1

Threat Perception,

Succession and

Domestic Interests:

Conceptualising

Contemporary

North Korean Strategy

William Hobart

Supervisor: Dr. Jingdong Yuan

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Acknowledgements: I wish to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Jingdong Yuan for his advice and support throughout the semester. Dr. Yuan's schedule left little time for himself and I am, without equivocation, appreciative for his time and patience. Thank you to Dr. Tom Wilkins who introduced me to the CISS program in 2009 while completing my honours thesis and providing me with the inspiration to enroll. Finally, thank you to my friends and family for their enduring love and support for the past five and a half years of my tertiary education.

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Contents

Introduction

Section 1 - Domestic Stakeholders and Parochial Interests

The Military

The Cabinet

The Korean Workers Party

The Kim Family

Section 2 - Strategies of Survival Conventional Military Brinkmanship

Diplomacy

Nuclear Weapons

Section 3 - Threat, Succession and External Forces Seoul and Washington

The United States

China

Six-Party Talks

Conclusion - Enduring Problems

Bibliography

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Abstract North Korea is a perennial flashpoint. The hermit kingdom attracts international attention for its belligerence, geopolitical significance and the image of its leaders, the Kims. Recently the world has witnessed an unprecedented increase in brinkmanship behaviour with the shelling of Yeonpyeong island, the sinking of the South Korean corvette ROKS Cheonan, nuclear tests and the collapse of Six-Party talks. The past decade has been a relative low-point for the crisis on the Korean peninsula. This paper seeks to explain the factors that have seen such a deterioration of relations occur by analyzing how actors within the regime, namely the military, are shaping North Korean policy - not only for the sake of regime security, but also their own parochial interests. This internal dynamic is occurring at a time when the regime is anticipating great vulnerability when power is transferred from Kim Jong il to Kim Jong un. This sense of domestic insecurity, in addition to the existential threat perception and the security landscape of the region are the primary impetuses to contemporary North Korean strategy and behaviour.

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Introduction

How has threat perception, domestic interests and succession shaped contemporary North

Korean Strategy?

The entire Party, the entire armed force, the entire population should re-double their efforts to

bring about a new revolutionary surge, convinced that victory is certain and showing the

indomitable spirit and thus fling open the gate of a great prosperous, powerful nation by 2012

and more strikingly demonstrate the dignity and might of songun (military first policy) Korea.

- Kim Jong il, at the April 9 2009 DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, quoted by KCNA

North Korea's strategy is to portray itself as a nation on the verge of a domestic collapse that

could have unpredictable and severe consequences for its neighbors and the United States. This

threat is projected to both compel those involved not to accelerate this end and to also assist in

its prevention by giving aid to the North Korean regime. Despite popular caricature and

rhetoric, Pyongyang wants to avoid war, desperately, especially during a period where

succession is not far off. Meanwhile, Kim Jong ill's nuclear program aims to achieve regime

security while appeasing the military and acting as a bargaining tool diplomatically. The

complexity and variety of North Korean strategy on one hand sees a potential nuclear armed

state with the ability to destroy Seoul with conventional weapons, and on the other hand, one

that is threatening in its vulnerability and the consequences of state failure. North Korea is a

country whose regime security if of the highest priority domestically, but whose national

security is of concern for its neighbors.

None of the regional powers want war and the North exploits this to see how much they can

get away with. Regime survival is not just about the existential concept of the Democratic

People's Republic of North Korea, it is also about the survival of the Kims, the military and the

elite who have their own parochial interests. Failure to recognize the domestic impetuses of

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bodies other than Kim Jong il clouds any reasonable assessment of the North Korean threat and

its behaviour. Analysts have long observed the domestic forces that shape foreign policy in

many countries, yet analysis of this kind is often neglected when studying North Korea in favour

of a monolithic model of North Korea with Kim Jong il as its only source of policy.

This paper will be in three parts. First, I will differentiate and assess different domestic

stakeholders and how various strategies reflect both North Korea's strategic imperatives but

also the actors more parochial, but critical, interests.

Second, I will analyze how successful the North Korean methodology is at achieving survival,

citing the various strategies North Korea has attempted so far, military brinkmanship,

diplomacy and nuclear weapon development and assessing each strategies advantages and

weaknesses.

Third, this paper will analyze exactly how the North Korean threat has been conceptualized in

the West to inform its policy toward the North. It will also illustrate how succession has

influenced the recent behaviour and policies of the North.

This analysis is a vital contribution to the recent, albeit breathless, speculation regarding the

upcoming succession of Kim Jong il. The issue is certainly important, yet drawing parallels

between it, and the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong il without taking into account the

dramatic difference in regional, domestic and global geopolitics is folly. Also, recent literature

fails to assess what the strategic imperatives of the North are and instead focus on the

personality cult of the Kims and inaccurately translate the Juche policy as an irrational code that

underscores all North Korean policy.

This paper asserts that North Korean strategic imperatives are

1- Regime survival

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2- National security

3- Economic sustainability

Kim Jong il's policies in the coming years will set the tone for the regime Kim Jong un will

inherit. North Korea's behaviour during 2010 was significantly more belligerent that it has been

in recent years. Thus, studying incidents such as the Cheonan sinking and the attack on

Yeonpyeong Island, (a South Korean-controlled island south of the Northern Limit Line, a

maritime border the North refuses to formally recognize) serve as indicators for what could be

the establishment of an intensification of the strategy to converge both domestic and

international needs for regime survival and succession. At the core of this strategy is the

Songun 'military first' policy that requires the population to feel that the diversion of funds to

the military is essential. Appeasing the military to prevent a succession struggle is vital for the

North's regime, but so too is the perception that nuclear weapons alone will guarantee the

survival of the regime.

Meanwhile, North Korea has demonstrated a clear pattern of escalating tensions with the

South and the United States as a precursor to negotiations for economic benefits. These

tensions centered on nuclear and missile developments, but not on outright aggression against

the South — until 2010. Pyongyang appears to have made three very calculated decisions.

Firstly, that nuclear tests and missile launches no longer created the sense of uncertainty and

crisis necessary to force the United States and South Korea into negotiations and concessions.

Second, that it had China’s cover, and third, that Seoul and Washington would not respond

militarily.1

All indications suggest that Pyongyang bet correctly. However, North Korea started 2011 with

some informal invitations for talks with the South, which have either been refused or stalled

based on North Korea's refusal to accept responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan.

1 STRATFOR (2011). "Annual Forcast 2011." from http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/20110107-annual-forecast-

2011.

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More recently the South said it is open to talks, without preconditions, however, if another

attack occurs against the South, it will respond militarily and "punish the enemy until they

surrender."2 This rare statement of defined redlines and objectives, (which could only mean

regime change through a military operation), coupled with the offer of talks illustrates how the

South feels the need to deploy brinkmanship tactics now before the North acquires nuclear

weapons.

In the atmosphere of regime succession, the Party will need to maintain institutional cohesion,

or at least have the relevant bodies checked against each other by Kim Jong il. However, the

two options of pursuing a diplomatic means for regime security though negotiation with the

United States and pursuing nuclear weapons for their deterrence credibility will split the Party

and Cabinet, and possibly even the Kims, from the military. Furthermore the policies would be

mutually exclusive with the U.S demanding the dismantlement of the nuclear program in

exchange for peace. Meanwhile, the Korean People's Army will affirm that nuclear weapons are

essential for regime survival. If 'peace' is achieved diplomatically, the military face an existential

crisis and could potentially lose their privileged place in society. If the nuclear option is pursued,

the country heightens the risk of a preemptive confrontation with the West.

This conflict will emerge as a major domestic challenge and characterize the post Kim Jong ill

era. Already, Kim Jong il is attempting to ensure that succession will carry over smoothly by

enhancing the Korean Workers Party after a long period of falling out of favor with the regime,

vis-à-vis the military, which have escalated tensions on the peninsula, enhancing their own

legitimacy.

2 Bangkok-Post (2011). "Choose dialogue or war, N. Korea tells South." from

http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/229654/.

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Section 1 - Domestic Stakeholders and Parochial

Interests

The vast amount of exiting literature on North Korea treats the state as a monolithic entity

whose depth is only granted by the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and Jong Il. As Kim Jong un

approaches inheriting the leadership from his father, it is important to assess who or what else

in the regime has political leverage and influence on policy and what their motivations are.

Inquiring into this facet of the regime during a succession phase helps us isolate and explain the

sometimes erratic strategy that the North portrays, but also, and more importantly, it informs a

better understanding on ways to formulate policy towards the North.

This section aims to take the 'surprise' out of North Korean behaviour. It will assert that the

military have the greatest influence and potential to guide the regime, followed by the Cabinet

and its advisors to Kim Jong il, and then the Korean Workers Party. Succession periods are

generally times where voices and ideas that have fermented for years, even decades, have an

opportunity to breathe more oxygen. Yet leaders will anticipate powers struggle within the

regime and will therefore seek to purge and silence those who are against the set piece of

regime succession. This section will begin with a theoretical approach to the regime and how it

operates, followed by a description of the various stakeholders and their critical, albeit

parochial, interests. Finally, this section will argue that the military have had an increasing voice

in North Korean policy of late, reflecting their increased influence domestically as they attempt

to set an agenda that will not threaten what they believe to be the only policy option for

guaranteeing regime, (and personal) survival - nuclear weapons.

Totalitarian regimes must maintain a high degree of threat to justify the intense measures of

state control. In North Korea's case, these threats exist in the form of external imperialism on

behalf of the United States as well as internal enemies. Maintaining this level of intensity is

difficult as it is justified on the basis that times are special and that the state faces an imminent

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threat.3 As this 'special' situation becomes the status quo and individuals who have accepted

that the initial hardship, brought on by devoting most resources to the protection of the state

with the promise of a better future, realize that times are indeed not 'special,' the totalitarian

measures lose their legitimacy.4 Furthermore, the threat, having not presented itself through

any obvious manifestation, also begins to lose its legitimacy. The state must therefore exercise

significant energy to maintain the ruse of an imminent threat to an increasingly exhausted and

skeptical populace. North Korea has attempted to address this through the personality cult of

the Kims and a severe domestic security apparatus. However, as economic returns turn

negative and conditions only worsen, the legitimacy of the whole operation comes into

question, personality cult or not.

North Korea was able to maintain a totalitarian model for some time until two significant

events outside of North Korea's control occurred, the death of Kim Il Sung and the distancing by

the North's cold war benefactors, China and the Soviet Union. Before these events occurred,

the North had an all-encompassing ideology; the Korean Workers Party controlled the

government and military bureaucracies; the state purged individuals deemed untrustworthy or

dangerous; it controlled the media and it had a planned command economy.5 Yet regimes can

only last so long if the populace is without the bare essentials of food, water and shelter. In the

1990's Kim Jong il responded to the new reality without China, the Soviet Union and his father.

He rationalized the state's governance structure to be more efficient, but maintained, crucially,

his father's legacy of ultimate authority.6 Ultimate power and ultimate authority are different

and North Korea began to look more post-totalitarian than totalitarian as the military were now

free from the subordination of the Party. With the increase of tier two influences, Kim balanced

3 McEachern, P. (2010). Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics. New York, Columbia University

Press. 4 Ibid.

5 Martin, B. K. (2004). Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. New York,

Thomas Dunne Books. 6 McEachern, P. (2010). Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics. New York, Columbia University

Press.

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his hereditary claim to legitimacy while empowering his advisors with space to express their

policy opinions, thus enabling and enhancing the regime's basic ability to govern, but so too

their means to pursue their own interests through policy framing.

The Military

Kim Il Sung was a military commander, indeed his legitimacy as a ruler stemmed directly from

his revolutionary credentials during the Korean war. Kim Jong il had no such military experience

but inherited the role as North Korea's ruler effectively three years after Kim Il Sung died in

1994. At this time, the North was coming to grips with a reformed China and collapsed Soviet

Union - in addition to a severe famine that had occurred due to irregular weather patterns and

a deficient food distribution system (of which the military was in charge of). The new regime

under Kim Jong il relied heavily on indoctrination and control of the masses and elites alike. At

the same time, there was a dramatic increase in military first policies and ideology. These

policies reflected the military's increased political role, as well as Kim's need to appease the

powerful brass within the institution.7

The military already enjoyed prioritized resource allocation, and with its accession in to the

political realm of the regime, it illustrated a change from the totalitarian, Party-dominated

regime of Kim Il Sung. Where the Korean Worker's Party was credited with the building of the

nation, the military, according to the state history, is responsible for the existence of the DPRK.

Without Kim Il Sung's military, there would be no 'North Korea.8 Kim Jong il also increased the

prestige of the military and many analysts assert it was they who carried him through the

difficult years after the death of his father.9

7 Minnich, J. M. (2005). The North Korean People's Army : origins and current tactics. Annapolis, Md., Naval

Institute Press. 8 Ibid.

9 McEachern, P. (2010). Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics. New York, Columbia University

Press.

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In 2010-2011 we have seen another surge of military first policy in the North. Internationally,

The military led a failed secret delegation to Seoul, the first time Brig. Gen Chul headed such an

initiative. In addition to its flagship nuclear weapons program, the Korean People's Army also

attacked Yeonpyeong Island. The military can't ignore the example set by Libya, who gave up its

nuclear weapons, but has now been attacked by the West. The military now has the chance to

not only influence, but dominate policy as those more aligned to the ideology of the Party die

off and the new classes of privileged officers recognize the danger of abandoning what they see

as the only guarantor of regime security. However, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is two-fold

for the military. The Korean People's Army is legitimized by the portrayal of an existential

threat, i.e. the United States and South Korea invading. Without this threat their legitimacy

diminishes. That said, if the threat were to eventuate, the North would be easily defeated

(assuming China would not support the North). It is in the interests of the military, therefore, to

embellish the existential threat, while not crossing the redline for provocation. Ergo, from a

grand strategy perspective, it is in the interests of the military to acquire nuclear weapons and

be the custodians of national security than it is to enter a peace agreement with the United

States and appear less relevant. The KPA will also attempt to scuttle diplomatic efforts on

behalf of the Cabinet. This was evidenced most recently when the secret inter-Korean talks led

by brig. Gen Pak Chul collapsed and resulted in a statement by the North saying it will not deal

with the Lee Myung Bak government.10 No solution is permanent, and doubts on the validity of

any peace agreement are bound to be questioned, but this will be addressed in the last section.

The military's job is national security and the nuclear program is its primary show piece. One

must remember that the North could be years away from a deliverable nuclear weapons

platform and the primary military deterrent are the permanent artillery batteries zeroed in on

Seoul. The military will seek to raise the stakes on the peninsula to warrant the acceleration of

10

AFP (2011). "North Korea says it won't deal with South Korea govt." from http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/05/30/11/north-korea-says-it-wont-deal-south-korea-govt. , Chosunilbo (2011). "N.Korean Military Growing in Influence." from http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/06/16/2011061601178.html.

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the nuclear program. As succession approaches, the military will look to extend its influence

further still to prevent being played against the Party or the Cabinet.

The Cabinet

Kim Jong il's 1998 constitution changed the State Administration Council into the Cabinet,

expanding its management authority and primary responsibility to implement policy agreed

upon by the largely symbolic parliament. Without the Central People's Committee and the

president, it is now a formally independent actor within the regime, although in practice, it is

responsible to the authority of Kim Jong il.11 The Cabinet can modify its own structures, alter

policy and inspect and abolish key administrative organs.12 The Cabinet, as opposed to the

Party or the military, is high in power but low in authority, mitigating, to a degree, the former.

However, it is the key actor in economic policy, which has made it a useful scapegoat for failed

policy, second to the Party. Because of its results driven legitimacy it has been a place where

pragmatism has, at times, come before ideology. It is here that the Cabinet is different to the

other top tier organs of the regime. Because it is more pragmatic than ideology driven, it is the

most likely organ to act in the regimes tangible interests but at the same time, silenced for its

relatively loose adherence to the Party line which more rhetorical than practical.

No one assumes a high position in the North without impeccable credentials and to argue that

the Cabinet is a different animal all together neglects some key assumptions. Like anybody,

they compete for influence and their own parochial interests. For the Cabinet, this entails

walking a fine line between achieving policy outcomes that it can be praised for, while working

within the policy framing from the Party and military and also appeasing the Dear Leader.

11

Behnke, A. (2008). Kim Jong Il's North Korea. Minneapolis, MN, Twenty-First Century Books. 12

McEachern, P. (2010). Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics. New York, Columbia University Press.

14

In the early 2000's when the economy took the forefront of the regime's concern, the Cabinet

resisted the ideological chorus from the Party to enhance isolation.13 The Cabinet cautiously

continued to suggest such radical changes as marketization and a price index.14 These

suggestions were overwhelmingly rejected as they were seen to violate the Party direction,

ideology and the state's national security during a time where the North had been accused of

being part of the 'axis of evil' and feared that liberal trade would open doors to the perennial

threat of capitalist thinking.15 Yet North Korean policy is notable for its contradictions and

reversals, as of 2010 and 2011, the North has begun to investigate and agree to economic

projects with the Chinese, in particular, the development of an island on the Yalu river to be

used as a base for logistics, tourism and manufacturing linked to China's industrial complex,

Dandong, Liaoning province.16 Although this region will behave more like a special economic

zone, it is a significant step towards expanding economic connections outside of the domestic-

socialist economy and illustrates a loosening of ideology as pragmatism demands other sources

revenue, especially with a revitalized and costly nuclear program.

The Cabinet may be authority-poor, yet they are often at the sharp end of policy execution and

benefit from the specialization of their staff. For instance, the foreign department is staffed by

a number of old hands who have remained behind the desk as other countries rotate their

envoys. The Cabinet has the ability to influence and frame the policy landscape and their

interests are largely pragmatic as their performance, and favor with the regime, is measured on

results - unlike the military who base their legitimacy on threat, or the Party who claim

legitimacy through the national narrative. Therefore, framing the policy landscape in a less

13

Kim, Y. o.-y., S.-y. o. Ch*oe, et al. (2005). Understanding North Korea's economic reforms / Kim Young-yoon, Choi Soo-young. Seoul, Korea, Center for the North Korean Economy, Korea Institute for National Unification. 14

Ibid. 15

French, P. (2005). North Korea : the paranoid peninsula--a modern history. London ; New York New York, Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan. 16

Chosunilbo (2011). "N.Korea, China Promote Business in Border Area." from http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/09/06/2010090600670.html.

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ideological, but practical sense advances their interests and is reflected in occasional policy that

may otherwise seem contrary, or reverse, to previous policies championed by other regime

bodies.

The Korean Workers Party

Before the 1998 constitution and Kim Il Sung's death, the Korean Workers Party was the core

body in North Korea, it was central to the totalitarian model and was staffed by the trusted

allies of Kim Il Sung, his comrades and was responsible for the ideology of the country and its

strategy.17 Party members were posted to all periphery organs of state to monitor and enforce

the Party line. By the time Kim Jong il took control of the country, however, the Party's

revolutionary calls and socialist ideology began to sound hollow amid the global collapse of

communism. Furthermore, Kim did not enjoy the same revolutionary credentials, or the

charisma, of his father. After the 1998 constitution, the role of the Party declined and was on

par with the military - evidenced in a number of attacks on the Party, one of which included it

being blamed for the famine of the 1990's.18 Kim also abolished the Party's Central People's

Committee and reduced the Party's official personnel by 30 percent, citing the need to

conserve scarce resources.19 Furthermore, Kim executed a number of Party officials, while

leaving the military brass unscathed as he consolidated power. The majority of ministry heads,

however, kept their office which was acquired under Kim Il Sung. But now, their deputies, loyal

to Kim Jong il for their position hold the power.20 Personal relationships to the Dear Leader

became more important than their Party or revolutionary pedigree as Kim did not want to use

the Party as an intermediary to the military. The Party has thus lost a crucial function in guiding

ideology and policy.

17

Park, K.-A. (2010). New challenges of North Korean foreign policy. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 18

McEachern, P. (2010). Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics. New York, Columbia University Press. 19

Ibid. 20

Ibid.

16

Those in the Party remain the ideological custodians of North Korea, yet their power and

authority have waned over time. Their allegiance to the Dear Leader and their revolutionary

and ideological credentials is what gives them their legitimacy. The Party's interests will be to

ensure that socialism is not corrupted with capitalist ideas and to monitor the other state

bodies. Their effectiveness, however, will likely deteriorate after they have served their purpose

of legitimizing Kim Jong un. Using the Party as a scapegoat for policy failure is an effective

means to defer responsibility. Unlike the ministry, the Party is not as integral to the overall

governance of the country. They will therefore seek to enhance their position in the regime, but

will also be cautious of the last time power was transferred from one Kim to the younger. The

Party's objective, therefore, is less to advance its own policy objectives than it will be to pursue

the ability to actually do so. For the Party, their interest is survival itself, not through relevance,

but through being a legitimizing device.

The Kim Family

It is suitable to discuss the Kims last, (albeit briefly, the role of Kim Jong il and his successor Kim

Jong un will be discussed further in later sections) as ultimately; they have the last word on

policy. The post-totalitarian regime is certainly different from that of Kim Il Sung, as Kim Jong il

was unable to govern with the same centrality as his father, for a variety of reasons, and his

successor, Kim Jong un, will likely face the same problems. The regime functionaries of the

military, Party and Cabinet frame the policy debates and imperatives for the Kims. Although the

ultimate decision will be made by the Dear Leader, the decisions presented to him will be a

product of who has managed to attain the most influence in the debates within the

bureaucracy. This power to present the context by which Kim makes his decision cannot be

underestimated as the policy options will not only be a product of North Korean strategy,

aligned to ideology or pragmatic strategic imperatives, but also the interests of the regime

organ that championed the policy initiative.

Kim Jong il faced the challenge of inheriting a country that was perennially on the brink of

collapse. Not only did he need to consolidate power and purge those who might turn against

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him, Kim also had to keep the country afloat.21 Kim Jong il's interests, as an individual, are

unique - not only is his survival dependent on the existence of 'North Korea' but also on the

survival of the monopoly of power within the regime. So too will be Kim Jong un's interests,

which he is now rushing to secure in what many have suggested is a less than ideal amount of

time to be in a grooming period (compared to his father).22 Kim Jong il initially pursed a policy

of power consolidation before having the means to make major policy decisions on the issue of

regime security through foreign and economic policy. For the Kims, establishing personal power

and authority and deciding on what economic and foreign policy decisions to make (framed by

the military, Party and Cabinet) are the two core strategic imperatives of the tenure.

A lot of political interests are converging in Asia. It is politically advantageous for China the

United States Japan and South Korea appear to be progressing on the North Korean issue as

each of these countries are, or will be, experiencing a leadership transition or consolidation

themselves. The recent inertia towards dialogue with North Korea must be viewed in this

context. But it must also be viewed in the sense that North Korean policy does not emanate

from a single source. Kim may have the last word, but his words are selected from those that he

is presented with. The top tier bodies of North Korea each have their own strategy for survival

and for the survival of the state. Each body has something to lose, and will lose everything in

the event of war or re-unification. Therefore, delaying these two options is the primary strategy

for the current leaders in their lifetime, for parochial reasons, but also for the regime survival of

North Korea in the long-term. It is harder to predict short-term personal decisions than it is to

forecast the systemic trends of a century. For North Korea, therefore, it is essential that we

analyzed the domestic issues and power struggles that exist within the regime before we

discuss its strategy as a whole.

21

Lim, J.-C. (2009). Kim Jong Il's leadership of North Korea. London ; New York, Routledge. 22

Ibid.

18

The next section will look at how these domestic power struggles have manifested in foreign

policy, in particular, the recent examples of military dominated policy that looks to extend the

redline for conventional attack, while maintaining the character of a country on the brink of

collapse - dangerous and worth negotiating with.

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Section 2 - Strategies of Survival

North Korean strategy is a mix of domestic and external inputs, history and threat perception.

For a state that is still technically at war with the United States and South Korea, regime survival

is the top item of the state agenda. The dominant voice in North Korean policy framing is the

military, for them, the security of North Korea, and of themselves, can only be guaranteed

through nuclear deterrence. For others in the regime, a non-aggression agreement with the

United States would be preferable, or at least, more pragmatic. Policy consistency is not

necessarily North Korea's modus operandi, and one can expect to see a number of competing,

but also complimentary, strategies designed to maintain the regime. Furthermore, Kim Jong il's

ability to keep both strategies viable demonstrates the authority he wields. As we have seen in

the past, North Korea uses (conventional) military brinkmanship, diplomacy and nuclear

weapons development as the cornerstone to their foreign and defense policy. In light of the

previous section's assessment of the North Korean domestic actors who influence policy, and

the conclusion that the military will have a stronger position relative to the Party or Cabinet,

this section will look at the means the North have gone to in order to maintain personal, regime

and national security. Given that the military's primary objective is to ensure this imperative, it

is suitable that both conventional and nuclear weapon deterrence come under their command.

However, diplomacy is far from abandoned and the experienced officials in the Cabinet have

pursued an agenda influenced not only by Kim, but their own interests. This section will assess

how successful these strategies have been thus far and their future potential, based on their

strengths and weaknesses.

Conventional Military Brinkmanship

North Korea's conventional forces, although significant in number, are largely outmatched vis-

à-vis the technological superiority of South Korean and U.S. forces.23 The North's conventional

23

Pervis, L. B. (2007). North Korea issues : nuclear posturing, saber rattling, and international mischief. New York, Nova Science Publishers.

20

strength lies primarily in its permanent artillery batteries that can strike Seoul and as a

defensive force. The rapidity by which these installations can attack lends itself well to

brinkmanship tactics as capability is near-assured. Although the nuclear program is often

mentioned in the same breath as North Korean conventional brinkmanship, it must be

distinguished not only because of the nature of nuclear weapons, but more so because the

capability has simply not yet been realized and the strategy behind the program is

fundamentally different.24

The influence of the military in North Korean policy formulation has kept conventional

brinkmanship at the top of the North Korean strategic agenda as it satisfies the existential

concerns of the military and has been the single most effective deterrent strategy in the North

Korean arsenal. In line with the previous section's assertion that the military's parochial

interests may be manifested in certain North Korean brinkmanship behaviour, is the possible

that the sinking of the Cheonan was designed to scuttle diplomatic negotiations between the

North and the West. Senior Chinese officials are convinced that hardliners in Pyongyang

orchestrated the Rangoon bombing to subvert secret diplomatic negotiations in Beijing

between US and North Korean diplomats.25 It’s entirely possible that history has repeated itself.

The rationality behind brinkmanship is underpinned by the conception that two (or more)

actors elevate the stakes of conflict to a degree whereby one is sufficiently deterred to the

point where they can no longer risk the outbreak of conflict. In essence, brinkmanship is the

exploitation of a security dilemma. North Korea has been able to use this strategy

asymmetrically though its capability to annihilate Seoul, despite its relatively weak capacity to

win a conventional land-invasion war. This position is enhanced by the myriad of strategic

interests on the peninsula that overwhelmingly favor averting war - allowing the North to

provoke and escalate tensions without the commensurate risk of retaliation. At the core of this

24

Cha, V. D. (2005). Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. New York, Columbia University Press. 25

Cronin, P. (2010). "DPRK Hardliners Sink Talks?". from http://the-diplomat.com/2010/05/21/dprk-hardliners-sink-talks/.

21

strategy is the ability to stall diplomacy and deter military action, with the opportunity to gain

small victories in aid and raise tension between allies (South Korea and the United States in

particular). In doing so, the North wins its most precious prize, time.

The ability to use brinkmanship to maintain a status quo, as opposed to change it, is a tactic,

rather than a strategy. Time is the most valuable resource to the North because it facilitates the

development of nuclear weapons. Thus far, the tactic has worked despite changes in

government in both South Korea and the United states, each of which has had significant

variances in their North Korea policy.26 More recently, the sinking of the Cheonan and the

attack on Yeonpyeong Island highlighted the North's ability to engage in acts of war without

serious retaliation. Although the North kept to already disputed territory in the case of

Yeonpyeong, and flat out denies its responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan, both serve as

examples of the brinkmanship tactics the North uses to escalate, negotiate and stalemate, in

that order, any progress on the fundamental issues on the peninsula. In addition to the ability

to buy time, the North has been able to extend the redline for retaliation and drive a wedge

between Washington and Seoul over the United States willingness to respond to Seoul's

security concerns.

Enhancing North Korean military brinkmanship is the perception of the North as an

unpredictable and dangerous actor, capable of destroying Seoul at any moment, or collapsing

and creating a geopolitical crisis in the region. In effect, North Korea has been able to act

relatively unimpeded to draw attention to issues it sees unfavorable, such as the position of the

maritime northern limit line, while encouraging other actors not to provoke the perceived hair

trigger on its artillery batteries - and if all else fails, stall the progression of dialogue and buy

time for the nuclear program.27 This strategy has also enhanced the domestic value of the

26

Scobell, A., J. M. Sanford, et al. (2007). North Korea's military threat : Pyongyang's conventional forces, weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles. Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 27

Fuqua, J. L. (2007). Nuclear endgame : the need for engagement with North Korea. Westport, Conn., Praeger Security International.

22

military, increased their prestige and maintained the conception of threat that facilitates the

'songun' policy, ergo framing the North's foreign policy on a war footing.

Despite the overwhelming benefits of the North's successful brinkmanship strategy, it also has

its pitfalls. Fundamentally a threat is not worth anything unless it is credible; at some point, the

aggressive Party may have to substantiate its claim and prove its commitment through action.

For North Korea, going beyond otherwise periphery conventional attacks by using its artillery

installations aimed at Seoul would undoubtedly warrant a severe military response, one which

the North could not survive if China did not assist it significantly.

Chronology of North Korean Brinkmanship28

Submarine Infiltration in East Sea September 18, 1996

North Korean submarine deploys several agents off the coast south of Gangneung to gain information on the South Korean air force. Mission aborted due to bad weather but a manhunt for the North Koreans resulted in 24 of the 26 crew/agents dead as well as 13 South Korean soldiers and 4 civilians. A South Korean diplomat working in Russia assassinated days later.

ROK Response: President Kim Young-sam banned aid to the North and civilian/business exchanges. South Korea also condemned the attack at the United Nations, calling on other countries to respond and cooperate. North Korea eventually apologized for the incident and the South returned the ashes of the 24 dead North Koreans at Panmunjom.

First Battle of Yeonpyeong June 15, 1999

The North Korean navy crossed the Northern Limit Line on several occasions during June 7-15th. South Korea responded conducted ramming maneuvers to force the ships back across the NLL, sinking one torpedo vessel on June 15th. North Korean boats were severely damaged killing 30 North Koreans. Nine South Korean servicemen were injured and two patrol boats were slightly damaged.

U.S. Response: The U.S. deployed an Aegis-class cruiser, electronic warfare aircraft and antisubmarine aircraft to South Korea. North Korea suspended contact with South Korea.

Second Battle of Yeonpyeong June 29, 2002

North Korean patrol vessels allegedly crossed the NLL in the Yellow Sea, opening fire on a South Korean patrol vessel, killing six

ROK Response South Korean armed forces “strengthened security preparedness.” South Korea received U.S. approval to use pre-

28 CSIS (2010). "North Korea's Provocations."

23

South Koreans and injuring nine. One South Korean speed boat was destroyed and a North Korean vessel also caught fire and is believed to have been sunk.

emptive force against intruding North Korean ships.

Battle of Daecheong November 10, 2009

South Korean forces issued three verbal warnings to a ship from the North once it had crossed the NLL and then fired a warning shot. The North Korean vessel continued southward, the South Koreans then opened fire. The North Koreans returned fire before heading back after their ship was damaged in the exchange. One North Korean sailor was killed and three wounded.

ROK Response: South Korean Prime Minister Chun called the incident “accidental.” The North threatened merciless retaliation. South Korea sent additional naval ships near disputed waters and put its military on heightened alert.

Sinking of the Cheonan March 26, 2010

The ROK Navy corvette Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea just south of the disputed Northern Limit Line near Baengnyeong Island after an explosion in the ship’s stern ripped it in two. Of the 104 South Korean sailors on board, 58 were rescued; 46 are dead or remain missing. The explosion was later determined by an international investigation to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

ROK Response: All inter-Korean trade, save the Kaesong Industrial Complex, will be severed, and North Korean merchant vessels will be barred from using South Korean sea lanes. South Korea also will restart its propaganda campaign across the DMZ.

Shelling of Yeonpyeong November 23 2010

North Korean artillery shelled the South Korean-controlled island south of the NLL from positions on the North Korean mainland. Homes were destroyed and at least two South Korean soldiers were killed. South Korean artillery responded in kind, and South Korean F-16 fighter jets were scrambled. The attacks were forewarned by the North in an attempt to deter military exercises in the region.

New sanctions issued against North Korea. Military exercises continued. After what seemed like a divergence of perceptions between allies, South Korea and the United States agreed to an enhanced schedule of military exercises overtime. South Korea establishes Northwest Islands Defense Command

North Korea's 2009 nuclear test failed to produce the results it desired in terms of economic aid

and diplomatic concessions.29 This was a primary impetus to the sinking of the Cheonan and

shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Furthermore, the disclosure of the light-water reactor and

uranium enrichment facilities in the North attracted the attention the regime had hoped for,

29

Stone, J. (2011). Catalytic Diplomacy: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. New York, Catalytic Diplomacy.

24

but the response was perhaps not what it anticipated. Instead of opening opportunities for a

change to the status quo, Seoul and the United States responded, after some concern regarding

the alliance's solidarity, with military exercises in the East China Sea as a show of force and

commitment.30

North Korea's military brinkmanship is used in union with its diplomatic strategy, and one

should look at them as complementing arms of North Korean foreign policy despite their

divergent domestic custodians. In the previous section I argued that the military have little time

for diplomacy, fearing that any agreement reached with the U.S., as it was between Kim Jong il

and Madeline Albright, the United States could easily decide to change its posture, as it did

under George Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech.31 Therefore North Korean diplomacy deserves its

own assessment of strengths and a weakness, taking into account the fact it is trapped in a

purgatory between being a sidearm of the overall military strategy and having the potential to

actually resolve core issues on the peninsula.

Diplomacy

When diplomatic negotiations do occur, they will often become stalled after the North's

demands are not met.32 Only when the North has negotiated bilaterally with the United States,

officially, have concessions been made by the North in exchange for aid.33 However, as the

previous section outlined, the ability for domestic actors to change, even reverse, policy is

commensurate with their favor in the regime and their authority. Ideally, North Korea would

attain a guarantee from the West of a non-aggression pact, this would negate the need for the

costly nuclear program, meaning the state could allocate resources to other sectors of society

and work on rebuilding the economy. The military would rather 'go down fighting' than be

30

Yonhap (2011). "S. Korean, U.S. marines to hold joint drill on Yellow Sea islands." from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/02/22/11/0301000000AEN20110222004700315F.HTML. 31

Park, K.-A. (2010). New challenges of North Korean foreign policy. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 32

Stone, J. (2011). Catalytic Diplomacy: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. New York, Catalytic Diplomacy. 33

Ford, G. and S. Kwon (2008). North Korea on the brink : struggle for survival. London ; Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press.

25

purged and made scapegoats of the regime; thus, the nuclear gambit is more preferable to the

diplomatic resolution. This domestic disharmony is also reactive to the external environment

and diplomatic climate. If the United States is overly hawkish, the KPA is able to enhance both

the perception of threat to the regime and its own legitimacy. If, however, the United States is

more conciliatory in its tone and offers bilateral negotiation, the chance that a peace

agreement can be reached is enhanced. Either way, Kim Jong il keeps both these strategies in

his playbook, and despite being mutually exclusive in the long-term, Kim has managed to keep

both options viable by exploiting the need for his favor within the regime.

Kim Jong il stated at his October 2009 meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that “hostile

relations between the DPRK and the United States should be converted into peaceful ties

through bilateral talks without fail.”34 The United States sees brinkmanship as provocation, and

refuses to 'reward' the North with the negotiations it desires.35 However, North Korea's policy

of military brinkmanship is intended to attract negotiation, emphasizing that now is the best

time to make deals with the North, before it becomes full nuclear power and enjoys increased

leverage. Complicating this dynamic is the competing interests of the North Korean military and

the Cabinet. Whereas the military would care very little about negotiation due to their inherent

distrust of the diplomatic system, especially with the West, the Cabinet has a greater proclivity

to see negotiation as a means to keep the regime afloat. Furthermore, they are the members

who engage in the actual negotiations. When negotiations do occur, the military are inclined to

frame and influence the North Korean agenda, derailing and stalling talks, that in turn, put a

hiatus on engagement and allow the nuclear program to progress until it reaches a stage, (or a

conventional attack is used,) to repeat the process all over again.36

34

Delury, J. (2011). "Analytical Failure and the North Korean Quagmire." from http://38north.org/2011/04/quagmire/. 35

Ibid. 36

Taylor, B. (2010). Sanctions as grand strategy. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, for The International Institute of Strategic Studies.

26

The advantage of diplomacy for the North Korean regime is that it provides the best means for

normalizing relations with the United States by making concessions on its nuclear program. The

overwhelming desire of all relevant actors is for a peaceful resolution to the issue on the

peninsula. Diplomacy, if sincere, would finally allow the North to enter the community of

nations where it can be rewarded for responsible domestic behaviour. In practice, diplomacy

has enabled the North to gain significant aid deals, (most of which are now suspended)

highlight the differences between Washington and Seoul and extend the time horizon for the

regime. However, when George W. Bush Jr. labeled the regime as part of the Axis of Evil, the

chances of successful diplomatic dialogue were severely diminished and changed the North

Korean foreign policy accordingly.

The current diplomatic climate now hinges on the North demonstrating it wishes to be a

responsible actor by making moves to de-escalate tensions on the border and dismantle its

nuclear program. Considering military brinkmanship has been used as a precursor to

negotiations, attracting attention to what the North sees as an unsatisfactory status quo,

Washington's strategy of relying on Pyongyang to demonstrate first and talk later undermines

their traditional modus operandi. Washington and Seoul are treating the resumption of talks as

a reward for North Korea, which underscores a fundamental under-appreciation of the

divergence in domestic intentions.37 For Pyongyang, dialogue and negotiation are a means to

an end, not ends-in-themselves. What Kim Jong il and the Cabinet want from the talks is

security assurances, primarily through the termination of hostile relations and diplomatic

normalization with the United States. Providing for the security of the regime would in turn

create conditions conducive to a more successful push at economic development. However, the

North will continue to develop a nuclear program quite openly in the absence of talks -

undermining what the West ultimately wants - denuclearization. North Korea is also looking for

asymmetrical advantages in the arms race with South Korea—whose reported annual defense

spending ($25.9 billion in 2010) nearly equals the estimated GDP ($27.3 billion in 2010) of

37

Delury, J. (2011). "Analytical Failure and the North Korean Quagmire." from http://38north.org/2011/04/quagmire/.

27

North Korea.38 North Korea’s “uranium breakout” during the early Obama Administration,

much like its plutonium breakout in George W. Bush’s first term, is a consequence of

misreading North Korean motivation, ignoring its security interests in negotiations, and treating

engagement as a reward instead of a means to resolve the issue.

A considerable amount of inertia has been accumulating towards the resumption of six Party

talks as the North Korean regime recognizes its poor economic condition, knows it doesn’t have

the full support of China and Russia and it is feeling the strain of isolation more every day. The

overriding policy impetus of late is succession, which will be discussed to greater extent in the

next section. Diplomacy has been a tactical, opportunistic tool for the North, but is undermined

by a strategic disharmony domestically and misread externally.

Nuclear Weapons

North Korea does not possess any Nuclear weapons. The ability to scale a nuclear device down

to warhead size, and then mount it on a robust delivery platform is a quantum leap from the

relatively crude nuclear devices (not weapons) the North has tested. This is the primary

weakness in the nuclear strategy so far, the strategy has not yet manifested into a tangible

deterrent threat. North Korean deterrence relies solely on its conventional forces. Its nuclear

potential is used as an escalating tool to compel the West to normalize relations. It took North

Korea extensive Soviet assistance with both civilian and military nuclear technology and more

than 50 years to get to the point where it could test a device in 2009 that by most accounts was

unsuccessful.39 Though subject to international sanctions, Pyongyang was able to accomplish

this with facilities that were never bombed and the industrial resources of the entire nation.

The second disadvantage to the North's nuclear strategy is cost. To facilitate the development

of nuclear weapons North Korea will have to devote ever increasing amounts of funds towards

the program, at the expense of social services under the rhetoric of Songun. As domestic

38

Ibid. 39

STRATFOR (2008). "Nuclear Weapons: Terrorism and the Nonstate Actor." from http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/nuclear_weapons_terrorism_and_nonstate_actor.

28

conditions worsen, more funds will also be needed to maintain the security apparatus designed

to prevent domestic dissent, (under the command of the Party, but enforced by the military).

Domestic obedience is already showing signs of resistance, especially in the northern regions

where those already deemed untrustworthy suffer the most (this is expected as many of these

exiles have little to nothing to lose, whereas those in Pyongyang wouldn't dare give up their

relatively privileged existence).40 The economic conditions in North Korea are hard to predict

and of central concern to the five other nations of the six Party talks is the possibility that the

North will sell nuclear weapon technology to outside actors. This has prompted China to look at

ways to prop up the North Korean economy without risking that the spoils of industry won't be

directed to the nuclear program.

Regime preservation is the cornerstone to the North's nuclear capability. Therefore, it is quite

conceivable that the military might construe even the most limited military strikes against

targets directly related to missile development or a nuclear program as an act threatening the

regime, and therefore one that necessitates a fierce response. Regime survival could very easily

entail a full, unlimited reprisal by the military to any strike whatsoever on North Korean soil.

North Korea has dug a number of tunnels at its nuclear test site in Punggye Ri, North Hamgyong

province, which the South Korean government says indicates that it is “obvious North Korea is

preparing for a third nuclear test,” adding that it is more likely the North will choose to test a

plutonium device as it has already reveled the existence of a modern uranium enrichment

facility.41 The successful detonation of a plutonium device would indicate that the North have

been able to make serious ground in their nuclear program as devices of this nature are

significantly more sophisticated by their ability to implode plutonium to reach a critical mass,

rather than a 'gun-type' uranium device.

40

Martin, B. K. (2004). Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. New York, Thomas Dunne Books. , International., A. (2011). "Images reveal scale of North Korean political prison camps." from http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps-2011-05-03. 41

Financial-Times (2010). "N Korea reveals new uranium facility." from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df1aee1c-f529-11df-a809-00144feab49a.html#axzz1PQtX7eqr.

29

The strength of the current nuclear program is that it acts as a leverage point for diplomatic

negotiation. The North is able to use nuclear tests as evidence that the time horizon for the

West to make peace guarantees is shortening. The North can agree to dismantle or allow

inspectors to the nuclear program in exchange for essential aid agreements, or ideally a peace

agreement. When the North's demands are not met it can happily continue the program. The

strategy is as its strongest when Kim is able to maintain two otherwise mutually exclusive

strategies. The regime has made minor concessions on its nuclear weapons program in return

for aid, while simultaneously maintaining enough of the program so that it can be easily

resumed. But this has also undermined any peace agreement attempts due to the lack of trust

and verification.

Nuclear weapons programs are rarely given up easily; equally as rare is the accession of states

to the nuclear club in a post NPT world. For the North to relinquish the program, it would need

firm assurance of its survival. Its conventional deterrence remains strong and has endured,

however, maintaining its credibility will diminish with time. Analysts have argued that the

nuclear program has gone from bargaining tool to a fully implemented policy of reaching

capability.42 If this is the case, it would be a reflection on the militaries increased role within the

regime as it advances its own interests and what it perceives to be the best interests of the

country. However, as this paper has argued, the nuclear capability simply isn’t there, yet.43

Another core oversight is that the North Korean nuclear program isn't just about weapons. The

North has a legitimate energy shortage and a nuclear powered industry helps address the

country's economic concern. The North may be convinced to sacrifice the weapons program if a

suitable package is offered and the military can be kept in line, but sacrificing its legitimate

42

Hecker, S. S. (2010). "where is North Korea’s Nuclear Program Heading?" Physics and Society 40(2). 43

The North has demonstrated its ability to produce plutonium, and to make a device using HEU as the fissile material. A fully capable weapons system is better suited to using Pu as its fissile material, however it is also more difficult. Using HEU on the other hand will augment their arsenal faster and (fearfully) provide export opportunities.

30

civilian applications is a whole other issue, but one that due to the dual use nature of nuclear

power, will endure as a source of distrust between the North and the West.

North Korean strategy has shown that few things remain permanent. As anti-ballistic missile

technology advances, the credibility of a nuclear program, operational or otherwise, diminishes

further. If North Korea becomes a nuclear state, it will encourage other countries to follow suit,

Iran for instance. One must remember the strategic imperatives of North Korea and nuclear

weapons may be seen to be the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, but if this program, in its

development, is worth more as a trade off than it is as a fully realized capability, the option of

dismantlement remains valuable. Yet this dilemma illustrates one of the core arguments of this

paper - within North Korea, there are certain actors who have their own parochial interests to

advance. For the military, this is to preserve the program, for others, having the program as a

device to achieve a diplomatic peace makes it as valuable as a fully realized capability. For Kim

Jong il, having both options open, effectively dividing and conquering the relative state organs,

enhances his own position during the regime's most vulnerable period ahead of succession.

Kim has been able to keep these two options viable for a number of years. However, when Kim

Jong un eventually inherits the regime, the risk that the military will come to dominate the

North Korean policy sphere means that the diplomatic option could diminish. Furthermore, the

North may overestimate the strength of nuclear deterrence if significant progress is made in

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology. In light of this, it is possible that the North could

continue the program until it can either no longer afford to do so, or until a satisfactory offer is

issued by the West for normalization of relations and a peace agreement. Reaching this stage

will depend on how actors inside the regime, other than the military, can frame the policy

options to Kim Jong un or his father. For now, it seems unlikely that such a change in perception

will take place. These questions also depend considerably on how the West and South Korea

conceptualize the North Korean threat.

31

While Kim Jong il has maintained his considerable authority over his regime subordinates, the

conventional brinkmanship policy has prevented any military action being made against the

North. Meanwhile, the nuclear program has served as a complement to the diplomatic strategy

in a pattern of escalation, negotiation and stalemate - ultimately buying time. Whether Kim

Jong un will be able to maintain this practice will depend on his ability to keep the interests of

each domestic actor in check. Naturally, if the nuclear weapons program makes significant

ground, Jong Un will be forced to make the call between running the regime as a nuclear state,

or cashing in on the program diplomatically when it is at its most valuable. This assumes the

external situation remains static. Amid an increasingly tense Asia Pacific, this is unlikely.

Therefore, the next section will analyze how the external, regional environment will impact on

the North's options for regime survival and succession.

32

Section 3 - Threat, Succession and External Forces

For a country so isolated, North Korea is very conspicuous. The amount of attention North

Korea receives from the press, academia and governments is significant, but is it commensurate

with the threat it projects? At the beginning of this paper, it was argued that the North portrays

itself as a nation on the verge of a domestic collapse, and could have unpredictable and severe

consequences for its neighbors and the United States. This threat is conveyed to both compel

those involved not to accelerate this end and to also assist in its prevention by giving aid to the

North Korean regime. Enhancing the strategy is the inability of the global community to reach a

consensus on the conceptualization of threat. Therefore, it is argued that the North exploit the

insecurity of otherwise much larger and more powerful nations.

This section will deal with the external forces that affect the situation on the Korean peninsula

and persist through the transition of power from Kim Jong il to Kim Jong un. Already, North

Korea has been subject to issues of out its control, such as China's 'rise,' the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the death of Kim Il Sung, Japan's rearmament and being designated as part of the

'Axis of Evil.' All these events had a serious impact on North Korean's own policy but so too on

the conception of the North Korean issue by external actors. Current factors that exist in the

region, as well as the trajectory of certain issues, such as Sino-U.S. relations and South Korean

economic prosperity, will have serious effects on the North Korean condition. For the purpose

of this paper, it is essential to understand how actors within North Korea will conceptualize the

security issues on the region.

North Korea's core strategic imperative is regime survival, thus national security is

fundamentally based on the perception of threats to the regime. The North's historical

insecurity has seen it maximize its conventional deterrence threat and develop a nuclear one.

This section will assess how North Korean threat perception has differed between actors,

namely the United Sates, South Korea and China. In doing so it will illustrate the strategy Kim

Jong il has implemented to assist a successful regime succession.

33

We must first isolate, to a degree, the threats originating from the North Korean regime as:

Conventional military threats

Threats related nuclear weapons

Threats of becoming a failed state

Each of these threats will be conceptualized differently between different actors. Furthermore,

differences in the conceptualization of threat can and has created issues between

governments, even allies.

As mentioned in earlier sections, the North relies heavily on its conventional deterrence

underpinned by its ability to shell Seoul to prevent any attempt to take Pyongyang. It maintains

this brinkmanship policy to enhance and maintain the extraordinary measures domestically to

convince the public that the post totalitarian model is legitimized by a clear and present threat.

The North's perception of security is therefore influenced both domestically and externally. For

the regime, not only is there the threat of reunification, which would invariably see the regime

collapse, but also, domestic revolution. The Arab Spring has demonstrated the swiftness and

severity of mass demonstration. Although these are very different countries with very different

realities, it is worth appreciating how little warning was heard before the insurgencies.

Similarly, the world was shocked when Germany reunified, this sentiment was echoed by South

Korean President Lee Myung Bak who told a meeting of the National Unification Advisory

Council that "we must prepare for unification as if it will come tomorrow."44

Seoul and Washington

In escalating the perception of threat domestically, the North enhances its regime legitimacy.

Internationally, the regime is perceived as weak but dangerous with the ability to involve bigger

powers should it collapse. It is therefore beneficial to avoid war, but at the same time, 44

DailyNK (2011). "Lee Backs Regular Trips To China." from http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=7736.

34

discourage a nuclear potential within an unstable state. Unfortunately, for much of the 2000's

Washington and Seoul's conceptualization of the North Korean threat were largely divergent.

Washington's Neo-Conservatives were at the height of their power following the Sept. 11

attacks and the Axis of Evil speech by George Bush Jr. Meanwhile, the left-leaning '386'

generation constituted the political elite in Seoul.45 South Korea was frustrated by the

unilateralism of the United States and felt Washington was underappreciate of the direct threat

of North Korean artillery to Seoul.46 Furthermore, there was a strong degree of anti-American

sentiment in the South related to base deployments and various incidents related to U.S.

personnel.47 Washington on the other hand, preoccupied with the threat of Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) saw the North Korean nuclear program and the potential for the transfer of

nuclear material and technology as an existential threat to national security.48 Maintaining an

almost opposite North Korean policy than that of Bill Clinton, Bush Jr.'s North Korea strategy

actually encouraged the North Korean nuclear weapons program as its unilateral actions in Iraq

and rhetoric of regime change enhanced the North's own perception of security for the

worse.49

These divergent perceptions of security are a product not only of the personalities of

incumbent leaders, i.e. the 386 generation in Seoul and the Neo-cons in Washington, but also

the geopolitical reality of Seoul's proximity to Pyongyang and its role as a regional middle

power. This is in contrast to the United States who is a global superpower with global reach and

45

Roehrig, T. (2006). From deterrence to engagement : the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books. 46

Shin, G.-W. (2010). One alliance, two lenses : U.S.-Korea relations in a new era. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. 47

Ibid. 48

Burns, R. D. (2010). The missile defense systems of George W. Bush : a critical assessment. Santa Barbara, Calif., Praeger Security International. 49

Cimbala, S. J. (2009). "North Korea and the Nuclear Danger: Context and Policy Options." Defense and Security Analysis 25(4): 393-412.

35

who acts as the regional balancer in Northeast Asia with its various deployments and nuclear

umbrella, i.e. 'extended deterrence.'50 A better consensus began to emerge as of 2005 to 2007

with a number of bilateral agreements such as the…

Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula (2005)

Summary Report of the Joint Vision Study - addressing the modernization of the alliance, (2006)

9.19 agreement in 2005 and the 2.13 action plan in 2007 regarding the Six Party Talks.

Together, these agreements sought to align South Korean and U.S. policy towards North Korea

in six key objectives,51

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula

normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations

normalization of DPRK-Japan relations

economy and energy cooperation

Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula

These objectives sought to simultaneously resolve the inter-Korean issues and address nuclear

proliferation. However, what otherwise looked like a unified step in the right direction,

reconciling South Korean and American conceptions of the North Korean threat, were

undermined by the North's domestic problem in guaranteeing regime survival - not from

outside actors, but from within, as it became apparent in 2010 that Kim Jong un would succeed

his father and enhancing his legitimacy as a leader was essential. This legitimacy was earned

through apparent responsibility for the Yeonpyeong shelling.52 But, these agreements, along

50

Kim, Y.-h. (2011). North Korean foreign policy : security dilemma and succession. Lanham, Lexington Books. 51

deGategno, J. S. a. P. (2008). " U.S. ROK Areas of of Consensus Interim Report." Perspectives on Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia The Atlandtic Council of the United States. 52

Kim, T. (2010). "Korean Peninsula at a New Juncture of War and Peace: Between Aggressive Deterrent and Escalating Risk of War." from http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/korean-peninsula-at-a-new-juncture-of-war-and-peace-between-aggressive-deterrent-and-escalating-risk-of-war.

36

with several before it, were victim to the same inherent problems of implementation

verification, and essentially, trust.

The Swiss-educated, youngest son of Kim Jong il, Kim Jong un, will need the support of the

military and the legitimacy provided by the Party if the transition is to be successful.

Furthermore, it is far better for the survival of the Kims as the custodians of the regime, and for

the survival of North Korea as a state, if he inherits a relatively strong country relative to its

current condition.

This paper is being written at a time when the North has performed two of its most daring and

provocative acts since attacking the presidential Blue House in Seoul and capturing the U.S. spy

ship Pueblo in 1968. The North has denied responsibility for sinking the Cheonan, allegedly on

the advice on China that no retaliation can be made if they continue to deny responsibility - but

was soon followed by the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.53

To many, this act was an attempt to bloody Kim Jong un and to earn him legitimacy amongst

the military as the strategist behind the attack. If this is the case, the attack, as mentioned in

the second section, was spectacularly successful. The third part of the succession strategy

(enhancing the KPA being the first) is to strengthen the country economically. These strategies

will however be influenced by the primary actor in shaping the North Korean security

conception, the United States.

53

JoonAngIlbo (2011). "China’s no to Kim’s request." from http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2935931.

37

The United States

A major factor affecting how North Korea calculates its position as well as the whole issue of

denuclearization is the role of the United States and how Washington manages to address (or

doesn't) the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Washington chooses not to 'reward' the North for

its belligerence, i.e. hold bilateral negotiations after tension has been escalated.54 This is done

to counter the North Korean strategy of appearing weak yet dangerous - but worth negotiating

with. The strategy is deployed when the North feels most isolated and insecure - a position

enhanced by various sanctions against the regime.

These sanctions, however, are largely ineffective at deterring the regime away from

belligerence. They in fact enhance the perception by the North that nuclear weapons must be

pursued, and that the United States is hostile.

U.S President Barack Obama cited the Cheonan attack and the North's nuclear and missile tests

in a letter to Congress explaining sanctions put into effect August 2010 that froze the assets of

four individuals, three companies and five government agencies.55 One of these agencies is

believed to include Office 39, a secret Party organization tasked with raising funds, often

though illegal operations, to finance Kim Jong il's decadent demands. U.S. State Department

special adviser on arms control and nonproliferation issues, Robert Einhorn, said that the

sanctions “are not directed at the people of North Korea, but at their leaders,” and expressed

the need to signal to the North Korean regime that “provocative behaviour will not go

unpunished.”56

54

Delury, J. (2011). "Analytical Failure and the North Korean Quagmire." from http://38north.org/2011/04/quagmire/. 55

Newby, A. (2010). "Obama administration announces new sanctions against North Korea." from http://csis.org/blog/obama-administration-announces-new-sanctions-against-north-korea. 56

Ibid.

38

The United States has found it difficult to remain consistent on North Korean policy. The Agreed

Framework of 1994 looked promising with assurances by Washington it would not use nuclear

weapons against the North, diplomatic relations would be normalized and North Korea's

graphite-moderated 5MWe nuclear reactor, and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under

construction would be replaced with two 1000MW light water reactors (LWR) power plants by

2003.57 These agreements were never successfully implemented due to an enduring suspicion

by the United States that the North was maintaining a uranium enrichment program. In light of

delays to the construction of the LWR, the North threatened that if significant progress was not

made, it would restart its enrichment program.

When the implementation of the agreed frame work failed, Six Party Talks looked to be a

possible avenue for the resolution of the Korean crisis - which to the United States is first and

foremost the dismantlement (and importantly, verification) of the North Korean nuclear

program. Six Party talks appeared to be working late in 2007 when the North agreed to a

package that saw aid, security assurances and advancement along the road to state recognition

in exchange for nuclear dismantlement.58 The short to mid-term implementation of this

agreement encountered the same problems as the agreed framework. Even when both

Washington and Pyongyang agree on the ultimate goal, decades of mistrust combined with the

fear in the North of losing its most precious bargaining tool lead to the problematic

implementation of agreements. The United States shows little sympathy for this reality and is

rather quick to declare the agreement as failed, not wanting to appear as appeasing the regime,

bringing the situation back to where it started.

Complicating this dynamic is the conceptual problem that the United States applies coercive

diplomacy, thinking it can deter the North from behaving aggressively in their region. Not only

57

Fuqua, J. L. (2007). Nuclear endgame : the need for engagement with North Korea. Westport, Conn., Praeger Security International. 58

Niksch, L. A. and T*ongil Y*on*guw*on (Korea) (2005). Implementing the Six-Party joint statement and the Korean Peninsula. Seoul, Korea Institute for National Unification.

39

does this engender the hawkish regime in the North - giving increased legitimacy to a nuclear

program and escalating the perception of U.S. hostility, it also neglects to acknowledge that the

North can endure these sanctions because of assistance from China that would rather see

North Korea stabilized.

China

China accounts for over half of North Korea's total trade, which has tripled between the two

countries over the last decade.59 Enhancing North Korean economic stability is a core strategic

imperative, second only to regime survival as it provides regime legitimacy, the means to

strengthen the military, less reliance on aid (not to mention some vague manifestation of Juche

- self-reliance) and the ability to provide some of the basic necessities to its people, staving off

domestic dissent. Economic stability will enhance Kim Jong un's legitimacy and will be an

attempt by Jong il to equip his son with a better starting position than he inherited, or at least,

make up for the relatively short grooming period Jong Un had to his father.

For China, North Korea is a buffer state. However, it is unlike the buffer regions of Inner

Mongolia or Tibet, to lose North Korea through domestic collapse or international intervention

would result in U.S. troops on its own border, and closer to Beijing than it would be

comfortable with. Therefore, China will seek to stabilize North Korea economically. This mutual

goal will also help Kim Jong un inherit some essential diplomatic and economic relations with

China as he takes control. However, Kim Jong ill's most recent visit, despite the rhetoric, may

indicate that China and the North are still at odds on some issues and perhaps China was not

the economic bonanza Kim had hoped for. South Korean sources have said that Kim was

unhappy with the amount of economic agreements China had inked.60 Also, during his Kim's

second trip to China last May, 2010 (the most recent in May 2011 being the third) it was

59

Snyder, S. (2009). China's rise and the two Koreas : politics, economics, security. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers. 60

ChosunIlbo (2011). "Miffed Kim Jong-il Pares Down Entourage for Meeting with Hu ". from http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/27/2011052701127.html.

40

rumored that China had refused to send the North 30 Jianjiji Hongzhaji fighter-bombers, aka

'Flying Leopards,' loaded with C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles, among other weapons, that

had been requested by Kim.61 All this comes at a time when since South Korea cut its food aid

program in 2008, the North is more dependent on China than ever. Without liberalizing its

economy, China remains the most viable way the North can increase its economic strength with

a number of investment deals on the Chinese border and the establishment of quasi-special

economic zones. The danger for all involved is where this increased economic strength will be

directed.

China, fearful enough of its own domestic situation as it battles inflation and unrest, will

support North Korea not only prevent a North Korean collapse and subsequent refugee crisis,62

but to also use the North's vulnerability during succession to enhance its own power in the

regime through economic policy. The North is a valuable source of leverage for China in its own

diplomatic repertoire. To lose this would see both a humanitarian crisis unfold in China, adding

stress to the current social harmony, the possibility of U.S. personnel on the Chinese border and

the loss of a valuable diplomatic tool

Six Party Talks

One argument in favour of an upcoming North Korean nuclear or missile test is that it does not

provide the same amount of risk of retaliation as a conventional attack, especially after the

political fallout from South Korea's clumsy response to Yeonpyeong attack. Furthermore, a test

would follow the pattern of escalation then negotiation as momentum builds to the talk's

resumption. Empirically, intelligence has documented the construction of tunnels and launch

facilities either completed or nearing completion, as mentioned in section three.

61

JoonAngIlbo (2011). "China’s no to Kim’s request." from http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2935931. 62

Already, many North Korean refugees live in border towns.

41

Without doubt all other members to the Six Party Talks (China, U.S., Russia, South Korea, Japan)

will have drawn plans for the North's inevitable collapse, these plans however, will have been

updated regularly in light of what most regard as a surprisingly enduring regime. This,

obviously, is testament to the fact that the North's core strategic imperative, regime survival,

has been successful. But what is success for the other nations to the six Party talks?

The six Party talks have six core issues63

Security guarantee - an issue raised by the North since it was labeled as part of the axis

of evil

The construction of light water reactors - under the 1994 Agreed Framework two light-

water reactors would be built in return for the closure of North Korea's graphite-

moderated nuclear power plant program at Yeonpyeong. This agreement broke down

after both sides defaulted, especially since 2002.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy - Under the non-proliferation treaty, civilian nuclear

power is allowed, yet the North has demonstrated that their nuclear program is

militarized.

Diplomatic relations - The North seek the normalization of diplomatic relations with the

U.S. but has been subject to the hot and cold policies of Washington and the condition

that the nuclear program is dismantled first

Financial restrictions / Trade normalization

Verifiable and Irreversible disarmament

Success for the members of the six Party talks must be analyzed geopolitically and in regard to

their own perceptions of threat. For the United States, the denuclearization of the peninsula is

its core concern and if the program is dismantled, and verified to be so, it will be satisfied.

Secondary will be the status of the regime - the U.S. would rather not have to worry about one

of its proxy military bases, Seoul, still feeling under threat by Pyongyang. Descaling the

63

Niksch, L. A. and T*ongil Y*on*guw*on (Korea) (2005). Implementing the Six-Party joint statement and the Korean Peninsula. Seoul, Korea Institute for National Unification.

42

conventional threat on the peninsula also serves U.S interests by lessening the chance of a war

that has the potential to involve China.

Russia, preoccupied with the Northern Caucuses and Eastern Europe would rather the situation

simply be resolved, seeking an increased voice in global affairs and negotiation, evidenced by its

involvement with serving as a lead mediator in the Libyan crisis, Russia would use the Korean

crisis as its own positive PR campaign. Geopolitically, due to Russia's strategic depth, North

Korea is not of core concern.

Japan uses the North as a surrogate threat through which it seeks to maximize its security vis-à-

vis China. Japan, however, is severely limited by its constitution. Recent acquisitions of

amphibious assault vessels, equipped with AEGIS ABM systems has been in response to North

Korean missile capability. Geopolitically Japan is fortunate in being an island, but should war

break out, a watershed moment on the status of its armed forces, the Japanese Self Defense

Force is highly likely given the inertia towards reform, or at least reinterpretation, of its

constitution from the early 1990's.

Success for Seoul is more complex. The collapse of the North would have huge economic and

cultural ramifications for South Korea. The best case scenario is total denuclearization and

conventional de-escalation on the North. Yet the South would also rather deal with a North that

is better off economically.

It is unlikely that any of these scenarios will be reached while Kim Jong il is in power. Succession

will be true test of what the North will look like, how it will behave and what the prospects for a

resolution on the peninsula are.

Assuming that succession is successful, the members of the six Party talks will take the chance

to pressure the new leader to make concessions where his father did not. The North will

anticipate this and equip Jong Un with people who can guide him. These people will represent

43

not only what they perceive to be best for Pyongyang, but also their own parochial interests -

paving the way for the military to influence North Korean policy and maintain the nuclear

program. Failing this, and despite the potential for the North to set new precedents, a third

hereditary succession has never been accomplished (excluding monarchies) and the possibility

of a military coup against the regime, based on the unsuitability of Jong Un to lead the country

remains very real.

44

Conclusion - Enduring Problems

Far from taking the sensationalism of the majority of North Korean analysis at face value, this

paper has sought to inquire into the mechanisms that have characterized North Korean state

behaviour, understand its conception of security and the variables that exist outside of

Pyongyang that have an impact on the policy and strategy pursued by North Korea to ensure

regime security.

The regime is approaching a period of great vulnerability, succession. Meanwhile, considerable

inertia towards the resumption of Six Party Talks has occurred on the back of two of the most

significant conventional attacks North Korea has launched, the sinking of the Cheonan and the

shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Kim Jong il visited China for a week in May 2011 where despite

the rosy rhetoric of a 'blood brotherhood' between the two Cold War allies, other reports

indicate that China is worried about North Korean stability as much as Kim.64

This context has demanded a greater understanding of the domestic and external factors that

serve as inputs to the North's policy as it juggles its nuclear weapons program, conventional

brinkmanship, diplomatic negotiations and competing domestic interests, amid Kim il Sung's

enduring legacy and the military's monopoly of violence.

The first section of this paper illustrated how the military, the Party and the Cabinet must all

partake in Kim Jong il's divide and conquer strategy where he manipulates, rewards, promises,

and threatens all of the former elements to sustain their his own power. It was argued that

despite Kim's overarching authority, a great deal of potential exists for the military to capitalize

on its executive power and advance its increased prominence in the regime at the expense of

the Party and possibly the Kims themselves. These domestic bodies have power is in their

64

ChosunIlbo (2011). "Miffed Kim Jong-il Pares Down Entourage for Meeting with Hu ". from http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/27/2011052701127.html.

45

ability to frame policy issues for the leadership. For the domestic bodies in Pyongyang, survival

is not only about the legacy of the DPRK, it is also personal survival. In a country where the food

crisis is well reported internationally and production is almost at a standstill, being in the elite is

something to hold onto, desperately. As succession approaches, these parochial interests will

be in competition with a new ruler - one, who as his father did before him, will consolidate

power in the traditional North Korean fashion, purges. On the other hand, if Kim Jong un is

unable to consolidate power, a very real threat of internal regime change could occur,

championed by the military in fear that a diplomatic resolution to the crisis on the peninsula

would see their relevance lost, and in turn, their elite place in society.

The second section of this paper assessed the various strategies the North has used to ensure

regime survival and national security, such as military brinkmanship, diplomacy and its nuclear

weapons program. In effect, this section illustrated the manifestation of how the North

formulates policy based on the influence of domestic actors - tying the interests illustrated in

the first section with the outputs of policy through its various executive areas. While Kim Jong il

has maintained his considerable authority over his regime subordinates, the conventional

brinkmanship policy has prevented any military action being made against the North.

Meanwhile, the nuclear program has served as a complement to the diplomatic strategy in a

pattern of escalation, negotiation and stalemate, ultimately buying time. Whether Kim Jong un

will be able to maintain this practice will depend on his ability to keep the interests of each

domestic actor in check.

Internationally, Kim Jong un will be dealing with a security landscape quite different to that

when his father inherited the leadership. The United States and South Korea have maintained

their alliance despite differing conceptions of the North Korean threat. Furthermore, U.S.

foreign policy is beginning to look further east now that its missions in Afghanistan and Iraq are

nearing an end. China's 'rise' is continuing, but its ability to maintain social harmony and

stabilize inflation and other fiscal issues is becoming a primary challenge.

46

Between China's interest in North Korean regime survival, U.S. concern over nuclear weapons

and South Korea's perception of immediate conventional threat, this paper assessed the

external factors that will continue to impact the policy formulation in North Korea. In particular,

what the contemporary issues mean for succession and how these relationships with

Washington, Seoul and Beijing have changed over time.

In effect this paper has deepened the analysis of the regime in two ways. It has assessed the

domestic levels of power beyond the monolithic entity of Kim Jong il and analyzed how the

various stakeholders and strategies in the regime have reacted to the succession issue and the

contemporary security landscape. In doing so, I have argued that the regime is approaching its

weakest point, as the parochial interests of the domestic actors in the regime are incompatible

and the leadership will undergo transition. Kim Jong il has exploited the former by allowing

both the diplomatic option and the nuclear option to survive, enhancing competition between

the military, Party and Cabinet for his favor and in turn his own authority. For Kim Jong un, his

ability to continue this strategy will be tested as the military has enjoyed a significant elevation

within the regime hierarchy, while the KWP, despite their relative executive weakness, must

also support the incoming ruler of the regime. This is the first challenge to regime survival. The

second challenge is the economic stability of the regime. This has been pursued through

strengthening North Korea's relationship with China, but China will be pressured to exercise its

influence on the regime from the international community while it deals with its own very real

problems. Thirdly, the regime faces its overall existential concern where the nuclear weapons

program hinges on its ability to either guarantee regime security through a viable weaponized

platform, or, through the peaceful dismantlement of the program in exchange for security

assurances, diplomatic normalization with the United States and economic aid.

All three tiers of ensuring regime survival have been analyzed in this paper, and despite what is

undoubtedly an otherwise dire situation in the North, the fact remains that the regime has

survived through it. It is difficult to imagine the regime will survive forever, and for the reasons

47

expressed in this paper, its sustainability will depend wholly on how the North negotiates its

domestic and external security issues leading to Kim Jong un's assumption of the leadership.

48

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