetweenconditions,welengthenedeachroundfrom10

to15secondsinbothconditions.Becauseofthelongerrounds(includingtheadditional

secondsgiventomaketheprotectionchoiceaftereachround),additionalpracticetimefor

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thenewgamefeatures,andthepost‐tasksurvey(discussedbelow),wereducedthe

numberofgamesineachexperimentsessionfromsixtofourtofitthesessionintheone‐

hourtimelimitrequiredforexperimentsusingoursubjectpool.Ofcourse,thedistinction

betweengamesintheprotectionavailableandprotectionunavailableconditionsonly

matteredinsessionsthatincludedmorethanoneparticipant,butroundsandsessions

wereidenticalinlengthforallparticipantgroupsizes.

Payment:participantswereinformedbeforeeachsessionthattheywouldreceivea

smallcashpaymentof“afewdollars”whichwouldvaryaccordingtothetotalnumberof

pointstheyearnedindividuallyduringthesession.Wesetthepaymentperpoint

($0.00086)accordingtothedistributionofscoresfromExperiment3,suchthatthemean

paymentwouldbeapproximately$3.00.

Post­tasksurvey:wedeviseda10‐itemquestionnaireforparticipantstocomplete

afterthefinalgameineachsessioninordertogatherself‐reportdataonparticipants’

attitudesandjudgmentsaboutthetaskandtheirstrategies,whichincluded8multiple‐

choicequestionswithresponseoptionsonaLikertscale,andtwofree‐responseitems.The

fulltextofthesurveyisshowninAppendix7.B.

Thedistributionofindividualpointvaluesandinteractionsfortheiconswasthe

sameasinExperiment3,andscoreswereagainnormalizedfrom[‐6,88]to[0,1]foreaseof

analysis.Notethatbecausethenormalizationdidnotincludetheincreasedrangepossible

fromthetransferofprotection‐relatedfees,itwaspossiblefornormalizedscorestogo

beyond[0,1],butthisdidnotoccur.Unadjustedscorereferstovalueswhichdonotinclude

thesubtractionofprotectionorusefeespaidortheadditionofusefeesreceived,

correspondingtotheplainvalueofthesolutionaccordingtoitselements;adjustedscore

150

referstothesamevalueswiththeabovefeesaddedorsubtracted(whenpresent).All

analysesofscorewillrefertounadjustedscoreexceptwherenoted;ingeneraltherewere

nodifferencesbetweenresultsforadjustedandunadjustedscores.

7.3.Experiment4Results

7.3.1Overallmeans

MeandependentvariablesineachconditionareshowninTable7.2(seealsoFig.

7.1).Forgroupedparticipants,meanoverallandfinalscoresineachconditionwerenearly

identicaltoeachotherandtothoseobservedinthevisible‐scoresconditioninExperiment

3.Onaverage,minimumscoreswerelowerandmaximumscoreswerehigherinthe

protectionavailablecondition,butneitherdifferencewassignificant.Isolatedparticipants

achievedslightlyhighermeanoverallandfinalscoresthanthoseinExperiment3.

Figure7.1:Distributionofscoresforallpossibleteams.

151

Table7.2:Meanscore,guessdiversity,andchoicesourceproportionsbycondition

(PU:ProtectionUnavailable,PA:ProtectionAvailable)

Cond.OverallScore(Percentile)

FinalScore(Percentile)

GuessDiversity

Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval

PU .451(93.3%) .525(97.5%) 60.1%* 6.9%* 14.6%* 75.6%* 2.2%

PA .446(92.6%) .530(97.5%) 65.9%* 6.2%* 17.8%* 72.9%* 2.3%

IsolatedPartic. .376(86.1%) .466(94.0%) ‐‐ ‐‐ 26.1% 61.0% 12.2%

*significantdifferencesbetweenconditions

7.3.2.Rounds

Linearmixed‐effectsmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossroundsforscore

andguessdiversity,witharandomeffectofparticipantgroup.Analysisofscoreversus

roundshowedverysimilarpositivetrendsforgroupedparticipantsineachcondition(PU:

F(1,712)=208.87,p<.0001,B=.627;PA:F(1,712)=283.72,p<.0001,B=.670).Isolated

participants’scoresincreasedsignificantlyacrossroundsaswell,butsignificantlylessso

thanforgroupedparticipants(F(1,657)=95.52,p<.0001,B=.498,meanincrease=0.150;see

Fig.5.4).Guessdiversityshowedcorrespondingdecreasesacrossroundsinboth

conditions(PU:F(1,712)=169.33,p<.0001,B=‐0.458;PA:F(1,712)=165.94,p<.0001,B=‐

.485;seeFig.7.2).

152

Figure7.2:Scoresincreasedandguessdiversitydecreasedataboutthesameratewhether

protectionwasavailableorunavailable.

Trendsforchoicesourcesacrossroundsshowedverysimilarpatternstothosein

Experiments2and3,withapproximatelythesamemagnitudeandsignificance:Imitation

andInnovationdecreasedsignificantlyoverrounds,andRetrievalandRetentionincreased

significantly.Therewasnosignificantdifferenceinslopeforanychoicesourcebetween

conditions,norasubstantialdifferenceincomparisontotheslopeoverroundsforeach

choicesourcefoundinExperiment3.Protectiondecreasedacrossrounds(F(1,712)=17.54,

p<.0001,B=‐0.170),whileuseofprotectedteamsincreased(F(1,712)=49.26,p<.0001,

B=0.331;seeFig.7.3).

153

Figure7.3:Protectiondecreasedacrossrounds,whileuseofprotectedteamsincreased.

7.3.3.Gameorder

Similarlinearmixed‐effectsmodelswereusedtoexaminetrendsacrossgameorder

foreachdependentvariablewithinconditions.Forthisanalysis,thegameordervaluefor

eachgamewascorrectedtoitsorderwithinthecondition,i.e.Game1or2ineach

condition.Scoreshowednosignificantchangeacrossgameorderineithercondition,and

guessdiversitydisplayedadecreaseacrossgameorderinbothconditions(PU:

F(1,30)=5.94,p=.021;PA:F(1,30)=4.76,p=.037;seeFig.7.5).Therewerenosignificant

changesacrossgameorderforanychoicesourceineithercondition(seeFig.7.5).

Withintheprotectionavailablecondition,protectiondecreasedacrossgameorder

(F(1,26)=9.79,p=.0043,B=‐0.217,meanchg.=‐0.020),butuseofprotected teamsdidnot

changesignificantly.

154

Figure7.4:Scoredidnotchangesignificantlyineithercondition,andguessdiversity

decreasedinbothconditions.

(a) (b)

Figure7.5:(a)ImitationandInnovationdidnotshowsignificantchangesacrossgame

orderineithercondition,nordid(b)RetentionorRetrieval.

155

Figure7.6:Protectiondecreasedsignificantlyacrossgameorder,whileuseofprotected

teamsshowednosignificantchange.

7.3.4.Groupsize

Trendsacrossparticipantgroupsizeforeachdependentvariablewithinconditions

wereexaminedusinglinearmixed‐effectsmodels,withtheparticipantgroupusedasa

randomeffectontheintercept.Slopesacrossgroupsizedidnotshowdifferencesbetween

conditionsforanydependentvariable,exceptwherenoted.Scoreincreasedsignificantly

withgroupsizeinbothconditions(PU:F(1,43)=27.19,p<.0001,B=0.512;PA:

F(1,43)=36.69,p<.0001,B=0.568;seeFig.7.7),andguessdiversityshoweda

correspondingdecreaseinbothconditions(PU:F(1,29)=28.96,p<.0001,B=‐0.661;PA:

F(1,29)=34.48,p<.0001,B=‐0.672;seeFig.7.7).Asforchoicesources,Imitationincreased

significantlyforlargergroupsinbothconditions(PU:F(1,29)=37.72,p<.0001,B=0.680;PA:

F(1,29)=37.20,p<.0001,B=0.699;seeFig.7.8a),whileInnovationdecreasedsignificantly

156

onlyintheprotectionavailablecondition(F(1,29)=8.94,p=.006,B=‐0.437;seeFig.7.8a).

NeitherRetentionnorRetrievalshowedsignificantchangesacrossgroupsize(seeFig.

7.8b).

Protectiondidnotshowasignificanttrendacrossgroupsize,whileuseofprotected

teamsincreasedinlargergroups(F(1,29)=37.45,p<.0001,B=0.751;seeFig.7.9).

Figure7.7:Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,meanscoresinagroupincreased,andthe

diversityofofferedsolutionsdecreased.

157

(a) (b)

Figure7.8:Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,(a)meanproportionsofImitationincreased

inbothconditionsandInnovationdecreasedonlyintheprotectionavailablecondition,and

(b)RetentionandRetrievalshowednosignificantchange.

Fig.7.9:Asparticipantgroupsizeincreased,protectiondidnotchangesignificantly,butuse

ofprotectedteamsincreased.

158

7.3.5.Differencesinimitation

Acrossbothconditions,approximately94.7%ofallguessesincludingImitation

wereofasingleparticipant.Atthetimeofsuchsingle‐sourceimitations,thescoreofthe

imitatedparticipantwasgreaterthanthatoftheimitatorinapproximately90%ofcasesin

bothconditions(seeFig.7.10a).Ofallinstancesofsingle‐participantimitation,the

probabilityofimitatingthetop‐scoringsolutioninthegroupwassignificantlyhigherinthe

protectionunavailableconditionthantheprotectionavailablecondition(t(34)=5.27,

p<.0001;seeFig.7.10b).Ananalysisoftheprobabilityofprotectionacrossscorerank

showedthatthebesttwosolutionspresentinanygivenroundwerenearlyalways

protected(seeFig.7.10c).

Toexamineseparatelyhowoftenandhowmuchparticipantsimitatedoneanother,

wemeasuredthemeanincidenceofguessesinwhichtherewasgreaterthanzeroImitation

(Imitationincidence),aswellasthemeanuseofImitationinthosecaseswhereitwas

greaterthanzero(Imitationproportion).MeanImitationincidencewassignificantlyhigher

intheprotectionunavailablecondition(0.205vs.0.162;F(1,92)=19.37,p<.0001),but

meanImitationproportionwaslower(0.341vs.0.390;F(1,89)=7.28,p=.008),andthe

distributionofmeanimitationproportionswasweightedslightlybutsignificantlymore

heavilytowardhighervaluesintheprotectionavailablecondition,asshownbya

Kolmogorov‐Smirnofftestofequalityofdistributions(D=0.1116,p<.0001;seeFig.7.11).

Inotherwords,participantsintheprotectionavailableconditioncopiedoneanotherless

frequentlybutinlargeramountsatatime.

159

(a) (b)

(c)

Figure7.10:(a)Therewerestrongbiasestowardimitatingbetter‐scoringparticipantsthan

oneselfinbothconditions,and(b)asignificantlystrongerbiastowardimitatingthebest‐

scoringparticipantintheprotectionunavailableconditionthanintheprotectionavailable

condition;and(c)arelatedanalysisshowedthatthebesttwosolutionsinanygivenround

werehighlylikelytobeprotected.

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Figure7.11:ForguessesthatincludedatleastsomeImitation,participantsinthe

protectionavailableconditionhadhigherproportionsofImitationintheirguesses.

5.3.6.Choicesourcestrategy

AsinExperiment2,thechoicesourcesofeachnon‐isolatedparticipantoverthe

entiresessionwereanalyzed,andeachparticipant’schoicesourcestrategywascategorized

accordingtotheirproportionofeachsource.Participantswhosechoicescontainedone

sourceinanaverageproportiongreaterthantheglobalaverageforthatsourceplusone

standarddeviation,werelabeledwiththatstrategy.Forexample,aplayerwhoseguesses

overthecourseofasessionconsistedofagreaterproportionofImitatechoicesthanthe

averageforallotherparticipantsintheexperiment,plusonestandarddeviation,were

labeledashavinganoverallstrategyof“Imitate.”Thosewhofittheabovecriteriaformore

thanonechoicesource,ornone,werelabeledashavinga“Mixed”strategy.Thescore

distributionforeachstrategycategoryineachconditionisshowninFig.7.12.

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(a) (b)

Figure7.12:Scorevs.choicesourcestrategyin(a)protectionunavailableand(b)

protectionavailableconditions,showingthataconservativehigh‐Retentionstrategy

resultedinthebestperformanceinbothconditions,thoughhighlyImitativestrategiesalso

performedwell.

Alinearregressionofmeanindividualscorevs.meanindividualImitationguess

proportionshowedasignificantpositiverelationship(thatis,thegreateraparticipant’s

averageproportionofImitation,thebettertheparticipant’sscore)inbothconditions(PU:

F(1,142)=7.91,p=.006,B=0.230;PA:F(1,142)=3.96,p=.048,B=0.165;seeFig.7.13a).The

oppositewastrueforindividualscorevs.Innovation,whichdisplayedasignificant

negativerelationshipinbothconditions(PU:F(1,142)=120.30,p<.0001,B=‐0.677;PA:

F(1,142)=98.01,p<.0001,B=‐0.639;seeFig.7.13b).Apositiverelationshipheldfor

Retentioninbothconditions(PU:F(1,142)=56.24,p<.0001,B=0.533;PA:F(1,142)=53.38,

p<.0001,B=0.523;seeFig.7.13c).Finally,anegativerelationshipwasfoundforRetrievalin

162

bothconditions(PU:F(1,142)=4.88,p=.029,B=‐0.182;PA:F(1,142)=7.15,p=.008,B=‐

0.219;seeFig.7.13d).

AsinExperiment2,analysesofmeangroupscorevs.meangroupguessproportion

foreachchoicesourceshowedsimilarrelationshipsofthesamesignificanceanddirections

asthosenotedabove.Analysesofmeanindividualscorevs.meangroup(excludingthe

individual)guessproportionshowedsimilarrelationshipsaswell,withtheexceptionofthe

absenceofsignificantrelationshipsforRetentionorRetrieval.Plotsoftheseareomittedfor

clarity.Alltrendsnotedaboveweregenerallymonotonic;thatis,therewerenothresholds

orinflectionpointsbeyondwhichtherelationshipschanged.

Similaranalysesofprotectionshowednosignificantrelationshipwithscorefor

individuals(seeFig.7.14a),orattheothertwolevelsdiscussedabove(groupand

individualvs.groupothers),whilescorevs.useofprotectedteamsshowedasignificant

positiverelationshipforindividuals(F(1,142)=67.42,p<.0001,B=0.567;seeFig.7.14b),as

wellasforgroups(F(1,60)=72.99,p<.0001,B=0.740),andforindividualscoreversus

protectionbyothersinthegroup,excludingtheindividual(F(1,142)=40.86,p<.0001,

B=0.471).Allofthesamerelationshipswerefoundforbothadjustedandunadjustedscore.

Plotsoftheseareomittedforclarity.

163

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure7.13:Higherindividualscoreswereassociatedwith(a)higherindividualImitation,

(b)lowerInnovation,(c)higherRetention,and(d)lowerRetrieval.

164

(a) (b)

Figure7.14:(a)Protectionshowednosignificantrelationshipwithscore,while(b)higher

useofprotectedteamswasassociatedwithhigherscores.

7.3.7.Improvements

Asinpreviousexperiments,improvementsweretalliedforeachparticipantineach

sessionandcondition.Histogramsofnormalizedimprovementshareinbothconditions

showedalessequitabledistributionofimprovementswithingroups(moreparticipants

withzeroimprovements,andfewerwithsharesnear1)relativetothescores‐visible

conditioninExperiment3(compareFigs.7.15and5.13).AKolmogorov‐Smirnofftestof

equalityofdistributionsindicatedthatthedistributionsineachconditionwerenot

significantlydifferent.However,theuppertailofthedistributionwasessentiallyshifted

upwards(i.e.thehighestimprovementsharesinthePUconditionwerereplacedbyeven

highersharesinthePAcondition),thoughthehighestachieversineachconditionwere

entirelydifferentsetsofindividuals.Meanoverallscorealsoshowedastrongpositive

165

correlationwithimprovementshareinthePAcondition(F(1,112)=49.98,p<.0001,

B=0.348),butthisrelationshipwasnotevidentinthePUcondition.

Themeanchoicesourceproportionsforguessesthatresultedinscore

improvementsandthosethatdidnotareshowninTable7.3.Intheprotectionunavailable

condition,guessesthatyieldedimprovementshadhigherInnovation(t(417)=‐9.78,

p<.0001)andlowerRetention(t(395)=6.01,p<.0001)relativetonon‐improvements.Inthe

protectionavailablecondition,therewashigherImitation(t(549)=‐2.78,p=.006),lower

Innovation(t(574)=2.86,p=.004),andlowerRetrieval(t(682)=3.37,p=.0008)for

improvementsthannon‐improvements.Ofallimprovements,aboutthesameproportionin

eachconditionresultedfromguessesthatincludedImitation(PU:.252vs.PA:.224).

In51.2%ofimprovementsintheprotectionunavailableconditionand43.9%inthe

protectionavailablecondition,thefocalplayerimitatedatleastonepeerwhohad

previouslyimitatedthefocalplayer.Inotherwords,aplayerwhowasimitatedbyanother

playeroftenlaterimitatedthatsameplayerinthecourseofcreatinganimprovement,and

thishappenedmoreoftenwhenprotectionwasunavailable.

166

Figure7.15:Histogramsshowingdistributionsofimprovementswithingroupsineach

condition.

Table7.3:Meanchoicesourceproportionsforimprovementandnon‐improvement

guessesineachcondition.

Condition Improvement %ofguesses Imitation Innovation Retention RetrievalNo 94.7% 7.9% 13.6%* 75.7%* 2.0%PU Yes 5.3% 9.1% 20.1%* 69.0%* 1.7%No 92.5% 7.0%* 16.8%* 73.0% 2.3%PA Yes 7.5% 10.0%* 14.4%* 73.9% 1.3%

*significantdifferencesbetweenimprovementsandnon­improvementswithin

condition

7.3.8.Guesssimilarity

Acomparisonbetweenthemeansimilarityofparticipants’mostrecentguessesto

thosewhomtheyimitated,andtothosewhomtheydidnotimitate,revealedslightbut

significantdifferencesinbothconditions.Intheprotectionunavailablecondition,there

167

weresimilarityvaluesof.576forimitatedvs..545fornon‐imitatedguesses(t(2511)=‐2.90,

p=.0037;seeFig.7.16a).Inthescores‐invisiblecondition,thereweresimilarityvaluesof

.491forimitatedvs..457fornon‐imitatedguesses(t(2051)=‐3.18,p=.0014;seeFig.7.16b).

Inotherwords,priortoimitation,theaverageimitators’guesswasmoresimilartothatof

theimitatedparticipant(s)thantothoseofothersintheprotectionunavailablecondition,

andthisrelationwasfoundbutwasslightlylessprominentintheprotectionavailable

condition.

(a) (b)

Figure7.16:(a)Intheprotectionunavailablecondition,imitators’previousguesses

showedgreatersimilaritytotheguessestheyimitatedthantothosetheydidnotimitate,

while(b)inthescores‐invisiblecondition,asimilarbutweakereffectwasobserved.

7.3.9Frequencyandmomentumbias

AsinExperiment1,wemeasuredthebiasofparticipantstochooseanicon

accordingtoitsfrequencyinpeers’choices.Toreiteratebriefly,wemeasuredthemean

168

probabilityofImitationandInnovationforanyiconnotalreadyincludedonaplayer’s

team,basedonthefrequencyofitsappearanceonpeers’teamsintheplayer’sdisplay,and

comparedthemtoexpectedchancebaselines.

Linearmixed‐effectsanalysisofimitationprobabilityversuschoicefrequency

showedapositivefrequency‐dependentImitationbiasthatwassignificantlygreaterthan

chanceintheprotectionunavailablecondition(F(1,258)=355.39,p<.0001,B=.722),but

significantlylowerthanchanceintheprotectionavailablecondition(F(1,258)=387.81,

p<.0001,B=.714;seeFig.7.17a);bothbecameapparentathighervaluesofchoice

frequencythaninExperiment3.Thereweresimilarpositivefrequency‐dependent

Innovationbiasesabovechanceinbothconditions(PU:F(1,258)=133.15,p<.0001,B=.517;

PA:F(1,258)=192.79,p<.0001,B=.601;seeFig.7.17b).

Wealsorepeatedtheanalysisof“choicemomentum,”bytallyingthechangeinthe

numberofplayerswhoseteamsincludedtheiconintheprevioustworounds,aswellas

thenumberoftheremainingplayerswhoaddedittotheirteaminthecurrentroundvia

ImitationorInnovation,andnormalizingforgroupsize.Afterlog‐transformingthe

Imitationprobabilitydatatoachieveanormaldistribution,t‐testsofImitationprobability

fornegativeandpositivechangesinchoicefrequencyshowedsimilarsignificantpositive

momentumbiasesinbothconditions(PU:t(304)=‐8.66,p<.0001;PA:t(299)=7.76,

p<.0001;seeFig.7.18a).SlightpositivemomentumbiaseswerealsofoundforInnovation

inbothconditions(PU:t(385)=‐3.40,p=.0007;PA:t(346)=‐5.54,p<.0001;seeFig.7.18b).

169

(a) (b)

Figure7.17:(a)Therewerebiasestowardchoosingelementsthatweremorefrequently

representedonotherteamsintheprotectionunavailablecondition,andlessfrequently

representedonotherteamsintheprotectionavailableconditionforImitationand(b)

biasestowardmorefrequentelementsforInnovationdecisionsinbothconditions.

(a) (b)

Figure7.18:Therewerebiasestowardchoosingelementswhoserepresentationonother

teamswasincreasinginbothconditionsfor(a)Imitationand(b)Innovationdecisions.

170

7.3.10.Surveyresponses

Thesurveydistributedtoparticipantsaftertheendofthelastgameineachsession

isincludedinappendix7.A.Thefirsteightquestionsonthesurveyweremultiple‐choice,

withpossibleresponsesona7‐choiceLikertscale,coded1‐7.Questions2,3,and4were

relatedtoprotectionandhadanadditionaloptionfor“doesnotapply,”whichwascodedas

0.Thelasttwoquestionswerefree‐response;oneaskedparticipantstodescribetheir

strategies,andmostresponsesweresomevariationona“copy‐if‐betterandthenmake

smallchanges”strategy;theotheraskedforanyfurthercomments,andmostresponses

wereeitherblank,orshort(generallypositive)commentslike“fun”orinteresting.”For

quickreference,theeightmultiple‐choicequestionsareshowninTable7.4.Stripchartsof

responseswithkerneldensityestimatesareshowninFig.7.19.

Table7.4:Multiple‐choicesurveyquestions,withresponsesassociatedwiththeextreme

lowandhighendsofthescale.Thosesignificantlyassociatedwithhigherindividualscores

areshowninbold.

increaseyourownscore(withoutregardtothescoresotherplayersmighthave)Q1 Duringthegame,didyoumostlytryto…?

scorehigherthanotherplayers

keepothersfromusingyoursolutionsQ2 If/whenyouprotectedyoursolutions,wasitmostlyto…?

getpaymentforothers'useofyoursolutions

copythewholeteamandpaythefeeQ3 Whenyouwantedtouseanotherplayer’sprotectedteam,didyougenerallypreferto…?

copyitandthenchangeittoavoidpaying

NeverQ4

Whenyoufoundateamwitharelativelyhighscore,didyoueverintentionallyleaveitunprotectedsothatotherscouldcopyitforfree? Everytime

171

VeryeasyQ5 Howdidyoufeelaboutthedifficultyofthetask?Veryhard

otherplayers’teamsQ6 Didyouchoosecreaturesmoreoftenfrom…?theleague

otherplayers’teamsQ7 Didyoufindthatyourscoreswerebetterwhenyouchosecreaturesfrom…?

theleague

LuckQ8 Doyoufeelthatsuccessinthistaskwasbasedmoreon…?

Skill

(a)

172

(b)

(c)

Figure7.19:Responsestothemultiple‐choicesurveyquestionsinTable7.4,plottedas

stripchartswithkerneldensityestimatesandmeanlines,separatedasfollowsforclarity:

responsesfromgroupedparticipantsto(a)non‐protection‐relatedquestionsand(b)

protection‐relatedquestions,and(c)responsesfromisolatedparticipantstoQ5andQ8.

173

Relationshipsbetweenplayerscoresandresponsestoeachquestionwereanalyzed

usingamixed‐effectslinearmodelwithparticipantgroupasarandomeffect.Higherscores

wereassociatedwithresponsesattheupperendofQ1(scorebetterthanothers)

(F(1,256)=22.68,p<.0001,B=0.236),theupperendofQ2(getpaymentfromothers)

(F(1,252)=6.39,p=.0122,B=0.140),thelowerendofQ3(copythewholeteamandpay)

(F(1,243)=14.91,p=.0001,B=‐0.210),thelowerendofQ4(neverleaveunprotected)

(F(1,242)=6.73,p=.0100,B=‐0.142),thelowerendofQ6(choosefromothers’teams)

(F(1,254)=19.88,p<.0001,B=‐0.225),andtheupperendofQ8(performancebasedonskill)

(F(1,254)=8.15,p=.0047,B=0.148).Inexaminationsofresponsetrendsacrossparticipant

groupsize,wefoundjustonesignificanttrend:responsestoQ2weresignificantlyhigher

(getpaymentfromothers)inlargergroups(F(1,29)=8.88,p=.0058,B=0.243).

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7.4.Experiment4Discussion

7.4.1.SimilaritieswithExperiment3

Aspredicted,resultsintheprotectionunavailableconditionofExperiment4(E4PU)

weregenerallysimilartothoseinthevisible‐scoresconditionofExperiment3(E3SV).

PerformancewasslightlybetterinE4PUthanE3SVaspredicted,whichmayhavebeendue

totheincentiveofcashpayment,ortheextratimetomakedecisionsabouteachround's

candidatesolution,thoughunfortunatelywecannotdifferentiatebetweenthesetwo

factorsascauses.IsolatedparticipantsinE4alsodidbetterthanthoseinE3,which

reinforcesthisexplanation.ImitationwasmarkedlylowerandInnovationhigherinE4PU

thaninE3SV,whichmayhavebeenacarryovereffectfromthePAcondition,inwhichthese

differenceswereevenmoreextreme.TrendsofRetentionandRetrievalovergroupsize

thatwerepresentinE3SVwerenotpresentinE4PU,andtherewasanegativecorrelation

ofscorewithRetrievalinE4PUthatwasnotpresentinE3SV,butineachcasethemissing

relationshipwasnominallypresentintheotherexperiment,butnotsignificant.Theless

equitabledistributionofimprovementshareinE4PUrelativetoE3SVcouldbeattributed

toadifferentialcrowding‐out(FreyandJegen,2001)ofintrinsicmotivationtoachieve

improvementsforsomeparticipantsandnotothersbythecashpaymentofferedinE4.

7.4.2.Performance

PredictionsconcerningthePAconditionweregenerallyborneoutaswell.

Maximumscoreswereslightlyhigher,butoverallscoreswereactuallyslightlylowerinthe

PAcondition,thoughneitherdifferencewassignificant.This,alongwiththeincreased

Innovation,decreasedImitation,andincreasedguessdiversityrelativetoPU,accordswith

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thepredictionsmadeforthiscondition:thegreaterincentivesforexplorationledto

increasesinInnovationandlessconvergence,andsomegoodreturnsintheformofslightly

moreimprovements.However,thegreatergeneralriskofexploration,aswellasless

efficientpropagationofbetterperformingsolutionsthroughImitation(becausethebest

solutionsweregenerallyprotected)ledtoawashingoutofthebenefitsofimprovements

bylowerscoresencounteredalongtheway,ratherthanfurtherimprovementofthebetter

solutionsthatwerefound.

7.4.3.Strategy

Aspredicted,theavailabilityofteamprotectionalsoaffectedtheuseofotherkinds

ofinformationinimitationstrategies:PAparticipantsshowedweakersimilaritybias,anda

reversaloffrequencybias,atleastforImitation.Theformercouldhavebeenduetoan

inclinationtowardsaltationiststrategiesasseeninE3SI,whilethelattercouldhavebeen

duetohigher‐frequencyiconstypicallybeingonprotectedteams.Thedecreasein

ImitationincidenceandincreaseinImitationproportionwhenprotectionwasavailable

indicatesthatthefeeforimitationwasadisincentiveforImitation,butwhenImitationwas

pursued,participantseitherkepttheimitatedguessunchanged(totakeadvantageofthe

presumedimprovementinscoreand“gettheirmoney’sworth”fortheusefee),orchanged

relativelyless(inorderto“inventaround”theprotectedsolutionwithoutasmuchriskof

loweringthescore).

Theassociationofhigherscoreswithhigheruseofprotectedteamswaslikelydue

tothefactthattheusefeewasquitesmallrelativetothepotentialbenefitinmostcases.

Thelackofarelationshipbetweenprotectionandscorecouldhavebeenduetogeneral

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overuseofprotection;thetypicalresponsetoQ4onthesurveyindicatesthatformost

participantsthedefaultactionupondiscoveringahigh‐scoringsolutionwastoprotectit,

andthisisborneoutinFigure7.10c.InthePAcondition,theincreaseduseofImitationin

improvementsrelativetonon‐improvementsshowsthatforthosewhorecognizedthe

valueofusingprotectedteams,Imitationwasquiteaproductivestrategy.

Thedecreaseinprotectionandincreaseinuseofprotectedteamsoverroundscan

bothbeexplainedbythefactthatimprovementsavailablefordiscoverybecame

increasinglyrareasparticipantsdiscoveredbettersolutionsandmovedhigherinthescore

distribution.Protectiondecreasedbecausefewerandfewerguessesyieldedprotection‐

worthy,relativelyhigherscores,andtheuseofprotectedteamsincreasedbecausethe

dwindlingsupplyofscore‐improvingsolutionsstokedthedemandforusingthoseofothers

andmadeparticipantsmorewillingtopaytherelatedfee.Theincreaseinuseofprotected

teamsacrossparticipantgroupsizecanbeconsideredanextensionofthegenerallygreater

Imitationinlargergroups.

Thoughtherewasnosignificantchangeinscoreorchoicesourcesacrossgame

orderwithinconditions,thedecreaseinthenumberofgamesperconditionrelativeto

previousexperimentsmadeforlessdatainwhichtodetecttrendsofthissort.The

decreaseinprotectionovergameorderwaslikelyanadaptationtothefailureofthe

always‐protectstrategy(displayedinQ4responsesandthenear‐universalprotectionof

thebest‐scoringsolutions)toturnaconsistentprofit(asshownintheflatscoreversus

protectionresults).

7.4.4Self‐reportedmotivationsandmethods

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Despitereceivinginstructionsthatthegoalofthetaskwasmerelytomaximizeone’s

owntotalscoreoverthecourseofeachgame,aswellasbeinginformedthatpaymentwas

contingentonlyonindividualperformance,responsestoQ1revealedthatmany

participantswerejustasmotivated(ormore)toincreasetheirperformancerelativeto

others.Thosewhoreportedsuchrelativeperformancemotivationalsotendedtoscore

higherthanothers,asdidthosewhosawperformanceinthegameasamatterofskill

ratherthanluckinQ8(thoughmostparticipantsbelieveditwasthelatter).Q2showedthat

participantsweresomewhatevenlydividedbetweenprotectingtokeepothersfromusing

theirsolutionsandgettingpaymentforthem,andresponsestoQ3showedthat

participantswerealsofairlyevenlydividedbetween“licensing”and“inventingaround”

others’protectedteams.

7.5.Conclusions

7.5.1.Similaritiesanddifferenceswithpreviousresults

Inthisexperiment,wefoundpatternsofresultsverysimilartothoseinprevious

experiments,buttherewerealsosomecuriousnewcombinationsoftheseeffects.

Specifically,weobservedinbothconditionstheby‐nowfamiliarresultthataconservative

approachtothistaskpaidoff:relativelyhighusageofImitationandRetentionwere

associatedwithhighscores,andInnovationandRetrievalwithlowscores;trends

displayingtheserelationshipsdifferedverylittleacrossconditions.

Besidestheresemblancebetweentheprotectionunavailableconditionof

Experiment4(E4PU)andExperiment3(E3SV)notedearlier,theprotectionavailable

condition(E4PA)showedsomeresultsthatresembledthoseoftheinvisible‐scores

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conditioninExperiment3(E3SI)aswell.Forinstance,therewasareducedtendencyto

imitatetop‐scoringsolutionsinE3SIwasduetotheimpossibilityofdistinguishingthe

qualityofsolutions,andinE4PAduetothedisincentiveofpayingtheusefeefortop‐

scoringsolutions(whichweregenerallyprotected).Therewasalsoincreaseddiversityand

innovationrelativetothealternateconditionforboth,andadecreaseintheuseof

similarity‐andfrequency‐biasedimitation.However,thesechangesledtothediscoveryof

fewerimprovementsinE3SIrelativetoE3SV,whilethereweremorefoundinE4PA

relativetoE4PU,thoughthisdidnotleadtogreateroverallorfinalscores.Overall,it

appearsthattheextraincentiveforInnovationinE4PAledtosomeimprovementswhose

benefitswerecanceledoutbytheworsesolutionsencounteredintheexplorationprocess,

andtherewasdisincentiveforimitationwhichresultedinfewersequentialimprovements,

whichmayhaveimprovedaverageperformancewithlessrisk.

7.5.2.Similaritiesanddifferencesbetweenexperimentalandreal‐worldpatentsystems

Thisexperimentfeaturedapatent‐likesystemforgoverningtheuseofinnovations,

butwasinnowaymeanttoaccuratelyrepresentthecomplexitiesofarealpatentsystem.

Majordifferencesbetweenthistaskandsuchrealsystemsinclude:ourautomatic

“licensing”ofpatentedinnovations,withnoabilityforpatenteestorefusetogranta

license,negotiatethelicensingfee,orinfringeothers’patentswithoutlicensing;

unambiguouspatentscopeandnoabilitytovaryordisputethebreadthofpatented

features;nodistinctionbetweendiscoveryandproductionofinnovations;noabilityto

“opensource”innovationssuchthattheycouldbeusedfreelybyothersbutnotpatented;

andnoabilitytosellorotherwisetransferpatentrightsbetweenparticipants.Wefeltthat

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testingtheeffectofachangeinincentivestoinnovateinamoregeneralsearchdomain,and

establishingcontinuitywithourpreviousexperimentsinthisdomainweremoreimportant

thanattemptingtoreplicatemorefeaturesofpatentsystems.However,anexperimentthat

didincludeallofthefeaturesnotedaboveactuallyfoundthatacompletelycommons‐based

(patent‐free)systemoutperformedbothapatent‐onlysystemandamixedpatent‐

commonssystem(Torrance&Tomlinson,2009).

Besidesthedistinctionbetweendiscoveryandproductionofinnovationsinthereal

world,thereisalsothefactthatphysicallyproducingmanyinnovativeproductsdepends

onrivalrousrawmaterialresources.Again,therewasnoprovisionforthisfactinour

experiment,butitwasincorporatedinanotherstudytocreateamarket‐basedmechanism

forpromotinginnovation(Meloso,Copic,&Bossaerts,2009).Similartoourexperiment,

participantsinthisstudyexploredvaryingcombinationsofoptionstosolveaproblem;the

primarydifferencewasthatinthe“patent”condition,amonetaryprizewasgiventothe

firsttodiscovertheoptimalsolution,andinthe“market”condition,participantsbought

andsoldsharesineachoption,andsharesofoptionscontainedintheoptimalsolutionpaid

amonetarydividendattheendofthegame.Melosoetal.(2009)foundnobenefitforthe

patent‐basedsystemoverthemarket‐basedsystem:theoptimalsolutionwasfoundinan

equalnumberofrunsofeachcondition.However,theoptimalsolutionwasfoundbya

greaterproportionofparticipantsinthe“market”condition.Theincentiveofprofiting

fromthesalesofsharesintheoptimalsolutionmotivatedmoreparticipantstofindthe

optimalsolutionthanaprizethatonlyoneofthemcouldwin.Thesharepriceofeach

optioninMelosoetal.’sstudyalsosignaledparticipantsaboutthegroup’scollectivebelief

initsvalue,whichsupportedalearningstrategysimilartothefrequencybiasseeninour

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results,andthe“filtering”ofoptionsusedinthesociallearningstrategiestournamentof

Rendelletal.(2010).

7.5.3.Polycentricinnovation

Thereremainlargedifferencesbetweentheaboveexperimentaltreatmentsand

manyreal‐worldintellectualdiscoverycontexts,mostobviouslyinthescaleofdiscoveries,

andtheinvestmentsoftimeandotherresourcesrequired.Butthefactthatmany

predictionsfromthetraditional“reward”and“prospect”theoriesofpatentshavebeen

contradictedorremainunconfirmedintheaboveexperimentalresults,aswellascross‐

nationaleconometricstudies(Park&Ginarte,1997),large‐scalereviewsofdatarelatedto

patentingbehaviorandchangesinpatentlaw(Bessen&Meurer,2008;Boldrin&Levine,

2008),andavarietyofothermeasures(seeChapter6)shouldgiveuspauseincontinuing

toendorsesuchtheories.Theincreasinglywell‐studiedperformanceofalternatemodelsof

innovationbyindividualusersandgroupsengagedinopencollaboration(Baldwin&von

Hippel,2009;Strandburg,2009;Benkler,2006)showusthattherearemanypossibilities

formoreequitable,efficient,andsustainablewaysofcreatingbeneficialinnovationsand

supportingaknowledgecommons.

MazzoleniandNelson(1998)notethatthetheoriesusedtojustifyIP(thoseof

incentivesforcreation,disclosure,commercialization,andefficientexplorationof

innovations)arenotuniversallyapplicableandinsomecircumstancesconflictwitheach

other.Theyalsonotethatthesetheoriesmakeassumptions(implicitlyorexplicitly)about

severalimportantfeaturesofcontextsinwhichinnovationoccurs:(1)“Thenatureand

effectivenessofmeansotherthanpatentstoinduceinventionandrelatedactivities”(a

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generaleffectivenessquestion)(2)“Whetherthegroupofpotentialinventorsislikelyto

workondiverseandnon‐competingideas,orwhetherthegroupislikelytobefocusedona

singlealternativeorasetofcloselyconnectedones.”(i.e.thestructureofthesearchspace)

(3)“Thedeterrenteffectofthepresenceofpatentsonunauthorizeduseofatechnology

andonthetransactioncostsinvolvedinlicensinganinvention.”(issuesrelatedto

competingfollow‐oninnovationsandanticommonsconcerns)(4)“Whetherthemultiple

stepsintheinvention,development,andcommercializationofanewtechnologytendto

proceedefficientlywithinasingleorganization,orwhetherefficiencyisenhancedif

differentorganizationsareinvolvedatdifferentstagesoftheprocess.”(issuesrelatedto

competitionandcentralization)(5)The“topographyoftechnologicaladvance,”i.e.“the

mannerinwhichinventionsarelinkedtoeachothertemporally,andassystemsinuse”

(alsodealingwithsequentialinnovationsandthestructureoftheproblemspace)

(Mazzoleni&Nelson,1998,p.1033).

Variationsintheseconditionsacrossdifferentinnovationcontextspromptachange

fromasking“Whichtheoryiscorrect?”to“Wheredoeseachtheoryapply?”Itiseasytosee

wherealternatemodessuchasuserinnovationoropencollaborationcouldgainpurchase

underthisframework,bymakingchangestotheassumptionsembodiedintraditionalIP

theories.Ratherthancentralizinginnovationdecisionsinpatent‐holdingindividualsor

firms,thesealternatemodesincreasetheflexibilityofthegovernanceofprovisionand

appropriationinaknowledgecommons,andsubjectthemtonormsdeterminedbythe

relevantcommunitiesofusersandinnovators.Asseenintheanalysesofpatent

performanceandvalueacrossindustries(Bessen&Meurer,2008),conditionsaround

inventionprocessesindifferentfields(e.g.pharmaceuticalsversussoftware)couldsupport

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avarietyofdifferentpracticesandorganizationalstructuresaroundthediscoveryanduse

ofinnovations,withdifferentrulesgoverningactionssuchascoordinationanddisclosure

ofcontributionstothecommons.Someofthesepracticesarealreadyinuseinsituations

suchasanonprofitpatentpoolforAIDStreatmentsindevelopingcountries(UNITAID,

2010),androyalty‐freelicenserequirementsforworldwidewebtechnologystandards

(WorldWideWebConsortium,2004).Atthesametime,thereisaplaceforhigherlevelsof

organizationandgovernance.Asmentionedearlier,IPrightscanbeusedtoresolveorpre‐

emptlegaldisputesbetweenknowledgeusersorusercommunities(O’Mahony,2003).It

hasalsorecentlybeenarguedthattheWorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization

(historicallyacoalitionforthepromotionofIPrightsandenforcement)shouldbere‐tooled

asamoregeneralinternationaladministrativeforumforconsideringandimplementing

policiesrelatedtoevolvingmodesofinnovation(Strandburg,2009).Thisrelianceonmix

ofvariousformsandscalesofauthoritywithoverlappingjurisdictions(asopposedto

completelycentralizedordecentralizedauthority)hasbeenfoundtobeanimportant

factorinthegovernanceofpublicgoodsandcommon‐poolresources,inwhichithas

becomeknownas“polycentric”governance(Ostrom,Tiebout,&Warren,1961;Andersson

&Ostrom,2008;Ostrom,2008).

Thereareundoubtedlysomeinnovationsthatmayhavebeendelayedornotcreated

atallapartfromsomeformofpatentsystem,buttherearealsoinnovationsthatwere

mademostlywithoutit(suchasmanyopen‐sourcesoftwareprojectsandmuchacademic

research)whichwouldprobablynothavebeencreatedifeachcomponentwassubjectto

patentprotection.Ratherthanarguingfortheabolishmentofthepatentsystem,these

innovationsdemonstratethatapolycentricsystemofknowledgecommonsgovernanceis

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possible,desirable,andinfactisalreadyuponus.Studiessuchasthosedescribedinthis

dissertationcanaidinunderstandingthecauses,consequences,anddynamicsofdiscovery

undervariousformsofgovernance,andthereforeinimprovingthepracticalprocessesof

discoveryforthebenefitofall.

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7.A.ProtectionchoicewordinginExperiment4

Protectionchoicedialog:attheendofeachroundexceptthelast,participantsinthe

protectionavailableconditionwhoseteamwasnotalreadyprotectedbyanother

participantwereshownadialogboxwiththefollowingtext(inquotes)andbuttons(in

brackets):

“Doyouwanttoprotectyourteam?Thiswillcostyou4points.”

[ProtectMyTeam] [Don’tProtectMyTeam]

Protectionconfirmation:Iftheparticipantclickedthe[ProtectMyTeam]button,a

dialogboxwasdisplayedwiththefollowingtextuntilthenextroundbegan:

“Yourteamwilbeprotectedfor3rounds.Youhavebeencharged4points.”

Protectiondenied:Iftheparticipantclickedthe[ProtectMyTeam]buttonand

anotherparticipanthadprotectedthesameteamfirstduringthesamepost‐roundchoice

period,adialogboxwasdisplayedwiththefollowingtextuntilthenextroundbegan:

“Sorry,someoneelseprotectedthisteambeforeyou.”

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Protectiondeclineconfirmation:Iftheparticipantclickedthe[Don’tProtectMy

Team]button,adialogboxwasdisplayedwiththefollowingtextuntilthenextround

began:

“Youchosenottoprotectyourteam.”

Previousprotection:Ifadifferentplayerhadprotectedthesameteamorateam

withinoneicondifferenceinapreviousround,thefollowingmessagewasdisplayed

insteadoftheProtectionchoicedialog:

“Yourteamthisroundcannotbeprotected.Waitingforotherstoprotecttheir

teams…”

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7.B.Post‐tasksurveyinExperiment4

Thefollowingsurveywasdistributedtoparticipantsfollowingtheendofthelast

gameineachsession.

Front

187

Back

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8.GeneralDiscussion

8.1.Conclusionsandcontinuations

Whenoneobservesothersforcluesaboutbeneficialbehaviors,itisimportanttobe

attentivetothemanypossibledifferencesbetweenthecontextstheyencounterandthe

relatedsituationsinwhichoneexpectstofindoneself.Thesecanbeduetochangesinan

environmentovertime,ordifferenceswithinandbetweenenvironmentsduetothingslike

climate,culture,orthecapabilitiesbroughttothepresentfrompreviousexperience.

Similarly,theexperimentalresultswehavesharedinthisdissertationaresubjectto

caveatsaboutthecontextinwhichweobtainedthem,butwebelievetheyoffersome

insightintocommonconflictsandmeritsubstantialfurtherstudy.

Thegoaloftheseexperimentswastoexaminehowgroupsofpeoplefindsolutions

toproblems,byadaptingtheirbehaviortotheirenvironmentsandtoeachotherovertime,

undervaryingcombinationsofinformationandincentives.Situationsthatfitthis

descriptionareubiquitiousinthelivesofhumansandothersocialanimals,butnotyetwell

understood.Theyarefullofcomplicatingandconfoundingfactorsthatmakeitdifficultto

findtheimportantfactorsthatcausetheoutcomeswesee.Intheseexperiments,wepared

awaymanyofthecomplexitiesofreal‐worldsociallearningtoenablerelativelysimple

interactionsinacontrolledproblemenvironment,sothatwecouldobserveparticipants'

behaviorunencumberedbyatleastsomeofthesecomplicatingfactors.Forinstance,we

didnotallowparticipantstospendpointsonimaginarylawyerswithwhichtosueeach

otherforvirtualpatentinfringement(Torrance&Tomlinson,2009),nordidwebuildan

artificialforagingapparatusforthemtopeckat.Wehopedtofindcommonalitiesbetween

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aspectsofdifferentkindsofexploration,suchasbirdssearchingforfoodandpeople

searchingforgoodideas,byabstractingfrommanyoftheirspecifics.

Thisquestforanidealabstractioncancreatetwokindsofflaws:first,itcanleave

outimportantqualitiesoftheeventsweareattemptingtomodel;second,thespecific

detailsthatarechosentoimplementthegeneralqualitieswewishtostudywillby

necessityintroducedistortionsoftheirown.Toconcludethisdissertation,wewilldiscuss

someoftherelevantaspectsofreal‐worldsociallearningandexplorationthatourtasks

didnottakeintoaccount,aswellassomeoftheartificialcharacteristicsthatmayhave

distortedparticipants'behavior,beforesummarizingthefindingsthatwebelievehave

validitybeyondourspecificparadigmsandshouldbeexaminedfurther.

8.2.Omissionsandcommissions

Weattemptedtoprovideappealing,understandable,andfairlyneutralproblemsfor

participantstosolve,whichdidnotundulyfavorcertaincognitiveassets(e.g.verbalor

mathematicalknowledge)thatcouldhaveintroduceddifferencesinbehaviorunrelatedto

ourdesiredphenomena.Inrealsearchsituations,ofcourse,historyandpreparationmatter

‐‐peoplebringallsortsofpreviousknowledgeandexperiencetobearonnovelsituations,

andtheseaffectoutcomesenormously.Thereisnosuchthingasa"pure"searchtask,

unmooredfromanyspecificskills.Traitsthatarepresumablyimportanttoperformancein

ourtaskssuchaslargeworkingmemoryandstrategicthinkingarebynomeansevenly

distributedamongthepopulation,norisenthusiasmforpuzzles,virtualpets,orfantasy

sportsleagues,elementsofwhichwetriedtoincorporateinordertomakethetask

interesting.

190

Inaddition,muchoftheknowledgeandexperiencethatpeoplebringtonewtasks

concernstheirfellowproblemsolvers,particularlytrustandotherbeliefsaboutothers'

capabilitiesandintentions.Peoplearepoliticalanimalsaswellassocialanimals,andthese

beliefs,andhowtheyarecreated,maintained,andmanipulated,areabsolutelycentralto

sustainedinteractionsingroups.Usingparticipantswho(presumably)knewlittleabout

eachotherbeforehandreducedthepossibilityoftheseimportantphenomenahaving

effectsonthecoordinationofbehavior.Thedevelopmentanduseofsuchinterpersonal

knowledgewasalsopreventedbylimitingparticipants'interactionsstrictlytothepassive

sharingofinformationabouttheirsolutions;theywerenotpermittedothermethodsof

communicationwitheachother(suchasachatinterface),ormanipulationofthe

environment(suchastaggingoficons).Wealsoomittedexplicitidentifyinginformation

aboutpeers,andpreventedimplicitidentificationbyavoidingconsistentpositioningof

eachparticipant'schoicesinthetaskdisplays.Capabilitiessuchasstableevaluationof

groupmembers'behavior,discussionandcollectivedeterminationofnormsare

particularlyknowntoaffectoutcomesinpublicgoodandcommon‐poolresourcedilemmas

(Ostrom,Gardner,&Walker,1994).Relatedly,eachgameinourtasklastedonlyafew

minutes,andthewholesessionwaslessthananhour;inreality,thelong‐term

sustainabilityofanysystem,letalonesomethingascomplexasaknowledgecommons,

cannotbeestimatedinsuchashorttime.

BeyondthespecificdetailsofpatentsystemsthatwementionedomittinginChapter

7,theeconomicvalidityofourtaskislimitedbythefactthattherewasnocostfor

explorationbeyondtheopportunitycostofforegoingotheroptions.Manyrealexploration

tasks(e.g.pharmaceuticaltrials,mineralexploration,orsoftwaredebugging)involve

191

substantialinvestmentsoftimeandotherresourcesbothupfrontandonacontinuing

basis.Therelativelyshortlengthandnarrowbreadthofprotection,amountsforprotection

andusefees,andtheoveralllevelofmonetarypaymentcouldraisesimilarobjections.

Becauseoftheabovedifferences,wemustbecautiousaboutgeneralizingour

resultstoobroadly,andourconclusionsmustbetestedinothersociallearningand

explorationparadigmstoobservetheeffectsoftheseandothercontextualfactors.

8.3.Summaryoffindings

Despitetheseconcerns,webelievethat(a)ourresultsmakeasubstantial

contributiontoknowledgeaboutthecauses,consequences,anddynamicsofsociallearning

andsearch;(b)thattheyhavesubstantialvaliditybeyondthetaskandparticipantsthat

generatedthem;and(c)thattheycanleadtofurtherfertileinvestigationinthelaboratory

andthefield.

Wefoundthatourhumanparticipantsusedseveralsociallearningstrategies

previouslystudiedinotherspecies(Laland,2004),suchascopyingbetter‐performing

peers,copyingsolutionelementsthataremorefrequentamongpeers,andcopyingwhen

uncertainaboutthereturnstoasociallearning.Wealsofoundevidenceforcopying

solutionssimilartoone'sown,whichhasbeenexaminedinstudiesofinnovationdiffusion

asbackwardscompatibility(Rogers,2003),aswellascopyingsolutionelementsthatare

increasingratherthandecreasinginfrequencyamongpeers,asobservedinarecentstudy

ofbaby‐namingdata(Gureckis&Goldstone,2009).Wealsofoundthat,ratherthansimply

fallingbackonalternatesociallearningstrategies(suchasfrequencybias)when

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performance‐basedimitationwasunavailable,theuseofeachsourceofinformationwas

usedindifferentwaysaccordingtothespecificincentivesandrisksinvolved.

Participantsusedfairlyconservative,incrementaliststrategiestoexplorecomplex

problemspaces,sothatinitialsatisfactorysolutionscouldbeusedasabasisforfurther

developmentviasmallamountsofbothimitationandinnovation.Thesetacticsallowed

participantstoprogressivelyandcollectivelynarrowtheirsearchtowardbetterregionsof

theproblemspacewithouttakingexcessiverisksthatcouldhurtaggregateperformance.

Somesimplemodels(Rogers,1988;Giraldeau,Valantone,&Templeton,2002)

predictthatimitationwillnotimprovetheoverallperformanceofagroup,becauseagents

willsimplyuseittotakeadvantageoftheinformationprovidedbyothers,andavoidthe

costsofexploration.Incontrast,wefoundthatparticipantsoftenusedimitation(in

combinationwithinnovationandretentionofprevioussolutionelements)tocumulatively

improveononeanother'ssolutionsandenhancebothindividualandoverallgroup

performance.

Whenweintroducedcontextualfactorsthatcausedimitationtobeeitherdisrupted

(hidingperformanceinformationaboutpeers'solutions)ordiscouraged(chargingasmall

feeforusingasolutionthatapeerhadpreviouslydiscoveredand"protected"),theuseof

innovationincreased,butimprovedperformancedidnotresult.Intheformercase,

participantscouldnotuseimitationtopropagategoodsolutions,andtheincreased

explorationwasessentiallywastedbecausethesearchremainedunfocusedandinefficient.

Inthelattercase,theadditionalexplorationactuallyresultedinanincreaseddiscoveryof

improvedsolutions,butalsothediscoveryofworsesolutionsintheprocess,which

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canceledoutthegains;thecostforimitationmeantthatparticipantsimitatedlessoften

andwerethuslesslikelytobuildononeanother'ssolutions.

8.4.Applicationsandfuturedirections

Inthecontextofscientificandculturalprogress,thereareparallelstothemodelsof

Rogers(1988)andGiraldeau,Valone,andTempleton(2002)mentionedabove,which

predictthatinnovationwillbeinshortsupplyandinefficientlyusedunlessthosewho

innovatecanexcludeothersfromimitatingthemwithoutpermission(e.g.Kitch,1977).

Ourworkshowsthattheabovemodelsareperhapsoverlysimplisticwhenitcomes

tohumansociallearningandexploration.Individualshaveacapacitytouseothers'

innovationsnotjusttoobtainastaticbenefitingoodperformance,buttocreateadynamic

benefitformanybyproducingsequentialimprovements;soadisincentivetoimitate(in

theformofexclusionrightsforinnovators)mayresultinlessproductiveinnovation,not

more.Theworkofothersinthisarea(e.g.Torrance&Tomlinson,2009;Bessen&Meurer,

2008;seeChapters6&7)confirmsthesefindingsandshowsthatthereareother

theoreticalandpracticaldisadvantagestograntingexclusiverightstoknowledge.

Thereisacountervailingmovementtotreatknowledgeasaresourcethatbenefits

fromcommunitymanagementatmultiplescales,ratherthanstrictprivateownershipor

centralizedstatecontrol(Ostrom&Hess,2007).Therearenaturallydebatesbetween

proponentsofthesevariousmethodsofmanagement,butitisclearthatthefutureof

knowledgeisinextricablyboundupinlearninghowtoequitably,efficiently,and

sustainablygoverntheproductsofitspastandpresent.

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Tomasello(1994)contendsthatthecapabilitiesofhumansforselectiveand

cumulativesociallearningconstitutea“ratcheteffect”thatallowsculturetodevelopstably

acrossgenerations,andthatthiseffectmaybeuniquetohumans.Thoughtheexperiments

inthisdissertationpresentagreatlysimplifiedenvironmentforsuchsociallearning,they

confirmedandextendedseveralprevioustheoreticalandempiricalresultsinthefield.

Theconcernsaboutourexperimentsnotedabove(aswellasrelatedworkdiscussed

inpreviouschapters)suggestpotentiallyusefulvariationsofourcoretasks.Forinstance:

useofvariouspracticalknowledgedomainsforsearchandvariouslevelsofexpertise

amongparticipants;useofnoisy(ratherthansimplypresentorabsent)scorefeedback;

variationsinthestructureofthesocialnetworkthatconnectsparticipants;explicitcosts

forinnovationandmoresubstantialincentivesforperformance;andcommunication

amongparticipants,andthereforeopportunitiesforcoordinationoftheirsearchbehavior

andmorestakeholder‐drivengovernanceoftheuseoftheresultingimprovements.

Theresoundingrefrainofthelargebodyofresearchoncommonsdilemmasand

othercollectiveactionproblemsisthatmanycanbesolvedthroughcarefulinvestigation

andmodificationoftherelatedenvironmental,cultural,andinstitutionalvariables,but

thereis"nopanacea,"nouniversalsolutiononwhichwecanrely(Ostrom,2010).

Continuedstudyisnecessary,ofthestructureanddynamicsofhumancollaborative

exploration,thenatureofincentivesandinnovativeeffort,andtheirinteractionas

manifestedinthedynamicsofcreativityinoureconomyandculture.Wepresentourwork

inthehopethatotherswillalsofinditusefulinilluminatingoursharedproblems.

195

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