Upload
joshua-gans
View
217
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
1/27
Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model ofIndustrialisation*
by
JOSHUA S. GANSMelbourne Business School, University of Melbourne
Carlton, Victoria, 3053, Australia E-Mail: [email protected]
First Draft: January 25, 1994This Version: August 30, 1996
This paper presents a model that combines the increasing specialisationand adoption of modern technologies views of industrialisation. Both of theseviews have been used in the recent literature to demonstrate the possibility ofcoordination failure. With simultaneous production across sectors, the modelgenerates the indeterminancy of equilibria common to the recent literature.However, by positing quite natural time lags in production thisindeterminancy is eliminated. It is shown that, in such a framework, even withoptimistic expectations, firms prefer to delay industrialisation in thedevelopment trap. This suggests that policies aimed at transition by usingindicative planning are unlikely to be successful. Journal of Economic
Literature Classification Numbers: O14 & O20.
Keywords: industrialisation, modernisation, specialisation, technologyadoption, complementarities, irreversible investment, indicative planning.
* This paper draws on results from Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation from Stanford University (see Gans,
1994). I wish to thank Kenneth Arrow, Mark Crosby, Paul Milgrom and Scott Stern for helpfuldiscussions and comments. I also thank the Fulbright Commission for financial support. All errors remainmy responsibility.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
2/27
2
I Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that the process of industrialisation involves the
application of progressively modern technologies in production. The concept of
progressively modern is, however, imprecise. Nonetheless, a non-controversial position
would be to view industrialisation as involving the use of production techniques that are
more efficient at the margin. Indeed, one recent strand in the literature posits a direct
linkage between technology adoption and greater marginal efficiency. Production
processes are potentially carried out by two processes: one with no fixed costs and constant
marginal costs and the other with some fixed cost but lower marginal costs than the first
process. Thus, progressively modern technologies involve producers incurring greater
fixed costs in order to improve the marginal efficiency of variable inputs.1
Another strand of the recent literature has considered industrialisation as the use of
greater varieties of intermediate inputs in the production of final goods. Intermediate
inputs are imperfect substitutes for one another. Therefore, the employment of an
additional variety raises the efficiency of final good production at the margin. 2 Sometimes
this mechanism for industrialisation is interpreted as increasing returns due to
specialisation. The metaphor here is that additional varieties of intermediate inputs allow
each variety to perform a smaller range of tasks with greater efficiency.
This strand of the literature shares with the direct approach outlined above a
requirement that a fixed cost must be incurred before efficiency gains can be realised.
Here, the fixed costs are associated with the entry of new varieties into production. On the
other hand, in the direct strand, the fixed costs are associated with the modernisation of
production processes. Without the existence of such fixed costs, final goods producers
would demand a potentially infinite variety of intermediate inputs and would always adopt
the least cost technology. Industrialisation, whether it be from modernisation or entry,
1 This strand is best exemplified by the model of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). An alternative
approach is developed by Baland and Francois (1995).2 The industrialisation as greater product variety view has been analysed by Romer (1987), Rodriguez-Claire (1996), and Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) among others.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
3/27
3
becomes a problem because firms face a trade-off between the action generating greater
efficiency and the fixed costs of adoption or entry.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a unified model of these two concepts of
industrialisation. In so doing, the common element of both strands is maintained, that is,
that the size of the market is a critical ingredient in determining the possibility of
industrialisation. On the technological side, however, producers in the intermediate input
sector will face a multi-dimensional choice. They will face an entry decision of whether to
enter into production or not and a modernisation decision. The modernisation decision will
involve a choice from a menu of technologies rather than a simple binary choice between
some constant returns and increasing returns technology. Therefore, the level of fixed
costs becomes a choice variable of firms. By incurring greater levels of fixed costs, firms
obtain progressively higher levels of labour productivity. As such, an economy is
considered to be more industrialised the greater the level of fixed costs incurred by
intermediate input producers and the more varieties are available for final good production.3
Section II presents a static model. This model generates the multiplicity of
equilibria that is common to static models basing themselves on one aspect of
industrialisation. More significantly, the model demonstrates that the same assumptions on
parameters that allow the possibility of multiplicity for one aspect also generate the
possibility of multiplicity for the other. That is, the same conditions that generate strategic
complementarities between sectors in their entry decisions, ensure that complementarities
exist in their modernisation decisions. This is because each action affects others though the
same aggregate variables.
Section III then presents a dynamic version of the model in a discrete time setting.
In order to ensure that utility remains bounded, I assume some simple time lags in
production. These have the effect of limiting the period by period growth of the state
variable (i.e., the level of industrialisation). This also means that the model exhibits
multiple steady states as opposed to multiple equilibria, with states of persistent
3 In the model to presented here, therefore, the fixed and marginal cost components of the increasing returnstechnology are no longer parameters that determine the range of equilibrium. They are replaced by a meta-parameter describing the rate at which fixed costs are translated into lower marginal costs.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
4/27
4
industrialisation exhibiting increasing growth over time. No rational expectations path
exists from the development trap to a state of persistent industrialisation suggesting that
transition policies based on indicative planning are unlikely to be successful.
II Static Model
The model to be presented here is similar to the model of Gans (1995b) which itself
builds upon that of Ciccone (1993). The latter develops a model of industrialisation in
which the fixed costs of entry and modernisation are in final good units while the former
develops a continuous technological choice space.
Sectoral Structure and Technology
The basic model to be considered here is of a closed economy consisting of two
production sectors -- an upstream and a downstream sector. The downstream (or final
output) sector consists of a continuum of firms producing a homogenous final good
denoted Y. Firms in this sector use a Cobb-Douglas technology, employing both labour,
LY, and a composite of intermediate inputs,X,
Y X LY= > 1 1 0, .
This production function exhibits constant returns to scale.4 In addition, it is assumed that
the downstream sector is competitive with all firms being price takers. I assume the good
they produce is the numeraire.
Households consume final goods not used in production and supply one unit of
labour inelastically for which they receive a competitive wage, w . The total labour
endowment is L .
4 The Cobb-Douglas assumption is not critical here. The results below could also be presented using ageneral constant returns to scale production function with the restrictions discussed by Ciccone andMatsuyama (1996).
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
5/27
5
The intermediate input composite is assembled by final goods producers according
to the following technology,
X x dnn
k
=
1
1
0
, > 1
where xn denotes the amount of intermediate input of variety n that final good producers
employ. The elasticity of substitution between different varieties, , is constrained to be
greater than one implying that no single variety is necessary for production. It is assumed
that each variety, n, is produced by a single monopolist, regardless of their choice of
technology.5 Thus, there is potentially a continuum of such firms lying on the [0, k]
interval of the real line.6 Apart from the usual pricing decisions, potential producers in this
sector face two additional classes of decisions: (i) whether to enter production; and (ii) if
so, at what level of technology. The first class of decisions I term entry, while the second
is termed modernisation. Together these constitute industrialisation. I will deal with the
elements of each of these decisions in turn.
Entry Decisions
Entry into intermediate good production is costly. It is assumed here that a variety
cannot be produced without the firm incurring a unit charge in terms of the final good.7
The level of this charge is independent of both the technological choice and the actual level
of production. Thus, it is a pure sunk cost of entry. As will be apparent below, firms will
find it optimal to enter production if and only if they face non-negative profits upon entry
(given their optimal technological and pricing decisions).
5 The fixed costs associated with entry make this a reasonable assumption as potential entrants find itoptimal to produce a new variety rather than compete with incumbent firms. Strictly speaking, however,these firms are in monopolistic competition with each other as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).6 The model is similar to the set-up of Romer (1987), although it contains some additional generality for he
assumes that = ( )1 1 .7 Many models of industrialisation assume that the fixed costs of industrialisation are in labour units (e.g.,Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; and Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). This
assumption makes it more difficult to generate strategic complementarities. The substantive results of themodel to be presented below could be generated under the labour units assumptions but only at the expenseof additional restrictions of the kind explored by Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996).
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
6/27
6
Technological Choice in the Upstream Sector
Upstream producers are able to choose, to some extent, their technology of
production. After entry, a typical technology has them using labour, ln, and producing
output, xn , according to,
x
l
Fn
n
n
=( )
.
The choice of Fn , itself, is assumed to be endogenous -- it represents a fixed cost (in final
good units) to the firm as well as a technological choice. Higher choices of Fn mean a
lower labour requirement, that is,
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
7/27
7
Since intermediate input producers face demand curves with a constant elasticity, -
, their optimal pricing scheme if they undertake positive production in period tis,
P w F dn wn
k
= ( )
=
1
1
0
1
1
1
11
( ) ,
the standard constant mark-up over marginal costs.
Using the optimal pricing rule, some simple substitutions show that, P w=
1
11
and x F X n n= ( )
1 , where,
= = { }( )[ ] ( ) ,F dn k F nk
n n k
1
0
.
The aggregate, , is a measure of the overall level of industrialisation. It is increasing in
both the variety of intermediate inputs produced and the level of technology chosen by
upstream firms.
Now consider the labour market. To satisfy demand, the labour requirement for an
intermediate input producer is simply, l F Xn n= ( )1 1
. As such, total labour demand
in the upstream sectors is,
L l dn X X n
k
= = 0
11 .
For the final goods sector, note that the Cobb-Douglas production implies that,
LPX
wXY = ( ) = ( )( )
1 11
11
.
It is assumed that the labour market clears in every period. As such, L L LY X= + and,
therefore, X L= ( )
( )11
1 . Finally, it remains to find the wage level each period. This
can be found by looking at the marginal product of labour in the production of final goods
and using the solution forX: w = ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 1
( ) ( ) .
Substituting the relevant aggregate variables into this equation gives a convenient
reduced form for the payoffs of an intermediate input producer entering into production.
To examine the structure of these payoffs, consider upstream profits (of an entrant) when
wages are held constant,
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
8/27
8
n n n n n n np w F x F F wL F = ( ) = ( )
( ) ( )1 11 1 .
The effect of rising industrialisation in this case is to depress profits and the marginal return
to modernisation. This is because increased entry and modernisation by others provides
more competition for any given upstream firm, reducing their total revenue. However,
when wages are varied profits become,
n n nL F F =
( )
( )1
1
1 1.
where = ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 11
. The flows of income and goods leading to this
equation are depicted in Figure One. The wage effectexerts a positive feedback on both
entry and industrialisation decisions -- they reflect higher demand for final goods and
greater efficiency in its production, raising demand for intermediate inputs. If the so-called
increasing returns due to specialisation (( ) 1 1) outweigh the decreasing returns to
additional use of the intermediate input composite (), the game between intermediate input
producers exhibits strategic complementarities (with the wage effect outweighing the
competition effect). The greater the level of industrialisation, the greater the marginal return
to both entry and modernisation. Therefore, for the rest of this paper it is assumed that
1 .
To emphasise, the pathways through which entry and modernisation decisions
affect industrialisation and, in turn, how industrialisation effects those decisions are
essentially the same. Both entry and modernisation decisions reduce the revenues of others
through the competition effect and raise them through the wage effect. Moreover,
industrialisation impacts upon these decisions through a single variable in the profit
function -- raising the gross profits (and marginal profits) net of modernisation and entry
costs. Thus, it impacts upon these decisions in a very similar manner.12 Both aspects of
industrialisation, therefore, have the same economic interpretation.
12 Slight differences do occur because the entry decision depends on gross profits, while the modernisationdecision depends on marginal profits. Their qualitative aspects are, however, the same.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
9/27
9
Equilibria
In order to simplify the exposition of what follows, I will adopt the following
functional form for ( )Fn ,
( ) ( ) ,F Fn n= + >1 0 .
This functional form captures the notion that greater sunk costs reduce the marginal labour
requirement and also imposes diminishing returns to this process. To ensure is concave
in Fn , it is assumed that < 1 1 .
Since the reduced form profit function already takes into account labour and good
market clearing, only equilibria in the game between intermediate input producers need be
considered. Suppose that m k upstream firms are active. Let
B Fn F n nn( ) argmax ( ; ) be the best response set for their modernisation decisions.13
The pair ( ,{ } )m Fn n m constitutes apure strategy Nash equilibrium if:
(i) ( )F Bn n for all n m ;
(ii) ( ) ( ) = + F dnnm
1 10
;
(iii) max ( , ) ,F n nn
F n m < >0 .
Thus, in equilibrium, all firms choose the technology that maximises profits and these
decisions generate a consistent level of industrialisation. In addition, in equilibrium, if they
choose to enter, non-active firms earn negative profits.
The following proposition summarises the possible equilibria arising in this model.
Proposition 1 (Static Equilibria). Suppose that the initial level ofindustrialisation is 0. The following characterise, completely, the set of pure
strategy Nash equilibria:(i) If L <
1
0
1
1
( )
, then for all parameters, there exists a development trap
with no further entry (or modernisation) by intermediate input producers;
(ii) If 111
11
11
( )
( ) ( )
> k L k and L <
11 0
11
( )
( )
, there exists an entry
equilibrium with no modernisation (i.e., k firms enter into production butFn = 0 for all n);
(iii) If L k > 1
1
1
1
( )
( )
and1 > , there exists an industrialisation equilibrium
(i.e., k firms enter into production and Fn > 0 for all n).
13 This involves an implicit assumption that firms producing low ordered varieties will enter first in anyequilibrium. This is a reasonable assumption given the symmetry among upstream producers producingmodern varieties and the fact that basic input producers do not face an entry charge.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
10/27
10
PROOF: Note first that the strategic complementarities and symmetry in payofffunctions ensure that any equilibrium is symmetric. Second, observe that anyupstream firm who enters into production chooses their technology according to thefollowing best response function,
F Ln*
max , ( )
( ) ( )
= ( )
0 1 1
1
1
11 1
.
Note that this is not positive under the condition for case (i). Moreover, under thatcondition, n( ; )0 00 < for all n. This remains true so long as no upstream firmchooses to enter or modernise further. Thus, = 0 is an equilibrium.
Now suppose that all k upstream firms entered but none invests in a moremodern technology than their initial level. In this case, = kand individual profitsare:
n k Lk( ; )( )
0 11
1=
This is positive so long as,
L k>
11
1
( )
.Observe, however, that
F L kn*
( )
( )
= 0 11
1
1
.
For there to exist a range ofL such that these two inequalities hold requires that:
11
1 11
1
1
1
1
( )
( ) ( )
> > k L k .
Finally, suppose all producers of modern varieties enter and adopt some
positive level of modernisation, i.e., F> 0. Then = + k F( ) ( )1 1 where,
( )( )
F Lk= ( )
1 11
1
11
.This is positive by the conditions of the proposition.
Several remarks on this proposition are in order. First, the presence of the entry cost
makes a development trap generic to the model. If the labour endowment is large enough
or ifk is large enough, there exist multiple equilibria in this model. Both the entry and
industrialisation equilibria Pareto dominate the development trap since positive output (and
hence, consumption) occurs in these cases. The additional condition for the existence of an
industrialisation equilibrium (that 1 > ) is a sufficient condition for global concavity of
aggregate consumption in the level of modernisation. As such, it does not appear to be
excessively restrictive here. Note too that (along with the condition for strategic
complementarity) this condition implies that firm profit functions are concave in technology
choice.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
11/27
11
III A Dynamic Model of Industrialisation
The above model shares with other static models of the big push the idea that
temporary government intervention can potentially facilitate a change from the development
trap to persistent industrialisation. It also shares with those models the possibility that
generating optimistic expectations or some form of indicative planning could achieve this
task without the need for direct government intervention.
As has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Krugman, 1991), in order to properly analyse
this latter possibility one needs to move from a static model to consider dynamics
explicitly.14
Taken literally, the economy could easily move back and forth between the two[equilibria]. The problem is that, in a completely static framework, one cannot capturethe difficulty of the transition in the process of industrialization, which may beresponsible for stagnation. In order to understand the self-perpetuating nature ofunderdevelopment and the inability of the private enterprise system to break away fromthe circularity, it is necessary to model explicitly the difficulty of coordination.(Matsuyama, 1992a, p.348)
Matsuyama extends the Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) model to a dynamic setting.
In his model, firms face adjustment costs in adopting the modern technology or switching
back to the traditional one. As such, they need to anticipate not only the current movements
of others but their future movements as well. In this set-up, Matsuyama finds that
indicative planning will not be sufficient to generate an escape from a development trap if
adjustment costs are large or the discount rate is high.
Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) also offer an explicitly dynamic model of the big
push.15 Their model has the same structure as the static model above although they do not
consider a modernisation choice and entry costs are in labour (rather than final good) units.
The only other significant difference between their model and the one in the previous
section is that:
X t x t dnn( ) ( )=
1
1
0
, >1.
14 The former possibility is discussed in Gans (1995a).15 Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also offer a simple dynamic model of industrialisation. It is ,however, only a two period model whereas the alternatives here and elsewhere have a long time horizon.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
12/27
12
There is potentially an infinite number of entrants in any period t. Using this framework
they analyse several models in a continuous time setting. They provide several examples of
models that exhibit multiple dynamic equilibria and thus, allow the possibility of indicative
planning. In those models, however, growth in the industrialisation equilibrium involves
constant per capita consumption. They do present one model with rising per capita
consumption and multiple steady states without the possibility of indicative planning.
However, that involves constant growth in the industrialisation steady state. Allowing the
possibility of increasing growth may be more consistent with the empirical reality of
industrialisation (see Romer, 1986).
In this section, I wish to consider an alternative approach to dynamics using the
model of section II. In so doing, I will use the form ofX(t) above but, for reasons that will
soon become apparent, use a discrete rather than continuous time setting.16 Households
and firms in this model solve intertemporal maximisation problems. For upstream firms,
incurring entry costs in period tallows them to start production in period t and successive
periods. Their technological choices involve sunk costs as well, although these can be
spread over time. By accumulating quantities of the final good over time, upstream
producers can increase their labour productivity. Thus, suppose that, at time t, the
cumulative amount of the final good purchased by firm n is,
F t f sn ns
t
( ) ( ),==
0
where f sn( ) is the amount of the final good purchased in period s. Then in t, and in
subsequent periods, the firm is able to produce x tn( ) without additional investment
according to: l t F t x t n n n( ) ( ( )) ( )= . Thus, by incurring sunk costs, intermediate input
producers require only ( )Fn units of labour to produce a unit of intermediate input in
subsequent periods. To make the choice space of upstream firms continuous, I suppose
that their choice off tn( ) is endogenous in each period and can take any positive real value.
16 All dynamic recent models of industrialisation and endogenous growth that I am aware of use acontinuous time setting.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
13/27
13
As before, higher accumulations of F tn( ) mean a lower labour requirement, that is,
0 is the subjective discount
rate and r(t) is the interest rate. The solution to this optimisation problem is characterised
by the familiar Euler condition and the binding budget constraint:
+
=+ +
+U C t
U C t
r t( ( ))
( ( ))
( )
1
1 1
1 for all t,
11
1
0+=
( ) ( ) = r tt
t
C t Lw t v( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
That is, to justify any rising growth in consumption, the interest rate must rise over time.
As discussed in depth by Romer (1986), a problem arises in contexts such as these:
with net profits increasing in the level of industrialisation, ( )t , utility could become
unbounded. Indeed, in this framework, from any positive level of industrialisation, all
intermediate input producers choose to enter and modernise in a single period, leading to
nonsensical infinite production. To avoid this difficulty, here I exploit the structure of the
positive and negative feedbacks in the model in section II by introducing time lags into
production.
For final good production, it is now assumed that:
Y t X t L t Y( ) ( ) ( )+ =1 1 .
17 Some depreciation could be included in this specification, although it would not alter the results to comein any substantive manner.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
14/27
14
That is, production of final goods takes one period. This is the reason why I have used a
discrete time setting. Allowing for this possibility means that the positive feedback (i.e.,
wage effect) from industrialisation will be delayed one period. As will be shown, this leads
to a mixture of substitution and complementarity in cash flows that results in smoothed
industrialisation across time.
Appendix A derives the relevant aggregate variables as a period-bu-period general
equilibrium of the model. Substituting these into the cash flow equation gives a convenient
reduced form for the cash flow of an intermediate input producer producing a positive
output in period t,
n n nt L F t t t f t ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )= 1 11 1 .
where is as before. Observe that if 1 , then, from a system-wide point of view,
there exists a positive feedbackbetween the past technological choices of intermediate
input producers and the firms current choice. To see this more clearly, suppose that there
is no further increase in overall industrialisation in period t. Then the mixed partial
derivative of the profit function with respect to f tn ( ) and ( )t 1 is nonnegative if and only
if ( ) ( )t t1 1 1
is nondecreasing in ( )t 1 for all f tn( ) . Observe that holding the
current increment to industrialisation, ( ) ( ) ( )t t t 1 , constant, this is equivalent
to,
+
( )
( )
( ) ( )t
t
t t1
1
10
1
,
which is true if and only if 1 . Then, ceteris paribus, the greater the past level of
industrialisation, the greater is the marginal return to both entry and modernisation.
It is worth noting, however, that the firms current technological choice is a
strategic substitute with the current choices of other intermediate input producers. So while
a greater level of past industrialisation raises the marginal returns to entry and technological
decisions today, greater current industrialisation dampens those incentives. The former
(complementary) effect emerges because greater past industrialisation pushes up current
wages which in turn raises demand for intermediate inputs through higher aggregate
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
15/27
15
demand. On the other hand, the latter (substitution) effect occurs because of the reduction
in current intermediate input prices caused by lower marginal costs of production and the
competition of entrants.
Equilibrium Defined
Given the dynamic context, the definition of what constitutes an equilibrium in the
game between intermediate input producers needs to be restated. Let
B fn t t f rt
n ntn t, ( ) ( )
( ), ( ) argmax ( ); ( ), ( ) { }( ) ( ) ( ) { } +
1 111
be the best response set for an active firm n k t
( ). A strategy pair, ( ( ),{ ( )} )
( )k t f
n n k t t
{ }
constitutes apure strategy Nash equilibrium if, for all t:
(i) { ( )} { ( ), ( )},f Bn t n t t ( )1 for all active n;
(ii) ( ) ( )( )( )
= +( )=
t f dnnstk t
10
1
0;
(iii) max ( ) , ( )( ) ( )f r
t
ntn tn k t
{ } +
( ) < > 11 1 ;
(iv) r(t) satisfies the household Euler condition.
Thus, in equilibrium, all firms choose the technology that maximises discounted cash flows
and these decisions generate a consistent level of industrialisation. In addition, in
equilibrium, if they chose to enter, non-active firms would earn negative profits. Finally,
the rate of interest satisfies the intertemporal optimisation condition for households.
Linear Utility
As will be discussed further below, the time structure of production makes the
specification of industrialising equilibria very difficult. However, one can show that
persistent industrialisation is possible.18 In order to make clear the forces driving this
result, I will start with the case of linear utility (i.e., U(C(t)) = C(t) for all t) and generalise
this in Proposition 2 below. In this simple case, the interest rate, r, is constant and equal
to the subjective discount rate, .
18 This result is related to the Momentum Theorem, initially stated in Milgrom, Qian and Roberts (1991)for contracting problems, and extended in Gans (1994, Chapter 3) to game theoretic contexts.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
16/27
16
Proposition 2 (Persistent Industrialisation). Let utility be linear. Suppose that
at some time t, > ( ) *t , where = ( )+
* 11
1
L . Then
+ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ... t 1 for> t.
PROOF: Suppose that in period t, > ( ) *t . Entry and technological choices areconsidered in turn. First, given the shock in period t, new varieties enter in periodt+1 until the difference in discounted cash flows from entering in t+1 as opposed tot+2 fall to zero for all firms. Without loss of generality, assume that entering firms
do not adopt more modern technologies, as would be case for ( )t close to * . Letk t k t k t ( ) ( ) ( )+ = + 1 1 . For an upstream firm, the difference in discounted sumof cash flows between entering t+1 as opposed to t+2 is,
L t t k t + + +( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
1 1 11
.
Setting this equal to zero gives a unique solution:
k t t L t ( ) ( ) ( )( )+ = +
11 1
1
.
k t( )+1 is positive since > ( ) *t . This, in turn, implies that + > ( ) ( )t t1 ,meaning that k t( )+ >2 0 since the right hand side of the equation is increasing in( )t . Note too that the finiteness of k t( )+ 1 puts a bound on period by periodutility. A similar reasoning applies to the technological decisions. The proof thenfollows by induction.
This proposition says that once industrialisation reaches a critical level, the process will
persist and continue of its own accord. Note too that, under persistent industrialisation, the
state variable of industrialisation evolves according to,
= + ( ) ( )( )t L t 1 1 1
,
a unique path. Thus, in the spirit of big push theories of industrialisation, the economy
can be stuck in a development trap from which an escape could be made provided sufficient
coordination of the decisions of intermediate input producers is achieved.
General Utility Functions
With more general utility functions, the result here becomes more complicated as the
interest rate, r(t), changes over time. Suppose that in period t, > ( ) *t , and k t( )+ 1
firms choose to enter in t+1 with firms modernising to a level, f. In this case, the relevant
Euler condition for intermediate input producers becomes (with + + ( ) ( ) ( )t t t1 1 ),
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
17/27
17
g t t L f t t t r t
r t( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) + + + =+ ++ 1 1 1 0
1 1
1
1 1 1
.
When utility is linear, the g(.) (i) is positive at + =( )t 1 0 since > ( ) *t ; (ii) becomes
negative as +( )t 1 grows large; (iii) is strictly decreasing in +( )t 1 ; and (iv) is strictly
increasing in ( )t , once again, since > ( ) *t . The first three properties guarantee that
+( )t 1 is positive and finite (as depicted in Figure 2(a)), while the last guarantees that
+ > +( ) ( )t t2 1 and that industrialisation is increasing over time.
These four properties are potentially violated when utility takes a more general form
and the interest rate varies over time. Observe that the interest rate depends both on
+( )t 1 and ( )t . From the household Euler condition,
1 1 11
1
1
1
+ + = + ( )
+ ( )
r t
U L t k t
U L t k t F ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
.
With strictly concave utility, one can see that r(t+1) is decreasing in +( )t 1 and
increasing in ( )t . This means that any of the above properties could be violated.
Therefore, we need additional conditions to assure that any solution, +( )t 1 , to the
general firm Euler condition is positive, finite and increasing in ( )t . Let ={ }* ( ) ( , ( ))t g t0 0 . The sufficient conditions are:
(i) Marginal utility is bounded from below, lim ( ( ))( )C t
U C t
= < 0
;
(ii) There exists no + >( )t 1 0 with the property that g t t t ( ( ), ( )) , ( ) * + > < 1 0 ;
(iii) g t t( ( ), ( )) + 1 ( g t( , ( ))0 ) is non-decreasing (increasing) in ( )t , for all +( )t 1
and > ( ) *t .
Of these conditions, only (ii) appears to differ significantly from the properties listed for the
linear case. It does not require that g be nonincreasing in +( )t 1 , although this is
sufficient for (ii) to hold. All that is required is that the highest value of g occurs at
+ =( )t 1 0 when < ( ) *t .19 This guarantees that entry and modernisation can only
possibly occur if past industrialisation reaches a critical value. Figures 2(b) and 2(c), give
19 It is not sufficient for this condition to hold only for = ( ) *t .
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
18/27
18
two examples of g satisfying these conditions. Note that in each + >( )t 1 0 and
+ +( ) ( )t t2 1 guaranteeing the conclusion of Proposition 2.
Assuming conditions (i) to (iii) it becomes possible to generalise Proposition 2 to
more general utility functions.
Proposition 2 (Persistent Industrialisation). Assume the conditions (i) to (iii)
hold and suppose that at some time t, > ( ) *t , where ={ }* ( ) ( , ( ))t g t0 0 . Then + ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ... t 1 for> t.
PROOF: First, observe that (i) guarantees that as + ( )t 1 ,g t t( ( ), ( )) + 1 . This along with (iv), the continuity of U(.) and the fact that > ( ) *t ensures there exists at least one solution to g t t( ( ), ( )) + =1 0, with + >( )t 1 0 , by Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994).20 This, in turn,
implies that + > ( ) ( )t t1 , meaning that + +( ) ( )t t2 1 since the right handside of the equation is non-decreasing in ( )t . Note too that (i) guarantees thefiniteness of +( )t 1 and hence, puts a bound on period by period utility. Theproof then follows by induction.
It is worth emphasising here that these propositions guarantee that only + ( ) ( )t t1 and
hence, C t C t ( ) ( )+ 1 is increasing over time. They do not guarantee that the growth rate
in consumption is rising (in contrast to endogenous growth theory -- Romer, 1986),
although that is possible. In Appendix B it is shown that, by dropping condition (iii) and
replacing it with an alternative bound on g t( , ( ))0 , the growth rate in consumption is
bounded away from zero, for all time after > ( ) *t . Thus, in contrast to neoclassical
growth theory, positive per capita growth persists over time. Proposition 2 also ensures
that industrialisation ensues so long as industrialisation exceeds a critical value. This
property has an interesting implication (as will be shown below). It also holds for all utility
functions with a sufficiently high intertemporal elasticity of substitution.21 Nonetheless, it
is shown in the appendix that without (ii), if it is ever the case that growth become positive
(not just at a critical level of industrialisation), then positive growth would persist
thereafter.
20 That theorem shows that the result here would also hold for some relaxation of the continuity andconcavity assumptions on U(.), so long as the solution to the households problem was an interior one.
21 The easiest way to see this is to examine utility of the form, U C t C t ( ( )) ( ) ,=
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
19/27
19
The Impossibility of Indicative Planning
The model under conditions (i) to (iii) has a very interesting implication. As a
model ofdynamic coordination failure this one differs from analogous static models (like
that of section II) in that optimistic expectations would not generate an escape from the
development trap. In many models of coordination failure, there exist rational expectations
paths from the development trap to industrialisation. Here, however, there exists no
rational expectations or perfect foresight paths from non-industrialisation to
industrialisation.
To see this, suppose that, the economy is at some low level of economic activity,
k0 < *. Also, for this demonstration, suppose that utility is linear (this will not be
necessary for Proposition 3 below). Now suppose that, beginning in the development trap,
all potential intermediate input producers expect k k 0 others to enter and adopt some
modern technology in the current period. Let the expected level of technology be some
constant,f> 0, and the new number of intermediate input producers be high enough such
that the resulting expected level of industrialisation would make these decisions profitable
when considered overtime (i.e., k f( )( ) *
+ >
11
). The question must be asked: is it
profitable for a given modern input producer to enter and modernise their technology this
period? A producer could, after all, wait one period before taking either of these actions.
To consider the optimal decision, all that is relevant are the cash flows of firms in the
current and next period. The two period cash flow from entering and modernising today is,
L f k k k f k
L f k k f k f
n
n n
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
+ + +( )
+( ) + + +( )
+
+
1 1
1 1 1
1
0 0
1
0
1
11
1 0 1 0
1
1
1
.
And the two period cash flow from waiting until tomorrow to enter and modernise is,
11
1
0
1
01
11 1 1
11
+
+( ) + + +( ) ( ) ++
L f k k f k f n n( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .
Thus, there is a trade-off between the earnings from production and higher productivity
today and deferring the sunk costs of entry and modernisation. An intermediate input
producer will choose to wait rather than produce if the following inequality is satisfied,
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
20/27
20
1
1
0 0
1
0
1
1 1 11+ ( ) + + + +( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )f L f k k k f k n n .
When fn = 0, this inequality holds, strictly, by the condition for the development trap ( i.e.,
that k0 < *). Moreover, it is easy to show that, from low levels of industrialisation, the
left hand side increases with fn faster than the right hand side. This means that it is always
optimal to wait.
This argument leads to the following proposition for general utility functions.
Proposition 3. Assume conditions (i) to (iii) hold. Given any initial level of
industrialisation, ( )0 , if < ( ) *0 then the economy is in a development trap for allt. Otherwise, it is in a state of persistent industrialisation.
The optimality of waiting means that no rational expectations/perfect foresight path exists
from the development trap to persistent industrialisation. The reason for this is that if it is
always optimal for one intermediate input producer to wait, by symmetry, it is optimal for
all firms to do so.22 As a consequence no industrialisation occurs and hence, any
expectations to the contrary would not be fulfilled. Observe that this result holds for any
positive discount rate. Thus, the non-industrialisation equilibrium is absorbing in the sense
of Matsuyama (1991, 1992a).23 Note, however, this fact is a direct result of the assumed
time lag in production of the final good. This assumption makes modernisation and entry
today strategic substitutes with similar decisions on the part of other producers. It is also
important to note that there does not exist a rational expectations path from industrialisation
to the development trap. This latter feature is a direct consequences of the irreversibility of
entry and technology adoption.
When a development trap is purely the result of coordination failure, it is often
argued that the role for the government is to coordinate the expectations of individual
agents, making them consistent with those for persistent industrialisation. This is also the
stated goal of indicative planning. If possible, such a policy would be costless (save,
22 This result is similar in flavour to the example of Rauch (1993) although in a very different context tothe one presented here.
23 Matsuyama (1991) states that one state is accessible from another if there exists a rationalexpectations/perfect foresight equilibrium path from one that state that reaches or converges to the other. Astate is absorbing if, within a neighbourhood of it, no other state is accessible.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
21/27
21
perhaps, the costs of communication), and firms would modernise on the basis of
optimistic expectations.
The above proposition shows that this solution will not work. This is essentially
because the problem, while one of a failure to coordinate investment, is not one of a failure
to coordinate expectations. If a government were to announce that firms should modernise
to a certain degree, even if this were believed perfectly by firms, each individual firm
would still have an incentive to wait one period before modernising. And, in that case, the
optimistic expectations created by the government would not be realised and the policy
would be ineffective.
Irreversibility and the time lag of production mean that history rather than
expectations matter for the selection of persistent industrialisation as opposed to a
development trap.24 The previous level of industrialisation determines whether the
economy will continue to industrialise in the future. However, it does not specify the
precise path this could take and there could be a multiplicity of steady states involving
persistent industrialisation. The selection of these could depend on expectations. This is
why it is difficult to characterise the industrialising paths of the economy. It is also difficult
to characterise the optimality, or otherwise, of industrialisation. Industrialisation clearly
involves foregone consumption in its initial periods. Therefore, to examine welfare issues
would involve some specification of household preferences. This issue is beyond the
scope of the current paper.
In summary, the above model exhibits, in a certain sense, both the development
traps and persistent industrialisation that are the hallmark of the big push theories of
industrialisation. It is important to note, however, that the distinction between this model
and other models of coordination failure lies solely in the assumption of a time lag to
production.25 With linear utility, this makes the steady state completely determinant. It is
worth noting therefore, that for a small open economy with perfect international capital
mobility and non-tradable intermediate inputs,26 that even with general utility functions the
24 See Krugman (1991a) for an extensive discussion of this point.25 It also relies to some extent on condition (ii) as is demonstrated in the appendix.26 As in Rodriguez-Claire (1996).
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
22/27
22
interest rate will not depend on the state of industrialisation. In this case, the uniqueness
results of the linear utility case will hold.
VII Conclusion
This paper has done two things. First, a model that combines both the
modernisation and specialisation views of industrialisation has been constructed. In so
doing, it was shown that the qualitative characteristics and hence, conclusions of the both
views were essentially the same. Thus, both viewpoints are complementary.
Second, this model was put into an explicit dynamic framework. In order to prove
the existence of a dynamic equilibrium, time lags into final good production were
introduced. This change meant that the wage effect from industrialisation was delayed
relative to competition effect. Firms would then have an incentive to industrialise over time
rather than in a single period. This eliminated the possibility of unbounded utility as
discussed in Romer (1986). This change also implied that policies for industrialisation
based on indicative planning or optimistic expectations were unlikely to be successful.
Even if firms were optimistic about future industrialisation they would have an incentive to
delay their own decisions. Since this applied to all firms, optimistic expectations would not
be realised.
It is worth emphasising here that the proof of existence of a dynamic equilibrium
and its characterisation is distinct from those usually undertaken in the growth literature. In
the recent literature on industrialisation or new growth theory, persistent growth
conclusions are found by assuming a specific functional form for utility functions, and
solving for balanced growth paths of interest rates and other state variables. Then it is
shown how these imply that positive growth will persist over time. In contrast, here I used
the monotone methods of Milgrom and Roberts (1994), to show that momentum, once
begun, will persist over time. This allowed a characterisation of dynamic paths as
involving persistent growth without looking for balanced growth paths or imposing specific
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
23/27
23
functional form assumptions on utility. This approach allowed a clearer understanding of
the assumptions that allowed for persistent growth over time. A direction for future
research would be to use this approach directly on endogenous growth models (e.g.,
Romer, 1990) and examine the criticality of function form assumptions.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
24/27
24
Appendix A
In this appendix, I derive n(t). Under these assumptions of Section III,
x t X t P t
p tn
n
( ) ( )( )
( )=
P t p t x t dn x t dn p t dnx t n n
k t
n
k t
n
k t
n nk t( ) min ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ ( )}
( ) ( ) ( )
( )= =
=
=
0
1
0 0
1
0
1
1
1
,
where here it is supposed that only a subset [0,k(t)] of firms choose to produce in period t.
Using the optimal pricing rule, some simple substitutions show that, P t w t t ( ) ( ) ( )
=
1
11
and x t F t X t t n n( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )=
1
, where now,
= = { }( )[ ] ( ) ( ( )) ( ), ( )( )
( )t F t dn k t F t n
k t
n n k t 1
0
.
The aggregate, ( )t , is therefore a measure of the overall level of industrialisation in period
t.
Now consider the labour market. As before,
l t F t X t t n n( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )= 1 1
and L t l t dn X t t X n
k t
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
= = 0
11 .
For the final goods sector, since production is lagged one period, producers choose
intermediate inputs and labour to maximise:
11 1 1+ +( ) + r t YY t w t L t P t X t ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
The Cobb-Douglas assumption means that the interest rate drops out with,
L tP t X t
w tX t t Y( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )= ( ) = ( )( ) 1 1 1
11
.
with period by period labour market clearing implying,
X t L t ( ) ( )( )= ( ) 11
1 .
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
25/27
25
Finally, it remains to find the wage level each period. Observe, first, that in each
period the cash flow of an upstream firm is,
n n nt w t F L t f t ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= ( )
1 1 .
Inserting this into the national income identity,
Y t F t k t k t w t L t k t k t ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) = + 1 1
where
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
t w t L t F dn f t dnn
k t
n
k t
= ( ) 1 1
0 0
and Y t L t ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 11 1 1 1
.
Therefore,
w tY t
Lt( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )= ( ) = ( ) ( )
1 11 1 1 1 .
Wages reflect the previous technological choices of intermediate input producers only
because of the time lag in final good production. Substituting w(t) into the above yields the
relevant equation.
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
26/27
26
Appendix B
The first result here will show what conditions on g(.) guarantee persistent positive
growth as opposed to rising increments to consumption over time (as proved in Proposition
2). For this purpose, condition (iii) can be dropped as g need not increase over time, but it
needs to be replaced with (iv) below to ensure that it remains positive as the level of
industrialisation rises.
(iv) For all > ( ) *t ,
g t L t t U L t
U LL t k t
( , ( )) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
0 011
1
1
1
11 =
>+
+
;
Figure 3(a) provides an example of what happens under these new conditions
demonstrating graphically the following result.
Corollary 1 (Persistent Positive Growth). Assume conditions (i), (ii) and (iv)
hold and suppose that at some time t, > ( ) *t , where = ( )+
* L 11
1
. Then
< + t.
PROOF: (i) and (iv) ensure that + >( )t 1 0 for all t, by the intermediate valuetheorem. Hence + > ( ) ( )t t1 for all t. Note too that the finiteness of +( )t 1puts a bound on period by period utility. The proof then follows by induction.
A version of Proposition 3 can be proved for this case.
Turning to examine the role of condition (ii), if is removed one can prove the
following corollary.
Corollary 2 (No Guaranteed Development Trap). Assume that only (i) and (iii)hold and suppose that at some time t, ( )t is such that g t t ( ( ), ( )) + >1 0 for some
+ >( )t 1 0 . Then + ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ... t 1 for> t.PROOF: (i) and the condition of the corollary ensure that +( )t 1 is positive andfinite by the intermediate value theorem. Hence + > ( ) ( )t t1 . By (iii) andTheorem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994), this implies that + > +( ) ( )t t2 1 .The proof then follows by induction.
Figure 3(b) demonstrates this possibility. What Corollary 2 says is that if it is ever the case
that industrialisation rose to a high enough level (perhaps due to a temporary shock), then
persistent industrialisation will persist thereafter. It differs from Proposition 2, in that it
does not rule out the possibility that a path to persistent industrialisation could exist from
8/14/2019 Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model Of
27/27
27
the development trap equilibrium. In this case, Proposition 3 would not hold and indicative
planning could succeed.
Finally, a similar version of Corollary 1 holding for persistent positive growth can
be proved using the following condition.
(iv) If there exists some * such that g( , )*0 0 > , then g t( , ( ))0 0 > , for all > ( ) *t .
Corollary 3 (No Guaranteed Development Trap/Persistent Positive Growth).Assume that only (ii) and (iv) hold and suppose that at some time t, ( )t is such thatg t( , ( ))0 0 > .. Then, < + t.
PROOF: (ii) and (iv) ensure that + >( )t 1 0 for all t, by the intermediate valuetheorem. Hence + > ( ) ( )t t1 for all t. Note too that the finiteness of +( )t 1puts a bound on period by period utility. The proof then follows by induction.