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Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace Intaek HAN Associate Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute [email protected]

Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace - …aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/20th/ARF Seminar on CBMs...Jan 25, 2003 · Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace Intaek

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Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace

Intaek HANAssociate Research Fellow, Jeju Peace [email protected]

I. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Cyberspace

II. Cyber Threats

III. National Strategies

IV. International Cooperation

V. Building Blocs for Cyber Peace

I. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Cyberspace

- Expansion of cyberspace

- Growing dependence- Cyber anarchy

- “Next battle space”

- Only India, China, and the Philippines had adoption below 10%- Global 40%, USA 60%

Broadband Adoption: Asia-Pacific

Internet economy as a percentage of 2010 GDP

New Threats by Year

Attacks on transportation system

II. Cyber Threats

- Types & methods

- Trends & distribution

- Characteristics

- South Korean experience

Types

- Cyber war, cyber terror, cyber sabotage, cyber espionage, cyber crime, hacktivism

Methods

- Hacking, malware, DDoS- Chipping, nano machines, electronic jamming, EMP

Trends & Distribution

- Threats are increasing by time & across the board

- More threats originate in Asia-Pacific than in any other region

- Frequency of threats varies by country

- 42% of observed attacks originated in APAC, 35% in Europe, 21% in North/South America, and 1.5% in Africa

Number of Cyber Attacks by Country

Characteristics- Attackers are numerous & anonymous, domestic

& foreign, and state as well as non-state

- Attacks are low-cost, instantaneous, asymmetric, and borderless

- Usually no direct physical damage or casualties

-> Difficult to identify, attribute, detect & retaliate

South Korean Experience

- Chronology of major incidents

January 25, 2003July 7, 2009March 4, 2011April 2011

III. National Strategies

- Defense, offense, deterrence, prevention

- National strategies are expensive and ineffective; they can be also inappropriate

- Obstacles to cyber deterrence

IV. International Cooperation

- Obstacles to International Cooperation

- Determinants of Security DilemmaOffense-Defense BalanceOffense-Defense Distinction

- Security Dilemma in Cyberspace* Additional complication: Non-state actors

V. Building Blocs for Cyber Peace

- Capacity Building

- Confidence Building

- Norm Building

Capacity Building

- Can improve national strategies

- Indirectly mitigates security dilemma if combined with confidence building

- Also a responsibility

Confidence Building- Communication

ex. Hotline- Constraints

ex. No first use, no civilian target, no cross-domain escalation

- Transparencyex. Unilateral declaration or exchange of information

- Verificationex. Inspection

Confidence Building (continued)

- Limitation in cyber space

- Additional complication: Non-state actors

Norm Building

- Rewriting the traditional law of war to apply to cyber conflict

- Traditional law of warApplies to interstate conflict as carried out by uniformed armed forces between two or more states

- New norm must also “fit” with extant norm

Parting Thoughts

- The best defense may still be good old diplomacyTraditional diplomacyCyber public diplomacy

- Can cyber war be a lesser evil than kinetic war?

- Why no al Qaeda-led cyber war yet?

Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace

Intaek HANAssociate Research Fellow, Jeju Peace [email protected]